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Mirrors of Modernization: The American Reflection in Turkey

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Abstract
This project documents otherwise neglected dimensions entailed in the assemblage and implementations of political theories, namely their fabrication through encounters with their material, local, and affective constituents. Rather than emanating from the West and migrating to their venues of application, social scientific theories are fashioned in particular sites where political relations can be staged and worked upon. Such was the case with modernization theory, which prevailed in official and academic circles in the United States during the early phases of the Cold War. The theory bore its imprint on a series of developmental and infrastructural projects in Turkey, the beneficiary of Marshall Plan funds and academic exchange programs and one of the theory's most important models. The manuscript scrutinizes the corresponding sites of elaboration for the key indices of modernization: the capacity for empathy, mobility, and hospitality. In the case of Turkey the sites included survey research, the implementation of a highway network, and the expansion of the tourism industry through landmarks such as the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. Social scientific interviews, highway machinery, and hotel lobbies were less external sites of implementation for modernization theory than laboratories where it was manufactured and enacted. While such microcosms were designed to scale down competing visions of modernization and technical expertise to a manageable size, their implementation was offset by the resilience of recipient subjects, as well as anxieties and hesitations on the part of practitioners. The projects of the social scientists, technical experts, and policymakers were not tantamount to a straightforward process of Americanization; rather techniques of knowledge production and corresponding visions of development were dynamic and subject to strategies of translation that reworked the inevitabilities their creators imagined. Based on multi-sited archival research spanning government agencies, private corporations, and the published work and private papers of key social scientists, the project traces the history and concrete enactment of a political theory, one whose imprint continues to guide current debates on political and economic development.

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MIRRORS OF MODERNIZATION:
THE AMERICAN REFLECTION IN TURKEY

Begüm Adalet

A DISSERTATION

in

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THE AMERICAN REFLECTION IN TURKEY
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2014
Begüm Adalet
For Rüheyla Öngen,

My grandmother
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This dissertation was written with the help of many debts incurred over the course of travels across research sites and homes between Turkey and the United States.

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ABSTRACT

MIRRORS OF MODERNIZATION: THE AMERICAN REFLECTION IN TURKEY

Begüm Adalet
Anne Norton

This project documents otherwise neglected dimensions entailed in the assemblage and implementations of political theories, namely their fabrication through encounters with their material, local, and affective constituents. Rather than emanating from the West and migrating to their venues of application, social scientific theories are fashioned in particular sites where political relations can be staged and worked upon. Such was the case with modernization theory, which prevailed in official and academic circles in the United States during the early phases of the Cold War. The theory bore its imprint on a series of developmental and infrastructural projects in Turkey, the beneficiary of Marshall Plan funds and academic exchange programs and one of the theory’s most important models. The manuscript scrutinizes the corresponding sites of elaboration for key signifiers of modernity, the capacity for empathy, mobility, and hospitality. In the case of Turkey the sites include survey research, the implementation of a highway network, and the expansion of the tourism industry through landmarks such as the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. Social scientific interviews, highway machinery, and hotel lobbies were less external sites of implementation for modernization theory than laboratories where it was manufactured and enacted. While such microcosms were designed to scale down competing visions of modernization and technical expertise to a manageable size, their implementation was offset by the resilience of recipient subjects, as well as anxieties
and hesitations on the part of practitioners. The projects of social scientists, technical experts, and policymakers were not tantamount to a straightforward process of Americanization; rather techniques of knowledge production and corresponding visions of development were dynamic and subject to strategies of translation that reworked the inevitabilities their creators imagined. Based on multi-sited archival research spanning government agencies, private corporations, and the published work and private papers of key social scientists, the project traces the history and concrete enactment of a political theory, one whose imprint continues to guide current debates on political and economic development.
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Introduction

The more local and specific knowledge becomes, the harder it is to see how it travels.¹

Theories are never found alone, just as in open country there are no clover leaf intersections without freeways to connect and redirect.²

In 1959, Frederick Frey wrote a piece called “Why Turkey?” for Forum, a biweekly journal published by prominent members of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University. The piece chronicles Frey’s experiences during the two years he spent in Turkey as a Ford Foundation grant recipient. The title of the article, Frey explains, comes from a query he frequently encountered from Turkish and American interlocutors alike: “Why did he choose Turkey for investigation when, as a social researcher, he had the whole world at his disposal to use as a laboratory?”³ Frey’s answer is consistent with the social scientific and political treatment of Turkey as an exception and model of modernization during this period: “Turkey is singular in today’s world—singular in a way that helps illuminate all our future.”⁴

The second installment of Frey’s article is an elaboration on Turkey’s “exceptional” transition to multiparty politics, his own status as a theorist of modernization, and his portrayal of expertise as a vocation that requires intimate familiarity with the social and material features of his field of examination:

We have traveled more than 20,000 miles in two years. Though we were subject to improper treatment in the back streets of Istanbul and our car parts were stolen in Kayseri, the memory I recall most vividly is the image of polite and smiling children who saluted us on the side of the road, who tipped their hats at us in the

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¹ James Secord, “Knowledge in Transit” Isis 95 (4), 2004, p. 660
³ Frederick W. Frey, “Niçin Türkiye?” Part 1, Forum 11 (128), July 15, 1959, p. 10. All translations from Turkish are mine.
⁴ Ibid.
Black Sea Region, who helped us locate the sites we wanted to see near Mersin, who ran hundreds of meters to inform us when we took a wrong turn.5

The anecdotal snippets equip Frey’s musings with equal measures of affection and disappointment, both sentiments borne out of a claim to all-encompassing knowledge about his object of inquiry. His narrative, otherwise favorable towards the obliging brood of Anatolia, is punctuated with depictions of partial hospitality at best, such as the wretched state in which he found the tourism industry and the personal interactions he observed in urban settings. Frey admonishes an overall “failure to apply the rules of common courtesy to strangers,” manifest in people cutting lines, trucks not giving priority to buses in traffic, and women being mistreated in public transportation.6 His account wavers between the depiction of Turkey as an exceptional yet exemplary site of modernization and one in need of self-criticism and improvement in its political institutions, material facilities, and norms of social etiquette.

Frey belonged to a group of experts who passed through Turkey during the postwar flow of American technical, military, and financial aid to that country. Like his fellow Cold War travelers, he was a tentative itinerant within circuits of funding that linked academic centers, governmental agencies, and private foundations. The primary product of this social scientific and political infrastructure was modernization theory, which provides the focal point for this project’s inquiry into the makings, travels, and enactments of political theories. The manuscript attempts to excavate otherwise neglected dimensions that are entailed in the assemblage and implementations of social scientific theories, namely their fabrication through encounters with their local, material, and

5 Frederick W. Frey, “Niçin Türkiye?,” Part 2, Forum 11 (129), July 31, 1959, pp. 8-9
6 Ibid., pp. 9-10
affective constituents. I argue that an examination of modernization theory and the
physical remaking of Turkey within its contours during the early phases of the Cold War
invites us to re-conceive of the ways in which we approach knowledge practices. Rather
than emanating from Western laboratories and migrating to their sites of elaboration,
social scientific theories and attendant developmental projects are fashioned through
particular encounters. These projects’ itineraries, furthermore, are derailed not only by
resistance from their recipients, but also anxieties and hesitations on the part of their
practitioners. The material mediators that are crucial to the theories’ construction and
implementation are, in turn, liable to misuse and breakdown, rather than functioning as
repositories for the ideological visions that motivate and sustain them.

Tracking the travels of a political theory helps reveal the affinity between
theories, their practitioners, and their recipients, as well as their instantiations in material
and political terms, complicating a narrative that assumes a relation of externality
between knowledge and its venues of application. Knowledge, contemplated through the
medium of travel, is conceived in particular encounters between people and practices,
“across localities and cultures.” ⁷ Far from hovering above and distinct from their myriad
destinations, political theories serve as the sites and terms of translation. ⁸ Translation,
“always a creative endeavor,” unfolds between, among, and across otherwise disparate
locales, as well as those traversing them. ⁹ Travel captures an equivalence, no matter how
intermittent, between theory and practice, the human and the material, the imagined and

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the tangible, the abstract and the particular. Insofar as the emergence of modernization theory and its products proceeded in tandem, conceptually and concretely, capturing their fragile movements allows us to expose both the imperial conceits and epistemic uncertainties endemic to the Cold War era, as well as any attempt at knowledge production.10

In its Cold War usage, modernization prevailed as a potent historical imaginary—a way of evaluating the world in novel political terms, as well as epistemic ones, “providing a set of categories and premises that continue to shape people’s experiences and interpretations of their lives.”11 Understood as “claim-making concepts,” whose analytical import nonetheless ought to be called into question, theories of modernization and attendant developmental projects are not to be dismissed as straightforward, sinister or doomed to failure from the outset.12 Rather, I take up, in this project, Frederick Cooper’s call to examine how “the idea of modernization was used in a particular context…the effects of its usage and its relation to politics on the ground.”13 Excavating the particular uses and elaborations of modernization theory requires an attunement to its travels between its sites of production, its sites of persuasion, and its sites of implementation—sites, as we will see, whose appearance as distinct realms obscures the ways in which knowledge is fashioned and registered in encounters between practitioners and their objects of study.

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13 Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, p. 147
As a product of the postwar alignment between political power and the social sciences, modernization theory traveled alongside those who crafted it, and those intended to be its recipients. Yet its journeys entailed more than “obtaining knowledge and/or having an ‘experience’” about terrains ostensibly detached from its assembly. Its categories were made, super-imposed, remade under the rubrics of travel and translation. Rendered legible through an array of visual media, such as maps, surveys, and texts-in-circulation, those categories aimed to yield archetypal subjects, technical blueprints or regional templates. A circuitous function of modernization theory, then, was the production of its models in line with the trajectories it had already envisioned for them. It was within such imperatives that Turkey came to be treated as an object of inquiry and intervention alike—a venue of fact-gathering for the social scientific laboratory that could also deceptively, indeed paradoxically, serve as a ready-made model for its neighbors across the Middle East.

Modernization theory, otherwise believed to be the uncomplicated result of overlapping practices in knowledge production and empire building, cannot be understood without an account of its material enactments and the contingencies that accompanied its circulation. In order to excavate the travels and contingencies endemic to the consolidation of any political theory and expert practice, this dissertation examines the historical, political, and epistemological formations of modernization theory: how did it cohere into a “claim-making concept,” with adherents and skeptics on the producing and receiving side alike? What were the material, social, and literary technologies

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entailed in the production of modernization theory as a paradigmatic “fact” guiding developmental projects? To what extent did social scientific and infrastructural projects succeed in their efforts to cultivate particular indices of modernization, such as empathy, mobility, and hospitality, on the part of their recipients? How did the concealment of anxieties and hesitations on the part of social scientists, technical experts, and policymakers aid or hinder the implementation of modernizing schemes? Finally, what role did Turkey play in this epistemic and semiotic constellation as the simultaneous model and exception of modernization?

In attempting to answer these questions, I am motivated by Susan Buck Morss’ suggestion that “the deeper the historical excavation of a concept goes, the more vulnerable it becomes. Far from providing it with solid ground, the process of exposing its historical foundations can cause the concept itself to crumble.” My aim in this project is to chronicle the vulnerabilities of the concept of modernization, as well as the individual, institutional, and material participants involved in its fabrication. Rather than contribute to the resurgence of a grand teleological narrative whose “unpackaging” was ostensibly brought to fruition as early as the 1970s, I treat modernization theory as a politico-epistemological category that stands in dearth of historical reflexivity and provincialization. In doing so, my project reveals the constitutive frailties and

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parochialisms of the concept, understood as “nothing other than a word in its sites,” through the stages of its inception and implementation alike.  

Examining sites of social scientific, political, and developmental encounters through the lens of a history of travels brings to the fore the manifold vicissitudes entailed in the itineraries of knowledge, as well as the networks of power, expertise, and capital necessary to sustain it. Travel also furnishes us with the vantage point of foreignness, a venue abundant with prospects for self-reflexivity. Anthropologists and historians, among others, have come to terms with the implications of their travels and research projects, their convoluted imbrications with empire and grand schemes of development. In their disregard for the travels, histories, and concrete effects of their theories and research agendas, political scientists have ceded analysis of a crucial domain of political practice: the work of experts such as themselves. Mobile experts such as

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19 For recent work in political theory that examines travel narratives, see Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore* and Susan McWilliams, *Traveling Back: Toward a Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
Frey hold up a mirror to our scholarly selves, and in doing so, provide a focal point for a query into the production of knowledge and its methodological, material, and political instantiations alike.

In the following sections, I outline the main concerns of this project: the treatment of Turkey as a model for modernization theory, the coherence of that theory into a naturalized and contested item through encounters with local actors, the material objects that at once facilitated and frustrated its assembly, as well as the oft-neglected affective dimensions of expertise. Other themes of the project, such as the translation, circulation, and mirroring of expert identities and practices are also addressed. I conclude with a note on archival methods and an overview of the remaining chapters of the manuscript.

The Turkish Model of Modernization Theory

Frederick Frey’s ruminations, which enlist the personal, material, and political facets of expertise, are emblematic of knowledge practices that were mediated and enacted through narratives of travel in the early phases of the Cold War. Social scientists, reared in wartime research centers and sponsored by novel sources of governmental and extramural funding after the war, indeed viewed the whole world as a laboratory at their disposal. This was an era when, in light of decolonization and the perceived threat of the Soviet model of development, “knowing the world,” as well as “knowing the enemy” came to be identified with “national interest” in the United States. Private foundations, such as the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the American Council of Learned Societies, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations played a pivotal role in the consolidation of area and language studies, which also found federal support from the

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National Defense Education Act (1958), spurred by the launching of the Sputnik the year before. The research agendas set by these institutions were aligned with US initiatives to promote “development” through the extension of technical aid and knowhow abroad, ranging from President Truman’s Point Four Program and Eisenhower’s International Cooperation Administration (1955) to Kennedy’s US Agency for International Development (US AID, 1961) and Alliance for Progress (1961). Such initiatives were means to consolidate a “brave new world—a liberal internationalist era” with the help of academic research centers which were to contribute to the production of area-specific knowledge and developmental projects alike.²³

The prolific Frey, for instance, worked as a consultant for the US Department of State and the US AID, and was summoned, among others, by the governments of Chile and Venezuela for assistance in housing and resettlement projects.²⁴ Featured in a Christian Science Monitor article probing the tasks of the political scientist and his contributions to society, Frey explained that “travel is an essential part of the job.”²⁵ Within the contours of social scientific practice that prized itself on its generation of law-like generalities and replicable models, then, Frey would contribute to the crafting of modernization theory through large-scale survey studies and elite interviews he conducted over the course of his trips to Turkey.²⁶ While he posited Turkey as a “rough

²⁴ “Biographical Sketch: Frederick Ward Frey”
²⁶ For Frey’s contributions to the Political Development series of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, see “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey” Communications and Political Development, ed. Lucian Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) and “Education:
model” to the recently “emerging countries” in his dissertation, however, he insisted that “westernization” and “modernization” were concepts that “have inhibited analysis as much as they have aided it,” seeing as how they were “vague, cosmic, unclear in their referents, and difficult to measure.”

Frey’s incredulous stance towards his own classificatory exercises is exemplary of the multiplicity of frames, logics, and postures that prevailed through the Cold War travels of expert knowledge and practice.

As a pliable recipient of US military, economic, and technical aid, Turkey appeared to be the exemplary site of economic and political liberalization during the early phases of the Cold War. Emerging from the debris of the Ottoman imperial project, it was the inheritor of a series of “modernizing” legacies, dating back to Tanzimat-era and Kemalist reforms. These legacies of authoritarian reform, as well as the tangible transformations in its material and social landscape captured the imagination of Turkish and American social scientists, allowing the abstraction of Turkey into both the model and laboratory of modernization theory. Social scientific models presuppose the conditions of their replicability, regardless of contingency and particularity. Even the social scientists who insisted on the singularity of Turkey’s experience with military-led

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28 Turkey received 152 million dollars within the purview of the Truman Doctrine, and 349 million dollars within Marshall Plan allocations. These amounted to about 2.6 percent of all Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)-commissioned funds, grants, and loans spent elsewhere in this period.

reform could not help but evoke a norm of political change: hence the role of the United States in configurations of modernization theory.

As a model of modernization, the Turkish landscape emerged as at once a representation on a smaller scale (“little America”) in an (un)specified time to come (“in thirty years,” “in the near future”) and an archetype whose emulation was predicated on what it already was. This double-fold temporality was articulated in light of the sites and sights associated with one’s positioning: facing America (“what the Middle East seeks to become”), Turkey, viewed from the West, was expected to orient itself towards Middle Eastern counterparts, participating in the drive to be seen as a model. If Turkey’s future was a projection of its past trajectory, multiple stages of abstraction attended its crafting as a model: its history presented “raw data” for the crafting of modernization theory, which was then re-packaged and re-exported to the rest of the region. The anticipated political trajectory of the Turkish model, however, was offset by military coups (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997), the resurgence of religious sentiment, and the unrelenting persecution of its ethnic minorities. The detours in this journey and the political implications of the social scientists’ projects and their models have apparently been forgotten: the recent uprisings across the Middle East have once again prompted

31 Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 79
policymakers and scholars to present Turkey as a model of modernity and democracy for the region.

While this project is concerned with the grids of intelligibility that were to render Turkey a resonant, albeit problematic, template of modernization across the region, I argue that it was one of the many sites where modernization theory was fashioned in contestation, rather than an external venue of its application. Edward Said’s potent formulation of Orientalism has inspired a number of studies that examine the constellation of knowledge practices and imperial power in the context of the Middle East. Such analyses have cogently chronicled Western attempts to manage and produce the Orient through a series of discursive practices, such as historical and literary texts. The force of such representational statements, as Said has argued, rests on their citational capacities, functioning as a vehicle for self-understanding on the part of those who (re)utter them. Said’s framework, however, retains a binary construction between subjects and objects of inquiry, the Occident and the Orient. As we will see throughout

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this manuscript, taking into account the local, material, and affective processes that are entertained in the construction of knowledge about otherwise foreign locales helps unravel the image of a “Great Divide between the universal knowledge of the Westerners and the local knowledge of everyone else.”

The diverse array of passersby embroiled in the weaving of modernization theory included survey researchers, diplomats, businessmen, engineers and architects—all tourists within circuits of knowledge, technology, and empire. While these figures seemingly agreed upon the premises of their theories and projects, they furtively contested their specificities. It is for this reason that recounting their travels requires embarking on a “tortuous history.” The implementation of modernization theory was by no means a unidirectional process, given the necessity to enroll and translate the interests of Turkish scholars and policymakers in the negotiation and assemblage of traveling theories. Intermediary figures were required to position themselves as “obligatory passage points” through which flows of information and knowledge traversed across the Atlantic. The characters whose itineraries are traced in the following chapters, social scientists Dankwart Rustow, Kemal Karpat, Nermin Abadan, and Frederick Frey, as well as technical experts such as Vecdi Diker, Harold Hilts, Gordon Bunshaft, and Sedad Hakki Eldem can be seen as passage points who were furnished with the task of translating the particular into the abstract and the universal.

36 Ibid., p. 103
38 Latour, Science in Action
The otherwise obscure role of such intermediary figures can be illustrated through the example of Mahmut Makal, who was a rural school teacher educated in the Kemalist Village Institutes. Makal’s account of his experiences across Anatolia, ranging from social norms and food shortages to timekeeping practices he observed, captured the imagination of American and European social scientists, at the same time as the latter counseled caution to his Western audiences. In his preface to the annotated English edition, historian Lewis Thomas, for instance, suggested that Makal’s “rationalist and liberal assumptions will make it all too easy for European readers to fall with him into the fallacy that we must set to work to shed light in this darkness, to fill the vacuum of ignorance with the blessings of modern knowledge.”

Thomas’ wary position was in line with the editorial interjections offered by anthropologist Paul Stirling: where Makal proclaimed that “a woman’s voice is taboo” in villages, Stirling interposed in a footnote that “as often, the author exaggerates. He feels so strong an urge to change the lot of women that he roundly condemns the existing institutions of society without making any attempt to understand them.”

Makal’s moralizing account of village life, propelled by an irresistible urge to chronicle (“All the things that I see—men, animals, objects—seem to call out and say: ‘Tell about us!’ and I want to describe these unknown villages of Anatolia”) fulfilled several functions. Portions of his text that detracted from the vision of the Turkish

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40 Makal, A Village in Anatolia, p. 69. Later in the text, where Makal writes that “there is no aspect of village life so confused as that of marriage,” Stirling responds: “the confusion exists largely in the author’s mind, and results from applying a Western ideal of marriage, itself altered by his own deeper attitudes” (121).
41 Ibid., p. 80
model of modernization were excised, written away as the aspirations of an individual
who benefited from “modern education” and reacted to his own village as a “citizen of
20th century Western civilization.” Makal also confirmed the western scholars’ self-
fashioning as sympathetic observers, more willing to “understand” their objects of
inquiry, at the same time as his anecdotal “monograph” was hailed as a primary example
of the recent social scientific analyses of cultural change by Turkish intellectuals. The
popularity of his book was also a testament to its authenticity, at least for American
modernization theorists such as Daniel Lerner who praised its depiction of the “slow
tempo, bitter struggle, and often meager fruit of the search for modern enlightenment in
traditional society.” Makal’s text served as both fodder and material proof for Lerner’s
own categories of tradition and modernization: “That there now exists in Turkey a market
of over 50,000 people able to buy the book…is a datum which suggests that economic
participation via cash, and psychocultural participation via literacy, have grown together
in significant measure.” The fact that Makal’s later text, The Fable of Development,
which chastised the shortcomings of the Turkish government’s developmental projects,
remains un-translated is indicative of the simultaneous enrollment and erasure of
obligatory passage points.

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42 Richard Robinson to Walter S. Rogers, March 20, 1954, Letters from Turkey (reprinted for the Peace
Corps by Permission of the Institute for Current World Affairs) (Istanbul: Robert College, 1965)
43 And, “Toplumbilimci Makal” (Makal the Social Scientist) Forum 3 (28), May 15, 1955, p. 20
44 Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, p. 122
45 Ibid. For a comparison of the two authors’ depiction of certain aspects of “traditional” life, such as the
use of clocks as mere “decorative” devices, see Makal, p. 58 and Lerner, p. 39
46 Mahmut Makal, Kalkınma Masali (Istanbul: Varlık, 1960). For a similar account of the mobilization of
Eastern European knowledge in the crafting of neoliberalism and the subsequent effacement of its
transnational roots, see Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal, “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic
Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism” American Journal of Sociology 108 (2), 2002
Local interlocutors—docile collaborators, silent skeptics, and unruly resistors alike—were active, if fickle, participants in the crafting of modernization theory. As we will see in chapters 2 and 3, members of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University were not the subservient recipients of recent developments in American social science: they adapted its categories and methodologies, and remade their premises. The engineers and architects who are the subjects of chapters 4 through 6 were the target of modernizing schemes in methods of record-keeping, road-building, and time management. Yet, vernacular practices and competing visions of expertise betrayed a logic of incommensurability, instances of “disconnect and mistranslation” that were constitutive of modernization across its sites of articulation and instantiation.47 Finally, the recipients of academic and infrastructural projects, such as survey respondents, university students, and rural populations remained recalcitrant, attesting to the resignification and redeployment of modernization’s temporalities and associated spatial practices. Theories of modernization and attendant developmental projects were not only selectively appropriated and indigenized in this scheme, but were produced in the very details of encounters, and ultimately used in unforeseen and at times contradictory ways.48

Assembling Modernization

47 Annelise Riles, “Collateral Expertise: Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Markets” Current Anthropology 51 (6), 2010, p. 796. Also see Anna Tsing, Friction.
Recent intellectual histories of modernization theory have presented pertinent critiques of the ideological commitments guiding social scientific inquiry.⁴⁹ Additional accounts have uncovered its roots in turn-of-the-century missions of uplift, as well as pre-war era progressive projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.⁵⁰ Yet, they have left modernization theory intact as an internally consistent discursive formulation, rather than examining the myriad contradictions, frailties, and complexities entailed in its articulation and implementation. While such studies have offered insightful examinations of Cold War social scientists and the institutional infrastructure that supported them, this narrow focus has come at the expense of their intellectual anxieties, as well as their encounters with local experts and material technologies. Such a view not only assigns coherence, a liberal conceit and confidence in theories and projects of modernization on the part of their practitioners, but also reinstates the West as the center of knowledge production. Even though the social scientists were indeed entangled in policymaking ventures and universalistic representational practices alike, processes of theory formation and implementation, were not unidirectional, nor were their projects imposed from above,


devoid of contingencies that are likely to derail any attempt at knowledge (and policy) production.

According to the retrospective accounts of its foremost practitioners, such as political scientist Gabriel Almond, modernization theory facilitated “state-of-the-art” scholarship, becoming the “authoritative, world-scale codification of knowledge.” As the expression of the social scientific search for uniformities, modernization theory was an attempt to apprehend difference through grids of intelligibility, typification, and enumerative practices. Yet its assemblage as a bundle of sweeping socioeconomic change through the presentation of its models as axiomatic and replicable paths was a drawn out process that concealed the ordeals of its production. The amount of labor invested in that concealment suggests that its coherence into “fact” need not obscure its simultaneous position as a “convention,” the “result of a historical gestation punctuated by hesitations, retranslations, and conflicting interpretations.”

Throughout their travels, the intermediary figures involved in the makings of modernization theory were accompanied with a series of material and literary technologies, such as methods, models, reports and design plans—artifacts crucial in the assemblage of their theories and projects alike. The proper usage and enrollment of such devices marked the experts themselves as subjects of modernity, as they were expected to employ modern research methods, and modern techniques of building, record-keeping, and machine-maintenance, among others. Modernization theory was thus crafted through

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networks of expertise linking “together objects, actors, techniques, devices, and institutional and spatial arrangements.” Its cohesion into a claim-making concept was predicated on the mobilization of an array of material equipment, which secured its formulation, replication, and dissemination alike. Facts are not autonomous products that emerge out of ostensibly hygienic laboratory practice in this scheme, but rather are artifacts whose circulation requires the active construction of social and material networks they can traverse through. It is these networks that reveal the chains of abstraction and generalization that are entailed in the production of universalizable knowledge claims, such as modernization theory.

Knowledge practices assume the character of a “reality effect” through a “kind of splitting” between statements (modernization theory) and entities (modernization and its models) attached to them; a splitting that is best seen as the “outcome of battles over truthfulness within thought, and through the deployment of a whole range of resources.”

In the case of modernization theory, such resources include surveys, maps, charts, and meticulously kept reports about counterpart funds—classificatory exercises or “technologies of distance” that tally, arrange, and organize that which they claim to merely represent. Such technologies delineated particular places, practices, and

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54 Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, “Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena?: The Example of Public Opinion Research” *British Journal of Sociology* 50 (3) 1999, p. 8
individuals as modern, while labeling others as backwards and provincial. Survey respondents who were too timid to articulate their opinions were deemed to be traditional subjects. Social scientists’ maps assigned regions of the country to designated grades within a developmental scheme. Delays in reports to Marshall Plan headquarters marked the local experts as indolent, at the same time as their zest for large-scale developmental projects was seen as a testament to their impatience—such outlooks proved too slow and too hasty, alternately, for the temporal and behavioral comportments associated with modernization. These documents were seeming attempts to gather information about the locals, and to render that data mobile, stable, and combinable in the name of universal knowledge.56 The erasure of the materiality of the process we call knowledge production, in turn, is an “accomplishment,” one that secures the coherence of concepts like modernization into given items.57

The accomplishment by which knowledge practices cohere into facts can thus be traced through an attunement to the technologies, allies, and artifacts that are enlisted in their generation and protection.58 Historians of science increasingly conceive of knowledge production as a concomitantly cultural and material activity. In their landmark work, for instance, Shapin and Schaffer trace the settling of a dispute between Thomas

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56 Latour, Science in Action, p. 223
58 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Airpump, p. 21
Hobbes and Robert Boyle—a dispute that at first sight entails the use of the airpump in establishing the experimental method in natural philosophy. The airpump’s success, the authors argue, was predicated on the institutionalization of certain conventions, such as elaborate rituals of replication and exercises in virtual witnessing in the assembly rooms of the Royal Society of London.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 56-60, 77-8} It is through such practices that belief evolves into knowledge: problems of knowledge, in turn, are ineluctably linked to “problems of the political order.”\footnote{Shapin and Schaffer, \textit{Leviathan and the Airpump}, pp. 21 and 225}

This new focus on the “symbolic practices within the conduct of science” has led to a proliferation in the applications of science and technology studies to the social sciences.\footnote{Karin Knorr Cetina, “The Couch, the Cathedral, and the Laboratory: On the Relationship between Experiment and Laboratory in Science” in Andrew Pickering, ed. \textit{Science as Practice and Culture} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 115-6. See Michel Callon, “What does it mean to say that economics is performative?” Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation Working Papers Series 5 (2006); Donald Mackenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, eds, \textit{Do Economists Make Markets?: On the Performativity of Economics}. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Timothy Mitchell, \textit{Rule of Experts}; Bruno Latour, \textit{Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)} Such studies have traced the demanding work that is entailed in the crafting of theoretical statements, as well as their performative aspects. Social scientific theories and attendant methodologies do not merely measure, encore, or describe, but produce the phenomena they seek to explain, such as the economy, objectivity, probability, public opinion, madness or the “modern fact.”\footnote{Michel Foucault, \textit{Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason} (New York: Vintage, 1988); Ian Hacking, \textit{The Taming of Chance} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, “The Image of Objectivity” \textit{Representations} 40, Autumn, 1992; Mary Poovey, \textit{A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998)} Theories and methods also generate and instantiate social relationships since they are enmeshed in the production of

\bibitem{Ibid.} Ibid., pp. 56-60, 77-8
\bibitem{Shapin and Schaffer} Shapin and Schaffer, \textit{Leviathan and the Airpump}, pp. 21 and 225
subjectivities. The set of claims rallied by modernization theorists, for instance, did not merely pertain to the developmental trajectory of Turkey, but also generated a series of statements and assumptions about modernizing mindsets, temporalities, and positions within a semiotic universe.

