The Christian Socialists of Austria as a Parliamentary Party

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THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS OF AUSTRIA AS A
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY

by

Edwin L. Dunbaugh

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in
HISTORY

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[Signatures]

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PREFACE

During the present century many attempts by the peoples of Central Europe to establish democracies have ended in tragic failure. One of the more durable governments has been the republic of Austria. Among the many factors contributing to its success is the existence there of a well established two party system. Both of the parties of modern Austria, the Austrian Peoples' Party and the Social Democratic Party, are deeply rooted in the history of the Austrian people. Both had their origin and their early development in the parliamentary system of the Hapsburg monarchy. This paper is a study of the Christian Socialist Party, fore-runner of the present Austrian Peoples' Party, during the years of its evolution as a parliamentary party from its founding in 1887 to the end of the monarchy in 1918. Special emphasis is given to the years from 1907 to 1911 when the Christian Socialists were the majority party in the Austrian house of deputies.

During its early years the Christian Socialist Party functioned primarily in the municipal government of Vienna. This study does not attempt to follow the party's role in the city except as it specifically affects the development of the Christian Socialists as a parliamentary party. The history of the party in Vienna has already been very thoroughly and fairly accurately handled in Rudolf Kuppe's Karl Lueger und seine Zeit (Vienna, 1933). Similarly, no attempt is made here to cover the internal histories of the several conservative parties in the provinces which joined the Christian Socialists in the Reichsrat in 1907. No attention is given
either to the Christian Socialist Party in Hungary or to the Christian Socialist political movements among the non-German nationalities of the empire. The Christian Socialist Party in the Austrian parliament was specifically a German party and its connections with the clerical groups of other nationalities was minimal.

Original sources for this study are frustratingly scarce. The important decisions of political parties are often as clothed in secrecy as the councils of war and they are therefore frequently unavailable to posterity. What official records the party did keep were destroyed by the Nazi regime. None of the top leaders of the party left significant papers or diaries. The published memoirs of Friedrich Funder and of Father Joseph Scheicher are pregnant with fascinating anecdotal material but both are discursive, disorganized, and frequently too inaccurate to be considered sound historical sources. The diaries of Joseph Redlich, edited by Dr. Fritz Fellner, contain many valuable and interesting, if antipathetic, references to the Christian Socialist Party. Both Rudolf Sieghart's *Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grosmacht* (Berlin, 1932) and Leopold von Chlumecky's *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand* (Berlin, 1929) give many first hand accounts of the authors' personal experiences with the Christian Socialist leaders.

The manuscript collection of the city of Vienna includes several letters exchanged among the party leaders during the period under study, but few of these reveal anything of political significance. Most of them were written to Karl Lueger during his many convalescent absences from Vienna. The most informative are those from Alfred Ebenhoeh, Lueger's Fliny the Younger, who questions the chairman incessantly regarding minor
points of party policy. Lueger's replies, unfortunately, are not in the collection. Prince Liechtenstein's one contribution is much the most interesting with its amusing and literate observations on all manner of subjects including the weather. The letters from Albert Gessmann and Richard Weiskirchner, which ought to be the most valuable, contain little more than formal salutations. The letters from Major Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, deposited at the Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv in Vienna, are extremely revealing on the relationship between the party and the archduke. Permission to use them was very kindly granted by the descendants of the archduke.

In the absence of official party records, the most dependable source for a continuous record of party activities is the Christian Socialist press. There were two major Christian Socialist dailies in Vienna. The clerical and moderately conservative Reichspost was the voice of the Christian Socialist parliamentary party. The Deutsches Volksblatt, outspokenly German nationalist and anti-Semitic, represented the lower bourgeois Vienna wing of the party. Both papers regularly published signed articles by leading Christian Socialist politicians.

Extremely useful for any study in this period of Austrian history is the newspaper Neue Freie Presse which, though avowedly liberal, provided an extraordinarily thorough and relatively objective coverage of contemporary events including verbatim reports of all open meetings of the Christian Socialists and of other political parties. Among other newspapers consulted were the Arbeiter-Zeitung, the organ of the Social Democratic Party, and the Fremden-Blatt, official mouthpiece of the foreign office.

This study has made liberal use of the plethora of official publications available for this period of Austrian history. Most helpful
were the *Stenographische Protokolle* and *Beilagen* of the Austrian house of deputies, and the statistical reports published by the Kaiserlich-Königlich Statistischen Central-Commission on population figures and election returns. There are several standard works on Austrian political history which are essential references for any study of this type. Chief among these are Alois von Czedik's four volume *Zur Geschichte der k.k. öster-
reichischen Ministerien, 1861 bis 1916* (Teschen, Vienna, and Leipzig, 1917-
1920) and Gustav Kolmer's monumental eight volume *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1911). The two works of Richard Charmatz, *Österreichs innere Geschichte von 1848-1907* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1912) and *Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1918) are less detailed but rich in insight and interpre-
tation.

There are, unfortunately, few monographs of merit on the political history of Austria during the last decades of the empire. Following the dissolution of the monarchy most scholars were attracted to studies of foreign affairs or of the nationality problems. Only in the years of peace and prosperity which have come to Austria since the end of the occupation have scholars turned with interest to the political history of the German population during the parliamentary period of the empire. The most out-
standing recent book is Johann Christoph Allmeyer-Beck's *Ministerpräsident Baron Beck* (Vienna, 1956), but there is indication that several more works of this nature should appear in the near future. It is the enthusiasm gleaned from pleasant associations with this generation of students of Austrian history which has engendered this study.
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INTRODUCTION

In those states in which a parliamentary government has operated successfully, one necessary concomitant has been the evolution of large political parties. Although these parties are not provided for in the constitutions and are generally not even considered in the philosophies which generate the constitutions, government by elected representation cannot function without them. These parties provide the entire machinery for nominating candidates and campaigning for them. They are the liaison between the voter and his government. Such political parties must be large and highly organized institutions on the scale of major commercial corporations. Ideally the party organization should be co-extensive with the state in which it operates (sectional parties are generally not very durable and are detrimental to the political system) with subdivisions paralleling those of the state: municipal, provincial, and federal. Such political parties take many years to develop. They often evolve along with the constitution of the state itself, as in Great Britain, France, or the United States. Their roots are found in the whole political, social, and economic history of the electorate they serve.

During the short period of parliamentary government in Austria,\(^1\)

\(^1\)The non-Hungarian provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy, as constituted after the Ausgleich of 1867, for which the only official designation was "The Kingdoms and Provinces Represented in the Reichsrat," will here be referred to as "Austria."
no such empire-wide\textsuperscript{2} party was ever able to materialize. The parliament in Austria was in fact never more than a sham; the emperor and the imperial bureaucracy never surrendered enough sovereignty to the parliament for the parties serving in it to develop any genuine political responsibility. Also, the division of Austria into several distinct politically-conscious nationality groups rendered impossible the evolution of an empire-wide political party. The political parties in the Reichsrat had no choice but to organize on national and sectional lines.

Although Austria never had a truly constitutional system, there was a short period, following the introduction of the general, equal, and direct franchise in 1907, when the emperor seems to have sincerely wished to share his authority with the elected parliament. For the election of this year two political parties, the Christian Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party, which had previously represented only a small part of the electorate, expanded their operations to campaign on an empire-wide basis. Both of these parties developed, in a remarkably short time, the highly organized political machinery which could have provided the necessary functions of political parties had Austria operated under a more genuine parliamentary system.

Of these two parties the Christian Socialists presented more of the characteristics of the political parties in countries with more effectual parliaments. The Social Democratic Party represented an electorate which was relatively new as a self-conscious social class and

\textsuperscript{2}Unless "Austro-Hungarian Empire" is specified, the word "empire" will be used here to denote the Austrian half of the Hapsburg monarchy.
which, before 1907, had a very limited franchise. Neither their organization nor their program had roots in the political evolution of the empire. The Christian Socialist Party, on the other hand, was an amalgamation of two political groups, the conservatives of the German rural provinces and the lower bourgeoisie of the city of Vienna, each of which had a long history of political consciousness, considerable experience in government on the local level, and well-established local organizations. The program of the Christian Socialist Party, although often ambiguous or even contradictory, had evolved with the political development of the electorate.

The most important single factor which gave the Christian Socialist Party the attributes of an established political organization was that this party had operated for many years in the city of Vienna before expanding to a parliamentary party. In line with the tradition of German cities, Vienna had a long history of elective government. The city council of Vienna, unlike the Reichsrat, was a genuine legislative body with full responsibility for governing the city. The municipal government of Vienna was the most important and most autonomous elected representative government in the Hapsburg monarchy. The political parties and the electoral machinery in the city of Vienna, therefore, had a far longer period of development than those operating on the Reichsrat level. The Christian Socialist Party held a controlling majority in the Vienna city council from 1895 until the fall of the monarchy. As the only party in the Reichsrat which actually controlled a functioning government, they were in a position to implement their program, to grant political favors, to dispense patronage, and even to engage in graft, in order to keep the party organization alive.
But the Christian Socialist Party failed in its efforts to become a genuine empire party. It failed first because the party was unable to transcend the nationality lines. The main support of the Christian Socialist Party was in the city of Vienna and in the German Alpine provinces. As the nationalist sentiments reached pathological proportions toward the end of the nineteenth century, it was necessary for the Christian Socialists to declare themselves an outspoken German party in order to hold their electorate. As the Germans were not even a majority of the population of the empire, no political party representing only Germans could be considered truly an empire-wide party. A second reason for the failure of the Christian Socialists to achieve their goal was that they were not operating in a true parliamentary system. The nationality disputes made it impossible for the house of deputies to enact legislation, the emperor lost interest in his parliamentary experiment, and governmental authority returned to the imperial bureaucracy, where, by tradition, it belonged. When the house of deputies ceased to have an important function, so also did the political parties working in it.

The Christian Socialists were unable to create a true parliamentary party in the framework of the empire. But after the First World War when the German provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy were constituted as the Republic of Austria, the Christian Socialists were able to provide the new republic with a genuine parliamentary party. No period of evolution was necessary. The organization which had been forged during the dying years of the empire went into operation as soon as the republic was founded, providing all of the necessary machinery for nominating candidates, conducting campaigns, and preparing a political program.
CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST PARTY

The Constitutional Framework

The natural evolution of political parties in Austria was hindered by the haphazard development of the Austrian constitution and the frequent arbitrary changes in the electoral system. The only constant factor in the constitutional history of the Hapsburg monarchy was that Emperor Francis Joseph neither wanted nor understood parliamentary government. The emperor's primary concern was the maintenance of the prestige of his empire as a European power. This prestige was considerably weakened during Francis Joseph's reign by increasing internal discord, and he and his advisers frequently attempted to placate the dissident groups within the empire by granting certain elements of parliamentary government. In this way Austria eventually achieved a parliamentary government in form but not in fact. There was a bicameral legislature with an elaborate electoral system, but it was never plugged in to authority. It was allowed to function only for its own sake; the ultimate sovereignty remained with the absolute monarch.

Parliamentary government for Austria had first been considered during the Revolution of 1848. A constituent assembly was elected and met, first in Vienna and later in Kromeriz, Moravia. But in 1849, when the revolutionary passions had burned out and order had returned, the assembly was dissolved. Francis Joseph did not think in terms of a

- 5 -
constitution again until the defeat of the Hapsburgs by France and Sardinia in 1859 presented a new threat to the prestige of the empire. In order to woo the support of discontented elements in his realm, particularly the German liberals and the landed aristocracy, more for their taxes than their love, Francis Joseph was willing, after that war, to try another constitutional experiment. It proved difficult to please both groups at the same time. The German liberals favored a strong central government which could encourage economic expansion and guarantee German supremacy; the aristocrats (of all nationalities) favored a federal government in which the greater responsibility would rest with the provincial diets dominated by the local nobility.

The first attempt at a constitution was the October Diploma of 1860 creating a government along purely federalist lines. This system proved so completely unsatisfactory to all elements except the most conservative aristocracy that it was never introduced. In its place the emperor promulgated the February Patent of 1861 (theoretically a re-interpretation of the October Diploma but in fact an entirely different concept of government) drawn up by Anton Schmerling. According to the February Patent, the power of the provincial diets was reduced and legislative authority was vested in a bicameral parliament, the Reichsrat. The delegates to the house of deputies were to be elected by the provincial diets, and, in an effort to assure a predominance of Germans and of the upper classes, the diets in turn were elected by the complicated curia system.  

3The electorate was divided into four classes (curiae): a.) the large landowners, b.) the urban chambers of commerce, c.) the general urban electorate, and d.) the general rural electorate. The urban and rural electorates included only adult males who paid an annual tax of ten florins or more.
The February Patent was not successful because the powerful Hungarian nobility refused either to accept the constitution or to work with Schmerling. They were adamantly opposed to a system giving the Reichsrat in Vienna control over the Hungarian parliament which Schmerling had endeavored to reduce to the level of a provincial diet. After four frustrating years the February Patent was suspended in order to create a new constitution which would be more acceptable to the Magyars. During the negotiations that followed the position of the imperial government was considerably weakened by the intervening war with Prussia, in which the Hapsburgs once again were conclusively defeated. In the Ausgleich of 1867 the Hungarians were able to achieve a position of virtual independence within the Hapsburg system. In theory Hungary and Austria were henceforth to be united only by a common monarch. In fact separation was effective only for domestic affairs. Francis Joseph always insisted that his monarchy, in its position as a European power, present itself as a single unit. The machinery necessary to maintain a single foreign office and a common army created also a certain integrity for the dual monarchy.

The maintenance of the army and foreign office made necessary a common treasury. According to the Ausgleich, Hungary, which contained two-fifths of the population, was to contribute about one-third of the funds, an arrangement that was to meet a vehement protest from practically every element in the Austrian parliament. One of the most calamitous clauses in the Ausgleich was the provision that the economic terms, the ratio of the contributions to the common treasury and the tariff, be reviewed every ten years. This was to take the form of an international treaty which, therefore, had to be ratified by both parliaments. Considering the antipathy of the majority of the Reichsrat to the Ausgleich in the first place, this provision guaranteed at least one upheaval per
decade in this already discordant body.

After the Ausgleich, the February Patent was patched up with the "Fundamental Laws of the State" to continue as a constitution for the Austrian half of the monarchy. The system was satisfactory to almost no group represented in the Reichsrat except the German liberals. The conservatives still resisted the centralized government; they wanted the legislative power to rest with the provincial diets. The Czechs could hardly be expected to acquiesce in a constitution in which the Magyars had been granted a separate government, and with it domination over a large Slav population. The Czechs were not only denied a similar privilege but were left in a parliamentary system which was heavily weighted to favor the Germans.

In the decade following the Ausgleich the Austrian Reichsrat was dominated by the German liberal parties and the Poles. This is explained in part by the peculiarly weighted voting of the curia system and in part by the default of the Czechs and the conservatives. The conservatives were divided in their attitude toward the new constitution. One faction refused to participate at all in the new parliament. This faction dominated the diets of Bohemia (where they also had the support of a majority of the Czechs) and Tyrol; until 1872 these provinces did not send any delegates to the Reichsrat. Another group of conservatives, whose strength lay in Upper and Lower Austria, held that, although they also disapproved of the constitution, it was necessary to participate in the parliament in order to defend the conservative position.

The boycott of the parliament by Bohemia and Tyrol was overcome in 1872 by a new electoral law providing for the direct election of delegates (still by the curia system). In the same year the conservative delegates in the house of deputies formed a loose organization
to present a united front against the liberals. Four major groups were represented: the Polish Club, a bloc of Polish delegates under the leadership of Prince Czartoryski; the South Slav delegates; the old Czech delegates; and the German conservative delegates. The chairman of the combined group was Count Karl Sigmund Hohenwart, a German conservative. This organization was officially designated as the Party of the Right but was generally known as the Hohenwart Club. ⁴

The world-wide economic depression of the 1870's, which was particularly stringent in Austria, did much to discredit the policies of the liberals. In the general election of 1879 the liberals finally lost their hegemony in the Reichsrat, and the liberal-dominated ministry of Count Auersperg resigned. Count Edward Taaffe, not himself a party man, assembled a coalition cabinet basing its parliamentary strength on a combination of antiliberal elements, known as the Iron Ring, of which the Hohenwart Club formed the core. This coalition, made up entirely of factions which did not approve of the constitutional system in which they served, managed to maintain its position for fourteen years.

It was during the Taaffe era that the two elements which were to constitute the Christian Socialist parliamentary party after 1907, the lower bourgeoisie of Vienna and the agrarian-conservatives of the German Alpine provinces, developed as political parties. The conservatives, now not only reconciled to parliamentary government but determined to take a leading role in it, found it necessary to create political organizations and a conscious political program in their rural constituencies in order to maintain their ascendancy over the liberals. The antiliberal parties

of Vienna were brought into existence by an extension of the franchise in 1882 which reduced the tax requirements for the general urban and rural curias from ten to five florins. This law was passed by the Taaffe regime in order to increase its mandate in the parliament; experience in France and Germany had already illustrated that the lower classes both of the peasantry and the bourgeoisie would generally return conservative deputies. A further extension of the franchise in 1896 gave even more strength to the parties of the lower bourgeoisie, and with the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907 they became one of the strongest elements in the Reichsrat.

The Clerical Tradition in Austria

In Austria, perhaps more than in any other part of Europe at the beginning of the present century, the relationship of church and state was still a pertinent issue, and clericalism a vital political force. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when the temporal power of the church in the rest of Europe had been weakened by the combined forces of commercialism and absolutism, in the Hapsburg lands this power remained relatively unshaken. Neither commerce nor urbanization had yet made serious inroads on the feudal nature of the Danube area, and the Hapsburg monarchs at that time were far more concerned with the protection and extension of their far-flung dynastic claims than in creating an efficient absolutism over their hereditary possessions. During the sixteenth century, when the Hapsburgs were faced with the dual menace of the Protestant Revolt to the north and the attacks of infidel Turks from the east, the prestige of the church was considerably enhanced. It was finally during the Thirty Years' War that the Catholic Church
established its strong position of autonomy and authority in the Hapsburg territories. Threatened at the same time with the loss of the kingdom of Bohemia and with the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire and believing that heresy was the cause of both problems, the devout Hapsburg monarchs gave their fullest support to the church and to the forces of the counter-reformation.

It was not until the eighteenth century that the position of the church was challenged by the Hapsburgs. Following a series of disastrous military and diplomatic humiliations, Maria Theresa (and later her son Joseph II) determined to modernize the government of the Hapsburg hereditary possessions in order to strengthen their position among the European powers. Influenced to a degree by the political philosophers of the Enlightenment and perhaps even more by the success of those of their colleagues who ruled more cohesive domains, Maria Theresa and Joseph II attempted the seemingly impossible task of changing their unwieldy governments into an efficient centralized administration.

One of the major obstacles encountered in these efforts was the enormous power of the church, a power virtually independent of Hapsburg authority. There were then 2,163 monasteries in the Hapsburg possessions, all exempt from taxation. Most of these held large land areas in feudal tenure which with their peasant populations were under the authority of a supranational monastic order. These monastic houses also operated most of the schools, hospitals, and welfare organizations (as well as some of the best wine cellars) in the Hapsburg lands. The secular clergy, a large and influential part of the population, were likewise more removed from state authority in the Hapsburg possessions

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than elsewhere in Europe; they came under the jurisdiction of their bishops, who in turn considered themselves subject not to the Hofburg but to the Vatican. Also, all legal questions governing birth, marriage, or death were regulated exclusively by canon law.

Bringing the church and its activities under the jurisdiction of a centralized bureaucracy was a slow and difficult process. In defending its position the church had the support of the powerful hereditary aristocracy, with whom it shared many common interests. Both were large landholders and therefore essentially agrarian; both owed their position of authority as well as their labor supply to the maintenance of an outmoded feudalism; and both were strongly opposed to centralization which would mean not only the loss of local prerogatives but also the promise of urban influences in the bureaucracy. Joseph II (whose reform program is known as the Josephinismus) took far more radical action than his mother. His most significant acts were those which curtailed the power of the monasteries. The emperor ordered closed all monastic houses which were purely contemplative. Their property was confiscated by the state. By this act 700 monasteries ceased to exist. Orders which performed a service of value to society (e.g. education, research, welfare, or care of the sick) were permitted to continue, but their land holdings were considerably reduced and their activities brought under the supervision of the state. Joseph II divorced these remaining monasteries from the ultramontane authority of their orders and placed them under the bishop of the diocese in which they were located. He then limited the authority of the bishop over diocesan affairs (a move which was greeted with understandable enthusiasm by many of the lower clergy); and, finally,

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6 Ibid.
by making the episcopal authority subject to the state rather than to the pope, Joseph was able to bring the whole church organization, technically at least, under Hapsburg jurisdiction. With the income from the confiscated church properties Joseph created the Religion Fund with which the state financed the educational and welfare work of the church (thus bringing these activities more specifically under state control) and augmented the salaries of the clergy.\(^7\)

Josephinismus had reduced the power of the church in the Hapsburg hereditary possessions, but had by no means completely subjected the church to the state. The position of the church in the Hapsburg lands was too strong, its traditions too old and too deeply ingrained, to be swept away by mere legislation. The laws governing the relationship of church and state were still to be re-evaluated and recomposed in every succeeding reign. The reaction to the reforms of Joseph II generated two basic points of view regarding the status of the church which, with modifications, continued to influence Austrian politics throughout the life of the monarchy. Supporting the spirit of Josephinismus were those who favored a strong centralized government. This included the rising business interests which would later be associated with the liberal political parties and those connected with the bureaucracy. The opposition to Josephinismus, which marked the beginning of the clerical tradition as a political platform, were those opposed to a strong government: the rural and agrarian interests, led by the hereditary aristocracy.

\(^7\)Paul von Mitrofanov, Joseph II: Seine politische und kulturelle Tätigkeit (Vienna and Leipzig, 1910), p. 685; Benedikt, p. 126.
The church did not make the substantial comeback that might have been expected in the conservative period following the Napoleonic Wars. Although the French Revolution had discredited many of the precepts of the Enlightenment, insofar as these precepts supported a strong central government, they survived. Therefore, while the ultraconservative government dominated by Prince Metternich reversed many of the acts of Joseph II, it relinquished neither the supremacy of the state over the church nor the right of the church to supervise education. The supporters of the clerical tradition had a remarkable, if temporary, victory, however, in the later conservative reaction which followed the Revolutions of 1848. The new young emperor, Francis Joseph, and his ministers, Felix von Schwarzenberg and Alexander Bach, believed that a well-buttressed and efficient absolutism was the best preventative for revolutions. They did not necessarily hold as a religious or political conviction that the position of the church should be restored, but they did believe that, to construct an absolute regime strong enough to resist further revolutionary outbreaks, the support of the church organization and of the clerically-minded nobility would be indispensable. The price that Francis Joseph and his ministers were willing to pay for this support was a concordat with the Vatican which defined the position of the Catholic Church in the Austrian Empire in such a way as to return to the church many of the prerogatives, though not the properties, lost during the reign of Joseph II. The most significant clauses and those which were later to cause the greatest controversy gave the church complete jurisdiction over marriage laws and over all education up to the university level.  

concordat began in Vienna in 1849 under the direction of Othmar Rauscher. The concordat was signed on 18 August 1855, the twenty-fifth birthday of the emperor.

The Concordat of 1855 proved but a pyrrhic victory for the clericals. The restoration of so much power and autonomy to the church was an anachronism: its main effect was to create a determined opposition. The liberal parties had their opportunity to attack the concordat when a central parliament was created for the Austrian half of the monarchy following the Ausgleich of 1867. Those elements which supported clericalism were also opposed to centralism and, as they elected not to take an active role in the new Reichsrat, they proved unable to defend themselves in the very arena where the clerical issues were to be fought out. The liberals, taking advantage of this situation promptly produced a legislative program to restrict the power of the church. Their efforts culminated in three laws passed on 25 May 1868. The first returned the marriage laws to civil jurisdiction; the second placed the secondary schools under the supervision of the state (the provincial governments); and the third guaranteed equal legal status to all citizens regardless of confessional affiliation. The following year, on 14 May 1869, another

9 Formerly a tutor of Francis Joseph, at that time prince-bishop of Seckau, and later cardinal archbishop of Vienna.

10 Ibid., p. 652.

law was passed, after considerable opposition, providing for the creation of public elementary schools which would be entirely independent of the church. As these laws were clearly contradictory to the terms of the Concordat of 1855, it was necessary for the government to abrogate the concordat. The opportunity came when the Council of the Vatican pronounced the dogma of papal infallibility; on 31 July 1870 the Hapsburg government simply gave notice that the promulgation of this dogma had invalidated the concordat.\[^{13}\]

The removal of the church's jurisdiction over education and marriage laws was not as complete as a reading of these laws themselves might imply. In its administration of the marriage laws, the civil courts almost always recognized the principles of canon law, particularly in regard to the most debated issue that divorce was unobtainable for members of the Catholic faith.\[^{14}\] Also, the church maintained considerable influence in the secondary and elementary schools even after 1869. The laws stated that the principal of each state-controlled elementary school should be appointed from the confession to which the majority of the children belonged. Except for a few districts in Vienna which might be Jewish, the Protestant areas of Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia, or the Russian Orthodox Bukovina, virtually every school in the empire would have a majority of Catholic students. As of 1880, only in Bukovina was the population less than 83 per cent Catholic, and, of the other provinces,

\[^{12}\]Kolmer, I, 378.
\[^{13}\]Ibid., p. 64
\[^{14}\]Albert Fuchs, Geistige Strömungen in Österreich, 1867-1918 (Vienna, 1949), p. 46.
only in Silesia was the percentage of Protestants more than five. 15
Thus the majority of the pupils, their parents, their communities, as
well as a majority of the teachers, and by law virtually all of the
principals were followers of the Roman Catholic confession and raised
in the Roman Catholic tradition. Furthermore, as the law of 14 May 1869
stated that the church should continue to "direct, implement, and superv-
ise" the religious education in the elementary schools, 16 every public
school had one or more ordained priests (known as catechists) on its
faculty. Under such circumstances the church could not be divorced from
the educational system by legislation.

The champions of the clerical cause in the Reichsrat were the
German conservative delegates. When the conservatives joined the Taaffe
government with the Hohenwart Club in 1879 one of their major objectives
was the repeal of the liberal anticlerical legislation, but they found
the Taaffe ministry indifferent and unco-operative. As a result a
majority of the German conservative delegates seceded from the Hohenwart
Club in November 1881, and formed a separate group known as the Center
Club. The name was not meant to indicate the relative political position
of the group in the Reichsrat but rather admiration for the policies of
the strong Catholic party by that name in the German Empire. Prince
Alfred Liechtenstein was chosen as the head of the Center Club (there-
fore usually known as the Liechtenstein Club). When he shortly there-
after retired from politics, he was succeeded by his brother Prince
Alois Liechtenstein.

15 Österreichisches statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrat
vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, Dritter Jahrgang; 1884 (Kaiserliche und
königliche statistische Central-Kommission, Vienna, 1885), p. 3.

16 Kolmer, I., 378.
During the eighties the Center Club became the champion of the working classes in the Reichsrat. Recent industrial expansion in Austria had brought with it the flagrant social injustices that were familiar in many parts of Europe during the nineteenth century, such as long working hours, child labor, poor living conditions, and economic insecurity. The crash of 1873 had thrown a frightening light not only on the poverty of Austria's industrial laborers but also on the serious threat which expanding industry presented to Austria's large class of artisans. The liberal parties, holding to their contention that the state should not interfere with the natural laws of the economy, had opposed any effort to improve social conditions by legislation. Motivated not by any principles of theoretical socialism but rather by the feudal concept of noblesse oblige, (as well as a desire to oppose liberalism on every possible front) the delegates of the Liechtenstein Club brought to the Reichsrat a comprehensive program of social legislation.

In their efforts to work out a constructive program the leaders of the Center Club, notably Prince Alois Liechtenstein and Count Egbert Belcredi, became associated with a small group of Catholic intellectuals led by Baron Karl von Vogelsang which had been concerned with formulating a policy of social reform based on the teachings of the Catholic Church. Baron Vogelsang had first come to Vienna in 1869 from Bratislava where he had been editor of a German conservative journal. In 1875 he was invited to be the editor of the Wasserland, a daily newspaper which was the organ of clericalism and conservatism.¹⁷ Vogelsang's editorials concerning the

role of Catholicism in social reform won him a devoted following, and his apartment at 2 Laurenzgasse in the fifth district became a gathering place for a dedicated group of clerics and writers. Some of the more significant members of the group were Dr. Francis Martin Schindler, a professor of theology at the University of Vienna; Dr. Joseph Scheicher, a professor at the diocesan seminary at St. Pölten; Father Heinrich Abel, a very popular Jesuit priest in Vienna; Father Adam Latschka, an assistant pastor at the Votivkirche; and Father Friedrich Piffl, who was later to become the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna.18 During the period when the Center Club was campaigning for social legislation in the Reichsrat, the Vogelsang Circle established a monthly paper through which to disseminate their ideas. This paper, the Österreichische Monatschrift für Gesellschaftswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaft, founded in January 1879, originally had the financial and moral backing of the leading members of the Center Club. It soon appeared that Vogelsang's writings were too radical for some of the august conservatives, and by 1881 he had lost their patronage. In that year the Vogelsang Circle founded a new paper with their own funds, the Monatschrift fürchristliche Sozialreform.19

During the first half of the eighties two important pieces of social legislation sponsored by the Center Club were enacted into law. The first was designed to protect the skilled artisans from the recent

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18 Kurt Skalnik, Dr. Karl Lueger: Der Mann zwischen den Zeiten (Vienna, 1954), p. 64.

influx of manufactured products on the one hand and from Jewish peddlers from Eastern Europe on the other. The law, ratified by the emperor on 21 March 1883, prohibited the manufacture or sale of any item of skilled handcraft without a certificate of qualification and membership in the appropriate guild.20 Another law, passed on 8 March 1995, was an early attempt to improve the life of the industrial worker in accordance with the theories of Vogelsang. This law limited the working day to eleven hours (which, including the lunch hour, would make a twelve hour day); prohibited labor for children under fourteen and night work for all women and children; and permitted only light labor for children from fourteen to sixteen.21

Soon, however, a majority of the conservatives began to lose interest in their role as social reformers. The new franchise law of 1882, which extended the vote to five gulden taxpayers, appeared to increase the political strength of the lower bourgeoisie, and the conservatives shrank from any further concessions to the monster they had helped to create. Of the conservative delegates only Prince Alois Liechtenstein and a few close associates remained interested in reform projects. By the late eighties the Vogelsang Circle was considered dangerously radical. Their meetings were held in secret so that the delegates who wished to participate might do so without endangering their political careers. Meetings were held at night at the home of Princess Zichy-Metternich (daughter of the former

20 Kolmer, III, p. 366.
21 Ibid., p. 370.
prime minister) in the residential outskirts of Vienna.\textsuperscript{22} With the conservative parties no longer willing to carry the responsibility for social legislation, the Vogelsang group began to discuss the formation of a political party of their own.\textsuperscript{23} The Five Gulden Law of 1882 had increased the franchise of the lower bourgeoisie to a degree that this group virtually controlled the fourth curia in the larger cities, particularly in Vienna. Vogelsang, Liechtenstein, and their followers believed that this vote would make a more dependable support for the ideas of Christian Socialism than the conservatives. Therefore, during the late eighties the Vogelsang Circle dipped their aristocratic and ecclesiastic hands into the muddy pond of Vienna city politics.

Antiliberal Parties in Vienna

Although the ideological foundations of the Christian Socialist Party stemmed from the Austrian clerical tradition and the reform program of the Vogelsang Circle, the political organization of the party had its roots in the antiliberal politics of the city of Vienna during the 1870's and 1880's. Political activity in Austria was still relatively new in this period. The complex machinery of a large political party, necessary to carry on the enormous activity of a successful political campaign was still in the embryonic stage. The beginnings were to be found in the city of Vienna, for in an era before media of mass communication it was only in a large city that the electorate could be successfully organized.

\textsuperscript{22}Friedrich Funder, \textit{Aufbruch zur Christlichen Sozialreform} (Vienna and Munich, 1953), p. 58.

Vienna, as the seat of three elected governments, early became a busy center for political activity. The Vienna voters sent representatives to the Reichsrat, the parliament of the Austrian half of the monarchy; to the diet of the province of Lower Austria, of which Vienna was the capital; and, most important in regulating the lives and businesses of the Viennese themselves to the Vienna city council. The elections to the city council at that time were based on a municipal constitution granted by the emperor in 1850. For the purposes of these elections Vienna was divided into ten districts (increased to nineteen in 1890 by the incorporation of several suburbs). The electorate included all males over twenty-four who paid a tax of ten gulden or more. In addition men of specified occupations were permitted to vote: the clergy and teachers of religion; officers of the armed services; certain specified high ranking officials of the government (imperial, provincial, or municipal, active or retired); all professors and teachers; and certain professional men: lawyers, doctors, civil engineers, architects, and apothecaries. This electorate included only about one-quarter of the adult males of the city. Elections were indirect through electoral bodies of which there were three in each district or thirty in all. Qualifications to vote in the electoral bodies was determined by the amount of taxes paid: those paying over 200 gulden voted in the first electoral body, over thirty in the second, and ten to thirty in the third. Each electoral body was entitled to a certain number of seats in the city council based on the population of the district as a whole.

24 The third electoral body was increased in 1882 to include all those paying a tax of five gulden or more.
There were 138 members on the council, elected for a term of six years, one third renewable every two years. A burgomaster was elected by the city council (from among its membership) for a term of six years, and a first and second vice burgomaster were elected for terms of three years each. The executive committee of the city council consisted of the burgomaster, the two vice burgomasters, and twenty-two others elected by the council from among its members.\textsuperscript{25}

Vienna politics was very strongly influenced by the relatively sharp class distinctions that were recognized by its citizens. Although many members of the nobility maintained residences in Vienna, the major part of the population formed three general groups which may be called the upper bourgeoisie, the lower bourgeoisie, and the industrial workers. The upper bourgeoisie comprised the executives of industries and large businesses and most professional men. By far the largest segment of the population of Vienna was the lower bourgeoisie. These were the proprietors of the myriad small shops, the purveyors of services, and the skilled handworkers or artisans. Members of such other groups as the civil service, the armed service, or the clergy might find their political sympathies with either of the above groups. Hired workers in small businesses were usually apprentices, journeymen, or clerks, and considered themselves on their way toward a permanent status among the lower bourgeoisie. Only those who were hired permanently in large industries considered themselves members of the workers' class.

\textsuperscript{25}Albert Shaw, Municipal governments in continental Europe (New York, 1906), pp. 10-15.
The lower bourgeoisie of Vienna had not always thought of themselves as a separate bourgeois class. They had originally associated themselves with the principles of economic and political freedom espoused by the liberal parties which considered themselves the upholders of the ideals of the Revolution of 1848. By the 1870's the Vienna lower bourgeoisie were beginning to realize that the liberal parties no longer represented their interests. The lower bourgeoisie recently had been hurt by the steady increase in large-scale businesses and industries. Competition from mass-produced industrial goods and large commercial department stores endangered the existence of the small businessman or artisan and threatened to force him into the proletariat. The Vienna lower bourgeoisie was particularly hard pressed by the crash of 1873. This depression made them even more aware of the dangers they faced from industry and big business. In the two decades following the crash the Vienna lower bourgeoisie developed a clearer class consciousness and developed a political position which was sharply opposed to that of the liberal parties. Whereas the liberals would oppose any legislation which might restrict the economy, the lower bourgeoisie now began to look to the government for laws to protect their social and economic status, both from the competition of industry and from the perils of periodic economic depressions. They sought this security for the most part in an extension of the old guild laws which the liberals considered an outmoded restriction on free enterprise. The liberals on the other hand wanted the government to encourage, or even subsidize, the industrial projects of private concerns which would contribute to the common welfare (e.g. communication systems and utilities), as was done in the United States or Great Britain. The lower bourgeoisie felt that such a
policy would benefit only a small group of capitalists and preferred
that such projects be undertaken by the government itself. The national-
ization or municipalization of communications and utilities would not
only mean lower prices for urban necessities but would create new civil
service jobs in which the lower bourgeoisie could maintain their social
status.

The lower bourgeoisie found also that they could not share
the strong antipathy of the liberals to the church. Few urban Catholics
of any social level would go so far as to support the clerical-
conservative view that the church should be returned to the position it
held before the Josephinismus. Nevertheless, the majority of the lower
bourgeoisie were sincerely devout, strongly influenced by their local
clergy, and therefore antagonistic to the anticlerical program of the
liberals.

An important factor in Vienna city politics was the prevalent
anti-Semitism of the Vienna lower bourgeoisie. Anti-Semitism had al-
ways been strong in Vienna as in any German commercial city with a
large Jewish population. But the anti-Semitism of the Vienna lower
bourgeoisie was further fed in the late nineteenth century when hundreds
of thousands of Eastern Jews, primarily from Galicia and Bukovina,
poured into Vienna and there competed with the lower bourgeois shop-
keepers and artisans. Many of these Eastern Jews engaged in door to
door peddling and were able to undersell the established local shops.

The Jewish population of Vienna jumped from 3,739 in 1848 to
116,751 by 1890.27 With the enfranchisement of the Vienna lower

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27 Hugo Hartsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs (Graz, Vienna, and
bourgeoisie, anti-Semitism became a necessary, if dangerous, part of any successful political platform.

German nationalism was also a factor in the politics of the lower bourgeoisie; but, as the Germans were in an indisputable majority in the city of Vienna, the German nationalism did not reach the proportions there that it did in those parts of the empire where Germans shared urban areas with another large ethnic group (e.g. Bohemia, South Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, or Carniola). The Germans of Vienna, however, could easily be stirred to negative nationalist sentiments for political purposes: anti-Magyar, anti-Slav, or anti-Italian. The anti-Magyar feeling had been aggravated by the terms of the Ausgleich, which most urban Germans condemned as being economically favorable to Hungary. The anti-Slavic attitude had grown during the last part of the nineteenth century because the general movement of the excess rural population into the cities, common throughout Europe and America in those years, had brought many Slavs (largely Czechs) into Vienna and into competition with the German lower bourgeoisie shopowners.

The curia system in the Vienna constitution was strongly weighted in favor of the upper bourgeoisie and the liberal parties. Before the extension of the franchise to the five gulden taxpayers in 1882, Vienna politics was almost entirely the province of the liberals. They dominated not only the city council but also the local political organizations. From 1868 to 1878 the liberal majority in the Vienna

28In Vienna, as elsewhere in Austria, there were at this time no political parties organized on a large scale. There were only local political organizations which were attended by interested voters. These organizations formulated policy and nominated local candidates for political office. Once elected, the deputies, whether in the city council, the provincial diet, or the Reichsrat, would join a bloc of
city council was organized into a tightly knit bloc under the leadership of the burgomaster, Dr. Cajetan Felder. The panic of 1873, which discredited many of the liberal policies and the subsequent revelations of scandals in the municipal government involving several councilmen, finally pushed a wedge into the liberal hegemony in Vienna. During the following decade many antiliberal political organizations were formed in the city, primarily in the great crescent of lower bourgeois residential districts which lie between the Ringstrasse and the Gürtel. In the Third District (the Landstrasse) the antiliberal club ("Unity") was led by Dr. Ignaz Mandl and Dr. Karl Lueger. Dr. Robert Pattai led an independent antiliberal political club in the Sixth District (Mariahilf). The most highly organized group during the 1870's was one which embraced the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Districts under the leadership of Dr. Rudolph Kronawetter and several colleagues.

The antiliberals were soon able to count on most of the seats of the Third Electoral body. Their influence in the city council was negligible, as they lacked a common program and a cohesive organization. In 1878, however, several of the liberal councilmen who had been chafing under the bossism of Felder joined the antiliberals in a loose bloc called

like-minded deputies known as a "club." These clubs, which were the nearest approach to a political party in Austria before the 1890's, operated only within the legislative body in which they were organized. When the members of these clubs arranged the co-operation of the local political organizations during campaigns, the larger political parties evolved.

29Skalnik, p. 21.

30Kuppe, p. 50. In Austria university graduates receive the academic title "doctor." This title had political significance in that it gave a definite prestige to bourgeois politicians seeking recognition in a government previously dominated by titled aristocracy. As academic titles are not generally used in English they will hereafter be omitted after the first reference.
the United Left. Dr. Karl Lueger of the Third District, then only thirty-six years old, was elected chairman. Both Kronawetter and Mandl were far more important as antiliberal organizers, but both were Jewish, which was a liability in some constituencies. Lueger was a colorful figure and a persuasive speaker. The platform of the United Left (sometimes known also as the Democrats) included the abolition of the curia system in favor of direct and equal elections, which would shift the vote to the lower bourgeoisie and unseat the liberals. In 1878, the United Left controlled fifty of the one hundred-twenty seats of the city council and were able to force Burgomaster Felder to resign in favor of a more acceptable liberal, Dr. Julius Ritter von Newald.

After reaching its highpoint about 1880 the United Left rather suddenly fell apart at the seams. The fact was that the members of the United Left had little more in common than their opposition to the liberal hegemony in the city council. Once the club had achieved a position of influence its members were unable to agree on a common policy. In 1882 the United Left was simply dissolved.

It was in the same year that Lueger persuaded his friend, Dr. Albert Gessmann, to go into municipal politics. Gessmann was then only twenty-seven years old and had been a clerk in the library of the University of Vienna. In 1882, with Lueger's backing, Gessmann ran for the city council in the second curia of the seventh district and won.

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31Skalnik, pp. 28-29.

32Ibid., p. 30.
In the city council Lueger and Gessmann worked in close co-operation and enjoyed referring to themselves as the "two-man party."\textsuperscript{33}

During these years, opposition to the policies of the liberal-dominated city council appeared from another quarter. A group of Vienna artisans was organized in 1880 as a pressure group to obtain legislation which would guarantee the artisan against competition both from big business and from peddlers. As most of these artisans did not pay ten gulden in taxes, they were not voters and could not seek help through their own representatives. The first meeting was called by the watchmaker Buschenhagen in Dreher's Beer Hall for 10 October 1880. Several hundred artisans attended. Lueger, sensing the political significance of the group, attended the meeting. The main speaker, of course, was Buschenhagen who talked about "Peddlers and the Artisan's Trade." His strongly anti-Semitic speech set the tone of the meeting. "Who are all these peddlers?" he asked. "Most of them are Jews who have been thrown out of Poland or Hungary or Russia. Just look at these people and tell me if they have ever learned a trade!" Buschenhagen then went on to demand a law that would prohibit anyone from practicing an artisan's trade without certification of his ability.\textsuperscript{34}

At a second meeting held two weeks later the artisans decided to form the "Association for the Protection of Handworkers" and planned a convention for all artisans of Austria to meet in Vienna the following

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{33}Tbid., p. 35.
\item\textsuperscript{34}Kuppe, p. 92.
\end{itemize}
year. This first All-Austrian Artisans' Day took place in the summer of 1881. Karl Lueger, again with his political antennae in tune, was the city councilman who introduced the resolution that this All-Austrian Artisans' Day receive an official welcome from the city of Vienna. 35

As a result of negotiations during the convention the Reform League for the Protection of the Artisans' Interests (usually called the Austrian Artisans' Reform League) was founded in February 1882. The original organizers in addition to Buschhagen were Ernst Schneider, a precision tool maker, and Karl von Zerboni. Zerboni was the editor of an avowedly anti-Semitic newspaper, the weekly Österreichischer Volksfreund, which he brought with him into the league. This paper carried on its title page "All articles written only by Christians." 36

The extension of the franchise to the five gulden taxpayers in 1882 made a significant change in the function of the Artisans's Reformers. As the class they represented now had a vote for the first time, the Reformers, previously only a pressure group, could now act as a political party. By 1882 there were already over a thousand members. As the United Left had been dissolved in that year, many of the now independent antiliberal politicians now saw the advantages of associating themselves with the Artisans' Reformers. The league on their part welcomed experienced politicians to their cause. Important

35Ibid.
36Ibid., p. 93.
among these were Robert Pattai, the antiliberal councilman from the
Sixth District and a pronounced anti-Semite, and Georg Ritter von
Schöenerer, who was later to lead the extreme German nationalist
movement in Austria. Lueger, who had earlier shown an interest in
the Artisans’ Reformers, never actually joined it, because he feared
that membership in the anti-Semitic league would cost him the support
of his colleagues, Mandl and Kronawetter. 37

At an organizational meeting on 22 May 1882 Pattai was
elected president of the league. The program which was worked out at
this meeting was a curious paradox combining elements of outmoded guild
laws with demands for radical and even socialistic legislation. This
program attracted the attention of the Vogelsang Circle which was at this
time working out a legislative program for the protection of the urban
artisans to be presented in the Reichsrat by the Center Club. Count
Egbert Belcredi sought out Ernst Schneider of the Artisans’ Reformers
and invited him to join the Vogelsang Circle as a regular member and
to advise them on the problems of the artisans. 38

Schöenerer found the anti-Semitism of the Artisans’ Reformers
too moderate for his tastes and in 1882 resigned from the league to
start a new political group, the German National Union. The union was
formed at a German nationalist convention held in Ottenschlag in August
1882. For the platform of the German Nationalist Union, Schöenerer

37Skalnik, pp. 41, 56-57.
38Kuppe, pp. 95-96.
published the Linz Program which until then had been secret, adding to it a clause excluding all Jews and descendants of Jews from membership in the party. This was the first time that "racial" anti-Semitism had been introduced into Austrian politics. The Artisans' Reformers professed "economic" anti-Semitism. They equated the Jews with the excesses in business and condemned their economic practices on the theory that their religion (unlike Catholic Christianity) did not require humanitarian principles in business affairs. This attitude is reflected in Karl Lueger's famous nonsense, "I determine who is a Jew." Schönerer's anti-Semitism, which was to receive a heinous popularity in the twentieth century, condemned a Jew because he was ethnically a Jew and included in its definition anybody who was even partly Jewish by descent.

The first Reichsrat election in which the Five Gulden Men could vote was called for 1885. In this election the antiliberals of Vienna decided to campaign for the seats of the general urban curia.

