Departmental Papers (CIS)

Date of this Version

November 2006

Document Type

Conference Paper

Comments

Postprint version. Copyright ACM 2006. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security FMSE '06, November 2006, pages 1-12.
Publisher URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1180337.1180338

Abstract

Home medical devices enable individuals to monitor some of their own health information without the need for visits by nurses or trips to medical facilities. This enables more continuous information to be provided at lower cost and will lead to better healthcare outcomes. The technology depends on network communication of sensitive health data. Requirements for reliability and ease-of-use provide challenges for securing these communications. In this paper we look at protocols for the drop-box architecture, an approach to assisted living that relies on a partially-trusted Assisted Living Service Provider (ALSP). We sketch the requirements and architecture for assisted living based on this architecture and describe its communication protocols. In particular, we give a detailed description of its report and alarm transmission protocols and give an automated proof of correspondence theorems for them. Our formulation shows how to characterize the partial trust vested in the ALSP and use the existing tools to verify this partial trust.

Keywords

assisted living, formal methods, formal verification, home health monitoring, security protocol verification

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Date Posted: 31 January 2007

This document has been peer reviewed.