Modernization theory required, inspired, and propelled traveling mindsets, bodies, and artifacts. It aimed to produce mobile subjects, in physical, as well as imaginary, terms: if its recipients could not literally undertake travel, they should be able to psychically accommodate the vision of self-chosen, voluntary movement. The modern self was expected to travel, imagine, and imagine travel. As was intimated in Frey’s account, modern subjects were also to know how to travel well, to wait in line for public transportation, and to lodge in aesthetically appealing, hygienic, and comfortable hotels. Ease of travel would not only occasion the emergence of new conceptions of time and sense of measurement (of self, distance, and objects), but would also aid the cultivation of skills like empathy and hospitality. Further linking the self and the imaginary, these skills would serve as the markers of modern subjectivities and modes of expertise alike, in the simultaneous circulation of people, ideas, and content between Turkey and the United States.

Assembling modernization theory was thus contingent upon the employment of a series of material mediators that facilitated its circulation. Punctual buses, social scientific surveys, and properly maintained machinery were means to produce subjects of modernization, capable of conceiving of time in linear, non-cyclical terms. As the

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64 I have relied on Anne Norton for this formulation.
theories and methods of the social scientists traveled, their locus of application, be they the masses of peasants residing in rural Turkey, the administrators of Ankara or the students of Istanbul, were also expected to envision themselves as subjects of mobility and receptivity. Thus designated as the recipients of an epistemological preoccupation with movement, these subjects relied on a set of material conditions that would facilitate their re-making-in-motion. The implementation of a vast highway network and the encouragement of the tourism industry through the building of such landmarks as the Istanbul Hilton (both financed by funds from the Marshall Plan) were concrete measures taken to ensure the conceptualization of traveling selves.

These conduits of transportation and venues of accommodation would further inscribe the contours of a hospitable landscape. Those inhabiting that landscape, in turn, (provided they were able to cultivate the attendant mindset of receptivity) would come to mirror the American experts who crossed the Atlantic in order to promulgate the means, standards, and objectives of modern mobility and mobile modernity alike. If Turkey was imag(in)ed as a model of modernization, it also took on a reflective function as the site of self-identification for those who studied it. The image of the modern self it delivered back, however, was riddled with fragmentation. Mirrors harboring multiple economies of identification were liable to distortion and deflection: the material mediators of modernization theory, themselves in motion and prone to movement, were capable of exceeding the intentions of their makers and overflowing their expectations.65

*Boundary Objects*

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65 Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, p. 85
In 1952, Russell Dorr, who acted as Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Turkey, delivered a triumphant speech that marked his departure from the country:

You can see that all phases of Turkish life have been affected by this program. In many instances, the effects are before us today: Turkish wheat being loaded abroad foreign ships in your own harbor here and at Iskenderun; ships passing through the Bosphorus carrying coal from Zonguldak to France and copper from Hopa to many countries. But the full impact of the program has not yet been felt by any means. That has been done in the setting in motion of an expanding economy. It works something like the dropping of a stone in a pool. Wave after wave spreads out from the point of impact getting even larger and moving even further.66

This imagery of swelling waves of modernization was seemingly engraved in the series of financial and technical assistance programs overseen by Dorr and those that continued after his tenure. Sociologist Mübeccel Kıray, for instance, conducted a large-scale survey in Ereğli in the wake of the implementation of a steel plant through a series of USAID loans. Kıray praised the collaborative attitude on the part of her respondents who were otherwise caught in a whirlpool of socioeconomic change: “Many times people volunteered to talk to us. In some cases, there were those who rebuked us for not contacting them.”67 Depictions of eager receptivity on the part of the beneficiaries of research and developmental projects were also found in the publications of the Turkish Information Office in New York. One pamphlet recounted the experiences of Harold Hilts, the Deputy Commissioner of the US Bureau of Public Roads, who was in charge of American aid to Turkey on highway programs. During a visit to Istanbul, “Mr. Hilts,

66 Russell Dorr’s speech in the wake of his departure from Turkey. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 41, Folder: Russell Dorr Speeches. (General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, College Park, Maryland)
Desirous of buying a small carpet was guided to a rug store in the old covered bazaar. The price tag indicated 800 Turkish liras. Mr. Hilts hesitated; it was rather expensive for him. The shopkeeper stared at him for a moment and seemed to recognize his face. ‘Aren’t you the American who is here to help us with our highway problems?’, he asked. Mr. Hilts replied ‘yes,’ whereupon the shopkeeper said ‘You can have it for 700 liras. I’ll cut my profit for you.’”

Such anecdotes were central to the depiction of modernization theory and attendant developmental projects as succeeding in their tasks. The recipients were fervent for the changes bestowed upon them, willing to discuss their benefits with scholars, and quick to display hospitality and gratitude to their benefactors. Yet, the material instantiations of modernization theory remained prone to ridicule, as can be discerned in the parodic intervention of Fakir Baykurt’s novel, *Amerikan Sargısı (American Bandage)* which depicts the failures of an American-funded “pilot project” in rural Ankara.69 Elsewhere, cartoonist Ferruh Doğan depicted the misappropriation of the objects associated with American modernization.70 As we will see throughout the manuscript, modernizing schemes could be offset by unintended consequences, such as infrastructural breakdown, material misuse, and self-reflexive practitioners. Such roadblocks exemplify the contingencies entailed in the construction and implementations of knowledge practices, which proceed through the work of multiple actors and material mediators, themselves capable of doing more (and less) than their users anticipate. Material mediators do not merely serve as a “backdrop for human action,” but rather “transform,

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68 *Turkish Roads and Highways* (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1950), p. 16
70 See Figure 1
translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”

Developmental techniques and visions produce signs, subjects, and material objects that are capable of reworking the inevitabilities their creators imagined.

The sites of implementation that are of interest to this project, such as roads and hotels can be seen as “boundary objects” that help enroll the interests of local participants. These objects “inhabit several intersecting social worlds…and satisfy the informal requirements of each of them…[they are] both plastic enough to adapt to local needs…yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites.”

Highways and accommodation facilities aided the work of translation, rendering projects of modernization recognizable across different settings, given their dual status as “concrete and abstract, specific and general, conventionalized and customized.”

The Istanbul Hilton Hotel, ostensibly incorporating local and global elements in its design, signified the recuperation of “authentic” motifs such as tiles and opulent architectural effects, as well as the aspiration to the International Style and consumerism in their American iterations. The highway project facilitated claims to physical similitude with the American model of modernization, at the same time as its novel components, such as Macadam roads, became venues of contestation. Through its material transformation, Turkey also became a boundary object: as the simultaneous laboratory and model of

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71 Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, pp. 72 and 39
modernization, it was “an object which lives in multiple social worlds and which had different identities in each.”

Hotels, roads, and machinery served as boundary objects between social science and governance. As standardized yet elastic forms, they facilitated the crafting of expertise, modernity, and authority, in epistemic and political terms alike. They were expected to produce modern subjectivities across either side of the Atlantic: those who conducted and responded to social scientific surveys, those who shipped the road-building machinery and those who were to learn their maintenance, those who designed the hotels and those who were to facilitate their habitation through conventions of hospitality. Other objects that proved central to the accounts and projects of modernization included spare parts, tractors, supermarket shelves, radios, and clocks, among others. The realm of the material was supposed to anchor and stabilize ideas of modernization and to render their recipients calculable, mobile, hospitable, empathetic, and capable of linear thinking. Yet, each material artifact was open to misappropriation, derailing the cultivation of modern identities and practices. Rather than focusing on these objects’ disciplinary or interpellative effects, then, it is more fruitful to call into question the singular content of modernization inscribed in their materiality. The manifold meanings endemic to nonhuman agents suggest that multiplicity is a property of things, rather than a result of their interpretation by different actors.

That multiplicity can be traced through the example of highway construction. Roads were central to accounts of modernization, which equipped transportation and

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75 Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, p. 116
attendant correlates, such as urbanization and communication with explanatory prowess. Rather than functioning as a mere conduit for modernization theory, however, roads were “full-blown actors” facilitating its assemblage. Highways, after all, were central to the multiple “claims” associated with the civilizing functions assigned to roads. The Turkish engineers and policymakers were told that modern practices in expertise would be rewarded through their recasting as regional models: hence the implementation of a United Nations highway training center in Ankara for the purpose of assisting neighbors across the Middle East. Rural populations across Anatolia, in turn, were promised highways on account of their capacities for uplift. They would use these roads, however, to leave their villages in unprecedented numbers and through inappropriate vehicles, such as tractors misused for weekend trips into the city, much to the chagrin of social scientists and policymakers. Roads were marked by translation strategies on the part of their recipients, as well as competing governmental agencies; in the process, their normative and positive content would be contested and worked over by experts and laypeople alike.

The unforeseen usage of roads can be seen as a testament to the “self-defeating” components of infrastructural projects, the “inherent instability or volatility of the material.” If that instability is construed as failure, the “possibility of ‘misfire’ at the basis of performativity” is opened up. Theoretical models, too, are likely to fail in their attempts to “bring into being the phenomenon they describe…there are ‘counter-performative’ instances when inverse effects are produced, and both the explanatory and

76 Ibid., p. 69
77 Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*, p. 72
78 Judith Butler, “Performative Agency” *Journal of Cultural Economy* 3 (2) 2010, p. 152
The anticipatory dimensions of theory are foiled.” The manifold contingencies that characterize the encounters between social and material agents are suggestive of the failings of the perlocutionary effects of traveling theories—failures that inform and facilitate claims of expertise and attendant practices of knowledge production. Traveling Experts

Colonial rulers, nation-state builders, and international organizations seeking to promote development abroad have deployed technological devices and infrastructural projects in the enactment of political incentives. The intended function of such projects has ranged from civilizing so-called backward populations and carving governable political territories to serving as visible evidence of superiority and prowess in the midst of a Cold War being fought over alternative models of technical progress. While the growing literature on “techno-politics,” development, and expertise has fruitfully detailed these processes, such works have depicted developmental projects’ recipients as powerless. They have also assigned success to the depoliticizing thrust of technical expertise and have portrayed experts as conceited and self-assured in concealing the interventionist nature of their work. I call attention, instead, to the manifold fragilities and anxieties that mark expert thinking and practice throughout this manuscript.

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79 Ibid.
80 On perlocutionary speech acts, see J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words
In his influential work on developmental discourse, Arturo Escobar insists on the certitude of that discourse in its production of disempowered subjects. His analysis thus falls short of disentangling the goals, aspirations, and actual outcomes of developmental projects.\(^{82}\) While Escobar has undertaken significant work to chronicle the forms of knowledge, institutions, and technological factors that constitute developmental discourse, he overlooks the ways in which they may well spawn subjectivities who escape a “top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic” approach that otherwise aims to “exclude people.”\(^ {83}\) Ethnographic studies, such as James Ferguson’s work in Lesotho, have also approached development as a powerful interpretive grid which succeeds in the production of its objects of knowledge in line with its imperatives. The developmental apparatus, for Ferguson, is a fundamentally depoliticizing project, “everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power.”\(^ {84}\) While Ferguson insightfully foregrounds the unintended consequences of developmental plans, such consequences are presented as “instrumental” in the exertion and intensification of this depoliticizing effect.\(^ {85}\) The disempowerment and depoliticization of local populations are taken at face value in both lines of analysis, whereby national governments and international agencies extend their allocation of developmental resources as technical,


\(^{83}\) Ibid., pp. 40-1 and 44


\(^{85}\) Ibid., pp. 20-21
politically neutral, and benevolent solutions to those in need. Foucauldian studies that scrutinize rationalities of government have also suggested that the conduct and management of territories and populations are predicated on the depiction of technical solutions as inevitable and, by extension, devoid of political implications.

In the case of the Istanbul Hilton, the Hilton Hotels International and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) were at pains to present their joint project as an extension of technical assistance. In the experts’ accounts, the hotel was a mere response to local architects’ demands for education in the “modernist” style, as well as the Turkish Government’s efforts to jumpstart the tourism industry. Yet, the project was thoroughly political from its inception, given the ECA’s accountability to Congress for dollar-generating schemes that would outlive the Marshall Plan, as well as Conrad Hilton’s depiction of his enterprise as central to US foreign policy in its battle for the “hearts and minds” of the decolonizing world. Despite efforts to conceal its political underpinnings, the hotel would become the site of protests staged by local architects, as well as heated parliamentary debates about the desirability of foreign capital and expertise: one of the various meanings embedded in this particular boundary object was the politics of imperial expansion in its Cold War iteration.

The actors involved in the hospitality initiative, such as Conrad Hilton, ECA representatives, and Turkish policymakers may appear to resemble James Scott’s
comeceited high modernists—“uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic

86 For a similar account, see Cooper and Packard, “Introduction,” International Development and the Social Sciences
about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production." These agents were indeed invested in “covering up” the true meaning of their work, not unlike the USAID developmental schemes that Timothy Mitchell recounts in the case of Egypt. While Mitchell insists that a degree of “self-deception” was central to the constitution of development as a discourse of rational planning, however, his narrative assigns too much certitude and coherence to social scientific thinking and attendant expert practices. Following Tania Li, attempts to render politically contentious issues technical are best seen as a “project, not a secure accomplishment.” Challenges to expert discourse persist in this scheme—rather than being contained within the contours of “self-deception” or “unreflexive confidence…in the value of expertise.” Contradictory outcomes of expert knowledge and practice may thus become the grounds for the simultaneous making and unraveling of epistemic authority.

Developmental projects of uplift are indeed contingent on the construction of their objects as backwards through the “authority of laboratory knowledge” that can nonetheless challenge the “physical boundaries and natural validity on which that authority was based.” The vagaries of imperial enterprise are inscribed in its affective components, as well as political and technical dimensions, otherwise deemed to be at the cornerstone of designations of expertise. The heterogeneity of interests on the part of US

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88 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 4
89 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, p. 43
90 Ibid., p. 233
92 Li, The Will to Improve, p. 11; Riles, “Collateral Expertise,” p. 799
94 Ibid., pp. 27 and 315
officials, as well as their Turkish counterparts, suggests a vision of expertise that exceeds the monolithic, disembodied, and calculating portraits we are accustomed to encountering in the literature. Failures, mistranslations, and uncertainties are intrinsic to expert knowledge and practice—yet their concealment need not secure the consolidation of expert authority. Rather, expertise is crafted not only through material and local sites of encounters, but is also beset by risk and uncertainty, as well as anxieties and hesitations on the part of its practitioners. Intervention is not a “daring plunge from one (tranquil, academic) world into another (agonistic, political),” in this scheme, but unfolds in an “interstitial domain of expertise, where the boundaries between these two worlds are blurry.”

The social scientists who crafted the research agendas for modernizing schemes, for instance, were often mortified at their lack of knowledge about their objects of study. The engineers and architects were deeply troubled by incompatibilities in design and building techniques. The shortcomings of explanatory models, as well as the inapplicability of their methods were manifest to the experts, rendering them wary about the reception of their various projects. The experts’ self-understanding was not exclusively motivated by self-deception or insidious depoliticization, but incorporated what Ann Stoler has called “epistemic uncertainty,” revealing provisional “truth-claims” at best, in lieu of durable “regimes of truth.” The experts’ knowledge careened between self-assured compendiums and “differential discomforts about what could be assumed to

96 Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, p. 43
be communicable and circulated.” Foregrounding the hesitations that persisted in experts’ self-perception and their personal interactions need not detract from the criticism of expert practice and power. Taking into account the precarious status of their thinking and work is not to absolve their imperialist motivations, but rather an attempt to complicate our grasp of modernizing schemes that are deployed in the name of knowledge and power alike.

In their mobility, social scientific theories and developmental projects are shot through with instances of reflection—be it scholarly skepticism, playful misuse or unruly behavior on the part of their recipients. As models and theories travel, they are refracted: in the mirror of auto-critique, social scientific and technical certitude is undercut by the anxieties of the experts, the coterminous success and failure of their projects, as well as their subversion upon execution. If travelers craft knowledge about themselves, and not just “the worlds through which they move,” encounters within “contact zones” can turn out to be “heterogeneous,” “unequal” and “awkward.” Participation in such exchanges or “roots and routes” is a risky business, fraught with uncertainty, mistranslation, and anxiety at best. Selvies, theories, plans are made, unraveled, remade over the course of their travels, rather than being safely lodged in a singular location from which they can be wrested and taken elsewhere.

The coincidental frailty of knowledge practices and expert identity in part stems from the ways in which the experts themselves were uncertain subjects of modernization.

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97 Ibid., pp. 138 and 39
98 Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore, p. 9; Tsing, Friction, p. 5. On contact zones, see Pratt, Imperial Eyes.
The social scientists were expected to present themselves as empathetic yet disinterested researchers. Technical experts were to utilize modern techniques in building, record-keeping, and punctuality. Yet, this ongoing self-fashioning was precarious and apprehensive, given competing visions of modernization and expertise that already prevailed in the field, as can be evinced in the Ottoman, European, and Kemalist legacies of reform piled on top of one another in Turkey. Such legacies intermittently resurface throughout the narrative of this manuscript: Kemalist depictions of civilizing railroads bleed into their replacement by liberalizing highways; German understandings of civil engineering and bureaucracy frustrate American efforts at modernization; Ottoman history at once inspires and perplexes the social scientists in their quest for categorization. Failures, misunderstandings, and gaps in knowledge stem less from the hubris of the planners, and are instead the very condition for expert knowledge and practice.

Encounters of the Archival Kind

The assemblage of the epistemic and political order that comprised modernization theory was predicated on an array of traveling experts, instruments, local knowledge practices, and artifacts. Encounters within this semiotic universe often took textual and documentary form, whose primary expression I was able to observe in a variety of archival settings. The organization and circulation of documents, as well as their authorship (and ownership) were crucial to contesting visions of authority, expertise, and modernization. Much like the other material mediators of concern to this project,

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archival documents, too, were laden with a multiplicity of meanings, rather than serving as the venue for a singular interpretative exercise. Their contingency was discernible in their storage in different locations, their varying aesthetics and audience, as well as their materiality which exceeded the signs inscribed on them and the meanings they were supposed to communicate.

The compilation of files in different archival sites revealed that which was deemed worthy of preservation. Their categorization reflected and facilitated the registers of truth through which experts approached their domains of study. Yet the documents’ volatility was evident in the public display of personal correspondence otherwise meant for limited circulation. Other texts, such as official memoranda and reports, were crafted with multiple audiences in mind, as though they were already situated to become the property of all, or at least the researcher with the correct kind of permit and identification. Some collections, such as the records at the Turkish Directorate of Highways, were presented to me with personal anecdotes about the hindrances interfering with archival efforts: the available documents were partial, salvaged from a trip to the Pulp and Paper Industry Foundation to be recycled along with others. This particular story about gaps in record-keeping readily mapped onto the dictates of the modernizers—missing paperwork was a seeming placeholder for truncated development that was manifest in material, as well as conceptual terms.

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A crucial research site, holding the private papers of a modernization theorist central to this narrative, was not a designated venue of storage at all. It was in this setting, perhaps fittingly, that the affective, tentative dimensions of expertise became clear to me. Dusty folders were marked, arranged, and catalogued with a logic of their own, neither alphabetically nor chronologically, yet effortless to navigate once I became familiar with the dozens of drawers and boxes lying around. Those who opened up their homes, offices, and at times, rather sterile institutional archives were equally hospitable; yet in one case “defiled” documents were denied to me, causing me to abandon a direction of inquiry. No matter how orderly their display, archival documents were also liable to surprise. They could be misplaced, lost or recycled, eluding openness to accessibility and legibility.

Archival material thus mirrored the frailties of the projects they chronicled. As material sites of enactment, they deflected and distorted, rather than commanded the display of coherent subjectivities. Self-reflexivity surfaced, if episodically, in the correspondences among the experts: an interminable yet productive breach between epistemic and political anxieties, or consternations involved in building a paradigm, a hotel, a road, or an empire. Unintended consequences of the archival record included filled out questionnaires that had been excised from a particular published account. These surveys imbued the respondents with embodied voice and strategies of resistance, one of the few instances where the institutional record was not able to efface the recipients of developmental projects. Often, archives exercised hegemony in their position as selective repositories, troubled and troubling; yet they remained pregnant with the possibility of
dialogical encounter with the material. Such encounters, as Mikhail Bakhtin has argued, occasion the possibility for setting on a “new course” and the “course of history” alike. Excavating the parochialism of modernization through its archival inscription allows us to re-conceive of its histories and futures, both of which are opened up through mutual glances and the relentless re-making of selves, theories, and artifacts over the course of their travels.

Outline of the Manuscript

The second and third chapters of the manuscript address the makings of modernization theory through a series of encounters between Turkish and American social scientists. The second chapter draws on the papers of political scientist and Middle East specialist Dankwart A. Rustow, which, together with his published work, reveals the extent of his engagements with the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council and the Council on Foreign Relations. These engagements exemplify the imbricated nature of the conduct of American social science and policy-making during the Cold War. Experts in both circles were preoccupied with the generalizability of the models they crafted, such as theories of modernization as a product of the comparative method and the idea of Turkey as a putative template for the rest of the Middle East. Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics and its attendant economic liberalization rendered it available for scientific and political scrutiny alike. Social scientists and policymakers treated it as an object of inquiry (through generous, if not selective, readings of Kemalist reform and Ottoman history) and intervention (through

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the material instantiations of modernization theory). While these interventions were intended to verify and validate the claims upon which modernization theory was to create a world after its own image, Turkey’s erratic political trajectory, as well as interactions with local social scientists would factor into the epistemic anxieties on the part of mediating figures, such as Dankwart Rustow.

The third chapter focuses on the role of survey research as an uncertain site for the fabrication and implementation of modernization theory. I primarily rely on Daniel Lerner’s work, as well as other studies it inspired and spawned throughout the 1950s and 60s. A plethora of social scientific surveys aimed to gauge levels of modernization across Turkey and were funded by organizations as diverse as the Mutual Security Agency, the Turkish State Planning Organization, the Ford Foundation, and the Voice of America, among others. These studies, which were conducted to measure and record the attitudes of peasants, students, and administrators, were efforts to enact modernization theory itself: the survey setting occasioned the forms of subjectivity and interpersonal relations articulated and idealized by that theory. The dissemination of survey methodology and attendant theories of modernization, however, were derailed by skeptical respondents and disorderly interviewer behavior, attesting to the capacity for each survey to outstrip the intentions of their coders, sponsors, and creators.

The remaining chapters of the manuscript examine the material sites of implementation and contestation for modernization theory, such as highways and hotels. The fourth chapter chronicles the technical, political, and personal encounters between the Turkish and American experts. In particular, I examine the tension-filled relationship between the governmental agencies involved in the propagation of highways in the
aftermath of World War II, namely the US Bureau of Public Roads, the Turkish Directorate of Highways, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. The interactions between these organizations were marked by contestation, as experts tended to disagree about the pace and methods of modernization, as well as the amount of machinery to be circulated and where and to whom roads should be delivered. The various disciplinary mechanisms imposed on the highway engineers reveal expert identity to be heterogeneous, malleable, and protean: through their relationship with non-human agencies, such as documents, maps, highway equipment, and roads themselves, the engineers were alternately designated (and designated themselves) as diplomats, civil servants, mechanics, military officers, agents of modernization and household names, among others. These shifting denominations are suggestive of the unstable nature of expert practice, whereby the highway engineer surfaces as one agent within social, material, and epistemic networks of expertise.

Chapter 5 details the modernizing, civilizing, and democratizing tasks assigned to highways, while not losing sight of their unexpected consequences and unforeseen usages. Highways were believed to grant access to otherwise remote corners of the nation, provide mobility to its members, and shrink the distances between them, thereby allowing them to participate in a shared national space and economy alike. Social scientists depicted the provision of roads, in particular to the countryside, as a civilizational necessity, one that would bring economic development, democratic participation, and access to an “open society.” The delivery of civilization and democratic ideals was deemed to be particularly urgent for the remaining outposts of the country, particularly those villages in eastern provinces that denied access and defied
homogenization in physical, political, and linguistic terms. While expert practice targeted concrete and imaginary transformations in the Turkish landscape, however, material mediators and representational devices, such as maps, buses, and highway building machinery, exceeded the intentions of their makers and overflowed their expectations.

The sixth and final chapter of the manuscript chronicles the efforts to develop a tourism industry in Turkey during the early phases of the Cold War, with a focus on the design and construction of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. The hotel was financed by the Turkish Pension Funds and the Economic Cooperation Administration of the US government. The actors involved in the implementation of the hotel alternately framed it as a safeguard against the perilous march of Communism, a turning point in the consolidation of the tourism industry or the signifier of a hospitable mindset, believed to be a necessary corollary to modernization. Rather than surfacing as a medium for the top-down imposition of an Americanized modernity or the material expression of the politico-ideological concerns of its builders, however, the history of the Hilton was marked by contention from the outset, in terms of its style, funding, and site, as well as the various meanings it was expected to communicate. As with the dissemination of social scientific theories and methods, the hotel and attendant conceptions of hospitality were predicated upon openness to foreign aid and expertise. Yet, their implementation was offset by disruptions in the flows and allocation of capital, the hesitations of traveling experts, and misunderstandings between the various participants of the tourism initiative.
Figure 1. Misused Objects. Ferruh Doğan, *Asrileşen Köy* (The Modernizing Village)
Chapter 1: Imaginary Laboratory: Dankwart Rustow and the Role of Turkey in Modernization Theory

“Since comparative government stakes its claims wider than heretofore, we can no longer permit the existence of white spots on our map of the world, of areas of knowledge unexplored or neglected either in terms of political geography or out of self-restraint…Comparative government, conceived as a total science, must see to it that such tangible gaps are filled at the earliest opportunity.” Karl Loewenstein, *Report on the Research Panel on Comparative Government* (1944)

“The political scientist who insists that the world is his oyster is likely to suffer a bad case of indigestion.” Dankwart A. Rustow, *Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory* (1968)

Political scientist Dankwart A. Rustow of Princeton University spent the 1958-59 academic year in Turkey, during which time he delivered a lecture at the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University about recent developments in the study of comparative government in the United States. In his speech, Rustow simultaneously exulted the turn away from the previous “ethnocentrism” in the study of politics and admonished the field researcher of the difficulties that awaited him or her in the field, such as problems of language, insufficient statistical data, changing political systems and foreign cultural milieus. Despite such predicaments beleaguering the study of comparative politics, Rustow did not hesitate to carve out the crucial role that Turkey would play in its reconfiguration: thanks to the legacy of Kemalist reforms, Turkey’s experience with Westernization preceded that of its counterparts in the recently developing world and “it is for this reason that at this moment when comparative government is being extended to the whole world, research in the political and historical system of the Turkish Republic are exceptionally significant.”

Given the conditions for the emergence of a “worldwide science,” Rustow noted, it was the task of the “Turkish citizens of the political science

103 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Mukayeseli Devlet İdaresi ve Türkiye Üzerine Bir Seminer” (A Seminar on Comparative Government and Turkey), *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 16 (4) 1961, p. 197
profession,” in lieu of foreign scholars, to contribute to its practice in this particular context, which would nevertheless cast light on processes of Westernization elsewhere.\textsuperscript{104}

While Rustow’s audience was receptive to the new orientation of political science, one issue remained of dispute during the roundtable discussion that followed: his assertion that comparison in political science could be viewed as akin to the laboratory experience in the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{105} In his summary of the discussion, Bahri Savcı, professor of law and political science, reiterated Rustow’s contention that the aim of comparative politics was to “investigate the institutions of nations with different variables, and thus arrive at a law, a theory that is applicable to all” but added that “some participants in the conference pointed out the dangers of arriving at ‘laws’ in this scientific area that does not have the laboratory experience…In the end, it was concluded that the actual aim is the search for ‘trends,’ rather than laws.”\textsuperscript{106} While Rustow posited Turkey as one site of fact-gathering for the comparative laboratory—an endeavor whose concern was the study of change—the certitude of scientific quest was undercut by the skepticism of his audience, who were designated as both the subjects of this new approach and its future practitioners alike.

This brief encounter between Rustow and the Turkish social scientists was indicative of the stakes involved in the production and dissemination of knowledge pertaining to non-Western areas in the aftermath of the Second World War. As students of comparative politics in the United States grappled with the imperative to abandon their foregoing “parochialism” in the midst of a rapidly changing political order, their grasp of

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Rustow, “Mukayeseli Devlet İdaresi,” p. 193
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 199
particular locales nonetheless remained informed by the search for “law-like regularities” and the necessity “to advance, in the form of rather bold and unqualified statements, generalized models of the political process common in non-Western societies.”

As suggested by Rustow’s speech, the task of the social scientist traveling to the site of his research entailed, in addition to the procuring of data, the promulgation of the methods and theories being crafted in a comparative laboratory that was in the midst of self-fashioning. Occasioned by the scientism endemic to the Behavioral Revolution, this imaginary laboratory was predicated upon an external location that would become the site of fact-gathering for a rational and systematic foray into the meaning and content of modernization. Hovering over one geography and imposing the imperatives of another (in this case, the “Anglo-American” or the “Western” model), the comparative laboratory was governed by rules and regularities, at the same time as its universal and abstract proclamations required mastery of the particular and its attendant anomalies.