39In 1880, several young politicians had met secretly in Linz to formulate a political program for Austria based on the extreme German nationalism which had been popular in certain circles since the creation of the unified German Empire in 1871. The Linz Program demanded among other things that: a.) A German majority should be assured in the Reichsrat by dropping the purely Slavic provinces from the monarchy; Galicia should be given independence and Dalmatia ceded to Hungary; b.) there should be the closest possible diplomatic and economic co-operation with the German Empire; and c.) that the Reichsrat should enact social legislation to protect the small farmer and the workers from the excesses of capitalism.

40"Wer a' Jud ist, bestimm' ich."
Although there was still no city-wide antiliberal party organization, the Artisans' Reformers, the Democratic Club of Kronawetter, and the independent candidate, Lueger, worked in close co-operation for the campaign. As the antiliberals did not have a strong organization in the Fifth District (Margareten) the popular Lueger stood for this seat while Mandl ran in Lueger's Third District. Ernst Schneider ran in the Second District (Leopoldstadt), Patta in his usual bailiwick, the Sixth District, and Kreuzig and Kronawetter in theirs, the Seventh and Eighth respectively. The elections were all close, but only four of the six candidates were elected to the Reichsrat: Lueger, Patta, Kreuzig, and Kronawetter.\n\nAs has been mentioned, by the mid-eighties the conservatives had withdrawn their patronage from the Vogelsang Circle, which they now considered dangerously radical, and the Vogelsang group had decided to enter the Vienna political arena to carry on their social reform program under the aegis of a new party. Before the franchise reform of 1882 a Catholic bourgeois party would have been out of the question. In the tradition of the Revolution of 1848 a large share of the Vienna bourgeoisie were basically, though not fanatically, anticlerical. However, among the newly enfranchised lower bourgeoisie the majority were devoutly Catholic so that now an urban party based on a Catholic Weltanschauung would be feasible.

The two men who undertook the job of organizing the party were Dr. Ludwig Psenner, now the editor of the Oesterreichischer Volksfreund,\n\n42 which he had purchased from Zerboni; and Dr. Adam Latschka,

\n\n41 Ibid., p. 129.

42 This paper was founded as a Catholic weekly by Cardinal Rauscher during the revolutionary year, 1848. It was later purchased by Zerboni and finally by Psenner. Under Psenner the Volksfreund promoted
a curate in the Votivkirche of Vienna. Psenner, Latschka, and the Vogelsang Circle were anxious to create a party which would bring under its wing as many as possible of the as yet unorganized anti-liberal politicians who could now command a much larger following. The Artisans' Reformers indicated that they would work in close political co-operation with the new party, but, as the Reformers had an obligation to serve their own class, they could not actually join the new party, which wanted to maintain a broader appeal. Ernst Schneider, as a member of the Vogelsang Circle, was the liaison between the two groups. 43

The party was officially founded in March 1887, as the Christian Socialist League and the first public meeting took place at the restaurant "Zum goldenen Luchsen" in the seventh district on 27 April 1887. During the spring and summer of 1887 there were similar organizational meetings in other districts of Vienna and in other cities of Lower Austria under the auspices of reform-minded clergy-men who were working in co-operation with the Vogelsang Circle. 44

Psenner, Latschka, and the Vogelsang Circle realized the need for a dynamic political leader to spearhead their new party and from the Landstrasse, Karl Lueger. Since the breakup of the United Left, a program of practical Christianity and social reform on a somewhat broader level than the scholarly Monatschrift edited by Vogelsang.

43Allmayer-Beck, Vogelsang, p. 106.
44Kuppe, p. 160.
Lueger had not belonged to any political party, although he worked in close co-operation with the Democratic Club of Kronawetter. Lueger was an ideal man to lead the Christian Socialists. He was an excellent campaigner with a large personal following. In 1887, then forty-three years old, he was known in Vienna as "handsome Karl": he was impressively tall and straight and wore a full beard neatly parted in the middle. His speeches were always intimate, sometimes almost to the point of vulgarity, but usually carefully tuned to his audience. He spoke frequently at small gatherings and knew how to appeal to the needs and to fan the prejudices of each particular group. Perhaps most importantly, Lueger was religiously Viennese. He came from the lower bourgeoisie (his father had been a janitor in the Vienna technical institute and later his widowed mother sold cigarettes): he was one of them and yet gave the appearance of being a "gentleman" who could hold a responsible political position. Lueger frequently used the Vienna dialect in his speeches which added to his local appeal.

Lueger's close political associate and personal friend, Albert Gessmann, had already been brought into the Vogelsang Circle by Ernst Schneider. The circle now urged Gessmann to bring Lueger to their meetings, hoping that he might be persuaded to lead the Christian Socialist Party, but Lueger preferred to wait. The Christian Socialists in their appeal to the five gulden voters were not only Catholic but also anti-Semitic, and Lueger was still reluctant to commit himself to a platform which would lose him the co-operation of Kronawetter and his Democratic Club.45

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45 Skalnik, p. 57.
The path was cleared for Lueger, however, by Kronawetter himself. In 1887, sensing the anti-Semitic tone of Vienna anti-liberal politics after the extension of the franchise, Kronawetter and his associate Kreuzig went over to the liberal Progressive Party. His move had the double effect of leaving Lueger politically isolated and of removing the barrier which had prevented his working with the anti-Semitic party.

On 3 September 1887 Lueger made his first appearance in the Vogelsang Circle, and from that time he regularly attended their meetings at the home of Princess Zichy-Metternich. Apparently secrecy was still maintained to the extent that members announced themselves at the door with assumed names. Lueger and Gessmann attended as Castor and Pollux. On 23 September 1887 Lueger was finally persuaded to address a meeting of the Christian Socialist Union. The seasoned campaigner pulled all stops and delivered a speech which was not only strongly anti-Semitic but anti-Magyar as well. The speech was wildly cheered, and in succeeding months Lueger was a frequent speaker at Christian Socialist meetings, though he still refrained from joining the party.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 63.

\textsuperscript{48}It seems unlikely that the politically astute Lueger would have placed himself on an equal plane with a subordinate, unless perhaps he remembered that only one of the twins was divine!

\textsuperscript{49}Kuppe, pp. 161-163.
The Vogelsang Circle took the lead in organizing a loose union of the Reichsrat delegates of the four antiliberal parties of Vienna: the Christian Socialists, the Artisans' Reformers, the German National Union, and the Catholic Conservative Club (of Vienna). Invitations were sent to the delegates of these four parties on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's ordination to the priesthood, 31 December 1888. The purpose of the new union, known as the United Christians, was to promote legislation for Christian social reform in the Reichsrat. For their program the United Christians recognized the guidance of the Vogelsang Circle. At the special request of Baron Vogelsang, Karl Lueger, who was not a member of any of the four parties, was elected chairman of the United Christians. Each of the four parties was to maintain its own local organization but agreed not to put up competing candidates in any district. This arrangement left the door open for other antiliberal parties to join the United Christians. The participating groups stood to gain by membership in a more inclusive party with a Christian orientation. The word "Christian" could be used to mean Catholic to the clericals, idealism to the social reformers, or anti-Semitism to the lower bourgeoisie. The names Anti-Semite and Christian Socialist (preferred by Vogelsang) were used interchangeably with United Christians until the Reichsrat election of 1893 when Christian Socialist Party became the official name.

The United Christians had two official newspapers at their service which helped to weld the four groups into a single party. The

50 Skalnik, p. 68.

51 Kuppe, p. 166.
Oesterreichischer Volksfreund, the weekly paper advocating Christian social reform, and the Deutsches Volksblatt, the organ of the German National Union. The Volksblatt was edited by the rotund Ernst Vergani. Its politics were those of Schönerer, anti-Semitic and German-nationalist, but as it received financial contributions from all factions of the United Christians, the paper, the only daily of the party, adopted a more moderate tone. 52

In 1888 Schönerer and his more ardent followers left the United Christians and founded an independent German nationalist party. A majority of the original Schönerer party (including Vergani) remained with the United Christians. 53 As Schönerer's fanatic German nationalism was often clearly unpatriotic and therefore embarrassing to the United Christians, his defection was actually to the party's advantage.

The first major campaign that the United Christians entered as a unified group was the Reichsrat election of 1889. Their unexpected success showed the advantages of the larger party. For this election Prince Alois Liechtenstein resigned as head of the Center Club, gave up his mandate as a Catholic Conservative, and campaigned as a member of the Christian Socialist Party. The prince was displeased with the trend that the Catholic Conservative Party had taken in shunning the program of social reforms which they had espoused a decade earlier, and he believed he could better serve his principles as a Christian Socialist. 54

52 Ibid., p. 189.

53 Ibid., p. 197.

54 Ibid., p. 197.
In the following year the United Christians campaigned for seats in the Lower Austrian diet, which had previously been almost exclusively liberal. Placing candidates only in the third electoral body, the United Christians won six of the ten districts of Vienna and six seats from other urban districts of Lower Austria. These twelve United Christians, plus the five clerical agrarian delegates, made a substantial bloc against the liberals in the 58 member diet. In the Spring of 1891 new elections to the city council brought 42 of the 138 seats to the United Christians.\textsuperscript{55} The political success of the United Christians was largely the result of the co-operation of the four factions. At a meeting in March, 1893, the United Christians were reorganized as a single party, the Christian Socialists, of which Karl Lueger remained chairman,\textsuperscript{56} and during the decade of the nineties this Christian Socialist Party was able to grow into one of the most formidable political forces in Austria.

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 223, 233.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 269.
CHAPTER II

EXPANSION OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST PARTY: 1891-1907

The Spiritual Leadership of the Christian Socialists

The political activity of the Vogelsang Circle ceased to be secret and indeed became publicly triumphant and militant with the publication on 15 May 1891 of the papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum. With this document Pope Leo XIII proclaimed that social reform along lines similar to the program of the Vogelsang Circle was a major Christian obligation. During the nineties the now increased reform activities of clergy, intellectuals, and politicians created a popular Catholic renaissance in Austria, which contributed substantially to the growth of the Christian Socialist Party.

Baron Vogelsang, unfortunately, did not live to see this fruition of the movement started in his name. He was struck by a horse and carriage while crossing the Ringstrasse and died on 8 November 1890.\(^1\) The former Vogelsang Circle, no longer obliged to meet clandestinely, now convened every Tuesday evening at the Hotel "Zur goldenen Ente." At these "Ente Evenings," which became a popular feature of the Catholic social movement, some of the most stimulating churchmen of Austria discussed current problems in politics, economics, social reform, or

\(^1\) Allmayer-Beck, Vogelsang, p. 3.

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theology. It was at these gatherings that they worked out the religious and philosophical bases as well as the practical details of the Christian Socialist program.

Successor to Vogelsang as the spiritual mentor of the group was Dr. Francis Martin Schindler, a professor in the theological faculty at the University of Vienna. Schindler was undoubtedly one of the most important social philosophers of the period, but owing to his natural modesty and scholarly habits, he remained relatively unknown even in his own time. Schindler came originally from the Sudeten area of Bohemia. He was born in the town of Merzdorf in 1847 and attended the diocesan seminary at Leitmeritz (Litoměřice). After his ordination he joined the faculty of the seminary. There he published several studies concerning the Catholic interpretation of social and economic changes in the industrial era. In 1887, when he was forty, he was invited to the chair of moral theology at the University of Vienna, where he soon became one of the most active scholars in his field. He wrote articles for the Historisch-politische Blätter and the Gelbe Hefte, periodicals dealing with Christian ethics in contemporary problems, and for Vogelsang's Monatschrift für christliche Sozialreform. In some of his more significant writings Schindler defended compulsory state insurance from a theological point of view; opposed Karl Marx's labor theory of value

2 Schindler even elected to have an apartment on the fifth floor of a walk-up building so that he would be disturbed only by people who felt their business important enough to make the climb.

3 The ethics of this problem were a major issue in Germany, England, and France as well as Austria during the late nineteenth century.
with a religious and economic defense of the relative theory; and presented a re-interpretation of an ancient Christian thorn in the flesh with an article entitled "Interest and Usury." In his political treatises, Schindler advocated the establishment of a parliamentary system of government in which representation was apportioned according to profession (or type of work) and economic class, rather than by geography, feudal class, or tax payment. His greatest opportunity for service came when the Vatican invited him to join the studies being made in preparation for the encyclical Rerum Novarum.⁴

Also important in spreading the new social gospel from the pulpit was the colorful Jesuit, Father Heinrich Abel. Although not himself engaged in politics, Father Abel helped to popularize the Christian Socialist program among the devout lower bourgeoisie of Vienna, and as a regular participant in the Ente Evenings was a close associate of the political leaders of the party. Father Abel came from an aristocratic Protestant family of Bavaria. After his conversion he attended the Jesuit seminary of St. Andreas in Carinthia. He came to Vienna in 1891, soon after he was ordained, and remained there until his death in 1926.⁵ Father Abel was an impressive man, quite large with a handsome face and a loud booming voice. He was an appealing public speaker both in and out of the pulpit. His sermons were known for warmth and humor; his Sunday congregations were frequently convulsed with laughter. Father Abel emphasized the practical rather than the devotional aspects of Catholicism.

⁵Kuppe, p. 243.
and was anxious to create a religious attitude which would have particular appeal to the men of his parish. Women, he felt, often made of religion a pietistic affair which then lost its appeal to the men whose minds, concerned with mundane matters, found this type of religion unrealistic. Father Abel, who liked to call himself the "Apostle to the men of Vienna," taught those who worked in the world of business that the responsibility for preserving a Christian world lay primarily with them.

Several other Vienna clergymen added to the prestige of the Christian Socialist movement. Father Rudolf Eichhorn, a priest from Floridadorf (in the industrial section of the city) was well known as a social worker even before he joined the Vogelsang Circle. In 1886 he wrote a widely-circulated pamphlet called _Weissen Sklaven der Wiener Tramwaygesellschaft_. Another popular writer on Christian social reform was the Redemptionist Father Georg Freund. Father Franz Stauracz, an active member of the Christian Socialist Party, founded a series of Catholic young men's clubs in Austria for the purpose of discussing social reform through political action.

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6 Funder, _Vom Gestern_, p. 110. Funder tells a story in this regard that is illustrative of Father Abel's approach. During a Catholic convention in Salzburg, Father Abel announced that he would lead a pilgrimage of men to Maria Plain. Women were explicitly excluded. The priest and his androus following made the trip to Maria Plain only to discover on arrival that the church was already filled with the ladies, quite smug for having outsmarted their spouses. The misogynistic Jesuit, not to be outdone, asked for the key to the church. Locking the women into the building, he improvised a small altar outdoors and there celebrated his mass for men only. One suspects that an occasional virile giggle bubbled up to heaven amid the prayers.

7 Kuppe, p. 242.

8 Ibid., p. 245.

9 Ibid., p. 242.
Father Joseph Scheicher was the founder of the Christian Socialist party organization in St. Pölten. Father Scheicher had studied at the St.-Andreas Jesuit seminary at the same time as his friend, Father Abel. Bad health, however, had forced him to leave the Jesuit school and to finish his studies at the diocesan seminary in St. Pölten where he was appointed professor of church history in 1878. As a young clergyman, Scheicher became interested in politics and social reform. He was a prolific writer, his most important work being Der Klerus und die soziale Frage, published in 1882. At the death of Baron Vogelsang in 1890, Scheicher took over as editor of the Monatschrift für christliche Sozialreform until he was succeeded by Wiard Klopp, Vogelsang's son-in-law, in 1896. In the same year, Scheicher was elected to the Lower Austrian diet, and in 1894 to the Reichsrat, from St. Pölten.10

The most distinguished member of the Christian Socialist movement, though not a clergyman, was Prince Alois Liechtenstein. A member of one of the most important noble families serving the Hapsburgs, Prince Liechtenstein was extremely conscientious in his dedication to social reform. Born in 1846, he was forty-four in 1890. He was a remarkably tall man, gaunt and thin, but muscular and athletic in appearance. He stood very straight and presented a picture of proud dignity which was hardly in keeping with the title of "Red Prince," given him by the opposition press. In 1870 Prince Liechtenstein had entered the diplomatic service. In the years just following the defeat of the Hapsburgs by Prussia, he was attached to the embassy in Berlin. Later he served in the Austrian

10 Ibid., p. 244.
embassy in France. The prince returned to Vienna in 1878 to enter domestic politics, and in the following year he was elected to the Reichsrat.

The electoral district which Liechtenstein represented in the Reichsrat was the Währing district number one, in Hernal, a suburb incorporated into the city of Vienna in 1890. When Prince Liechtenstein went there to campaign, he proved especially adept at maintaining the delicate balance between the aristocrat and the politician. To his constituents he always remained "the prince" (Austrians of all classes have always had a high regard for their aristocracy), but a prince that understood their problems and sincerely wanted to help them. In political groups or on the floor of the Reichsrat, Prince Liechtenstein talked very little. He was not a man of easy conversation. He was highly intelligent but thought slowly and preferred to work out his ideas in solitude before airing them in public. His speeches were never polemics; they were essays on social science. Usually, after having worked long and hard to prepare a manuscript, Prince Liechtenstein would memorize his speech for delivery. He usually took his manuscript with him but very seldom did he refer to it. Neither eloquent nor melifluous, his public addresses were nevertheless captivating by virtue of their sincerity, dignity, understanding, and wealth of factual detail.\(^\text{11}\)

It was Prince Liechtenstein who described the Christian Socialist program on the floor of the Reichsrat in 1891. This body had viewed with both fear and contempt the seating of delegates from the

\(^{11}\text{Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 109-10.}\)
radical lower bourgeois parties of Vienna after 1885. With only six members in the house of deputies in 1891 the Christian Socialist representation was not yet a serious threat. Nevertheless, it was to the party's advantage to have the august prince represent them. Liechtenstein outlined a program of social reform in which each point was justified by a sincere reference to basic Christian principles. In line with Vogelsang's teachings, Prince Liechtenstein's program was based on the idea that every person should be assured a standard of living which recognized his right to human dignity and would make it possible for him to live a moral Christian life.\(^{12}\)

These were the men who, during the nineties, worked out the platform of the Christian Socialist Party. Priests, scholars, aristocrats, and politicians met each Tuesday evening at the Hotel Ente to exchange ideas and to formulate a program. This program was transmitted to the people from the pulpit, through the press, and in political speeches. Frequently the emphasis varied to suit the audience but the essentials remained the same: the party program was Catholic; it recognized the rights and needs of the individual; it supported the dynasty and the empire; and, although not always explicitly, it became increasingly German nationalist.

The Christian Socialist Workers' League

An important result of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* was the founding of the Christian Socialist Workers' League. The original mover of this organization was Leopold Kunschak who in 1891 was a

saddler's apprentice twenty-one years old. There had been various Catholic workers' societies in Vienna, but after the promulgation of the encyclical in 1891, Kunschak wanted to bring all of these societies into a single organization which could have as its program the principles set forth in the Rerum Novarum. In his efforts he had the full support of the reform-minded clergy of Vienna and the unexpected cooperation of the Christian Socialist Party leaders.

By 1891 the Christian Socialists realized the need of directing a stronger appeal to the Austrian industrial workers. In December, 1888, and January, 1889, the Austrian Social Democrats had met at Hainfeld and formed a unified party led by the physician, Victor Adler. In the early nineties there was already talk of introducing a universal, direct, and equal franchise. Such a law would give a tremendous amount of strength to the Christian Socialists, but they would still be seriously limited if the Social Democrats were able to capture the vote of the Austrian workers. The Christian Socialist Party could hardly be expected to appeal to the worker class. Although technically the philosophy of Vogelsang favored improvements for the workers, the party organization of Vienna geared its appeal to the lower middle class, who, fearing competition from industry, were no more favorable to the industrial worker than they were to the industrial capitalist. Therefore, in a belated attempt to attract the worker class by appealing to his Catholicism, the party leaders decided to sponsor Kunschak's efforts to organize the Vienna Catholic workers' clubs.

With the help of Gessmann, Kunschak held a preliminary organizational meeting on 21 September 1892. On 4 December 1892 there was a
meeting for the official founding of the Christian Socialist Workers' League. The Catholic workers there present were treated to a visit from several dignitaries of the Christian Socialist Party, including Lueger, Gessmann, Prince Liechtenstein, and Father Rudolph Eichhorn. The cabinet-maker Leopold Bischof was elected head of the workers' league (who stepped down in favor of Kunschak in 1897). During the next several years Kunschak organized similar Christian Socialist workers' clubs in other industrial areas of Lower Austria. By November 1895 he was able to establish a Christian Socialist workers' paper, the Freiheit, which appeared bi-monthly. At a Catholic workers' convention in Vienna in 1896, forty-eight delegates claimed to represent 20,000 Catholic workers from all parts of Lower Austria. Although Kunschak's organization was moderately successful, it did not prevent the majority of Austrian workers from giving their support to the Social Democrats.

The Political Position of the Christian Socialists Before the Electoral Reform of 1896

The success of the Christian Socialist Party in Lower Austria during the nineties raised the question of its relationship with the other clerical group, the German conservative parties of the Alpine provinces. When Prince Liechtenstein had joined the Christian Socialists in 1889, most of the German conservatives of the Center Club rejoined the Hohenwart Club. Many of these conservative delegates joined

\[^{13}\text{Bid., p. 293.}\]

\[^{14}\text{The two delegates from the rural curia of Vorarlberg remained independent and did not join any parliamentary alignment until they came into the Christian Socialist Club in 1901.}\]
only reluctantly; they still did not want to lend their support to the government and they would have preferred a political alliance which was purely German. There was considerable sentiment among the German conservatives for an understanding with the Christian Socialist delegates, which could be the foundation of a Catholic and German bloc strong enough to permit their independence from the Hohenwart Club. The main spokesman for this point of view was Dr. Alfred Ebenhoch, leader of the Catholic conservative party in Upper Austria. Ebenhoch and his sympathizers realized that the nature of the urban Christian Socialists was basically incompatible with their agrarian and conservative organization, but they believed that, when acting only in the Reichsrat, the two groups would be in agreement on major issues. Both were clerical, German, antiliberal, and anti-Magyar.\textsuperscript{15}

The more conservative delegates of the German Alpine provinces, however, viewed the Vienna Christian Socialists as dangerously radical, and, with few exceptions, the Austrian hierarchy endorsed this opinion.\textsuperscript{16}

In the summer of 1892 the Clerical-Conservative Party of Upper Austria, the group most sympathetic to the Christian Socialists, organized the third All-Austrian Catholic Day in Linz. The main theme of this convention was the promotion of understanding between the two Catholic parties. Karl Lueger, whose demagogic politics were too well known to be overlooked, wisely remained at home for the occasion and allowed the Vienna group to be represented by the more presentable team

\textsuperscript{15}Kolmer, V, 421, 480.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 415-21.
of Prince Alois Liechtenstein and the professor of moral theology from St. Pölten, Dr. Joseph Scheicher. Prince Liechtenstein, who pleaded for the political unity of the parties, was the main speaker of the day.17 Conciliation and cooperation pervaded the atmosphere during the convention with speakers from both parties participating in mutual assurances. But the bishops remained adamant in their censure of the Christian Socialists; and the German clericals, therefore, remained in the Hohenwart Club.18

One positive result of discussions held during the Linz party day was the founding of a new Catholic daily paper in Vienna, the Reichspost. The Christian Socialists in particular wanted an organ which could fill a need that the other two Catholic dailies could not provide. The Vaterland was too specifically conservative and the Deutsches Volksblatt too strongly pro-German and anti-Semitic to spread the doctrine of bourgeois clericalism and moderate social reform. A meeting of interested party members was held in May 1893, to carry out the plans for the paper made at Linz. Father Schindler was chairman. The first edition of the Reichspost appeared on 2 January 1894.19 Ambrose Opitz, a priest from Sudetenland, was the first editor but was soon succeeded by Dr. Friedrich Funder, who was still a man in his early twenties.20

17 Ibid., p. 169.
18 Ibid., pp. 170, 174.
19 Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 158-61.
20 Reading between the lines of Funder’s memoirs it is not difficult to conclude that as editor of the Reichspost he was acting primarily as a spokesman for Albert Gesmann. It is interesting to compare this with the fact that Leopold Kunschak, also a man in his
On 11 November 1893 Count Taaffe resigned after a fourteen-year tenure as prime minister. He was succeeded in office by Prince Windischgrätz21 whose cabinet contained a coalition including both the Liberal Club and the Hohenwart Club. Ebenhoch and his sympathizers among the clerical delegates smothered even more sharply at this alliance with the liberals.22 Any union at this time, however, was made impossible by the behavior of the Christian Socialists, who during the ministry of Windischgrätz, hurled venom at the clericals for cooperating with the liberals. By 1895 the Catholic hierarchy and the more conservative of the clerical delegates were not only uninterested in cooperation with the Christian Socialist Party but were seriously embarrassed by the party's Catholic orientation. In February 1895 the Cardinal Count Schömborn of Prague; the Bishop of Brünn, Dr. Bauer; and the Dominican Father, Albert Maria Weiss, journeyed to Rome to persuade Pope Leo XIII to make a public statement that the Christian Socialist Party did not have the endorsement of the Catholic Church. This request was made in the name of all of the bishops of Austria and with the full knowledge and approval of the cabinet.23 The written complaint, which they had drawn up for the pope, accused the Christian Socialists of representing unhealthy elements of the electorate, of being not Catholic

twenties, who often seemed to be a puppet of Gessmann, was elected as head of the Christian Socialist Workers' Party about the same time that Funder took over as editor of the Reichspost.

21 A grandson of the famous general of that name.

22 Kolmer, V, 357.

23 Ibid., p. 412.
but socialist, of promoting class hatred and the overthrow of the existing order; and stated that the membership of many of the lower clergy in the party amounted to insubordination.\(^{24}\)

The papal secretary, Cardinal Rampolla, immediately summoned his friend, Father Schindler, to the Vatican to explain these accusations. Meanwhile, the papal nuncio in Vienna, Monsignor (later Cardinal) Agliardi, was using his influence on behalf of the Christian Socialists. On his arrival in Rome, Father Schindler had a personal audience with Leo XIII, who, after considering the evidence, gave Schindler a message for Lueger that "the leader of the Christian Socialists should know that he has a warm friend in the pope." The pope did not specifically take sides in what he considered a domestic issue, but his replies made clear that his sympathies were with the Christian Socialists.\(^{25}\) Later Lueger also made a trip to the Vatican, where he was warmly received by the Holy Father. Thus a move to discredit the Christian Socialists ended in giving the party very favorable publicity.

In June 1895 the Windischgrätz coalition ministry gave way to a ministry of civil service officials. The head of the new ministry was Count Casimir Badeni, a Polish nobleman, often known as the Hapsburg Bismarck, because of both his appearance and his methods.\(^{26}\)

In November 1895 the Christian Socialists had their greatest victory to date by winning a majority of seats in the Vienna city

\(^{24}\)Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 144-45.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 147.

council after twenty years of antiliberal campaigning. The new council
selected Lueger as burgomaster. The excitement of victory was soon
dampened, however, when Francis Joseph refused to confirm Lueger's
election. During the campaign the Christian Socialists had staged some
excessive antiforeign demonstrations which had alarmed the emperor.
Lueger and his party strongly opposed the fact that many Viennese utili-
ties were developed and operated with foreign capital. 27 Heated by cam-
paign oratory, some enthusiastic Viennese subjected foreign merchants to
such insults that the Vienna grain market had to be moved to Budapest
for several days. 28 There seemed to be some danger of heavy withdrawals
of foreign capital, which would have been ruinous to the Austrian economy.
The emperor was acting also on behalf of influential Viennese Jews who
were naturally concerned for themselves and their businesses should
Vienna be dominated by the Anti-Semitic party. The Hungarian government,
resenting the anti-Magyar speeches of Lueger and his party, added their
pleas to the emperor that he not confirm Lueger's election. 29

The Alpine clericals, however, sided with the Christian
Socialists. The refusal of the emperor to confirm Lueger as burgomaster
was the deciding factor which led a group of nineteen conservative dele-
gates to resign from the Hohenwart Club. 30 A year later these delegates
joined with eleven other clericals in forming a new party, the Catholic

27 Kuppe, p. 319 ff.
28 May, p. 310.
29 Ibid.
30 Hantsch, II, 467.
Peoples' Party, which included the conservative representatives from Styria, Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, and Upper Austria. Baron Dipauli, the head of the delegation from Tyrol, was elected chairman, and Alfred Ebenhoch of Upper Austria, vice-chairman.\(^{31}\) It was understood that the Catholic Peoples' Party was merely the neutral ground on which the clericals would have to stand before arranging a closer union with the Christian Socialists.

**Christian Socialist Electoral Successes: 1896-1900**

The refusal of the emperor to confirm Lueger as Burgomaster of Vienna actually proved advantageous to the Christian Socialist Party. The "burgomaster question" became a cause célèbre throughout the Austrian half of the monarchy: the antagonisms, pro and con, which were aroused by the incident, soon made the party's name well known far beyond its own political bailiwick of Lower Austria. Karl Lueger became a martyr in the cause of democracy against autocracy; a martyr with whom an even larger number of Vienna lower bourgeoisie could identify themselves and whom they recognized, now almost unanimously, as their political leader. It was after the confirmation controversy that Lueger became a myth to the people of the city, the "uncrowned king of Vienna," and his name and person almost sacrosanct; a situation which the party exploited frequently and successfully.

The Christian Socialist position was considerably strengthened in 1896 by a further revision of the electoral laws for the Reichsrat. Count Badeni, in an effort to end the embarrassing agitation for a

\(^{31}\)Kolmer, VI, 180.
general, equal, and direct franchise, created a new curia in which all adult males were to vote whether or not they already had a vote in one of the other curias. This fifth or general curia was to send 72 delegates to the house of deputies. The other 353 deputies were still elected by one-third of the population who voted in the original four curias. At the same time, the tax requirement for the rural and urban curias was reduced from five to four gulden.\textsuperscript{32}

In another city council election in April 1896 (the fourth that had been called since November 1895 in an effort to end the impasse), the Christian Socialists polled an even surer majority, Lueger was again elected burgomaster, and the emperor again refused to confirm his election. Meanwhile, elections to the Lower Austrian diet of that year gave the Christian Socialists thirty-one of the seventy-eight seats. As the antiliberal agrarians controlled fourteen seats, the liberals were outvoted for the first time in this diet, long a liberal stronghold. Following these elections, three Christian Socialists were elected to the eight-member provincial executive board: Albert Gessmann, Father Scheicher, and Leopold Steiner.\textsuperscript{33}

In March 1897 new elections were called for the Reichsrat, the first in which the entire adult male population cast votes in the Fifth Curia. In Lower Austria (including Vienna) the Christian Socialists carried nine of the ten Fifth Curia mandates. They lost only the Vienna First District, the business center, which was understandably liberal.

\textsuperscript{32}Kolmer, VI, 162-172.

\textsuperscript{33}Scheicher, V, 120; Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 189.
In the unbalanced electoral system, the increased Christian Socialist representation still did not carry much weight in the Reichsrat, but it did indicate the voting power that the party might expect in the event of a universal, direct, and equal franchise. Including seats from the other curias in Lower Austria and one seat each from the Fifth Curia of Bohemia, Styria, and Vorarlberg, the Christian Socialists, in 1897, had twenty-seven out of 425 mandates in the house of deputies.\textsuperscript{34}

On 8 April 1897, the Vienna voters were called to the polls to elect a city council for the fifth time in sixteen months. This time the Christian Socialists received ninety-three of the 132 seats, and again they elected Lueger burgomaster. By this time the Christian Socialists had controlled the city council for well over a year with no genuinely tragic results, and Francis Joseph condescended to confirm the election.\textsuperscript{35} The emperor had been impressed, too, when the Fifth Curia vote showed that the Christian Socialists unquestionably enjoyed the confidence of the people of Vienna.\textsuperscript{36}

Shortly after the Reichsrat election of 1897, the Catholic Peoples' Party indicated their willingness to create a united bloc of the two parties in the house of deputies. Representatives of the two parties met at the Vienna city hall on 26 March 1897: Baron Dipauli and Alfred Ebenhoch for the Catholic Peoples' Party; Lueger, Prince Liechtenstein, Gessmann, and Pattai for the Christian Socialists. Only

\textsuperscript{34}Hantsch, II, 467.

\textsuperscript{35}Kuppe, pp. 372-73.

\textsuperscript{36}Hantsch, II, 488-9.
a general plan was discussed at this time; the actual negotiations were
to be arranged later. 37

It seemed that in March 1897 the Christian Socialists and the
Catholic Peoples' Party were but the rural and urban wings of a clerical
party which would encompass all of the German provinces. But an event
took place the following month which made very clear that the two parties
represented very different points of view and which postponed a union of
the two parties for another decade. This event, which almost spelled the
doom of parliamentary government in Austria, was the promulgation of the
Badeni language ordinances on 5 April 1897 stipulating that all civil
service officials in Bohemia and Moravia must use both the German and
Czech languages for official business. 38

Although these ordinances appeared on the surface an entirely
fair and sensible solution to the German-Czech nationality difficulties,
they were greeted with violent opposition by German people in all parts
of Austria, an opposition which was vividly reflected by their repre-
sentatives in the Reichsrat. 39 Following the Badeni laws the German

37 Reichspost, 30 March 1897, pp. 1-2.

38 Kolmer, VI, 209-211.

39 Neither the Czechs nor the Germans could accept the Badeni
ordinances, as these laws indicated that the government did not intend
to fulfill the aspirations of either group. The Germans wanted Bohemia
and Moravia to be divided administratively by nationality: a program
equivalent to unscrambling an egg. The Czechs (i.e., the dominant
Young Czech Party) would accept nothing short of an Ausgleich in which
they would be the dominant nationality in the autonomous state. The
Germans further objected to the law because, while most educated Czechs
spoke German, very few Germans were competent in Czech. The laws then
were tantamount to handing over the civil service to the Czechs.
parties in the Reichsrat, at the lead of Georg von Schöenerer, began a policy of vehement obstructionism in the house, in which the hurling of inkstands augmented the arguments for German cultural superiority.

The Badeni language ordinances had made an uncontrollable eruption of the long smoldering nationality antagonisms among the peoples of Austria. It became impossible for any political party to survive unless it gave full reign to nationalistic prejudices. In the decade from 1897 to 1907 the Christian Socialists dutifully rang the changes on a fanatic Germanism. In November 1897 the more moderate German parties in the Reichsrat united in a bloc called the German Mutual Assurance. This bloc included the German Austrian Club (moderate liberals), the Constitution-true Large Landholders (pro-liberal), the Catholic Peoples' Party, and the Christian Socialists. Their program attempted to appeal to the prejudices of their German voters without demanding any German separatism which would involve a dissolution of the monarchy. The fact that the Christian Socialists were willing to join a political alliance which included the liberal parties shows to what an extent nationalism overshadowed all other issues during these years.

As might be expected, Georg von Schöenerer reached a peak of popularity in the period of crisis following the language ordinances. In the heat of success the Schöenerer party preached a pro-German platform which was highly treasonous: the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy and the annexation of the German provinces to the German empire. Schöenerer also attacked the ultramontane loyalties of the Hapsburg imperial and royal government in his famous "Los von Rom" doctrine. The

40 Hantsch, II, 470.
fanatic pronouncements of Schönerer during his short but spectacular vogue in some ways turned to the advantage of the Christian Socialists. Although Schönerer's temporary popularity seriously encroached on the Christian Socialist following, many devout Catholics, especially in the rural areas of Lower Austria, revolted by the excesses of Schönerer, came to recognize the value of the vital clericalism and to respect the Austrian loyalty of the so-called "radical" Christian Socialists.

The consequences of the Badeni language ordinances also led to a split in the Catholic Peoples' Party of Tyrol. Count Badeni had yielded to public pressure and resigned as minister-president in November 1897. After a short-lived ministry under Baron Gautsch, Count Francis Thun was asked to head the government in March 1898. In an effort to secure the support of the German clerical delegates for an overdue renewal of the Ausgleich, ⁴¹ Count Thun invited Baron Joseph Dיפauli, the leader of the Catholic Peoples' Party, into his cabinet as minister of commerce. Baron Dיפauli accepted this post in October 1898. ⁴² Many of the delegates of the Catholic Peoples' Party were sharply opposed to the entrance of Dיפauli into the cabinet and to the fact that members of their party would be expected to vote for the renewal of the Ausgleich. At the personal request of the emperor, however, all but two of the party members eventually complied. These two delegates, Schöpfert

⁴¹Pending at this time was not only a solution to the crisis created by the Badeni language ordinances but also the renewal of the Ausgleich with Hungary. The delegates of the German Alpine provinces who had seceded from the Hohemvart Club had, by virtue of this fact, expressed nonsupport of the Ausgleich.

⁴²Kolmer, VII, 133.
and Kapferer, both of Tyrol, resigned from the Catholic Peoples’
Party.\(^4\)

Schöpfer, an ordained priest and a professor of exegesis at the
diocesan seminary in Brixen, was the leader of a wing of clerical
political opinion in Tyrol, known as the "Sharper Tone," which was
similar to that of the Vogelsang Circle in Vienna. The "Sharper Tone"
criticized the clerical party (which in Tyrol was strongly influenced
by the hierarchy, particularly the prince-bishop of Brixen) for taking
too passive a role in supporting the traditional feudal conservative
position. They advocated instead that the church and its political rep-
resentatives take an active lead in promoting a Christian way of life
through modern constitutional means.\(^5\)

As Father Schöpfer was the editor of the popular clerical
organ, The Brixener Cronik, his resignation from the Catholic Peoples’
Party set off a lively press war between the two factions of Tyrolian
clericals, with the Tiroler Stimmen acting as champion for Baron
Dipauli.\(^6\)

Following the split in the Tyrolian party, the Catholic Peoples’
Party ceased to exist. The former deputies of the party rejoined the
other German conservatives in the Center Club. As the Hohenwart Club
had since been dissolved, there was no longer a question of serving the
interests of a supranational conservative bloc.

\(^{4\text{a}}\) Klötz, Dr. Aemelian Schöpfer: Priester und Volksmann

\(^{4\text{b}}\) Ibid., pp. 160-65. Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 91.

\(^{4\text{c}}\) Klötz, pp. 165-89.
In 1900 another general election was called for the Reichsrat. Although the Christian Socialists had made clear their German nationalist sympathies, they lost many of their Lower Austrian mandates to the German Nationalist parties of Wolf and Schönerer. While the German Nationalist parties jumped from five to twenty-one seats, the Christian Socialists dropped from twenty-eight to twenty-five.\footnote{On Whitsunday of 1899 (20 May) the parties of the German Mutual Assurance had met to agree on a common solution to the nationality crisis. Their resolution at this meeting is known as the Whitsunday Program. Cf. Appendix.}

After the convening of the Reichsrat in 1901, however, the Christian Socialist Club added six new members from Tyrol and Vorarlberg. In the election of 1900 Dr. Schöpfer's party had taken four seats from the conservatives, including that of Baron Dipauli! In the Reichsrat these four delegates\footnote{Hantsch, II, 481.} then joined the Christian Socialist Club.\footnote{Aemelian Schöpfer, Joseph Schraffl, Franz Huber, and Joseph Killchelm.} When Schöpfer and his followers joined the Christian Socialists, the two rural delegates from Vorarlberg, Jodok Fink and Martin Thurnherr, previously independent, also joined the club.\footnote{Reichspost, 8 January 1901, p. 1.} This gave the Christian Socialists all five seats from Vorarlberg: the two mandates from the urban curia and one from the Fifth Curia were already held by members of the party.

\footnote{Tbid.; Hermann Deuring, Jodok Fink (Vienna, 1932), p. 136.}
The new Reichsrat, however, soon proved incapable of carrying on business. The antipathies created by the language laws were still too strong to permit peace in the house. A ministry under Count Clary had repealed the Badeni ordinances, but this move so embittered the Czech delegates that they then took up the obstructionist methods taught them by the Germans. During the years until the universal suffrage law of 1907 the important work of government was not carried on in the Reichsrat but in the provincial diets and the community councils. It was during this period, when the Christian Socialists controlled both the Vienna city council and the provincial diet of Lower Austria, that some of their most important work was accomplished.

Christian Socialists in the Vienna City Council and the Lower Austrian Diet: 1900-1907

With the confirmation of Karl Lueger as burgomaster the Christian Socialist Party was in unchallenged control of the Vienna city council and remained so until the end of the monarchy. Once in office the party almost immediately put into force their program of municipalization of public utilities, thus fulfilling the worst expectations of their liberal opponents. The greatest controversy came over the municipal gas works which Lueger wanted to build. At that time gas was supplied to Vienna by a British firm under contract with the city. As their contract was to expire by October 1899, Lueger was determined to have a city gasworks erected by that time. The vested interests tried to block any loans for the project, but Lueger was able to acquire the funds and proudly met the deadline. Other city projects came in astoundingly quick succession. By 1900 there was a municipal electric works with
which virtually the entire trolley system was electrified by 1902. New trolley lines brought the suburbs into commuting distance. A new fresh water source was opened by 1910. A civic social reform program brought city employees invalid and old age pensions, and sickness and accident insurance. These were but the most significant of the activities of the city council during the tenure of the Christian Socialists.\textsuperscript{51}

By 1903 the six-year tenure of Lueger had expired. He was returned by a landslide vote in 1903 and again in 1909. In a provincial election of 1902 the Christian Socialists also achieved a controlling majority in the Lower Austrian diet. They carried all but one\textsuperscript{52} of the Vienna mandates. In the light of this success the emperor appointed Prince Alois Liechtenstein as Landmarshall of Lower Austria. With Liechtenstein presiding over the provincial diet and Lueger burgomaster of Vienna, the party was able to integrate the work of the two governments. In the new executive committee of the province where three of the eight members had been Christian Socialists, there were now seven. In addition to Steiner, Gessmann, and Scheicher, were Robert Meyer, Robert Pattai, Hermann Bielohlawek, and Joseph Sturm.\textsuperscript{53}

The province of Lower Austria, primarily under the leadership of Albert Gessmann, carried through a program modeled on that of the city of Vienna. Similar benefits were extended to provincial employees. Particular attention was given to public health and welfare: a hospital

\textsuperscript{51}Kuppe, pp. 391-96.

\textsuperscript{52}Floridsdorf, which sent a Social Democrat.

\textsuperscript{53}Scheicher, V, 120.
for the mentally ill was built at Steinhof; there was a provincial insurance program, an unemployment program, orphanages, and a provincial electric works. For the farmer there were agronomy studies, fertilizer aids, a savings bank, and a public slaughter house. Gessmann himself was the committeeman in charge of public education for Lower Austria from 1896 to 1908. The law of 1869, which had removed public education from the jurisdiction of the church, had placed it with the provincial governments. Thus the public school system of the whole province including the city of Vienna came under Gessmann and the administration of a clerical party.

Gessmann was also active in promoting a farmers' cooperative society in Lower Austria. A Farmers' Society founded in Tyrol in the late 90's by Joseph Schraffl, a political associate of Schöpfer, had proved not only of great value to the farmer but also a means of propagating the Christian Socialist program among the small independent peasantry. Gessmann realized that such an organization would also be advantageous in Lower Austria. The Lower Austrian Farmers' League was founded in 1906; its first president was the Christian Socialist, Joseph Stöckler. The function of the league was to make the small independent farmer aware of his class and to provide a means for this class to work together for the amelioration of common problems.

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54 Hantsch, II, 483; May, p. 312; Kuppe, pp. 459-66.
55 Hantsch, II, 484.
The Christian Socialists and the Ausgleich

During this period in which nationalistic antipathies raged within the Reichsrat, relations between Austria and Hungary also reached a dangerous lowpoint. The basic disagreements revolved around the financial arrangements which returned on schedule every ten years to plague the troubled monarchy. Austrians argued that, as Hungary's population and economy had expanded at a greater rate than her own, Hungary should raise her contribution to the common budget over the established 32.5 per cent. Hungarian politicos not only had no intention of raising their ante, but many were anxious to declare economic independence by abolishing the customs union and the mutual state bank. By the late nineties a new political party had come into prominence in Hungary demanding complete independence from Austria; they would recognize only that the reigning Hapsburg was king of Hungary. The head of this party was none other than Francis Kossuth, son of the celebrated leader of the revolution of 1848.

The renewal of the financial arrangements which were due in 1897 had been postponed on a year to year basis and finally settled only in 1901. No sooner had this problem been bedded down than a new crisis rocked the catamaran ship of state. In a new Hungarian parliament elected in 1901, the Kossuth party, while not a majority, had grown alarmingly and proceeded to make their influence felt through bargaining and obstructionism. The following year a bill was presented to this parliament asking for a routine increase in the number of Hungarian troops for the common army in keeping with the increase in the population. Led by the Kossuth party, but with ample support from the other
Magyar delegates, the parliament refused to vote for the increment unless Magyar were used as the language of command for Hungarian regiments. This unheard of recalcitrance let loose a storm of resentment from the other side of the Leitha. Francis Joseph was incensed. As always, the emperor's primary concern was the strength and prestige of his domains as a European power. In this regard he always considered his monarchy as a single state. In his mind the army was the one institution where the concept of an integrated realm still survived and where it must, at all costs, remain. In his famous statement while reviewing troops at Chlapy in Galicia (16 September 1903) the emperor made very clear that he would not tolerate any separatism in his common army. The issue was temporarily resolved the following year when a compromise bill was forced through the Hungarian parliament.

During the agitation in Austria which accompanied the army crisis of 1902-3 the Christian Socialists in the house of deputies and elsewhere, although often in a demagogic tone, showed their support of the emperor and of the integrity of the monarchy. Karl Lueger made political capital of the situation by feeding the indignant Austrians with speeches lambasting what he called the Judeo-Magyar ruling clique of Hungary.

