Departmental Papers (CIS)

Document Type

Conference Paper

Date of this Version

June 2001

Comments

Copyright 2001 IEEE. Reprinted from Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop 2001, pages 256-259.

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Abstract

The theory of relational parametricity and its logical relations proof technique are powerful tools for reasoning about information hiding in the polymorphic λ-calculus. We investigate the application of these tools in the security domain by defining a cryptographic λ-calculus -- an extension of the standard simply typed λ-calculus with primitives for encryption, decryption, and key generation -- and introducing logical relations for this calculus that can be used to prove behavioral equivalences between programs that rely on encryption.

We illustrate the framework by encoding some simple security protocols, including the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol. We give a natural account of the well-known attack on the original protocol and a straightforward proof that the improved variant of the protocol is secure.

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Date Posted: 10 September 2005