Modernization theory, as one archetype of the virtual laboratory, traveled between its site of production, its site of persuasion, and its site of implementation, sites whose appearance as distinct realms is a misleading function of its practitioners’ self-

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presentation. Even though the social scientific laboratory was seemingly situated in the ideal realm, coordinates of the local (and the material) were retained within it, given its positioning as a reflection and reversal of the world. The claims to scientific abstraction crisscrossed with the demands for personal familiarization with “exceptional” research sites and the privileging of field work, which, in turn, resulted in detours and roadblocks in the itinerary of “traveling theories.” While the laboratory architecture was to occasion the crafting of taxonomies, the simultaneous fixity and fluidity of classificatory exercises were revealed over the course of encounters with research sites.

One site for the fashioning of modernization theory was Turkey, which was posited as a model that would help explicate processes of modernization across the Middle East. Deemed to be at once “exceptional” and “significant” by self-proclaimed specialists, Turkey was configured as both a site of fact-gathering for the comparative laboratory and the telos of modernization processes elsewhere, thereby displaying a split character and temporality as an object of knowledge and action alike. Insofar as the crafting of modernization theory was interwoven with circuits of knowledge production and political exigencies alike, the dissemination of its models and axioms was derailed by the ambivalence of local recipients, the vagaries displayed in the fields under scrutiny, as well as the hesitations of those undertaking social scientific work in the United States. The functionalist narrative so pivotal to visions of modernization was thus undermined in

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109 I would like to thank Anne Norton for this formulation.
the trajectory of its theorization: inasmuch as its proponents hoped to present modernization theory itself on a developmental path signaling the highest stage of the social sciences, its transposition to other locales belied its claims to universality and inevitability.\textsuperscript{111}

The study of foreign locales through the lens of modernization theory was by no means a unidirectional process, given the necessity to enroll and translate the interests of the Turkish scholars and policymakers who actively participated in the negotiation and assembly of these traveling theories.\textsuperscript{112} It is for that reason that intermediary figures such as Dankwart Rustow were required to position themselves as “obligatory passage points” through which flows of information and knowledge traversed across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{113}

Traveling between the field and the laboratory, these passage points were furnished with the task of translating the particular into the abstract and the universal. Further calling into question the fragility of the laboratory analogy in the social sciences, however, the work of such intermediary figures themselves were riddled with instances of profound ambivalence, deficient knowledge of the field, and circuitous movement at best. Rustow, in this scheme, surfaces as an erratic itinerant—a latter-day dragoman who contributed to the efforts to extrapolate from the Turkish example to the rest of the Middle East, at the same time as he retained his skepticism towards the laboratory endeavor, given his decades-long expeditions among scholars, policymakers, and various institutions across Turkey and the United States.

\textsuperscript{112} Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation”
\textsuperscript{113} Latour, \textit{Science in Action}
This chapter begins by contextualizing the emergence of modernization theory within the American social sciences in the aftermath of World War II. I then turn to the work of Dankwart Rustow, and in particular, his participation in the configuration of Turkey within modernization theory and policy circles. Rustow’s travels between various institutions, such as the Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), underscore the imbricated nature of the conduct of American social science and policy production, wherein both modes of expertise shared a preoccupation with the generalizability of the models they proposed, such as the case of Turkey. The shortcomings of that model, as well as the hesitations of his Turkish and American colleagues, came to inform Rustow’s increasingly critical attitude towards the theories and implementations of modernization, thus attesting to his precarious position as a mobile mediator in the midst of these encounters.

Modernization Theory, Modernizing Turkey

Inscribed with a proclivity for universalisms and the conception of a teleological, linear path towards progress, modernization theory was informed by Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism, which was infused with the conviction that development could be read as a process endowing society with a distinct adaptive capacity.\(^{114}\) This assumption of a teleological progress towards development, heavily rooted in Anglo-American depictions of modernity, was increasingly reiterated in other works of the modernization literature, which postulated a singular process underlying the transition

\(^{114}\) For an account of the work of Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and their colleagues at the Harvard Department of Social Relations, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), chapter 3
from traditional to modern societies. That transition was presumed to entail such turning points as the rise of mass media, urbanization, increasing rates of literacy, and industrialization. These sweeping transformations were depicted through tropes of pre-conceived stages, replicable processes of social mobilization, and the teaching capacities of the factory as a school of modernization, among others.\textsuperscript{115} The purported transportability of such processes facilitated the emergence of the modernization paradigm as a product of postwar comparative politics, whose “pressing into strange lands and experimenting with exotic concepts” occasioned the conceptualization of its mode of comparison as “the very essence of the scientific method.”\textsuperscript{116}

In the postwar consolidation of the relationship between political power and political science in the United States, the turn towards area studies abetted the universalization of the social sciences, at once facilitating claims of generalization and fostering interdisciplinary dialogue. As Timothy Mitchell puts it, “the development of area studies was not simply a reaction to the needs of the Cold War, but integral to the larger attempt to create a sovereign structure of universal knowledge—itself part of the project of a globalized American modernity to which the Cold War also belonged.”\textsuperscript{117} In the immediate aftermath of World War II, political scientist Karl Loewenstein, for instance, credited the war for the end of the “tedious and stagnating routine” of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{116} Gabriel Almond, “Political Theory and Political Science” \textit{American Political Science Review} 60 (4), 1966, pp. 877-8
\end{footnotesize}
comparative government and insisted on the need for an “intimate knowledge” of the political institutions and attitudes of wartime enemies and potential allies alike. If the end of the war gave rise to a sanguinity that would enable “access to the true Gestalt of foreign political civilizations,” comparative government was to “assume the character of a ‘total’ science [so as] to serve as a conscious instrument of social engineering.”

The prologue to this chapter, that is, the brief encounter between the American social scientist in the field and his local counterparts to whom he appeared to be preaching the new premises of his discipline was thus emblematic of the Cold War alignment of processes of knowledge production and the attempted dissemination of that knowledge to foreign locales. In response to decolonization abroad, as well as the perceived threat of the Soviet model of development, such dissemination was facilitated by academic exchange programs, as well as research agendas determined by the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. In particular, the activities and publications of the Ford Foundation-funded Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was crucial in the promulgation of the theories, as well as the policy-oriented work of these scholars in the United States, culminating in the tenure of such figures as Walt Whitman Rostow and Lucian Pye of the Center for International Studies (CENIS) of MIT in the Kennedy administration.

The purported reconfiguration of comparative politics under the dictates of the Behavioral Revolution and the imperatives of generalizability encouraged an emphasis on

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the “exceptional significance” of Turkey, which was presented as a model to its Middle Eastern neighbors, overlooking the ways in which the latter had already embarked on their own developmental paths, given the availability of a plethora of alternative modernizing ideologies across the region. As we will see throughout this chapter, furthermore, self-proclaimed specialists also construed Turkey as significantly exceptional—a site whose “unique” history of authoritarian reform resisted repetition in other contexts, despite similarities in geographic location or a shared political history.

An important reason why the Turkish case occupied a role in the postwar social scientific imaginary was the legacy of Ottoman and Kemalist reforms that characterized its landscape. The first attempts at modernization on the part of the Ottoman Empire coincide with its imminent collapse during the Tanzimat period (1839-76), at a time when the imperial forces were faced with the necessity to integrate into the world economy. Such integration required not only the centralization of power and an enhanced bureaucratization process, but also an overall compliance with “Western” conceptions of human rights and freedom, with the extension of numerous rights to non-Muslim communities within the imperial boundaries. During the era of Constitutional Monarchy, the overarching reforms ranged from the dissolution of the janissaries to the establishment of new schools, as well as the abolition of timars (the remaining vestiges of feudalism), and the much disputed introduction of the fez as official headgear. While the millet system did allow for Christian subjects to retain their identities, Abdülhamid II

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120 For an overview of the Cold War-era modernizing ideologies available across the Middle East, such as pan-Arab nationalism, political Islam, American liberalism, and Soviet communism, see Nathan Citino, “The ‘Crush’ of Ideologies: The United States, the Arab World, and Cold War Modernization” Cold War History 12 (1), 2012
“embarked on a kind of Kulturkampf of enhancing Ottoman culture in Muslim areas by promoting religious loyalty to the empire and his own person.”¹²¹ This period was also coupled with an increasing move towards the Turkification of language and the identification of Anatolia with patria (vatan).

The most important legacy of this era was the emergence of a new local elite, namely the Young Turks, who later became the vanguards of the Revolution of 1908, and are also deemed the precursor to Mustafa Kemal, credited to be the singular engineer of the modern Turkish Republic. The Young Turks, who found their political expression in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), were the harbingers of the move towards a Turkish cultural nationalism, prevailing against the options of both pan-Ottomanism and Islamism, as embodied in the writings of leading intellectuals, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. Late Ottoman era reform thus undertook the reconciliation of intensive Turkification, continuing appeal to Muslim sensibilities in the periphery, and a modernization project that was explicitly modeled after Germany (aided by the flow of expertise from Europe).

In an Occidentalist vein mirroring earlier attempts at modernization under Ottoman rule, the Turkish state-building project, from its inception in 1923 as a Republic, modeled its official discourse after the ideal of an Enlightenment-style secular liberalism. The construction of the Turkish nation-state at once identified modernization with westernization, while at the same time imposing processes of reform from above in a highly authoritarian manner. The state’s authoritarianism was coupled with a nationalist

outlook, one that deemed indispensable the creation of a unified and homogenous Turkish bourgeoisie (culminating in the establishment of Varlik Vergisi, a capital tax targeting non-Muslims). The construction of an indigenous bourgeoisie, along with the expulsion of Greek communities and the massacre of Armenians (as well as the Alevi Kurds of Dersim) in the early 20th century were early steps taken in this direction.

The bureaucratic elite who undertook the modernization project also considered religious life to be parochial, and thus antithetical to the forging of a modern Turkish identity. Part of the modernizing project, then, involved measures to implement changes in the script, the scales, the calendar, and the education system, breaking with the Islamic code in favor of the Swiss-inspired Civil Code of 1926. Furthermore, the transformation of physical appearance, through the imposition of bans on religious attire (notably the 1925 Hat Law), was central to the state-building project, one that was ineluctably bound up with the disciplining of gendered bodies. The “emancipation” of women, including but not limited to their right to suffrage and access to coeducation, was thus equated with the modernization project, albeit envisioned (and delivered) as a top-down process, generously granted by Kemal Atatürk, now deemed the father of all Turks. Over the subsequent decades, the principle of secularism would be imposed by state discourse, proliferated by devoted “Kemalists,” and protected under the aegis of the Army in its self-designated role as the sentinel of secularism.

The configuration of Turkey as a model for modernization theory took place in the context of the implementation of multi-party rule for the first time, leading to a decade of rule, between 1950 and 1960, by the Demokrat Parti (DP) under Adnan Menderes, while Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), now led by Ismet Inonu,
waited its turn in opposition. The DP, backed to a large extent by small merchants, urban petty bourgeoisie, and commercial farmers, was framed with a populist appeal from its conception in 1946, exemplified in its support for the expansion of religious liberties, private enterprise, infringements on étatism, and the encouragement of foreign investment, as well as Menderes’ captivating discourse on the “sanctity of the ballot.”

Thus seemingly a success story of simultaneous economic and political liberalization, Turkey surfaced as at once a “model ally” and the model of modernization theory for Cold Warriors in the United States.

During this time, Ankara became host to US and UN-sponsored research centers and universities that would train administrators, architects and engineers across the Middle East, such as the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE, 1952), the Middle East Technical University (METU, 1956), and the UN Highway Training Center (1954-1958). Such institutions would become the grounds for the training of experts in line with American notions of modernization. At the same time, Turkey’s signing of a series of secret bilateral agreements with the United States,

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122 Reşat Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946-1961” in eds. Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal, *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), p. 55. It should be noted, however, that DP were not necessarily the harbingers of the process of political and economic liberalization. Following international pressures and competition from DP towards the end of 1940s, Inonu abolished the titles National Chief and Permanent Chairman he had introduced during the Second World War, religion lessons were in the process of being reintroduced to school curricula, and étatism was “in the process of serious modification by the late forties, and the introduction of the Marshall Aid programme in 1947 gave it more of a nudge than the politics of the opposition parties,” Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 124.


124 The reports that led to the founding of TODAIE and METU were explicit that these institutions serve as training grounds across the Middle East. See *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951), and Charles Abrams, “The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning” TAA 173/57/018, Report No: TAA/TUR/13. (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Program, August 23, 1955)
which led to the establishment of extensive facilities for US armed forces across the
country, also coincided with its adherence to the Baghdad Pact (1955, later CENTO) in
an effort to consolidate its status as a crucial actor in the defense of the “Northern
Tier.”

While modernization theorists and policymakers alike praised Turkey’s seeming
pliability as an ally, they also treated the transition to multi-party politics as consistent
with earlier reform projects, thus erasing their authoritarian underpinnings. It should be
noted, however, that DP was simultaneously undertaking acts such as the reintroduction
of religion classes to primary education and switching the language of ezan from Turkish
back to Arabic (one of Ataturk’s “experiments”), at the same time as it was circulating
decrees against the defamation of Ataturk monuments and statues. In that sense,
postwar politics in Turkey was fraught with a series of negotiations regarding the content
of Americanized conceptions of modernization and the concurrent emergence of
revivalist, if not altogether anti-modernist, sentiment in Turkish official discourse and
popular practice alike.

Turkey’s ostensibly linear and inexorable path towards liberalization-as-
modernization, would see a further series of reversals towards the end of the 1950s. The
decline in the price of export commodities due to unfavorable weather conditions and
slowing international demand at the end of the Korean War led to the Menderes
government’s decision to undertake inflationary growth by increasing credits to

125 See Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and
Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) for a detailed
account.
126 Richard Robinson, “The Lessons of Turkey” Middle East Journal, 5 (4), 1951; George McGhee,
“Turkey Joins the West” Foreign Affairs 32(4), 1954
127 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, pp. 365-7
agriculture and growing public investment. By the middle of the 1950s, the onset of a severe balance of payments crisis led to the ultimatum that American aid would only continue under the conditions of a return to statist measures of control. Menderes initially paid no heed to the warnings of foreign economists and international agencies, leading to frustration on the part of the latter, until finally undertaking a de facto shift to ISI practices.

This period was also marked by increasingly authoritarian tendencies on the part of Menderes, evident in strict measures against the press and universities, and culminated in the 1960 military coup, which led to the deposal and hanging of Menderes and three cabinet members. The military regime—though only in power for a year and a half—put to referendum a more liberal Constitution (including rights for unionization and collective bargaining), but also established the State Planning Organization, which intimated a return to ISI as official government policy, as well as a series of five-year economic plans that stayed in effect until as late as 1980. Over the course of the 1960s, the strains on Turkish-American relations also escalated, ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Lyndon Johnson’s censure of Ismet Inonu with regards to the Cyprus crisis (1964), and growing anti-American sentiment among Turkey’s youth within the contours of an increasingly visible leftist politics towards the end of the decade. The reversals in

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128 As Çağlar Keyder explains: “In one of the first instances when international organizations forced a developing country’s government to adopt more planning, World Bank and OECD experts urged Menderes to form a planning board in order to impose some logic and control over public spending and the allocation of foreign exchange. By the end of the decade it seemed that the hegemonic power had recognized Turkey’s particularity in relation to other southern European countries in exempting it from the liberal market model” (State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, London: Verso, 1987), p. 135. For a slightly different account, see Şevket Pamuk, “Turkey 1946-1990” in eds. Pamuk and Roger Owen, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
the politico-economic trajectory of Turkey account for the shifts between its depiction as a model and an exception, attesting to the fragility of laboratory endeavors in the social sciences, as well as the contingencies entailed in the intellectual trajectory of their practitioners, such as Dankwart Rustow.

*Beastly Politics*

In an autobiographical essay aptly titled “Connections,” Rustow lays out the foundations for his pivotal role in Middle Eastern studies as contingent on three “accidents.”

The first was the move of his father, the renowned economist Alexander Rüstow, from Berlin to Istanbul in 1933 as part of Ataturk’s plan to re-envision Darülfünun as Istanbul University. Second, Dankwart Rustow’s studies in Switzerland were interrupted by the Second World War, prompting him to follow his father to Istanbul in 1940, at the age of 16. There, he audited classes at the Faculty of Law, majored in Arabic and Persian, and minored in Italian and comparative literature at the Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University, and received a Baccalaureate from Lycee de Galatasaray in 1944. After the war, Rustow relocated to the United States, and embarked on his studies in political science, first at Queens College, and later at Yale University, where he earned a PhD in 1951. Upon the completion of his dissertation, which examined Swedish party politics, Rustow took a job at Oglethorpe University in Atlanta, when “the third and decisive accident occurred,” a meeting with his former teacher Klauss Knorr.

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who informed him of a new program in Near East studies at Princeton, which Rustow joined the following year.130

In his account of the various acquaintances he acquired in Middle Eastern studies and political science, Rustow also explains his first encounter with the study of politics through a glimpse of Carl Joachim Friedrich’s *Constitutional Government and Politics* on his father’s bookshelf:

> For it was in Friedrich’s book that I first came across the technical term ‘political science.’ Its German equivalent of *Staatswissenschaft* (or ‘science of state’) had a repulsively authoritarian ring—but the term ‘political science’ to me sounded exciting, indeed fascinating. My earliest political memories had been when, early in 1933, I returned home from the third grade to find Hitler’s Gestapo on their hands and knees searching through the attic of our home in suburban Berlin—and later my father’s announcement that, because of the political changes in Germany, he had to go off to Turkey. In short, I had come to think of politics as a wild beast that chased your family from its home country. But if there was such a thing as political science, then the beast could be tamed with the power of reason! There was no question that this was what I must study once I managed to go to the United States.131

Rustow’s depiction of politics as a wild beast to be tamed through the certitude of scientific reason is in seeming tension with the circulatory nature of the accidental events that impelled his career forward. It was war that drove the Rustows out of Europe; and it was in Turkey, the ostensibly “neutral third party,” that they would wait it out, unlike his American colleagues, such as Gabriel Almond and Daniel Lerner, who spent the war in governmental agencies.132 The urge to tame, apprehend, and discipline politics as an object of study, on the other hand, would take Rustow across the Atlantic, parting ways with his father who returned to Heidelberg to participate in the Reconstruction of

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131 Rustow, “Connections,” p. 270
Germany. Once in the United States, Rustow was thrust into the midst of the efforts to re-envision the *science* of politics—a process that would not only take him back to Turkey repeatedly through the following decades, but also entailed grappling with competing visions of modernization and change in the context of the broader Middle East. Rustow’s travels, first by accident and later by choice, would consolidate his role in forging transnational circuits of knowledge on both sides of the Atlantic.

Rustow was not only a central figure at Princeton, but also served as the secretary for the Committee on the Near and Middle East, co-sponsored by the SSRC and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). He wrote the Near East section in Almond and Coleman’s *Politics of Developing Areas*, co-edited a volume comparing processes of modernization in Turkey and Japan in the *Political Development* series of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, and contributed profusely to their various publications, writing about leadership, the military, religion, and political parties in the context of Turkey.\(^{133}\) It is no wonder, then, that Rustow often gets treated as a committed modernization theorist, even in the memorial essay that was published after his death in *Comparative Politics*, for which he both served as Editor-in-Chief between 1979 and 1995 and provided a logo (a sketch of the world, given his previous work as a cartographer during his doctoral studies).\(^{134}\)


\(^{134}\) “Dan, as the readers of *Comparative Politics* well know, is one of the founders of the ‘modernization’ school of thought.” Irving Leonard Markovitz, “In Memoriam: Dankwart A. Rustow: Personal
modernization theory, too, Rustow is either relegated to the background or depicted as a Cold Warrior given his involvement with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 135

Despite his seeming complicity with the imperatives of modernization theory, however, the forgotten fragments of Rustow’s prolific corpus reveal his engagement with contesting visions of modernization, as well as his role in carving out a place for Turkey within that literature. His involvement with the emergence of modernization theory took place during early research trips to Turkey (1953-54, 1958-59), but while he applied modernization theory to the site of his field research, Rustow remained skeptical of linear accounts of change, proposing at each turn “amalgamate patterns” encompassing modernity and tradition alike. 136

Propelled to situate himself as an obligatory passage point or a mobile mediator between social scientists and policymakers in Turkey and the United States, Rustow simultaneously participated in the efforts to construct a comparative laboratory and to provide requisite “raw data” from the field for this “total science.” Each encounter over the course of this itinerary, however, seems to have reshaped his thinking, leading him to query both the behavioralist assumptions that


motivated laboratory claims and the “models” they posited in the service of the alignment between knowledge practices and Cold War politics.

Modern de Tocquevilles

Rustow’s first research trip to Turkey took place during the 1953-54 academic year under the auspices of the Near Eastern Studies department at Princeton University. This project (which was never published) was to examine political change through a study of the composition of the elite, processes of state building, as well as pressure groups and the press in Turkey.¹³⁷ Rustow intended this study to be a comparative overview of the Young Turks, the Kemalists, and the “present democrats” with regards to their political goals and ideologies, thereby providing a critique of narratives of Turkish modernization that otherwise identified the beginning of that process as late as 1920 or 1923. This work would propose, instead, continuity along the axis of Ottoman-Turkish reforms—a framework that exemplified his (and others’) various writings on Turkey throughout the following decades.¹³⁸

Though Rustow’s year-long stay in Turkey prevented him from attending the seminal first meeting of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) on

¹³⁷ Abstract of the paper presented at the Conference on Research in the Middle East, sponsored by the SSRC, Tehran, February-March 1959. Other Turkey scholars who discussed difficulties in field research during this meeting included Norman Bradburn, Sydney Fisher, Peter Frank, Frederick Frey, and Rachel Lowe Rustow (Rustow Papers).

¹³⁸ The positing of continuity between Ottoman and Turkish processes of modernization became a fad in the next decades, not only in the contributions to the SSRC volumes by Turkish and American social scientists, but also in the work of historians such as Bernard Lewis (The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). Also see Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma (Modernization in Turkey) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1973); Kemal Karpat, ed., Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973); Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi (Turkish Modernization) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1991) for a similar periodization.
February 19, 1954, his correspondence with Gabriel Almond, the Chairman of that Committee, during this period suggests that Rustow was central to the perceived reorientation in comparative politics. While Rustow regretted his absence from the preliminary meetings, which addressed political behavior in the non-West, Almond reassured his Princeton colleague: “If you need some vision of a payoff to sustain your spirits in the difficult days of field work and library work in Turkey, may I say that you will be so far ahead of the great majority of the profession when you come back that in retrospect these costs and sacrifices will appear to have been of great value.”139 Almond’s veneration of field experience was in keeping with the CCP’s burgeoning interest in the study of non-Western areas. The valorization of “research time abroad” as a “precious commodity” was one that would continue to characterize the endeavors of the political scientist who now surfaced as a “new species of field worker;” “much more the child of the contemporary scene…a pioneer exploring new lands, tapping new sources of information and theorizing about the most current of issues.”140

Following that first meeting, Almond kept his colleague abreast of the recent discussions about research agenda at the CCP, which was in the process of “trying to give birth to itself and thus far has labored mightily but without much result.”141 While the participants of the Committee concurred that the problems peculiar to the non-West

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139 Gabriel Almond to Dankwart Rustow, November 6, 1953 (Rustow Papers). Rustow’s field work consisted of studying parliamentary debates, newspaper files, memoirs, published documents, as well as conducting “direct observation” and a series of interviews (Abstract for the Conference on Research in the Middle East, Rustow Papers). For an account of Rustow’s “interview technique,” which entailed speaking to the opposition in order to prompt responses from government officials, as well as his refusal to take notes during the interviews so as not to intimidate his respondents, see Rustow, “Connections,” p. 275


141 Gabriel Almond to Dankwart Rustow, May 27, 1954 (Rustow Papers)
called for a different research strategy, given difficulties in the comparison of its political processes with those of Europe and the United States, Almond consulted Rustow as to what that strategy ought to entail: “For example, should a de Tocqueville kind of survey precede more specialized and intensive studies? If so, what intellectual equipment and research techniques should the modern de Tocqueville command? And what advice would you give to such modern de Tocquevilles as to how to proceed in making such surveys?”

Almond’s summoning of de Tocqueville, a foreigner whose survey of the American landscape once professed the necessity for a “new political science” is telling in this scheme: as members of the CCP turned their gaze to the non-West, they, too, would proffer all-encompassing theories that hinged on an exploitation of their status as strangers. Given the portrayal of Tocqueville as the archetypal intellectual traveler in this context, the contributions of Rustow, already conducting work in the field, would prove seminal to the makings of the new “new political science.”

Soon after this initial inquiry, Almond enclosed a memorandum he sent to Guy Pauker, Lucian Pye, and George Mct. Kahin regarding the suggested terms of reference for the Conference on Research Strategy for non-Western Areas, which Rustow was also slotted to attend after his return from Turkey. Almond emphasized, once again, the means by which non-Western areas could be considered a “single field of investigation,” given commonalities in the persistence of traditional political systems, exposure to change, and

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142 Ibid.
143 In an edited volume that offered counsel to the political scientist abroad, Robert Ward noted: “He is apt to find also, however, that this factor of novelty—and the distrust instinctively aroused thereby—may to some extent be offset by the fact that he is a foreigner. Foreigners, especially Americans, are popularly expected to deport themselves in strange, i.e. foreign ways. It might be a bit disappointing if they did not do so” (“The Research Environment” in Studying Politics Abroad, p. 47).
contact with the West in such settings. Research in these areas, Almond explained, would attempt to “develop a body of knowledge on the basis of which predictions can be made as to how these mixed traditional and rational systems will develop” and discern developmental patterns that would ease assimilation and adaptation “to the western rational pattern with the least dislocation and instability.”

Rustow’s response was succinct and yet indicative of the cross-regional thrust of subsequent CCP endeavors. Though he was enthusiastic about the prospect of studying westernization, Rustow suggested that comparison across specific areas, such as the Near East and Latin American countries, might prove fruitful, given the prevalence of democratic forms with little or no democratic content, as well as the recurrent change between military dictatorship and periods of parliamentary government in these otherwise disparate settings. Later, Rustow would commend what he labeled the “current reorientation in comparative politics” as a “logical stage of growth and development,” noting that current events, which used to “reinforce our parochialism…now impel us to greater universality.” Rustow’s reading of Westernization as inducing an irresistible force led him to conceive of the comparative method itself as a means to overcome parochialism and facilitate the generation of universal knowledge. Insofar as the developments in comparative politics came to mirror the inevitable change that seemed to characterize the postwar landscape, the role of the social scientist also appeared to be in need of reassessment: “Not long ago Western man ruled the world,” Rustow declared,

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144 Gabriel Almond Memorandum: Suggested Terms of Reference for Your Conference on Research Strategy for the non-Western Areas. (Enclosed in Almond to Rustow, June 10, 1954, Rustow Papers)
145 Ibid.
146 Rustow to Almond, June 13, 1954 (Rustow Papers)
“now he studies it.”

Though the proclaimed (and perhaps self-conscious) differentiation between the rule and study of the world harkens back to Rustow’s quest for “taming the beast of politics with the power of reason,” the statement unwittingly posits an equivalence between the production of knowledge and its implementation in the service of imperial power: the subsequent correspondence between the participants of the CCP suggest that they were increasingly cognizant of this convergence as well.

**Odious Comparisons**

Rustow’s interest in cross-regional comparison led to his contribution to the influential volume, *Politics of the Developing Areas*, edited by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, which seemingly facilitated the coming to fruition of modernization theory within political science. This work not only championed the structural-functional approach to comparative politics, but also devised a new “conceptual vocabulary,” one that would replace states with political systems, powers with functions, roles with offices, and structures with institutions, thereby surfacing as an intimation of a “major step forward in the nature of political science as science.”

While all political systems were presumed to be mixed ones, thereby ostensibly blurring the otherwise strict differentiation between modernity and tradition, the formulation of input and output functions in terms of interest articulation and aggregation on the one hand, and rule making, application and adjudication, on the other, suggested a developmental scheme that was informed by the Anglo-American and continental European models.

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150 Almond, “Introduction” in *Politics of the Developing Areas*, p. 4
discussed elsewhere. Almond’s proclamation of the need to “master the model of the modern” in his introduction to the volume was offered not only as a means to “derive our functional differentiation” (given their culmination in Western settings), but also a declaration of the exigency of “practical policy motives.” In this effort to extend “the boundaries of the universe of comparative politics and include in it the ‘uncouth’ and exotic systems of the areas outside Western Europe,” field research would once again prove indispensable for the universal claims of “political science as science.”