In this decade of nationalist problems from 1897 to 1907 the Christian Socialists both singly and collectively joined in the popular pasttime of producing reorganization plans for the Hapsburg Monarchy. Dr. Joseph Scheicher led off as early as 1900 with a brochure entitled Aus dem Jahr 1920. In this utopian year of 1920 Dr. Scheicher envisioned a federated Hapsburg government called the "United Eastern
States" embracing semi-autonomous provinces delineated according to nationality. Each provincial unit would employ its own language while German would remain the language of the federal government. Among these provinces, of course, Hungary, shorn of its non-Magyar areas, would have no greater autonomy than the other provinces. Another proposal which attracted many of the Christian Socialists, especially Karl Lueger, was that presented by Aurel Popovici, a Rumanian from Transylvania. In his book, Die vereinigten Staaten von Grossaestreich (1906), Popovici gave the first organized presentation of the Great Austrian idea which with modifications became the basis of almost all of the reorganization plans up to 1918. Popovici's system was similar in concept to Scheicher's though more practical and far more detailed. He would create fifteen provinces, also based on nationality. These provinces would include in their jurisdiction enclaves of members of that nationality located in other provinces, although it seems incredible that anyone raised in Transylvania could have believed this arrangement practicable. The fifteen provinces would be united under a strong central (and German dominated) Hapsburg imperial government.56

The Christian Socialist plans, proposals, and prejudices regarding the nationality question and the reorganization of the monarchy were summarized in a manifesto of their party convention at Eggenburg on 17 September 1905. The manifesto was a strongly worded denunciation of the dualist system and of the Magyar hegemony in Hungary.57

57 Reichpost, 19 September 1905, pp. 1-3.
CHAPTER III

THE CREATION OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST EMPIRE PARTY

The Universal, Equal, and Direct Franchise

By 1905 Francis Joseph was ready to apply drastic measures to quiet the divisive nationalistic forces which were threatening his monarchy. Many times the emperor had been advised that this nationalist particularism was a bourgeois concept; that it could be overcome by extending the franchise to the loyal lower classes. Count Taffe had tried this remedy in 1893, but the emperor was not yet convinced, and the attempt aborted. Now the situation had not only become increasingly more difficult, but the loyalty of such a "radical" party as the Christian Socialists during the recent crises had made Francis Joseph more sympathetic to such a solution.1

The Austrian Reichsrat which convened in September 1905, hummed with rumors that the government might ask for a universal franchise. The opening speech of minister-president Gauthsch made tempting allusions to the idea but no definite announcement. Nevertheless, during the next few days a flood of suffrage proposals came from the floor. Those of the Christian Socialists, who had since their inception led the cry for a universal franchise, showed that they had begun to cool slightly to the idea. The significant increase in the popularity of the Social Democratic

1Hantsch, II, 488.
Party meant that, in the event of a completely equal suffrage, this party would become a serious challenge to the Christian Socialist hegemony in Lower Austria. Karl Lueger indicated his party's dilemma by coating the universal suffrage proposals with suggestions that minorities be protected, that voting be compulsory, and that a residence qualification be required. Lueger's friend, Richard Weiskirchner, even suggested a residence requirement of five years, which would withhold the franchise from transient workers, both industrial and agricultural, but his party did not back him. With or without modifications, the Christian Socialists still realized that they stood to gain by a universal suffrage, and when the proposals came to a vote on 6 October, the party voted for them almost to a man.  

As the government showed no interest in these proposals, the deputies were completely surprised when early in November Baron Gautsch again appeared before the house and told them that the government was about to introduce a universal, direct, and equal franchise. Both Gautsch and the Hungarian premier had been summoned to Bad Ischl a few days earlier and instructed by the emperor to bring about the suffrage reforms as soon as possible.  

The arrangements were pushed through with astounding

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3 Jenks, p. 41; Rudolf Sieghart, Die Letzten Jarzehnte einer Großmacht (Berlin, 1932), p. 83. The emperor had undoubtedly been influenced by the fact that Nicholas II had promulgated the October Manifesto for Russia a few days earlier. Although the franchise granted in accordance with this manifesto was extremely limited, the fact that Nicholas II was thinking of constitutional reforms at all would have been encouraging to Francis Joseph.
alacrity for Austria. By February 1906, Baron Gautsch presented the Reichsrat with the new electoral program. The debates on the reform lasted until 22 March 1906, at which time Alfred Ebenhoeh gave the summary and defense of the government proposals. A committee of forty-nine deputies, with membership apportioned according to party and nationality, was appointed to work out the details of the reform. On this committee Gessmann represented the Christian Socialists and Ebenhoeh the Catholic Conservatives. ⁴ It was no easy job to work out the reform or to get it through the parliament. For the past ten years it had been almost impossible to get the Reichsrat delegates to agree on anything; now they were being asked to support a measure which was specifically designed to vote many of them out of their seats.

During April the bill almost founderd. The Polish delegates, partly at the instigation of an intrigue originating in the upper house, presented demands designed to kill the reform. This incident forced Baron Gautsch to resign, but he was able to choose a successor, Prince Conrad Hohenlohe, who had been a successful reformer as governor of Trieste. Within a month, however, Hohenlohe was in difficulty with the Hungarian premier over the tariff agreement and he also resigned.

Francis Joseph asked Hohenlohe to recommend a successor who could carry through the franchise reform. The emperor was particularly anxious this time to find a premier who would be acceptable to Francis Ferdinand. He realized that his nephew had considerable influence among those die-hard aristocrats who were most determined to kill the reform and whose machinations had forced the resignation of Baron Gautsch.

⁴Jenks, p. 53.
Hohenlohe's recommendation was Max Vladimir Freiherr von Beck. Beck was an excellent choice. As an official in the Ministry of agriculture, he was well known for his hard work, his ability to carry through difficult assignment, and for the political acumen to have his measures accepted by the bedlam in the Reichsrat. Beck, furthermore, was a close friend and confidant of Francis Ferdinand.

On being summoned by Francis Joseph, Beck explained that he did not wish to accept the position until he had consulted Francis Ferdinand. The emperor, however, was impatient. As Francis Ferdinand was in Madrid attending the wedding of the king of Spain, Beck was obliged to accept the post without his consent. This was later to prove a serious error. Beck became prime minister on 2 June 1906.

During the summer and fall of 1906 the committee for the electoral reform worked with surprising energy and co-operation to prepare the bill. As prime minister, Beck proved adamant in preventing obstructionist techniques or the extreme demands of particular groups from hampering the committee's work. The reform bill was finally completed by 9 October 1906. The revised house of deputies was to have 516 members: 233 German, 259 Slavic, and 24 Italian and Rumanian. These seats were distributed among the provinces according to population. Within the provinces, voting districts were created according to nationality. There were some inequalities caused by necessary compromises, but no glaring injustices. Considering the obstacles involved the bill was well devised. It passed the lower house by a vote of 194 to 63 on 1 December 1906. On 21 January 1907 it passed the Upper House (by a dangerously narrow

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margin) and on 26 January, the bill received the official sanction of the emperor.

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The Christian Socialists in the Campaign of 1907

The promulgation of the universal, direct, and equal suffrage law in January 1907, greatly enlarged the electorate in the Austrian half of the empire. The abolition of the curias increased in particular the proportionate representation of three general classes in the German areas of the empire: the small farmers, the lower bourgeoisie, and the workers. Although the Christian Socialist Party attempted to win votes from all three of these groups, the workers' class in the empire, as it turned out, was the province of the Social Democrats. The Christian Socialists, however, were able to find a substantial following among the lower bourgeoisie and the small farmer, and the increased electorate made it possible for them to expand to an empire-wide party. This Herculean task was carried out by the party leaders between the time the new franchise bill went into effect in January 1907, and the elections to the Reichsrat in May 1907, although a good deal of the ground work had been done before this time.

Although Karl Lueger was recognized as the titular head of the Christian Socialist Party until his death in 1910, and his persuasive personality was necessary both for the popularity of the party and for the harmony of the various factions within it, the man most responsible for the actual organization of the Christian Socialists on an empire-wide basis was Gessmann. Rudolph Sieghart overstates the case only slightly when he writes that "the growth of the party from a local

6Jenks, pp. 59-62; Hantsch, II, 495.
party to an empire party of great strength was the work of a single man, Albert Gessmann.⁷ Political opponents often referred to Gessmann as the "Chief of Staff" of the Christian Socialist Party.

Like Luenger, Gessmann was a native Viennese of lower bourgeois origin. With a personality very different from Luenger's, he made an interesting complement to the burgomaster. Gessmann lacked Luenger's friendliness and winning personality. "He was a cold person inwardly and outwardly." He had no sense of humor. He was by nature mifiant in his dealings with people, distrustful and unfriendly until he was well acquainted. What he lacked in warmth he made up with intelligence, energy, and hard work. He possessed a tremendous physical endurance which made him an indefatigable campaigner. When meeting with voters he was always equipped with a thorough knowledge of current political issues and of his party's position regarding them. While his speeches lacked popular appeal, they were persuasive because of their factual content, logical argument, and apparent sincerity.⁸ Gessman's main contribution to the Christian Socialist Party was not, however, in his dealings with the voters. His forte was party organization. It was he who took the many factions, social movements, religious groups, and local politicians and welded them into a single political party. This Gessman accomplished not so much with the rather broad appeal of the party program as with artful bargaining on every level. Gessman was not offended by the frequently shady aspects of local politics; he knew how to use these

⁷Sieghart, p. 318.

⁸Ibid.; Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 268-73.
things to achieve his ends.  

During the period when the Christian Socialist Party was reforming on an empire-wide basis, Gessmann was still the provincial executive committee member in charge of public schools in the province of Lower Austria. His office in the Lower Austrian building on the Herrengasse even more than the office of the burgomaster became the unofficial headquarters for the party organization. Friedrich Funder, one of the few who counted Gessmann as a personal friend, gives an interesting picture of Gessmann's method of operation.

Daily at 7:00 A.M. during his morning toilet and still in his underwear, he received the party secretaries and the men of the party's press staff to talk with them. Often he would be in the next room, the bathroom, giving them explanations and dictating articles in telegraphic style. He would not keep any assistant who could not get used to this system. These men usually left the house by 8:00 A.M.

Then at 8:00 he received members of the executive committee of the Christian Socialist club of the House of Deputies. By 10:00 he began his work in the government building of the province of Lower Austria.  

One of the most valuable assets for the expansion of the party was the centrally organized Christian Socialist press. Here again Gessmann, although himself not a journalist, was able to make excellent use of the extensive Catholic press of Austria which was conveniently integrated in the Piusverein. The Piusverein was founded at the Fifth All-Austrian Catholic Day (20 November 1905). Its purpose was to improve the dissemination of Catholic ideas by providing clerical journals in all

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9Scheichner, V., 110-11.
10Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 269.
11Named for Pope Pius V who had united the Christians in a crusade against the Turks.
parts of Austria with a centralized news service, with editorials giving
the church's interpretation of important events, and with articles and
essays by prominent Catholic clergy, writers, or politicians. Austrian
Jesuits, needless to say, were particularly active in the Piusverein.
In addition to articles, the organization also provided public speakers,
trained and organized by Father Victor Kolb, S.J., who on invitation
would explain or clarify Catholic points of view to local groups.

As a church-sponsored organization the Piusverein was able
to solicit funds through the parishes. This provided a lucrative source
of income which would not have been available to a purely political press
organization. The society supplied its member papers with enough money
that many tottering clerical journals throughout Austria could for the
first time compete with the leading newspapers in their areas. As the
urban journals of Austria were traditionally liberal, the increased
strength of the Catholic papers was of great advantage to the Christian
Socialist Party.

Both the Reichspost and the Vaterland joined the Piusverein.
12
From this time there was very little difference in the position taken
by these two papers, once bitter enemies. The Vaterland continued as
the journal of the clerical aristocracy under the editorship of the
aging intellectual, Dr. Kaspar Inthal. The Reichspost, edited by

12It is significant that the Deutsches Volksblatt did not
join the Piusverein. This paper, still edited by Ernst Vergani, repre-
Cented the German Nationalist wing of the Christian Socialists. These
moderate nationalists had not followed Schönerer and Wolf out of the
United Christians but had remained as a semi-autonomous group in the
Christian Socialist Club. The paper was anti-Semitic but not clerical.
As the leadership of the Christian Socialist Party drew closer to the
rural and clerical groups, the Deutsches Volksblatt tended to loosen
its connection with the party.
Friedrich Funder, presented a similar interpretation for the masses.

After the founding of the Piusverein, the Reichspost jumped to a leading position among Austrian newspapers. As the most important clerical paper in the capital city, the office of the Reichspost in the Strogzigasse became the base of operations for the Piusverein's news service. The Reichspost received almost half of the organization's annual financial contributions which enabled it to extend its coverage and improve its features. Within a year the circulation had doubled and by the time of the campaign of 1907, the Reichspost, the official organ of the Christian Socialist Party, was recognized as Austria's leading Catholic daily. 13

Gessmann, who was very influential in the policies of the Reichspost, had in the Piusverein an excellent propaganda machine for his efforts to expand the activities of the party throughout the empire.

For the expansion of the Vienna Christian Socialist Party to an empire-wide party, Gessmann had a twofold program. First, the party should be strengthened in those provinces where it was already established: Lower Austria, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg. Also, the party should try to effect either a union or a close working agreement with the clerical-conservative parties in those German provinces where this party already had a strong local organization and where the Christian Socialist's primarily bourgeois platform would not have an appeal to the predominantly agrarian populations: Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, and Carinthia. In the non-German provinces, the Christian Socialists would run candidates in whatever German areas they had a chance of carrying. In most of these areas there already existed some German-Catholic organization, which, whether or not it had been primarily political before the

13Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 319-29.
franchise reform could now be used as the basis of a local Christian Socialist party.

In carrying out his plan, Gessmann had the full co-operation of Alfred Ebenhoeh, the head of the clerical-conservative party of Upper Austria. During the campaign of 1907, Ebenhoeh gave Gessmann a verbal assurance that after the election he would lead his entire Upper Austria delegation into the Christian Socialist Club, whether or not the rest of the Center Club could be persuaded to follow him. On these conditions, Gessmann was able to promise Ebenhoeh that the Christian Socialists would make no effort to organize or to campaign in the province of Upper Austria.

In the other provinces where there was a strong conservative organization Gessmann was also able to arrange pre-election campaign agreements. The Christian Socialists promised to campaign only in urban districts where the conservatives did not place a candidate. In Salzburg, the arrangements were made with the provincial Catholic Conservative organization (known as the Clerical Party) headed by Baron Victor von Fuchs. According to the electoral divisions in the franchise reform of 1907, Salzburg had seven electoral districts, three urban and

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14 Ebenhoeh had, on many occasions since 1895, shown his desire to co-operate with the Christian Socialist Club in the Reichsrat. He had expressed willingness for the Center Club to join the Christian Socialists once in 1895 and again in 1904. Reichspost, 17 September 1904, p. 2.

15 Reichspost, 20 March 1907, p. 2. In 1905 a small Christian Socialist organization and press had been established in Linz, but in 1907 they did not carry their campaign beyond four urban districts where the Socialists were certain to win and where the conservatives had not put up a candidate of their own.
four rural. The three urban districts were controlled largely by the German Peoples' Party (German nationalist and liberal). The four rural districts were largely Catholic Conservative with some competition from a German nationalist conservative party. According to the compromise the Christian Socialists were permitted to run candidates in two of the urban districts. The third urban district and the four rural districts were reserved for the Catholic Conservatives.

In Styria there was already an active Christian Socialist organization. As in Lower Austria it was primarily an urban party. Unlike Lower Austria, however, it did not have a very significant following. In Styria the Christian Socialist Party was primarily a movement of the lower clergy to promote social and economic reform outside the framework of the Socialist Party and under the aegis of the Catholic Church. Thus it was possible for the urban Christian Socialists in Styria to make a compromise with the rural conservative party (the German Clericals) headed by Baron von Morsey. Of the thirty electoral districts in Styria, eleven were urban and nineteen were rural. Of the eleven urban districts ten were German and one Slovene. Twelve of the rural districts were German and seven Slovene. As the ten German urban districts were fairly securely in the hands either of the Social Democrats or of the German Liberals, the Conservatives (at no great cost to themselves) left all of them open to the Christian Socialists. The Christian Socialists ran candidates in all ten (and one was actually elected!) Of the twelve German rural districts in Styria three were

16Reichspost, 22 April 1907, p. 2; Summarische Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen von 1907 (Brünn, 1907), pp. 8-9.

17Kuppe, p. 484.
allotted to the Christian Socialists, all of whom were elected; the other nine were reserved for candidates of the Catholic Conservative Party, all of whom were likewise elected.\textsuperscript{18}

In Carinthia there was no German clerical-conservative party. Most of the German population voted either with the Social Democrats or the German Liberals. Therefore, the Christian Socialists were left an open field by the clericals. Nationalism was so strong among the German population of Carinthia, however, that the Christian Socialists were never able to establish there.

Only in Tyrol of the German provinces did it prove impossible for the Christian Socialists and the Catholic Conservatives to reach a compromise during the campaign. Since Aemelian Schöpfer and his colleagues had left the conservatives in 1901 and joined the Christian Socialists, there had been two Catholic parties in the Tyrol: the Christian Socialists, headed by Father Schöpfer, and the Catholic Conservatives, headed by Baron Joseph Dipauli until 1901 and then by Dr. Kathrein. On the other hand, the Christian Socialists stood a better chance of competing with the conservatives in Tyrol, as in this province, more than in the others, the Catholic Conservative Party was influenced by the aristocracy and the hierarchy and was therefore not always popular with the small farmers.

The city of Innsbruck as with many of the larger cities was so well organized by the German national parties and the Social Democrats that there was very little advantage to a Christian Socialist campaign there. The Tyrolian Christian Socialists made their appeal entirely to the small farmers, many of whom voted only in the Fifth Curia until 1907.

\textsuperscript{18}Summarische Ergebnisse..., pp. 8-11.
In 1902 the Christian Socialist press, Tirolia, founded a periodical farmers' journal, the _Tiroler Bauernzeitung_. In 1904 the Christian Socialists held a party day in Sterzing at which was founded the Farmers' Union (Bauernbund), an organization which fostered co-operative savings banks, insurance programs, and other services for the small farmers who resented the competition from the large landholdings. 19

Although the Christian Socialists did not have the co-operation of the episcopate of Tyrol it was still clearly a clerical party. The party's support in Tyrol increased tremendously when the Conservatives showed their opposition to the new franchise law. The Conservative Party was naturally opposed to this law which ended the curia system and decreased their representation. When the new franchise was sanctioned in January 1907, the Conservatives of Tyrol saw that if they were to preserve their identity at all, they would have to reach some compromise with the local Christian Socialist organization. Accordingly Dr. Altenweisel, the prince-bishop of Brixen, who since 1901 had been the leader of episcopal efforts to ruin the Christian Socialists, 20 traveled to Vienna to try to effect an agreement. On 27 January 1907, the bishop called a meeting of the Tyrolian delegates of the two parties in the parliament building. Representing the Conservatives were Dr. Kathrein, the head of the Conservative delegation, and Dr. Tollinger, Dr. Haneis, and Dr. Schrott. Representing the Christian Socialists were Father Schöpfer and Joseph Schraffl. 21

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19Kl8tz, p. 168.

20Until 1909 the Tyrolian clergy were expressly forbidden by the hierarchy to co-operate in any way with the Christian Socialist Bauernbund. Ibid.

21Reichspost, 29 January 1907, p. 9.
compromise had previously been agreed on for the five urban districts, according to which the Christian Socialists would not run a candidate in Innsbruck District #1; both parties would run candidates in Innsbruck District #2; and in Kufstein (District #3) the two parties would put up a single candidate. In Lienz (District #4) only the Christian Socialists campaigned and in Bozen (District #5) only the Conservatives. Prince-bishop Altenweisel now suggested that the eleven rural districts be divided four for the Conservatives and seven for the Christian Socialists. The Catholic Conservative delegates were willing to accept the suggestion but the Christian Socialists refused. If they permitted the bishop to dictate the terms of a compromise, they argued, the Christian Socialists would not be living up to their claim that they, unlike the conservative party, were not dominated by the episcopacy. Probably the main reason for the refusal, however, was the conviction of the Christian Socialists that with the new franchise they could win even more than seven of the eleven rural districts. As it happened they won ten of them.

In line with his plan to make the Christian Socialist Party into an "empire party," Gesmann also wanted Christian Socialist candidates to stand in the German electoral districts of the non-German provinces where the party had not previously been organized. In many of these districts there already existed political clubs of the German lower bourgeoisie.

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22 *Reichspost*, 7 March 1907, p. 9.
24 *Summarische Ergebnisse*, pp. 8-9.
which, of course, represented a much more significant electorate after the reform of 1907. Dr. Gessmann's method was to meet personally with the leaders of these clubs and to incorporate the local club into the larger Christian Socialist organization. Thus of the 55 German electoral districts of Bohemia the Christian Socialists were able to put up a candidate in 41 and to have a political agreement with the Catholic Conservative party in two others. In Moravia there were Christian Socialist candidates in 17 of the 19 German districts. In Silesia, of 9 German districts, eight had Christian Socialist candidates and in the ninth was an allied Catholic Conservative candidate. In the Bukovina there were Christian Socialist candidates in two of the four German electoral districts.\textsuperscript{25} The large percentage of Jews in the German areas of the Bukovina gave the less savory aspects of the Christian Socialist platform a peculiar local appeal.

The official declaration of the Christian Socialist Party as the Christian Socialist Empire Party came during a party day in Vienna on 10 March 1907. The Vienna leaders sent invitations to local Christian Socialist groups in all parts of the empire. The meeting took place at the Hotel Wimberger on the Neubaugürtel at 11:00 A.M. The Reichspost reported the occasion as follows:

Yesterday the Christian Socialist Party, the Empire Party, was really founded. Everywhere that there are German elections the Christian Socialist Party is represented. People have come from all over the empire to partake in the foundation ceremony.\textsuperscript{26}

The welcoming speech was given by Prince Liechtenstein. Dr. Lueger was ill and could not be present.

\textsuperscript{25}Reichspost, 27 April 1907, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{26}Reichspost, 11 March 1907, p. 9.
The election platform of the Christian Socialist Empire Party was adopted at this meeting. This platform showed that the party had something to offer almost every class of the electorate. The first clause stated that the Christian Socialist Party believed in the "extension of the political rights of the people." This was a non-committal statement by which the Christian Socialists meant no more than an endorsement of the recent franchise reform which had given their party existence. As this reform gave a vote to every adult male, any "extension" of the political rights would mean a more equitable distribution of electoral districts. Since this would give an increased vote to the Socialist and to the non-German nationalist parties, it is doubtful that the Christian Socialists seriously favored any further changes.

The second clause, a condensation of the Eggenberg Program of two years earlier, was an outspoken attack on the Ausgleich. Since 1905 the imperial ministry had been working on a renewal of the Ausgleich with Hungary, but as yet there had been no settlement which the Austrian Reichsrat would ratify. The Christian Socialists were opposed to the Ausgleich because they believed that any solution of the nationalities problem which gave one nationality group (i.e. the Magyars) a greater autonomy that the others was unsatisfactory. They favored a centralized government (dominated, of course, by Germans) in which Hungary would be one of several roughly-equal members. The Christian Socialists also attacked what they believed to be an unfair distribution of the financial responsibility of the two halves of the monarchy and an unfair trade agreement. Assuming that an enlarged Christian Socialist Party would be influential on a ministerial level, the statement began:

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27 This platform was printed in the Reichspost, 12 March 1907, pp. 1-2.
The most important task is a new relationship with the countries of the Hungarian crown. The Hapsburg monarchy cannot be an important power unless there is an improvement in the legislative and economic situation in Hungary. Since 1867 the Magyars have built up a state within the monarchy, but the Austrians have had to pay for it. This financial arrangement was made by the Jewish-Magyar minorities. The German-Slavic-Romanic peoples have been taken in because of the weakness of the government.... Austrian agriculture has been ruined by the unlimited import of Hungarian products. This Magyar dictatorship must end... The Christian Socialist party is a German party and will always defend the interest of the German people.

The third part of the platform of 1907 dealt with social security measures which were based on a program which the Christian Socialists had already successfully carried through in the city of Vienna. An introductory statement tried to differentiate the program of the Christian Socialists from that of the Social Democrats.

Contrary to the Social Democratic Party these reforms are for everybody. Whether an artisan or a landowner, a man is entitled to be cared for in case of poverty. We must particularly give economic protection to the Middle Class; they are the most important.

Most of the points in the Christian Socialists' social security program had not changed significantly since Prince Liechtenstein's speech in 1891; they included: old age insurance, unemployment insurance, legislation against unfair competition, protective legislation for the guilds and for the artisans, and establishment of state-sponsored credit organizations. But an interesting new provision called for legislation to protect the large department stores and other big business!

Part four of the platform was a program to protect the small farmer. "The Liberal economic system has done great damage to the farmers." The Christian Socialists wanted to free the property of the small farmer from taxation, to establish agricultural credit unions (to free the farmer from the necessity of "borrowing from the Jewish capitalists"), to provide state grazing facilities for cattle, and to establish
co-operative farmers' insurance programs. Most of these programs were already in effect in the province of Lower Austria and had been advocated by the Christian Socialists as a minority party in Tyrol. Part five set forth the Christian Socialist program for the workers. As the workers of the empire were almost certain to vote Socialist and as any really appealing demands for the workers would serve only to offend other classes whose support was more valuable, the Christian Socialist workers' platform was necessarily weak. Its wording was intended to appeal to the Catholic consciousness rather than the class consciousness of the worker. Still playing the tune of Baron Vogelsang but not on the crusader's trumpet the Christian Socialists demanded that the worker be "guaranteed enough income to support a family," that women be freed from labor to "encourage families and family life," that school attendance be enforced to prevent child labor, and that all workers be free from labor on Sundays and holidays. When operations required Sunday labor the worker should be guaranteed another day of rest. Working hours should be reduced "to insure a decent existence" and overtime and night work carefully regulated. The state should establish more workers' agencies to reduce unemployment. Finally, of course, the Christian Socialist Party would "carry through these principles in spite of the Jews and the Jewish press."

Another clause in the election platform was a rather limp attempt to take up the cause of the Catholic opposition to the Liberal-sponsored legislation of the 1860's and 1870's which had removed public education and the administration of marriage laws from the jurisdiction of the church. The rural wing of the party felt strongly that if a Catholic party were influential at the Reichsrat level a major program of that party should be the return of these jurisdictions to the church. The
German nationalist wing of the party in Vienna, already smarting at the co-operation with the clericals, would certainly be reluctant to see any political functions returned to the hierarchy. Never at a loss for an ambiguous phrase, the party leaders were able to compose a clause for the platform which Christian Socialist speakers in rural areas could, and did, expand and interpret to suggest a wholehearted support of the return of the education and marriage laws to the Church but which on the other hand need not offend nor alarm the urban electorate.

The Christian Socialist Party counts as one of the noblest values of the German peoples the Christian-German breeding which is reflected in the sanctity of marriage and of family life, and in the moral and religious education of the youth.

It was unfortunate for the party that its most popular and persuasive campaigner, Karl Lueger, was seriously ill throughout the pre-election period and unable to make any personal appearances. Lueger was suffering from an infection of the liver which also affected his eyes. Just a few days prior to the party day in Vienna in March 1907, he had been forced to request a six-week sick leave from the Vienna city council. The burgomaster spent this period at a villa in Italy which belonged to one of his friends. Although some of the party leaders visited him there, Lueger was virtually without influence during this crucial period in the party's development. On 23 April, only two weeks before the election, he was permitted to return to Vienna so that he could be propped up in front of the public before they went to the polls. Although Lueger retained his office as burgomaster of Vienna and remained as titular head of the party, he was never again as active in public affairs. He was very ill and almost blind until his death three years later. During these years

28 Reichspost, 12 March 1907, p. 9.
it may be assumed that Gessmann was the leading voice in the Christian Socialist Party.

Throughout the months of March and April, 1907, the Reichspost carried articles describing the speeches given by party leaders not only in Vienna but all over the Austrian half of the monarchy. One cannot read these articles without being appalled at the activity of Albert Gessmann who during these months gave speeches almost daily and appeared at party meetings in every part of the empire. Between January and May of 1907, Gessmann spoke before more than 400 groups.

The first election day was on 15 May 1907. The Christian Socialists themselves were surprised at their success (although they were even more surprised by the success of the Social Democrats who were taking even more seats than the Christian Socialists). The most phenomenal Christian Socialist victory was in the city of Vienna, the party's original citadel. Of the thirty-three Vienna mandates, the Christian Socialists won sixteen, the Socialists eight, and the liberals only one (the First District, in the old city, the center of the business district, and therefore, expected to be Liberal) in the first election. In eight districts there was no majority and the Christian Socialists stood against a Socialist candidate in each of them for the

29Kuppe, p. 480.

30In Austria, as in many countries with a multi-party system, there were two elections. In the first election only the candidates who received a majority of votes were considered elected. In districts where there was no candidate with a majority, there was a by-election, usually about one week later, in which the voters could choose between the two candidates with the highest number of votes. In this second election, one of the candidates was sure to poll a majority. The by-election made possible a practice whereby two or more parties could work together in the by-election to outvote the candidate which might actually have polled a plurality in the first election.
by-election.\textsuperscript{31} At Dr. Gessmann's recommendation, the Christian Socialists did not seek the co-operation of any of the losing parties against the Socialists in the by-election. What advantage might come to the party by the few extra seats gained in this way would be offset, Gessmann believed, by the bargains that would have to be made with the other parties.

In the by-election of 23 May, each of the two parties won four of the districts, giving the Christian Socialists a total of twenty and the Socialists twelve from the city of Vienna. In one of the four districts (\#5, Leopoldstadt, I) the Social Democrats had won the election only by combining with two of the losing parties. The Christian Socialists had almost one half of the votes cast in the city of Vienna: of 324,612 votes cast, 155,922 were for the Christian Socialists and about 164,690 against.\textsuperscript{33}

The Christian Socialist showing in the other urban districts of Lower Austria was less spectacular. Of the ten urban districts the Christian Socialists took only one (\#38, Mistelbach) on the first election, while the Socialists took four (\#34, Ebreichsdorf; \#35, Leising; \#42, Neunkirchen; \#43, Lilienfeld-Wilhelmsburg). Five districts had to be decided in the second election. In Zwettl (\#37) the Social Democrats combined with the German Peoples' Party (moderate German national and moderate liberal), neither of which had polled as many votes as the

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Summarische Ergebnisse}, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Reichspost}, 15 May 1907, p. 3.

Christian Socialists in the first election, and won the seat. In the by-election the Socialists won a clear majority in Wiener-Neustadt (#40). The German Peoples’ Party, presumably by agreement with the Socialists, took Krems (#36), although again the Christian Socialists had received more votes than either of the other two parties in the first election. The Christian Socialists, apparently without any combinations, won in Baden (#39) and in St. Pölten (#41). In every one of the twenty-one rural districts of Lower Austria the Christian Socialists won in the first election. From a total of sixty-four seats in the province of Lower Austria, the Christian Socialists won forty-four.  

In Upper Austria there were twenty-two districts: six urban districts and sixteen rural. In the six urban districts the Christian Socialists ran in only four and lost all of them. Dr. Ebenhoch’s conservative party (the Catholic Peoples’ Union) put up candidates in the two urban districts of Steyr (#4) and Wels (#5). Both of these went to the by-election in which the Conservatives lost Steyr (the more industrial) and took Wels. In the sixteen rural districts Dr. Ebenhoch’s party won all seats on the first election, which gave his party seventeen of the twenty-two districts of the province. 

In Salzburg the Catholic Conservative Party won all four rural districts, as was expected. The three urban districts, including the two in which the Christian Socialists had been permitted to run, went to the local German nationalist party (German Peoples’ Party).  

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34 Summariache Ergebnisse, pp. 4-5.  
35 Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
36 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
In Styria, as with all provinces where there was a significant non-German population, the German nationalist parties competed with the Christian Socialists for the loyalty of the lower bourgeoisie and the small farmer. Consequently, the picture here was neither as bright nor as uncomplicated as elsewhere. Of the eleven urban districts the Christian Socialists campaigned in ten and lost in all of them. The Socialists took six, the Liberals three, and the German Radicals three. There were nineteen rural districts: twelve German and seven Slovene. The Christian Socialists campaigned and won in three of the rural German districts (Märzzuschlag, #12; Bruck a.d. Mur, #13; Liezen, #14). The remaining rural German districts were left to the Catholic Conservatives who won all nine seats. In Carinthia there was no local Catholic Conservative organization. The Christian Socialists ran candidates in seven of the ten districts but took only one (Wolfsberg, #5).

The real surprise was in Tyrol where the Christian Socialist Party and the Catholic Conservative Party campaigned against each other. The Catholic Conservatives did not win a single seat in Tyrol. There were two districts where the two parties had run a single candidate. In Kufstein (urban district #3) a Conservative, Dr. Michael Mayr, and in Meran (rural district #13) a Christian Socialist, Dr. Franz Dorfmann. Both of these men were elected. Thus technically Dr. Mayr was a Conservative delegate but he subsequently joined the Christian Socialist Club in the Reichsrat.

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37 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
39 Ibid., pp. 16-19; Klötz, p. 162.
The four Christian Socialist candidates from Vorarlberg were all elected with a clear majority on the first vote as was expected.\(^{40}\)

In the four Slavic provinces of the north the Christian Socialists could not compete against the established parties which emphasized the nationalistic antagonisms. In Bohemia the Christian Socialists ran candidates in forty-one of the fifty-five German districts; none were elected. In Moravia the Christian Socialists ran candidates in seventeen of the nineteen districts; one was elected. No seats were won in Silesia where there were Christian Socialist candidates in eight of the nine German electoral districts. In Bukovina, where there were four German districts, a Christian Socialist stood in only one and lost. In Galicia, Gorizia, Istria, Carniola, Trieste, and Dalmatia, the Christian Socialists ran no candidates.\(^{41}\)

According to the final results of the election of May 1907, out of 516 seats, the Social Democrats with a total of eighty-five seats had the largest representation in the Reichsrat of any single party. The second largest was the Czech Club with eighty-three seats. The German National Union (a combination in the Reichsrat of various German nationalist, liberal, and agrarian parties which did not have either cohesion or an integrated program) had eighty seats. The Christian Socialists came fourth with only sixty-six seats. That either the Social Democrats or the Czechs could outvote any single German

\(^{40}\) *Summarische Ergebnisse*, pp. 18-19.

\(^{41}\) *Die Ergebnisse des Reichsratswahlen*, pp. 54-164.
party was unthinkable to the German delegates. Fear and opportunism thus cleared the path for an organic union of the Christian Socialist Party with the Catholic Conservative Party. The conservatives could bring thirty deputies into the Christian Socialist Club, and increase the sixty-six mandates of the Christian Socialists to a more comfortable ninety-six. This would make the Christian Socialists the largest single party in the Reichsrat.

The Merger of the Catholic Conservative Party with the Christian Socialist Party

Several factors contributed to making a merger of the Catholic Conservative Party with the Christian Socialist Party possible in 1907 although such a move had been rejected by the conservatives only a few years earlier. Of these factors the single most important was the unexpectedly large mandate of the Social Democratic Party and the parties of the Czech Club in the election of 1907. The Center Club (the organization of the German Catholic Conservative delegates) consisted of only thirty representatives after the election of 1907. There were seventeen delegates from Upper Austria, nine from Styria, and four from Salzburg. With such a small bloc they could not expect to carry any weight in the Reichsrat. Actually, the conservatives could count on only thirteen members as Ebenhoch, the head of the Conservative party of Upper Austria, had already announced (unofficially) that his seventeen delegates would join the Christian Socialist Club whether or not the other conservative delegates decided to follow him. With these seventeen new members the

\[42\] Summarische Ergebnisse, p. XII.

\[43\] On 1 May 1907, just prior to the election, Ebenhoch had made a specific public statement on the subject to which he later made reference in an article he wrote for the Reichspost on 9 June 1907, p. 1.
Christian Socialist Club would still have been four votes short of the Socialists. Therefore, the remaining thirteen members of the Center Club, whose small size rendered them impotent in the Reichsrat anyway, would find their own political interests served if, by adding their number to the Christian Socialist Club (a voting bloc which would be German, Catholic, and loyal to the emperor), they would make this club the largest voting block in the house.

The path toward a merger was further cleared by the fact that there were no Conservative delegates elected from Tyrol in 1907, and thus the Tyrolian clerical party no longer had a vote in the Center Club. It will be remembered that in Tyrol alone of the German provinces these two parties had been unable to divide their spheres of campaigning before the election of 1907. Therefore, the differences between the two parties were too sharply drawn and the feeling between the two groups too strong to permit a merger. But the absence of a Tyrolian member in the Center Club after the elections of 1907 made the negotiations for a merger considerably easier.

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43 Summarische Ergebnisse, p. XII.

45 Dr. Michael Mayr (a professor at the University of Innsbruck and the director of the governor's archives in Innsbruck) was elected from the Tyrolian Third District (Kufstein) as a member of the Tyrolian Catholic Conservative Party, but as he represented one of the two districts in which the Catholic Conservatives and the Christian Socialists had put up compromise candidates, he was listed as a Christian Socialist. He later joined the Christian Socialist Club on his own volition which cost him the support of his home party organization in the election of 1911. (Klötz, p. 162).
The thirty members of the Center Club met in Vienna on 1 June 1907, at 10:00 A.M. at the call of Baron von Fuchs of Salzburg to discuss the advisability of joining the Christian Socialist Union. The sentiment for the merger was by no means unanimous. Baron von Morsey of Styria in particular expressed strong doubts. He believed that it would not be possible to maintain a genuine conservative position within the framework of the Christian Socialist Club. Von Fuchs also expressed reservations about a union. Delegates Ebenhoch and Schlegel (both of Upper Austria) spoke on behalf of the union. Ebenhoch explained the advantages of the merger and again made clear that the Upper Austrian delegates would join the Christian Socialist Union whether the Center Club decided to join in a body or not. After considerable debate the group voted unanimously that the Center Club would be dissolved and that all of its members would join the Christian Socialist Union. The basis of the merger was to be along lines which had been worked out previously between Ebenhoch and Gessmann before the election (when only the Upper Austrian delegates were considering a union with the Christian Socialists).  

Regarding their decision the Conservative delegates issued the following communique:

Those who are together here today, the chosen representatives of the Catholic Conservative party from Upper Austria, Styria, and Salzburg, have decided after a long discussion that they will join the Christian Socialist organization, but recognizing the party organizations which exist in the above-named provinces and with the liberty to vote as they wish in regard to agrarian-economic questions.  

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46 Reichspost, 2 June 1907, p. 1.

47 Ibid.
This declaration meant that the conservative delegates would join the Christian Socialist Club in the Reichsrat, but that their conservative party organizations in the provinces were to remain independent and autonomous. The Christian Socialist Union would act as a bloc only on the Reichsrat level. Furthermore, the provincial parties would be permitted to act independently in the Reichsrat on all issues involving agriculture. This last provision reflects the fact that one of the major problems in the merger was the opinion of some of the conservative delegates that the two groups had opposing views on economic questions. Following the meeting Ebenhoeh, Baron von Fuchs, and Franz Hagenhofer visited Prince Liechtenstein (the first deputy chairman of the party) in the Landmarschall's office in the Lower Austrian provincial building on the Herrengasse to inform him personally of their decision.\(^{48}\) It is interesting to note that they chose to make their announcement to the prince rather than to Lueger or Gessmann, and that Baron Morsey did not accompany them.

The agreement of the original Christian Socialist Club to admit the conservatives' came only after a sharp and bitter debate within the party, the scars of which never really healed. The Christian Socialist political organization in Vienna was still not really integrated either in its program or in its following. The various political clubs with their local support which had joined the Christian Socialist bandwagon in the nineties still had a semi-autonomous existence within the Vienna organization. Some of these represented a small business element which

\(^{48}\)Ibid.
while not liberal were nevertheless bourgeois in their thinking. They were Catholic but not necessarily clerical. They could admire the social reforms of their local clergy, but they would deplore the return of major political prerogatives to the hierarchy. To them the rural conservative parties represented the idea of government by privilege; it was just this that the Vienna Christian Socialists had so recently fought and so proudly defeated. Among the factions within the party some had no clerical leanings at all. Ernst Vergani, the three-hundred pound editor of the Deutsches Volksblatt, had a following whose major platform was German nationalism. His orientation to the Christian Socialists was far more anti-Semitic than pro-clerical. Robert Patai and his not-too-lower middle class electorate from Mariahilf held a similar relationship. Even Gesammann had once admitted that it had been difficult for him to accept the clericalism of his party.\textsuperscript{49} Only Lueger's extraordinary ability in arbitration and compromise and the advantages of membership in a successful party had cemented the organization in Vienna and Lower Austria. It was the leaders of these less clerical factions who now voiced objections to a union with the rural parties. They believed that their best asset was their uncontested hegemony in the Vienna and Lower Austria governments. Here the politicians actually had some power, whereas the Reichsrat was little more than an arena for nationality disputes. Even though the alliance with the conservatives might make them the largest single party, they would still occupy a relatively insignificant place in the house of 516 members. On the other hand, a union with the conservatives might commit the Christian Socialists to an agrarian program and to influences from the aristocracy.

\textsuperscript{49}Kuppe, p. 202.
and from the upper clergy. Such commitments would change the nature of the party and its program and thus greatly weaken their hard-
earned prestige with the electorate of Lower Austria. The increased vote in the Reichsrat would not outweigh the disadvantages should they lose their position in the Vienna city council and the Lower Austrian diet. Karl Lueger at first shared this opinion. The details of the union had been worked out between Gessmann and Ebenhoeh during the burgomaster's illness. Lueger, however, was eventually won over to the idea of a union with the conservatives, and was able also to convince the Vienna organization to fall in line (some rather reluctantly as events were to prove later). The most likely explanation for Lueger's change of heart is that the government (or perhaps even the emperor) requested a union of the two parties.

More than a week after the conservative delegates had presented their offer of union to Prince Liechtenstein, the Vienna organization was persuaded to discuss terms for a merger. On 9 June the leaders of the two parties held a conference in the burgomaster's office of the Vienna city hall. Lueger himself represented the Christian Socialists. The Upper Austrian party was represented by Ebenhoeh; the Salzburg party by von Fuchs; and the Styrian party by Hagenhofer. It may have been significant that the Styrian delegation was represented by Hagenhofer, the head of the Styrian Farmers' Co-operative, rather than Baron von Morsey, an imperial and royal chamberlain, who was the actual chairman.

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50This was the first time that Lueger had participated in any of the negotiations for the merger.

51Reichspost, 12 June 1907, p. 6.
of the party organization in Styria, and who had raised the strongest objection to the merger in the last independent meeting of the Center Club.\textsuperscript{52} Lueger must have given the conservatives some verbal assurances regarding the Christian Socialist stand on agrarian questions, for the negotiations were completed without the clause granting the provincial parties their independence on agricultural issues.\textsuperscript{53} This point was undoubtedly conceded privately by Lueger but omitted from the published statements in order to give the new combined party the appearance of greater unity for the public eye.

On the following day, 10 June 1907, there was a meeting of the Christian Socialist Union (i.e. the sixty-five delegates who had originally been elected on the Christian Socialist ticket) in Wing II of the parliament building at 4:00 p.m. It was their first official meeting since the election. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the admission of the new members from the Center Club. The strong objections from the Vienna and Lower Austrian delegation had been worked out before the meeting by Lueger and Gessmann, and the delegates came to the meeting prepared to grant their assent. The strongest opposition during the meeting came from the Styrian delegates. The party in Styria was very much opposed to the strong aristocratic influences in the politics of their province. During the campaign, although Gessmann had worked out agreements between the two groups, there had been some bitterness. The Styrians finally gave their approval but emphasized strongly that the Christian Socialist organization in each province

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Reichspost}, 12 June 1907, p. 6.
should maintain its independence from the conservative organization. The
delegates from Salzburg echoed this demand although the cleavage was not
strong in their province. The other provinces did not face this diffi-
culty. The conservative organization in Lower Austria was negligible;
there was no Christian Socialist Party in Upper Austria; neither party
was strong in Carinthia; the Conservatives of Tyrol were not entering
the union; and the Conservatives had lost any political voice in
Vorarlberg. After the long debate a vote was taken in which the
Christian Socialist delegates voted unanimously to admit the thirty mem-
bers of the former Center Club. Gessmann then immediately informed the
various Conservative provincial leaders of this decision by tele-
graph. 54

One week later, on 17 June 1907, the combined party held
its first meeting in the Vienna city hall to elect officers for the
newly constituted Reichsrat club. Lueger was elected chairman. There
were five deputy chairmen: Prince Liechtenstein and Albert Gessmann,
both early organizers of the party and both representing the Vienna
organization; Alfred Ebenhoeh, representing Upper Austria; Joseph
Schraffl, representing Tyrol; and Baron von Fuchs of Salzburg. Elected
to the parliamentary steering committee were Julius Axmann, an early
member of the Vienna organization, Jodok Fink, a delegate from Vorarlberg
who had been in the Christian Socialist Club since 1901, Francis
Hagenhofer of Styria, Leopold Steiner, long an influential leader of the
Vienna party, and Joseph Stöckler, head of the party-sponsored Farmers'
Co-operative in Lower Austria. 55 These elections show that although the

54 Reichspost, 12 June 1907, p. 2.
55 Ibid., 19 June 1907, p. 9.
weight of the leadership still rested with the Vienna organization, the effort to include representatives from each of the provinces gave the provincial wing of the party an influence on the policy making level out of proportion with their representation in the house. Among the twelve top men, five were from the Vienna group and seven from the provinces. Joseph Stöckler, representing Lower Austria, must be considered a rural delegate.

As a religious celebration of the unification of the two Catholic parties, Father Heinrich Abel led an all-male pilgrimage to Maria-Zell on 16 June 1907. In a solemn prayer addressed to literally hundreds of men who had made the pilgrimage, Father Abel intoned:

They cannot lie out of existence the fact that against all expectations the unification of the Christian camp has finally come. And those who disturb this unity will not be successful against the mighty Christian people. Dear Mother, look upon these two men (Lueger and Ebenhoch) who are among us today, the two men who have reconstructed the unity of the Christian people.56

The following week on 24 July the unification received a gastronomic celebration (an absolute essential among Germans) at the Grand Hotel in Vienna. This enormous banquet was reported in the Reichspost:

There was yesterday a celebration of -- we would like to say -- touching beauty. At the head of the banquet table sat the leader of the Christian Socialist Party who had become very gray in the days of his illness, who was revered with boundless love; around him were his faithful co-fighters, all filled with one and the same grand idea and with unspoiled happiness at the brilliantly accomplished construction of the Christian Socialist Party. Around him sat the provincial marshall and the provincial party chairman, the general and the peasant, the former minister and the simple tradesman, the university professor and the common clerk, and the common laborer too, all beside each other in a friendly and gemustlich

56Ibid., 17 June 1907, p. 2.
manner. It was truly a round table of King Arthur as Dr. Ebenhoch called them in his soul-rendingly beautiful speech. Tears glittered in Dr. Lueger's eyes as he answered the toast of the provincial party leader of Upper Austria; he was so moved that his voice broke as he spoke. And, after his first words of thanks to Dr. Ebenhoch, Dr. Lueger stopped talking and extended his hand as though in a common vow of faithful brotherhood, and indescribable jubilation followed; there lay something like a great consecration, a noble transfiguration, over this sparkling gathering in which the political power of the entire German Christian people of Austria were represented.

