This thesis seeks to explain Argentina’s repeated currency crises, including the need to return time and again to the IMF for a stabilization package, using the domestic contestation of the populist left and military right. This thesis argues that Argentina’s domestic politics have contributed to the recurrence of currency crisis, filling a gap in several distinct academic discussions by giving an exhaustive account of how each period of currency crisis in Argentina was rooted in and was exacerbated by the policy choices of domestic political actors. In particular, thesis argues that the nature of Argentine politics has meant that there is no domestic champion for the kind of economic stabilization packages prescribed by the IMF, and, simultaneously, there is an enduring public pressure to enact leftist policies devoid of sustainable macroeconomic rationale. Unlike other countries such as Chile (where there has been political space for pro-stabilization parties to emerge), Argentina’s political landscape is structured in a way that has consistently undercut the health of the peso. I offer a two-part theory of “unique political pathways”. First, I argue that in Argentina the following four characteristics have combined to push the country toward currency-destabilizing policies: (a) the spectrum of popular parties; (b) party allegiance of the military; (c) the presence of powerful unions; and (d) the specific priority of the far right. Second, I map the manner (or “pathways”) by which this unusual political landscape manifests in currency crisis, highlighting the domestic political roots of Argentina’s IMF dependence.