This aspiration towards scientific universalism by means of extrapolating from local knowledge, however, was undercut by epistemic anxieties, as can be evinced in the communications between the contributors of this volume. Rustow, who was responsible for the section on the Near East, for instance, was hesitant about his “ignorance about details” with regards to the region, as he explained to James Coleman: “quite honestly and strictly between you and me and the bedpost, I could not name a single newspaper in Afghanistan, Libya, the Sudan or Saudi Arabia. I wouldn’t be too sure whether there are any at all in Yemen...Hence it hardly seems cricket for me to indicate boldly that political functions are performed by the press in these various countries.” Coleman, who was responsible for crafting the conclusion to the volume, seemingly shared Rustow’s concerns as to the gaps of knowledge about the areas under scrutiny, and communicated as much in the various memoranda he dispatched to the contributors to the volume:

Indeed, the results revealed in striking fashion the near hopelessness of trying to integrate the efforts of a group of collaborators who never really worked together

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152 Almond, “Introduction” in Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 64, 16, and 10
153 Ibid., p. 10
154 Ann Stoler, Along the Archival Grain
155 Rustow to James Coleman, December 24, 1958 (Rustow Papers)
long enough to develop a really systematic common framework mutually understood. As Gay [Almond] once remarked, we should really have had six months together, and we might have come up with something very significant. I would go a step further, drawing on Dan [Rustow], and say that before that sixth-month meeting we each should spend ten years in the field. In any event, the results were not at all comparable, and I must confess that I exercised considerable license in interpreting entries to try and achieve comparability.¹⁵⁶

In Coleman’s account, insecurities about unfamiliarity with the field are swiftly mapped onto the incommensurability of the theoretical inclinations of the contributors. If the task of comparison is a collaborative one, it is offset by foreignness of not merely the field, but also that of the other social scientists. Though attempts at codification aim to flatten out difference, lingering instances of parochialism and incompatibility are indicative of the arduous labor that is endemic to any knowledge production, as well as its subsequent concealment. Despite Almond’s encouragement for extrapolation from the Western model, then, problems of operationalization, categorization, and definition would persist for the practitioners of the comparative laboratory.¹⁵⁷

The assignment of the various countries under types of political systems (competitive, semi-competitive or authoritarian) proved particularly daunting for the contributors. The rapid changes in the regions of interest was one reason why Rustow marked his own matrix “not for publication,” citing “considerable pangs of conscience” when it came to placing the countries within the “democratic,” “semi-authoritarian” or

¹⁵⁶ Coleman Memorandum, May 1, 1959 (Rustow Papers)
¹⁵⁷ Coleman, for instance, pointed out the problems stemming from Almond’s insistence on “mixed types” of modernity since the latter came to entail various meanings, ranging from non-particularistic ascriptive types to homogeneous, secular ones. He suggested that mixed categories could overlap with any of the distinct conceptions of the “modern” thus coloring the modes of integration that were discussed in the book, raising important issues: “one is whether the Anglo-American market place model is the ultimate norm by which we evaluate ‘integration’ within these systems…There are other ‘modern’ modes of integration perhaps, depending upon what we mean by ‘modern.’ The second question is whether we assume that a ‘mixed’ system is necessarily transitional or pathological. It all depends on the nature of the mixture.” Coleman, Memorandum: Classification of non-Western Political Systems. August 18, 1958 (Rustow Papers)
“traditional static” slots: “Somehow I always have in the back of my mind the Afghan aristocrat studying for his PhD at Harvard who will one day buttonhole me and say: ‘what’s the idea calling us ‘static’ and bestowing the honorific of ‘moving’ on Saudi Arabia, which has a far more hidebound government than ours?”¹⁵⁸ For Rustow, the prospect of the ungainly encounter with Afghan nobility was a further testament to the fact that “our categories are too saddled with value connotations, even if we say they are analytical.”¹⁵⁹

Coleman’s memoranda to the contributors suggest that other participants shared Rustow’s reservations. Myron Weiner noted that he put Pakistan “after much soul searching, into the mixed-mixed category,” only to find the establishment of martial law which led to its replacement in the authoritarian-mixed box: “but can I be certain what box she will be in when this book is published?”¹⁶⁰ Lucian Pye, otherwise a sentinel of modernization theory and the comparative method alike, wrote:

I am afraid that I am a bit disturbed about having to put things down in such a brutal fashion…Actually I am far more tough minded toward the hypersensitive peoples of Southeast Asia than most people who try to work with them, and I fully believe in calling things as one sees them. But there is something to the point that comparison is odious, and I am not sure that we accomplish much by

¹⁵⁸ Rustow to James Coleman, December 24, 1958 (Rustow Papers)
¹⁵⁹ Ibid. Rustow’s anxiety about the reception of this work went so far as to prompt him to suggest and succeed in a title change dangerously close to the publication date of the book: “I feel very strongly that the adjective ‘underdeveloped’ is both scientifically inaccurate (because it imports an unwarranted value judgment) and, what is more important, is extremely offensive in practice to the inhabitants of countries commonly so described.” (Rustow, Memorandum to Almond, Coleman, Herbert Bailey: Title of book. November 18, 1959). Coleman once again took up Rustow’s case, favoring his suggested alternative, “political systems in transition” (Coleman Memorandum, November 24, 1959), whereas Almond had the final say in what must have seemed like a compromise: “It occurred to me that the title ‘Politics of Developing Areas’ might solve all of our problems and get us away from the fuzziness and clichéd quality of ‘Political Systems in Transition.’ If you still have problems let us know” (Almond to Rustow, December 7, 1959) (Rustow Papers).
¹⁶⁰ Coleman, Memorandum, January 19, 1959 (Rustow Papers)
saying who is more and who is less democratic, unless we relate it to something else.\textsuperscript{161}

Though the practice of “political science as science” called for certitude in attempts at prediction and classification, the spectral presence of the non-Western, be it the hypersensitive peoples of Southeast Asia or Rustow’s imaginary Afghan aristocrat, derailed the validity of universalistic claims, further imperiling the coveted analogy with laboratory practice.

Despite the reluctance on the part of the authors, Coleman attempted to “create order out of our chaotic universe of systems” and included the matrices in his conclusion to the volume, wherein each developing country under consideration was compared with its “model” for emulation, namely the parliamentary system of the Western country with which they had the most contact.\textsuperscript{162} Though Coleman acknowledged some of the contentions that informed the writing process, he nonetheless concluded that “an exploratory functional approach to political systems…should at least attempt to differentiate those systems on the basis of functional profiles constructed from existing knowledge, however inadequate the latter may be.”\textsuperscript{163}

The preceding account provides a glimpse of the negotiations and standstills that afflicted the efforts of naming, comparison, and classification in this particular laboratory endeavor. The work that would come to be seen as emblematic of the structural-functional turn and the consolidation of modernization theory as a paradigm in the social sciences was by no means the product of an undisputed process. Though this work and its

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., and Coleman, Conclusion, \textit{Politics of Developing Areas}, 558. See Tables 4, 5 and 6
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 563
premises would continue to inform the successive publications of the CCP, and, in particular, its long-standing series on political development, its making was beset by scholarly anxiety at each stage. Such anxiety, in turn, was mirrored in the hesitations of the recipients of these theories, recipients whose collaboration was nonetheless crucial for their dissemination.

*Traveling Theorists, Mobile Models*

In his retrospective account of his engagement with the *Politics of Developing Areas*, Rustow conceded that he adopted the functional-structural terminology somewhat begrudgingly: “Instead, I would have much preferred to stay with plain English and with the political role of groups that had been the SSRC Committee’s original focus. But in the crucial discussions among the contributors to the Almond-Coleman volume, I remained the only dissident, and rather than quit the fascinating project, I did my best to analyze Near Eastern politics according to those seven ‘functional’ dimensions.”¹⁶⁴ Though Rustow was wary of the functionalist categories proclaimed by Almond and the others, he did not fail to employ them, citing a high degree of modernization under indigenous auspices for Turkey, and no levels of westernization at all in the context of Yemen and Afghanistan, with all other Near Eastern countries falling under a mix of foreign and indigenous initiatives.¹⁶⁵ At the end of his chapter, however, Rustow parted way with the models upheld in the volume and suggested that “even if at some future stage politics, society, and culture throughout the Near East should have become thoroughly

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¹⁶⁴ In characteristic fashion, and consistent with his poetic sensibilities, Rustow continued: “Except that, after one long and intense summer that we spent at Stanford University, I could not resist venting my dissent at a ‘fun and farewell party’ with an adaptation of a song from *Porgy and Bess*: ‘It ain’t necessarily so; Structures and functions, Parsonian disjunctions, They ain’t necessarily so…Little matrix was small, but, oh my! When it got debated, It got so inflated…’” (Rustow, “Connections,” p. 280)

¹⁶⁵ Israel was left out of the analysis on account of its “uniqueness.”
modernized, there is no reason why this should make the countries of the region into replicas of any western country or of each other—any more than Norway is a replica of France, or Canada of Austria,” and gestured, instead, towards the “amalgamate patterns” of modernity and tradition he had expounded elsewhere.166

Rustow’s discomfort with the replicability of a Western model of modernity seems to have been informed by an unpublished essay in which he reviewed recent works written on Turkey during the mid-1950s:

In reading about the forced cultural changes of the Kemalist period we still are likely to encounter statements to the effect that ‘Turkish script and vocabulary had been modernized to keep pace with the world’ (Bisbee), and in the last few years we have almost grown used to hearing all non-industrial areas condescendingly referred to as ‘under-developed countries.’ It is above all the fatuous notion that social progress is automatic and unilinear of which we must beware in studying the problems of culture change in non-Western countries…The ‘world’ did not progress from the Arabic to the Latin script or from a highly literary and eclectic language to an artificially archaizing idiom. The present condition of the countries that are in the process of Westernization does not closely resemble any particular stage in our own historical development, and their striving toward such patterns of social organization as representative government and capitalism, which telescopes centuries into a few decades, does not follow the path we ourselves pursued in the past. Nor will these countries, once Westernization has run its course, be exact replicas of a Western country any more than Western countries are of one another.167

166 Rustow, “The Politics of the Near East,” p. 452. Rustow formulated the notion of “amalgamate patterns” in his Politics of Modernization and Westernization in the Near East (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1956). In that early text, he objected to his colleagues’ employment of the term modernization in lieu of “Westernization”: “Personally, I detect in that word a parochial value judgment by which we posit our culture as the most advanced and also an implicit statement (which ought to be demonstrated rather than assumed) that ‘modernization’ is inevitable and a mere matter of time…It seems safe to predict that, even if Westernization should run its course, no non-Western country will ever be an exact replica of the West—any more than any Western country is of another,” p. 5

The passage is indicative of Rustow’s recognition of the disciplinary work performed by the assertion of a singular trajectory of modernization, modeled after that of the West. His apprehension towards worldwide generalizations also suggests that he was aware of the temporal condensation such predictions disclose. Within those generalizations, after all, the knowledge of the Western past was presumed to cast light on the future of “underdeveloped” countries, wherein assertions of replicability were predicated on the expectation that such countries as Turkey would become what they had already been cast as. The conceit of insight into a singular model of development, however, did not preclude the necessity for the study of the non-West as a privileged site of fact-gathering for the purpose of universalistic laboratory claims. Regardless of his critique of such claims, Rustow, too, would continue to study Turkey as one such venue that facilitated the production of social scientific knowledge.

In line with the configuration of Turkey as a field in the service of studies of modernization elsewhere, Rustow co-edited, with Robert Ward, the only country-specific volume to come out of the Political Development Series of the CCP. The motivating rationale behind this project was offered by Almond in his preface to the volume: “First, are there necessary and recurrent sequences in political and social change which have to be respected in all planning for political development? Second, how can we ‘invest’ most effectively in the ‘growth’ of particular institutions in order to produce the political outcomes which we prefer?”168 A roster of Turkey and Japan scholars convened in Dobbs Ferry between September 10 and 14, 1962 in order to grapple with these questions, with

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168 Almond, “Preface” in Rustow and Ward, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, pp. v-vi
Rustow inviting some of the social scientists he had lectured at Ankara University in 1959.\(^{169}\)

The minutes of the Dobbs Ferry meetings reveal the contentious nature of this particular cross-regional and cross-disciplinary endeavor. The participants disagreed as to the components of modernization (secularism, democracy, economic development), as well as the factors that may (or not) induce it (an active military, civil bureaucracy, education or mass media). Questions of borrowing and imitation, as well as the pace and timing of modernization were discussed at length.\(^{170}\) Though Japan and Turkey scholars alike emphasized the continuity of reform in both settings, dating back their analyses to the Meiji and Ottoman periods respectively, they failed, for the most part, to arrive at a consensus about the comparable periods of modernization within the two countries.\(^{171}\)

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\(^{169}\) Those who contributed to the volume with writings on Japan were John Whitney Hall, Robert A. Scalapino, William W. Lockwood, R.P. Dore, Shuichi Kato, Masamichi Inoki, Roger F. Hackett, and Nobukata Ike. Those who wrote the Turkey sections were Halil Inalcık, Roderic H. Davison, Peter F. Sugar, Frederick W. Frey, Kemal H. Karpat, Richard L. Chambers, and Arif Payaşoğlu. Others who participated were Richard K. Beardsley, Wolfram Eberhard, Charles Frankel, Harubhiro Fukui, Manfred Halpern, Pendelton Herring, Bert F. Hoselitz, Samuel P. Huntington, Takeshi Ishida, Akdes Nimet Kurat, James Morley, Herbert Passin, James Perkins, Gustave von Grunebaum, Walter F. Weiker, and Bryce Wood. Other names initially considered to attend the conference were Bernard Lewis, Nermin Abadan, Şerif Mardin and Aydın Yalçın (Rustow Papers).

\(^{170}\) Arif Payaşoğlu of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University, pondered how much speed could be construed as modernization, and if the latter was measurable or quantifiable in the first place. Others agreed that modernization could not be equated with change (Von Grunebaum) or democratization (Frankel), leading Scalapino to suggest a “dynamic” definition of the term “modernization,” with Frey proposing several stages of political development. Minutes of the Seminar on Political Development on Japan and Turkey, Dobbs Ferry, New York, September 10-14, 1962 (Rustow Papers).

\(^{171}\) A typical formulation of continuous reform between the Ottoman and Turkish eras came from historian Roderic Davison: “1833, 1839, 1854-56, 1876, 1908, 1921-22, and 1945…Historically, each built on its predecessors. There is a cumulative effect of reform which the successive consideration of isolated periods will not show” (Davison, “Environmental and Foreign Contributions: Turkey” in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, p. 102). Payaşoğlu seems to have been the rare (if partial) dissident on this issue: “One basic characteristic of the process of political modernization in Turkey has been its cyclical nature. Whenever a major change has occurred in political institutions and leadership, a period of relative freedom has been followed by a period repression” (Payaşoğlu, “Political Leadership and Political Parties: Turkey” in ibid., p. 427).
In their concluding meeting, the participants of the seminar agreed with Rustow’s suggestion that the differences between the modernization experience of Turkey and Japan stemmed from “givens” at the start of modernization (such as insularity or the availability of traditional institutions to “hold onto”) and the subsequent choices made about the means of modernization. Though Rustow and Ward provided a definition of modernization in line with the central tenets of the Political Development Series (“a marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a spread of secular, scientific, and technical education, a transition from ascribed to achieved status, an increase in material standards of living”), they were hesitant to propose anything more than a “chronicle of uniqueness” given the futility of seeking a “shared substratum of experience” or a unilinear evolution from traditional to modern societies in these two settings.172 Thus concluding with multilinear patterns to be discerned through a “problem-focused approach,” the editors also pointed towards the recent proliferation of alternative models of modernization, such as the “Russian Communist,” “Chinese Communist,” the Brazilian and Japanese ones.173

Upon his return to Turkey, one participant of the conference, historian Halil İnalcık reported the findings of the group, noting that “it was pointed out that modernism and traditionalism carry a value judgment and that they differ from society to society,

172 Ward and Rustow, “Introduction” in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, pp. 3-4; “Conclusion” p. 464
173 Ibid., p. 467. Though no mention was made of a Turkish model in the concluding chapter, some participants had alternatively suggested that unlike the example of Japan which was “too unique to be generalized,” the study of Turkey, which appeared more “typical” might prove “useful for the purpose of generalization” (Peter Sugar, Minutes of the Seminar on Political Development on Japan and Turkey)
from period to period.”174 In his review of the book, however, Niyazi Berkes of McGill University, whose contributions to the modernization literature took an increasingly critical turn throughout the 1970s, expressed his disappointment with the comparative thrust of the edited volume: “Ostensibly, their purpose would be to compare notes so that, eventually, the major factors operating positively and negatively upon the modernization of the non-Western societies would be identified, analyzed, and turned to effect in the processes of modernization itself.”175 Such comparison, Berkes thought, was lacking in the various articles of the volume, aside from the contributions by the editors themselves.

Berkes’ skeptical appraisal of this volume resonated with the reception of the various CCP publications among the members of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. Nermin Abadan objected to the claims of scientific certitude, noting that “subjectively speaking, the behavioralist school is an exciting innovation for many young social scientists. It has brought the excitement of solving new and unknown problems with new and untried methods. But this has led many young social scientists to assume that they are at the service of science, entering the mood of the scientist who is observing a successful experiment at the laboratory.”176 In an article that drew on the theoretical foundations of the Almond and Coleman volume, Yavuz Abadan undertook an application of their functionalist terminology to the Middle East in order to examine the

174 Halil İnalcık, “Türkiye ve Japonya’nın Siyasi Modernleşmesi Üzerine Bir Konferans” (A Conference on the Political Modernization of Turkey and Japan) Türk Kültürü (1), November, 1962, p. 50
prospects of democracy in the region.\textsuperscript{177} He cautioned, however, that “excessiveness can always lead to false conclusions in such generalizations…The comparative method ought to make us favor dualist models, not monist ones.”\textsuperscript{178} Also relying on İnalcık’s account of the conference on Turkey and Japan, Abadan nevertheless insisted that “one cannot seek the determinism of the physical sciences and mathematical certitude in the social and political sciences.”\textsuperscript{179} Şerif Mardin, whose \textit{Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought} was widely influential in the circles of modernization theory, similarly objected to the findings of the \textit{Politics of Developing Areas}, and in particular, the chapter by Rustow, which “treats its political systems as a homogeneous mass, thereby failing to make use of the analytical opportunities yielded by this concept and missing the opportunity for a comparative study of Middle Eastern systems.”\textsuperscript{180}

Finally, sociologist Özer Ozankaya prepared a master’s thesis entitled “Social Change and Economic Development in Turkey and Japan” at Syracuse University and published parts of this thesis in the Political Science Journal of Ankara University, whose faculty he joined thereafter.\textsuperscript{181} Though Ozankaya reiterated the assumptions of the modernization template, espousing the inevitability of cultural change, and confirming, for the most part, the conclusions of the Ward and Rustow volume, which he cited

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\textsuperscript{177} Yavuz Abadan, “Mukayeseli Devlet İdaresinin Ana Konuları ve Ortadoğu” (Issues in Comparative Government and the Middle East) \textit{Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi} 17 (3), 1962
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 114
\textsuperscript{179} Yavuz Abadan, “Mukayeseli Devlet İdaresi,” p. 122
\textsuperscript{180} Şerif Mardin, “Türkiye’de Muhalefet ve Kontrol” in \textit{Türk Modernleşmesi}, p. 177. (Reprinted from “Opposition and Control in Turkey” \textit{Government and Opposition} 1 (3), 1966)
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frequently (“We see that the Turkey of 1960s is not even at the level of Japan in the 1920s”), he used the two cases as a means to test the “reliability” of W.W. Rostow’s stages of economic growth—a test Rostow’s thesis failed by Ozankaya’s standards.¹⁸²

These disparate and immediate reactions to the most recent publications in the modernization literature suggest the intricacies entailed in the reception of that work in Turkish social scientific circles. At once apprehensive of the fetishization of ostensibly scientific methodology and underwhelmed with the comparative nature of such work, these scholars willingly yielded the Turkish site for further examination. While the historical nature of the work of such figures as Mardin and İnalcık would prove influential for the modernizations theorists across the Atlantic, the writings of Ozankaya and the Abadans reveal the consistently partial adoption, indeed, the translation of the main categories, theories, and models being crafted in the comparative laboratory in the United States. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these instances of translation were particularly visible in the employment of survey methodology as an important component of the routinization of modernization theory. Rustow’s long-standing, and in some cases, considerably intimate, interactions with his colleagues in Turkey, in turn, are a testament to his efforts to enroll their interest in the crafting of modernization theory.

The Turkish Model

During his tenure at Columbia University as Professor of International Social Forces, which took effect after his departure from Princeton in 1960, Rustow returned to Turkey in April 1965 in order to discuss the “Columbia Political Science Project.” At this time, he met with Aydın Yağan, Mehmet Gönlübol, Mümüf Soysal and Şerif Mardin of

¹⁸² Özer Ozankaya, “Japonya’nın Modernleşme Denemesi,” p. 307
the Ankara University Political Science Faculty in order to discuss the possibility of an academic exchange program between the two universities. The proposal was backed by Andrew Cordier, the Dean of the School of International Affairs and John Badeau, the Director of the Near and Middle Eastern Institute at Columbia University, as well as Kemal Karpat, then of New York University.

Karpat, who was an avid proponent of modernization theory and its applications to Turkey, became one of Rustow’s most committed collaborators acquired over the years. The two scholars submitted a series of proposals to Columbia University in the mid-1960s in an attempt to rekindle what they perceived to be a decline of American scholarly interest in the study of Turkey. Upholding the singularity of Turkey in “[embarking] upon a deliberate program of modernization,” they suggested that “research on Turkey in many ways can serve as a pilot project for comparative research on other developing countries.” The presence of other Middle East scholars at Columbia, such as J.C. Hurewitz, Charles Issawi, Charles Frankel, and Herbert Hyman, seemingly made that university the ideal venue for the building of a Program of Social Science Research on Turkey. Such a project would not only “add to our substantive knowledge of

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183 Andrew Cordier to Rustow, February 5, 1965 (Rustow Papers)
184 Karpat and Rustow’s acquaintance dates as early as 1957 when Rustow reviewed Karpat’s Politics in Turkey for Princeton University Press and went so far as to appease the worries of the Press given Karpat’s visa problems in the late 1950s when he was teaching at Montana State University (Karpat to Rustow, September 8, 1958; Rustow to Karpat, November 29, 1958; Gordon Hubel to Rustow, November 17, 1958; Rustow to Hubel, December 3, 1958, Rustow Papers)
185 Proposal for a Program of Social Science Research on Turkey at Columbia University, December 1964 (Rustow Papers)
186 Other suggested participants in the program were NYU, Princeton and Ankara Universities, as well as Robert College or METU in secondary capacity, with funding to be requested from the Turkish State Planning Organization. In another version, the proposal is for a “Center for Turkish Studies.” It is interesting that these were submitted soon after the opening of the American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT), an initiative from Rustow was conspicuously absent (See Hans G. Guterbock to Rustow, December 19, 1971 for the ARIT President’s efforts to retrospectively remedy this, Rustow Papers)
Turkey as a key example of a developing country,” but also “promote the development of social science research within Turkey, through strengthening cooperation among Turkish and American social scientists, so as to hasten the time when social science research in contemporary Turkey can help define and solve some of the problems of Turkey’s own modernization.”

In their rationale for such a center, Rustow and Karpat also lamented the increasing scholarly interest in “Arab nations,” which came at the expense of a recognition of Turkey’s “services to worldwide modernization.” It was imperative that such services be credited through collaborative social scientific work, and not “classic propaganda”: “This way, it can be demonstrated that economic development is possible within the purviews of a democratic order.” As for other developing countries in the region, the authors insisted that they take Turkey as an example, seeing as how Turkey as the first Muslim state to embark on secular modernization, then on a parliamentary experiment, remains a path setting model for other developing Muslim states. The aloofness of Turkey from other Muslim states, due to her foreign policy, seems to have dimmed her prospects of remaining a model. In reality, however, liberal intellectuals from Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab countries follow closely the developments in Turkey partly as a possible policy alternative, and partly (if the Turkish democratic experiment fails) as a vindication for their present regimes.

The seemingly imperceptible shift between the positing of Turkey as a model for the sake of knowledge production and for purposes of policy implementation elsewhere is

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187 Proposal for a Program of Social Science Research on Turkey at Columbia University, December 1964 (Rustow Papers)
188 Proposal for a Center of Turkish Studies, n.d. (Rustow Papers). Karpat and Rustow’ efforts to “stimulate new scholarly interest” in Turkey also gave rise to a conference sponsored by the SSRC and the Department of Politics at NYU (Proposal for a Conference on Democracy and Economic Development in Turkey, November, 1964, Rustow Papers). The findings of this conference were published in Karpat, ed. Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), where Karpat, in his introduction, put forward a reading of modernization as entailing a correlation between economic and social development on the one hand and political change on the other. That correlation was explicated through successive stages of development.
noteworthy in this scheme. Conceived as a privileged site of theory and practice, lessons from the Turkish past and present are presumed to present a model for the future of “developing Muslim states.” The content of that model, however, is unstable at best, not only because it is subject to re-definition over the course of its processes of travel and translation, but also because of the complexity of its linguistic and temporal inscription. The seamless conflation of the exception and the model, as we will see, is revealed to be pregnant with possibilities for political action in the region.

The Turkish Exception

In 1952, during a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) meeting on American policy in the Middle East, historian Lewis Thomas declared Turkey a “natural” for the United States. The statement was occasioned by the seemingly consistent liberalization of Turkey on the one hand, and its staunch anti-Soviet sentiment, on the other, culminating in its zealous participation in the Korean War in its bid to become a member of NATO. Thomas’ speech at the Council relied on tropes that exemplified writings on Turkey at this time, including the valorization of Ataturk despite “some” authoritarian tendencies (“He used an iron hand but for the good of the nation”) and the idealization of the legacy of Tanzimat-era Ottoman reforms. For Lewis, however, Turkey’s successful past of modernization and its present status as a “natural” ally did not necessarily ensure its emergence as a leader in the Middle East: “Our use of the Turks in the Middle East

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Command was extremely awkward. All we succeeded in doing was to stir Arab-Turkish friction. It should be noted that the fact that the Turks are Muslims does not mean that they love the Arabs. It is much the same as our regard for the Mexicans.” Noting Turkey’s emergence as “one of Israel’s best customers,” Thomas added, “the Arabs think of Turkey as a sort of ‘White man’s nigger.’”

Thomas’ cautionary (if unseemly) analogies, however, did not deter the other participants from inquiring after whether or not the Turkish experience could be replicated—a question that continued to preoccupy CFR meetings throughout the following decade. Six years later, John Badeau acting as Chairman of a discussion group on the Middle East and Modern Islam, “suggested that one might study the influence that the Turkish program of modernization and westernization has had on the other Middle Eastern countries. Why has the Turkish example had less of an effect than was generally expected? Was it because the Turkish attitude was too secular?” As Badeau asked the participants to contemplate the effects of secularization as a means to determine Turkey’s role as a “leader in beneficial change or a deviationist,” Lewis Thomas recalled, once again, “the sad effect of our attempt to use Turkey to bring the Arab countries into the West’s Middle East security system,” but left it to the other participants to decide “whether Turkey is a pioneer or deviationist.” One proponent of the view of Turkey as a leader of the region was John Campbell, research director at CFR, who suggested that “despite historical differences between Egypt and Turkey, there must have been some in

191 First Meeting, Group on the Middle East and Modern Islam, 1958-59, November 5, 1958, Folder 1, Volume 76 (CFR Records)
Egypt or the other Arab countries who were struck by the idea that there was something worth copying from the Turkish experience.”

In 1952, when Lewis Thomas ardently declared Turkey to be “a natural ally” for the United States, George McGhee, then holding the post of Ambassador to Turkey took a three day-long train ride across the country with President Celal Bayar. During that trip, McGhee explained to Bayar what he envisioned as Turkey’s role in the Middle East:

In an effort to provide an analogy for what I considered the Turkish position to be, I described the efforts made by the United States since the beginning of President Roosevelt’s administration in 1932, through the ‘Good Neighbor Policy,’ to win the confidence of the Latin American states and play a role of constructive leadership in the Western Hemisphere. I pointed out that whereas these states had previously distrusted and felt jealous of the United States, we had now developed a very sincere cooperation through the inter-American system in military, economic, political and social matters. I suggested to the President that Turkey might well in her own interest pursue such a Good Neighbor Policy in the Middle East. Turkey was the natural leader of the Middle East because of her historical position, military strength, political stability, economic development, and membership in NATO.

The next morning, McGhee explained in his report, Bayar revealed that he had thought over the matter, agreeing that the region had been neglected for too long in Turkish foreign policy. McGhee further elaborated his vision of Turkey’s emergence as the “unquestioned leader” to its neighbors, counseling the initiation of a program akin to a “Point Four Policy”: “It need not entail much money—it could be started by granting spaces in Turkish civil and military schools for students from the other Middle East countries, and sending professors and training missions to those countries.” It would be easier, McGhee continued, for Turkey to “teach these countries than it was for us, or the Western Europeans. The gap between them and us was too great. Our country dazzled

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192 Fourth Meeting, Group on the Middle East and Modern Islam
193 McGhee to State, May 11, 1952, RG 59, 782.11/5-1952. (General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, College Park, Maryland)
and confused them since they had little hope of ever achieving our standards. Turkey, however, provided a much more comparable environment—one that these countries could hope to emulate.\textsuperscript{194} In the statements of Thomas and McGhee, the conditions for the possibility of Turkey’s status as a leader to be revered \textit{and} emulated in the region were predicated upon its (necessarily partial) semblance with the United States and its Middle Eastern counterparts alike—a sense of refraction that characterized the writing of modernization theorists as well.\textsuperscript{195}

Soon after his return from Turkey, McGhee attended a study group on “The Defense of the Middle East,” along with Badeau, Thomas, and J.C. Hurewitz. Dankwart Rustow acted as research secretary for this group, a task that marked the beginning of his involvement with the CFR. As the participants contemplated Turkey’s role as the “cornerstone of Western Defense in the Middle East,” given its position as a stalwart guarantee against Soviet takeover of the region, Rustow assured his colleagues that American aid had been well-spent in Turkey, ensuring the latter’s position as a reliable ally.\textsuperscript{196} The Council continued its dissection of the military in the Middle East over the years, with Rustow, along with Manfred Halpern and Charles Issawi, also attending such meetings.