This banquet was a manifestation of how firmly the formerly separated groups had already grown together. It was a festival of friends in the hearty cordiality of which political values of extraordinary greatness expressed themselves.57

The Election of the Christian Socialist Richard Weiskirchner as the President of the Austrian House of Deputies

With the addition of the thirty members of the Center Club the Christian Socialists now controlled ninety-five seats in the new House of Deputies. This gave them eight more votes than the Social Democrats and made the Christian Socialists the largest single party and the largest organized voting coalition in the house. This meant that a member of the Christian Socialist Union would be elected president of the new house. Inasmuch as the nomination by the party was virtually tantamount to election, the discussions concerning a possible candidate began as soon as the Center Club announced their willingness to join the Christian Socialists on 1 June 1907.

Both Alfred Ebenhoch and Robert Pattal were anxious to receive the party's nomination. Ebenhoch made his wishes known in a letter to the party chairman which must have been written almost as soon as he had returned to Linz from the last meeting of the Center Club.

57Ibid., 25 July 1907, p. 9.
Linz, 3 June 1907

Very honored Herr Burgomaster:
Dear Friend,

Relying on the friendship you have always shown toward me, I should like to take the liberty of making a request of you. For some time now, and without any prompting from me, the newspapers have been mentioning me as a candidate for the presidency of the new house. I feel capable of doing a good job. In connection with the discussion we had the last time I saw you, I should like to take the liberty of mentioning to you, as our leader, that I am a candidate for this position and that therefore I should like to request the nomination of the club. If this should not be possible I would support any one of the older and better represented group of the club who wishes to become a candidate. Perhaps I might add that I have tried at all times to work for an understanding between the two groups which are now, thanks to God, united, and also that this unification would not have taken place without my having worked for it. I ask you, dear friend, if you think that this could be arranged, to use your influence toward making it possible, I should very much appreciate your disregarding this letter.

With the best regards from me and my family

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Ebenhoch. 58

At the meeting of the Christian Socialist deputies of 10 June 1907, mentioned above, Pattai also announced his desire to become a candidate for the presidency of the house of deputies. He said that although he did not wish to pressure the membership in any way that he did wish to remind them that the last time the house of deputies had voted for a president, the Christian Socialist delegates had cast their ballots unanimously for him. 59 Lueger himself had previously made known

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58 Letter from Ebenhoch to Lueger, 3 June 1907. Handwritten effects of Dr. Karl Lueger, Manuscript collection of the City of Vienna, I.N. 40958, Vienna City Hall.

59 Reichspost, 12 June 1907, p. 2. Pattai must have been aware, however, that the present situation was entirely different. On the
that he favored Richard Weiskirchner as the Christian Socialist candidate for president of the house. The fact that Weiskirchner was Lueger's personal choice rather than that of a party consensus and that Weiskirchner was later nominated by the party and subsequently elected president of the house shows to what extent Lueger was still a strong leader of the party in spite of his long illness and his absence from Vienna during the recent crucial elections.

Weiskirchner probably owed much of his political success to the fact that he had long been a personal friend of Lueger.

As the son of Dr. Lueger's schoolmaster he has always enjoyed the favor and protection of the Christian Socialist leader, but it is stated to have filled with competence all of the municipal offices he has hitherto held.

Only forty-six, Weiskirchner was a comparatively young man for the job. He was already a magistrate (department head) in the Vienna city government and a member of the Lower Austrian diet.

The first public mention that the party was likely to support Lueger's choice had appeared in the Reichspost on 6 June 1907. On that same day Ebenbichl wrote to Lueger withdrawing his request for Lueger's support in the nomination:

earlier occasion to which he referred there was not the remotest possibility of electing a Christian Socialist, and Pattal's nomination was merely a courtesy, whereas on this occasion the man who received the nomination would almost certainly become the president of the house.

60 Ibid.
61 London Times, 26 June 1907, p. 3.
62 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 465; Walcher, p. 17.
I gather from the newspapers that the party acknowledges Dr. Weiskirchner for the presidency. My announcement must be forgotten and also my request of you, for which you must forgive me.63

The Christian Socialists were particularly fortunate in getting support from the other parties in the Reichsrat for their candidate. The German National Union had little choice but to support Weiskirchner. They were not strong enough to place a candidate of their own. As their platform was based primarily on German nationalism they could hardly support a non-German. The alternatives were a German Social Democrat or a German Christian Socialist. Although the German National Union was later to ally with the Social Democrats to unseat the Christian Socialists in the Reichsrat, apparently in 1907 they felt that a Christian Socialist president was the lesser evil as they gave their entire vote to Weiskirchner.64

The main opposition to Weiskirchner's candidacy came from the Slavic parties. An article in the Young Czech journal, the Národní Listy on 10 June 1907, announced that the Slavic deputies in the Reichsrat would unite to prevent the election of Weiskirchner. Their argument was reasonable. There were far more Slavic deputies than Christian Socialist deputies and they believed that one of their number should be elected to

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63 Letter from Ebenbacht to Lueger, 6 June 1907. Handwritten Effects of Dr. Karl Lueger, Manuscript Collection of the City of Vienna, I.N. 40953, Vienna City Hall.

64 Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Österreichischen Reichsrates in Jahre 1907, XIII. Session. I Band. 3 Sitzung, p. 57.
the chair of the house. As their candidate they nominated Dr. Záček. The Národní Listy claimed that they could count on the votes of the Jewish delegates (the liberal deputies who were racially Jewish had been excluded, of course, from the German National Union) for a Slavic president.

The Socialists put up their own candidate, Dr. Fernerstorfer, and refused to cast their votes for anyone else, although it was far from possible that the house would elect a Socialist president. 65

The election was set to take place on Monday, 24 June 1907. In the weeks before the election the Neue Freie Presse conducted a slander campaign against the Christian Socialist Party in order to hinder the election of Weiskirchner. They tried to aggravate the anti-Christian Socialist feeling among the Czechs in particular to prevent the possibility of their co-operating in an election of Weiskirchner. 66

The Neue Freie Presse articles also suggested that the nomination of Weiskirchner indicated a lack of unity in the new Christian Socialist Club, that the former members of the Center Club had preferred the nomination of Ebenhoch and were very disappointed with the choice of Weiskirchner. On 25 June, Ebenhoch himself wrote an almost pathetic article in the Reichspost designed to dispel this dangerous impression:

Our party unanimously supported the candidacy of Dr. Weiskirchner. His nomination came without debate. There was no second candidate

65 Ibid.

66 Neue Freie Presse, 6-23 June 1907, passim; Reichspost, 19 June 1907, p. 3.
as I had already withdrawn my own candidacy...This should answer the false newspaper accounts which stated that I had been promised something else if I would withdraw my candidacy.... I have made this clear also to those of my honored colleagues who were considering me for this position. 67

On the evening of 24 June (the night before the vote was to be taken in the house of deputies) the Czech Club held a meeting to discuss their position in regard to the election. They decided not to continue to press for a Slavic deputy for president but to support the candidacy of Weiskirchner. It is known that at this time Baron Beck was already considering a reorganization of the cabinet which would reflect the changed representation in the parliament. In making the negotiations for these changes he was using the services of Albert Gessmann whose aptitude for political bargaining had become known to Beck during the negotiations for the electoral reform bill. It seems likely that Gessmann was able to buy Czech support for Weiskirchner by assuring them adequate representation in the new cabinet. It is even more likely that Gessmann was able to promise Christian Socialist support for a Czech as the first vice-president of the house of deputies. As a Czech could never have been elected president regardless of how long the Czech Club held out, and as a Czech vice-president was assured with Christian Socialist support, this alone may have been sufficient inducement for their support.

In the voting in the house on the following day, 351 of the 453 valid ballots went to Richard Weiskirchner, a sound victory for the

Christian Socialists and for the log-rolling abilities of Gessmann. The first vice-president was Dr. Žacek, an Old Czech delegate from Přerov in Moravia who received 329 votes. As the second vice-president, the house elected Dr. Staryński of the Polish Club, a university professor from Galicia.

In a short address after his election, Weiskirchner made reference to the fact that this was Austria's first attempt at a parliamentary government and that the men there assembled had a serious responsibility to make it successful. He asked also for co-operation in producing the social reform that the country needed. Finally he recognized one of the most serious problems of the group he was addressing by promising to observe a scrupulous impartiality as president of the house, that the fact that he was himself German would not prevent him from treating fairly all other nationalities of the Austrian fatherland.

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68 Stenographische Protokolle, XVIII Session, 3rd Sitting, 25 June 1907, p. 57.
69 Ibid., p. 59.
70 Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST PARTY IN THE MINISTRY OF BECK

The Decision to Enter the Cabinet

The participation of the Christian Socialist Party in the cabinet of Baron Max Vladimir von Beck is closely bound with the unusual part this ministry played in the constitutional development of Austria. Traditionally, a Hapsburg cabinet had been a group of experts advising an absolute monarch. As the operation of government became more complex, the ministers found themselves at the head of complicated bureaucratic departments. The monarch remained absolute; the cabinet members added to the responsibility of advising that of carrying out the will of the monarch within the scope of their particular ministries. During the nineteenth century, on the other hand, the British government by evolution and others by constitution had developed another concept of the role of the cabinet in the government, that of a responsible ministry. This concept, which involved also a representative parliament, was based on a different philosophy of government: that the ultimate source of sovereignty was the people; and that the monarch and his ministers were simply the executives charged with running the business of government for the sovereign people. The members of the parliament were considered to be the representatives of the people, and it was to these peoples' delegates that the ministers must be accountable. By 1900 the parliamentary system of Great Britain, where the cabinet is

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actually chosen from among the representatives, had become the popular prototype. In this system, the ministry as well as the parliament is expected to carry out the will of the people. When the monarch calls a prime minister, he is theoretically acting as the chief executive of the people, choosing the man who can best carry out the desires of the people as expressed by the election of their deputies to the parliament. During the years just before the first World War, a popular mystique was that the democratization of a government was a panacea for domestic problems. In this light, many English historians and others, popularized an interpretation of history which suggested that any government showed "progress" insofar as it approached the constitution of Great Britain.

Therefore, in 1905, when Francis Joseph, in his search for a solution to the nationality disputes, suddenly insisted on a universal, direct, and equal suffrage, many Austrians quite easily believed that it was his intent to change the whole basic philosophy of government to a rough approximation of that of Great Britain. Even Rudolph Sieghart, president of the council of advisers to the prime minister, showed his conviction that Austria had embarked on a new era of constitutional development:

...the monarchy had a clear path ahead of it to move in a new direction. The creeping pessimism had given way to a hopeful enthusiasm and there was a general expectation that the rejuvenated political system was ready to stride forth on a new road. \(^1\)

\(^1\)Sieghart, p. 129.
It is possible that at this time even the emperor himself believed that he was leading his monarchy\textsuperscript{2} into a new political era. Beck certainly believed it. He was always more a scholar than a politician, although he was certainly adept at the game of politics. Beck was a large man with a bearing of effortless dignity. (Although he was only forty-seven when he was called to office, he was quite bald with a fringe of stark white hair and a thick white handlebar moustache.) Beck's political views could have been held only by an Austrian: as a scholar he was a democrat; as a gentleman he was a monarchist. Actually these positions were not incompatible. It was Beck's sincere conviction that a thorough democratization of the Austrian constitution would bring the greatest degree of strength, honor, and prestige to his monarch. In other words, Beck's political attitudes gave him precisely the qualifications of the minister-president that Francis Joseph was seeking in June, 1906.\textsuperscript{3}

Beck soon proved his political acumen by assembling a ministry which was at least representative if not responsible. One judgement of Beck in reference to the creation of his ministry says that he was ingenious, intelligent, skillful in dealing with people, and a master in the art of negotiation.\textsuperscript{4} Beck's first cabinet did,

\textsuperscript{2}Similar reforms were then under negotiation for Hungary.

\textsuperscript{3}Johann Christoph Almeyer-Beck, Ministerpräsident Baron Beck (Vienna, 1956), pp. 126-128.

\textsuperscript{4}Charmatz, Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1918 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1918), p. 78.
in a far greater measure than most Austrian cabinets, represent the parties and nationalities in the Reichsrat.

In order to secure support for the government's new franchise bill from the large number of representatives from Bohemia, Beck was anxious to include both German and Czech Bohemian delegates in his new cabinet. Room was made in the cabinet, therefore, for two new ministers without portfolio, one to be a Czech from Bohemia and the other a German from Bohemia. These were to be known respectively as the Czech Nationality Minister and the German Nationality Minister. As there had previously been a minister without portfolio from Galicia known as the Polish Nationality Minister, there was some precedent for the decision.

As soon as the cabinet posts had been arranged, Beck devoted himself to getting the franchise reform bill through the Reichsrat. As explained in the previous chapter, this reform was completed with surprising speed and the elections to the new parliament were able to take place in May 1907.

5These ministers simply had seats on the cabinet. The name does not mean to suggest that their posts involved any responsibility for their nationality group, although they did frequently receive delegations from national pressure groups.

6The final appointments as confirmed by the emperor on 7 June 1906, were as follows: Baron von Bienerth, German Large Landholder, Minister of Interior; Julius Ritter von Derschatta, German Nationalist, Minister of Railways; Dr. Gustav Marchet, German Liberal, Minister of Education; Dr. Francis Klein, Minister of Justice; Baron Schonaich, Minister of National Defense; Wytold Korytowski, Polish Club, Minister of Finance; Dr. Joseph Först, Young Czech, Minister of Commerce; Count Leopold Auersperg, German Large Landholder, Minister of Agriculture; Count Wojciech Dzieduszycki, Polish Club, Polish Nationality Minister; Dr. Bedřich Pacák, Young Czech, Czech Nationality Minister; and Heinrich Prade, German Nationalist, German Nationality Minister. Fremden-Blatt, 7 June 1906, Evening edition, p. 1.
With the popularly elected parliament in operation, the new task facing the Beck ministry was the renewal of the economic agreements of the Ausgleich with Hungary, the shoal on which many otherwise acceptable ministries had foundered. This ordinarily difficult task had been further complicated by recent political developments in both halves of the monarchy. In a Hungarian election in 1906, the Independence Party led by Francis Kossuth had gained a majority of the seats in the parliament. As this party was pledged to bring an end to any association whatever with the Austrian half of the empire, they could not be expected to come to an easy agreement over a treaty to extend the dualistic system. In the elections to the Austrian Reichsrat of May 1907 the three largest groups were also adamantly opposed to a continuation of the present terms of the Ausgleich: the Christian Socialist Party, the Czech Club, and the Social Democrats. Also opposed to the Ausgleich were many of the parties in the German National Union.

The negotiations for a new treaty occupied the ministries of the two halves of the empire (as well as the Delegations meeting that year in Budapest) through most of the month of September 1907.

On 7 October, the council of ministers finally concluded a mutually satisfactory economic agreement. Each of the ministries then prepared to start the fight anew to have the instrument ratified by their parliaments. Just before the treaty was to be presented in the Austrian house of deputies, Lueger delivered another strongly-worded

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7May, p. 360.
speech against the Ausgleich. He condemned the new agreement as treasonous to Austria. But hidden between the lines of Lueger's harangues against both the treaty and the Magyars is the suggestion that he was already well aware that his party would support the government. The speech was undoubtedly more for publication in his party's press than for the persuasion of his colleagues in the house. He seems to be reminding his electorate for one more time that his party is really anti-Magyar before feeding them the pill he knows is coming. Lueger, as usual, pulled his anti-Semitic stops for this occasion: "I have never cried 'Los from Hungary' but only 'Los from the traitorous Judeo-Magyar clique'." The Times of London had some appropriate, if uncomplimentary, comments on what it called the "wantonly provocative speech" by Lueger:

The...burgomaster does not seem to understand that the leader of the most popular and influential party in Austria cannot with impunity use language tolerable only in pothouse electioneering.10

One wonders if these sentiments were not occasionally shared if not necessarily expressed by other members of the Christian Socialist leadership who were anxious to prove the party's willingness to co-operate with the government.

Early in November 1907 minister-president Beck prepared to reorganize his cabinet. It is true that, in line with his own view of the government he headed, Beck wanted the cabinet to reflect the

9 Neue Freie Presse, 28 October 1907, Evening edition, p. 2.
10 The Times, London, 29 October 1907, p. 5.
changed party representation in the new house of deputies. There is no question, however, that the major reason for the cabinet change at this time was Beck's attempt to secure the support of two large blocs of votes (the Christian Socialist Party and the Czech Club) for the pending treaty with Hungary.\textsuperscript{11} The negotiations for the cabinet changes were extremely involved. During the arrangements, Baron Beck, democrat though he was, became extremely disillusioned. Ubiquitous patronage demands and questionable political bargaining seemed always to accompany any dealings with the new parties returned by the universal franchise, particularly the Christian Socialists. During this period the exasperated Beck once remarked that "the voting public should see what they have for representatives."\textsuperscript{12}

Beck had first offered the Christian Socialists two seats in his cabinet shortly after the election. According to an interview published in the Reichspost, Lueger was at that time very cool to the invitation:

\textbf{Question:} "Will the Christian Socialists enter the ministry?"

\textbf{Lueger:} "I can say only that I am not going to join the cabinet."

\textbf{Question:} "In some of the newspapers, members of the Christian Socialist Party are being mentioned who might possibly enter the cabinet."

\textbf{Lueger:} "I can tell you quite frankly that as long as I have a say in this, the party will remain independent of the government."\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11}It was clearly out of the question for the Social Democratic Party to be brought into the government at this time, as they, in theory, did not even accept the monarchy, not to mention the Ausgleich.

\textsuperscript{12}Allmayer-Beck, \textit{Beck}, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{13}Reichspost, 17 May 1907, pp. 1-2.
Lueger was thinking as usual only in terms of his responsibility to the Vienna electorate. He was the champion of the "little man." The concept of a people's government, however valid, had not yet permeated to his Viennese. The imperial government, to them, was remote, the province of the privileged classes. "Their" party's role was in the Vienna city hall; in the Reichsrat the party would be lost to them. Therefore, although Lueger undoubtedly knew what his party's position would be on entering the cabinet, his first reaction for publication would have to be one of apparent resistance and independence.

In October, when Beck was actually ready to announce the changes in his cabinet, Lueger was far less hesitant. In the meantime, his political soul had been buoyed up by the festive celebrations of the union with the Catholic Conservatives. Press reports during the ceremonies had indicated to him that the Viennese voter was more proud than resentful when his party leaders could rub elbows with the aristocracy. Shortly after his return from Budapest in late October the prime minister himself had gone to Canossa in the Vienna city hall to petition the burgomaster. Beck wanted two Christian Socialists to join his cabinet: one from the former Conservative party and one from the original Vienna party. Lueger assured him that there would be no opposition to sending a rural Christian Socialist into the cabinet; whether one of the Vienna leaders would join would be up to the party to decide. Lueger himself stuck to his promise and would never accept a cabinet post, although it was offered both in October 1907 and
During the first week of November the party's executive committee held a meeting to decide on their position regarding the new cabinet. As Lueger had predicted, they easily agreed that a delegate from the rural wing of the party should join the cabinet. As Alfred Ebenhoeh controlled by far the largest following among this group, his nomination was routine. The action of the committee in naming Ebenhoeh was probably only a confirmation of arrangements worked out long before by Beck and the party leaders. Some opposition was encountered, as expected, when the party wanted to send a second man to the cabinet from the Vienna wing. Press speculation as well as party consensus during the long period of negotiation had assumed that if a second Christian Socialist from the Vienna group joined the cabinet it would be Albert Gessmann. Surely Gessmann's work during Lueger's illness and his role as the organizer of the enlarged party would make him the obvious candidate. It came as a complete surprise to the committee when Lueger nominated Richard Weiskirchner. There seems no other explanation than that the vendetta between Lueger and Gessmann was still sharp. Weiskirchner saved the situation by announcing that he did not wish to be considered for the post as he preferred to remain president of the house of deputies. Gessmann was then designated as the party's choice for the second Christian Socialist in the cabinet.\(^\S\)

\(^{14}\) Allmayer-Beck, Beck, p. 193.

\(^{15}\) Reichspost, 5 November 1907, p. 3.
One cannot help sensing that Lueger's chairmanship of the party must often have been a thorn in the flesh for Gessmann. Gessmann undoubtedly considered the ailing patriarch as a cumbersome vestige of an earlier era who was unable to comprehend the new direction the party had recently taken and whose main asset was his tremendous drawing power.

When the final arrangements were made to make room for the new cabinet members, Ebenhoeh expressed his desire to head the ministry of agriculture.16 His voters of Upper Austria were certain to object to his participation in the government and still more to the party's acceptance of the new economic agreements with Hungary. Hungarian competition with Austrian agricultural products had embittered the peasant against the terms of the Ausgleich. Ebenhoeh felt that only in the office of minister of agriculture, where he might be of specific assistance to his rural voters, could he hope for their acceptance of his membership in the cabinet. It proved unusually easy for Beck to give Ebenhoeh the ministry he wanted. In constructing his original cabinet in 1906, Beck had promised certain portfolios to specific nationality groups for bargaining purposes. Although changes could be made in the cabinet members, any specific post would have to be assigned to a member of the same nationality as the incumbent; otherwise an impossible amount of bargaining would be necessary. The resigning minister of agriculture was Count Leopold Auersperg, of the German Large Landholders' Party. As this party had received no mandate whatever in the election of 1907, the post simply passed from a conservative

16 Ibid.
rural German with no parliamentary backing to a conservative rural German from the largest party in the Reichsrat.  

Some trouble was encountered, however, in finding a suitable ministerial post for Albert Gessmann. As the post of minister of agriculture had been secured for the party with an eye to pleasing (or perhaps one could say appeasing) the rural wing of the electorate, the party wanted Gessmann to fill a post in which he could serve the other major component in the party's electorate, the Vienna lower bourgeoisie. The party requested, therefore, that Gessmann be appointed minister of commerce.  

Beck could not offer him this post, however, as it had been held by a Czech. The previous incumbent, Dr. Fořt, of the Young Czech Party, had resigned in protest over the treaty with Hungary. Although it seemed unlikely that the Young Czech Party could be persuaded to join the new ministry, the post would have to pass to another member of the Czech Club from a different party.  

Gessmann himself then suggested that a new ministry be created for him to be called the ministry of social policy. (Such a ministry had been under discussion and its functions previously agreed to.) This solution also proved impossible when the Social Democratic Party, understandably enough, objected to allotting such a ministry

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17Charmatz, p. 79.

18Reichspost, 5 November 1907, p. 1.

19Ibid.
to a member of the Christian Socialist Party. Finally a compromise was reached whereby a new ministry would eventually be created for Gessmann: the ministry of public works. As such a large number of workers were then employed in government projects, this ministry was virtually a ministry of labor and is frequently so translated. Pending completion of the arrangements for the creation of this new ministry, Gessmann was to join the Beck cabinet as minister without portfolio.

On 8 November 1907 the cabinet changes were confirmed in a letter from the emperor to minister-president Beck. The Czech nationality minister, Dr. Pacák, a Young Czech, had resigned on 25 October in protest against the treaty with Hungary and was succeeded by Dr. Karel Prášek of the more moderate Czech Agrarian Party. The German nationality minister from Bohemia, Prade, whose German Radical Party had lost strength in the elections, was succeeded by Peschka of the German Agrarian Party. The ministry of commerce vacated by the

20Charmatz, p. 79.

21Reichsepost, 9 November 1907, p. 1.

22Ibid.

23Several of the ministerial posts did not change hands: Baron von Bienerth as Minister of Interior, Dr. von Derschatta as Minister of Railways, Dr. Marchet as Minister of Education, Korytowski as Minister of Finance, Count Dzieduszycki as Polish Nationality Minister, Dr. Klein as Minister of Justice, Baron Schonaich as Minister of National Defense, Fremden-Blatt, 9 November 1907, Morning edition, p. 1.

24Ibid. At the subsequent death of minister Peschka, Prade again assumed this post. Charmatz, p. 78.
Young Czechs was at first assigned to Dr. Wohanka, a Czech member of
the upper house, but on the evening of 7 November the Young Czech
party agreed to participate in the ministry, and Dr. Francis Fiedler
of their party took the post. 25 Ebenhoeh, of course, succeeded
Count Auersperg as minister of agriculture, and Gessmann was named
minister without portfolio. 26 The London Times described this re-
constituted ministry of Baron Beck as "the nearest approach to a
parliamentary ministry that has been seen in Austria for many years." 27
This was a safe observation.

The decision of the Christian Socialist Party to participate
in the cabinet obligated the party to support the government in its
efforts to gain ratification of the recently negotiated economic
treaty with Hungary. The deputies of the Christian Socialist Club
held a meeting on 11 November 1907, and voted to support the treaty. 28
The support of the Christian Socialists and the Young Czechs assured
ratification by the Austrian Reichsrat. On the same day the Independence
Party of Hungary met in Budapest and pledged their support. 29 The treaty
was eventually ratified in both halves of the monarchy in the last week
of the year 1907, barely before the previous economic agreement was to

25 Neue Freie Presse, 9 November 1907, Morning edition, p. 2.
27 The London Times, 9 November 1907, p. 5.
28 Reichspost, 12 November 1907, p. 9. There was no opposition
at this meeting. In the vote to join the ministry a week earlier the
party members understood that this meant also the support of the treaty.
29 Ibid., 13 November 1907, p. 2.
expire. Minister-President Beck, with considerable assistance from the Christian Socialist Party, had been successful in the two extremely difficult tasks assigned to him by the emperor: the electoral reform and the renewal of the Ausgleich with Hungary.

Some time was needed to carry through the necessary negotiations to erect the new ministry of public works for Dr. Gessmann. The house of deputies was not in session between 21 December 1907 and 2 April 1908. This gave Gessmann and others time to work out the details of the new ministry. Actually no new function was involved. Three related bureaus (known as sections in Austria) were detached from other ministries (commerce and agriculture) and grafted together to form the new ministry of public works: a) Civil Engineering and Construction; b) Mining; and c) Supervision of Skilled Trades. The first two sections dealt with government projects which employed both engineers and laborers. In these projects the ministry was responsible for regulating the conditions of labor and supervising the workers' communities provided by the government. It was these functions which caused the tremendous resentment of the Social Democratic Party. They felt rightly that the Christian Socialists represented the urban lower middle class and the rural clerical peasantry. The group of people employed by government mining and engineering projects were laborers, the class specifically represented by the Social Democrats. The functions of this new ministry gave

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30 *Stenographische Protokolle*, 56th Sitting, 18th Session, p. 3941.

31 *Beilage zum Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses*, 18th Session, No. 766.

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Gessmann an opportunity to offer to a large segment of the workers of Austria many benefits which, if properly publicized, could appear as part of a policy of the Christian Socialist Party.

The third section was very legitimately the concern of Gessmann. This section supervised the many state functions for the education and protection of artisans in the skilled trades. The state operated model shops, factories, or construction units to provide education in various skilled trades, to experiment with and to publicize various new tools and methods, or to show the most efficient utilization of tools and methods. The section was also concerned with the instruction of skilled workers in the trade schools (other than engineering or mining), with the supervision of public electrical works, and with state-sponsored unions of skilled workers. As the Christian Socialists in Vienna considered themselves primarily the representatives of the people in the trades, this bureau which regulated the training and more especially the protection of the skilled artisan was a very valuable one in the hands of the party.

The new ministry was brought into existence and Gessmann called to head it on 21 March 1908. It was possible for the government to create a new ministry, but the funds for it to function had to be voted by the Reichsrat. It was here that the Socialists had an opportunity to attack it. A spokesman for the government

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32 Alois von Czedik, *Zum Geschichte der k. k. Österreichischen Ministerien, 1861 bis 1916*, (Teschen, Vienna, and Leipzig, 1917-1920), III, 186. With a lack of logic unusual even in departments of the government the jurisdiction of this third department in the ministry of public works also included all government-sponsored efforts to encourage tourists to come to Austria.
introduced two emergency bills on 2 April 1908. The first covered certain legal changes necessary to transfer the sections from other ministries to the new ministry for public works. The second asked the house to authorize the government to supply this ministry with funds from the supplementary credit already voted for the year 1908.\textsuperscript{33} The opposition led off with a long speech by the leader of the Socialist Party, Viktor Adler. Adler felt that the government had reversed the proper procedure for such a measure; the parliament should first recognize the need for a new ministry and then request the permission of the government. In this situation, said Dr. Adler, the government had created the ministry and then asked the permission of the parliament. He further questioned whether this ministry of public works could be of any value to the working people involved. This was "a ministry which, as everyone knows, was not created out of any objective necessity, but only because it was necessary to create an office for a minister who would otherwise have nothing to do."\textsuperscript{34} The next day Beck himself appeared before the house of deputies to defend the creation of the ministry and to make clear that the emperor had a constitutional right to name his own ministers.\textsuperscript{35} The two bills finally came to a vote and were passed on 9 April 1908.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33}Stenographische Protokolle, 62nd Sitting, 18th Session, pp. 4118-4122.

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 4123-4134.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4162.

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4211.
The Christian Socialists
and the Austrian Kulturkampf of 1907-1908

By the Fall of 1907 the Christian Socialist Party had, in a period of a few months, catapulted to a position of power and prestige in the empire. But they had done so only with a series of steps which had by no means been universally accepted by their constituents. The merger of the two Catholic parties had been very unpopular with large segments of the electorate. Vienna voters feared feudal and episcopal influences in their bourgeois party which had so recently wrested power from privilege. Alpine agrarians balked at placing their organizations under the authority of urban politicians. In both factions popular opinion opposed the party's participation in the ministry and its subsequent acceptance of the Ausgleich. At the same time, the negotiations for bringing the Christian Socialists into the cabinet provided the opposition press ample opportunity to present to the public evidences of weakness and cleavage in the clerical party. 37

Consequently, the party leaders wanted to find, or if necessary to create, some great issue which would be popular with all factions of their diverse electorate, which would emphasize the unity of the two wings of the party, and which would divert public attention from the unpopular Ausgleich. Such an issue would have to be one which could publicize the role of the Christian Socialist Party as the tribune of the Catholic people and the champion of the clerical tradition in the German-speaking areas of the empire.

37 Cf. in particular Neue Freie Presse, 13 October 1907, Morning edition, p. 5.
Therefore, in November 1907 the party launched a spectacular attack on the anticlericalism in the universities. Whether or not this was already a burning political issue, it was soon to become one.

Anticlerical demonstrations in the universities had long been a thorn in the flesh of the faithful. In most European universities during the late nineteenth century there were many students who, confronted for the first time with modern methods both in the physical sciences and in the literary criticism of ancient sources, were inclined to reject their earlier faith. At the same time a reaction to the growing agnosticism led the more devout students to an even stronger affirmation of their faith. The cleavage between these two groups, which on many campuses frequently came to violence, was particularly strong in predominantly Catholic countries "where there was no middle ground, such as Protestantism had elsewhere furnished, between the extremes of belief and disbelief."38

By the turn of the century the anticlericalism in the German-speaking universities was still further fired by the German nationalism then in full vogue among the students, particularly in the traditionally ultranationalistic student clubs. These student nationalists opposed the Catholicism of Austria because it subjected their country to ultramontane (i.e., Italian rather than German) influences. The nationalist (pro-Berlin) and anticlerical demonstrations of the German student clubs became particularly virulent following the Badeni language

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38Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Political and cultural history of Europe. (New York, 1939), II, 529.
ordinances and the subsequent popularization of their openly treasonous sympathies by Georg von Schönnerer in his "Los von Rom" doctrine.

In order to check the influence of these anticlerical student clubs, the church, with the support of the government, encouraged the founding of specifically Catholic student clubs. The object was to lure the student away from the attractions of the nationalist fraternities by presenting them with a Catholic-oriented student club which had all of the trappings, so important to university students, of the traditional Burschenschaften. These included the peculiar pill-box caps with colored bands by which a student could publicly display his deep loyalty to an organization he had never heard of when he arrived at the institution.\textsuperscript{39} What the sponsors had probably not anticipated was the open hostility that inevitably erupted between the older nationalist clubs and the newer clerical clubs. Every fall, when the students first donned their colors, there could be expected a round of demonstrations often ending in violence. This became part of the university scene. In the fall of 1907, the feelings were particularly sharp on both sides because of the recent promulgation (on 8 September) of the papal encyclical \textit{Pascendi Dominici Gregis}, a strong condemnation of the Modernist heresy.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39}A list of the Catholic student clubs in the German-speaking universities of the empire as of 1907 included: Norica, Austria, Nordgau, Rudolphiner, Carolina, and Kürnberg. The names suggest that the clubs were meant to encourage pro-Hapsburg sympathies as well as Catholicism. \textit{Bericht Über den 6. allgemeinen Österreichischen Katholikentag vom 16-19 November 1907}, (Vienna, 1908), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{40}Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 422.
It was this situation in the universities, relatively harmless in itself, that the Christian Socialist Party decided to exploit to publicize the party's role as the champion of the church and thus to rally the discontented factions within the party's jerry-built structure. The occasion for the party's opening blast at the universities was the Sixth All-Austrian Catholic Day which was held in Vienna from the 10th to the 19th of November 1907. 41

Several days before the convention met the Reichspost announced that the main theme of this convention would be the "school problem," by which was understood the recent anticlerical demonstrations in the universities. 42 This "school problem" had received considerable publicity in the few weeks immediately preceding the convention because of a particularly violent demonstration at the University of Graz on

41 The best way to describe an Austrian Catholic Day is as a convention of Catholic societies. As virtually every Catholic parishioner was enrolled in some society, this could include practically all of the active Catholics in the German-speaking areas of Austria. Nevertheless, it was only as a member of a specific society that one was invited to participate. The names of some of the more important societies show the political implications of the occasion: Catholic Journalists, Christian Youth Organization, Union of Catholic Women's Clubs, Catholic Journeymen's Union (Gesellenverein), Austrian Society of Katecheten, Society of Catholic Apprentices, Union of Catholic-German Student Clubs, and many others. There were, of course, also many organizations of a purely religious nature. For each of these there were many functions planned for their five days' stay in Vienna: business meetings, educational lectures, addresses by important personalities from the clergy or from politics, corporate communions, and, of course, a great deal of food. Bericht über den 6. allgemeinen Österreichischen Katholikentag, pp. 1-16.

42 Reichspost, 10 November 1907, p. 2.
24 October 1907. A young instructor, Dr. Ude, a Catholic, and a member of the Catholic student club "Carolina" was to receive a second doctorate. On his way to the ceremony he was accompanied by several other members of "Carolina" all wearing colorful evidence of their affiliation. The entrance to the assembly hall was at the end of a long ramp which happened at that moment to be occupied by members of a German nationalist fraternity, who, apparently on an impulse, decided to prevent the "Carolina" group from entering the hall. What began as ordinary hazing turned into a brawl which lasted all day and which soon involved not only a large part of the student body but many of the citizens of the provincial capital as well.

It was Dr. Lueger himself who fired the opening shot in this new Austrian Kulturkampf. On the very first day of the convention the genial Catholic burgomaster of the host city gave a welcoming speech to a plenary session of Catholic student clubs. Lueger reminded his audience of the anticlerical legislation of the 1860's which had attempted to take the control of the schools out of the hands of the church. He pointed out that now with his Catholic party in the government, it was time to restore the schools to the church.

We have succeeded in taking over the elementary schools. We have begun the attack on the secondary schools. We still have a major job to do: we must take over the universities. The universities must no longer be a breeding ground for revolutionary and seditious teachings, for teachings that are against the fatherland and against the faith.

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44. *Bericht über den 6. allgemeinen österreichischen Katholikentag*, p. 32.
This part of the speech alone would have been enough to start trouble. It is inconceivable that even Lueger could make such tactless remarks in public. But he continued to squeeze dry all political potentialities present in the situation. The next part of the speech was addressed to his anti-Semitic following in Vienna. It is interesting that only the first part was printed by the anti-Lueger *Neue Freie Presse* whereas only the second part was printed by the Christian Socialist daily, the *Reichspost*.

As I reflect what has gone on at the University of Vienna and the University of Graz, the question comes to me, 'Are these people really seekers of knowledge?' ...It will be hard for some people to accept the fact that of eight professors recently appointed seven are Jews (loud boing)... We shall have to fight until there will be seven Christians to one Jew.\(^{45}\)

The speech ended with the usual appeal to God and the final appeal to the pride of the citizens of Vienna in their city.

If...we are united in spirit, a spirit they are trying to take away from us, we shall step forward and fight. This we shall do, so help me God, to win our fight. In this spirit then I welcome you all as my brothers in the name of the city of Vienna.\(^{46}\)

Lueger had left himself wide open to attack and the *Neue Freie Presse* lost no time in taking up the cudgel. This paper, which considered itself the heir to the principles of the Revolution of 1848, supported the constitution of the monarchy, centralism, and the German "liberal" position.\(^{47}\) An editorial in the *Neue Freie Presse* of


\(^{46}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{47}\) *May*, p. 95.
18 November 1907 labeled Lueger's speech as dictatorial and despotic. They saw "the Christian Socialists' conquest of the universities (as the) ... newest goal of the clerical party." The editorial went on to lament the possibility that "even the universities might come under the authority of a parliamentary party, which presumes to have full power over Austria and which serves as an instrument of the clerical rulers." The Neue Freie Presse feared they could foresee a day when the Christian Socialists could persuade the government "to recognize only clerical professors and to test any candidates for a professorship not on their erudition but on their faith."

This editorial certainly read a great deal into Lueger's speech that was not necessarily there. Lueger himself made no public counter to the attacks of the liberal paper. The city hall announced that the burgomaster was very ill. It is true that Lueger was ill at the time, but one wonders whether the illness was not used as an excuse to keep the burgomaster out of public notice until the controversy blew over. It is possible that the other leaders of the party forced the chairman to stay quiet lest he put his foot in his mouth again and further endanger the prestige which other men than Lueger had recently gained for the party.

On 18 November there was a stir at the University of Vienna itself. Several professors made public statements concerning Lueger's speech which were printed the following morning in the Neue Freie Presse.

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48 Neue Freie Presse, 18 November 1907, p. 2.

49 Ibid.
Professor Vatroslav Jagic, professor of Slavic philology, called Lueger's pronouncement "a thoughtless and unproveable statement." Dr. Leopold Schroder, professor of geography, felt that although any limitation of the freedom of scientific research by the state or the church would be a "cultural impossibility," nevertheless, he was deeply concerned that the leader of the most powerful political party in Austria should make such remarks. Dr. Adolph Bauer, professor of the history of antiquity at the University of Graz, passed off Lueger's remarks as the "empty phrases of parliamentary enthusiasm."\(^{50}\) Such an evaluation from a man who, familiar with the public addresses of the political leaders of Athens and Rome and not limited in his judgements to the rather short period of parliamentarianism of the Hapsburg state, seems to come closest to the fact.

Soon the students themselves got into the act. At the German University of Prague, where the student body had gathered for the inauguration of a new rector, the Catholic students were attacked by the anticlericals. Some were thrown down the stairs; some were locked in an auditorium.\(^{51}\) On the following day, 19 November 1907, a petition addressed to Gustav Marchet, the minister of education, was circulated among the students at the University of Vienna. The signatories went on record as opposing a situation whereby the "appointment of an instructor should be made according to the principle of political proportions, or that any other consideration than knowledge

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 19 November 1907, pp. 3-4.

\(^{51}\) Reichspost, 19 November 1907, p. 2.
or pedagogics be a basis for such an appointment."\(^{52}\) This petition would seem to reflect the fears published in the *Neue Freie Presse* on the previous day.\(^{53}\)

By the following day Lueger could no longer ignore the storm which had broken over his address to the assembled Catholic student clubs four days earlier. Apparently he had not expected such a violent reaction. He retaliated with an open letter to the university professors which was published in the *Reichspost*. The language of the burgomaster and head of the largest party in the parliament in addressing the intellectual elite of his city seems unbelievably puerile. One is led to suspect that Lueger was addressing his lower middle class following in Vienna rather than the university professors. At any rate, the letter shows that he knew he had gone too far.

**Highly esteemed Her Professors!**

In the issue of the *Neue Freie Presse* of 19 November of this year, one of your statements was published which referred to me, or rather to the context of talks which I gave on the recent Catholic Day to a gathering of members of Catholic student clubs.

I bid you kindly to notice that I referred not at all to the freedom of research or to unrestrained scientific inquiry. My speech dealt almost entirely with certain scandal scenes which have taken place on the theatrical stage which the German universities of Austria have become.

\(^{52}\) *Neue Freie Presse*, 20 November 1907, p. 4.

\(^{53}\) The practice of apportioning government appointments in the same ratio as the representation of the parties in the parliament, the "proporz" system, is so prevalent in Vienna as to be something of a local joke.
Dear sirs, I believe that knocking people over the head is not unrestricted scientific inquiry and that furthermore you cannot call it freedom of research when you knock a hole in someone's head or go around breaking windows. I hope that you will agree with me in this point, and I expect that you will use the energy which you have so uselessly wasted against me to establish order and peace at the universities and also to maintain the dignity of the academic world and that you will make a special effort to shield academic freedom from violence and from vulgar crimes.

Permit me to express the highest esteem with which I sign:

Dr. Karl Lueger, Burgomaster

At the university some of the members of the pro-German student clubs drew up a manifesto regarding Lueger's speech. This manifesto opened by describing Lueger's speech as a "harsh attack against German scholarship in the Ostmark." It went on to complain of the "disastrous effect" which the Roman (i.e., Latin and therefore not German) clergy had inflicted upon the culture of mankind "since the intellect of the Jesuits had won over Christianity itself."

On 25 November 1907 the rector of the University of Vienna called a meeting of the entire faculty of the university to vote on an official protest against the proposals of the Christian Socialists. There were about three hundred members of the faculty present.

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54 Reichspost, 21 November 1907, p. 1.
55 Neue Freie Presse, 24 November 1907, p. 3.
56 Ibid., 26 November 1907, p. 3.
Meanwhile in the house of deputies, the delegates of the Christian Socialist Party were trying to turn the rash utterances of their leader to their own political advantage. On 22 November 1907 several Christian Socialist delegates began a series of interpellations of the minister of education concerning the disturbances in the universities of the empire. The privilege of interpellating the imperial ministers was granted to the delegates as tribunes of the people. But in this case the interpellations of the Christian Socialist delegates were designed to embarrass the minister of education, Gustav Marchet, an avowed liberal, and to provide material for the party's press to make the university controversy appear to be the fault of the ministry and of the German liberal member of the ministry in particular. There were two sets of interpellations addressed to Dr. Marchet on that date. The first led by the Vienna delegate, Dr. Joseph von Baechlé, vice president of the Catholic School Union, quizzed the minister on the general problem. The second, endorsed by Dr. August Kemetter, delegate from Lower Austria and the Director of the Lower Austrian Teachers' College in Vienna, and by Joseph Schlegel, a small town judge from Upper Austria, specifically interpellated the minister as to why the rector of the Technical College in Prague had forbidden the students of the Catholic student club "Vandalia" to wear their colors.

At the same meeting the delegate from Moravia, Dr. Thomas Masaryk, later the first president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, called for a resolution that the imperial government should guarantee

57 Stenographische Protokolle..., 35 Sitting, XVIII Session, 22 November 1907, Abhang II 1403/1, p. 2638.
58 Ibid.
academic freedom.\textsuperscript{59} Dr. Masaryk's speech of 22 November 1907 has become a classic appeal for the preservation of academic freedom in an age when all institutions tend to become tools of the state. Needless to say, in a house of deputies with a Christian Socialist plurality, Masaryk's resolution was not passed. But the effect of the resolution worked against the Christian Socialists. Masaryk's speech was widely publicized and its contents read and appreciated by many who deplored the demagogic political techniques of the Christian Socialists in using even the church and the universities for political playgrounds. The Christian Socialists won on the floor of the house of deputies, but they lost heavily in prestige.

The affair was not over. The Christian Socialists could not afford to allow the matter to come to an end while they were on the wrong side of the question. They waited only for another situation to arise when they could again appear before the people of the empire as their champion on the side of God and against the side of evil (the German Liberals). Such an event was provided for them in a very few months. On 18 January 1908, Dr. Ludwig Wahrmund, a professor of church law at the University of Innsbruck, gave a public lecture entitled: "The Catholic Weltanschauung and Academic Freedom."\textsuperscript{60} Soon thereafter this speech appeared in pamphlet form. The whole lecture reflected a line of thought concerning the Christian faith

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid.; Neue Freie Presse, 23 November 1907, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{60}Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 424.
which could not be accepted by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. In one passage Wahrmund stated that Catholicism was "purely in theory monotheistic whereas in practice and in the popular concept it was in its way polytheistic to an extent that the very pagan religions which the church had fought against so strongly could hardly excel."

Wahrmund went on to describe Catholicism as a "superstitious, heathen-polytheistic," (and) "long outmoded concept, mocking the scientific achievements of modern times." In the Catholic Weltanschauung one "must believe in gods who descend in person down from heaven or in people who ascend in person up to heaven." Wahrmund referred to the Catholic students as "parasites" who ought to be weeded out of the universities.\textsuperscript{61} This was asking for it. The Christian Socialists again saw their opportunity to act as the defender of the faith for holy Austria. They sent up a cry to crucify Wahrmund and with him, if possible, the German liberal minister of education, Gustav Marchet. The Christian Socialists had previously contended that under the ministry of Marchet it was impossible for a Catholic to obtain a chair in any of the universities and the Wahrmund Affair gave the party the opportunity they had been waiting for to try to bring about Marchet's resignation.\textsuperscript{62}

Wahrmund's lecture took on an even greater significance because it was delivered in the province of Tyrol. Here there were two Catholic parties vying with each other to be recognized as the true defender of the clerical position. The old Catholic Conservative party,

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 425.

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Ibid.}
recently routed in the Reichsrat elections, saw in the situation an excellent opportunity to show all Austria that in Tyrol the conservative party was still very much alive and independent. Thus during the next several weeks the conservative party and press of Tyrol competed with the Christian Socialists in the hunt for Wahrmund's head. In the Tyrolian diet members of both parties demanded that the rector of the University of Innsbruck prohibit Prof. Wahrmund from lecturing at the university. In Vienna the Christian Socialist delegate, Schraffl, interpellated Marchet concerning Wahrmund, and a special meeting of the Christian Socialist Club passed a resolution demanding that Wahrmund be removed from the university, and that Marchet resign from the cabinet.