J.C. Hurewitz prepared a series of background papers for one such study group, suggesting that “the intrusion of Middle East soldiers into politics has altered the pace of

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{195} According to Daniel Lerner, for instance, at the same time as America was precisely what the “modernizing Middle East seeks to become,” Turkey was “becoming the area’s bright model of modernization.” (\textit{Passing}, pp. 79 and viii)
modernization, at times hastening it and at others slowing it down.”¹⁹⁷ Throughout the meetings, the participants discussed the advantages of military-led modernization, such as the recognition of the need for change, the production of charismatic leadership, the recruitment of better men, and the establishment of country-wide control through the means of organized strength.¹⁹⁸ Though he pointed out the differences in times and setting, and found the civilianization of Nasser’s government insufficient by comparison, Hurewitz praised the dedication on the part of Nasser and Ataturk alike to projects of modernization.¹⁹⁹ Over the course of the discussion that followed, the possible status of Turkey as a pioneer in the region was once again formulated, with Hurewitz suggesting that “we need to look more closely to see whether Egypt was indeed following the Turkish pattern, but with a time lag of thirty years.”²⁰⁰ While Rustow commended the (alleged) civilianization of Ataturk and his retinue upon entry into politics (“a trend that the United States might be eager to encourage”), he objected to the generalization of the Turkish model and added: “We cannot assume every army represents the wave of the future. Modernization is a deceptive term subject to many interpretations. One should not try to classify empirical phenomena according to hard scholastic categories.”²⁰¹ It was not merely the generalizability implied by the notion of a model that troubled Rustow; he also thought that the trajectory of military modernization had been volatile in the case of

¹⁹⁷ Hurewitz, “Varying Military Styles in the Middle East,” (Background Paper for the Group on the Military in the Middle East) Folder 3, Box 174 (CFR Records)
¹⁹⁸ Second Meeting, Group on the Military in the Middle East 1963-1964, November 26, 1963 Folder 3, Box 174 (CFR Records)
¹⁹⁹ Hurewitz, “Military Modernizers: Similarity and Difference in the Turkish and Egyptian Experiences” (Background Paper for the Group on the Military in the Middle East) Folder 3, Box 174 (CFR Records)
²⁰¹ First Meeting, Group on the Military in the Middle East 1963-1964, October 23, 1963 Folder 3, Box 174 (CFR Records)
the Turkish example since “not all types of armies at all times have been an asset to modernization in Turkey.” Still, Rustow did not hesitate to proclaim that the objective of the 1960 coup was “to reverse the headlong drift toward authoritarianism that had developed under Menderes”—an exoneration of the coup that was consistent with the writings of Turkey scholars at the time. At any rate, for Rustow and the others, the seemingly rapid removal of the army from the Turkish political scene seemed aberrant in the context of the proliferation of military regimes in the region during this time period.

The roots of Rustow’s skepticism as to the generalizability of the Turkish experience can be traced back to his participation in the conference on political development in Turkey and Japan, which took place the year before the CFR meeting on military modernization. In addition to his role as organizer, Rustow was responsible for the chapter on military for that conference, where scholars of Japan and Turkey alike objected to the designation of the army as the uncontested vanguard of modernization. Dating his analysis back to the reign of Selim II in his paper, Rustow suggested that “for nearly two hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey’s foremost modernizer,” as well as

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204 Some Japan scholars, such as Inoki suggested that the army had actually been a factor of non-modernization in Japan. Peter Sugar argued that the army could retard modernization as well (Minutes of the Seminar on Political Development on Japan and Turkey, Rustow Papers)
the primary recipient of projects of continuous reform. While Rustow did not hesitate to introduce a caveat to his analysis, noting that “Kemalist tradition and principles can be invoked in support either of military self-abnegation or of authoritarian reform,” he nevertheless included, in his analysis, praise for American military aid as conducive to the modernization of the Turkish soldier.

CFR meetings, too, addressed the nature of American aid to the developing world during this time. In one study group that tackled the changing role of diplomacy, it was suggested that the objective was no longer to conduct negotiations between states, but rather to gather accurate and detailed knowledge of the non-West. One participant from the SSRC CCP circles, Lucian Pye, praised the efforts for community development and school education programs in the Philippines, while others expressed concern that educational training programs, exhibitions, radio broadcasts, and cultural exchanges could readily be perceived as intervention on the part of their recipients. Rustow recalled his field experiences in Turkey in response, and laid out the role for the American social scientist in easing suspicions of intervention:

Mr. Rustow felt that one bottleneck in any such study would be getting information in the field. The political reporting of the embassies is not complete as most embassy personnel are instructed not to fraternize with the opposition parties in various countries…University people are not so restricted and can get a better over-all picture of the operations of a country. In his own experience, once he explained to people that he was not working for the government, or as a journalist, he was able to obtain a much more open expression of views.

205 Rustow, “The Military: Turkey” in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, p. 352
206 Ibid., p. 384. This article, incidentally, would be published, in Turkish, by the Turkish military academy in 1970, on the eve of yet another coup in that country (Rustow, Türkiye’de Ordu, Istanbul: Harb Akademileri Komutanlığı, 1970)
207 First Meeting, Ad Hoc Group on Diplomacy in the Developing Countries, 1961, March 13, 1961, Folder 3, Box 171 (CFR Records)
208 Second Meeting, Ad Hoc Group on Diplomacy in the Developing Countries, 1961, March 29, 1961, Folder 3, Box 171 (CFR Records)
Rustow’s interjection is indicative, once again, of the imperative for data-collection from particular sites in order to facilitate the crafting of models within social scientific and policy circles alike. Participants in respective dialogues may question the capacity for the generation of law-like generalizations (Rustow, Coleman, and Thomas), and the recipients themselves (the Turkish social scientists and policymakers) may resist the validity of scientific claims originating in the comparative laboratory of the SSRC CCP or the meeting rooms of the CFR. Even if the “beast of politics” displayed unruly behavior, however, those who tried to tame it through the force of reason continued to resort to claims of prediction, replicability, and generalization, despite and through the relentless frailty of such claims and the contingencies entailed in the behavior of that which they sought to explain. Failures in theory and hitches in implementation are thus constitutive of claims of expertise: while the models they invoke are necessarily precarious, it is through their conceptualization that the concomitant “study” and “rule” of the world are enabled. The political landscape of that world, however, was rapidly changing towards the end of the 1960s, and those fluctuations would be reflected in the writings of Rustow, who surfaced as an increasingly skeptical mediator between the production of theory and policy, as well as the funds that supported those productions.

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209 In a later meeting of the same study group, Rustow reiterated that “using Turkey as an example…some generalized guidelines can be formulated, at least as to how the United States can approach the educational problem in various countries.” Third Meeting, Ad Hoc Group on Diplomacy in the Developing Countries, 1961, April 19, 1961, Folder 3 Box 171 (CFR Records). Though Nathan Citino relies on this passage in his effort to depict Rustow as a Cold Warrior who remained a major proponent of the view of Turkey as a model to the rest of the Middle East, the latter was much more hesitant in his participation in these discussions, as we have seen. In that regard, while Citino’s insightful analysis succeeds in revealing the “disciplinary tensions between social scientists who sought to derive general rules and historians focused on distinct contexts,” I have tried to show in this chapter that the social scientists’ conceptions themselves were fraught with tensions, ambivalence and contingency in thinking (“The Ottoman Legacy,” p. 588).

A Bad Case of Indigestion

Between the years 1961 and 1963, Rustow served as a senior staff member in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, where he took part in a study program that tried to identify political development as a key issue in “emerging countries.”211 The result was A World of Nations, published in 1967 as Rustow’s most comprehensive account of modernization, which he depicted as the “rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men” in a manner that transforms man’s relation to time, nature and other men.212 Parting ways with his earlier skepticism of the “value connotations” of that phrase, Rustow insisted that theories of modernization could be viewed as “ethically neutral”: “In any case, the task of understanding the process of change in the modern world is distinct from that of evaluating it, the role of the participant from that of the observer. Society as a whole cannot engage in modernization without accepting its ingredients as beneficial or its totality as inevitable, but the student of modernization need not concur in either of these judgments.”213 Influenced by the recent writings of his Columbia colleague Samuel Huntington, Rustow now believed the effects of modernization to be morally ambiguous, noting the hazards and deprivations entailed in its propagation.214

Taking up the questions of rhythm, speed, scope and timing that were addressed at the conference on Turkey and Japan, Rustow delineated various models of modernization, depending on the sequence of equality, identity, and authority formation.

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211 Kermit Gordon, “Foreword” in A World of Nations
212 Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 3
213 Ibid., pp. 5 and 8
214 Samuel Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay” World Politics 17 (3), 1965
in a diverse array of settings. Rustow’s assertion of these manifold sequences was forcefully articulated in terms of an assault on the work of fellow modernization theorists, such as Karl Deutsch, Lucian Pye, and Daniel Lerner:

They have sought the requisites of democracy in literacy or in affluence. They have traced the ambivalent attitudes of Burmese officials to crises of personal identity. They have ascribed the Middle Easterner’s response to newspapers and radio programs to his capacity for empathy or his familiarity with city life. They have attributed economic growth to changing methods of toilet training. Heedless of all that Lenin, Nkrumah, and others have preached about the primacy of politics, they have relegated politics to the position of dependent variable. No one will mourn the sterile legalism of Wilson’s days; but today’s generation of scholars has been in danger of throwing the political baby out with the institutional bathwater, of letting their interdisciplinary enthusiasm carry them to the point of self-effacement as political scientists.

In his attempt to recuperate the study of politics, which seemed to be in danger of extinction given the interdisciplinary nature of the endeavors in which he repeatedly participated over the previous years, Rustow objected to “any unilinear theory of ‘stages of political growth,’” which betrayed a “a certain inflexibility of thought”: “It is as if Darwin had expected amoeba, in five successive stages of growth, to evolve into a fern, an elephant, a sequoia, and a dinosaur.”

His objection to the singular path of modernization also took into account the input from his colleagues at Ankara University a decade ago: “The attempt to forecast future developments in all societies in terms of a single evolutionary ‘law’ precludes any realistic insight into the diversity of human conditions.”

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215 He noted, for instance, that “the Japanese sequence can hardly serve as a model for political modernization elsewhere. It emerged from a singular history which in turn was conditioned by a unique geographic situation” in Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 127
216 Ibid., p. 143
217 Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 141
218 Ibid., pp. 131-2
The following year, Rustow continued his assessment of modernization theory in the first issue of *Comparative Politics*. Though he believed that parts of this vast literature could be salvaged, given its scope and promising analysis of change, he thought that it had not lived up to the promise of overcoming the previous parochialism inflecting political science—an initiative he had extolled during the previous decade. One culprit for the failed delivery of this promise was the functionalism and “awkward neologisms” sullying the work of Almond and his disciples: “Almond laudably sent Western students of politics off to study the non-West, but regrettably he sent them off with a conceptual baggage far more distinctively Western than he realized. A less ambitious set of categories and one derived more closely from the non-Western data might well have guarded against such neoparochialism in disguise.”\(^{219}\) Rustow’s disillusionment with the comparative laboratory culminated in his disclosure of its unintended consequences. Having attempted to fold otherwise neglected areas into its domain of study, comparative politics had reversed, and in the process, doubly exacerbated the problem of parochialism, which now resurfaced in excessive, if not altogether sinister terms—hence Rustow’s insinuation that Almond was one political scientist inclined to view the world as his oyster, with the likely result of a “bad case of indigestion.”\(^{220}\) As further instances of such indigestion, which manifested itself in “functional abstractions” and “worldwide generalizations,” Rustow cited area studies, which presumed “geographic proximity” to produce comparability between “Turkey and Yemen, Thailand and Indonesia, Haiti and Argentina,” as well as the growing literature on the role of military in politics, which

\(^{219}\) Rustow, “Modernization and Comparative Politics,” p. 43  
\(^{220}\) Ibid., p. 42
expected that “Ataturk in Turkey, Stroessner in Paraguay, Chiang in China, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Peron in Argentina should all be playing similar political roles.”

In addition to the publication of this compelling appraisal of modernization theory, the year 1968 also saw Rustow get arrested along with students during protests at Columbia University. Frustrated with the response of the university administration to student demands, he left Columbia for CUNY the next year, where he held the post of Professor of Political Science and Sociology until the time of his death in 1996. It is no wonder, then, that Rustow’s increasingly mordant critique of the Behavioral Revolution opens with a panoramic view of the situation at home:

There is a great deal of soul-searching in the social sciences these days. Should the sociologist, political scientist or economist remain objective, detached and above the political battles of the day? Or does he have an obligation to apply his knowledge to the urgent problems of his society? If so, should he play the role of a social engineer improving the workings of the government and strengthening the established order? Or should he be a gadfly, social critic or activist championing such causes as the peace movement and the fight for racial equality? Is objectivity possible, or is it merely a timid pose, a hypocritical form of conservatism?

Over the course of this essay published in 1971 in the *American Scholar*, Rustow faults the fifty year-long reign of positivism and behaviorism in the social sciences with the display of a “hypocritical form of conservatism” under the pretense of claims to objectivity. Unlike the natural scientist who presents a future image of their selves, the social scientists yearning for “discovery” in their fields cannot remain insulated from their audience and subject matter, given the intersection of the latter in the venue of “society.” Joining the ranks of his peers at Ankara University a decade later, Rustow now

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221 Rustow, “Modernization and Comparative Politics,” pp. 45 and 43
222 Rustow, “Relevance in Social Science, or the Proper Study of Mankind” *American Scholar* 40 (3), 1971, p. 487
demurs to the validity of laboratory aspirations within the social sciences: “The astronomer peering at his stars, the biologist raising a culture of bacteria, the chemist testing the composition of his molecules, in fact, any outside observer may meaningfully search for immutable, value-free laws. But the social scientist is an observer from inside society, and within those confines his task becomes both more modest and more difficult.”

The task of the social scientist, at once humble and arduous, requires deliverance from the confinements imposed by the Behavioral Revolution, as well as a recognition that “the sociologist’s or political scientist’s field research cannot help being a series of social or political acts—he is always a participant observer.” This eventual concession to the alignment between the study and conduct of politics culminates in the charge against the posture of ethical neutrality. Not only does such neutrality remain unattainable in social scientific endeavors, but its expression in practical terms is of an exceedingly insidious nature:

‘Value freedom’ in his conclusions puts [the behaviorist] back ashore as a passive supporter of the wealthy and the powerful because, whereas others might have to be shown how, it is they who dispose of the most effective means of application. Ethical neutrality, therefore, generally means conservatism—not by conviction but by default…The human qualities of social science cannot be exorcised, only grossly distorted—and one of the worst distortions is the ease with which the ‘value-free’ scholar can become a brain-for-hire to the wealthy and the powerful.

Though Rustow’s exclusive indictment of the “behaviorist” may indicate a gesture of self-absolution in this scheme, he did not hesitate to implicate himself in the seeming

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223 Ibid., p. 496
224 Rustow, “Relevance in Social Science,” p. 489
225 Ibid., pp. 492-3
practice of “value freedom” in the service of the alignment between knowledge, power, and capital.

Children Devoured

In 1971, Rustow encouraged Benjamin Smith, a young political scientist from SUNY College at Cortland to undertake an “intellectual history of the Committee on Comparative Politics and the Princeton group [as a microcosm of a larger pattern revealing how major approaches and ideas are generated and disseminated, including as a key part their preliminary institutional setting].”226 Not only did Rustow write a letter of recommendation for Smith, but he also offered his personal papers relating to the activities of that group for his work. Rustow noted that this would be the first full-fledged study of the Council, whose operations and influence in shaping the Behavioral Revolution had hitherto remained under-analyzed. The contours of Smith’s project were considerably altered after his conversation with Rustow, who persuaded him to “discover the role of SSRC in what is said to be an institutional network within which U.S. policy processes create and select their expertise and channel resources for the formation of new areas of expertness, as well as fund specific studies…When science serves through institutions which are structurally tied to the interests of class, then an entire reassessment is justified.”227 Smith’s initial findings were presented at a conference of the American Political Science Association, where he explained that his study of the committee topics, expenditures, revenues, and the affiliations of grant and fellowship recipients of the SSRC revealed that “the organization has been by and large supportive of the governing

226 Benjamin W. Smith to Dankwart Rustow, October 18, 1971 (Rustow Papers)
227 Ibid.
class.” During the same conference, Rustow sat for a round-table discussion (pointedly entitled “Comparative Political Studies: Did the SSRC-Sponsored Revolution Devour its Own Children?”), along with Samuel Huntington, Lucian Pye, and Bernard E. Brown.

As the intellectual (and political) force wielded by the modernization paradigm was waning, given critiques from dependency theorists and conservatives alike, Rustow put forward his influential conceptualization of democratic transitions, based on two case studies that harkened back to the earlier trajectory of his career, Sweden and Turkey.

Rustow’s travels to Turkey continued over the following decades, most notably resulting in his CFR publication, *Turkey, America’s Forgotten Ally*, a text seemingly regressive in its rendition of Turkey as a crucial yet neglected actor at the brink of the Cold War.

Regardless of the implications of this belatedly wistful glance towards the Turkey of the past, it is evident that the expeditions of this particular traveler had failed to yield the law-like generalities that once promised to deliver the social sciences from its foregoing parochialism.

Even when contemplated as a singular, natural ally whose particular legacy of reform resisted replication elsewhere, the developmental trajectory of Turkey was concocted as a template in the accounts of the modernization theorists and policymakers.

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229 *Political Science Enters the 1970s*, p. 208


alike. The narrative of unremitting encounters with the West, dating back to the Tanzimat era, was one that took on import by way of reiteration—be it in discussions of military leadership, educational reform or receptivity to foreign aid. The widespread circulation of that narrative in the circles of the SSRC CCP and the CFR was at once predicated upon and further facilitated the spread of the modernization framework. The making of modernization theory and the role of Turkey within its contours—as a particular venue for the crafting and testing out of laboratory initiatives—were thus mutually intertwined. The proclamation of law-like trends, despite their tendency to erase the particular, nonetheless required familiarity with one situated site. That familiarity, in the case of the modernization literature on Turkey, was one aspect of Rustow’s work in the midst of its oscillations between wholesale complicity with universalistic social science and a self-reflexive censure of its applications in the service of the “wealthy and the powerful.”

Rustow’s return, late in his career, to the translation of poetry, from English to German to Turkish and back, is suggestive of the liminal nature of his standing between the various institutions, social scientists, and policymakers he encountered over the course of his travels between Turkey and the United States. Though he was drawn to the latter given the allure of its social scientific reasoning, which would help tame the “beast of politics,” Rustow’s abiding bonds with an increasingly unruly field attested to the futility of scientific aspirations and scholarly detachment alike. The pliability exemplifying his writings on Turkey and modernization, in turn, is mirrored in the frailties of the theories, models, and projects borne out of the circles of expertise amidst which he became an obligatory passage point over the course of two decades.
Chapter 2: Questions of Modernization: Coding Speech, Regulating Attitude in Survey Research

One might even speculate that ordinary men, at least, in some degree, have become more enlightened and scientific in their approach to social problems and their understanding of their fellow men as a result of surveys being widely disseminated in newspapers, mass magazines, and on nationwide television. They have become less parochial, more knowledgeable about their fellows and the variety of beliefs and the reasons for the differences, and more cognizant of the wider and varied moral standards by which they might guide their own conduct (Herbert Hyman, The Sample Survey: Its Nature, History, Utilization and Effects, emphasis in original).

This writer was on one occasion informed with some vehemence by a Central American Minister of Justice that a questionnaire is an instrument of propaganda. ‘It is printed and it circulates,’ were his words (Frank Bonilla, Survey Techniques).

At the National Library in Ankara, which strives to collect copies of all published work in Turkey, sit two sample survey reports that were conducted on Turkish students in 1959. The first was a study undertaken by political scientist Frederick Frey, then of MIT, in collaboration with the staff at the Test and Research Bureau of the Turkish Board of Education and Discipline, as a means to discern the values high school students assigned to occupational groups. Attached to this report is a replica of the instructions that were circulated to the sampled high schools along with the mail questionnaires. The instruction sheet appears proverbial, indeed, pedestrian, for those accustomed to the design and dictates of the appropriate questionnaire setting. In a context not altogether familiar with the imperatives of survey research, however, these instructions took special care to explicate the premises (and promises) of this particular mode of inquiry. In the detailed instructions attached to this study undertaken to decipher the value-orientation of high school students, emphasis is placed on the value of asking questions directly.

232 Frederick W. Frey, George W. Angell, and Abdurrahman Ş. Sanay, Lise Seviyesindeki Öğrencilerin Değer Sistemleri: Öğrencilerin Meslek Gruplarına Bağlı oldukları Değerler (The Value Systems of High School Students: The Values Students Ascribe to Occupational Groups) (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi Eğitim Araştırmaları ve Değerlendirme Merkezi, 1962), see Figure 2
(overlooking, therefore, the survey’s mediated form in a mail questionnaire), and the necessity to practice candor in the students’ articulation of their own opinions. Though their opinions were unlikely to find verbatim counterparts among the orderly questionnaire boxes, open to inscription with “X”s, the instructions insisted that propinquity would have to supplement for semblance, remaining preferable to the silences whose latent multivalence was likely to interfere with the classificatory thrust of survey research.

The second survey, conducted by Nermin Abadan of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University, inquired after the spare-time activities of university students in three different faculties. As in the case of the high school questionnaire, Abadan’s survey enclosed an exhaustive description of the precautions taken for anonymity as a means to allay the suspicions and anxieties on the part of the students, anxieties that might otherwise obfuscate the findings of scrupulous research conducted in a “scientific manner.” In the seemingly more credible setting of anonymity at the National Library, a patron had scribbled their own answer in response to the question, “Where do you live?” in the bound and otherwise vacant copy of the questionnaire. Though the range of options were constricted (“with one’s parents, friends or spouse”), the appurtenant respondent drew in their own box (in compliance with survey etiquette), and wrote “under the bridge.” Despite detailed safeguards against negligent behavior, it seems, omissions and substitutions remained part and parcel of the survey landscape, long after its intended function had been fulfilled.

The survey report about spare-time activities culminates with a three-fold typology of the university students, inspired, avowedly by the tradition, inner and other-directed personality types described in David Riesman’s work in the United States, proclaimed to be equivalent, in turn, with Daniel Lerner’s traditional, transitional, and modern categories in the context of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{234} The survey gauging the value orientation of high school students commences, in turn, with a functionalist account of value systems: the prevalence, depth, and the speed of change within these systems are deemed as amenable to measurement by scientific methods as the evolution of biological organisms.\textsuperscript{235} The coding system of this survey was also of a reiterative nature, based on similar research that had been conducted on a different set of university students in Turkey, which in turn employed a scale used in a previous survey about student preferences at the cross-national level.\textsuperscript{236} Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, in fact, there was a proliferation of sample surveys targeting the students, current and future administrators, as well as the masses of peasants residing in Turkey, conducted by Turkish and American social scientists alike.\textsuperscript{237} The demands and funding for these

\textsuperscript{235} Frey et al., p. 3  
\textsuperscript{236} Herbert Hyman, Arif Payaslıoğlu, Frederick Frey, “The Values of Turkish College Youth” in \textit{The Public Opinion Quarterly}, 22 (3), 1958; James Gillespie and Gordon Allport; \textit{Youth’s Outlook on the Future} (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958)  
surveys came from organizations as diverse as the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO), the Ford Foundation and the Voice of America (VOA), among others. The coding of the data, the preparation of IBM punch cards, the training of the research team, and the crafting of reports, in turn, took place in various institutions across either side of the Atlantic, further intimating the circuitous nature of the survey itinerary.

By examining the roots and contours of such studies inquiring after the relationship between value-orientation, attitudinal change, and behavioral characteristics vis-à-vis processes of modernization, this chapter traces the route of survey methodology between Turkish and American social scientists and their respective institutions, such as MIT, Columbia and Ankara Universities, through the 1950s and 1960s. An examination of the intellectual, political and representational life of the sample survey reveals an alignment between the desired subject of modernization theory and the ideal respondent who was presumed to be familiar with the conditions of the survey setting: impersonal relationships, the promise of anonymity, the capacity for having and voicing opinions regarding otherwise improbable situations. Deemed as technologies central to the routinization of modernization theory, interviews invoked particular kinds of social

interactions, requiring a series of attitudinal and linguistic adjustments on the part of the
survey researcher and respondent alike. The problems associated with survey research in
“modernizing” settings, furthermore, and the remedies proposed to overcome such
hindrances are suggestive of the attempts at supervision and interpellation endemic to this
mode of inquiry. In that regard, studies conducted to measure and record the attitudes of
peasants, students and administrators were indeed meant to enact modernization theory,
insofar as the survey setting was set up to occasion the forms of subjectivity and
interpersonal interactions articulated and idealized by that theory. Yet instances of
evasion and refusals to answer by the pre-designated categories prevailed, attesting to the
capacity for each survey to outstrip the intentions of their coders, sponsors and creators.
Rather than assign certitude to the interpellation of modernized survey participants, then,
this chapter aims to uncover the hesitations, apprehensions, and reinterpretations that
were endemic to the travels and instantiations of survey methodology. The questionnaires
and their specific stipulations surface, in this reading, as documents of a different order,
as artifacts of knowledge practices that nonetheless remain “textual entities”
“[overflowing] their makers.”

In the first part of this chapter, I consider the broader milieu for the increasing
affinity between survey methodology and modernization theory in the United States in
the aftermath of the Second World War, given the concomitant emergence of an interest
in attitudinal studies and the modernizing non-West in this period. Thereafter, I offer a

University Press, 2005), p. 85. On documents as knowledge practices, see Annelise Rise, ed. Documents:
Artifacts of Modern Knowledge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006); Michel Foucault, The
Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1982)
detailed examination of Daniel Lerner’s work in Turkey since his theory of modernization viewed respondent behavior itself as a decisive signifier of modernity. Finally, I inspect a series of surveys undertaken by Herbert Hyman, Frederick Frey, Arif Payaşoğlu and Nermin Abadan; surveys that explicitly followed Lerner’s lead in the conduct of attitude research, at the same time they re-made some of its central categories in ways that occasion the tracing of instances of translation along the survey trail.

A New Breed of Social Scientist

The lineage of survey methodology in the United States can be traced back to the mail and voting polls popularized by the *Literary Digest* in the 1920s, and subsequently, the large-scale sample surveys undertaken by George Gallup and Elmo Roper through the 1930s. Over the next decade, surveys continued to be associated with market and media research, thereby retaining a certain lack of prestige among academic circles. As the onset of World War II initiated a scholarly relocation towards governmental research, it was at wartime survey centers such as the Surveys Division of the Office of War Information, the Division of Program Surveys of the US Department of Agriculture, and the Research Branch of the War Department that the contours of the affinity between the social sciences and survey research began to crystallize. Under the leadership of such luminary names as Rensis Likert, Samuel Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, wartime research centers evolved into the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, and the Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University, despite initial resistance from the host universities to formal integration. In 1945, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the National Research Council established a Joint Committee on the
Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants, further bolstering the scholarly reputation of survey methodology.\textsuperscript{239}

In the decades following the war, the asserted need to move away from the foregoing “parochialism” of American social scientific endeavors occasioned the emergence of a “new breed of social scientist,” for whom there was to be “no land too remote, no village too ordinary or too primitive, no governmental process too imposing or too esoteric” for the study of modernization.\textsuperscript{240} The expansion in the regional application of social scientific scholarship at this time intimated both a blurring of inter-disciplinary boundaries under the purview of area studies, and a reorientation in the objects of inquiry, approaches, and methods employed by each field.\textsuperscript{241} Political scientists, for instance, followed the lead of their peers in social psychology and sociology, who seemed cognizant of the tailored fit between personality scales and the aptitudes of survey research.\textsuperscript{242} “The distinctive feature of non-Western politics as a field for study,” after all, was “the basic cultural conflict taking place in these areas [and] the researcher must be especially sensitive to problems related to changing value patterns in


\textsuperscript{242} The practice of survey methodology in political science was not a novelty in the aftermath of the war: “pioneering survey work” was already conducted in Charles Merriam’s program at University of Chicago in the 1920s (Converse, \textit{Survey Research in the United States}, p. 78). Its applications in the form of attitudinal studies in the “non-West,” however, appear to have benefited from cross-disciplinary dialogue.
the society.” In that regard, survey methods, which were already being employed to discern voting behavior and public opinion at home, could be rendered compatible with both the nascent interest in non-Western areas and the tasks assigned to the “new breed of social scientist,” among which was contributions “to the endeavor to modernize the lives of the people in developing countries.”

The replicable, orderly, and standardized nature of survey research rendered it apposite for the task of measuring, coding, and recording of social change, now the prized variable in a field transformed by the Behavioral Revolution. For those concerned with the study of change and with modernization in particular, survey methodology was rich with the attractions of “medium-range” analysis, conveniently located between the excesses of aggregate data and the configurative case study. The advantage of longitudinal or panel studies which enabled trend analysis over long periods of time suggested that once a survey was conducted targeting a particular sample of

245 For a detailed overview of the relationship between the Behavioral Revolution and modernization theory in the context of political science, see chapter 4 in Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003)
students, rural populations or the elite, that data could be compared with a new set of findings three, five or even ten years down the line, thereby making it easier to capture processes of change for the social scientist “seeking general principles—even laws—of political modernization.”

This optimism regarding the seeming fit between the needs of modernization theory and survey methodology was only exceeded by the enthusiasm for the modernity of the technique itself. The expansion of the focus of research from national samples to cross-national or cultural surveys seemed to proceed along an inexorable path, a move along “what might imperialistically be termed the manifest destiny of survey research in an extensive sense.” Surveys, by gathering results more “tangible and practical” than the “abstract and theoretical” knowledge yielded by other methods, helped “promote the scientific study of politics by forcing improvements in the rigor of research procedures, the quality of measures, and the techniques for certifying facts.” Such sanguine faith in the technological and scientific merits of survey research, however, was ultimately undercut by the imperatives of methodological self-reflexivity, as reservations about the applicability of survey methodology to foreign locales remained a point of contention throughout the 1960s. Skepticism regarding transportability came to surface given a

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247 Hyman, “Research Design” in *Studying Politics Abroad*, p. 182
248 Frey, “Cross-cultural Survey Research,” p. 179, emphasis in the original
purported equivalence between the “modernity” of the technique and the “modernity” of settings amenable to being surveyed. If surveys proved capable of serving the “cause of social change,” it was not clear if their application elsewhere necessitated some degree of change having already taken place since the method was “essentially a technique for the study of the ‘alphabetized,’ mobile, individualistic and market-oriented societies of the West.”