The government of Beck was caught in a dilemma. His ministry was dependent on the support of the Christian Socialist Party and he could not afford to ignore their demands. On the other hand, the Christian Socialist insistence that Wahrmund be fired from the University of Innsbruck was, as Marchet himself pointed out, completely out of keeping with the traditions of academic freedom. Through February, March, and April 1908 the battle over Wahrmund continued. The Christian Socialist party and press continued to demand the dismissal of Wahrmund and the resignation of Marchet. According to Alfred Ebenhoch, the

63 Allmayer-Beck, Beck, p. 212.
64 Reichspost, 2 February 1908, p. 5.
65 Ibid., 10 February 1908, p. 8.
66 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 425.
67 Cf. e.g. Reichspost, 2 February 1908, p. 5; 5 February 1908, pp. 1-2; 22 March 1908, p. 5; 18 April 1908, pp. 1-2; 22 April, pp. 1-3; and 29 April 1908, p. 5.
Wahrmund affair was the main topic for conversation in the back rooms of the house of deputies. In a letter to Lueger concerning Wahrmund the usually phlegmatic Ebenhoch wrote, "How will it end up? A man could go crazy!"  

During this period a group of university professors formed an organization for the defense of academic freedom known as the "Wahrmund Protectorate." Dr. Hildebrand, rector of the University of Graz, was the chairman. Eventually this organization was to play host to many whose interests were not so much the protection of the persecuted professor as pure political opposition to the Christian Socialist Party. Thus the Wahrmund Protectorate came to include many leaders of the German Progressive Party, the Young Czech Party, and the Social Democratic Party. Meanwhile, the university students formed their own interuniversity organization, the "Freedom of Nationalities and Confessions on Behalf of Wahrmund," which soon had representation in all of the German universities.

The old policy of the Beck government at first had been to hold firm and hope that the matter would blow over without embarrassing the ministry, but when the demands of the Christian Socialists continued for several months, Beck requested Marchet to take definite

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68 Letter from Ebenhoch to Lueger, 15 March 1908, Manuscript collection of the City of Vienna, I. N. 40952, Vienna City Hall.

69 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 425.

70 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 426.
measures. Early in April the ministry of education announced that Dr. Wahrmund’s brochure would be removed from circulation and that Wahrmund himself was to receive a government grant to do research abroad. The grant was to begin with the Easter recess (19 April) and to last to the end of May. The assumption was that Wahrmund would not return at all for the Spring semester and the matter would have until September to pass out of the public mind. 71

No sooner had the barrassed minister of education tried to placate the Christian Socialists by removing Prof. Wahrmund and his book from the scene than he faced an attack from his own party. On 10 April 1908 the German Progressive delegate von Hock introduced an interpellation of the minister complaining that the suppression of Wahrmund’s brochure was contrary to academic freedom. When the vice president of the house, Dr. Žáček, who was presiding, noticed that the interpellation contained the entire text of the pamplhet, he had the presence of mind to postpone it to a special closed session held that evening, lest the publication of the interpellation with all of Dr. Wahrmund’s famous lecture set off even stronger Christian Socialist protests. 72

Two days later came the unexpected announcement from the University of Innsbruck that Prof. Wahrmund would resume his classes as soon as he returned from his travels at the end of May. This news touched off a series of indignant explosions from the clerical camp.

Protest meetings convened in many parishes of the province. In the Tyrolian diet a conservative delegate delivered another diatribe demanding Wahrmund's dismissal. On 28 April, Count Francis Thun (frequently the voice of the Christian Socialists in the upper house), in an interpellation of the minister of education, complained strongly that Wahrmund was being allowed to return.

Following this interpellation Marchet felt that he had no choice but to request the University of Innsbruck not to permit Wahrmund to continue his classes. On 6 May the law faculty of the university met and decided that, considering the strong public opposition, especially from the powerful clerical parties of Tyrol, they should comply with the minister's request. This announcement set off a series of student demonstrations in every German university in the empire which lasted for over a week. On 8 May the students at the University of Vienna voted a general strike to begin four days later. Within the next two days strikes had been voted by the students in all of the German universities, in each case at the

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73 *Neue Freie Presse*, 18 April 1908, Morning edition, p. 2.

74 *Reichspost*, 15 April 1908, p. 1.

75 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 23 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-38.

76 *Neue Freie Presse*, 29 April 1908, Morning edition, p. 7.

77 Ibid., 8 May 1908, Morning edition, p. 6.

78 Ibid., 8 May 1908, Evening edition, p. 4.
instigation of the "Freedom of Nationalities and Confessions on Behalf of Wahrmund." The students of the Czech university at Prague voted their sympathy with the German students but did not vote to strike.\(^{79}\)

On the day before the strike was to begin the rector of the University of Vienna, Dr. von Ebner, made an announcement entreaty the students of his university not to strengthen the hand of the clericals by staging strikes or demonstrations. Dr. von Ebner, on his part, assured the students that he would do everything possible to protect academic freedom in the university.\(^{80}\) Similar declarations were issued the next day by other rectors and, \textit{mirabile dictu}, the students heeded the warning and did not strike.\(^{81}\)

At the University of Innsbruck where the fervor of the nationalist students was loudest, the rector, Dr. von Scala, took a bold step. He assembled a collection of striking students, protesting professors, and random representatives from Graz and Vienna and announced that he would permit Dr. Wahrmund to return to his classroom.\(^{82}\) Dr. von Scala pointed out that in accordance with the request of the minister of education, the law faculty had barred Dr. Wahrmund from continuing his lectures in church law but that there had been no decisions specifically preventing the professor from giving some other course. That night there were wild celebrations in the streets and stubeln of Innsbruck.\(^{82}\)

\(^{79}\textit{Ibid.}, 10 May 1908, Evening edition, p. 10.\)
\(^{80}\textit{Ibid.}, 13 May 1908, Morning edition, p. 3.\)
\(^{81}\textit{Ibid.}, 13 May 1908, Evening edition, p. 2.\)
\(^{82}\textit{Ibid.}, 14 May 1908, Evening edition, p. 3.\)
This announcement must have put Marchet in a difficult position. The following day Dr. von Scala met with the minister in Vienna but no report was issued of their talks. 83 The reaction in the Christian Socialist camp, however, was electric. On the day following the announcement from Innsbruck, the Christian Socialist deputy, Hagenhofer, appeared at the gates of the University of Graz with two hundred embattled farmers to enforce the demands of the clericals. They wanted in particular the disbanding of the Wahr mund Protectorate (of which the rector of the University of Graz, Dr. Hildebrand, was chairman) and the admission of more Catholics to the faculty. 84 On the same day the Christian Socialist Committee for Higher Education 85 passed a resolution that the party should protest to the ministry of education of von Scala's announcement and to repeat their demand that Wahr mund be dismissed permanently from the University of Innsbruck. 86

Tension mounted as the day for Wahr mund's return to Innsbruck approached. On 26 May, as announced, the professor stepped off a train in the mountain capital relaxed and tan after his studies


85 This was a committee of the Christian Socialist club of the Reichsrat which was formed as a counterpart to a similar committee appointed by the German National Union to formulate policy in dealing with the Christian Socialists over the Wahr mund Affair.

86 Ibid., p. 5.
in Spain and Madeira. Wahrmund claimed that he had avoided reading Austrian newspapers and was therefore happily uninformed about the events, precipitated by his lectures, which had taken place while he was away. The next day Wahrmund left Innsbruck again on a two-day round trip to Vienna for a brief conference with the minister of education. On 1 June Wahrmund posted a notice at the University of Innsbruck that on the following day he would begin a seminar on church marriage law. The understanding of the rector of the university, of the faculty of the law school, and apparently of the minister of education\(^{87}\) was that Wahrmund could not be allowed to continue his former series of lectures (on church law) but that their various commitments did not prevent them from permitting him to lecture on some other subject. One can easily believe Dr. Wahrmund's statement that he was unaware of the storm which had raged during his absence when, at this critical stage, he chose to lecture on the equally controversial topic of church marriage laws.\(^{88}\)

On 2 June, the day that Wahrmund's new seminar was to begin, the ministry of education suddenly announced that the University of Innsbruck was to be closed until further notice. Actually the

\(^{87}\) No official statement of his position on the compromise was ever issued from Dr. Marchet's office. As any specific statement would have called forth opposition either from his own party or from the Christian Socialists or both, this silence was probably wisest. But considering that von Scala had announced the compromise shortly after a private conference with Marchet and that Wahrmund had announced his seminar the very day after a similar conference, it is probable that the move had at least the tacit approval of the minister.

\(^{88}\) Ibid., 2 June 1908, Evening edition, p. 1.
university had been closed by Baron Spiegelfeld, the statthaler of Tyrol; only the announcement came from the ministry of education. Baron Spiegelfeld was a member of the Catholic Conservative Party (not merged with the Christian Socialists in Tyrol). He had telephoned Prime Minister Beck the previous day to demand that Wahrmund's classes be cancelled. The statthaler did not have the right to cancel classes, but he did have the right to close the university, which is what he promised to do if Wahrmund continued to lecture. Beck did not wish to oppose the statthaler but at the same time he did not wish to make further difficulties for Dr. Marchet. The best solution, it seemed, was to permit Spiegelfeld to close the university and let the onus fall on the clericals rather than on the harrassed minister of education.\footnote{Ibid.}

On the same day that the announcement of the closing of the University of Innsbruck was published the students at the University of Vienna held a mass meeting and voted for an immediate protest strike.\footnote{Ibid., 3 June 1908, Morning edition, p. 2.} At this point the interuniversity student organization, "Freedom of Nationalities and Confessions on Behalf of Wahrmund," took over and organized similar strikes in all other German universities and also in the Czech university in Prague.\footnote{Ibid., 3 June 1908, Morning edition, p. 2.} It was during these strikes that Marchet attended the opening of a Childrens' Aid Center in Wahrning.
Francis Joseph was also present at the ceremony.\footnote{Dr. Marchet had been a close friend of Frau Schratt since childhood and was therefore personally known to the emperor (Joseph Maria Baernreither, \textit{Fragments of a Political Diary} [London, 1930], p. 249).} It is reported that on this occasion the old emperor called Marchet over to him and told him very sternly that he was to "stop the scandal!"\footnote{Hermann Deuring, \textit{Jodok Fink}, p. 157.} There is no way of knowing to what extent the minister was affected by this imperial command but, from 6-8 June, Marchet, Prime Minister Beck, and Professor Wahrnund held a series of conferences.\footnote{\textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 9 June 1908, Evening edition, p. 1.} It was at this time that they worked out a secret agreement that would permit Wahrnund to save face without further embarrassing the ministry or laying the government open to further attacks from the Christian Socialists. The agreement, as follows, was to go into effect on 1 October 1908:

Prof. Wahrnund was to request a leave of absence of one to two years for the purpose of "scientific research;" the government would give Wahrnund a research grant of 10,000 kronen per year; and should Dr. Wahrnund "for reasons of health, seek retirement, he is now assured that in addition to his regular pension he should receive 2,000 kronen per year." This agreement was signed by Prime Minister Beck, Dr. Marchet, and Professor Wahrnund.\footnote{Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 427.} The minister-president and Marchet must have been desperate for a solution. Had it ever become public that the government had bought off Wahrnund, it would have meant more than political suicide for the two ministers involved.
This entire agreement was rendered unnecessary by a series of events in the next two weeks. On 15 June, Marchet called a conference of university rectors to discuss the student strikes and the Wahrmund Affair. During these talks the rectors arranged that Wahrmund be called to a chair of church law at the German university in Prague, the only German university in the empire which was not in a province dominated by a clerical party. The law faculty of the German University of Prague subsequently confirmed the invitation. Dr. Wahrmund remained on this faculty (apparently without incident) until his death in 1932.

At the conference of 15 June the rectors also decided not to reopen any of the universities for the remainder of the spring semester of 1908. They hoped that by September the problem might be forgotten. If there were any further demonstrations in the fall, the rectors agreed, the wearing of colors would be permanently prohibited.

Following the conference of the rectors, Baron Beck met with the leaders of the Christian Socialist Party in the city hall and informed them that, in accordance with the demands of their

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96 *Neue Freie Presse*, 15 June 1908, Evening edition, p. 3.
97 *Funder, Vom Gestern*, p. 428.
100 *Neue Freie Presse*, 16 June 1908, Morning edition, p. 3.
party, Prof. Wahr mund had been permanently barred from the University of Innsbruck. The announcement that Wahr mund had been invited to Prague did not come until two weeks later on 26 June. There is no way of knowing whether Beck knew of this when he talked with the Christian Socialists on 16 June. When the announcement did come, the Christian Socialists let out an indignant howl. The party's committee on higher education passed a resolution that the minister of education should prevent Wahr mund from accepting the post, and on 2 July a scathing editorial appeared in the Reichspost demanding that Marchet either prohibit Wahr mund from lecturing at any university in the empire or resign. The editorial promised that if the situation were not rectified, the Christian Socialist Party could no longer support the government.

The Christian Socialist protests were in vain. The government chose to ignore them. Wahr mund was now safely out of the jurisdiction of the clericals. It was July. Student demonstrations could no longer stir up popular indignation. The Reichsrat was about to end its sessions and deputies could no longer deliver embarrassing interpellations. The Christian Socialists had been duped. The Wahr mund Affair had apparently been settled behind their backs. The party had not only lost the struggle, they had lost face. The Christian Socialist leaders, especially Gessmann, realized that if something did not soon develop which could

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103 Ibid., 30 June 1908, Morning edition, p. 3.
104 Reichspost, 2 July 1908, pp. 1-2.
turn the situation to their advantage, the Christian Socialists would
have to resign from the cabinet even though this would mean the fall
of the Beck ministry.\footnote{105}

When the new political season opened in the fall, the
German nationalists were the first on stage. On 2 October their
committee on higher education met with Marchet to demand that he
prohibit the founding of any new Catholic student clubs as a step
toward preventing a recurrence of the previous year's demonstrations.
Marchet hedged the question by announcing that the rectors had already
decided to prohibit \textit{all} student clubs at the first sign of trouble.\footnote{106}
Not content to let the matter rest, the Christian Socialist committee
on higher education met on 5 October and drew up a series of resolutions
in rebuttal: that the \textit{numerus clausus} be invoked in determining the
number of Catholic student clubs to be permitted on any campus, that
the existing clerical clubs receive the same privileges in the
universities as the other student clubs, and that all Catholic students
be granted the right to "sally and saunter" (\textit{Auffahrten und Bummel}) at
will on campus. If these rights of Catholic students were not respected,
said the committee, the party would demand the resignation of Marchet.\footnote{107}

These resolutions of the Christian Socialists set the stage
for the party to return the situation to their own advantage at the
first sign of trouble when the universities opened. But the students

\footnote{105} Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 428.

\footnote{106} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 2 October 1908, Evening edition, p. 3.

\footnote{107} \textit{Ibid.}, 6 October 1908, Morning edition, p. 8.
did not oblige. When classes resumed in the third week of October, all was quiet. The game was over; the fad had passed.

The Christian Socialists had to find some other excuse to swing the hatchet at the agile Dr. Marchet. They did not have long to wait. During the first week of November the Christian Socialists decided to resign from the cabinet partly because of pressure from the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and partly because of a new language crisis in Bohemia. But Albert Gessmann did not lose this last opportunity to strike at the minister of education. When he announced his resignation from the cabinet, Gessmann gave as his only reason the fact that the Beck cabinet had been unable to remedy the anti-clericalism in the universities.

A small column on the same page of the newspaper as Gessmann's announcement, gave ominous indication that the German nationalist bigotry in the universities had other victims than the clericals: "The students of a German national student club at the University of Vienna today attacked a group of students wearing the colors of a Jewish fraternity."

The Christian Socialist Party and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand

Almost as soon as the Christian Socialists came into a position of influence, they found themselves being drawn into an intrigue then being formed by the archduke Francis Ferdinand and his

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108 Cf. Sections C and D.
109 Neue Freie Presse, 7 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 3.
110 Ibid.
immediate associates to unseat the minister-president Baron Beck, the man whose policies had brought the party into prominence. From about 1900 the heir apparent had taken an active interest in the affairs of the realm and in so doing had become an outspoken critic of many of his uncle's policies. In the years following, a group of dissentients gathered around the archduke to form an unofficial opposition to the emperor. This political influence emanating from the Belvedere (the beautiful baroque palace which was the official residence of Francis Ferdinand) was often referred to as the Nebenregierung or the "other government." The policies of the Belvedere Circle were essentially ultraconservative, ultraclerical, and ultramilitarist. A majority of the members belonged to the German landholding aristocracy of Bohemia, considered the most reactionary element in the monarchy. Some of the more significant personalities at the Belvedere were Heinrich Count Clam-Martinic, Ottokar Czernin, and Prince Karl Schwarzenberg, of the Bohemian landholders; Dr. Heinrich Lammasch, a clerically-minded professor of law; and Conrad von Hötzendorf, well-known as a proponent of extreme militarism.\textsuperscript{111}

By far the most important figure in the Belvedere Circle was Major Alexander Brosch von Aarenau. Major Brosch was appointed military adjutant to the archduke in January 1906. Almost immediately he became Francis Ferdinand's closest adviser, confidant, and personal

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\textsuperscript{111} Georg Franz, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der habsburger Monarchie (Brunn, Munich, and Vienna, 1943), p. 36.
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friend. Brosch was the picture of military efficiency. His bearing was that of a soldier. In speech and writing he was precise, logical, and succinct. And he was determined to use both his position and his intelligence to increase the prestige and influence of the man he had been called to serve. It was Brosch who transformed the Belvedere Circle from a group of dissident aristocrats into a highly organized pressure group and a powerful political force in the monarchy. One of the weaknesses of Francis Ferdinand’s following was that for the very reasons that it existed none of them held positions of political influence, either in the elected parliament or in the bureaucracy. Brosch attracted into the circle many people who were not only sympathetic with the aims of the archduke but who also held positions of authority in the government. Once the Belvedere Circle was more efficiently organized, they were able to place more of their men in key government positions (e.g., in 1906 Conrad von Hützendorf was appointed chief of the general staff of the imperial and royal army).

Brosch was also to a large degree responsible for drawing up more carefully the objectives of the Belvedere Circle. These objectives were concerned for the most part with a reorganization of the

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112 Rudolph Kiszling, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este (Graz and Cologne, 1953), p. 95; Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 381.
113 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 381.
114 Franz, p. 71.
empire at the accession of Francis Ferdinand. Generally, these plans call for the reorganization of the empire on a more centralized basis. Provinces were to be redrawn as far as possible along ethnic lines. Each province was to hold a roughly equal position in the centralized monarchy. The whole would be held together by a strengthened monarch backed by a strong army. The most difficult obstacle to this reorganization was the Ausgleich of 1867 which had established Hungary as disproportionately larger than the other provinces. A large section of the Brosch memorandum, therefore, was concerned with suggesting measures, legal or otherwise, of abrogating the Ausgleich.

In contemporary politics the only major objective of the Belvedere (and with Francis Ferdinand it amounted to an obsession) was to prevent any further concessions to the Magyars which would make the job of reorganization even more difficult when the time came.

As the Belvedere Circle became a more coherent and conscientious pressure group in Austrian (and Hungarian) politics, Francis Ferdinand and Major Brosch sought a press outlet through which to disseminate their ideas and to influence public opinion. Through Brosch's efforts three journals became available to the Belvedere: the Oesterreichische Rundschau, a fairly intellectual

115 These plans, drawn up by Brosch with the help of Professor Lammesach (Franz, p. 71), were published in two newspaper articles during the 1920's. One article appeared in two parts in the Neues Wiener Journal on 30 December 1923, and 1 January 1924. The other article appeared in the Reichspost on 28 March 1926.
monthly journal edited by Leopold von Chlumecky, himself a member of the Belvedere Circle and a personal friend of Francis Ferdinand; the *Armeezeitung*, a military journal edited by Karl Danzer; and the *Reichspost*, the daily organ of the Christian Socialist Party.  

It is not as surprising as it might seem that the Belvedere Circle, composed primarily of feudal aristocracy, should use the organ of a popular political party for the propagation of its views. In fact the Belvedere and the Christian Socialists had many points of contact. Both were clerical, which was the original basis of the relation. The Christian Socialists were empire-minded and intensely loyal to the dynasty. In their Eggenburg Party Day Manifesto of 1905 the Christian Socialists had embraced a program for the re-organization of the empire which was quite compatible with those of the Belvedere, and which indicated that the Christian Socialists could be counted on to support any measures designed to clip the wings of the Magyar ruling class.  

Friedrich Funder, who was then chief editor of the *Reichspost*, gives this account of how the relationship between the Belvedere and the Christian Socialist press was initiated:

One Sunday afternoon...a member of the imperial guards as big as a tree came into the editor's office...Some days later I was called to the Belvedere. In the simple office on the Rennweg was the adjutant of the archduke,

\[116\] Franz, p. 36.

\[117\] The essential points of the Eggenburg Manifesto were taken from the book, *Die vereinigten Staaten vom Gross-Österreich* by Aurel Popovici. Popovici was himself close to the Belvedere and the plans for the reorganization of the empire drawn up by Brosch show Popovici's influence.
Alexander Brosch von Aarenau...(who) informed me that his highness followed my newspaper with great interest and attention.\textsuperscript{118}

Following this interview Funder himself became a member of the Belvedere Circle. Through Funder not only the Reichspost but also the provincial press of the party was used to propagate the ideas of the Belvedere.\textsuperscript{119} Apparently Funder became virtually a press secretary for the archduke:

I received information and was instructed how to supply this information to the press of other countries.

Upon instructions from Francis Ferdinand, delivered through Brosch, Funder even wrote specific articles for foreign newspapers.\textsuperscript{120}

It was not until later, when Francis Ferdinand was seeking support in the Reichsrat for his campaign to unseat minister-president Beck, that the Belvedere sought to extend its influence with the Christian Socialist press to include the party as well. Baron Beck had once been an adviser to the archduke for political affairs, and, therefore, when Beck was first named minister-president, Francis Ferdinand was pleased to have one of "his men" in this responsible post. He thought that finally there was an Austrian minister-president who would help the Belvedere Circle in its efforts to humble the Magyars. On the day that Beck was appointed, Francis Ferdinand telegraphed him (concerning Hungary): "Under no circumstances

\textsuperscript{118}Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 367.

\textsuperscript{119}Franz, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{120}Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 377.
give in to them -- do not even make minor concessions." Later the archduke wrote that he hoped Beck would "become a wild Tartar toward Hungary and free us from this plague."121

But the archduke's pleasure turned first to disappointment and eventually to fury when Beck tried to run the government in the interests of the monarchy rather than in response to strings pulled from the Belvedere. Francis Ferdinand's first disillusionment with Beck came when the minister engineered the franchise reform of 1907. The Belvedere could not approve of an electoral revision which would take the prerogative of government almost completely out of the hands of the hereditary aristocracy.122

A second crisis arose between the prime minister and the heir apparent in October, 1907, when Beck, after untold difficulties, finally concluded the new ten-year economic agreement with Hungary. Although this treaty was as favorable to Austria as could be expected from a Hungarian government dominated by the Independence Party, Francis Ferdinand was furious with Beck for having concluded a treaty which in his belief perpetuated and even increased the privileged position of the Magyars. Against the archduke's specific request Beck had accepted a treaty which was to last for the usual ten years. He had wanted Beck to conclude only a provisional agreement of one year's duration (following the bad example of a decade earlier). Thus

121 Kiszling, p. 92.

in the event that emperor should die, there would not be any objectionable arrangements with Hungary that could last too long to be remedied.\textsuperscript{123}

From this time the Belvedere Circle openly plotted to bring about the fall of Beck. The simplest way to force the prime minister to resign would be through the parliament. The Belvedere could use the existence of a responsible ministry, of which it so strongly disapproved, to bring about the fall of the man who had created it. The Belvedere, of course, was not represented in the popularly elected house of deputies. But the project could carry if they could arrange an alliance with the powerful Christian Socialist Party. Brosch already had an entre\textsuperscript{e} to the party leaders through Friedrich Funder and the Reichspost, which had been enrolled in his services for over a year. Also there were many influential deputies of the conservative wing of the party (e.g. Baron von Morsey, Victor von Fuchs) who might actually be in sympathy with the Belvedere.

For the party, the stakes were high. The fall of Beck at this time could mean the loss of all of the recent strides toward parliamentary government. On the other hand, to refuse to do the bidding of Francis Ferdinand would surely incur the permanent disfavor of this highly temperamental man who might at any time become the emperor.

The Belvedere first sought the assistance of the Christian Socialists in a last-ditch effort to prevent the passage of the

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid.
economic treaty with Hungary in the Fall of 1907. Major Brosch called personally on Lueger in the city hall to ask him not to permit Gessmann and Ebenhoch to join the cabinet (and thereby release the party from its obligation to vote for the treaty). All that Brosch got from this interview was a full dose of the Lueger charm. Lueger told Brosch politely that he and his party believed the treaty was necessary. Still, on the eve of the entrance of two Christian Socialists into the Beck cabinet, Lueger was able to let Brosch leave his office firmly convinced that it was "only a question of time until this party would try to overthrow the regime of Beck." 124

During the Spring of 1908 a new situation arose which kindled afresh the wrath of the archduke against the minister-president, and which again brought Major Brosch seeking aid from the Christian Socialists. On 19 February 1908 the Austrian parliament passed the Schraffl-Latour Bill to raise the pay of officers and men in the Austro-Hungarian army. It was generally known in political circles that the inspiration for this measure had come from the Belvedere and that its passage was of enormous importance to Francis Ferdinand. 125 As the Schraffl-Latour Bill concerned both halves of the monarchy, it had to be presented by the Austrian prime minister to the council of ministers. They, in turn, had to present it to the delegations.

124 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 7 November 1907, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-14.

125 Chlumecky, p. 253.
If the two delegations accepted it, the bill would be presented to both houses of parliament. When the bill came before the Hungarian delegation on 3 March 1908, it was rejected. At a meeting of the council of ministers the following day it was decided that the army pay raise was too important to put off until the next scheduled session of the delegations in the Fall. A special session was set for May 1908 to re-introduce the bill.Obviously, a bill which could not pass in the Hungarian delegation in March had very little chance of passing in May. The fact was that Baron Beck and the Hungarian minister-president, Wekerle, had already been working on a compromise army pay raise which the Hungarians could accept. This new proposal was to be presented to the delegations in May directly from the council of ministers. It seems sensible that Beck should have worked out an acceptable compromise on the army pay raise. A somewhat diminished army pay raise was better than none at all, but Beck's reasoning, however logical, simply infuriated the archduke and his following. That even the interests of the army could be subjected to negotiations and compromises was unthinkable! At the Belvedere, Beck's plan was referred to derogatorily as the "Army Ausgleich."

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126 *Reichspost*, 4 March 1908, p. 2.
129 Chlumecky, p. 254.
In Brosch's view it was "of the utmost importance that the suggestions made by Baron Beck (to Weckerle) not be permitted to come about," and during the two months before the next meeting of the council of ministers Major Brosch worked assiduously to assure that they would not. Brosch also saw in this situation an excellent opportunity to unseat the minister-president altogether.

Brosch's plan was complicated and again involved the cooperation of the Christian Socialist Party. He seems to have assumed that his close relationship with the Reichspost meant that he could count on the support of the whole party. According to Brosch's plan, when Beck's compromise proposal came before the Austrian delegation in May, the Christian Socialist members of the delegation were to vote against it, thus assuring its failure. This move would both kill the "Army Ausgleich" and discredit Baron Beck. The next step would be for the Christian Socialists in the Austrian house of deputies to interpellate the prime minister regarding the secret and unconstitutional means by which he and Weckerle had worked out the compromise. Failing a satisfactory answer, the two Christian Socialist ministers were to withdraw from the cabinet. Without the Christian Socialists, Beck would no longer have the support of a majority of the cabinet and would be obliged to resign.\(^{131}\)

\(^{130}\) Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 8 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-36.

\(^{131}\) Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 25 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-40.
It was an important part of Brosch's plan that Beck's fall come over a question concerning both halves of the monarchy. In such an instance, only the minister-president would be responsible and the rest of the cabinet would not fall with him. Thus, they could "overthrow Beck--without otherwise changing the cabinet--and in his position simply place Baron Bienerth." This last stipulation was vital to the whole plan: Brosch was dependent completely on the co-operation of the Christian Socialists, who could hardly be expected to give their enthusiastic support to the overthrow of the entire cabinet.

During the next several weeks, virtually every important leader of the party (except, for some reason, Weiskirchner) was treated to a personal audience with the heir apparent. Brosch felt, with good reason, that this would go a long way in bringing local politicians to heel.

Fortunately for Brosch, Lueger was at this time very ill and during the critical months from February to May of 1908 he was recuperating in Lovrano. Brosch probably already knew the fruitlessness of dealing with Lueger from his talks with him the previous October. The wily burgomaster was invariably friendly, even intimate, but noncommittal. With Lueger somewhat remote, the junior party leaders might be more malleable.

\[132^*\text{Ibid.}\]

\[133^*\text{Ibid.}\]
The first to feel the warm breath of personal favor from the Belvedere was Alfred Ebenhoch. The effect of an audience with his future emperor on the agrarian politician from Upper Austria was exactly as Brosch had expected. It was an ecstatic, almost effervescent, Ebenhoch who wrote the next day to his party chief, then still languishing in Lovrano.

Yesterday evening I was summoned before the archduke Francis Ferdinand who spoke to me for over an hour about all sorts of relationships. I am impatient to share with you the fact that his imperial highness places the greatest faith in our party and wants us to be his support. I was much moved by the degree of esteem and love with which the archduke spoke of you.  

Some time later Albert Gessmann was also called to the Belvedere. Both Francis Ferdinand and Major Brosch found him "too unreliable."  

As the day for the meeting of the council of ministers approached, Brosch was still not certain whether the Christian Socialists could be counted on to read their part of the script. There remained one important figure in the party that Brosch knew he could rely on: Dr. Friedrich Funder, editor of the Reichspost. Brosch decided to try a new tactic. He persuaded Funder to run an article in the Reichspost

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134 Letter from Ebenhoch to Hueger, 22 March 1908, Manuscript collection of the city of Vienna, I. N. 40951, Vienna City Hall.

135 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 25 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-40.

136 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 23 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-38.
on 15 May 1908 condemning the policies of Baron Beck and clearly stating that these policies would cost the minister-president the support of the Christian Socialist Party. Brosch hoped with this article to stir up feeling against Beck among the rank and file party members, who would then force the party leaders into opposition. According to Brosch, the article was intended as "a trial balloon." We must then wait and see how the party itself will react to this announcement of their opposition, especially...the two Christian Socialist ministers. Should the majority of the party react favorably, then we can carry the matter further. 137

It seems inconceivable that Friedrich Funder could have published a lead article in the Reichspost, announcing the party's opposition to the minister-president, without the previous knowledge or consent of the two party ministers, especially of Albert Gessmann. But if we are to believe Brosch's letter, that is just what was intended. It is, of course, possible that Funder did tell Gessmann about the article, that Gessmann too was anxious to see what the reaction of the party might be, and that he consented to the publication of the article only with the understanding that his knowledge of the article be kept secret. This conjecture would be more in keeping with the close relationship which had existed, and which continued to exist, between Gessmann and the Reichspost.

137 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 14 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-33; Reichspost, 15 May 1908, pp. 1-2.
As a trial balloon the Reichspost article was a bust. Instead of rallying the rank and file party members to the cause of the Belvedere, it drew violent criticism from a majority of the party, much of which was printed in the Deutsches Volksblatt during the next few days. Brosch still did not believe that this loyalty to Beck represented the true feelings of the party. He was convinced that Beck had simply bribed Vergani, and he continued his efforts to cajole the party leaders into carrying out his plan.

On 21 May the council of ministers met in Vienna and accepted the compromise on the army pay raise proposed by Baron Beck. The following day the delegations met to debate the proposal. Now Brosch went into high gear. On the evening of 22 May he wrote to the archduke that he had been able to "negotiate deals with Count Latour, Count Clam (both were members of the upper house and of the Austrian delegation, and close to the Belvedere), Dr. von Fuchs, Dr. Gessmann, and a series of other Christian Socialists--the latter in an indirect fashion--and, I must be so immodest as to say, that--not without difficulties--I have arranged that the delegation will reject the compromise."  


139 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 23 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-38.

140 Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 22 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-37.
The following day, however, the archduke's adjutant was not so smug. "...on the basis of my own contacts with the Christian Socialist delegates, I unfortunately no longer hold the same view."\textsuperscript{141}

The Christian Socialists had simply refused to be pushed. There was no reason for them to go into opposition. The party had not backed the article in the Reichspost. There was every indication that the party's mandate was to stay in the ministry and to support Beck. Eventually the army pay compromise passed both delegations and needed only ratification in the two parliaments. Brosch was furious with the Christian Socialists for failing to support him. "Dr. Lueger is sick and weak; Dr. Gessmann and Dr. Ebenhoch are afraid of losing their portfolios, and a majority of the party awaits...favors from Baron Beck."\textsuperscript{142}

Not yet daunted, Brosch now turned to the president of the Austrian house of deputies, Richard Weiskirchner. The irrepressible adjutant still believed he could wheedle the Christian Socialists into conducting an interpellation of Beck in the house, and he spent the best part of a morning trying to persuade Weiskirchner to institute it. Weiskirchner was able to keep the major at bay, but was apparently not able to discourage him. Later that day Brosch wrote to Francis Ferdinand, "Whether or not I was able to convince Dr. Weiskirchner, I was unable to get a binding promise from him." Then Brosch pulled his

\textsuperscript{141} Letter from Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 23 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-38.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
last ace. "I believe that it would be of particular value if your imperial highness reveal to him once höchstpersönlich die ansichten Höchstderselben."\(^{143}\)

Even a personal interview with the archduke failed to move the faithful Weiskirchner. When the Beck army pay compromise eventually came before the Austrian parliament, the Christian Socialist Club supported it, and the bill passed. For the time being the machinations of Francis Ferdinand and of Major Brosch had proved unsuccessful. Beck was still in office, and he still had the support of the Christian Socialist Party. For all his efforts, the only fish that Major Brosch had snagged was Friedrich Funder.

But the incident caused serious damage to the Christian Socialist's prestige in Vienna. Although the party itself had steadfastly refused to be influenced by Major Brosch, the outspoken support of the Belvedere by the Reichspost (the main liaison between the party and the people) led the public to believe that the party had become the tool of the heir apparent. This became a serious disadvantage from which the party never recovered.

Brosch had by no means given up his campaign against Beck. When he failed to bring about Beck's fall over the army pay question, Brosch simply waited for his next opportunity. During the summer of 1908 he found that he could employ the willing services of the imperial and royal minister of foreign affairs, Alois Lexa Freiherr von Aehrenthal,

\(^{143}\)Brosch to Francis Ferdinand, 5 May 1908, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, C-40. The words in italics are untranslatable. They mean that Weiskirchner should be invited to a personal audience with the archduke.
who strutted onto the political stage at this time. He proved particularly valuable, for in his position he also enjoyed the confidence of the emperor. Aehrenthal's dislike of Beck likewise stemmed from the franchise reform. In 1906 when the electoral reform was under negotiation, he had just returned from service abroad where he had virtually lost contact with Austria's domestic problems. Horrified by the idea of universal suffrage, he had tried to use his influence to dissuade Beck from carrying it through. When Baron Beck spurned his "expert" help and advice, Aehrenthal enrolled in the intrigue which was then organizing under Francis Ferdinand to remove Beck from office. 144

The last straw for the foreign minister came when Beck was the only member of either cabinet to oppose his plan for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which he presented in the summer of 1908. It was Beck's belief that the relationship between the dual monarchy and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been determined by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Therefore, according to Beck, the Hapsburg monarchy could not change these arrangements without the prior knowledge and consent of the signatory powers. Aehrenthal's plan called for a unilateral announcement of the annexation. Beck believed that such a move would antagonize the European powers, and weaken Austria-Hungary's power status, the very opposite of Aehrenthal's objectives. 145 The fact that subsequent events proved Beck's position to be correct need not have enhanced his popularity with Aehrenthal. The emperor had given his wholehearted support to

144 Allmeyer-Beck, Beck, p. 304.

145 Sieghart, pp. 130-31.
Aehrenthal's plan and, as he was annoyed with Beck for his outspoken criticism, he gave a more willing ear to Aehrenthal's intrigues. Thus reinforced, Francis Ferdinand and Major Brosch moved in for the kill after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908. During this month Francis Ferdinand sent a series of messengers to the city hall "to demand from Lueger the head of Beck." It is to Lueger's credit that he hesitated several weeks before executing the demands of the archduke. There were still many considerations, and the party leaders were in a serious dilemma. First, the party owed its position to Beck. The power of the Christian Socialist Party in the Reichsrat was derived almost entirely from the electoral reform for which Beck deserved most of the credit. Beck had invited two members of the party into his cabinet and had gone to some trouble to create the ministry of public work so that Gessmann could run a department which would give him prestige with the party's urban electorate. Furthermore, the party had participated in the Beck ministry for almost a year. Both Ebenhoch and Gessmann had worked to implement the policies of a ministry they were now being asked to depose.

The same question had even deeper significance on the level of political philosophy. Beck wanted the parliament to take a more active part in forming the policies of the government. It was with this in mind that he had wished to include leaders of the larger

\[146\] Allmayer-Beck, Beck, p. 307.

\[147\] Sieghart, p. 141.
political groups in his cabinet. It was only under such a political system as Beck had tried to create that the Christian Socialist Party had any real political significance. A new minister-president, particularly one who would be acceptable to the Belvedere, might not share Beck's views on the role of the parliament, might not feel obliged to consider the parliament in determining major policy, nor to include representatives of the major parties in his cabinet. Under such a system, the Christian Socialists, regardless of the number of votes they could command at the polls, would be comparatively impotent. To grant their services to Francis Ferdinand in bringing about the resignation of Beck might well mean political suicide for the Christian Socialist Party itself!

On the other hand the Christian Socialists had recently suffered a humiliating defeat in the recent Wahrnund Affair. The party held Beck accountable for failing to dismiss Marchet as minister of education and for permitting Wahrnund to lecture at the University of Prague. If the Christian Socialists complied with the request of the Belvedere the cabinet would be left intact but Beck would be replaced with Bienerth. Bienerth was a clerical. If he were premier the ball would be returned to the Christian Socialists.

During October 1908 Gessmann talked with Rudolf Sieghart and confided in him his genuine despair over the party's dilemma. Sieghart (a close friend and admirer of Beck) tried his best to convince Gessmann to stay with the ministry. Sieghart pointed out to him that Beck had come closer than any previous minister-president to creating "a more democratic form of government in Austria." If the
conservative circle of Francis Ferdinand were to be permitted to depose Beck, then all of the constitutional reforms that the Christian Socialist Party, and Gessmann in particular, had believed in and worked hard to achieve, might be lost. "I well understand," Sieghart said to Gessmann, "that morality must play a smaller role with political parties than it does with individuals. But think of the unfavorable impression that the voters will have of the Christian Socialist Party, a government party, should they, with no apparent reason, deal the head of the government the coup de grâce. Your party is at a point of decision. You may remain with the present government and carry through the work of national and political understanding on a democratic basis. In this event Dr. Lueger must give the Belvedere a clear no. In this way your party could earn a lasting reputation for having been the decisive factor and a great service to the state."

Unfortunately for the party, Sieghart's good counsel went unheeded. Francis Ferdinand eventually became impatient with the deliberations of the Christian Socialists, and late in October 1908 he sent Major Brosch himself to deliver an ultimatum to Lueger. The Brosch message amounted to a demand that the party withdraw its support from Beck immediately.

During these same weeks a new language controversy developed in Bohemia, which turned public opinion among the German-speaking constituents of the party against Beck. It was the Bohemian situation

\[148\] Ibid., pp. 141-42.

\[149\] Ibid., p. 142.
which led the party leaders to believe that they had a mandate to
desert the prime minister. Thus at the same time the Christian
Socialists could give the appearance, if somewhat belatedly, of
complying with the wishes of Francis Ferdinand as well as of
satisfying the party's wounded pride over the Wahrmond Affair.

The Christian Socialists
and the Fall of the Beck Cabinet

Following the fiasco of the Badeni language ordinances
of 1897 the government made repeated attempts to work out a new law
that would be satisfactory both to Czechs and to Germans. The
success of the language law for Moravia in 1905 encouraged the
government to continue its efforts in Bohemia. In 1908 Baron Beck,
with his usual sincerity and his determination to attempt the
impossible, turned his attentions to the tortuous Bohemian language
controversy. The minister added confusion to complexity by
supporting at the same time a move to end the curia system in the
elections for the Bohemian diet. In so doing he met the solid
opposition of the Bohemian aristocracy (mostly German-speaking) who
knew that any change in the electoral system would weaken their
privileged position in the province. These powerful lords, who
could count on the baking of the already anti-Beck Belvedere,
determined to prevent Beck from arriving at either a new electoral
law or a solution to the language problem. Prince Karl Schwarzenberg,
a leading member of this group declared: "The Bohemian lords will
never permit Beck to have anything to do with the language question.
They want to solve [sic] it themselves. If Beck were to solve it,
he would become too powerful, and this must be prevented under all circumstances.¹⁵⁰

When the Bohemian diet assembled in September 1908, the lack of a solution to the language question brought the house to an impasse,¹⁵¹ and on 16 October 1908 Beck ordered the dissolution of the diet. This move so angered the already exasperated Czechs that a series of antigovernment demonstrations broke out in Prague, and on 14 October 1908 the two members of the Czech Club in the Beck ministry resigned.¹⁵²

The disturbances in Prague continued for another two weeks and by the first of November there was considerable speculation about the future of the Beck ministry. The general consensus in Vienna was that the ministry was finished. Beck himself was still convinced that he could reconstruct his cabinet and work out a satisfactory solution in Bohemia. With this in mind he had a series of meetings early in November with the leaders of the parliamentary parties.¹⁵³

On 2 November Beck met with Lueger and Gessmann in the burgomaster's office. Beck told the Christian Socialist leaders that he believed he would be able to bring the Czechs back into his cabinet (and thus save the ministry) if he could offer them a third portfolio, preferably the ministry of agriculture. Lueger and

¹⁵⁰Chlumecky, p. 140.

¹⁵¹Charmatz, p. 86.


¹⁵³Neue Freie Presse, 3 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 4.
Gessmann answered that this solution would probably be acceptable to their party if a third cabinet seat were also assigned to a Christian Socialist and if the Czech Club would give the Christian Socialists the much coveted ministry of commerce. It is evident from this response that Lueger and Gessmann were giving no consideration to the rural wing of their party.\(^\text{154}\) Apparently Baron Beck was reassured by this conference. After the meeting he wrote in his diary, "I believed that I could count on the support of the party as much as ever."\(^\text{155}\)

Beck was mistaken. Three days later the Christian Socialist Club voted almost unanimously to withdraw its support from the Beck ministry.\(^\text{156}\) There are many explanations for the party's apparent duplicity. Most important was the unrest in Prague. In any language or nationality dispute, the German population of all parts of the empire usually developed very strong sympathies whether the issue at hand directly concerned them or not. As the Christian Socialist voters were almost entirely German, it was necessary for the party to reflect these sympathies. In the preceding few weeks, Beck had become extremely unpopular with the Germans of the empire particularly in Vienna. They believed that his actions in Bohemia were unfavorable to the Germans, and they held him responsible for the antigovernment demonstrations by the Czech population of Prague. On 3 November the

\(^{154}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{155}\text{Allmayer-Beck, Beck, p. 244.}\)

\(^{156}\text{Neue Freie Presse, 5 November 1908, Evening edition, p. 1.}\)
front page of the Reichspost carried another "trial balloon" article attempting to probe public opinion. The article denounced Beck for the failure of his policies in Bohemia and threatened the resignation of the Christian Socialists in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{157} The sympathetic reception to this article in Vienna strongly influenced the Christian Socialists in their decision to withdraw their support from the ministry.\textsuperscript{158} The importance of public opinion on the Bohemian problem in influencing the party's decision is indicated also by another vote later in the meeting to support "any coalition ministry that can effect an agreement between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia."\textsuperscript{159} This statement certainly did not leave the party with any binding commitment.

A second explanation for the party's negative decision was Beck's belief that he could win the Czechs only by giving them the ministry of agriculture and compensating the Christian Socialists with the ministry of commerce. Although this suggestion had been acceptable to Lueger and Gessmann, it was adamantly opposed by the agrarians, who announced that they would not support Beck on these terms.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157}Reichspost, 3 November 1908, pp. 1-2. It is not unlikely that this article was also inspired by the Belvedere.

\textsuperscript{158}Deutsches Volksblatt, 7 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{160}Neue Freie Presse, 5 November 1908, Evening edition, p. 1.
Probably the most important factor influencing the party's vote was an election for the Lower Austrian diet which took place during the last week of October and the first week of November 1908. The final results of this election were published on the same day that the Christian Socialist Club voted not to support the Beck ministry. This election showed that the popularity of the Christian Socialist Party in Lower Austria, and particularly in Vienna, was even stronger than it had been in the Reichsrat elections of a year earlier. In the Reichsrat election of 1907, the Christian Socialists had polled 158,899 votes in the city of Vienna. In the elections for the Lower Austrian diet, the general urban curia of Vienna (synonymous with the entire electorate of Vienna in the Reichsrat elections) had given the Christian Socialists 168,173 votes. Even more significant was a drop in the Social Democratic vote in Vienna from 124,756 to 106,991. Although this election, of course, did not change the proportional representation of the Christian Socialists in the Reichsrat, it certainly strengthened the party's hand in negotiating for seats in a new ministry.  

The new election in Lower Austria also made it possible for the two Christian Socialists in the Beck cabinet to resign without losing face. The new diet would soon have a provincial marshall who would automatically be the nominee of the Christian Socialist club of the diet. It was already known that Gessmann

161 Neue Freie Presse, 6 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 2; Deutsches Volksblatt, 1 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 3.
wanted this office. 162 This position was far less tenuous than a seat in the cabinet. Gessmann now already enjoyed the prestige of having been a cabinet minister and undoubtedly had come to realize that a politician carried very little weight on the imperial level. Prince Liechtenstein, who was then the provincial marshall, was accommodating enough to prefer a seat in the cabinet and was therefore willing to make the trade with Gessmann. 163 On 6 November, two days before the Beck cabinet actually resigned, Gessmann announced that in any reorganization of the ministry he would definitely not accept a post. 164 On the same day, the Christian Socialist press explained that Prince Liechtenstein and Richard Weiskirchner would probably be in the party's lineup for new cabinet appointments. 165

If Weiskirchner were given a seat in the cabinet, the presidency of the house of deputies would be open. Ebenboch had already shown his interest in this position, and it was understood among the party leaders that if Ebenboch resigned from the cabinet, he would receive the party's nomination. 166


164 *Neue Freie Presse*, 7 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 2.


Another important consideration in the Christian Socialist vote was the still smoldering Wahrmund Affair. Friedrich Funder claims that this was the only factor in the Christian Socialist desertion of Beck.¹⁶⁷ Prof. Wahrmund's appointment to the German University of Prague had been a public humiliation to the Christian Socialist Party and one which they could not permit to stand unchallenged. By the time of the Christian Socialist vote, it was already accepted that, in the event of Beck's resignation, the next minister-president would be Baron Bienerth. Baron Bienerth, while not a democrat was certainly a clerical, and his appointment would be considered a victory for the Christian Socialists.¹⁶⁸ In a Bienerth cabinet, the Christian Socialists would probably receive three portfolios, and in a sense, the prime ministry as well. The consensus of contemporary pundits was that the Belvedere had offered Gessmann, in return for the destruction of Beck, some office in the service of the minister-president in which he would be a backstairs Richelieu to the lethargic Bienerth.¹⁶⁹ In the light of subsequent events, this seems unlikely.

As soon as the Christian Socialist Party announced that they would not support the ministry, Beck's resignation was inevitable. On 6 November the papers reported that Beck would give his resignation to the emperor on the following day. Gessmann,

¹⁶⁷ Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 425.
¹⁶⁸ Neue Freie Presse, 5 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 2; Deutsches Volksblatt, 7 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 1.
¹⁶⁹ Neue Freie Presse, 7 November 1908, Morning edition, p. 2.
who already knew that he would not take part in a new cabinet, took this opportunity to make political capital of the situation. On 7 November, before Beck had officially resigned, Gessmann announced his own and Ebenhoch's resignation from the cabinet, and gave as his reason the failure of the Beck ministry, and of Gustav Marchet in particular, to end the anticlericalism in the universities.\textsuperscript{170} Thus, officially, the Beck cabinet fell because of the Wahrmund Affair.

Beck himself always believed that in spite of the many forces working against him, he could have withstood them all had the Christian Socialists kept faith. After his resignation "Beck stated in a most irritated manner that the Christian Socialists had betrayed him and sold him out; Gessmann stood at the head of an intrigue which had been started many months before."\textsuperscript{171}

The reasons for the fall of Beck probably go far deeper than the machinations of the Belvedere Circle or the opportunism of the Christian Socialist Party. Most of the explanations offered are based on the misconception that Beck did actually head a parliamentary government. In fact, Austria had never ceased to be an absolute monarchy in which an experimental parliamentary government functioned for a short time by permission of the absolute monarch. Francis Joseph realized that if his monarchy were to

\textsuperscript{170}Reichspost, 8 November 1908, pp. 1-2; Fremden-Blatt, 7 November 1908, Evening edition, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{171}Chlumecky, p. 304.
retain its great power status, he would have to solve the nationality disputes which had been raging within her borders and at an alarmingly increasing rate since the Badeni language disputes of a decade earlier. All attempts to solve this problem had failed. In 1905 Francis Joseph had been anxious to attempt a new remedy: universal sufferage and a quasi-parliamentary government with a quasi-responsible ministry. This experiment had been Beck's assignment, and Beck's name was closely associated with it in Francis Joseph's mind. The electoral reform had been successful. A parliament faithful to the crown had been returned by a loyal people, which was the highest hope of the supporters of constitutional government. But in the mind of the emperor the main purpose of this experiment had been to settle the internal disputes and to give the Hapsburg empire a stronger position among the world's great powers. The electoral reform had not done this. During the two years of the Beck ministry a series of demonstrations by national groups in both parts of the empire had created even further unrest.\textsuperscript{172} In the capital of Galicia, Lwow (Lemberg), there were riots at the university, protests of the Ruthenian students against the exclusive use of the Polish language. Many Ruthenian students were arrested.\textsuperscript{173} In further disorders the brutality of Polish police led to the death of a Ruthenian peasant. The culmination of the Ruthenian race riots was the assassination of the Polish governor of Ruthenia, Count Andrew Potocki, by an

\textsuperscript{172}\textit{Charmatz}, pp. 83-86.

\textsuperscript{173}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 85.
embittered Ruthenian student at Lwow, Miroslav Sichinsky.\textsuperscript{174} In September 1908 bitter race riots broke out in Ljubljana (Laibach) between Slovenes and Germans,\textsuperscript{175} and in October began the demonstrations in Prague mentioned above.

Although Beck had been successful in his assignment to put through an electoral reform, he had not succeeded in curing the deep-rooted nationality problems of the empire. Beck was not an individual in the mind of the emperor; he was an idea, and the idea had failed. His resignation merely spared the emperor the problem of dismissing him.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{174} May, p. 341.

\textsuperscript{175} Charmatz, p. 86.

CHAPTER V

THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST PARTY DURING THE MINISTRY OF BARON BIENERTH

Creating the New Ministry

When Beck resigned, it was expected that the coup would come off about as the Belvedere Circle had planned it. The fallen chief would be replaced by the more pliable Baron Richard Bienert, a few cabinet changes would reflect the increased prestige of the obsequious Christian Socialist Party, and the government by responsible ministers would continue. On 8 November 1908 Francis Joseph summoned Baron Bienert and asked him to build a new ministry based on the representation in the Reichsrat.2 Bienert, who candidly confessed his ineptitude in politics, called on the legerdemain of Albert Gessmann to assist him in assembling his ministry. Gessmann remarked at the time that he could construct a coalition cabinet in twenty-four hours, but his boasts proved premature. No cabinet could ever be elastic enough to accommodate all of the demands presented at this time by the various parties and nationalities.3

Fruitless haggling among the party leaders dragged on for almost a week. Finally on 11 November Bienert went to Francis Joseph to inform him that he had been unsuccessful in building a parliamentary ministry

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1Charmac, p. 104.
3Charmac, p. 104; Fellner, p. 1; Sisghart, p. 146.

- 180 -
and to ask permission to appoint a temporary cabinet of civil service officials. The request was granted by the impatient emperor, and on the following day the cabinet of officials was named. Only the Polish, Czech, and German nationality ministers remained of the party representatives.

Baron Bienert announced that as soon as a parliamentary ministry could be assembled he would resign. But the government of bureaucrats remained. This was the path of least resistance. The prime minister was himself a bureaucrat; his long service in the ministry of the interior had taught him to distrust politicians in responsible offices. Bienert’s passive nature did not equip him to press for a revision. Francis Joseph was satisfied; so, too, was Francis Ferdinand. There was no need for a change. The precarious period of a responsible ministry was over. Qualified men could now carry out their assignments untroubled by the whims of their political supporters.

Baron Bienert was a pleasant man. Though elderly, he was known for his wit and cheerfulness. He was a man of culture and learning with the perfect manners of the traditional Austrian gentleman. He was open and honest in all of his dealings (which may have been part of his ineptitude as a politician), and frankly humble about his exalted position. Bienert even admitted to Rudolph Sieghart that, while he was pleased with the emperor’s confidence, he did not consider himself qualified for the job.

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6Charmatz, p. 104.
7Sieghart, p. 116.
There were many who were prepared to agree with him. Although his qualities may have been delightful in the drawing room, in the premiership they were only disappointing.

As head of the government, Bienert excelled in an unshakable calmness and adaptability. Passion he had neither in the good nor in the bad sense.\(^8\)

Joseph Redlich was less kind. He believed that Bienert lacked any capacity to head a ministry.\(^9\) Bienert had ability but no ambition. He did not see himself in the role of a great political leader. Austria had recently attempted a bold new constitutional experiment. The emperor had been dissatisfied with the results of this experiment, but had probably not yet abandoned it altogether. A man of high ideals and sincere determination might still have been able to continue Beck's work. But Baron Bienert was not such a man, and parliamentary government was allowed to expire.

Bienert actually reflected the deflated spirit of the times: the aura of enthusiasm which had prevailed two years earlier had passed. Neither politicians nor bureaucrats still felt the former desire to solve the problems of the monarchy with constitutional innovations. By November 1908 their highest hope was to keep the business of government in operation from day to day in spite of the parliament. During the ministry of Baron Bienert, the Reichsrat ceased to have any real importance. The nationality disputes in the house continued at such a pace that there could be no parliamentary activity. Efforts to introduce legislation were either blocked by obstructionism or bottlenecked by a form of filibuster peculiar

\(^8\) Chambert, p. 105.

\(^9\) Fellner, p. 25.
to this body known as the "Emergency Bill."  

As soon as Bienerth's provisional cabinet was installed the bureaucrats resumed their efforts to write a new language law for Bohemia. By 3 February 1909 the government had a law ready to introduce in the Reichsrat. The bill had the support of a majority in the house of deputies. But it was opposed by the Czech Club which, while not strong enough to defeat the bill in the house, did represent a majority of the population in the province concerned. The only recourse for the Czechs was to start a conscientious filibuster to prevent the introduction of the bill.  

On 5 February, Bienerth had an audience with the emperor who expressed annoyance at the situation in the house of deputies and impatience with his ministers for their inability to solve the nationality problem in Bohemia. Francis Joseph told his premier to close both houses of the parliament for a period of four weeks. Baron Bienerth went himself to the house of deputies that afternoon and handed Wallkirchner the order to dismiss the session.  

After the announcement bedlam broke loose in the house. In the scuffle that ensued, one Czech deputy received such a deep wound in his hand from a set of German teeth that he required medical treatment. When the representatives of the people finally marched out of the parliament building, somewhat bloody but unbowed, the German nationalist delegates registered a final protest by joining on the steps for a hearty chorus of "Wacht am Rhein." The Young Czechs followed suit with

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10 Any bill introduced as an emergency bill took priority over the order of the day; hundreds of these bills could hold up matters of importance indefinitely.


a defiant rendition of "Hej Slované," while the Social Democrats crooned "Lied der Arbeit." The Christian Socialist delegates, their German souls unable to resist the impulse to sing but apparently hard pressed to find the proper musical expression of a loyalty so diverse and undefined, hesitated awhile, then broke into "Gott Erhalte." This must have been music indeed to the imperial and royal ears across the Volksgarten.\(^\text{13}\)

During the enforced recess Baron Bieneth announced that he would rebuild his cabinet in an effort to pacify the party antagonisms in the house. The expectation was that the minister-president would muster the parliamentary ministry he had originally promised. The announcement of Bieneth's new cabinet on 10 February was a severe disappointment and was probably the first realization by the people and the parties that parliamentary government was to be forgotten. In a typically Austrian maneuver Bieneth tried to comply with the theory of a responsible ministry without actually permitting the parliament the possibility of interfering with the government. Four members of the Reichsart were invited to join the cabinet: one German Nationalist, one Christian Socialist, one Czech, and one Pole. The rest of the cabinet was still to be composed of bureaucrats. The representation of these four parties in the ministry certainly did not reflect the proportional strength of these parties in the house of deputies. In no case was the minister the candidate of the party he represented: the men were invited as individuals by the minister-president and received only grudging permission from their parties to join the government. Dr. Albin Bráf, the Czech appointee, had to make a quick trip to Prague for consultations with his colleagues before he could accept.

\(^{13}\) Deuring, p. 161.
In both the Polish Club and the Christian Socialist Club permission was voted only after stormy sessions and strong protests.\footnote{Neue Freie Presse, 11 February 1909, Morning edition, p. 3.}

Bienert, disinterested as always in politics, left the details of the cabinet changes to his section chief, Rudolph Sieghart. It was up to him to decide which men should represent these four groups in the cabinet and to make the necessary arrangements with their parties. During these negotiations Sieghart called on Lueger in the Rathaus. He told him that he wanted Richard Weiskirchner as minister of commerce. The burgomaster appeared pleased with the suggestion but wisely refused to commit himself before consulting his party. Then Lueger, who knew that he would face considerable difficulty in getting the party's consent, asked Sieghart how much ransom the government was willing to pay for Weiskirchner. (This was the type of "pourboire politics" that had so disillusioned Baron Beck.) "None," Sieghart answered, "he is not a prisoner." Lueger laughed.\footnote{Sieghart, p. 149.}

Later that day, Lueger called a meeting of the Christian Socialist Club. Sieghart's proposal drew a vehement protest as Lueger had predicted. Many members of the club had never been reconciled to the participation of Gessmann and Ebenbichl in the Beck cabinet. Opposition had become stronger when, during their tenure, the party had been obligated to sanction an Ausgleich renewal unfavorable to Austria, a move that was viewed with great disfavor by many of the party's constituents. The party caucus eventually reached a compromise: Richard Weiskirchner
would be free to accept Bienert's bid, but only as an individual, not as a Christian Socialist. The party would not endorse his candidacy nor would the party accept responsibility for his actions as a minister. 16

On the following day when Bienert announced his new cabinet, Richard Weiskirchner was named minister of commerce. 17

At the same meeting the Christian Socialists took up the question of nominating a successor to Weiskirchner as president of the house of deputies. As in June 1907 both Alfred Ebenhoch and Robert Pattai announced their candidacy for the position. Pattai was the choice of the Vienna party but the agrarians held out for Ebenhoch. When the two Christian Socialists had resigned from the cabinet in November, the Vienna leaders had been interested in supporting Ebenhoch for president of the house as compensation for his giving up the ministry of agriculture. But at the meeting in February Gessmann himself asked the club to vote for Pattai. This move produced a vociferous protest from the rural delegates. But Gessmann saw that the party's position had changed considerably since November. When the problems in Bohemia had continued unabated for four long months, the antipathies in the house of deputies between the Slavs


17. The rest of the cabinet included as minister of finance, Bilinski, of the Polish club, formerly the director of the state bank; minister of education, Count Stärgkh, a professional bureaucrat; minister of justice, Hochenburg, of the German National Union; minister of agriculture, Braf, of the Czech club, a professor of the Czech University in Prague; minister of railroads, Wirba, a government railroad official; minister of labor (as Gessmann's ministry of public works was now to be called), Ritt, a noted engineer employed in government railway construction; minister of national defense, General Georg; Polish nationality minister, Count Dzięguszycki, who had held this post under Beck; Czech nationality minister, Záček, formerly vice-president of the house of deputies; and German nationality Minister, Schreiner. Fremden-Blatt, 10 February 1909, Evening edition, p. 1.
and the Germans had gradually taken precedence over all other issues. Virtually every member of the house took a definite stand on one side or the other. With Germanism becoming more popular than clericalism with the voters as well as the delegates, the Christian Socialists were anxious to publicize themselves as a German party. Early in 1909 they had gone as far as to seek closer cooperation with the liberal-dominated German National Union. Both parties appointed committees to work out a program of mutual cooperation.18

The Christian Socialist leaders were therefore anxious to find a candidate for the presidency of the house who would have the support of the German liberal parties. Ebenhoeh, an agrarian, a conservative, and a clerical, would hardly be the ideal candidate. Pattai, on the other hand, was as close to being a liberal as was possible in the Christian Socialist camp.19 Pattai was a Christian Socialist more by historical accident than by political proclivity, and he had made no secret of this fact in the house.20

The conservative Christian Socialists, led by Baron von Morsey, contested the candidacy of Pattai. The agrarians had relinquished the ministry of agriculture with the understanding that Ebenhoeh would become the president of the house. Then when only one Christian Socialist, and not three as was expected, was invited to join the ministry, they had been asked to support Richard Weiskirchner, a Vienna man. And now, for the presidency of the house of deputies, the only other influential post open

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18 *Neue Freie Presse*, 2 March 1909, Morning edition, p. 5.
19 After the election of 1911 Pattai joined the liberal German Progressive Party.
20 Fellner, p. 38.
to the party, the agrarians were expected to acquiesce in supporting an-
other urban leader. Ebenhoeh himself saved the situation by announcing
that he definitely did not wish to be considered as a candidate and by
urging his conservative colleagues to support a candidate acceptable to
the German nationalists. Pattai ultimately received the unanimous nomi-
nation of the party.21

That same afternoon the committees for mutual cooperation of the
Christian Socialist Club and the German Nationalist Union met in the parlia-
ment building.22 For a change the Christian Socialists were more eager for
cooperation than the German Nationalists. Since the disturbances in Bohemia
the German voters of the empire had developed increasingly strong national-
ist sympathies. The Christian Socialists were in serious danger of losing
strength to the nationalist parties. They were therefore, very anxious to
give the appearance of the closest possible relationship with the German
Nationalist Union in the parliament. The German parties, on the other
hand, wanted to work with the Christian Socialist Club only as a tactical
maneuver against the Czechs in the house of deputies. As they were the
representatives of nationalists, liberals, and Jews, they had nothing to
gain by broadcasting their romance with the clericals. At this meeting on
5 February, Gesmann, the spokesman for the Christian Socialist committee,
presented a program which provided for the closest possible cooperation
between the two parties, including a combined executive board for the two
committees. But the nationalists showed no enthusiasm for Gesmann's plan.
Their representative, Gross, proposed that the two committees meet only on
an ad hoc basis when specific issues concerning nationality problems came

21Neue Freie Presse, 2 March 1909, Morning edition, p. 4.
22The members of the Christian Socialist committee were Liechten-
stein, Gesmann, Pattai, Axmann, and Schlegel.
before the house. It was this proposal that was eventually accepted.

Before the meeting adjourned, the German Nationalist committee assured the Christian Socialists that their parties would give their votes to Robert Pattai for president of the house. 23

On 10 March Robert Pattai was elected president of the house of deputies by a vote of 237 to 103 with 98 abstaining. The vote represented almost exactly the German-Slav alignments, with the Polish Club voting with the Germans. The Socialists, who put up no candidate of their own, accounted for most of the abstentions. 24 The new president of the house of deputies was genuinely admired as a jurist and a parliamentarian but disliked as a person, even by his party colleagues. He was egotistical and patronizing. In his diary Joseph Redlich quotes some of Pattai's contemptuous remarks about other members of his own party (which Redlich characterized, incidentally, as "all too true").

Prince Liechtenstein wants only to become a minister. . . . Weiskirchner is an egotistical intriguer who is just looking for a fat sinecure. He wants to be director of the [Lower Austrian] provincial bank. . . . Gessmann is a malicious denouncer. In his desire for wealth, he would like to become a provincial marshall; thus and therewith he could make his wife a "lady." 25

Pattai was nonetheless an intelligent and cultured person. He was a student of the classics and a connoisseur of art. Politically, Pattai was primarily anti-Semitic and German nationalist, which is explained in part by the fact that he came from Styria where German nationalism is usually stronger than in some other parts of the empire. He came to Vienna as a young man, soon after he received his law degree from the University

23_Neue Freie Presse, 2 March 1909, Morning edition, p. 5.
25_Fellner, p. 38.
of Gras, started politics on a platform of anti-Semitism, and came into the Christian Socialist Party with the Artisans' Reformers. 26

Pattai did not have an easy tenure as president of the house; it was a tumultuous session over which he had to preside. The cabinet reorganization had antagonized rather than placated the parties, and obstructionism continued to block parliamentary activity throughout the session. The situation became so impossible that by August 1909 there was daily expectation that the cabinet would fall, which sent the ministers and party leaders into another game of musical chairs hoping to be in position when Bünner stopped the music. Every meeting, luncheon, Jause, or cab ride became a discussion of the probable redistribution of cabinet posts. In these speculations the holding of office seems to have become of itself important; the duties of office negligible. Austria had reaped the evils of democracy and none of the benefits. The Christian Socialists still believed that the emperor would call a parliamentary cabinet in which their party would play the major role. Weiskirchner seems to have been convinced that the ministry of Baron von Bünner, aristocratic Bohemian landlord, would soon fall and be replaced by the ministry of Richard Weiskirchner, fat Vienna lawyer. He spoke freely of his future office and frequently discussed with his friends which of them might occupy seats in his ministry. 27 But the Christian Socialists, far from being on the verge of taking over the government, were already on their way to oblivion, as events were to show within a very few months.

26 Scheicher, V, 125.
27 Fellner, p. 21.
The Reichspost and the Zagreb Treason Trials

Bienert's failure to continue a parliamentary ministry was a serious blow to the recently acquired prestige of the Christian Socialist Party. But this proved only the first in a series of situations which were eventually to leave the party almost totally discredited after only four years of parliamentary power. The second thrust to the party's popularity was the involvement of the Reichspost in the notorious Zagreb treason trials of 1909. These trials came as a remote byproduct of the threat of war with Serbia which had hovered over the political and diplomatic scene during the winter of 1908-9.

Very soon after her initial shock at the spectacular announcement of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1908 Serbia ordered the mobilization of her first reserve (120,000 men). At this time Serbia assumed that in any act of defiance against Austria-Hungary she could count on the backing of those powers which had been party to the treaty of Berlin, especially Russia and Turkey. When these powers advised a conciliatory policy, however, Serbia immediately withdrew her troops from the Hapsburg frontier. Although still demanding compensation, Serbia announced that she wished only a peaceful solution to the annexation crisis. Count Forgach, the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade, was not convinced. He informed Ashrenthal that he had evidence showing that Serbia was still secretly preparing for war and advised that Austria-Hungary begin military preparations immediately.29

28Russia under a new foreign minister, Izvolsky, had lately taken a very aggressive foreign policy, as had Turkey, where the activist Young Turk Party had recently taken control.

Certain groups in the monarchy were delighted to discover that the opportunity for a war with Serbia had not entirely passed. By December 1908 it was obvious that the other powers had very little intention of aiding Serbia. Therefore, there was little danger of becoming involved in a large-scale war. A decisive war against Serbia at this time would prevent any further dangers from that country, the very existence of which fostered discontent among the South Slavs within the monarchy. A defeated Serbia could become a Hapsburg satellite, and Austrian expansion in the Balkans could continue unimpaired. Also, a quick and successful war would convince the rest of Europe that Austria-Hungary was still a military power. The outspoken leader of this point of view was Conrad von Hötzen- dorf, Austria-Hungary's chief of staff, who had received his appointment at the specific request of Francis Ferdinand. Also sympathetic with these ideas were Foreign Minister Aehrenthal and Major Brosch.30

Francis Ferdinand himself was opposed to a preventive war with Serbia. He feared that it would alienate the South Slavs within the empire whose support he would need if at his accession he were to muster all available forces against the Magyars. The archduke and his adjutant almost came to a break over this question, but when Brosch threatened to resign, Francis Ferdinand permitted him to maintain his own position in the matter.31 Brosch did in fact work with Conrad and Aehrenthal in their efforts to bring about a "preventive war" with Serbia. In so doing he again made use of the very willing services of the Christian Socialist newspaper, the Reichspost. Throughout the crisis, the columns of the

31Funder, p. 393.
Reichspost regularly printed anti-Serbian propaganda and editorials which, while not openly suggesting preventive war, were certainly sympathetic to the possibility. In this policy the Reichspost was again taking a role independent of the party. Some of the Christian Socialists were willing to support a war with Serbia but a majority of the party was opposed to it.

Any legitimate justification for a war was lost when first Turkey and then Russia agreed to recognize the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was virtually no chance that Serbia would attack without allies. Yet this very fact made a Hapsburg victory more certain and Conrad the more determined. The Russian note was received on 21 March. The following day an article appeared in the Reichspost which was deliberately designed to stir German nationalist feeling against Slavic Serbia and to keep alive the sentiment for a preventive war. The article contained some astounding "revelations." Using documents which were later proved to be forgeries, the Reichspost claimed to have uncovered an extensive Serbian espionage system which received funds directly from the Serbian foreign office for the purpose of stimulating separatist sympathies among the South Slavs within the empire.

Three days later a similar article, based on the same documents, appeared in the Neue Freie Presse. This liberal newspaper would reach elements of the population that did not read the clerical Reichspost. The

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33 Fellner, p. 9

article in the Neue Freie Presse carried the signature of Dr. Heinrich Friedjung, one of Austria's most respected historians and a close personal friend of Count Aschenthaler. Friedjung's article carried the even more spectacular information (based ostensibly on the minutes of a Serbian secret society, Slovenski Jug), that the Serbian government had supplied funds to the Serbo-Croat Coalition Party in a recent campaign for the Croatian diet.  

The chances of a war with Serbia, prophylactic or otherwise, pretty well withered on 31 March when Serbia herself acknowledged the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and gave up her claims for compensation. Following the crisis, however, several members of the Coalition Party in the Croatian diet were brought to trial in Zagreb on charges of treason. The most damning evidence of the government against them were the documents which had been published by the Reichspost and the Neue Freie Presse. A surprise entered the case on 11 May when Professor Thomas Masaryk presented evidence to the Austrian house of deputies proving that these documents were fraudulent. The treason trials continued throughout the summer although everyone now realized that they were a hoax. Finally, on 8 October the government withdrew its charges. Once cleared, the indignant Croats filed libel suits against the Reichspost and against Dr. Friedjung.  

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37 There were three libel suits. The first was of forty-nine delegates of the Croatian diet against Dr. Friedjung. The second was brought by a Croat deputy, Supilo, against Dr. Friedjung. The third was a suit of three South Slav deputies, Supilo, Pribičević, and Lucinić, against the Reichspost. As all three suits hung on the authenticity of the same documents, the plaintiffs agreed to a single trial (Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question, p. 209).
The trials of Dr. Friedjung and the Reichspost took place in Vienna and dominated the headlines throughout December 1909. Representing the Reichspost was Heinrich Ambros, theoretically the editor responsible for the publication of the articles in question. But Friedrich Funder was frequently called to the stand as a witness, and during the course of the questioning it became apparent that it was Funder himself who was responsible for the articles. As evidence of the authenticity of his sources, Funder produced his copy of a document purported to be a dispatch from the Serbian foreign office to the ambassador in Vienna concerning Serbian underground activities in Austria-Hungary. According to the Times of London competent diplomatic circles immediately recognized this document as a fabrication. Although Funder seems honestly to have believed that the document was genuine, he admitted that he had seen neither the originals nor photographs. Without giving any names Funder assured the court that the source of his information left no doubt as to its authenticity. Even in his recently published memoirs, Funder still accepts the good faith of Brosch in asking the Reichspost to publish the documents.

The weaknesses of the testimonies of both Dr. Funder and Dr. Friedjung became apparent in the examination of the minutes of the Slovenski Jug which had been used by both newspapers. Again Professor

42 Funder, p. 398.
Masaryk appeared with the evidence: this time the president of the organization in person. This gentleman, not an adolescent revolutionary but a professor at the University of Belgrad, proved that he had been in Germany on the dates that he was supposed to have signed the minutes. Finally, after this testimony, on 22 December, Dr. Friedjung was cornered into the humiliating admission that he could not honestly verify his sources. Ultimately all of the suits were withdrawn.

Throughout the trial it was obvious that neither the Neue Freie Presse nor the Reichspost had knowingly made use of spurious documents. The material had been furnished from higher up. Although neither Friedjung nor Funder ever betrayed their sources, it was generally understood that as Friedjung was a friend of Aehrenthal his information had come directly from the Ballhausplatz. The connection between the Reichspost and the Belvedere was also well known. Neither Aehrenthal nor Brosch made any effort to pull their loyal minions out of the fire. The tragedy for the Christian Socialists was that it seemed vividly clear to the voters, who could not understand that the Reichspost had acted independently, that their party had again been used as the tool of the unpopular and ultra-conservative Belvedere. Friedrich Funder (and by association the whole party leadership), had lost face with the public not only because he had been used by the Belvedere, but also because of the utter naïveté with which he had allowed himself to be duped by the transparent duplicity of Brosch and Aehrenthal.

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The Death of Karl Lueger and the Problem of Electing a Successor as Burgomaster

On 10 March 1910, Dr. Karl Lueger died. A mournful but typically Viennese announcement appeared the following day in the Reichspost.

Cry Christian Austria, your leader is dead. Hide your face in your hands and let the tears flow. He has left us. We were scattered and he united us. We were in disgrace and he took the chains from us. Frightened and humbled, we had been robbed, but he led us. With his strong sword, he led the way for the Christian people. And now he has left us. [14]

Lueger's death was not unexpected. The burgomaster had been suffering from a serious kidney infection for over four years. The disease had also affected his eyes, and during the last three years of his life Lueger had been almost blind. Following an unsuccessful operation on 19 February 1910, Lueger was expected to die at any time. The columns of sentimental bilge published daily in the Reichspost actually became somewhat embarrassing when the doughty demagogue managed to hold on for another three full weeks.

On 26 February one particularly syrupy column appeared in the Reichspost. It seemed at the time no more than another space-filler designed to feed the thanatophilia of the lower bourgeoisie, but later events showed the column to be part of a propaganda campaign that was being carefully laid out by Albert Gessmann. The caption bawled: "I have no other hope but to die!" A subheading reported the temperature, pulse, and breathing of the burgomaster as of 7:30 P.M. on 25 February. This was followed by an account entitled "Dr. Lueger's Political Legacy," which described a touching deathbed scene between Lueger and Gessmann:

At 7:30 in the evening the sick man had someone call Representative Dr. Albert Gessmann who came quickly to the sickbed.

It is well-known that Dr. Gessmann is the oldest political associate of Dr. Lueger; it was he who remained with Lueger after the collapse of the Democrats (the United Left) and the break with Dr. Mandl. At first so ridiculed, then so successful, they were known as the "Two Man Party."

Dr. Lueger . . . with deep feeling reached his hand to Dr. Gessmann and said with a weak but clear voice: "Dear Friend, I must speak with you once again, for you are my oldest fellow-worker."

Dr. Gessmann, overcome with deep emotion, could hardly speak. Trying to control his voice he said: "Dear Burgomaster, please. We are all counting on your recovery."

Dr. Lueger shook his head to show that this was impossible . . .
The sick man went on with soft resignation. "I hope for nothing other than death."

Then he grabbed Dr. Gessmann's hand and said to him, "Stay with one another. Hear me. You keep my people together."

He said these words slowly with pauses, and after a while he repeated, "You are my oldest fellow worker. Hear me. Keep my people together."45

Feed my sheep.

In a surprisingly short time after Lueger's death a series of ugly scandals appeared within the ranks of the party which indicated all too graphically that only Lueger's popularity had maintained the unity and discipline of the party. The first break came right at the top. Lueger's body had not yet been returned to the soil when his two closest associates, Albert Gessmann and Richard Weiskirchner, were caught in an unseemly struggle for the burgomaster's chair.

It was well understood by the party leaders that much of Lueger's prestige, and therefore also his effectiveness as a party leader, was derived from his exalted position as burgomaster of the capital city, the most elective post in the monarchy. In the event of Lueger's death, the interests of party unity and party discipline would suggest that this position of prestige pass to the person who was recognized as Lueger's successor as party chief. Constitutionally, of course, the first vice

45 Reichspost, 26 February 1910, p. 2.
burgomaster automatically would succeed to the post; but as all three vice burgomasters were Christian Socialists and as there was a strong Christian Socialist majority in the Vienna city council, it could be expected that party discipline would oblige the vice burgomasters to waive their succession and permit the city council to elect as burgomaster the man chosen by the leaders of the Christian Socialist empire party organization.

The question had first come up during the electoral campaign of 1907. At that time Lueger was already seriously ill, and even then there was the possibility that he might not live long. The party leaders feared that should Lueger die without making a clear statement about his choice for a successor the post of burgomaster would pass to the first vice burgomaster, Joseph Neumayer, who was sympathetic with the Vergani wing of the party. This group was then balking at the projected union with the conservatives, and should they fall heir to the post of burgomaster of Vienna, the position of the Christian Socialists in the Reichsrat could be seriously weakened. Lueger was therefore, induced to draw up a formal document, called his "Political Testament," in which he named Dr. Richard Weiskirchner his successor as burgomaster of Vienna. This testament was signed by three witnesses: Dr. Gessman, Prince Liechtenstein, and Dr. Klotzberg (a city councilman). 46 No mention is made in this document of the constitutional procedure by which this succession was to come about. As the burgomaster was an elective office, it is hard to understand how Lueger or anyone else could have believed the post was his to bequeath. Perhaps Lueger had taken literally the current expression that he was the "uncrowned king of Vienna." Certainly the sanctity which the citizens of

46 Funder, p. 450.
Vienna later attributed to this document suggests that they did not yet fully grasp the principles of democratic government.

Although Gessmann might seem to have been a more logical choice as Lueger's successor than Weiskirchner, actually in 1907 Gessmann had very little interest in becoming a burgomaster. He had much bigger fish to fry. He was helping the prime minister to organize his cabinet, and he expected soon to accept a portfolio of his own. By March 1910, however, the positions were reversed. Gessmann had intrigued his way right out of the ministry and now held no political position more important than head of the department of schools for Lower Austria. Weiskirchner, on the other hand, was safely ensconced as minister of commerce and rather expected that he might be the next minister-president. Therefore, in 1910, when Lueger again seemed about to die, Gessmann decided that he would like very much to become burgomaster of Vienna. Weiskirchner, of course, had no objections. It was apparently to prepare the voters for this backstairs juggling of public office that the article in the Reichspost, quoted above, was published, in which Lueger himself appears to be ordaining Gessmann as his successor.

At noon on 10 March, three hours after Lueger's death, a small group of party leaders held a secret meeting at the Vienna palace of Prince Liechtenstein to decide who should be the next burgomaster. The group easily agreed that the post should go to Gessmann. There remained, however, the embarrassing question of Lueger's "Political Testament" naming Weiskirchner as his successor. The party leaders apparently decided that the testament should be published as well as the reasons for

the change. Should the document be kept secret, someone might discover it and use it to the detriment of the party. Publication of the testament, on the other hand, would establish that the mantle of Lueger had fallen on Weiskirchner, who now, on the strength of this authority, could publicly lay his hands on the balding head of Albert Gessmann. Thus the Viennese electorate would know that the succession was in order and the Vergani group would be disarmed in any attempt to prevent Gessmann's election.\footnote{Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 451.}

Later that afternoon there was a meeting of the entire Christian Socialist Reichsrat club under Gessmann's chairmanship. Gessmann explained to the club what had been decided at the earlier meeting. He read the "Political Testament" aloud and explained why it was no longer timely. The only objection from the floor came from Joseph Schraffl who said that the testament was sacred and therefore binding. As Schraffl was a delegate from Lower Austria (not from Vienna where opposition to Gessmann's candidacy might be expected), and was president of the Lower Austrian Farmer's Union which he had founded with Gessmann, his remarks probably reflected a genuine sentiment on the day of Lueger's death rather than any personal opposition to Gessmann. Weiskirchner answered these objections by pointing out that he had left the service of the city of Vienna to join the ministry after the testament had been drawn up, that he had done so with the approval and encouragement of Lueger, and that at the present he was not in a position to resign from the cabinet. The Christian Socialist Club then voted to support Gessmann's candidacy for burgomaster.\footnote{Ibid.}
That same day the evening edition of the *Deutsches Volksblatt* carried a full page article in extra large type describing Lueger's "political testament" and concluding with a strong statement that this testament carried no provision for an amendment.\(^{50}\) Vergani, who probably had not known about the testament for more than a few hours before his paper went to press, had lost no time in throwing barricades across Gessmann's road to the Rathaus.

The following morning the official version of Lueger's "political testament" was published in the *Reichspost* and with it an article explaining the change in the order of succession.

Although the original wishes of our dead leader had long become meaningless because of events since that time, namely the change in the position of the party resulting from the election of 1907, the beginning of its responsibility in the parliament, and its participation in the ministry; he had taken no... precaution... but left it entirely up to his friends in the party to find whomever they felt to be most qualified... to be invested with the golden chains...\(^{51}\)

But the matter was by no means settled. The parliamentary club of the party obviously had no authority to choose the burgomaster of Vienna. They had voted only to support Gessmann's candidacy as a party maneuver. The article in the *Reichspost* had been designed to open the door to Gessmann, but it was so worded as to leave it open for anyone else as well. Sometime during the twenty-four hours following the meeting of the parliamentary club, the strong opposition to Gessmann's candidacy, already evident in the *Volksblatt* article, crystallized into an organized "stop Gessmann" movement within the ranks of the Christian Socialist

\(^{50}\) *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 10 March 1910, Evening edition, p. 4.

members of the Vienna city council, in whose hands the ultimate decision was to rest.

As was explained in an earlier chapter, many of the Christian Socialists of Vienna had never been reconciled to the expansion of the party to an empire party, to the policies which the party had been obliged to adopt in the parliament, to the union with the provincial clerical parties, or to the association with the ultraconservative circle at the Belvedere. To the deputies of the Vienna bourgeoisie, Gessmann was the very embodiment of these policies. Not only did they object to Gessmann's policies, they undoubtedly felt that with him at the helm of the city government, their own position at the polls might be weakened. The strategy of the opposition in the city council was to emphasize that Weiskirchner had been the choice of the deceased Lueger and to demand that the city council honor the dead leader's wishes. Weiskirchner was known to be closer to the Vienna interests than to the rural-conservative wing of the parliamentary party. Should Weiskirchner be unable to accept the post, then it should pass to the first vice burgomaster, Joseph Neumayer, who also represented the interests of the Vienna bourgeoisie.

The Deutsches Volksblatt wing of the party had waited three years to get at Gessmann. With Lueger no longer alive there was nothing to prevent them. The burgomaster squabble was just the excuse they needed to launch an attack. Their plan was to discredit Gessmann, to take over the party leadership in the city of Vienna, and to pursue a policy independent of the Reichsrat party. There were several of their men in the city council, all Christian Socialists who had become disgruntled by the tendency of the party to sacrifice local issues for shadow boxing on the imperial level.
Ernst Vergani led off with a series of articles in his Deutsches Volksblatt attacking Albert Gessmann personally. Gessmann was very vulnerable. He was not a warm and sympathetic personality. The Vienna voters, used to unctuously charming Lueger, were not drawn to Gessmann whose role as an ambitious politician was far more transparent than Lueger's. The Vergani paper did not make the political mistake of attacking Gessmann as the successor of Lueger, or of suggesting that they would replace the party of the dead leader. Quite the contrary, the Deutsches Volksblatt claimed that they were the successors of Lueger. Lueger had been the leader of the little man of Vienna. They had been in Lueger's party. They wanted to run Vienna in the interests of the Viennese as Lueger had. It was Gessmann who had sold the party to the government, to the clericals, and to the Belvedere. Now the party should be returned to Vienna. The argument had enough truth in it not to need too much convincing.

What? The last testament of our Lueger has become meaningless? Because Dr. Weiskirchner has become Minister of Commerce? Can a post on the ministry mean more to him than to succeed in the office of Lueger at the head of the capital of the empire? Because of this Dr. Gessmann should become burgomaster?

In appealing to the proud citizens of Vienna the article suggests that to be the burgomaster of the "capital of the empire" was far more important than to have a seat in the imperial cabinet.

By 12 March, Gessmann realized that his position was hopeless and announced that he would withdraw his candidacy in the interests of party unity.

52 Funder, Vom Géstern, p. 451.
53 Deutsches Volksblatt, 11 March 1910, Morning edition, p. 1
54 Neue Freie Presse, 12 March 1910, Evening Edition, p. 1
During the next two days an alternate plan was worked out which was apparently acceptable to all concerned. According to this plan some candidate chosen by the city council would take over as burgomaster until Weiskirchner could conveniently resign from the ministry, at which time whoever had been elected should step down to allow Weiskirchner to become burgomaster. On the 11th Weiskirchner issued an official statement:

In the event that I should be released from my obligations to the crown and the cabinet, and the citizens of Vienna then call upon me, it would come to me with great pride and honor to follow this call and thus to fulfill the testament of my deceased father-like friend.55

On 11 March there was a meeting of the Christian Socialist Empire Party56 to elect a successor to Lueger as the head of the party as a whole. The choice fell on Prince Alois Liechtenstein.57 This was probably a serious mistake. Lueger's strong position was enforced by the fact that he held several positions in the party. He was head of the party, chairman of the party clubs in the city council, the Lower Austrian diet, and the Reichsrat, as well as holding the elective post of burgomaster of Vienna. Party discipline would probably have been easier to maintain had all of these positions passed to one person. The obvious man to lead the party was Gessmann, but Gessmann had too many enemies within the party to be accepted as the uncontested party leader. Therefore, Lueger's various positions were, unfortunately, parceled out among several party leaders. Under these circumstances, Prince Liechtenstein was the most acceptable


56 This included all Christian Socialist delegates in the Reichsrat, in all of the provincial diets, and in the Vienna city council, as well as designated party workers who did not hold elective office (e.g. district officials and editors of party newspapers).

57 Neue Freie Presse, 16 March 1910, Morning edition, p. 3.
person to head the entire organization. It was well understood that Ges-
mann would in fact be the forger of major party policy and strategy.
Prince Liechtenstein was already suffering from cancer and was no longer
able to take an active part in politics. Gesmmann thus found himself again
in the difficult position he had so long held under Lueger of having to
assume the leadership of the party without the authority of an official
position from which to enforce party discipline.

At the same meeting the question of choosing the burgomaster of
Vienna was brought up. In the heated discussion which followed, it be-
came apparent that the recent situation had caused considerable ill-felling
between Gesmmann and Weiskirchner. In the complicated series of events
immediately after Lueger's death, Gesmmann had lost his opportunity to
become burgomaster of Vienna, whereas Weiskirchner had worked out an agree-
ment whereby he could have his cake and eat it too. Gesmmann was particu-
larly annoyed by the fact that the whole question of the burgomaster
succession had left him in a rather bad light. The meeting of party
leaders at Prince Liechtenstein's on 10 March, at which it had been de-
cided that Gesmmann should become burgomaster, was secret. When the
attempt misfired, it appeared to party members, as well as to the public,
that Gesmmann had attempted to stage an unsuccessful coup while Weiskirch-
ner, whom he had apparently tried to cheat out of his rightful heritage,
had finally come forth to claim his due. During the meeting on 14 March,
therefore, Leopold Steiner, at the instigation of Gesmmann, stood up and
told the whole story of the secret meeting at the Liechtenstein palace
and explained that Weiskirchner himself had requested that Gesmmann should
succeed to the post.\footnote{Fellner, p. 53.}
Once Gessmann had made his position clear, the party voted to accept the plan whereby one of the vice burgomasters would take over the post until Weiskirchner was free from his service in the ministry, at which time the Christian Socialist majority on the city council would be advised to give him their support for burgomaster. It was the consensus of the meeting that Dr. Joseph Neumayer, a Vergani sympathizer, should be passed over in favor of the second vice burgomaster, Dr. Joseph Forzer, originally a member of the small Catholic-Conservative Party in the city of Vienna, who would be more acceptable to the majority of the party.\(^{59}\)

The following morning the third vice burgomaster, Dr. Hierhammer, stated rather pointedly in an interview that Forzer might be the choice of the empire party, which had no authority in the Vienna city council, but that he was certainly not the choice either of the city council or of Lueger's testament. It was Hierhammer's opinion that when it came to an election, the city council would probably overlook the party's candidate and elect Neumayer. Hierhammer, as it turned out, was entirely correct. When the city council nominations took place on 6 April, Neumayer was chosen by an overwhelming majority.\(^{60}\) He was subsequently elected burgomaster on 22 April.\(^{61}\) According to the agreement, he would not fill out Lueger's tenure but would serve only until his own term as vice-burgomaster expired in 1912. If at that time Weiskirchner was free to take over, Neumayer was to resign voluntarily.

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\(^{59}\) _Neue Freie Presse_, 15 March 1910, Morning edition, p. 2.

\(^{60}\) _Ibid._, 7 April 1910, Morning edition, p. 1.

This compromise was clearly a victory for the *Deutsches Volksblatt*. Neumayer, while not actually a close associate of Ernst Vergani, nevertheless held similar sympathies. Even Richard Weiskirchner represented a compromise between the two points of view: Lueger's testament was more a convenience than a decisive factor in his nomination. Weiskirchner, although a minister, had served for years in the Vienna municipal administration and was sympathetic with the *Deutsches Volksblatt* view in regard to local issues. He also apparently detested Gessmann, which undoubtedly helped him in his negotiations with the Vienna city council.

At noon on 15 March there was a meeting of the Christian Socialist Reichsrat Club to elect a successor to Lueger as chairman. Prince Liechtenstein had been the first deputy chairman but as he felt that the responsibilities as the head of the party organization were all that he wished to assume, Albert Gessmann, formerly the second deputy chairman, was elected chairman of the club. 63 This post became the one office from which Gessmann could exercise his authority.

Scandals and Cleavages in the Christian Socialist Party

While the burgomaster question was still a major news item, another event occurred which proved to be only the opening gambit to a long series of scandals involving the conduct of members of the Christian Socialist Party in high public office. On the evening of 19 March, a little more than a week after Lueger's death, Felix Hrabta, a Christian Socialist delegate to the Lower Austrian diet and to the Vienna city

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62 Fellner, p. 53.


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council, as well as a member of the Vienna municipal budget committee, addressed a meeting of the Christian Socialist Workers' League in the thirteenth district (Ober-St. Veit). Hraba began his speech with some very specific criticisms of the leadership of his own party. Although he did not give any names, it was fairly clear that the main object of his opening remarks was Albert Gessmann. Hraba lamented the fact that the party recently had to witness the spectacle of Lueger's closest associates fighting over the spoils of his political legacies. These men did not seem to realize, Hraba explained, that it was up to the Vienna city council and not the leaders of the club of the party to choose a burgomaster. He said that it was not the position of burgomaster these people were seeking but an opportunity to get their hands on the large amount of money which the burgomaster could control.

These people naturally will tell everyone that they have campaigned the longest with Dr. Lueger. The truth is that for years they have disliked Dr. Lueger. They even changed the name of the party. Before we were called simply the Christian Socialist Party. Now they name us the Christian Socialist Empire Party . . . . Even Dr. Lueger was opposed to calling us the "empire party." It would certainly be better now if we still had our old designation.