For those who employed the survey method in the non-West, then, it remained an approximation at best since it appeared to be “better adapted” to “modern society.”

Such reservations as to the transportability of the method suggest the stakes involved in the self-proclaimed aspirations of the “the scientific imperialist eager to expand the realm of survey research.” On the one hand, it seemed that there were pre-conditions for survey work, which, for Stein Rokkan, included centralization and bureaucratization, sufficient levels of literacy and cross-local mobility in population, thus suggesting a role for “survey organizations [as] ‘nationalizing’ agencies.”

Yet, obstacles along the path seemed insurmountable to practitioners: problems in the standardization of procedures and questionnaires; the shortage of local facilities, trained native interviewers, and IBM equipment; indeed, unreliable census records which triggered sampling errors and incomplete maps that led to difficulties in locating respondents were frequently cited among the hindrances beleaguering the field researcher. The single most trying predicament, however, presented itself to be of the attitudinal sort at the individual level: the persistence of “evasion, courtesy, fear, silence

251 Rokkan, “Comparative Survey Analysis: Trends, Issues, Strategies” in Comparative Survey Analysis, pp. 15
252 Frey, “Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey,” pp. 335-6
253 Hyman, Payaslioğlu and Frey, “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” p. 276
254 Rokkan, “Comparative Survey Analysis,” pp. 5-6 and 19
and outright lying” in respondent behavior demanded various measures for “verbosity, sophistication, credulity, conformity, extremism in responses, inability to differentiate, among other things.”\(^{255}\) While such unruly behavior was readily attributed to an overall lack of familiarity with the conditions of the survey, it also provided fruitful ground for further reflection upon the mindset of the local respondents and the assertion of difference along cultural lines.

**A Most American Thing?**

In 1958, a special issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly* was devoted to the problems of attitude research in the modernizing non-West, addressing areas as diverse as Indonesia, Iran, Uruguay and Chile, Turkey and “Africa South of the Sahara.” In his editorial introduction to this volume, Daniel Lerner noted the affinity between survey research and “participant societies” (one of his many placeholders for modernity), wherein the opinion-holder was fashioned as the “cash customer and the voter.”\(^{256}\) Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph formulated the problems they encountered during survey research in India in a vein that critically called into question the presuppositions of their method, pointing out the “flaws in the assumption that most people hold opinions on a broad range of issues and are capable of articulating them.”\(^{257}\) If the respondents they encountered were not acquainted with the premise of opinion-holding and articulation, they also seemed unfamiliar with the method itself, which was instead popularized by the


\(^{256}\) Daniel Lerner, Introduction, “Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 22 (3), Fall 1958, p. 221

image of the ubiquitous pollster at home: “The scholar engaged in survey research who presents himself to the American housewife can do so with considerable confidence of a friendly and understanding reception…But the interviewer who faces an illiterate Harijan woman in village India is not likely to rouse any familiar images or ideas.”258 This proclamation of the affinity between the prevalent visibility of the interviewer and the success of survey methodology in the United States was indicative of an oft-repeated sentiment with regards to the exceptional amenability on the part of American respondents to being surveyed.

Elsewhere, Sidney Verba noted the specific characteristics of American society that made survey research an effective technique in that setting, such as specific and impersonal relationships, an inquisitive mindset, and the ease with which respondents spoke to strangers, as well as a “greater understanding of scientific inquiry; greater comprehension of an ‘opinion’ (an individual statement of preference that cannot be considered right or wrong); greater ability to imagine oneself in hypothetical situations; and so forth and so forth.”259 The increasing conflation of American with modern society is evident in such formulations suggesting that the United States, among the modern settings appropriate for this research method, remained singularly situated to be its fertile practice ground. For political scientist Frank Bonilla, the grounds for such exceptionalist thinking was unfair censure, fostered more by the perception of survey research abroad than by the reality at home: “The poll, according to one generalized and harsh indictment, reflects pristinely the basic anti-intellectualism and materialism of American character

258 Ibid., p. 236
and culture. The poll and its practitioners, continues the angry list of particulars, are…dangerously albeit maladroitly manipulative.”260 This lengthy list of grievances, for researchers like Bonilla, overlooked the difficulties at home, since the degree of cooperation, uncomplicated conversational skills, and survey-proneness assigned to American respondents was an overstatement at best.261

Yet Bonilla, like his colleagues conducting social scientific survey research, was cognizant of the limitations pertaining to the interview setting abroad. Not only was such work beset by the absence of articulate respondents, equipped with the necessary “social skills and intellectual capacities,” but also conspicuous was the lack of “some experience with free and easy communication.” Bonilla’s snippet of the interview moment suggests the pitfalls at stake:

A total stranger appears, usually unannounced, and demands admission to the home. He proceeds to extract information about the family relationships of all who occupy the dwelling and then seeks to isolate one specific individual for more extended interrogation. He insists that the ensuing dialogue adhere to a rigid and unfamiliar pattern, frequently giving exact instructions as to the form in which he wants replies and sternly discouraging departures from his prescriptions. Though the subject matter and the phrasing of questions may seem to the respondent argumentative, embarrassing, gratuitously aggressive, or even dangerous, the uninvited visitor proceeds impassively, taking little note of the interviewee’s distress or exasperation, all the while refusing to reciprocate by revealing his own sentiments regarding the matters under discussion.262

The detailed preoccupation with the figure of the interviewer as a stranger furnishes the complications stemming from familiarity (or lack thereof) with yet another layer of

foreignness. The interviewer emerges as an unsolicited guest, who nevertheless finds in himself the prerogative for setting the dictates of the conversation. His demands are exacting, his questions unwelcome, and his presence is perceived as a nuisance at best. For the researcher whose task it was to “structure respondents’ frames of reference” so that they would be able to “provide answers that under normal circumstances would not be within their capabilities to formulate,” however, such a reception could only be indicative of a lack of capacity for interpersonal trust and an inability for taking a leap of faith in compliance with the demands of the interview situation.263

A corollary to the problems entailed in the interview setting was the persistence of difficulties in literal equivalence, given the multiplicity of meanings and emotional connotations that inevitably surfaced in studies of behavioral and attitudinal measurement. For Verba, such problems could be overcome with a higher sensitization towards particularities, insofar as “the individual [was] placed in his political and cultural context rather than being treated as the isolated and anonymous figure of the standard polling model.”264 It is not clear, however, to what degree the “contextualization of meaning” can necessarily be rendered congruous with the survey logic, which aims to standardize and code the answers acquired, even in the open-ended interview setting. Interviews, following Tsing, may be viewed more fruitfully as “sticky engagements,” indicative of “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection

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264 Verba, “The Uses of Survey Research,” p. 78
across difference.” In other words, the painstaking care taken in the literal translation of the questionnaires cannot account for the ways in which their concepts retain a mutable quality over the course of their travels to foreign settings, thereby being “transformed in translation.”

A cursory foray into the circulation of the survey form in Turkey, prior to its applications through collaborations with American social scientists, suggests the processes of translation endemic to its practice. On the one hand, mail-in questionnaires and self-administered surveys were employed by magazines and newspapers as early as the 1920s, thereby suggesting that the interview subjects had already been acquainted with the question and answer setting prior to and despite claims of a certain unfamiliarity with the method in this context. Throughout the 1940s, a group of faculty working on rural sociology and social psychology at Ankara University also employed small-scale surveys that targeted villages and towns in the vicinity of Ankara. Though most of

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266 ibid., p. 3
267 A. Holly Shissler, “If You Ask Me”: Sabiha Sertel’s Advice Column, Gender Equity, and Social Engineering in the Early Turkish Republic in *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2007), p. 8. Shissler notes that dissident journalist Sabiha Sertel, who published questions about particular topics and asked the readers to mail in their responses in *Resimli Ay* through the 1920s had studied survey methodology with William Ogburn at the New York School of Social Work. Ogburn would later move to the University of Chicago, where he trained other survey methodologists, most notably, Samuel Stouffer.
these scholars were forced to resign from their posts following the “red scare” that culminated in the academic purge of 1948, their monographs and questionnaires, which were meant to capture attitudes towards time, measurement, and work, would inform the categories of “tradition” employed in the large scale surveys carried out by American social scientists in Turkey in the following decades. These later appropriations or, more fruitfully, instances of “enlisting” are indicative of the frailties entailed in processes of translation, which nevertheless abetted the “black boxing” of the modernization approach to survey methodology.

For those who employed the survey method abroad, regardless, it seemed more suited to the modern American setting that fostered and perfected it, given ambivalence in language, hitches in research design, and seeming hostility in interviewer reception elsewhere. The question remained: If the task of the survey researcher was to measure and record attitudinal patterns, to what extent should respondent behavior vis-à-vis the interview setting be figured into various indices of modernization? For Daniel Lerner, ever an enthusiast in the applications of the method as a means to discern degrees of modernization, opinion holding itself could be factored into the analysis as a variable, thereby facilitating a reading of silences in the interview setting not as “the loss of data, but [itself] an important datum”: not only was Lerner’s work in the Middle East cited as the first cross-cultural survey undertaken in the developing non-West, then, but its

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categories of modernization were also hailed as a model that would inform later studies.\textsuperscript{271}

\textit{Spelling Modernity}

In May 1963, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC held a conference on Survey Research in Developing Areas in New York. During that meeting, Daniel Lerner delineated the methodological and administrative requirements underpinning the types of survey research that would help explicate processes of political modernization. Survey research, explained Lerner, ought to be comparable and replicable insofar as it was particularly suited to the task of understanding \textit{and} explaining the modernization process, which “is (or should be) relatively geography-free and even culture-free in its principal components.”\textsuperscript{272} Citing his own experience with the Middle East surveys conducted by the BASR at Columbia University, Lerner insisted that it was the opportunity to test the “ideal types” against data from seven countries that “made it possible for us…to move from a theoretically-derived typology to empirically-determined generalizations—i.e., from what is merely plausible to what is highly probable.”\textsuperscript{273} If it was the comparative nature of the BASR data that helped generate a universally applicable, scientifically sound model of modernization for Lerner, the explanatory prowess of the survey method was just as expedient for capturing the regularities intrinsic to that model.

\textsuperscript{271} Verba, “The Uses of Survey Research,” p. 81
\textsuperscript{273} Daniel Lerner, \textit{Survey Research on Political Modernization}, p. 3
While Lerner extolled survey research for its capacity to account for the “general effects” of modernization, divorced from geography and culture alike, he was not entirely forthright about the origins of the Middle East survey data at the SSRC meeting, nor was there full disclosure of its source in its presentation in book form in 1958. Three years prior to the publication of the book, Lerner co-wrote an article with David Riesman, presenting an early public formulation of his findings, and divulged:

> In the fall of 1950, three hundred long, exploratory interviews were conducted in Turkey by native interviewers trained by a researcher from Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research. The respondents were selected to overrepresent listeners and potential listeners to the Voice of America; thus, three men were interviewed for every woman, urbanites were over-chosen, as were upper income groups...The interest of the Voice of America, which financed the original fieldwork and extensive analysis, in securing some feedback from its broadcasts turned out to provide a record, as fascinating as it is complex, of a country in which old prisons of the self are in process of being shattered, while the existence of new prisons, products of liberations, is dimly recognized.

Over the course of its journey between different institutions, the Middle East survey was thoroughly steeped in interests, expectations, and obligations, though most presentations of the data chose to remain silent about its origins. The travels of the survey—conceived in one setting, conducted in another by trained native interviewers, coded and (re)analyzed along different research agendas—also reflects the changes and consistencies in the theoretical and methodological inclinations of Lerner, acquired during his tenures at various research institutions.

Born in Brooklyn in 1917 to Russian émigré parents, Lerner studied English literature at NYU until serving as the chief editor of the Intelligence Branch of the

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274 Lerner, *Passing*
275 Daniel Lerner and David Riesman, “Self and Society: Reflections on Some Turks in Transition” in *Explorations*, No. 5 (June 1955), p. 68
Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army during World War II. Lerner’s participation in survey studies that attempted to measure the effect of Allied propaganda on military and civilian populations in Germany would make him a suitable match for uncovering the effects of VOA activities across the Middle East. Lerner was asked to analyze the VOA data upon his arrival in 1951 at BASR, then under the direction of Paul Lazarsfeld. Though he was one of the several rapporteurs who presented the analysis of the data to VOA, Lerner was responsible for the sections on Turkey from the outset. The answers to the survey were initially to be coded according to Lazarsfeld’s theory of the two-step flow model of communication but by the time Lerner had moved to MIT as professor of sociology and senior research staff at the Center for International Studies (CENIS) in 1953, the recoding of the data in accordance with an opinion-range index reflecting Lerner’s three-fold typology of modern, transitional and traditional societies was agreed upon. CENIS thus financed the reanalysis of the data, as well as the follow-up fieldwork in 1954, including Lerner’s trip to Balgat, Ankara, the trip that inspired his

276 Lerner’s dissertation, *Sykewar*, chronicles his military research. Between the war and his tenure at BASR, Lerner worked with the Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR) project at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. See Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 1, Folders 3 and 5, Biographical Material

277 The original contract between BASR and VOA, signed in 1949, stipulated the conduct of research in France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Brazil, Spain, and Egypt. It was after a series of replacements that the Middle East survey was arrived at, and the content of the study was changed to inquire after the role of mass media in respondent orientation towards their own government and foreign countries engaging in propaganda activities. See Hemant Shah, *The Production of Modernization: Daniel Lerner, Mass Media, and the Passing of Traditional Society*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), pp. 83-4

278 Other rapporteurs included Elihu Katz, Siegfried Kracauer, and Mayone Stycos.

279 See Shah, chapters 4 and 5. Shah argues that there were reservations on the part of Lazarsfeld himself not the least, as to the transportability of his two-step flow model of communication to non-Western settings.
arresting depiction of the Grocer and the Chief, deemed “the symbolic protagonists of the drama of modernization.”

Lerner’s early ruminations on the Turkey data came to facilitate his initial conceptualization of modernization, which appeared to be correlated with “socioeconomic status, urban residence, and media exposure” on the one hand, and the capacity for “egoidentification” or “introjection,” which “teaches us to know the roles of others and how to assume them on appropriate occasions,” on the other. While the surveys were conceived as technologies central to the social scientific laboratory on its quest to gather verifiable data about non-Western respondents, then, they paradoxically relied on the subjects’ ability to generate a myriad of fictions. For Lerner, the prerequisite for modernity is a “great characterological transformation,” traced through the psychic mobility of the individual and his or her acquisition of emphatic skills, which in turn “spell modernity.” For this tautological formulation, Lerner relies on a series of projective questions in order to prepare an empathy index, ranging from the ability to imagine oneself as the editor of a newspaper, in charge of a radio station or the head of a government, to living in a different country from one’s own. Lerner’s index assigned 0’s, 1’s, and in rare cases, 2’s (“chooses non-adjacent country in which one could live if not in native country”) to the responses, at the expense of the rather detailed reasons provided.

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280 Lerner and Riesman, “Self and Society,” p. 74
282 Lerner, Passing, p. 54
by the respondents when prompted to imagine themselves assigned to improbable tasks or dwelling in foreign settings in the open-ended question and answer setting.\textsuperscript{283}

Though these responses were lost in the reported form of condensed scores and continuums providing an “opinion range,” their presentation in numerical form testify to the character of the survey setting itself as an experiment in modernity. After all, Lerner’s very understanding of modernization, quite explicitly defined through the operationalization of an empathy index, conceived, in turn, as the ability to imagine oneself outside of the self, suggests the inextricable link between the research method and that which it seeks to explain. “The manner in which persons perceive the interview situation,” Lerner suggests, “is a datum on their readiness and competence to participate personally in essentially impersonal social enterprises.”\textsuperscript{284} Overlooking the ways in which the survey being discussed was far from being conceived as an “impersonal social enterprise,” Lerner did not hesitate to read refusals to respond to the survey’s various questions as an inability to partake of the modern mindset, otherwise indicative of a capacity for empathy since “the very nature of the interview requires a certain ability to identify with others.”\textsuperscript{285}

Lerner’s interjection, in this context, suggests that the survey method does more than report its findings; it expects, \textit{demands} at every turn, that the interviewee also transport him or herself out of the “traditional” environment (be it a coffeehouse or the subject’s own house) so as to be placed in the modern, sterile, “impersonal” setting of the

\textsuperscript{283} See table 8 for Lerner’s empathy index in \textit{Passing}, p. 144. For a list of the projective questions, see pp. 69-70
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 147
\textsuperscript{285} Lerner and Riesman, “Self and Society,” p. 78
The imperative to be able to answer questions, to hold and articulate opinions in a certain manner is presumed to be an implicit corollary of partaking in the questionnaire. It is telling for Lerner that it is the traditional Turkish subjects, not yet sufficiently exposed to mass media and thus not cultivated in the ways of the modern participant style, who find the question and answer situation “deadly earnest” and “can more easily imagine destroying the self than making the effort to project it beyond the familiar world into the strange.” Unaccustomed to the norms and rules dictated and regulated by the survey setting, these traditional Turks remain improper interview subjects. The inability to imagine themselves in an alien context, in turn, tarnishes their modernity score, gauged strictly in quantitative terms. The survey aims to interpellate its respondent and subject matter alike: its claim at representation—necessarily condensed, seemingly disciplinary—is simultaneously a claim at its own legitimacy. Foreign to its locale of application, the survey demands answers that will have to be rendered proper to its object of inquiry. In that process the subjects providing the responses will be produced as malleable ones—willing for interlocution, but only in a manner predetermined by the expectations of those that set the terms of proper discourse.

*Sticky Conversations*

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286 It should be noted, however, that though the capacity for empathy spelled a modern attitude in the Middle East, it merely suggested difference in “national characteristics” in the European context. This was particularly evident in the case of the French who found the “role-playing” questions frivolous or silly: “There is a vast psychic difference between the illiterate and untutored traditionalism of the Middle Eastern peasant and the traditionalism which prevails among the contemporary elite of France. The Frenchman has acquired his traditionalism as an intellectual discipline and an explicit psychic code…Whereas the Arab peasant usually has no sense of possible alternatives to his traditional ways but simply ‘does what comes naturally,’ the Frenchman has a very sophisticated rationale for his conduct.” (Lerner, “Interviewing Frenchmen” *American Journal of Sociology* 62 (2), 1956, pp. 191-2). For a similar reading of attitudinal differences between the German and British elite, see Lerner and Suzanne Keller, “Empathy in Cross-national and Occupational Perspective,” July 1957, Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 11, Folder 42

287 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 148
In their initial assessment of the Middle East surveys, Lerner and Riesman elaborate on the ideal respondent required by the survey setting by way of illustrating what (s)he is not. Citing a part of the interview with the Chief of Balgat, who answers a question about whether or not he gives advice to fellow villagers (“yes, that is my main duty, to give advice…About all that I or you could imagine, even about their wives and how to handle them, and how to cure their sick cow”), Lerner and Riesman immediately comment: “it would seem from this exchange that the Chief could not project himself into the interviewer’s place (conceivably, he aggressively did not care to), else he would quickly have realized that the latter could imagine advice on other matters than the cure and care of females.”

Lerner and Riesman insist that it is the task of the respondent to offer unconditional cooperation by putting himself in the place of the interviewer, revealing, in the process, a profound misreading of the Chief’s willingness to anticipate (perhaps imagine) his interlocutor’s expectations with regards to the requirements of his job. If the Chief chooses not to abide by the terms of the proper interview exchange, according to the authors, it is at best an indication of a refusal to compromise, further arresting him in time traditional, a time encapsulated with hierarchies, obsolete conceit, and an inability to “compare, equate or differentiate” personal and public problems.

The attitudinal adjustment expected from the respondent is swiftly mapped onto the discursive stakes entailed in the interview situation. Following their depiction of the episode with the Chief who could not imagine anything but the “cure and care of females,” Lerner and Riesman comment on the centrality of sufficient skills of

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288 Lerner and Riesman, “Self and Society,” p. 70
289 Ibid., p. 77
communication in a footnote that cites an assessment of interviews conducted in
Arkansas in the aftermath of a tornado.\textsuperscript{290} In the Arkansas example, they observe that the
“lower-class hillbilly respondents,” who, like their Turkish counterparts proved incapable
of putting themselves in the interviewer’s place, “would plunge him \textit{in medi\'{a}s res}
without telling him so, shift place or pronoun without realizing that he could not follow,
and so on.”\textsuperscript{291} Seemingly surprised to find parallels between the “hillbilly” respondents of
Arkansas and the traditional Chief of Balgat in Ankara, the authors nevertheless make a
gesture toward recognizing the potential subversion and tactical prevarication that the
survey unwittingly produces:

To be sure, we realize that one must be wary of comparisons between the lower
class and the less enlightened in a modern ‘mass society’ like our own and the
tradition-oriented, the leaders and followers alike, in a pre-industrial culture. We
realize, too, that the disaster-study material is susceptible of varying interpretations; for example, the possibility that the lower-class respondents were
resentfully and at least semiconsciously making fools of the interviewers while
pretending co-operation (or, possibly, that linguistic difficulties in the narrow
sense, rather than broadly semantic issues, were involved). Nevertheless, there
would appear to be some similarity in the lacunae of self-other awareness in
these historically quite separate settings—a similarity reflected in analogous
metaphoric patterns.\textsuperscript{292}

In this turn of events, it is no longer the Chief preoccupied with cows or the lower class
witnesses of the Arkansas tornado, barely capable of keeping their pronouns straight, who
are prone to ridicule. In the absence of interlocutors who will participate in a previously
delineated realm (in terms imaginary and discursive alike), it is the interviewers
themselves who are thrown into unfamiliar terrain.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[291] Lerner and Riesman, “Self and Society,” p. 70
\item[292] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Incidentally, the questionnaires used in the Turkey surveys, some of which are catalogued along with Daniel Lerner’s papers at the Special Collections at MIT, reveal a variety of resilient responses, which did not make it to Lerner’s musings on modernization in published form. These refusals to engage with the survey questions automatically disqualified the respondents from being categorized as modern subjects, capable of empathy in general, and of conversing with the interviewer in a proper manner in particular. Oftentimes, however, their refusals indicated less a lack of capacity for imagination than a realistic assessment of their standing or interests in life. Some said they lacked the education or credentials for running a newspaper, others that they were not interested in that line of work. Another replied that he would resign immediately from the post of President since he did not consider himself qualified for the task.

One particularly unruly respondent objected to the wording of the survey questions and the limited categories imposed by the answer range. Asked to provide two defining characteristics on five different nations (the US, England, France, Germany and the Soviet Union), the respondent demanded: “If I am to respond that the Americans are industrious and the British intelligent, would I be saying that it is not possible for the British to be industrious and the Americans to be intelligent?” He added, “I do not think questions of such importance and complexities should be answered in a condensed manner, like vitamin pills.” In fact, a lack of imagination in numerical terms, guaranteed to gain low scores on the Lerner modernity index, was a commonplace

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293 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 7. Ist-35-City. The same respondent refused to quantify and rank his newspaper reading experience: “I am not accustomed to make reckonings by figures even in material matters. I leave it to you to derive the answers of these questions, from the [descriptive] answers I gave concerning movies, newspapers, and radios.” Asked about his opinion of the interview as a whole, he deplored “human nature is not to be treated, in my opinion, as a calculating machine which is the case with regards [sic.] the majority of the questions involved in this questionnaire.”
occurrence among those interviewed. “I am against statistics in general,” another respondent insisted, but his aversion was directed towards the survey in particular: “the questions aren’t judicious enough. In life, all is not black and white than is grey. And grey is a ‘nuance.’” In addition to being restrictive, the questions seemed demeaning to some. Told he could ask about anything he wanted to find out about America, one respondent, otherwise reluctant to adopt the quantitative terminology of the survey, inquired: “What is the height of the Empire State Building? How many cars the Ford produces a year? [sic.]” “Sarcastically, resents the question,” added the interviewer in parentheses.

Such occurrences suggest that the interview setting was far from proceeding along the impersonal and cordial lines envisioned by the researcher. No matter how hard the survey tried to produce a particular kind of verbal exchange and social interaction, based on civility, tolerance, and empathy alike, such regulations were bound to be broken by the interview setting. The retorts, silences, and refusals to think in numbers and condense all into statistically communicable “vitamin pills,” on the other hand, remained antithetical to the categories proclaimed by the survey. It is for that reason that they must be rendered inferior to the coded categories, erased from the narrative, and expelled from what Lerner believed to be his rigorous means of highly probable, empirically-determined generalizations. In that regard, the extent of representation proclaimed by the sample survey is necessarily curtailed by exclusions, substitutions, and attenuations. For so much emphasis on empathy in Lerner’s communicative theory of modernization, not
voicing opinions in the interview setting is presumed to amount to not having an opinion at all. That which it neglects to include in its scientific proclamation, the survey reporter resorts to, albeit in selective manner, as “qualitative support” (or quite elegantly, as in the case of Lerner’s work, as narrative device). Yet these partial inclusions, which surface as plot devices and intermittent depictions of the protagonists involved, only underscore that which is expelled from the condensed, mediated, and codified account. Why else, we wonder, are people not likely to want to move to the US, aside from a lack of capacity for imagining themselves elsewhere, indeed wishing they would die instead? (“I am convinced that living a mechanized life is far from agreeable,” one responded.296 “Why is it that while acquiring wealth [Americans] didn’t acquire the necessary culture to go with this wealth? Why do they still insist on segregation while claiming to be the best democratic country?” another inquired).297 What else was sacrificed by endless cataloguing and (re)coding?

*The Grocer, the Chief and the Interviewer*

It would be insincere to claim that Lerner neglected all mention of the verbatim answers recorded by the interviewers. A student of literature before the war, Lerner was no stranger to the narrative category and he masterfully employed characters, chronotopes, and literary devices, evident in particular in his arresting parable of the Grocer and the Chief, a version of which appeared in *Harper’s Magazine.*298 It was the story of these two that intrigued Lerner the most while going through hundreds of interviews (three hundred to be exact, in the case of the Turkish surveys), and led him to

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296 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 2, 1st-13-City
297 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 3, Izmir-47-city
proclaim that the “personal meaning of modernization in underdeveloped lands can be traced, in miniature, through the lives of Balgati—The Grocer and The Chief.”\footnote{299}{Lerner, \textit{Passing}, p. 19} Himself attuned more to the visible relay of the survey than its verbal—albeit mediated—counterpart, Lerner was struck, in particular, by the description of these two characters by the interviewer, Tosun B., “more highly sensitized to what he saw than what he heard.”\footnote{300}{\textit{Ibid.}} Prior to his own trip to Balgat, Lerner relied on the account of this modern mediator, “a serious young scholar from Ankara,” who remained contemptuous of the traditional Chief and the transitional Grocer alike.

A “prophet” ahead of his time, the Grocer “lives in a different world, an expansive world, populated more actively with imaginings and fantasies;” he “‘sees’ things the others do not see, ‘lives’ in a world populated by imaginings alien to the constrictive world of the others.”\footnote{301}{Lerner, \textit{Passing}, pp. 41, 23, 72} In contrast to the Chief who held the only radio in Balgat in 1950 and tuned in only for news from Korea, Lerner cites the Grocer’s aesthetic preferences approvingly:

> It was in a movie that he had first glimpsed what a real grocery store could be like—‘with walls made of iron sheets, top to floor and side to side, and on them standing myriads of round boxes, clean and all the same dressed, like soldiers in a great parade.’ This fleeting glimpse of what sounds like the Campbell Soup section of an A & P supermarket had provided the Grocer with an abiding image of how his fantasy world might look.\footnote{302}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 27-8}

In addition to providing an elaborate description of the supermarket shelves the Grocer pined for, the passage captures and confirms, for Lerner, the crucial link between a distinctly modern(izing) capacity for empathy and the ability to imagine otherwise.
foreign places, lifestyles, indeed, arrays of soup cans. Furthermore, and to the benefit of Lerner’s theory of modernization, the Grocer’s fantasy world is facilitated by the corresponding prerequisite for the modernity index; the ability for psychic mobility, mediated, in turn, through the means of mass communication. In this mediated experience, the modernizing subject no longer encounters the complexities found in the “natural” environment where the “traveler is apt to become bewildered by the profusion of strange sights and sounds,” but is rather accustomed to the simplicity of “artificial” settings, where the “receiver of communications is likely to be enjoying a composed and orchestrated version of the new reality.” Thus disposed towards the orderly display of Campbell soup cans, the Grocer’s fantasy world not only accommodates that vision, but is readily articulated in the interview setting.

In that regard, the Grocer presents himself as the paragon of the proper interview subject. His wide range of imagination is accompanied with a capacity for anticipating and providing the responses that are expected of him. Asked how he would rule, the Grocer responds that “he would make roads for the villagers to come to towns to see the world and would not let them stay in their holes all their life.” His capacity for psychic mobility takes into account the physical mobility of his fellow Balgati—hence his position as a vanguard in the interview setting and the modernization process alike. Unlike the Chief who cannot image leaving the place where he was born, it is the Grocer who can readily imagine himself living in America: “Indeed he seemed fully prepared, as

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303 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 53
a man does when he has already posed the question to himself many times." These instances, cited profusely and admiringly by Lerner, are indications of the survey method succeeding at its task, which does not merely entail the procuring of data (and the delineation of its structure, content, and contours alike), but also the invoking of particular types of knowledge about its respondents. In that regard, the questionnaire retains a certain future orientation as well, carefully cataloguing the dreams and expectations of the Grocer’s psyche, which is, in turn, amenable to mobility, the much-prized indicator of modernization itself.

While the Grocer, a proxy for all transitional Turks in Lerner’s scheme, comes closest to embodying the ideal respondent in the village of Balgat, “he is not yet capable of the Modern Turk’s introjective technique;” though he is “learning to project imaginatively, [he is] not yet stretching his imagination too far.” It is for this reason that the completely modernized interviewer, Tosun, is perplexed by the effective means of communication on the part of his interlocutor, who otherwise seems “a very unimpressive type,” and “even wore some sort of a necktie.” This detectable tone of distaste is telling for Lerner: Tosun’s contempt for the Grocer must have stemmed from the latter’s ability to “see himself as the interviewer saw him.” Lerner interprets the tension between the two characters (which is the counterpart to the tension-filled relationship between the Grocer and the Chief, on the one hand, and the Chief and Tosun, on the other) as an indication of the throes and pangs of modernization. The Grocer is

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305 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 25
306 Lerner, “A Scale Pattern of Opinion Correlates,” pp. 269-70
307 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 22
308 Lerner and Riesman, “Self and Society,” p. 72
It is noteworthy that Lerner includes a member of the survey team in his array of protagonists inhabiting the “modernizing landscape,” which “involves many Tosuns and shepherds, many grocers and chiefs, many sons of chiefs.”

The interviewer emerges as a full-fledged character in this account of the otherwise anonymous landscape (the Grocer and the Chief being the only titles granted to the respondents, wherein all else are reduced to number, location and rural/city distinction on the front page of the questionnaires).

David Riesman’s introduction to the *Passing of Traditional Society* yields further insight into the demanding task assigned to the interviewer. Riesman suggests at the outset that he agreed to read the interviews Lerner gave him less out of an interest for the region than his “interest in the technique of the interview as a cultural form, as a mode of communication among the social strata as well as a mode of inquiry.”

Riesman’s proclamation of the interview as a “cultural form” speaks to the type of social interaction it requires and rewards, as well as the kinds of knowledge it invokes about the parties involved. In this reading, the method itself becomes grounds for observation, insofar as

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309 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 77 and 43
310 In his account of his follow-up visit to Balgat, Lerner also provides descriptions of the two additional interviewers who accompanied him. One was Tahir S., who received an accolade from Lerner on account of his composed deportment in the question and answer setting, “always the American trained interviewer.” The other was Zilla K., who fits the profile of the female interviewer Lerner had “ordered ‘by the numbers’: thirtyish, semi-trained, alert, compliant with instructions, not sexy enough to impede our relations with the men of Balgat but chic enough to provoke the women” (*Passing*, pp. 34 and 29). Lerner’s meticulous instructions suggest the amount of work that went into obtaining the kind of interlocutor that would occasion the interview process emblematic, in turn, of the stage for modernity itself.

311 Riesman, “Introduction,” *Passing*, p. 1
its discursive contours, as was evident in the case of the Arkansas interviews, refuse to be subject to regulation, at the same time as they remain laden with power. In Riesman’s account, the task of the interviewer as mediator necessitates a fine attunement to the requirements of survey research on the one hand, and civil service, on the other:

Interviewers, in fact bear to the bureaucracy of social research somewhat the same relation that foremen bear to industrial management: the interviewers mediate between the home office and the field, adjusting to the capabilities of particular respondents the demands for comparability and standardization that issue from central headquarters.\(^{312}\)

Though data procured at the survey site is akin to construction material, readily modified and sculpted vis-à-vis blueprints supplied by the managerial office, the interviewers also ought to acquire skills of improvisation or mastery over spontaneity, lest the information provided by the respondents prove resistant to comparison and standardization alike. The necessary adjustment “to the capabilities of particular respondents,” furthermore, is the gist of the spontaneous interpretive process; an assessment of the respondents nonetheless colored by preconceptions regarding their background, occupation and capacity for proper speech, among other things.

The members of the survey team, after all, were asked to attach lengthy descriptions of the respondents at the beginning of the questionnaire forms, and did not hesitate to provide comments on the physical appearance and education, as well as the eating habits and seeming level of intelligence of their subjects. At times, such observations gave the interviewers license to skip certain questions, especially if they were acquainted with their subjects beforehand, in one case a close friend, and in another a domestic employee. Some interviewers were flattering—if curiously—in their aesthetic

\(^{312}\) Ibid., p. 2

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assessments of the respondents (“He reminds me of a dignified silkworm inside his cocoon”), others even more ruthless than Tosun (“he always gave me the impression of a jelly-fish, physically...When he speaks his mouth is wet. When he pronounces his ‘th’s, ‘sh’s and ‘ch’s he spits in the air”).\footnote{Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 8, Ist-40-city and Folder 13, Ank-70-city}

In addition to meticulously recording physical depictions of their respondents, the interviewers frequently observed a sense of fear and intimidation on the part of their interlocutors. Some noted that this initial state of trepidation was gradually relaxed once they were explained that the project had nothing to do with politics; yet a clarification of the survey’s motives was a rare occurrence in itself. Most respondents dwelling in rural areas continued to believe that the interviewers came from newspapers, aid agencies or the government, and that their answers would facilitate the arrival of roads, radios, movies—not unlike the ones they were being interrogated about. Some suggested that the questionnaire would prove unlikely to help and that American experts should come and see the situation for themselves, though one thought this had been done before, “with no result.”\footnote{Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 2, Istanbul-18-rural}

It was not only the interviewer communicating his or her judgments about the survey setting since each respondent was also asked what they thought about the interview once the questionnaires were filled out. Though these often detailed answers did not make it to Lerner’s reported opinion range or empathy index, they reveal yet another instance of the unexpected and unmanageable results of the survey setting. Many found the questionnaire “silly,” “lengthy,” “superfluous yet lacking,” and for one it
seemed “funny, queer…a most American thing.” Another was wary of the lack of transparency intrinsic to the survey setting, and suggested that “if sincerity is the rule between interviewer and respondent…it would be very interesting for those interviewed to know the results.” Yet every once in a while there were those that evoked the Grocer, highly receptive to and appreciative of the interview process, and suggested that they would have “loved to be able to ask questions too.” At any rate, we are twice removed from these responses, skeptical, affronted, enthusiastic or hopeful about prospects for improvement in their surroundings. First, we are dependent on the account of the interviewers regarding the appearance, sentiments and brightness of the respondents, as well as their ability to engage the questionnaire in an acceptable manner. Second, and ultimately, it is not the accounts of the survey team that facilitate our perception of the survey material, but rather the survey researcher, who resides over their interpretation in written, indeed, literary form.

*Back to Balgat*

When Lerner returned to Balgat in 1954, eager to meet the Grocer, he found the village already on its way to “passing,” having acquired a chartered bus service to Ankara, purified water, and a police station. The sons of the Chief, now the last Muhtar of Balgat, had become shopkeepers, one running a grocery, the other Balgat’s first clothing store. The hopes of the Chief with regards to his sons becoming soldiers, like those bravely fighting in Korea, had been shattered. An adjustment had been required of him and “the masterful Chief had been able to incorporate change mainly by rearranging

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315 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 5, Izmir-31-city
316 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 8, Folder 12, Ist-27-city
317 Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 3, Ist-42-rural; Folder 7, Ist-35-city
the environment.” As for the original Grocer, the “symbol of the characterological shift, my man…he who dramatized most poignantly the personal meaning of the big change now under way throughout the Middle East,” he had passed onto not the full-fledged modernity whose pioneer he had been in the context of Balgat, but rather, to Lerner’s dismay, the netherworld. Seeing the centrality of the quest for the Grocer to Lerner’s visit to Balgat and his account of it alike, it would appear that the Grocer had to have died for Lerner’s narrative to work. A visionary whose absence is made all the starker by the lingering presence of the now outdated Chief, the Grocer “had shown the way” to the rest of the Balgati, at the same time as he provided Lerner with a protagonist in this miniature drama of modernization. Though we learn little, if at all, about the Grocer’s background (in contrast to the detailed descriptions of the Chief’s house, sons and wife), the glimpses of the former’s dreamscape, so readily amenable to empathy and mobility, have been rendered representative of all transitional experiences in modernizing Turkey, indeed, the entire Middle East.

In the context of Lerner’s seminal work on modernization in the Middle East, then, the task of the survey is manifold. In Lerner’s writing, replete with a preoccupation with models, literary imagery and narrative structures, the imperative to survey is as crucially linked to sight as it is to cataloguing and numerical reduction. In this account that is wholly dependent on mediation and translation alike, reliant on the figure of the not-so-disinterested interviewer, plot twists, “passings,” and crossroads provide the “landscape” the modernization narrative requires. Though Lerner masterfully performs

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318 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 35
319 Ibid.
320 Lerner, *Passing*, p. 40
the task of narrative chronicler, however, his discerning eye is principally that of the forecaster:

There are villages to which, willy-nilly, the city comes—either via a new concrete road as in Turkey, or via road as in Egypt, or via adventurous young villagers who shuttle to and fro as in Lebanon. By whatever method the city invades the village…The poignancy is heightened for the modern observer, who knows that in some sense the city will always ‘win,’ by the great human cost added to these dramas because the actors are unaware that a rough draft of the third act is already written.321

It is not clear, in this account, if the interviewer on the field is necessarily capable of grasping the stakes involved in the unfolding of the drama. A mere foreman, a mediator between the office and the field, the interviewer is easily repulsed by those unlike him, and readily intimated by those akin to himself. The social scientist who comes to possess the survey through its manifold travels may very well remain the ultimate “modern observer,” at once responsible for delineating the categories that will inform the coding process, and knowing, beforehand, how the next chapter of modernization will play out.

Lerner’s account of modernization, after all, is one that rests on predetermined stages that unfold in progressive, linear fashion: urbanization, literacy, mass media extension, economic and political participation occur in that order simply because, in some sense, “they had to go together.” The end-point for this cluster of positive change, in turn, is an identifiable destination, since as Lerner famously claimed, the West, and in particular, America, was precisely what the “Middle East seeks to become.”322 In that process, the survey itself takes on a facilitating task: “The Bureau questionnaire can serve as a model for future efforts to apply modern American research procedures in the less

321 Ibid., p. 76
322 Lerner, Passing, p. 47 and p. 79
developed areas of the world.” As intimated by some of the large-scale sample surveys conducted throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lerner’s procedures and categories of tradition, transition and modernity indeed provided a qualified model for later studies in Turkey.

**Translating Transition**

The two surveys that served as a preamble to this chapter share a lineage that suggests an affinity in terms both of content and methodology. Both studies were guided by the presupposition that the students under examination were, by and large, modernized, based on earlier criteria laid out by works such as Lerner’s. Though Frey argued that the high school students retained “an immoderate amount of authoritarianism,” their “growing ideological commitment to democratic forms” attested to the crucial role of education in processes of modernization. While his questionnaire itself was of a reiterative nature, Frey manufactured a new coding system for the open-ended questions that pertained to personal achievement categories, discerned, in turn, through notions of future aspirations, assessments of the self and the material world, and conceptions of intellectual and cultural development.

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323 Ibid., p. 105
324 Frederick W. Frey, “Education” in *Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 224, 225, 230. The basis for discerning degrees of authoritarianism was a question from the Gillespie and Allport survey: “Democracy is often defined in the words of Abraham Lincoln as ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ If you were forced to do so, would you personally give greater emphasis to the conception ‘by the people’ or ‘for the people’?” (Gillespie and Allport, p. 51). The question was repeated verbatim in the Turkish high school questionnaires, and more than 78 percent of the respondents stressed “by the people” (Frey, “Education,” p. 225).
325 Democratic Potential/Values Study (Turkey), Herbert H. Hyman Papers, Box 2, Folder 5, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York (Hyman Papers, hereafter)
Nermin Abadan was more forthcoming in the disclosure of her intellectual predecessors, as her three-fold typology not only mapped onto the three universities whose students she investigated (the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at the Middle East Technical University, the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, and the Faculty of Law at Ankara University), but also to those postulated by Lerner and Riesman alike: “the outer-oriented, materialist manager; the idealist, prospective administrative-leader, and the traditional, static implementer.” For Abadan, however, inasmuch as the METU students could be considered under the purview of Riesman’s outer-oriented and Lerner’s modern categories, they remained too steeped in the Anglo-American tradition: if these students could imagine themselves as the President of Turkey or citizens of another country (echoing questions from Lerner’s empathy index), Abadan argued that this was more a testament to their “materialism” seeing as how these students remained “under the influence of the thought patterns of a society that has already tackled its trial of modernization.” While Abadan confirms Lerner’s contextualization of Turkey within a transitional framework, noting that “Turkey, which occupies a special location among the Muslim nations of the Middle East is, as Daniel Lerner has correctly

326 Abadan, Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri, pp. 6, 44, 124
327 Ibid., p. 87. Abadan formulated the question in terms that pertained to the students’ dreamscape and not in line with a Lerner-esque empathy index per se: “What do you dream about becoming?” The options ranged from excelling at one’s job, becoming a millionaire or a great artist to acting as the President or the Prime Minister and living as citizens of another state, p. 147. The attribution of “materialism” to the METU students was in keeping with Abadan’s normative interjections, which were particularly manifest in her commentary on not how the students actually spend their time, but how they should. Her distaste for “killing time in coffeehouses” and not working during summer vacations is telling in that regard: “This picture demonstrates the saddening attitude of Turkey’s revolutionary, venturesome generations towards work or creative activities that ennoble the person, that strengthen his being and soul...This attitude contrasts with their western counterparts who spend their summer vacations engaging in simple, bodily work at farms or construction sites in order to acquaint themselves with foreign cultures. One can only hope that the Turkish youth, who aspire to resemble their western counterparts as a result of the infusion of mass media, will abandon their baleful parasitic behavior which stems partly from unwarranted pride, and partly from national apathy” (pp. 104-5, emphases in original).
pointed out, ‘not yet a modern society by our standards, but is no longer quite traditional
either’,” what is at stake is a process of translation (a remaking of the categories by
rallying them for purposes beyond their initial intent), in lieu of a wholesale acceptance
of their template.\textsuperscript{328} Though Abadan’s survey did not hesitate to enroll categories from
previous work that gauged attitude-formation vis-à-vis frameworks of modernization,
then, her interpretive stance entailed modifications that nevertheless contribute to the
“routinization” of the original categories.\textsuperscript{329}

Abadan’s detailed—albeit modulated—explication of Lerner’s findings was in
keeping with her central role in the propagation of recent trends in the American social
sciences in Turkey. Abadan spent the 1953-54 academic year as a Fulbright Fellow at the
University of Minnesota, where she “discovered political science,” while studying with
Herbert McClosky, whose work investigated political behavior through survey
methodology.\textsuperscript{330} It was through her dissertation about public opinion, her various articles
on media research, public administration and interest groups, as well as the elective
courses she offered on mass media and American political parties that Abadan
contributed to what she described as the (re)emergence of Turkish political science with
an “independent identity” in the context of a prevalent American influence within the
Turkish social sciences throughout the 1950s.\textsuperscript{331} While Abadan went on to conduct

\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., p. 63
\textsuperscript{329} Bruno Latour, \textit{Science in Action}, p. 43
\textsuperscript{330} In her memoirs, Abadan explains that she first learned about public opinion through an “assistant of
Daniel Lerner’s” who was conducting the Middle East surveys in 1950. Though Abadan expressed a wish
to study with Lazarsfeld at Columbia following that encounter, the Fulbright Commission sent her to
\textsuperscript{331} See Nermin Abadan, \textit{Halk Efkarı (Public Opinion)} (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1956);
“Siyasi İlimlerde Gelişimi Eğitimleri” (\textit{Developments in the Social Sciences}) \textit{Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi} 17 (3); “Devlet İdaresinde Menfaat Gruplarının Rolü” (\textit{The Role of Interest Groups in Government})
surveys on Turkish guest workers in Western Germany (work that she later became
renowned for), she remained critical of her earlier study on the spare-time activities of the
university students, and, in particular, her method of sampling, which, due to lack of
funding and assistant personnel, did not entail a process of random selection, and thus
proceeded in an “incomplete and faulty” manner.\textsuperscript{332}

The norms for selecting a representative population by which Abadan appraised
her own study came from the lecture notes of a course on social scientific methodology,
offered during the 1957-1958 academic year at the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara
University, where Abadan taught at the time. That course, which Frederick Frey also
attended during his time in Turkey as a Ford Foundation grant recipient, was co-taught by
Arif Payaşoğlu and Herbert Hyman, within the purview of an exchange program
between NYU and Ankara University, under the auspices of the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA). Though other modes of data collection, such as
content analysis were also discussed, the lecture notes suggest that the amount of time
devoted to survey design exceeded all other methodological concerns.\textsuperscript{333}

In many respects, the trajectory of Hyman’s career was intertwined with the
proliferation of survey methodology in the social scientific circles of the United States.

\textbf{Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi} 14 (1); “Radyonun Görevi ve Tesir Alanı” (The Function of the Radio
and its Sphere of Influence) Forum 4(47). For more on Abadan’s teaching, see Ali Çankaya, \textit{Yeni Mülkiye
Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler} (A History of the Political Science Faculty) (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Yayınları, 1968). For more information about Abadan’s role in the configuration of the “American
influence” on Turkish social sciences, see Cangül Örnek, “1950li Yıllarda Amerikan Sosyal Bilim
Anlayışı.” For Abadan’s popular writings about her travels across the United States, see her columns in the
daily \textit{Ulus}, between February and June 1953.

\textsuperscript{332} Abadan, \textit{Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Serbest Zaman Faaliyetleri}, pp. 8-10. For Abadan’s work on West
Germany where she also employed survey methodology, as well as Lerner-esque formulations of “rising
expectations and frustrations,” see Abadan, \textit{Batı Almanya’da Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları}

\textsuperscript{333} Hyman, “Sosyal Bilimler Metodolojisine Giriş Ders Notları” (translated by Arif Payaşoğlu), Hyman
Papers, Box 1, Folder 2 (Collected Letters: Introduction to the Methodology of the Social Sciences: 1957-
1958). Hyman also offered a course on public opinion during this time.

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During the war, Hyman participated in the Division of Program Surveys of the US Department of Agriculture and the bombing surveys in Germany and Japan, both overseen by Rensis Likert, who went on to lead the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.\(^3\) After the war, Hyman continued work in survey research at the New York office of NORC, where he prepared a study of interviewer effects for the Joint Committee on the Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants, before being recruited by Lazarsfeld to the BASR at Columbia.\(^4\) Trained as a social psychologist who continued teaching in sociology departments such as Lazarsfeld’s, Hyman remained committed to “the exciting features of survey research—the fast pace, the grand scale, the stimulating milieu of work, the quick and socially useful payoff from the findings and the apparent impact in high places, the foreign travel and the exotic encounters in the course of field work.”\(^5\) Hyman’s depiction of venture, excitement and propensity for risk situates him squarely within the “new breed of social scientist” discussed above, and given his involvement with the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, Hyman also shared his colleagues’ interest in the analysis of change in non-Western areas insofar as the sample survey could be seen as “a tool to produce information on human functioning…The availability of the method and its widespread acceptance has had the general consequence that those in high places are more inclined to

\(^{3}\) Hyman returned to Japan in 1947 as a member of the expert mission on public opinion and sociological research and spent the 1950-51 academic year in Oslo as a visiting professor in methodology (Hyman Papers, Box 7, Folder 15, Personal Data). In his account of the development of survey methodology in the American social sciences, Hyman explains that it was his experience with the bombing surveys that “led us to train survey researchers and help conduct the first postwar surveys in Japan, Turkey, Norway, and elsewhere against the frequent objections that the method would not work” (Taking Society’s Measure, pp. 128-9).

\(^{4}\) Hyman, Interviewing in Social Research, op. cit.

\(^{5}\) Hyman, Taking Society’s Measure, p. 149
make important decisions and manage affairs rationally, more frequently on the basis of empirical systematic evidence, less by guesswork and preconceptions.”\(^{337}\) The prowess of survey methodology, in that regard, stemmed not merely from its utility in capturing and measuring processes of change, but *inducing* it, in the minds of decision-makers and average consumers alike: it was the widespread dissemination of surveys that led “*ordinary men*” to appear “more enlightened and scientific in their approach to social problems.”\(^{338}\)

While Hyman espoused the superiority of the survey method over data collected by processes of observation, he also cautioned against conducting it on subjects who may be “*unwilling or incompetent* to provide reliable answers.”\(^{339}\) Luckily for Hyman, the academic year he spent in Turkey presented two opportunities for conducting surveys on purportedly willing *and* competent subjects in the university setting—studies that were cited profusely by Abadan and Frey alike. The first of these works was a comparison between the values of the students of Robert College and the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, whose findings Hyman, along with Payaslıoğlu and Frey, presented in the special issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, which spoke to problems of attitude research in the developing non-West. The student of Robert College, not unlike the METU student in Abadan’s study, was found to “resemble his American counterpart more than the Ankara student.”\(^{340}\) As would Frey’s study on high school students that succeeded it, this survey on university students also employed the Gillespie and Allport


\(^{339}\) Hyman, “Sosyal Bilimler Metodolojisine Giriş Ders Notları,” p. 85, emphasis in original

\(^{340}\) Herbert Hyman, Arif Payaslıoğlu, Frederick Frey, “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” pp. 278-9
questionnaire as a means to discern patterns of nationalism, authoritarianism, and religiosity as compared with the youth of ten different nations, ranging from the United States and France to Japan and Mexico. Hyman and his collaborators also insisted that most of the university students could be considered modern given the behavioral indices of Lerner’s study, but they did not refrain from introducing additional “historical and logical criteria” in their appraisal of Turkey as “presumably partaking both of traditional Middle Eastern culture and of modernized or Westernized culture.”

The “historical” signs they employed facilitated the evaluation of the Turkish college youth in comparison to both the “traditional” past of Turkey (which surfaced as a residual category, discerned through the observations of the authors), and the “modern” youth in neighboring Europe (based on the findings of the Gillespie and Allport survey): “At the level of symbols and practices of daily living, they are clear representatives of modern civilization. This is revealed, for example, in their dress, hygiene, health practices, possessions, and media behavior. Unlike an earlier educated generation, very few can use Arabic.”

The signs of modernity, in this scheme, are rendered visible in perceived and material terms, and yet are presumed to evade the pitfalls of what Hyman critically deemed “pseudo-cross national research” elsewhere.

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341 Hyman et al., “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” p. 280.
342 Ibid., p. 281. This last sentence was among several declarations, such as references to the “survey imperialist,” which were omitted from the Turkish translation of the article in the Journal of Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University (Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 14 (1) 1959).
343 “Strategies in Comparative Survey Research” presented at the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1963 (Hyman Papers, Box 1, Folder 11). Interestingly, Hyman found Lerner’s empathy index to be an instance of such haphazard comparative work, which, despite the latter’s “meticulous” method, led the reader to “somehow contrast [the empathy index] mentally with a Western, modern society, of which we have no empirical example.” Hyman continued: “Wouldn’t it be ironic if he subsequently found a lot of immobile personalities, nonparticipant types in the United States or Great Britain?” The irony seems to have eluded Hyman and his collaborators when they presumed Arabic-speaking youth to be imbued with a traditional mindset.
This blend of modernity and tradition confirmed, for the authors, a reading of Turkey vis-à-vis Lerner’s transitional framework, since though the Turkish students appeared to be more nationalistic than their Western counterparts, less able or willing to imagine “a world government” (a sign of tradition) they surpassed their European peers on the question of secularism (a sign of modernity): “In comparison with the Gillespie and Allport findings on the question, the Turkish students are only slightly more religious than Americans, and considerably less religious than German or Italian youth. This in the last home of the Caliph!”

Reverberating across this study of modernization traced through the value systems of university students, then, were categories of transition espoused in earlier work across the Middle East, the replication of questionnaires—albeit, with minor omissions, given problems of equivalence and translation—conducted on students of the West, and a confirmation of conjectures that guided the survey process in the first place. It is telling, in this scheme, that the field research itself was of an edifying character, conducted by “a group of Turkish students in the course of receiving training in social research.”

The training process of the students of political science in survey methodology at Ankara University produced another study whose findings were published by Payaslıoğlu and Frey, with counsel and assistance from Hyman himself. The results of the study on the values of college youth were compared with two other studies on the graduates of the same faculty, thus presenting the basis of a panel study. Since this method was “new”

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344 Hyman et al., “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” pp. 284-5; Gillespie and Allport, p. 51
345 Hyman et al., “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” p. 275
346 A. T. J. Matthews, Emergent Turkish Administrators; Fahir H. Armaoğlu and Guthrie G. Birkhead, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 1946-55 Mezunları
to Turkey, the academic setting was necessarily its first venue of practice: the students of political science, indeed, the future administrators of Turkey, were designated as simultaneously the subjects and employers of this survey, thereby suggesting its double-fold benefits in terms of content and training alike. While the students learned of the sample survey method by not only carrying it out, but also by virtue of being interviewed, the meta-methodological concerns of this study also assisted the students in becoming accustomed to the “realities of survey research,” such as the scarcity of available sources, the necessity to accomplish certain tasks at a designated time period, and the imperative to cooperate with others in a rational manner.347

The basis for the trend analysis in this study was a comparison of the occupational patterns of the fathers of the university students, though such an inquisition had not been the primary concern for any of the surveys under examination. The discrepancies in the occupational categories employed by each survey, in turn, presented yet another opportunity for training the future survey methodologists through this illustrative model of a panel study. Noting the need for adjustment given these discrepancies, Payaslıoğlu and Frey condensed, combined, and re-categorized the answers offered by the students in each survey, thereby providing another instance of the shrinking of particularities under the pretense of recoding. The replacement of recorded categories through yet another citational link (under erasure) ostensibly bolsters a trend analysis of change by way of discarding problems of incommensurability that may otherwise prevail. Yet change itself can be said to resist being captured or represented in this context, since the substantive categories from the earlier surveys have been tempered with, indeed flattened out—hence

347 Arif Payaslıoğlu and Frederick Frey, “Babalarının Mensup Olduğu Meslekler,” p. 229
a modification which abets the survey researcher-in-training in his or her quest for cycles and regularities. The task of the survey novice, in this scheme, surpasses that of procuring and presenting raw data, as it is expanded to include tweaking information, redefining occupational categories, and disposing of irregularities and outliers.348 The rearrangement of original categories, in turn, is consistent with the processes of stocking and saving emblematic of the archival thrust of survey collection, one whose impression inscribes accumulation.349

Other examples of trend analysis were enabled by a 1965 survey on governors and district governors, which presented the basis for a comparison with both the Armaoğlu and Birkhead survey employed by Frey and Payaslıoğlu, and a 1956 study on administrators, which had been undertaken as a result of the exchange program between Ankara and New York Universities.350 Retrospectively enlisting these earlier surveys by couching them in terms of a modernization framework (and overriding, broadly, their original content), the various studies by Roos and Roos employed panel, cohort, and cross-sectional data that further helped the inflection of survey methodology with tropes of modernization. The proliferation of such studies targeting both current and potential administrators would lead their practitioners to view conditions for survey research in Turkey as “unusually favorable: These conditions include a bureaucratic elite that has

348 Ibid., pp. 241-43
been surveyed in considerable detail over the past fifteen years, the availability of several nationwide attitudinal surveys, and, most important, the helpfulness and interest in social science shown by many administrators and professors.”

As social scientific surveys obtained greater visibility in Turkey, the work of Hyman, Abadan, Frey, and Payaslioğlu, among others, enlisted the categories proclaimed by Lerner’s seminal study, at the same time as they introduced caveats and modifications to some of its formulations. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a series of novel academic and governmental institutions further facilitated the conduct and spread of survey methodology, such as the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (1952), the Test and Research Bureau of the Board of Education and Discipline (1953), the State Planning Organization (1960), as well as the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (1963), the Turkish Social Sciences Association (1967), and the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University (1967). The popularization of social scientific surveys can be said to have come to its fruition by the 1969 elections, when the daily newspaper *Milliyet* commissioned a group of professors from Istanbul University to prepare a survey on the voting behavior of workers. Indeed, surveys were so prevalent by 1970 that at a conference about the development of the social sciences in Turkey, psychologist Şefik Uysal explained that “when one thinks of social research in our country, the method of data-gathering that comes to mind is the survey.”

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352 Şefik Uysal, “Metodoloji Açısından Türkiye’de Yapılan Sosyolojik Araştırmalar ve Bir Örnek: Köy Araştırması” (*Sociological Research in Turkey in terms of Methodology and an Example: The Village*
In the midst of the social scientific proliferation of surveys came a study that was born from intricate alliances between these new institutions in Turkey in 1962. The survey, which targeted a sample of 8,000 rural residents, was christened by the Rural Development Research Project of USAID, with a roster of familiar names listed as its consultants: Daniel Lerner, Herbert Hyman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Sloan Wayland, with Frederick Frey acting as the main rapporteur. The institutionally embedded nature of this study yields further insight into the ways in which survey methodology was fraught with suspicions, alliances, and frailties when undertaken in foreign settings. The project was, for the most part, carried out by the Research and Measurement Bureau of the Turkish Ministry of Education on the field, with the assistance of native interviewers trained specifically for this study. The processing of the data, in turn, was undertaken at the computation center of MIT. It was at CENIS that Frey completed the reports, sometimes in collaboration with other scholars, which were then submitted to AID. About four-fifths of the cost of the enterprise was covered by the Turkish government (the payment of interviewers, coders, administrators, and costs of publication), with the rest furnished by AID (the team of US consultants, cost of data-processing materials and statistical services). For Frey, the survey was a “near-exemplary cooperation on both sides,” also

presenting the first of its kind and scale in the context of Turkey. Given the “sensitive and possibly volatile character of the investigation,” furthermore, the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO) was enlisted as an “official liaison” in order to assist in “dealing with delicate political situations,” thus “leaving our nascent survey organization generally free to concentrate on the demanding technical tasks of the research.”