After these outspoken opinions directed against the party leaders, Hraba then told his audience that certain of his fellow party workers who had been placed in responsible public offices had used these positions to feather their own nests. More specifically, Hraba said, the public had been robbed by Christian Socialist officials in the construction of several welfare institutions sponsored by the provincial government of Lower Austria. 61

The reaction to this speech within the ranks of the party was a mixture of fury and fear. A special meeting of the Vienna Citizens' 61

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Club (the party club in the Vienna city council), was called to deal with Hraba. Several party leaders, including Albert Gessmann, Leopold Kunschak, and Hermann Bielohlawek, gave impassioned speeches rebuking the now no longer "felix" Hraba for breaking the party discipline. They demanded that he be voted out of the Citizens' Club. The speeches were followed by a sharp debate in which Hraba requested the club to make a thorough investigation before expelling him from the party. During this debate, Albert Gessmann, apparently in a state of panic (one wonders what he was afraid of!), jumped up and shouted to Hraba, "Did you mean me? What part of your speech referred to me?"

After this outburst the meeting went completely out of control. Hraba again insisted over the shouting that he would give any information that was demanded to a specially appointed committee of investigation, but not to an open meeting. Hermann Bielohlawek, with a characteristic impetuousity which he was soon to regret, demanded that Hraba be immediately required to name the men whom he was accusing of graft or be voted out of the club. Hraba suddenly and unexpectedly complied by shouting, "I referred to the deputies Aßmann and Bielohlawek." 65

65 Julius Aßmann was one of the earliest associates of Lueger and Gessmann in forming the Christian Socialist Party. He had been a saddler's apprentice during the 1890's and had been active in organizing Viennese apprentices and other artisans (journeymen), or clerks who worked for hire. His union was grafted to Leopold Kunschak's Catholic Workmen's Organization in 1897 to form the Christian Socialist Workers' Party, a semi-autonomous unit within the party framework. According to Father Scheicher Aßmann was an unpleasant person, pompous and conceited. It was known to some members of the party that when Aßmann headed the Christian Socialist apprentices, he frequently dipped into the till of his organization and that whenever he was in danger of being discovered, Lueger would arrange to have his debts paid with party funds. Aßmann was, nevertheless, a good politician, a good speaker and vote-getter. The party leaders apparently knew his corrupt tendencies but considered him too valuable to lose.

Bielohlawek, too, was a party hack on the local level whose loud temperamental political harangues pulled votes. He lived well which made
After a moment of stunned silence, disorganization turned to riot. Bielohlawek demanded that Hraba show proof of his accusations. Hraba again asserted that he would present his proof to an investigation committee, but his pleas were unheeded. Before the close of the meeting a motion was introduced to expel Felix Hraba from the Citizens' Club. The motion passed easily; there were only three votes against it. 66

For the next several weeks, the "Hraba Affair" made excellent copy for every Vienna newspaper. The Neue Freie Presse and the Arbeiter Zeitung carried almost daily editorials condemning the Christian Socialists for their behavior. A front page editorial in the Neue Freie Presse presented the very logical argument that the party leaders had inculpated themselves by insisting that Hraba be expelled from the party without an investigation. If his accusations of corruption were not true, the party leaders would certainly want to clear themselves in the public eye by permitting an investigation. Their refusal to hear Hraba's case could only indicate to the public the veracity of Hraba's accusations. 67 Ernst Vergani and the Deutsches Volksblatt took up Hraba's cause as another opportunity to attack Gessmann. Vergani charged Gessmann with expelling Hraba only to prevent a revelation that not only were the accusations against Axmann and Bielohlawek true but that all of the party leaders were deeply involved in corruption. 68 From the fact that the Deutsches

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66 Neue Freie Presse, 7 April 1910, Morning edition, p. 3.
68 Deutsches Volksblatt, 7 April 1910, Morning edition, p. 1; Scheicher, V, 151.
Volksblatt so unhesitatingly championed Hraba in spite of the virtually unanimous condemnation of him by the Citizens' Club, as well as from the nature of Hraba's original remarks, one could permit a conjecture that Vergani might have instigated Hraba's speech in the first place or at least encouraged it. Hraba on his own could never have been so naive politically to believe that an attack on his own party would grease his path to the elective office he was seeking. He might have attempted such a move, however, if he had known that he had the backing of a newspaper which had previously guaranteed him its services in blackmailing his way back into favor with the party.

During the month of April, 1910 libel suits were filed against Felix Hraba by Hermann Bielohlawek, Julius Axmann, the Christian Socialist club of the Vienna city council, and the executive committee of the Lower Austrian diet (in which the Christian Socialist Party held a majority). These cases could not be brought to court, however, because the Lower Austrian diet was then in session and Hraba enjoyed immunity as a member of this body. On 10 April the Christian Socialist Club of the diet had a meeting to discuss how Hraba might be brought to immediate trial. The members agreed that it was necessary to clear the party by having the matter brought to trial, but they also realized that the trial should be held as quickly as possible. The sooner it was over, the sooner the entire ugly affair could be removed from the public eye. The club saw two possibilities: either they must use the Christian Socialist majority to vote to expel Hraba from the diet and thus remove his immunity, or they must push through the business of the diet in order to adjourn the session as early as possible. It was agreed that the latter course would present
fewer problems. In spite of this resolution the affairs of the diet dragged on until the middle of June giving the opposition newspapers another two months in which to use the Eraba affair as material for editorials condemning the Christian Socialists.

While the voters were still stunned by the split in the Vienna faction of the Christian Socialist Party evidenced by Eraba's accusations, the Deutsches Volksblatt, the party's second largest newspaper, began a propaganda campaign against the leaders of the party and against Albert Gessmann in particular. The Reichspost soon took up Gessmann's defense and the Vienna voters were treated to a lively and acrimonious press war between the two Christian Socialist dailies. The Volksblatt campaign began on 22 May: the whole front page of this Sunday edition was devoted to a stinging editorial against Gessmann entitled "The Clique." The article accused Gessmann of using the party only to further his own ambitions. Gessmann, it said, wanted to become the dictator of the Christian Socialist Party and had consistently subjected the interests of the city of Vienna to rural interests in order to gain the support of the agrarian wing of the party for his rise to power.70

Vergani's second editorial appeared less than a week later. This time the Volksblatt accused several leaders of the empire party of having interests in large business firms. The article reminded the readers of a day when the Christian Socialist Party attacked the German Liberal majority in the city council as a party representing big business, while the Christian Socialists claimed to represent the small private businessmen of the Vienna lower bourgeoisie. The Volksblatt's editorial complained

69 Neue Freie Presse, 14 April 1910, Morning edition, p. 11.
that now with the Christian Socialist leaders themselves occupying positions in large corporations they were no longer qualified to represent the little man. The paper also hinted that the Vienna city administration, dominated by the Christian Socialists, often gave an inordinate amount of municipal business to companies in which party leaders held an interest, and suggested that it was to such instances that Hrabal's charges of corruption referred.\textsuperscript{71}

According to Vergani the person most vulnerable in this regard was none other than Albert Gessmann. In 1909 Gessmann had inherited some money which he used to found a Building and Loan Bank, of which he became president. The assets of this bank were valued at one million kronen (about $250,000.00). Vergani was able to make good copy from the fact that Albert Gessmann, a leader of the Christian Socialist Party, the party of the Vienna lower bourgeoisie, was himself, in fact, a great financier, the president of a bank. This line of thought fell in well with Vergani's contention that the leaders of the Christian Socialist party had become too important in their exalted positions in the empire to remember their obligations to their Vienna constituencies. At the same time Gessmann was the supervisor of a bank operated by the city of Vienna to supply credit to people who worked for the municipal civil service.\textsuperscript{72} Although there was never any proof of corruption, Vergani suggested very strongly that Gessmann was able to use his position in the city bank to the benefit of his own bank. Vergani made his point stick by recalling a conversation with Lueger in which the burgomaster had said he was afraid Gessmann was using his inside knowledge of municipal affairs to increase the profits

\textsuperscript{71}Tbid., 28 May 1910, Morning edition, pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{72}Tbid.
of his bank. 73

The Deutsches Volksblatt also found other Christian Socialist leaders who held positions in large businesses. Alfred Ebenhoch served on the board of directors of both the Danube Steamship Company and the Berlin Railroad Construction and Management Company. Baron von Morsey likewise served on two boards of directors: the Leykau-Josefsthal Company and the Pitttener Paper Manufacturing Company. The Volksblatt laid particular emphasis on the fact that Julius Axmann was the owner of the granite works of Axmann and Company which had received some lucrative contracts from the city to re-lay cobblestones wherever new trolley lines were built. 74

On 28 May, the day that these accusations first appeared, Gessmann called a meeting of the party Reichsrat club (of which he was chairman), to explain the attacks of the Deutsches Volksblatt. He assured the assembled delegates that Vergani's accusations of corrupt business practices in regard to his Building and Credit Bank were entirely untrue. Prince Liechtenstein introduced a resolution that the club (a) give a vote of confidence and thanks to Dr. Gessmann, and (b) no longer recognize the Deutsches Volksblatt as an organ of the party. The resolution passed, but it must be noted that this meeting included only the Reichsrat delegates and did not speak for the Christian Socialist Party as a whole. 75

Nevertheless, Vergani continued his efforts to discredit Gessmann. One article in the Deutsches Volksblatt which appeared under banner headlines, recalled the attempt of Gessmann to wrest the torch of party

75 Neue Freie Presse, 29 May 1910, Morning edition, p. 5.
leadership from the dying Luenger at his deathbed. The Deutsches Volksblatt called attention to the Reichspost account in the issue of 26 February.\textsuperscript{76} In this paper words were put into the mouth of Dr. Luenger ..., which could have served no other purpose than to give the impression that Dr. Gessmann was to be the successor of Dr. Luenger.\textsuperscript{77} The article further reported that Luenger's nurse and his sister had been present when Gessmann visited the burgomaster. "These matters were not discussed," they had told the Volksblatt reporter. Gessmann made no effort to counter this move in the Reichspost, but wisely kept silent.

From Vergani's next move, it is fairly clear that he held some hitherto unsuspected aces. By the middle of June, 1910 the Lower Austrian diet had adjourned and preparations were in progress to hold the combined libel trials late in the month. Viktor Kienböck\textsuperscript{78} had been retained by all of the plaintiffs against Hrabá. Then, with no apparent explanation, on 16 June, just before the trials were to go to court, all of the libel suits against Felix Hrabá were dropped.\textsuperscript{79} Although it would not be difficult to imagine the possible reasons for this change of plan, no thorough explanation was offered. Joseph Redlich's information, however, seems credible. He was told that Ernst Vergani, who had championed Hrabá throughout the crisis, was in possession of material which would have substantial Hrabá's accusations against Axmann, and would also have incriminated Leopold Steiner, a close associate of Gessmann's. According to Redlich, Vergani had threatened to publish this information in the Deutsches Volksblatt unless the libel suits against Hrabá were immediately

\textsuperscript{76}Cf. above, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{77}Deutsches Volksblatt, 12 June 1910, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{78}When Karl Luenger first graduated from the university he worked in the law offices of Kienböch's father (Skalnik, p. 10).

\textsuperscript{79}Reichspost, 17 June 1910, p. 1.
withdrawn and Hraba were reinstated in the Christian Socialist Party.  

The day after the suits against Hraba were withdrawn, the Reichs-
post carried a friendly article lamenting the recent disagreements within
the Christian Socialist family. The whole thing, they pointed out, had
been a misunderstanding. The Reichs post also published a letter from
Felix Hraba apologizing for the speech which had been so grossly
misinterpreted:

... I gave a speech at a meeting of the Christian Socialist
Workers' Union in St. Veit on 19 March 1910. In this speech
... I brought forth certain reproaches against my fellow party
workers which I did not wish to be broadcast and which I cannot
maintain.  

Felix Hraba was soon reinstated in the party club of the Vienna
city council, and the party club of the Lower Austrian diet. There was a
rumor that he was to be the party candidate for the seat in the Reichsrat
vacated by Lueger.  (He was not.) Three weeks later, on 7 July, Julius
Axmann resigned from the Christian Socialist Party and from the three
party clubs of which he was a member. He also resigned from the Vienna
city council. He retained his seats in the Reichsrat and in the Lower
Austrian diet but not as a Christian Socialist. No explanation for this
move was given in the Christian Socialist Reichs post, but an editorial
in the Neue Freie Presse made quite clear that Axmann's resignation
following so closely on the heels of the sudden whitewashing of Hraba
was all the proof the public needed that Hraba's original accusations
must have been true. The whole matter had been settled secretly within
the ranks of the Christian Socialist Party. The editorial pointed out

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80Fellner, p. 67.
81Ibid., 17 June 1910, p. 1.
that corruption in the government was not a party matter and deserved a thorough public investigation.\textsuperscript{83} The \textit{Deutsches Volksblatt} gloated over this development for two full pages but did not make any specific charges against Ammann.\textsuperscript{84}

On 8 July 1910, Albert Gessmann called a meeting of the Christian Socialist Citizens' Club to discuss party policy in the face of the widespread public criticism. Some party members quite openly stated the embarrassing facts. The Hraba affair had made quite apparent the fact that there was corruption in the city and provincial governments and that the party was involved in it. If the Christian Socialist leaders insisted on maintaining silence and secrecy, the public would believe the worst anyway. Might it not be better to permit an investigation? At least then the party could show its willingness to clean its own house. By showing the public exactly where the corruption was, they could also prove that the rest of the party was healthy. The truth could not possibly be as damning as what the public already believed.\textsuperscript{85}

This position carried and the club agreed that in a meeting of the Vienna city council to be held later that day, Gessmann was to introduce a resolution asking the burgomaster to appoint a committee to investigate the charges of corruption made by Felix Hraba. The resolution was introduced and passed, Burgomaster Neumayer accordingly appointed a fifteen

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}, 8 July 1910, Morning edition, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Deutsches Volksblatt}, 8 July 1910, Morning edition, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 9 July 1910, Morning edition, p. 3. The main spokesman for this point of view was Victor Silberer, popular Vienna sportsman, editor of \textit{the Wiener Sportzeitung}, and Reichsrat delegate from the sixth district. It is interesting to note that in the Reichsrat campaign of 1911 the party leaders did not endorse Silberer as the party candidate from this district (\textit{Walcher}, p. 14; \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1911 Morning edition, p. 6).
man investigation committee. There was a hitch, however. The session of
9 July was the last session of the Vienna city council before the summer
recess, and Burgomaster Neumayer admitted that he did not believe the com-
mittee would be able to start its investigations before September. 86
The situation looks very much as though Gesmann had done a skillful job
of stage managing. There had been demands for an investigation for months
not only from the opposition parties but from many members of the Christian
Socialist party itself who were anxious to clear their own names in the
eyes of the voters. Gesmann knew that eventually he would have to give
in to these demands. He also knew, it would certainly seem, that Axmann's
delaings would not bear too close scrutiny. With these assumptions the
sequence of events followed in very logical order: Axmann resigned from
the party on 7 July; the following day Gesmann called the meeting of the
party club of Vienna to ask if they wanted an investigation. Their answer,
as Gesmann undoubtedly anticipated, was a unanimous affirmative. The bill
to appoint an investigation committee was then introduced to the city
council by Gesmann himself, but, as it happened, on the day before the
council was to have a two month recess. Evidently, Gesmann was hoping
that the whole mess might possibly be forgotten by September. Unfortun-
ately for him his gamble proved wrong.

During the summer of 1910 the Deutsches Volksblatt opened a
new attack on Gesmann's Building and Loan Bank. Vergani found a man
named Pöschl, a former employee of the bank. Pöschl made a statement in
the Volksblatt that the operation of Gesmann's bank was corrupt and that

86 Neue Freie Presse, 9 July 1910, Morning edition, p. 3.
it was about to declare bankruptcy. As the Reichspost saw it, this last move was designed not only to make Gessmann appear guilty of trying to rob his investors (Vienna voters), but also to create a run on the bank which would ruin Gessmann financially.

According to Friedrich Funder, Gessmann could have cleared himself of this slander by threatening to publish some truths about Vergani himself. Gessmann did publish his account of this affair in the Reichspost shortly before the election of June, 1911. According to Gessmann's article, Vergani had asked him in March, 1910 to let him in as a stockholder of the Building and Loan Bank. Gessmann refused. It was in that month that the slanders against Gessmann began to appear in the Deutsches Volksblatt. In July of 1910 Vergani offered to sell the Deutsches Volksblatt to Gessmann for 2,000,000 kronen. Gessmann again refused. In August, 1910 the articles appeared in the Deutsches Volksblatt that Gessmann's firm was about to declare bankruptcy.

Vergani denied nothing. He didn't have to. Gessmann was too late. He and the whole party leadership had already been discredited in the eyes of the Vienna voters. No further accusations now from Gessmann's pen could make the situation look any better. By the time Gessmann's counterattacks were printed the people of Vienna saw only that there were still more scandals. Whether they cleared one wing of the party and implicated another was no longer important; the Reichsrat election results

87 Deutsches Volksblatt, 10 July 1910, Morning edition, p. 1. Poschl was later found guilty of libel and was sentenced to seven months of hard labor (from which he escaped and fled to another country). This conviction, of course, came too late to restore the damage to the reputation of Gessmann and his bank (Funder, Von Gestern, p. 455).
88 Reichspost, 12 July 1910, p. 1.
89 Reichspost, 5 June 1910, pp. 1-2.
in June, 1911, showed that the people of Vienna had been disenchanted with the Christian Socialist Party. Dr. Funder suggests rather piously that the reason Gessmann did not publish these facts earlier was that he feared he might damage the unity of his party. Considering the damage already done to Gessmann himself, plus the fact that the split in the party was already fairly irreparable, one cannot help wondering whether Vergani had still further information that Gessmann was afraid he might publish. Whatever his motives, Gessmann finally gave in to the pressure from the Volksblatt and on 8 September 1910, resigned both as president of his own Building and Loan Bank, and as supervisor of the civil servants' credit bank.

An editorial in the Neue Freie Presse pointed out the double significance of this move. Although no evidence was ever produced that Gessmann was guilty of any wrongdoing, his resignation from both the private and municipal bank positions certainly indicated to the public that he might well have been implicated in the corruption which Hraba had charged. Gessmann's obvious fear when Hraba first made his accusation and his reluctance to permit a thorough investigation of Hraba's charges would certainly point to his guilt. Furthermore the fact that a top leader of the Christian Socialist Party had been obliged to give in to pressure from Vergani indicated that Gessmann was losing his control of the party and that the organizational structure was even weaker than the public

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90 Funder, Vom Gestern, pp. 453-54.
91 He was succeeded in this office by his son.
93 As Prince Liechtenstein at this time had been in the hospital for several weeks for a series of cancer operations, Gessmann was the acting chief of the party.
already suspected.\textsuperscript{94}

One week later still another development of the Hraba affair came into the public press to plague the sorely tried Christian Socialists. A German liberal representative in the Vienna city council named Zipperer accused Bielohlawek of the corruption attributed to him by Felix Hraba during a council meeting. Bielohlawek filed a libel suit against Zipperer which came to trial on 16 September 1910. Theoretically, Zipperer was the defendant but even before the case began it was obvious that Hermann Bielohlawek and the Christian Socialist Party was actually on trial. In order to discover whether Zipperer was guilty of libel, Bielohlawek's whole life both private and public were brought into the court for review and from the court into the newspapers. The trial lasted until 21 September. For over a week a series of witnesses appeared each telling fantastic stories about the dealings of Hermann Bielohlawek. When the trial was over there could be very little question that Bielohlawek led a very full and very expensive private life, which no one could have managed on his stipend; that Bielohlawek was making his money on kickbacks from companies that had received favors from the city government;\textsuperscript{95} and that many others in the Christian Socialist party were probably involved. None of the evidence, however, was conclusive, and Zipperer was convicted of libel.\textsuperscript{96} As the judge pointed out the only thing which the court could

\textsuperscript{94}Neue Freie Presse, 9 September 1910, Morning edition, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{95}Bielohlawek edited a small newspaper, the Volkspresse. According to the information gathered during the trial, companies which had received lucrative contracts from the city would place advertisements in Bielohlawek's newspaper for which they paid extraordinarily high rates. As there was no legal limit to what Bielohlawek might charge for advertisements in his newspaper, he could not be convicted of accepting bribes or kickbacks.

\textsuperscript{96}Zipperer was sentenced to two weeks imprisonment with one day of each week on bread and water.
prove against Bielohlawarek was that he took a great many women out to dinner, and that he drank a great deal of champagne and ate a great many oysters. On the other hand, although the court had not found Bielohlawarek guilty, the trial had made him just as guilty in the eyes of the voters as though he had been convicted.97

One last act remained to be played before the curtain could finally be rung down on the now somewhat pall ing Hraba Affair. On 23 September, two days after the close of the Bielohlawarek-Zipperer trial, the ad hoc investigation committee of the Vienna city council appointed on 8 July finally had its first meeting. Vice Burgomaster Forzer, a conservative Christian Socialist, was elected chairman of the predominantly Christian Socialist committee.98 The committee investigated Hraba's charges and came up with a great deal of evidence none of which they believed conclusive enough for the city council to draw up charges against anyone in the municipal administration. When this report was submitted to the city council on 18 October, the Social Democratic and German liberal members were incensed. They wanted the investigation to continue and to be expanded. The Christian Socialist members insisted that no genuine evidence would ever be produced. When it came to a vote, the Christian Socialist majority carried and the Hraba case was finally dropped.99


99 Ibid., 19 October 1910, Morning edition, p. 3.
Significance of the Scandals of 1910

These disclosures of cleavage and corruption among the Christian Socialists of Vienna made evident some essential weaknesses both in the party organization and in the city government. The basic problem was that a parvenu political party had been able to gain such complete control of the city in so short a time. By 1897 the Christian Socialist Party had taken over all branches of the municipal government: administrative, legislative, and judicial. The Christian Socialist predominance was so strong that in the years from 1897 to 1918 Vienna was subjected to virtually one party rule. As decisions concerning party policy were usually worked out in party counsels, under such a one party system it was not always clear whether Vienna was being run by the municipal government or by the Christian Socialist Party. Whereas the municipal government was a constitutional body whose procedures were public and prescribed by law, the party had no constitutional status and its procedures were private and only partially and vaguely covered by law.

During the years of the Christian Socialist hegemony in the municipal government, the party itself was suffering from inadequate organization and leadership. Its structure and policies had been left deliberately vague in order to accommodate its many disparate elements. When the Christian Socialists first came to power in Vienna they were still a new party in which democratic elements had not had time to evolve. Party policies (and this frequently also municipal policies) were worked out by a small clique of leaders within the party who were neither legally nor theoretically responsible to the electorate for decisions made in the name of the party. Party discipline was easily maintained by dispensing the enormous amount of patronage which had suddenly become available when
the party took over almost the entire city government.

The structure of the party was weakened by the position and policies of the chairman. Karl Lueger enjoyed an enormous popularity among the Viennese. Few people receive such unrestrained adulation during their lifetimes. After the controversy over the confirmation of his election as burgomaster, Lueger was almost deified. Many lower bourgeois Viennese associated themselves personally with his victory and thereafter proudly cast their votes for his party. The Christian Socialists owed much of their success in Vienna, both initially and ultimately, to this personal popularity of the chairman. Party members knew that their own elections depended on Lueger's favor and thus the burgomaster was the unchallenged czar of the party organization in Vienna. Since all power emanated directly from Lueger, the party evolved no chain of command. No one save Lueger was responsible for the actions of the party members, and Lueger never seemed able to delegate his authority. In fact, the charismatic nature of his power made it almost impossible for him to do so.

Lueger himself, although often unscrupulous in his political dealings, was unquestionably honest as a public servant. No case of corruption was ever uncovered in which Lueger was personally involved. Nevertheless, Lueger was certainly culpable in permitting a situation to exist in which graft and corruption could flourish unhindered in the city government.\textsuperscript{100} Whether or not he actually knew what was going on during his administration,\textsuperscript{101} he should have made it his business to know it,

\textsuperscript{100} For a discussion of Lueger's shortcomings in permitting corruption in the Vienna city government, see editorial in the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 16 September 1910, Morning edition, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{101} Father Scheicher believed that Lueger did know about the graft, at least in the cases of Axmann and Bialohlavek, and that he made no attempt to curb it (see footnote, p. 210).
and he should have provided both the party and the city government with a means for checking the activities of their members. The aura of sanctity which surrounded the rathaus during Lueger's term of office made it impossible to institute investigations from outside the party or the municipal administration.

As head of the empire's largest political party and chief executive of the empire's largest city (not to mention his duties as delegate to the parliament and to the diet of Lower Austria), Lueger could not possibly have supervised the activities of all of his subordinates personally. During a large share of his tenure he was virtually inactive: much of the time he was bedridden and after 1907 he spent an increasing amount of time away from the city recuperating. Thus not only the party organization but the administration of the city of Vienna was left leaderless. The three vice burgomasters, Neumayer, Forzer, and Hierhammer, were insignificant strawsen. Gessmann, Lueger's chief assistant in the party, was disliked and distrusted in Vienna, probably even by Lueger himself, and devoted his energies largely to affairs on the provincial and imperial levels.

Consequently, graft and self interest were allowed to flourish in the Vienna city government. During the years in which the Christian Socialists controlled Vienna, the city carried through a large-scale program of municipalization; gas and electric works, trolley and rapid transit systems, road construction, and many other facilities, previously privately operated, came under city management. At the same time both the city and the provincial governments were either instituting or enlarging many public welfare agencies. All of these came under the supervision of Christian Socialist appointees, lower bourgeois politicians with little
or no experience in either management or politics. Under these circum-
stances a certain amount of graft and corruption might have been anticipated.
The remarkable thing is that it was not more widespread.

These underlying weaknesses were all laid bare when Lueger's
death removed the keystone from the jerry-built party organization. In
the scramble for position which followed, two widely differing factions
became discernible. One, led by Gessmann and Liechtenstein, wanted the
city party to lose its identity in the new empire party. Prince Liech-
tenstein had never been active in local politics and wanted mainly to see
a strong party in the parliament to implement the Christian Socialist
program. Gessmann, always more a politician than a statesman, had per-
sonal reasons for his predilections. At Lueger's death he undoubtedly
wanted to become the recognized leader of the party organization if not
its titular head. He realized, however, that he was too unpopular in
Vienna to occupy a key position in a purely local party. It was only by
shifting the emphasis to the empire party, where he could count on the
support of the rural wing, that he could throw the balance in his favor.
By taking over as burgomaster of Vienna, Gessmann probably hoped that he
could eventually assume command of the urban wing as well through his
control of patronage.

A majority of the party members in Vienna were opposed to Gess-
mann and to his policies. They believed that their mandates would be
stronger if they maintained the integrity of the Christian Socialist Party
of Vienna and did not permit it to lose its identity in the empire party.
Therefore, it was necessary for this faction first to block Gessmann's
move to become burgomaster and then to discredit him personally in order
to prevent his becoming the recognized leader of the party. Vergani
represented only the extreme of this point of view but he had enough sympathy in the Vienna party to give him sound support in his attack against Gessmann. Felix Kraba's speech, timed as it was only one week after Lueger's death, was not an isolated blunder of an inexperienced politician. It was obviously the opening gambit of a well-planned campaign against Gessmann in an effort to preserve the integrity of the local party. There were not, as it turned out, very many cases of corruption, but the men involved were all close to Gessmann, and these revelations in the Deutsches Volksblatt were undoubtedly calculated as the best means of discrediting him without bringing down the whole party.

These party squabbles and the subsequent public scandals had less effect on the voting public than might have been expected. The lower bourgeoisie were solidly Christian Socialist, and, once the worst offenders had been removed from office, they were willing to continue to support the party. In the parliamentary elections of 1911, the Christian Socialists lost many Vienna mandates in the Reichsrat, but this was more as a result of strategic co-operation between the liberals and the Social Democrats during the second election than of any significant decline in the number of votes cast for the Christian Socialists. In two subsequent elections for the Vienna city council and in one for the Lower Austrian diet, the party showed that they still had the confidence of the Vienna voters. It was not until the Austrian republic was established and the curia system was finally scrapped for municipal elections that the Christian Socialists lost their control of the city council.

102 Cf. next chapter.
CHAPTER VI

THE DECLINE OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS AS A PARLIAMENTARY PARTY

The Reichsrat Elections of 1911

In March 1911 it was imperative that the government secure two measures from the Reichsrat: an authorization for a loan of six million kronen to balance the budget and the approval of a new draft bill. The Polish Club, ordinarily the most dependable bloc in the parliament, chose this critical juncture to withhold its support. Other nationality groups had wrested valuable concessions by remaining aloof when the government was willing to pay high prices for votes. Now the Polish delegation refused to sanction the army and budget measures unless the Reichsrat passed a bill for new canal construction in Galicia. Without the Polish votes the government bills could not pass.

Baron Bienerth, who never really had his ear to the ground for local politics, felt that he could secure stronger support by dissolving the Reichsrat and ordering a new election. This opinion was based on the widely-shared belief that the Christian Socialist Party had continued to increase in popularity over the past four years and that a new election, therefore would give this party an even stronger mandate in the parliament.¹

The Reichsrat was dissolved on 28 March, and new elections were announced for June. Once again Albert Gessmann had to prepare his party

for a parliamentary election campaign. He had a far easier task facing him in 1911 than in 1907. In the earlier campaign Gessmann had first to create a political party and then to campaign for it. By 1911 the Christian Socialist Party was well established in all German-speaking areas of the empire. The local organizations had only to nominate their candidates, in most cases the same men who had run in 1907.

The main area in which Gessmann was required to do some necessary fence mending was in the city of Vienna itself. The scandals which had plagued the party throughout the year had spotlighted one very weak link in the Christian Socialist system: the lack of an integrated party organization for the city of Vienna. In each of the provinces the Christian Socialist Party was a distinct and semiautonomous unit. For provincial and communal affairs, these local organizations maintained their own leadership, formulated their own programs, and supervised their own campaigns. Only in matters pertaining to their activity in the Reichsrat were they responsible to the central organization. For these groups party discipline was relatively uncomplicated. In the city of Vienna, however, the most valuable bailiwick of the Christian Socialists, there existed no local party organization per se except that of the party as a whole. The system in Vienna had hardly evolved from the eighties and nineties when the United Christians had provided a loose union of local Viennese political groups. The two largest parties in the union, Ernst Schneider's Artisans' Reform League, and the original Christian Socialist Union of Fathers Psenner and Latschka, had since lost their identity in the new party. The other large party in the United Christians' club, Schönerer's German National Party had left the union in 1888, but the faction of this party which had remained with the Christian Socialists, the Anti-Semites
led by Ernst Vergani, still maintained a separate organization within the Christian Socialist framework. The Christian Socialist Workers' Party led by Leopold Kuschak was likewise a semi-independent unit with its own constitution within the Christian Socialist system. Also in Vienna there were a number of local political clubs and the personal followings of independent politicians which had become attached to the Christian Socialists but which maintained a degree of autonomy.

Rather belatedly, Gessmann realized that it would be necessary to set up an integrated party organization for Vienna in order to enforce party discipline. He encountered very little opposition to this plan, as all of the local Christian Socialists, of either major camp, had been embarrassed by the well-publicized quarrels of the past year. On 19 March 1911, slightly more than a year after Lueger's death and a year to the day after Hrabla's subsequent bombshell, Gessmann announced the First Party Day of the Vienna Christian Socialist Union. The convocation was held in the meeting room of the city council at the Vienna city hall. Over a thousand party regulars attended; there was no hope of seating them all. Prince Liechtenstein was too ill to preside (although he did make a short appearance later in the day), and Albert Gessmann took the chair. Almost as soon as he had called the meeting to order and outlined his plans to the assembly, the complaints which had characterized all of the party's negotiations for the past year again began to issue from the floor. Most consistent was the assertion that the party had been ruined by the union with the Conservatives. One party member, who seemed to be reflecting the consensus of a large share of the assembly, stated that the merger had been made behind Lueger's back and that the deceased leader had never really approved of it. Chairman Gessmann then gave the meeting a long
lecture, assuring them that the plan of union had been Lueger's in the first place and that Lueger had been largely responsible for carrying it through. The minutes do not indicate how many of the members were convinced by this argument.²

Eventually Gessmann was able to arrive at the business of the day and in an all-afternoon session the local politicos agreed on a plan for a new Vienna Christian Socialist organization. The basis of this plan had been worked out in advance by a committee of the Citizens' Club under the chairmanship of councilman Kroll (presumably with considerable assistance from councilman Gessmann).

The unit of government in the new Vienna organization was to be the District Association. This would consist of all Christian Socialists in the district (electoral district) who served in the Reichsrat, the provincial diet, the city council, or the district boards, as well as one representative for every fifty Christian Socialist voters in the district. The District Association was to elect an executive committee from its own membership for a term of three years. This executive committee would then elect its own chairman and two vice chairmen. The executive committee was empowered to decide what individuals or political clubs in the district qualified for membership in the Christian Socialist Party. The District Association as a whole was to vote for the Christian Socialist district nominees for all political offices: district boards, city council, provincial diet, or Reichsrat. These nominees would then have to be approved by the empire party organization. The empire party leadership would still be responsible for the official Christian Socialist

²Reichspost, 20 March 1911, p. 1, ff.
platform for Vienna, and they reserved the right to make any negotiations in the districts should the party want to make local agreements with other parties. Generally, however, it was the practice of the Christian Socialists to make no commitments outside of the party. Otherwise the district organization was autonomous in local affairs.\(^3\)

At the top of the Vienna Christian Socialist Union was an executive board, not elected from below, but made up entirely of *ex officio* members. This executive board was to consist of: (a) the head of the Christian Socialist Empire Party, (b) the active cabinet ministers who were members of the party, (c) the president of the house of deputies, (d) the Burgomaster of Vienna (they seemed to assume that these last two offices would be held by Christian Socialists), (e) the executive committee of the party club in the house of deputies, (f) the executive committee of the Anti-Semitic club in the Lower Austrian diet, and (g) the executive committee of the Christian Socialist club in the Vienna city council.\(^4\) This executive board was obviously too large and too cumbersome to have any effective leadership over the newly constituted Vienna organization. It is not difficult to read between the lines of this plan that the main function of the reorganization was to bring the Vienna members of the party more effectively under the discipline of the "empire party" organization.

In spite of Gessmann's last minute attempts at reorganization, the Vienna party did not hold together during the campaign of 1911. There were several districts in which different factions of the party put

\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Neue Freie Presse, 20 March 1911, Evening edition, p. 5.
up separate candidates. Even with the new organization it was not always possible to decide which candidate was official. Although most of the dual candidacies were resolved by compromise or strategy, in some districts the Christian Socialists actually entered the election with two opposing candidates. In all cases the splits within the party were widely publicized and hurt the party in the election.

The most strenuously contested nomination in Vienna was in the sixth electoral district (Second Bezirk, Leopoldstadt, second subdivision). The incumbent deputy from this district was Victor Silberer. At a meeting of the District Association held late in April, 1911, a man named Oppenberger announced that he wished to be considered. The vote was close but Silberer was renominated. After the vote, however, Oppenberger decided to campaign anyway, and his supporters agreed to back him. Silberer appealed to the central organization to establish the validity of his nomination. He was shocked to find that they had no interest in helping him. Silberer himself interpreted this indifference as proof that the party leadership had become too weak to enforce discipline. Father Scheicher suggests that Gessmann actually wanted to drop Silberer and saw the split in the District Association as a good opportunity to do so. Gessmann was supposed to have considered Silberer's views too radical for the now "matured" Christian Socialist Party.

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5 Father Scheicher believed that Silberer was one of the most capable men in the party and that Gessmann was too narrow minded to appreciate him. (Scheicher, V, 353.)

6 Neue Freie Presse, 14 May 1911, Morning edition, p. 6.

7 Scheicher, V, 353.
When the central organization of the party failed to endorse the legitimacy of his candidacy, Silberer became disgusted and voluntarily withdrew his name. A few days later, in his sports magazine, he published a stinging denunciation of Gessmann's management of the party, which was reprinted in the *Neue Freie Presse* the following day.

Two weeks ago I announced my candidacy only because of the strongest exhortations from his excellence, Dr. Gessmann. . . . Since that time I have become aware of many circumstances within the party . . . that would never have been permitted under Dr. Lueger. The present organization of the Christian Socialist Party leaves much to be desired, and the discipline still more. In all areas insubordination prevails. . . . To be sure there were dissensions in the party in Lueger's day. . . . But he would appear with his irresistible authority and his iron fist; order was always quickly restored.8

It is interesting to learn that after Silberer had so obligingly withdrawn his name from the race, it was not Oppenberger who became the official Christian Socialist candidate from the sixth electoral district; it was Victor Kienböck, the lawyer whom the party had retained for the abortive libel suits against Felix Hraba. Was it possible that this was the price the party had to pay for his silence? If so, and Gessmann was able to arrange the nomination, it would seem that Gessmann's control of discipline in the local clubs was not as weak as Silberer believed.

One other well-publicized battle was waged in the Josefstadt (Eighth Bezirk; electoral district 16). Alois Heilinger was the incumbent deputy for this district. For over a year Heilinger had been an outspoken critic of Weiskirchner's policies as minister of commerce, and Weiskirchner saw in the new election a chance to have Heilinger unseated. Weiskirchner, therefore, decided to run for the nomination of the sixteenth district himself.9 As the enmity between these two men was already a *cause célèbre*

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8 *Neue Freie Presse*, 14 May 1911, Morning edition, p. 6.
9 Weiskirchner's own mandate was from the Alsergrund area (Electoral District 18). As he was the party's representative in the cabinet, he wanted to run in two districts so as not to risk losing his seat in the Reichsrat.
in Vienna, the struggle for the nomination in the Josefstadt made good reading in the liberal press. The exact details of the subsequent negotiations in the Josefstadt party club are somewhat shrouded, but the ultimate solution shows the unmistakable mark of Gessmann’s nimble hand. When the official list of Christian Socialist candidates was published in the Reichspost, the nominee of the sixteenth district was neither Heilinger nor Weiskirchner but the most loyal Gessmann supporter in the Vienna organization, Leopold Kunschak.  

Kunschak also went into the election with two nominations. He had first been nominated by District 28 (Hernals) which he already represented in the Reichsrat. Hernals was a workers’ district and the party wanted Kunschak to run there to pull as many votes as possible. There was a strong chance that this district might vote Socialist, however, and the party wanted to secure a second nomination for Kunschak, a valuable party man in the Reichsrat.

This well-laid plan misfired, however. The local Christian Socialist club in the Josefstadt resented the interference of the central organization. When Kunschak was recognized as the official candidate, a majority of the local district association seceded and put up Heilinger as an “Independent Christian Socialist.”

Joseph Neumayer, the burgo-master of Vienna, ran in electoral district 23 (Hietzing), Lueger’s former seat. Neumayer had originally received this mandate in a special election shortly after Lueger’s death.

\[10\] Reichspost, 11 June 1911, pp. 4-5.

\[11\] Neue Freie Presse, 16 May - 12 June 1911, passim.

\[12\] After Lueger died, the former minister-president, Baron Beck, expressed the desire to run for this seat on the Christian Socialist ticket. The party had at first been sympathetic to the suggestion. Gessmann, however, vetoed Beck’s candidacy at the specific request of Francis Ferdinand. Allmeyer-Beck, Beck, p. 422.
Heinrich Hierhammer, the second vice-burgomaster of Vienna, was nominated for the mandate recently vacated by Julius Ammann. With these four exceptions, all of the party's candidates who had been elected in 1907 were renominated in 1911.

Of the provincial party organizations only Styria experienced any difficulty in selecting candidates. Styria, in fact, was the only province in which it had been necessary to amalgamate the Christian Socialist and the Conservative party organizations at the time of the union in 1907. In Lower Austria and Vorarlberg there had been no conservative party; in Upper Austria and Salzburg there had been no Christian Socialist party. In these provinces the existing organizations simply remained intact. In Tyrol the Conservatives had refused to join the Christian Socialists and in 1911 were still an independent party. In Carinthia neither the Conservatives nor the Christian Socialists were able to establish on a very large scale. 13

In Styria, however, there had been both a Christian Socialist and a Conservative party before the merger in 1907. Of the two, the Conservatives represented the older and better established organization. The Christian Socialist Party of Styria was a clerical and reform party with a lower bourgeois following in Graz and its suburbs. When the Center Club voted to join the Christian Socialist Club in 1907, it was the Styr-
ian conservatives who had voiced the strongest protest. The merger was eventually arranged, however, with mutual assurances that the conservatives

13As Carinthia had a fairly large Slovene population, a party such as the Christian Socialists, with only a moderately nationalist platform, could not hope to gain a following. Carinthia did elect one Christian Socialist candidate in 1907. In 1911, although they styled themselves the "German Christian Socialist Party," they did not win any seats in Carinthia.
would operate only in rural areas and the Christian Socialists only in Graz.

In the provincial executive committee of the newly integrated party, Francis Hagenhofer, a conservative, became the chairman. Hagenhofer was able to pack the committee with former conservatives so that the new united party organization in Styria was, in fact, simply an extension of the former conservative organization. The problem came to a head during a provincial diet election in 1910. The executive committee was able to engineer the nomination of a completely conservative slate, ignoring the aspirations of all former Christian Socialists. Neunteufel, the head of the Christian Socialist organization in Graz, made a public accusation that Hagenhofer had not lived up to the bargains made in 1907 when the two parties had merged. Hagenhofer retaliated with a libel suit against Neunteufel in the spring of 1911 shortly before the new elections. Hagenhofer's testimony gives a fairly clear indication that there had been secret agreements between the Styrian Conservatives and the Vienna Christian Socialists at the time of the merger. The Styrians in the Center Club had apparently received strong verbal assurances from the Vienna leaders that, if in the new united Styrian organization the former conservatives were to take over the complete direction, they would have the tacit support of the central organization. This conjecture seems more credible considering that, following the libel trials, Neunteufel was expelled from the party by the conservative-dominated Styrian organization,

14 Baron von Morsey, the former head of the Styrian Conservative Party, had resigned shortly after the merger.

15 *Neue Freie Presse*, 5 March 1911, Morning edition, p. 7.
and the Vienna leaders of the Christian Socialists made no effort to save
him. Neußeufel and the former party club in Graz founded a separate
"Old Christian Socialist Party" which put up separate candidates in the
election of 1911 (none of whom were elected). 16

The first election was held on 14 June 1911. Almost as soon
as the earliest returns were counted it became apparent that the Christ-
ian Socialists were not going to repeat their successes of 1907. The
party held up relatively well in the rural districts. Of the seventy-
six districts won by the Christian Socialists outside of the city of
Vienna in 1907, sixty-five were retained in 1911 with a simple majority
on the first election. In sixteen more districts Christian Socialists
qualified to participate in the run-off election.

The greatest disappointment was in the city of Vienna, the
original Christian Socialist stronghold. Out of the thirty-three Vienna
electoral districts the Christian Socialists had taken twenty in 1907.
In 1911 only two gave the Christian Socialists a clear majority. Vienna
was not completely lost, however. The party had received enough votes
to continue in the run-off elections in twenty-one other districts. In
fifteen of these the Christian Socialists had a significantly larger vote
than the opposition party. If in the run-off election they could claim
even these fifteen, the party would still hold a majority of the Vienna
mandates. In thirteen Vienna districts and in three other urban districts
of Lower Austria the Christian Socialists entered the lists in the run-
offs against Socialist candidates. If the Christian Socialists could

16 Ibid.; Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im
Reichsrat Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911 (Vienna,
1912), pp. 1-14.
make a bargain with the German National Union\textsuperscript{17} to support each other in districts where either faced a Socialist, these thirteen Vienna mandates could be saved.\textsuperscript{18}

It had generally been the policy of the Christian Socialist Party not to weaken its position by making encumbering election agreements with other political parties.\textsuperscript{19} On this occasion, however, negotiations between the Christian Socialists and the German National Union were initiated by Baron Bienærth himself. The prime minister had two reasons for wanting to arrange an agreement between these parties. First, the election returns, contrary to his expectations, had indicated that the Christian Socialists were not stronger but far weaker than in 1907. As this party was the mainstay of his ministry in the parliament, Bienærth wanted to use any means available to increase the Christian Socialist mandate in the run-offs. Furthermore, the election had shown a marked increase for the parties of the non-German nationalities. Anxious to see as much strength as possible in the German bourgeois elements of the parliament, the prime minister hoped to create an understanding and a spirit of mutual cooperation between the Christian Socialist Club and the German Nationalist Union.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} The German National Union was represented in Vienna primarily by the liberal German Progressive Party. There was also a German Nationalist Party in Vienna which was less influential.

\textsuperscript{18} Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen . . ., pp. 14-52; Reichspost, 15 June 1911, pp. 1-5.

\textsuperscript{19} E.g.: in 1907 the Christian Socialists would not accept a mutual agreement with the conservative parties. They would cooperate only on the basis of an integral union.

\textsuperscript{20} Neue Freie Presse, 15 June 1911, Morning edition, p. 2.
Conferences began the very afternoon of the election day in the meeting room of the crown council. Presiding was Baron Bienert. With him was one minister from each of the two parties concerned: Weiskirchner from the Christian Socialists and the minister of justice, von Hochenburger, from the German National Union. Representing the German National Union from the house of deputies were Baron von Chiari, Steinwender, Sylvester, Gross, and Weidenhofer. The Christian Socialists Club sent Prince Liechtenstein, Gessmann, Pattai, Steiner and Schoiswohl.

The Christian Socialist delegation first presented their recommendations for a compromise. They pointed out that the districts in which the German national parties would be running against the Social Democrats were primarily in Bohemia. There were fourteen such districts in which the cooperation of the Christian Socialists would assure their victory. The Christian Socialists asked in return that the parties of the German National Union support their candidates in those districts of Vienna and Lower Austria where they stood against a Social Democrat. It was understood that there would be no thought of a compromise in districts where the two parties faced each other. The leaders of the German National Union were interested in the Christian Socialist proposals but agreed that the ultimate decisions must rest with the local organizations of the districts concerned.\footnote{\textit{Neue Freie Presse}, 15 June 1911, Morning edition, p. 2.}

The results of this meeting would suggest that the position of the Christian Socialists was not hopeless. The party still had a firm hold on its rural districts and by compromising with the German parties, they could probably still claim a majority of the mandates of Vienna.
Another conference had taken place that same afternoon, however, which proved that the best laid plans of mice and Christian Socialists could not change the color of a German liberal. This was a meeting of the Central Electoral Committee of the German Progressive Party, the liberal party of Vienna, a member of the German National Union. They, too, discussed the possibility of an electoral compromise with the Christian Socialists and came to the unalterable conclusion that they would support any other party on the slate, even the Social Democrats, rather than assist the Christian Socialists. At the end of the meeting the committee passed a resolution that, "The Progressive Central Electoral Committee strongly recommends the Progressive Central Electoral Committee strongly recommends the Progressive voters to cast their votes on 20 June unconditionally for the opponent of the Christian Socialist candidate." As the Progressive Party was the major representative of the German National Union in Vienna, the efforts of the leaders of the union to follow the wishes of the government by cooperating with the Christian Socialists were nullified.

During the next three days there were several meetings of district organizations of the Progressive Party and of other parties in the German National Union. All of these district meetings echoed the feelings of the Progressive Central Electoral Committee. Under no circumstances would any district organization in Vienna or Lower Austria support the Christian Socialist candidate. Their voters were specifically advised to cast their ballots for the Social Democratic candidate. Even the august liberal newspaper, the Neue Freie Presse, supported the sentiment

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22 Ibid., p. 2.
to vote Social Democratic (i.e. moderate Marxist) rather than Christian Socialist.\textsuperscript{23}

In every case the strongest reason given for this fanatic opposition to the Christian Socialists was the blatant corruption in the Vienna city government. The Christian Socialist scandals were still a burning issue and one which drew strong public sympathies. But the German Nationalists undoubtedly had tactical reasons for their position. The parties in the union which stood to gain from cooperation with the Christian Socialists were the Free All-German and the German Agrarians which faced the Socialists in several urban districts in Bohemia. The party which blocked the alliance with the Christian Socialists was the German Progressive Party which had its main strength in Lower Austria. Before 1907 (under the curia system), this party had received a plurality of the parliamentary votes from Vienna and Lower Austria. But in the election of 1907, they had been almost entirely eclipsed by the Christian Socialists. In 1911, the Progressives had their opportunity for revenge. Were they to cooperate with the Christian Socialists they would be the weaker party of the coalition and would probably receive the smallest possible consideration in patronage. If they were to cooperate with the Socialists, on the other hand, the German Nationalists would be the only member of the alliance which could accept seats on the cabinet or indeed receive any government appointments.

The results of the run-off election were exactly what might have been predicted: the complete rout of the Christian Socialist Party.

in the city of Vienna. The elections gave the Christian Socialists only one more Vienna mandate, a total of three. Outside of Vienna the party picked up seven seats. In the house of 513 deputies, the total Christian Socialist representation had dropped from ninety-six to seventy-four.\footnote{Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen . . ., pp. 14-52; Fritz Freund, Das Österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1911-1917, p. 41. Alois Heilinger, who had been the Christian Socialist deputy from the Josefstadt and who had run as an "Independent Christian Socialist" in 1911, polled 4,107 votes over 935 for Leopold Kunschak, the official nominee of the party. In the run-off Heilinger easily defeated his opponent, a Social Democrat. In the House of Deputies, Heilinger joined the club of the German National Union.}

The most significant result of the election was that not one of the Christian Socialist party leaders of Vienna was re-elected. Prince Liechtenstein, Albert Gessmann, Richard Weiskirchner, Joseph Neumayer, Leopold Steiner, Leopold Kunschak: all were without a seat in the Reichsrat. In the provinces the election results were also disappointing, but by no means as drastic as in the capital. In Lower Austria (other than Vienna) there were thirty-one electoral districts. The party had polled twenty-four of these in 1907; and in 1911 maintained twenty-one of them, although with a substantially smaller vote in every district. The three seats which the party lost were all in urban industrial areas where the picture was similar to Vienna; the German Nationalists and the Social Democrats were able to combine their strength to unseat the Christian Socialists. In Mistelbach (#36, Gessmann's mandate), and St. Pölten (#41), the Christian Socialists polled a plurality in the first election but lost to a combination of the other parties on the run-off election. Only in Baden (#39) did the Christian Socialists lose a seat by having a substantially smaller number of votes than in 1907. The other urban
districts of Lower Austria (Ebreichsdorf, Liesing, Krems, Zwettl, Wiener-Neustadt, and Neunkirchen), voted Socialist in both 1907 and 1911.

In Upper Austria the Christian Socialists fared reasonably well. They received considerably fewer votes in 1911 but actually picked up one more seat. In 1907 the then independent Conservative Party had taken all sixteen rural districts and one of the six urban districts. In 1911 they kept all of these mandates and added also the urban district of Urbahr (across the Danube from Linz). Ebenhoeh seems to have had the situation well in hand.

The distribution of seats from Salzburg was exactly the same as it had been in 1907. The three urban districts cast their votes for the German Peoples' Party (moderate nationalist and liberal); the four rural districts for the Christian Socialists.

In Styria the Christian Socialists had carried none of the eleven urban districts in 1907 and, although they pulled even fewer urban votes in 1911, they gained one district by combining with the German liberals for the run-off election. The twelve German rural districts had all been either Christian Socialist or Conservative in 1907 and remained Christian Socialist in 1911 (although, as elsewhere, with fewer votes than in 1907). The situation in Styria had been complicated by the split in the Christian Socialist Party. The "Old Christian Socialist" Party ran their own candidates in three rural districts: Liebnitz, Fehring, and Hartberg. The regular Christian Socialist candidates won nevertheless in all three districts.

The Christian Socialists had never tried to establish themselves in Carinthia. They had claimed one Carinthian district in 1907 (Wolfsberg), but even this was lost in 1911. More significant is the fact that in 1907
in several districts of Carinthia the Christian Socialists, though they lost, did command a fair proportion of the votes, which they did not retain in 1911. The total Christian Socialist vote in Carinthia in 1907 had been 14,085 and in 1911 only 7,379. During the four intervening years Carinthia had been the scene of demonstrations between the German and Slovene population which threw sympathies in that province to the national parties at the expense of the Christian Socialists.

The new election did not change the position of the Christian Socialists significantly in the province of Tyrol. The Catholic Conservatives of Tyrol still maintained a party in competition with the Christian Socialists and in 1911 cost the Christian Socialists one seat. In 1907 the two parties had managed to support a single candidate in Kufstein, Michael Mayr, a Conservative. As related in a previous chapter, Mayr had joined the Christian Socialist Club in the Reichsrat contrary to the instructions from his party, rather than remain impotent as an isolated delegate. The fury of the Catholic Conservative organization against Mayr for this insubordination was so strong that in 1911 they refused to support his candidacy from Kufstein and instead gave their support to the German liberal candidate who therefore won the seat. This had been the only urban seat in Tyrol taken by the Christian Socialists in 1907. On the other hand, all eleven of the German rural seats of Tyrol had been Christian Socialist in 1907 and remained so in 1911. The Christian Socialists also lost one of the four Vorarlberg districts in 1911: the single urban district, Bregenz, returned a German Nationalist candidate.

The defeat of the Christian Socialists in 1911, therefore, was only in Vienna and Lower Austria. A study of the returns shows that in
the other provinces (as well as in the rural districts of Lower Austria) the Christian Socialists had maintained almost all of their mandates. The party in fact represented virtually all of the rural elements in Austria (except in Carinthia). It is especially significant that, while all of the party leaders of Vienna failed to receive their mandates, every one of the party leaders from the rural provinces was re-elected to the Reichsrat; Alfred Ebenhoeh, Baron von Fuchs, Father Aemelian Schopfer, Joseph Schraffl, Jodok Pink, Joseph Schlegel, Francis Hagenhofer, and Joseph Stockler all retained their mandates.  

This fact, more than any conscious change of policy, determined that after 1911, the Christian Socialist Party in the Reichsrat no longer represented the interests of the lower bourgeoisie but was almost entirely a clerical and agrarian party.

There are many explanations for the failure of the Christian Socialist Party in Vienna in 1911. The most obvious is the bad name the party received from the scandals of the previous year: the fight over the burgomaster's chair, the accusations of corruption from within the party, the subsequent revelations showing that the charges of scandal and corruption were probably true; and finally the press war between Vergani and Gessmann in the Deutsches Volksblatt and the Reichspost. Lueger's death had done more than superficial harm to the Christian Socialist Party. Lueger was not only tremendously popular personally, he was a symbol of the unity of the party. Lueger's person was the only factor in Christian Socialism which transcended the confusion of local political parties, widely separated social classes, and divergent political platforms.

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25 Baron von Morsey of Styria had not run for re-election in 1911.
which the party had tried to represent. The party members in all parts of Austria believed that they had joined a well organized, well integrated party with a leadership of experience in Vienna. When Lueger was removed from the picture, the fight for position on the part of the Vienna leaders showed that there was no central organization. People no longer felt the same loyalty to the party as an idea. It was unfortunate that no one strong leader came forth to take Lueger's place. The party lacked a colorful figurehead. The voters wanted a leader; what they got was childish name-calling in the newspapers from Lueger's second-rate associates.

Many of the Vienna voters had been disillusioned by the party's orientation since 1907. Before 1907 when the party had operated only in Lower Austria, it had served the interests of the German lower bourgeoisie. In the early years of the twentieth century, the nationality question had become increasingly predominant in the minds of the voters. The Christian Socialists were a German party, to be sure, but a moderate German party. While Lueger had continued his harangues against the Magyars and Slavs, Gessmann had joined the cabinet which renewed the Ausgleich on terms favorable to Hungary. By 1911 the Viennese had begun to distrust the clerical and conservative proclivities of their party leaders; and they suspected an alliance between the Christian Socialists and the unpopular Belvedere.

Before 1907, the Christian Socialists in Vienna had been a party of bold projects for social reform. In the Reichsrat the only major social reform between 1907 and 1911 was the prohibition of night work for women, and this act was drafted only in accordance with the terms of an international agreement. This was not entirely the fault of the party. The long history of obstructionism had prevented the
Reichsrat from passing almost any legislation at all. Nevertheless the original impetus for social reform was losing momentum. The whole concept of social reform as noblesse oblige and as the social obligation of a churchman, the concept on which the Christian Socialist program had been conceived, had lost its popularity. Social conditions had changed considerably in twenty-five years. The times of 1911 could never have produced a Vogelsang, or such priests as Schöpfer, Scheicher, and Schindler. Industry had grown and with it the labor class. Their social maladjustments could no longer be solved in the narrow framework of Vogelsang’s philosophy. The Socialist Party had now emerged as a full grown political organization to be the spokesman of the working class. Some of the basic assumptions of this party, or at least of the founder of its doctrine, were so shocking to the upper classes, particularly to Christians, that the whole idea of social reform as a political ideal had become anathema among conservatives and clericals. As the Socialist Party grew, so did its enmity with the bourgeois parties, in this case the Christian Socialists. As a party in opposition to the Social Democrats, the alternative for the Christian Socialists was away from reform; it became a party to defend the status quo. But as such it was to appeal only to the essentially conservative rural population. For the urban voters the Christian Socialists Party had lost both its élan and its raison d’être. The bourgeois voters now had new causes and new crusades and they gave their votes to the parties that espoused them.

The Resignation of Albert Gessmann

The failure of the party at the polls in the election of 1911 was the final personal blow to Albert Gessmann. Gessmann, more than any single individual including even Lueger, had been responsible for the
creation of the Christian Socialist parliamentary party. The election results had definitely reflected against his leadership. The success of the rural over the urban wing of the party meant that the central executive would no longer be his Vienna group. His own ambitions and political machinations had been responsible for creating many of the ugly situations which had discredited the party in the eyes of the voters. His efforts to give the party prestige and position by participating in the imperial cabinet and cooperating with the Belvedere Circle were major factors in the party's internal disagreements and loss of mandates.

Actually Gessmann probably never understood the real reason for the failure of the party. The fact was that there was no longer a parliamentary government in Austria in 1911, no need for the Christian Socialist empire party, no need for Gessmann. He saw the election of 1911 only as the last in a series of political errors. With the fall of Beck in 1908, Gessmann had expected to become a leading member in a new cabinet, the political adviser behind the Belvedere-picked minister-president. This had not materialized; Gessmann had even lost his seat on the cabinet. At Lueger's death the party he had worked so hard to establish did not choose to elect him its chief. He had even failed in his last-ditch effort to keep some personal prestige by succeeding Lueger in the post most closely associated with the leadership of the party by the voting public, that of burgomaster of Vienna. Gessmann was undoubtedly pinning all of his hopes on the belief that a new election in 1911 would increase his party's representation and return him to a leading position in Bienersh's cabinet. This election was not merely disappointing; it was a fiasco. He had lost his own district. In commenting on the failures of 1911, even Friedrich Funder, one of Gessmann's few
admirers, seems to sense Gessmann's basic weakness:

He was a great man without whom the party never would have become what it was, but he did not have that certain Viennese quality of being in tune with the people (Volkstümlichkeit) which right now was so important.\textsuperscript{26}

Gessmann had apparently decided beforehand that if the elections in June 1911 were not successful he would retire permanently from political life. It was on the very day that the results of the final election were published, 21 June 1911, that Gessmann wrote to Funder, indicating his intentions and explaining that he would no longer be active on the editorial board of the \textit{Reichspost}.\textsuperscript{27} On the following day, Gessmann sent a letter of burgomaster Joseph Neumayer resigning from the Vienna city council. Gessmann had served on the council since 1879, a period of thirty-three years, during which he had never lost an election. At the same time Gessmann wrote to Prince Liechtenstein asking to be relieved of his duties as head of the school board of Lower Austria and explaining his decision to retire from politics.\textsuperscript{28} Gessmann's actual resignation from the Lower Austrian diet and as head of the party club in the diet and as head of the party club in the diet was not tendered until that body reconvened in September. Several days after this resignation had been received, when other party members had been elected to fill Gessmann's provincial offices, the Christian Socialist delegate Reinosl (one of the three from Vienna who still held his seat in the Reichsrat), introduced a resolution to the Lower Austrian diet giving a vote of thanks to Albert Gessmann. This resolution was not a panegyric but a cautiously worded

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{26}Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 452.
\bibitem{27}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 458.
\bibitem{28}\textit{Reichspost}, 23 June 1911, p. 2.
\end{thebibliography}
and highly formal expression of gratitude. Robert Pettai took the floor and informed the diet that he for one could not possibly, with a clear conscience, offer any thanks to Gesmann. Several other Christian Socialists spoke in agreement with Pettai. When the resolution came to a vote in the overwhelmingly Christian Socialist diet, it did not pass.  

As soon as Gesmann was able to extricate himself from public service, he and his wife traveled to Switzerland where they remained for almost a year away from any reminder of Vienna and of politics. During this time they occupied a suite in a pension in Luzern, overlooking the lake. In a letter to Jodok Fink explaining his decision, there is certain evidence that Gesmann already had some pangs of nostalgia for the smokey world of politics:

... as much as I cling to the party with every fiber of my heart, I am quite certain that, for a while at least, perhaps forever, I serve it best if I stay out... But if I can, without drawing the least attention, serve either the party or one of my friends, and I may well call you my dearest and most faithful friend, then I shall do so with pleasure.  

After returning to Vienna Gesmann kept to his decision to stay away from politics. The new party leaders frequently requested that he take a hand, but he refused. After 1911 he spent all of his efforts on the building and loan society which he had founded. In 1917, during the war, the emperor Charles I honored Gesmann by naming him to a seat in the Upper House, but he was never active there. Earlier that year, he had suffered several strokes which had left him an invalid. On 7 July 1920 Albert Gesmann died at the age of sixty-eight.  

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29 Neue Freie Presse, 3 October 1911, Morning edition, p. 7
30 Deuring, p. 162.
31 Funder, Von Gestern, p. 463.
Reaction to the Election in the Empire Party

On the day following the final election, Richard Weiskirchner resigned as minister of commerce. He had been called to the ministry as a parliamentary representative; without a seat in the parliament, he could hardly remain in the cabinet.³² Although the Christian Socialist Party still retained over seventy seats in the new house, their position had obviously been weakened and with it the parliamentary support of the Bienerth ministry. A few days after Weiskirchner’s resignation, therefore, Baron Bienerth and his entire cabinet stepped down. For the second time the emperor asked Baron Gautsch to form a ministry. Gautsch subsequently named a cabinet composed entirely of bureaucrats.³³

On 22 June there was a meeting of the executive board of the Christian Socialist Empire Party.³⁴ One of the problems which faced the party leaders in the light of the election results was what position the Christian Socialists would maintain vis-a-vis the other parties in the house of deputies. For the relatively smaller parties to carry any weight in the large and variegated Reichsrat it was almost mandatory to unite into larger blocs. Only a fairly large delegation could command patronage, or hope for a seat in the cabinet, or put through legislation favorable to its constituents. Joining a large bloc meant, on the other hand, that the individual parties had to compromise on some parts of their platforms. In the Reichsrat elected in 1907 the Christian Socialists had been the largest single party in the house. They had been able to

³⁴ At this meeting Prince Liechtenstein was unanimously re-elected as head of the Christian Socialist Empire Party, although he did not have a seat in the Reichsrat.
command a good deal of authority without aligning themselves with any other group. In the new house the influence of the Christian Socialists would be negligible unless they entered into agreements with other parties. Nevertheless, at the suggestion of Prince Liechtenstein the board decided that the Christian Socialist Club should remain completely independent. As the Reichsrat had proved incapable of serving as a legislature, political influence within the house was of relatively little value to the party. The leaders considered the recent election only a temporary setback for their party. If the Christian Socialists should return to power in the future, their position would be far stronger had they not in the meanwhile compromised on their program. At this meeting, therefore, the executive board of the party passed a resolution to maintain a policy of a "free hand" in the Reichsrat.35

Several days later, on 4 July 1911, the Christian Socialist deputies held their first formal meeting since the election. In line with the assumption that a major explanation for the party's recent setback was their failure to identify themselves clearly as a German nationalist party, the club voted to change its official name to "The Christian Socialist Union of German Deputies."36 At the same meeting Alfred Ebenhoch was elected to succeed Albert Gessmann as chairman of the club. Following the elections Ebenhoch and the Upper Austrian delegation presented a strong protest against the policy of a "free hand" as outlined previously by the executive board of the party. Ebenhoch, speaking with the experience of a former cabinet member, argued that the Christian Socialists had

35Reichspost, 23 June 1911, p. 9.

36Karl Neisser, ed., Politische Chronik der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, 1911, VII (July), 730.
an obligation to the government which was stronger than any obligation to
the government which was stronger than any obligation to maintain the narrow
clerical-conservative platform. Before any considerations of party platform
it was necessary for the Christian Socialists to cooperate with the other
parties to the extent of making the parliament workable. Ebenhoch argued
that in order for the parliamentary system to continue (he apparently be-
lieved that it could), the Christian Socialists should join in any coali-
tion, however tenuous, of parties loyal to the empire, to support govern-
ment measures. Baron von Plantz, a newly elected delegate from Styria,
announced that his delegation agreed with Ebenhoch's point of view and
proposed a resolution that the party should adopt a program which empha-
sized the need to support the "workability of the parliament." The
resolution of Baron von Plantz produced several hours of debate but no
agreement was reached at this meeting.37

At a subsequent meeting on 17 July, however, the party adopted
an official platform which showed that the adherents of the "free hand"
policy had won out. This program also shows to what extent the Christian
Socialists had become purely a clerical and agrarian party.

1. The Christian Socialist Union still holds, as it has always,
to the basic principles of the Christian Weltanschauung, which
they believe to be the requirement for the continued welfare of
human society.

2. Concerning the Kulturkampf, the Christian Socialist Union will
not disturb the denominations recognized by the state, but will
always take the part of the rights and freedom of the Catholic
Church against all encroachments. They will also protect the unity
of the family against all efforts to dissolve it, and will further
protect the ethical religious upbringing of the youth against all
attacks. The existing confessional peace this party holds to be
a disturbing factor as it seems to thwart more than anything else
the social laws and reforms which the people have requested of the
parliament.

37 Neue Freie Presse, 6 July 1911, Morning edition, p. 7.
3. The party stands for the honest work and the support of the middle class.

4. The party will use any means to break the power of Capitalism to hurt the people.

5. The Christian Socialist Party will remain independent in the Reichsrat so that its commitments to the people as stated in the above paragraphs can be maintained without compromise.  

The program was given the seal of authority by assuring the constituents that the party would not lose sight of its duty to carry out the will of its deceased leader, Karl Lueger. This program shows that the Christian Socialists no longer thought of the ideals of an earlier generation. The demands for sweeping social reforms, the programs that issued from the secret midnight discussions of the Vogelsang circle, were not given even a passing nod in 1911.

When the Reichsrat reconvened in October 1911, Alfred Ebenhoch was very ill and unable to attend. Jodok Fink took over as temporary chairman of the delegation. During the fall, Ebenhoch's illness became more severe. He resigned from the house of deputies in December, and on 30 January 1912 he died. Ebenhoch had been the only influential member of the now dominant agrarian faction who had favored a strong central organization and an active parliamentary policy. His death removed one of the few remaining cohesive forces in the party and contributed decisively to the further weakening of the empire party organization.

In line with the now virtually unopposed policy of decentralization no one was elected to succeed Ebenhoch as chairman of the Reichsrat.

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38 Funder, p. 463; Reichspost, 19 July 1911, p. 1.
39 Neue Freie Presse, 26 October 1911, Morning edition, p. 5.
40 Neisser, Politische Chronik, 1912, I (Jan.), 7.
delegation. In each subsequent meeting of the club one of the members of the executive board\(^{1}\) was designated as chairman pro temp.\(^{2}\)

Shortly after Ebenhoch's death two new provincial parties were established by rural dissenters from the Christian Socialist ranks. The first, founded in Styria, was an outgrowth of the splinter party started by Neunteufel in Graz before the election of 1911. On 20 January 1912, this group sponsored a convention in Graz for the founding of the "Independent Peoples' Party of Austria." Baron von Pantz, a Reichsrat delegate from the regular Christian Socialist Party of Styria, now joined the Independents and was elected chairman of the new party. There were also several representatives from Lower Austria, including Augest Kemetter, also a deputy. Although the Independents considered themselves a completely separate party, the two members of the house of deputies, von Pantz and Kemetter, were permitted to join the Christian Socialist Club in the Reichsrat.\(^{3}\)

In March another new party was organized in Upper Austria by a group of dissenters from the local Christian Socialist Party. They were known as the "Independent Provincial Party." Their bitterness toward the parent organization is indicated in their declaration that the new party would be "a friend of religion and of the faith," but "an enemy to the misuse of religion for political purposes."\(^{4}\)

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\(^{1}\) The executive board elected on 17 July 1911, consisted of von Baechl, Miklas, Schoiswolff, Schöpfer, Jukel, Hauser, and Eisterer. *Ibid.*, 1911, VII (July), 738. Of these the last three mentioned were rural delegates who had been elected to the house of deputies for the first time in 1911.


At a convention in Graz the following year the Upper Austrian party joined with the Independent Peoples' Party of Styria. The new united party adopted two resolutions which again show the nature of their dissatisfaction with the Christian Socialist leadership. The first resolution called for "a closer cooperation with the other German parties," and the second demanded a policy which would not be "strictly in the interests of the large farmers." The independent party actually represented only the temporary discontent and disillusionment with the Christian Socialists. After the initial enthusiasm of its organization, the party did not develop a significant following either in Styria or in Upper Austria. Since there were to be no more elections to the Reichsrat this splinter party developed no importance whatever on the parliamentary level.

While the death of Ebenhoeh in January, 1912, probably made possible the split in his Upper Austrian organization, another death a few months later opened the door for a union of the two clerical parties of Tyrol. On 25 June 1912, Archbishop Joseph Altenweis, prince-bishop of Brixen, died in Innsbruck. For many years there had been efforts by both the Christian Socialists and the Catholic Conservatives of the province to unite the two parties. The moderate conservatives were dissatisfied with the impotence of their party and felt that only by uniting with the Christian Socialists could their party return to significance.

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45 Ibid., 1913, III (Mar.), 123.

46 The diocese of Brixen included most of the province of Tyrol, although part of the province came under the diocese of Salzburg. Brixen is not an archdiocese; the title "archbishop" was honorary.

47 Neue Freie Presse, 26 June 1912, Morning edition, p. 3.
But the extreme conservatives of their party, led by Archbishop Altenweisel, while not objecting to a union with the Tyrolian Christian Socialists, were adamant in their refusal to permit their party to be placed under the authority of the central organization of the Christian Socialists. The Christian Socialists were sufficiently strong in Tyrol that they did not need to accept the union on these terms. After the election of 1911, however, the leadership of the Christian Socialist Party passed from the distrusted Vienna politicians to the more acceptable provincial delegates, and the subsequent death of Archbishop Altenweisel removed the last major obstacle to a merger of the Tyrolian parties.

The Christian Socialists hoped that Monsignor Waitz of Vienna, a cleric with outspoken Christian Socialist sympathies, would be called to the diocese of Brixen. But the appointment went to Francis Egger, former suffragan bishop of Vorarlberg. Even Bishop Egger’s appointment was considered a concession to the Christian Socialists. Although Egger was not an active supporter of the party, he was at least indifferent to politics, and would not be expected to block the activities of the Christian Socialists in Tyrol or to prevent the eventual merger of the two clerical parties. 48

In 1914 the two parties formed a common club in the Tyrolian diet with Joseph Schraffl, a Christian Socialist, as chairman. Finally in 1918, on the eve of the republic, the two groups united officially as the Tyrolian Peoples’ Party and joined the central Christian Socialist organization. 49 The union of the parties in Tyrol was, next to the

48 Ibid., 19 September 1912, Evening edition, p. 3.
49 Klutz, p. 164.
decline of the party in Vienna, most responsible for making the Christian Socialist Party as it was constituted during the republic less bourgeois and more agrarian and conservative. This union brought the ultr clericals of Tyrol into active participation in the party. At the same time, their entrance into the party removed the hesitations of many ultraconservatives of other provinces who had until then refused to participate in politics under the aegis of the Christian Socialist Party.

Reaction to the Election of 1911 in Vienna

Since the expansion of the Christian Socialists to a Reichsrat party in 1907 there had been increasing dissention among the party members in Vienna and Lower Austria. Ernst Vergani and his supporters had represented only the extreme position. There were many other members of the Vienna city council and the Lower Austrian diet who, while not wishing to declare outright opposition to the party leaders, nevertheless had not approved of the alliance with the clericals. The opposition became more general and more articulate when the Reichsrat election of 1911 so clearly discredited the expansionist policies of Albert Gessmann.

Shortly after the elections there was a move to separate the local Christian Socialist organization from the "empire party" and to create a new party operating only in Vienna and Lower Austria. This plan had the support of a large number of the local leaders including Burgomaster Joseph Neumayer and the former president of the house of deputies, Robert Pattai. From considerations of political strategy the decision

50 Pattai had recently referred to the Christian Socialist organization in a public speech as a "cadaver." Reichspost, 10 July 1911, p. 2.
to found a new party at this time was essentially a sound one. The Christian Socialist "Empire Party" had a function only on the Reichsrat level. It was made up of two distinct components, the Lower Austrian bourgeois party and the rural agrarian and conservative party, which had almost no interests in common outside of the Reichsrat. The past four years had indicated that there could be no legislative activity in the Reichsrat; therefore, there was no need for a Reichsrat party.

The Vienna group realized that their best chance for survival and for future service lay on the local level. Their power was not in the Reichsrat but in the Vienna city council and the Lower Austrian provincial diet, living and active legislative bodies. Although the Christian Socialists as an "empire party" had discredited themselves in the eyes of the Vienna voter by subordinating the interests of the bourgeoisie to those of the aristocracy and the clericals, and by the recent scandals, the party still retained an aura of prestige in Vienna which might not yet be completely extinguished. The Vienna politicians had lost their seats in the Reichsrat but they might still be able to hold their seats in the Lower Austrian diet and the city council by disassociating themselves with the policies of the party since 1907: i.e. the "empire party." The proponents of a separate party did not wish to appear as a secessionist group. They wanted to convince the voter that it was the "empire party" which had veered from the sacred path of Karl Lueger, while their party represented the true political descendents of the revered burgomaster.

The new party was to be called the "German Anti-Semitic Citizens' Party of Vienna." The program of the party was set forth in an

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51 "Deutsch-antisemitische Burgerpartei in Wien," the word Burger connotes that the party wishes to represent a class of people
article by Adolph Gussenbauer in the *Deutsches Volksblatt*.\textsuperscript{52} Gussenbauer explained that he and his associates could no longer tolerate the policies of the leaders of the Christian Socialist Union "which make the interests of Vienna second to agrarian interests," and who as leaders of a political party had allowed themselves "to be in a position of dependence on the episcopate." The new party would be divorced from agrarian and clerical influences. They would emphasize German nationalism and racial antisemitism. They would limit their organization to Lower Austria and operate primarily in the city of Vienna and its suburbs so that they could serve the bourgeois interests. Insofar as the party acted on a Reichsrat level, it would find its strength in an alliance with the parties of the German National Union.\textsuperscript{53}

The first organizational meeting for the new party was held at the Riedhof restaurant on the evening of 6 July 1911. Councilman Nagler was chairman. Thirty Christian Socialist members of the city council were present, and the meeting was assured that the new party could count on a far larger number once it was established. They hoped that Richard Weiskirchner could be persuaded to join. He had been approached but he had not made his position clear.\textsuperscript{54} Weiskirchner had given one public speech which showed that he was sympathetic with the Vienna separatist movement. What he probably had in mind was to follow a program similar to that proposed by Gussenbauer, but to do so within the framework of the Christian

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\textsuperscript{52}Gussenbauer had been an outspoken supporter of Ernst Vergani in the Vienna city council, especially after he was publicly criticized for his position by Karl Lueger in 1909. Funder, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{53}Reichspost, 10 July 1911, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{54}Neue Freie Presse, 7 July 1911, Morning edition, pp. 10-11.
Socialist organization. What Weiskirchner wanted most of all was to become burgomaster of Vienna. He was therefore, anxious not to say anything which would commit him to either wing of the city council until he saw which way the majority was going to jump.

There remained in the city council a substantial number of Christian Socialists who had no desire to sever their connections with the "empire party." The major spokesman for this point of view was Leopold Kunschak. Each side was championed by one of the party newspapers; the Deutsches Volksblatt took up the cause for the separatist wing of the party and the Reichspost became the organ of the conservatives.

On 24 July 1911, a Christian Socialist rally was scheduled in the great center courtyard of the enormous neo-Gothic city hall of Vienna. The leaders of the German Anti-Semitic wing decided to use this occasion to present their ideas to the people and to bring the new party into reality by spontaneous demand. What was meant to be a rally turned out to be something more like a riot. The event had been advertised through the numerous political clubs in the city which still made up the local units of the party. These clubs had been alerted to the fact that the new party was to be organized that night and groups of both sympathies came to the Rathaus ready for a fight. As the titular head of the party organization in Vienna, Burgomaster Neumayer, a moderate Deutsches Volksblatt partisan, was the chairman of the rally. Robert Pattai was the first speaker. He led off with a stinging denunciation of Gessmann (not by name) and of the Christian Socialist Party leadership. According to two reports (both, however, antipathetic to Pattai) he was jeered by the audience.\footnote{Funder, \textit{Vom Gestern}, p. 462; Hemala, p. 3.}  

Burgomaster Neumayer was to be the next speaker, but
before he started to speak, Leopold Kunschak appeared on the balcony, apparently uninvited. He was wildly applauded. Kunschak had recently made himself the official martyr of the Reichspost wing of the Christian Socialists, and at the time of the July rally, he had just been released from prison; the balcony scene was his first public appearance. This was a master stroke. The crowd went wild. Neumayer tried to begin his speech but could not. Finally he yielded the stage to Kunschak. When the crowd permitted, Kunschak began by reminding his audience of the sacred trust of the party to continue the work of Lueger. "Since Lueger's death," he intoned, "reptiles have crept out of the corners" to spit on Lueger's Christian Socialist program and its representatives. "But we stay loyal to the Christian Socialist idea and to the memory of Dr. Lueger." Wild cheers.

Councilman Nagler was to speak next. Neumayer introduced him, but the crowd shouted for the return of Kunschak. No one could restore order. The crowd had been stirred up and off they went to carry their demonstration into the streets of Vienna. The symbols of the two wings of the party had become the two newspapers that represented each: Reichspost for the original party and the Deutsches Volksblatt for the new wing. Apparently the crowd had come equipped with copies of the

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56 In a meeting of the city council during the campaign of 1911, Kunschak had made some unkind references to the character of Felix Hraba who was then campaigning as an independent. Hraba sued Kunschak for libel; Kunschak was convicted and was sentenced to three days in jail. The Reichspost had played up the case as entirely unjust and among the regular party supporters there was great sympathy for the incarcerated Kunschak, all of which was widely publicized.

57 Hemala, p. 3.
Reichspost to use as signs of their loyalty. "With the Reichspost
fastened to long sticks like banners, thousands of people poured out of
Rathaus singing the Lueger song." 58 Heaven knows what the "Lueger song"
was. We can only hope that it has been forgotten.

The crowds moved toward the offices of the Deutsches Volksblatt.
The police had anticipated this move and the offices were surrounded by
patrolmen. The crowd then proceeded up the Josefstadterstrasse to the
Reichspost office which was only a few blocks north of the Rathaus on
the Strosszigasse. Funder was in the office at the time. He saw the
crowd and climbed out on a balcony to greet them, giving them an impas-
sioned speech with one arm wrapped tenuously around a flagpole. 59

Following this fiasco the effort to found a new German party
in Vienna petered out. In September Gussenbauer and Nagler called
several more meetings at their usual place, the Riedhof restaurant, this
time to create a separate German Nationalist club within the local
Christian Socialist organization. But this, too, failed to attract suf-
dicient support. 60 The reason for the failure of the German party was
not that its program lacked adherents. The concept of the new party was
essentially a good one from the point of view of political strategy.
The truth was that a new party was rendered unnecessary by the fact that
the Christian Socialist Party in Vienna itself had become completely
separate from the clerical-conservative empire party. With only three
delegates in the Reichsrat, there was nothing to bind the Vienna party

58 Funder, Vom Gestern, p. 462.
60 Neue Freie Presse, 20 September 1911, Evening edition, p. 5.
to the program of the Reichsrat party. They served entirely different interests. With Gesmann out of the party and Prince Liechtenstein too ill to be an effective party leader there was no one in the Vienna organization who represented the "empire party" point of view. Burgomaster Neumayer was openly opposed to it. Weiskirchner, although a former minister, had after 1911 indicated his Viennese sympathies. Once divorced from the clerical and agrarian wing of the party, the program of the Vienna Christian Socialists was not essentially different from that proposed by Gussenbauer, though to a more moderate degree: German nationalist, anti-Semitic, bourgeois, and Vienna-centered.

In a city council election less than a year after the Reichsrat elections of 1911, the Vienna voter showed that his quarrel with the Christian Socialist Party had been only in the Reichsrat and not in the city. The elections took place during April and May, 1912. Seventy-four seats were up for renewal, all but six of which were Christian Socialist. Five were from the first electoral body; forty-eight from the second; and twenty-one from the fourth.61 The Christian Socialists retained all five seats in the first electoral body and lost two of the forty-eight in the second. In the fourth electoral body, which is the most representative of the feelings of the voters, the Christian Socialists held only fourteen of the twenty-one seats. In the election they lost four (three to the Social Democrats and one to the Progressives) and gained one (from the Social Democrats). Out of a total of seventy-four Christian

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61 Only the seats of the second and fourth electoral bodies were up for renewal in 1912. The five seats from the first electoral body were vacancies which had occurred by death or resignation since the last election. The fourth electoral body, in which all citizens voted, had been added to the original three at the same time as the Fifth Curia for the Reichsrat elections in 1896.
Socialists who stood for re-election, sixty-eight were elected. The vote was not the spectacular victory that the party had enjoyed in the municipal elections since 1895, but it certainly did not indicate, as had the Reichsrat elections of the year before, that the Christian Socialist Party had lost the confidence of the city of Vienna. The one seat which the Christian Socialists lost to the Progressives was that held by Hermann Bielohlawek. Under the circumstances, it is hard to understand why the party permitted Bielohlawek to be renominated in the first place.

According to the agreements made following the death of Lueger, Neumayer was supposed to step down as burgomaster after the elections of 1912 (at which time his own term as vice-burgomaster was to have expired) so that the new city council could choose its own burgomaster. It was assumed that in so doing they would follow Lueger's "political testament" and elect Richard Weiskirchner. When the new city council convened in September, however, Neumayer maintained a "j'y suis; j'y reste" attitude and showed no signs of resigning. It was not until late in December that Weiskirchner's supporters managed to force Neumayer to resign by refusing to vote his salary for the coming year. Neumayer finally stepped down, albeit reluctantly, on 19 December 1912. On 23 December, Richard Weiskirchner was elected burgomaster of Vienna, receiving the unanimous vote of the Christian Socialist members of the council.

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63. Ibid., 17 December 1912, Evening edition, p. 3; 20 December 1912, Morning edition, p. 13; 23 December 1912, Evening edition, p. 5. Weiskirchner was the last Vienna burgomaster elected under the monarchy. He had the unhappy task of governing the city during the difficult war.
The Christian Socialist Party to the End of the Monarchy

After the elections of 1911, the Christian Socialists almost ceased to function as a parliamentary party. The discord which had characterized the previous sessions continued in the new house of deputies, and the imperial government operated without reference to the parliament. On 16 March 1914, Count Sturgkh, impatient with the parliament's inability to provide necessary increases for the army, prorogued the Reichsrat and ruled by decree. A few months later the monarchy became involved in the First World War. Not even the most starry-eyed visionary could have believed that the Austrian Reichsrat would be an efficient instrument of government in a full scale war.

During the war the Reichsrat Club of the Christian Socialist Party met once a year in Vienna, usually in January, to determine policy and to remind themselves of their existence. Prince Liechtenstein, the nominal head of the party, was very ill throughout these years and almost never attended the meetings.

The Reichsrat was not summoned again until May, 1917, during the ministry of Clam-Martinic. By this time the monarchy was in mortal danger and the parliament was called in a desperate effort to marshall popular support for a continuation of the war. But the only business accomplished by this session was the discussion of futile projects for the reorganization of the empire. Finally, during the late summer and

years. On 22 November 1918, after the proclamation of the republic, Weiskirchner and the city council stepped down (Funder Vom Gestern, p. 600). During the first republic the Vienna city council was consistently dominated by the Social Democratic Party.
early fall of 1918, with the defeat of the central powers inevitable and the dissolution of the monarchy imminent, this last meeting became the forum to which the non-German delegates could announce the creation of separate independent national states. 64

By 21 October a rump parliament of German speaking delegates agreed to recognize the fait accompli and to consider themselves as the Provisional National Assembly of German Austria. Of the 232 remaining delegates, 102 belonged to the German National Union, 65 72 to the Christian Socialist Party, and 42 to the Social Democrats. Before attending the first session of the provisional parliament, the Christian Socialist Club met to determine the party's consensus on a form of government for the German speaking remnants of the empire. The vote was almost unanimous for a constitutional monarchy. 66

During these critical days the Tyrolian Peoples' Party sponsored a convention of the Christian Socialist leaders in Innsbruck which was held on 18 and 19 October 1918. At this meeting the newly united clerical party of Tyrol agreed to join an all-Austrian Christian Socialist Party. The leaders of the dissenting "Independent" Christian Socialist Party were also present and announced that they were ready to rejoin the party. 67

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64 Hantsch, II, 568-69.

65 Many of whom represented districts which were later awarded to countries other than the Republic of Austria.


67 Neue Freie Presse, 19 October 1918, Morning edition, p. 3.
By early November the sentiment of the Austrian people was turning toward a republic. Perhaps the most influential of many factors was the proclamation of the German republic on 9 November. The trend received further impetus on 11 November with the signing of the armistice and the announcement the same day by the Emperor Charles that he would acquiesce in any decision the Austrian people might make regarding the form of government they wanted.

On that day the Christian Socialist Club, which now represented the most conservative element in the provisional government, held a meeting to determine their position in the light of recent events. Although most of the members would undoubtedly still have preferred a constitutional monarchy, they realized that the Austrian people now clearly favored a republic and that therefore the party ought to carry out the wishes of their constituents. This position was presented to the meeting by Jodok Fink. According to the latter-day monarchist Friedrich Funder, Fink read his speech in cold, unemotional tones, "as though he were reading a death notice." The following day the provisional government proclaimed Austria a republic.

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68 Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p. 593.
CONCLUSION

In its thirty years of parliamentary activity the Christian Socialist Party scored many spectacular successes but in the long run fell far short of the goals it might have achieved. In 1907 the Christian Socialists seemed to be in a position to provide Austria with the type of powerful empire-wide party which might have contributed some stability to her political system. After the introduction of universal suffrage the local Vienna party had expanded its operations to campaign in all of the provinces represented in the Reichsrat. The party's popular platform of social and electoral reform in a framework of moderate clericalism was easily adapted to appeal to both urban and rural elements throughout the empire. In the elections the party received an unexpectedly large mandate. With the subsequent addition of the remaining rural conservative delegates, the Christian Socialists emerged as the largest party in the house of deputies just at the time when the emperor wanted to choose a cabinet based on the representation in the parliament. The Christian Socialists should have been ready to ride the crest of the wave of current enthusiasm for popular government.

The party's performance in the parliament, however, was disappointing. During their four years as the leading party in the house of deputies they proved unable to maintain their reform program on the parliamentary level, to exert any permanent influence in the imperial
government, or to forge a cohesive empire-wide party organization. By
the end of the monarchy the Christian Socialists had ceased to be a
popular reform party and had developed into an essentially conservative
party representing only the German rural elements of the electorate.

Most of the factors which prevented the Christian Socialists
from maintaining their once promising position were part of the political
and social milieu in which they operated. There were many factors,
however, which arose from weaknesses within the party itself.

The sharp political and ethnic divisions in the Reichsrat
actually rendered the creation of an empire-wide political party vir-
tually impossible. After the Badeni language ordinances of 1897,
nationality questions took on a wildly disproportionate significance in
the minds of the voters. Non-Germans, however sympathetic they might
have been to the clerical and reform platform of the Christian Social-
ists, could not have been persuaded to back a predominantly German
political party. At the same time, the Vienna lower bourgeoisie, the
mainstay of the Christian Socialists, would have withdrawn their support
had the party not become outspokenly German. Consequently, after 1897
the party’s expansion was limited to German electoral districts and the
idealistic principles of Pope Leo XIII, which might have been the basis
for a supra-national political program, were de-emphasized in favor of
the popular, often even vulgar, nationalist slogans.

The most important factor in the gradual disappearance of
idealism and reform from the Christian Socialist platform was the con-
current growth of the Social Democratic Party. As long as the Christian
Socialists were striving to wrest control of the municipal and provincial
governments from the parties of privilege they sponsored a program of reform. Once in power, however, the Christian Socialists found that they in turn had to repel boarders from the rapidly expanding Social Democratic Party. The classes represented by the Christian Socialists largely achieved their aims in the franchise reform of 1907. The election of that year indicated that any further extension of the suffrage would benefit the Social Democrats and the non-German parties at the expense of the Christian Socialists. Consequently, the Christian Socialists tended to move from a platform of reform toward a defence of the status quo.

The Christian Socialists' reforming zeal was further weakened by the efforts of the party to achieve a position of influence in the imperial government. The first step was the admission of the rural conservative delegates into the Christian Socialist Club in order to reap the benefits of being the largest party in the Reichsrat. The radical elements in the Christian Socialists' program, particularly those regarding agrarian questions, had to be watered down to accommodate the new members. Eventually these conservative delegates, who were far more acceptable in government circles than the bourgeois politicians of the original party, achieved an influence in the party's policies out of proportion to their numbers.

The admission of the conservatives also presented a major obstacle to the creation of a cohesive empire party organization. The maintenance of the autonomy of the provincial parties was one of the main conditions of their joining the Christian Socialists in the Reichsrat. More important, however, was the fact that the Austrian parliament played
so small a part in the actual government of the empire. Had the Christian Socialists been the largest party in a house of deputies capable of passing legislation they would have presented a political program to their urban and rural constituencies which would have made both dependent on the central organization. Had the Christian Socialist leaders held policy-making cabinet posts for any duration, the party might have accumulated some of those factors of power, patronage in particular, which are necessary for a cohesive political organization. Had the important issues of the time been the concern of the parliament and of a responsible ministry, the autonomy of the local provincial parties would eventually have disintegrated and the authority could have been assumed by the central leadership.

Instead, the house of deputies, torn by implacable differences among the delegates, proved unable to pass legislation and thus forfeited the one significant role which the imperial government might have been willing, or even obligated, to grant them. Party representatives in the cabinet were mere pawns of the bureaucracy as long as the parties behind them were impotent. Furthermore, some of the most important issues were in the realm of foreign affairs which was the province of the combined government of Austria-Hungary and therefore out of the reach of party politicians.

The Christian Socialist central organization was further weakened by the failure of the party to produce any capable leaders at the empire level. Other than Karl Lueger no individual combined those qualities of popular appeal and political acumen which are necessary for a successful party leader. A colorful personality who could represent
the embodiment of the party in the eyes of the electorate, who could pull votes on the strength of his own popularity, and who understood the inner workings of political power and party control, could probably have overcome the separatist tendencies of the local Christian Socialist factions. Luenger had these rare qualifications but he had long passed his prime when the empire party was formed. After his death no one came forth who was capable of assuming such a role.

After the election of 1911 the Christian Socialists tended to become primarily a rural party. As was mentioned above the conservative members had achieved a disproportionate influence in the party even before 1911. In the election of that year so few Christian Socialist deputies were returned from Vienna that the party executive committee was left almost entirely to the agrarians. With the bourgeois elements absent from the party leadership and the radical reforms dropped from the party platform, many of the provincial conservatives who had eschewed politics after their defeat in 1907 found their way back to public life through the Christian Socialist Party. With the union of the two clerical groups in Tyrol the acceptance of the party by the conservatives was complete. By the end of the monarchy the Christian Socialist Party had become the voice of agrarianism, conservatism, and clericalism in Austria. The original bourgeois party had established the Christian Socialist Empire Party into which they invited the disconnected and autonomous agrarian parties. When the Vienna faction subsequently abandoned the parliamentary arena, the provincial parties found themselves housed in a centralized political organization from which they could carry out a concerted clerical and conservative program.
It was as such that the Christian Socialist Party was soon to take on its responsibilities as the leading party in the Austrian republic.