Frey’s proclamation of a division of labor between the political and technical aspects of the project amounts to an oversimplification since a closer look at the depiction of the survey reveals that different tasks were assigned to a diverse range of institutions for collecting the data on the field (the Research and Measurement Bureau), its subsequent recording, coding (the MIT computation center), and analysis (CENIS). Different intermediaries were employed at each agency, in turn: that who trains the field reporter, the interviewer who remained under constant supervision, the statistician and the coder, as well as the social scientist who takes on the task of accumulation, and the policy-maker to whom he presents the end product. The travels of the questionnaire material between these different agents thus begin with their dispatch from the center institution to the native training center. After the questionnaires have been filled out and collected from randomly selected households, they are sent back to MIT for coding and card-punching, where they will be closely monitored for residual errors. The complex nature of the distribution of tasks to different agencies suggests the stakes entailed in the

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353 Frey, “Surveying Peasant Attitudes,” p. 338. Though Frey acknowledged Lerner’s Passing as a precursor to this survey, he neglected mention of a study on the social and economic effects of farm mechanization, carried out by members of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University at the request of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) in 1952. (A Committee of the Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization in Turkey). Concerned more with the dissemination of agricultural techniques than the behavioral adjustment that may have stemmed from such change, the study on farm mechanization remained outside of the purview of studies on modernization.

354 Frey “Surveying Peasant Attitudes,” pp. 338-39
economy of the survey. In addition to its circulation between various institutions, the survey was also encumbered with an additional set of responsibilities: “Since formulations of their interests were solicited from some twenty-eight different Turkish agencies, from more than a dozen AID sections, and from eight or ten other organizations, and since our own theoretical hypotheses concerning development were also supposed to occupy a prominent portion of the instrument, a torrent of suggested topics and questions inundated us at the start.”

The survey is shot through with obligations to sponsors and administrators, seemingly confirming Frey’s contention that “an extensive multicultural survey demands the skills of a diplomat, financier and administrator, as well as technical and theoretical expertise.”

In that regard, the strict delineation Frey posits between the political and technical aspects of the project is a false one, given the vulnerable nature of research in “today’s suspicious and contentious world,” where “the problems that interest the political scientist professionally are, alas, very similar to those that interest certain suspicious characters.” Not only was it necessary, by Frey’s concession, to enlist the SPO in order to divert skepticism, but such considerations also figured into the survey design itself, wherein the over-all sample of the villages was divided into two subsamples: “Probably the paramount reason was again our concern regarding the political sensitivity of the enterprise. It was always possible that some untoward event could occur during the two months we would be in the field and terminate the entire project.”

Furthermore, the
two-step sampling process, which posited an interchangeability between the village unit and villager as population samples, suggests the intensive measures taken to allay suspicions, which, in turn, presents a corollary to the anxieties on the part of the survey team.

This sense of apprehension was also manifest in the special care taken to control native interviewer performance. The interviewers were carefully chosen among those with rural backgrounds—literate and “reasonably sophisticated” ones at that—and were subjected to a course that included “familiarization with the instruments and sampling plan, lectures and discussions on interviewing techniques, model interviews, role playing, coding practice, and pre-test field work…Some extra time had to be spent on emphasizing the nature and importance of research and surveys in general.”\(^{359}\) Given the strenuous conditions for conducting research in mostly remote villages across Anatolia, supervisors paid regular visits to research sites, further ensuring that team leaders abided by norms of randomness in their selection of the respondents. In addition to the practice of at least three separate pre-tests, further safeguards included the division of each interviewer group (male and female alike) into two equivalent clusters to carry out interviewing in half-samples so that the performance of the subsets could be compared against each other.\(^{360}\) Such preoccupation with performance check and accuracy is a further testament to the unruly nature of survey methodology since errors could stem from respondent and interviewer behavior alike. In that vein, survey design is revealed to

\(^{359}\) Ibid., pp. 350-1

entail arrangements for the taming, control, and supervision of the interviewers, as well as the research process at large.

At the end of this extensive training process, Frey could self-assuredly declare that “one of the oft-cited side benefits of the project was that we would bequeath to Turkey a sizable group of well-trained and experienced village interviewers who would be of great use to the government in future work with the peasantry.”361 Unforeseen circumstances prevailed nevertheless, such as the persistence of an unwritten language (Kurdish), which necessitated the employment of bilingual interviewers, “inevitably sacrificing, thereby, some control over interviewer performance.”362 In this context, the disorderly nature of language itself surfaces as a possible bump along the otherwise preordained itinerary of the survey as a material artifact. Thus, it is only after the conclusion of a small magnitude of error that the final reports can be typed up: hence the need for checking of the two subsamples against each other, an evaluation of the interviewer ratings, a consideration of the completion rate, and a comparison with previous village censuses.363

Once the results have been tallied, the reports impel an aesthetic reconfiguration: the verbal format of the questionnaire gives way to expression in numerical and graphic form alike.364 The tables are crafted in accordance with the indices that have been carefully conjured up by the coders. The distribution graphs, in turn, propel yet another shift in stylistic orientation: the categorization, enumeration, and ranking of coded

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361 Frey, *Surveying Peasant Attitudes*, p. 348
363 Hyman, “Checks on the Accuracy of the Survey Findings”
364 See Figures 3 and 4
preferences that have been accumulated through the survey process now map onto lines and curves that come to represent the mindset perceived to be peculiar to the rural landscape. The rapporteur’s task is to furnish his policy recommendations with as much visual corroboration as possible, wherein the policy-makers will have “insight” into the Turkish peasant’s psyche through its mediated display in the form of “immutable and combinable mobiles.”

The reports themselves addressed issues as diverse as land ownership, national identification, regional variation and mass media, even if some of these questions were not necessarily included in the original research agenda. Policy considerations remained paramount in these reports, with particular emphasis placed on identifying that which was likely to induce and disseminate change, be it mass media, local innovators or elite leadership. Though some signifiers were found not to contribute to degrees of modernization at all (land ownership), others (mass media, literacy, mobility, the propensity to innovate) were found to be of utmost importance, with yet others falling somewhere in between (the occasional “regional anomalies in attitudinal modernity”).

While some novel modes of analysis were introduced, such as the necessity to “conceive of attitudinal regions as basic planning units,” Frey also found the opportunity to compare

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365 In his discussion of the accumulating thrust of censuses and cartography, Latour explains their treatment of otherwise unfamiliar events, people and places in centers of calculation which invent “means that a) render them mobile so that they can be brought back; b) keep them stable so that they can be moved back and forth without additional distortion, corruption or decay, and c) are combinable so that whatever stuff they are made of, they can be cumulated, aggregated, or shuffled like a pack of cards” (Science in Action, 223).

degrees of national identification with the lycee-level students from his previous study.367 Most importantly, and echoing, once again, Lerner’s work in Turkey, mass media was hailed as the most effective medium for forming attitudes, enabling the peasant to “[encounter], typically for the first time, a world he never really knew.”368 The Rural Development Research Project also included an index for political empathy, which was formed from three questions asking the respondent what (s)he would do if (s)he were Prime Minister, village headman or county prefect.369 Attitudinal modernity and exposure to change, in turn, were glimpsed through composite indices that combined measures of geographical mobility, political empathy and mass media exposure, as well as “personal and community don’t knows.”370 Questions aiming to gauge levels of “knowledge” on the part of the peasant, in turn, figured into the “cognitive flexibility” index, thus being juxtaposed with “his willingness and ability to stretch his mind by entertaining a new idea, projecting to another role, adopting a new practice,” as well as his “propensity to innovate,” which “reflects the villager’s willingness to adopt new work practice.”371

368 Frey, Report No. 3: The Mass Media and Rural Development in Turkey, p. 197
370 “Personal don’t knows” assessed the respondent’s inability to answer basic personal questions about his ideas and orientations, “questions for which knowledge was as minimal a factor as possible and which reflect his willingness or ability to contemplate these projective ideas. Questions asked included: how many children were ideal, whether young people were less respectful of their elders than they used to be, what the respondent most wished for, whether he felt things were going to get better or worse in the near future.” The “community don’t knows” inquired after questions such as: What is the main village problem? Has there been a village project recently? Are there introducers of new ways in the village? Is there a conflict in the village over modernization? To whom do villagers look for farming leadership? Ibid.
371 Frey and Roos, Report No. 7: The Propensity to Innovate Among Turkish Peasants. This index was formed from three questions: would the respondent be willing to be the first in his village to adopt a new and useful technique? Would he accept the recommendation of such a practice by his son? Would he side with those who promoted new ways when there was innovational conflict in his village?
The report that aimed to measure the propensity to innovate among Turkish peasants further reveals the ways in which the various indices were intertwined with one another. For the authors, the proclivity for innovativeness was already indicative of modern attitudes, as can be evinced in their interchangeable use of the “new” and “modern” ways as against the old in their conflictual formulation of technical innovation. Though it was deemed “difficult to eliminate any item as being generally irrelevant to problems of innovation,” they concluded that it was the male, literate, young adults with higher degrees of exposure to mass media who seemed more likely to be innovative, thus suggesting that it was already those considered to be “modern” by the standards of the survey who were most likely to modernize. Further evoking Lerner’s tautological standards for psychic mobility and interpersonal trust, the capacity for having an “open, imaginative mind,” as well as degrees of “external mistrust” (discerned through interviewer evaluations cataloguing suspicion, sincerity, and cooperativeness on the part of the respondent) were taken into consideration. High scores on the innovation index thus indicated a “relatively flexible cognitive structure”: “Innovators appear to be people who are generally knowledgeable about their community, who can project their thoughts and stretch their imaginations, who are not distrustful of strangers coming into the village environment, and who are not restricted by parochial loyalties.” Once again, behavior in the interview setting came to connote exposure to and proclivity for modernization alike.

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373 Frey and Roos, *Report No. 7*, pp. 8, 16
In 1968, a group of Turkish agencies collaborated on a survey that measured the propensity for modernization in Turkish villages. In this survey that evaluated 5244 villagers vis-à-vis the “human factors” of modernization, exclusively native facilities were employed for technical aspects, with the State Statistical Institute rendering its IBM machines available for the purpose of card-punching. Frey’s Rural Development Research Project provided not only the guidelines for sampling methods, but also a basis for comparison, since half of its questionnaire was replicated in this later study. Some questions from the original survey were omitted on account of the fact that they seemed too laden with connotations of prestige. The main categories of the report, however, were familiar, providing an overview of the spare-time activities of the peasants, as well as their levels of education, literacy, and attitudes towards the future. Even though these questions were evaluated through a framework that emphasized tropes of open society, mastery over nature and technological change, the conception of modernization as a mentality and attitude was undercut with the tampering of some of the original categories. While the peasants were asked if they would be willing to experiment with new seeds if more fertile kinds were available, for instance, the rapporteurs noted that this was the only question in their survey that pertained to innovational propensity: even though the questionnaire asked about levels of (and choice given) conflicts between old and new ideas, the responses were not coded into a broader index for innovation.

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375 The researchers refrained from inquiring directly after the ownership of land and radios. *Ibid.*, p. 8

376 T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, pp. 209-210, 253
The—albeit partial—replication of the Rural Development Research Project may suggest a level of success in the conduct of its manifold safeguards. By 1968, however, Frey had only published two articles divulging the findings of the research, and the reasons for this scarcity remained a point of contention. Though the publication of the Turkish replication of the study presumably helped dispel some of this aggravation, one scholar went so far as to censure the unavailability of the original research as a hindrance against the “development of social sciences in our country. Unless this is done, I have to express with sadness, this study can be deemed a form of ‘intellectual neo-colonialism.’”

Edwin Cohn, who acted as economic adviser to Turkey under both the MSA and USAID missions, repeated the sentiment that the project, though originally deemed attractive during the time of its conduct, now gave “the impression that they regard the Turks as guinea pigs to be studied and analyzed for the benefit of the external scholarly community,” thus fostering the view that “Turkey is being exploited by foreign scholars for their own exclusive advantage—and, by implication, to Turkey’s detriment—[which] is somewhat analogous to the attitude widely held by Turkish intellectuals…toward foreign enterprises in general and mining companies in particular.”

Cohn’s contextualization of the reception of the project within a broader atmosphere of suspicion is apt, given a growing anti-Americanism among university students.

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377 Çağdem Kağıtçibaşı, “Sosyal İlim Metodolojisi: Köy ve Nüfus Araştırmaları, İzmir Araştırma,” in Türkiye’de Sosyal Araştırmaların Gelişmesi, p. 178 (Social Science Methodology: The Village and Population Studies, the Izmir Study)

students in this period, including the “violent disruption” of a lecture Daniel Lerner was to give at the University of Istanbul in 1969.\textsuperscript{379}

The preceding account is not meant to detract from the import of Lerner’s work in the propagation of survey methodology and modernization theory in the Turkish social sciences. The legacy of his narrative of the Grocer and the Chief is inscribed in its enactment of modernization theory, where the coding of speech and regulation of attitudes suggest a tailored fit between survey research and that school of thought. In the work of Lerner and later iterations, regardless, the hostile reception of initially welcome projects, questionnaires overflowing their original intent and disorderly interviewer behavior seem to have persevered. The interviewees’ responses, in turn, employed strategies of resistance and subversion in the form of refusals to respond in the designated way, prevarication of opinions, and skepticism towards the premises and categories proclaimed by the survey. Finally, the reported form of the surveys relentlessly re-made questionnaires and coding procedures, thus denoting mutability in processes of translation, reiteration, and circulation alike. The survey route is thus derailed—albeit intermittently—with ambivalence and disbelief, not unlike the following interview exchange about the United Nations:

-Do you know what the UN is?
-Vaguely.
-Why do you say vaguely?
-Because I don’t believe in it.\textsuperscript{380}

\textsuperscript{379} Daniel Lerner Papers Box 13, Folder 27, Untitled, n.d.  
\textsuperscript{380} Daniel Lerner Papers, Box 9, Folder 7. Ist-35-City.
READ THIS SECTION ENTIRELY AND CAREFULLY BEFORE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS. This survey is part of ongoing research being conducted in Turkey about the question of Education. By the end of this research, we hope to acquire information about your problems and your desires pertaining to the future. We are of the opinion that the best way of discerning what the youth expect from life is by asking them directly.

THIS IS NOT A TEST! There are no right and wrong answers to the questions. The only “wicked” answer is that which is not candid or well-thought out. Since there are no right and wrong answers, and we are only interested in learning about your own opinions, we ask that you do not cheat or consult others. If you don’t know the answer to a question, just write “I don’t know.” If your answer is “none” or “no,” write “none” or “no” for an answer. If you leave an answer blank, we cannot estimate if you absent-mindedly omitted the question or if your answer was “none” or “no.”

THE VALUE OF THIS SURVEY DEPENDS ON THE CANDOR AND ATTENTION YOU DEMONSTRATE IN ANSWERING IT: You are currently among two thousand students responding to this questionnaire in our country. These two thousand students were chosen in a scientific manner so as to include every type of student. It is our wish that every kind of student in this country will answer these questions. We have taken all precautions for you to be able to answer them in a free and comfortable manner. Do not write your name or school identification number on this survey. This survey will be delivered to you in sealed form. If the seal is broken, do not accept the survey, and clarify this in the designated space below. In addition, after you finish the survey, place it in the stamped and sealed envelope. This way, nobody, not your peers or teachers or the school administrators, will be able to see your answers. The surveys will be sent directly to Ankara. A similar survey was previously conducted in this manner on university students in Turkey.

READ ALL QUESTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE ANSWERING THEM! The questions may seem simple but they generally require thinking in great detail. You will see a box next to most of the options. Unless there is a different explanation put an “X” next to the box that indicates a statement that comes closest to your opinion. Naturally, no statement will be exactly the same as your opinion. But even if it is not exactly the same as your opinion, pick the answer that comes closest. If a question has multiple sections, answer each one of them. Even if you need to write “I don’t know” or “none” several times, please indicate this. Do not omit any questions. We hope that you will enjoy filling out this survey and we believe that your assistance in the understanding of your opinions will be helpful for everybody.

Figure 2. “This is not a Test!” Frederick W. Frey, George W. Angell, and Abdurrahman Ş. Sanay, Lise Seviyesindeki Öğrencilerin Değer Sistemleri, Appendix 2.
Figure 3. Measuring Optimism. Frederick Frey, Allan R. Kessler, and Joan E. Rothchild, *Report No. 2: Index Construction and Validation*
Figure 4. Measuring Optimism. Frederick Frey, Allan R. Kessler, and Joan E. Rothchild, *Report No. 2: Index Construction and Validation*
Chapter 3: Material Encounters: Experts, Reports, Machines

With emphasis on teaching rather than doing, indications are that the Turkish participants in the program are beginning to grasp even the most intangible ideas involved in the technology of modern building and maintenance. In January 1950, at a meeting of regional highway chiefs, very useful recommendations in line with the American advisers’ own thinking were made by the Turkish engineers without any prompting. (Robert Kerwin, The Turkish Roads Program)

American officers here are after making money on overseas pay, with a bad attitude, as if we are an American colony and they were the supermen, sent by the supermen in the States to help us govern ourselves, we the poor ducks. (Izmir-47-city, “Middle East Surveys”)

A curious item displayed alongside the dusty blue binders decorating the bookshelves at the General Directorate of Highways (KGM) in Ankara is a pamphlet, entitled Etiquette and Counsel for Travelers to America, penned by engineer Orhan Bayçu in 1950. The audience for Bayçu’s maxims, which addressed issues as diverse as table manners, gender relations, small talk and dress code in the United States, was Turkish highway engineers headed for a training program overseen by the Federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) in Washington. “Etiquette,” the civil engineer explained, “does not only entail acting in the correct and polite manner in society, but is also a component of modern rational hygiene. Etiquette warrants the love and esteem of one’s interlocutor, as well as efficiency in one’s work.” Bayçu noted that one should avoid mockery of Americans’ ignorance on certain issues, and respect their personal liberties, the most beloved and prized possession in that country. Every mistake on the part of the Turkish visitor, after all, would reflect on and denigrate not just themselves, but Turkishness as a

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381 Orhan Bayçu, Amerikaya Gideceklere Etiket ve Tavsiyeler Etiquette and Advice for those Traveling to America (Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, April 1950), p. 1. The Records of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey (KGM Records hereafter). I would like to thank Gülçin Manka and Figen Aydoğdu of the Press and Public Relations Unit at the Directorate for their generosity and assistance with the archival material.
whole, seeing as how each engineer was traveling to the United States as an “unofficial ambassador” of their country.\textsuperscript{382}

Bayçu’s interpellation of highway engineers as “unofficial ambassadors” was one elaboration on the nature of their work during the American-funded and planned highway network that sprawled across Turkey in the aftermath of World War II. The engineer was alternately a “commander” in an outstanding army, the beneficiary of Marshall Plan “investment in dollars,” or someone “assisting in the design of new social, economic and cultural patterns” for their country.\textsuperscript{383} Highway engineers were also hailed as the agents of modernization, spearheading the material transformation of the Turkish landscape. Bayçu’s hesitant dictums to the itinerant engineer suggest, however, that modernist visions of the highway system providing a path to a prosperous and open future could be frustrated by local mistranslations and material roadblocks, opening the very category of the modern up to contestation, appropriation, and redefinition.

Building on recent literature that examines the techno-political work performed by developmental projects, I call attention, in this chapter, to the manifold fragilities and anxieties that mark expert thinking and practice.\textsuperscript{384} The interactions between the governmental agencies involved in the highway initiative, such as the US Bureau of

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid., pp. 21-2
\textsuperscript{383} Karayollarında Çalışmak İstemez Misiniz? Wouldn’t You like to Work at the Highways? (Ankara, 1961, KGM Records); Talk presented to Turkish engineers at the General Directorate of Highways by F.G. Draper during their preparation for highway studies in the U.S. under the ECA Technical Assistance Program, May 2, 1950, Ankara, Turkey (KGM Records); and Charles Weitz, Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, Speech delivered at the 2nd UN Highway Training Center of Ankara, Karayolları Bülteni, Highway Bulletin 5 (55), May 1955
Public Roads (BPR), the Turkish General Directorate of Highways (KGM) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) were marked by the translation and alignment of interests. Experts tended to disagree about the pace and methods of modernization, as well as the amount of machinery to be circulated and where and to whom roads should be delivered. The provisional corrections proffered by the American engineers to their Turkish counterparts, in turn, suggest that the latter were believed to be in need of reorientation (in attitudinal, physical, and epistemic terms) before they could become the purveyors of modernization to the rest of the country.

The disciplinary mechanisms imposed on the highway engineers reveal expert identity to be heterogeneous, malleable, and protean: through their relationship with non-human agencies, such as reports, maps, highway equipment, and roads themselves, the engineers were alternately designated (and designated themselves) as diplomats, recalcitrant pupils, civil servants, mechanics, military officers, agents of modernization and household names, among others. These shifting denominations are suggestive of the unstable nature of expert practice itself, and this volatility is detailed in the array of material objects that have to be “pampered and adapted” in the convoluted makings of expertise. The engineer surfaces as one agent within a wide array of networks of expertise entailed in negotiations of modernization since the latter’s authority is predicated on interactions with “material and cognitive and social equipment” alike.

While the highway project in Turkey was to mirror the American one in physical, conceptual, and administrative terms alike, the very model of expertise that the Turkish

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engineers were to abide by, that of the American highway organization, was fraught with shortcomings, as can be discerned in the assaults on the part of the ECA and their Turkish counterparts alike. The heterogeneity of interests on the part of US officials suggests the need for an understanding of expertise that exceeds the monolithic, disembodied, and calculating portraits we are accustomed to encountering in the literature. In the case of the highway initiative, seemingly personal encounters are revealed as a category as indispensable as technical and political ones, otherwise deemed to be at the cornerstone of designations of expertise. Expertise is crafted not only through material and local sites of encounters, but is also beset by risk and uncertainty, as well as anxieties and hesitations on the part of its practitioners.

Following an overview of the founding of the new Turkish highway organization after the image of the American Bureau of Public Roads, I examine the tension-filled relationship between the latter institution and the ECA. The location of highways, the circulation of reports, and the labeling of road building equipment were the sites of contention regarding reputation, visibility, and authority between the two agencies. The American engineers imposed similar demands on their Turkish counterparts, whose re-orientation was equally contingent on their mastery over material devices, such as documents and machinery. The very modernity of expert identity and knowledge was called into question for both set of practitioners, and their negotiations are catalogued in the political, material, and personal encounters between them.

Mirrors for Engineers

On March 22nd 1945, Vecdi Diker and Vehbi Ekesan, engineers at the Department of Roads and Bridges of the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, boarded a plane from Ankara which took them to New York by way of Egypt and Casablanca. Diker and his companion spent two months in Washington DC, where they inspected the Federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), and another two months traveling through an array of states ranging from New Jersey, North Carolina and Alabama to California, Texas and Colorado, some of whose terrains were deemed similar to Turkey. Over the course of their trip, they also visited factories, universities, and research institutes across the country, having traveled 25,000 kilometers by car by the time of their departure back to Turkey on August 27th.

Upon his return to Ankara, Diker presented a report on the American highway system to the Ministry of Public Works, depicting in detail the service stations, rest stops, restaurants, tourist camps and repair shops he observed alongside highways, as well as various regulations regarding road taxes, the use of contractors, and laboratory research that ensured highway construction. The BPR, Diker noted, was the prototype of the “modern highway organization” of which the Turkish “highway cause” was in dire need, seeing as how his Department’s lack of autonomy from the Ministries of Public Works and Finance impeded its efficient operation. Though he conceded some adjustments

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388 Soon after he submitted his report, Diker remained contact with the BPR prior to his trip, requesting monthly bulletins and publications pertaining to highway construction. See Vecdi Diker to Thomas MacDonald, November 1st, 1944; MacDonald to Diker, April 28, 1945. RG 30 Bureau of Public Roads Classified Central Files. 1912-1950. 015 Russia-Turkey—1942-50, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 30 hereafter), Box 510

would have to be made in modeling a new administrative unit after the American one,
Diker raised the possibility of having American engineers brought to Turkey to educate
personnel, whose cultivation of estimable standards of expertise was truncated under the
unfavorable conditions of Turkish bureaucracy. 390

Three years later, Harold E. Hilts, Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Public
Roads, arrived in Turkey in order to prepare another report on the highway situation.
Hilts’ report, like Diker’s which preceded it, insisted that a new, autonomous General
Directorate of Highways would have to replace the Department of Roads and Bridges.
This administration would reign over ten regional directorates and incorporate different
divisions for the planning and research, finance and accounting, as well as the building
and maintenance phases of highway construction. 391 This new organization would come
to resemble the fourfold division in the United States, wherein the “Directorate’s
authority to set standards for provincial road construction and to review provincial road
programs to assure that they conformed to the over-all national plan was closely modeled
on the powers of the Bureau of Public Roads.” 392 In addition to providing guidelines for
the simplification and standardization of record-keeping practices, Hilts also addressed
the shortage of technical personnel in Turkey but praised recent initiatives towards the
training of mechanics, technicians and repairmen, noting the increasing availability of

390 Diker had already been in correspondence with the BPR about the possibility of having an American
engineer sent to Turkey for the purpose of building a laboratory for testing road materials. E.F. Kelley to
J.E. Benson, October 3, 1945; Diker to MacDonald, August 22, 1946. (RG 30, Box 510)
391 Harold Hilts, Türkiye’nin Yol Durumu, Turkey’s Highway Situation, p. 27 (Report delivered to the
Ministry of Public Works, February 1948, Ankara, KGM Records)
392 Robert Lehman “Building Roads and a Highway Administration in Turkey” in Howard Teaf and Peter
Franck, eds. Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation (Publications of the
Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, 1955), pp. 379-80. The division in the
US consisted of Public Roads Administration in DC, State Highway Departments, as well as County and
Township Road Districts and Municipal Road Districts.

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portable repair shops across the country.  

“The management of the personnel system is as difficult as the management of an industrial enterprise,” Hilts added, and the preparation of budgets and the careful monitoring of expenses would ensure that good management and a grasp of financial matters proceeded in complementary fashion.

It was Vecdi Diker’s follow-up visit to Washington in August 1947 that occasioned Hilts’ report, which stands as a mirror image of his own. The purpose of this second trip was negotiations with the US State and War Departments regarding the purchase of highway equipment under the purview of the Truman Doctrine, whereby it was agreed that 5 million dollars from those funds would be allocated for highway construction. A treaty was signed between the Turkish Ministry of Public Works and the US Aid Commission on April 26, 1948, allowing for the arrival of American machinery and funding necessary for the construction of roads. The initial set of equipment was immediately put to use in highway construction between Iskenderun and Erzurum, the first exercise in mechanized road building in Turkey.

The aid agreement also included a clause recommending the formation of the American Public Roads Group (PRG) in order to train and assist the technical staff of the Turkish Department of Roads and Bridges. The PRG would remain in Turkey as late as 1959,
with Truman Doctrine funds replaced first by ECA aid under Title III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, and later Title II of the Mutual Security Act.\textsuperscript{398} At the height of the collaboration between 1948 and 1952, the number of American personnel working in Turkey totaled 117, ranging from bridge and highway engineers to mechanics, technicians, superintendents, foremen, administrative personnel and stenographers.\textsuperscript{399}

The American PRG was to provide guidance in the fields of administration, planning, programming and financing phases of highway construction in Turkey, with the Federal Bureau administering an engineer training program in Washington.\textsuperscript{400} The training center in Washington offered 16 week-long highway courses, with the curricula including lectures on the role of highway transport in the American economy, the historical development of highways, administrative organizations, and equipment. More technical subjects such as highway drainage, bridging, soil stabilization and compaction, along with equipment selection, construction methods and highway maintenance were

\textsuperscript{398} The amount of American aid for highway construction during this period was 5 million dollars in 1948, 5 million in 1949, 9 million in 1950, 4.5 million in 1951, 3,369,000 in 1952, 5,287,000 in 1953, 5,700,000 in 1954, 2,500,000 in 1955, 214,900 in 1956, 1,563,250 in 1957, 800,000 in 1958, 167,076 in 1959, totaling 43,101,226 million dollars from its inception. (Geoffrey Ireland, \textit{Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi} The Administration of Highway Transportation in Turkey, Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1961), p. 257

\textsuperscript{399} Lehman “Building Roads and a Highway Administration in Turkey,” p. 375

\textsuperscript{400} The first training program in Washington took place in 1946, with 22 engineers arriving from India. By 1948, 116 highway engineers from 23 countries had studied in Washington, and another 509 engineers from 35 countries would participate in the training programs between 1949 and 1954 (Bruce Seely, Donald Klinger, and Gary Klein, “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer: Moving American-Style Highway Engineering to Europe, 1945-1965 \textit{Comparative Technology Transfer and Society}, 2 (3), 2004), p. 236. The number of Turkish engineers who attended these programs is unclear. According to the \textit{Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan}, which was submitted to the Aid Mission in Turkey on a regular basis, 24 engineers had traveled to the United States by 1951, and 30 more were headed there in 1953 (Issues 7, 1/4/1951-30/6/1951 and 14, 1/1/53-31/3/53). The \textit{Highway Bulletin}, the official monthly publication of the KGM reported the number of trainees between 1949 and 1959 as a total of 92 (10 (110), December 1959). The most comprehensive document on the extent of American technical aid during this time period does not provide information on the number of Turkish highway engineers who traveled to Washington. (See \textit{Türkiye’ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları (1949-1968)} American Economic Aid to Turkey, 1968, KGM Records)
also covered. Following this first phase, delegates were sent in groups of three or four on ten week-long field trips to states deemed similar in terrain to their country of origin. In their assigned states, they were given the opportunity to observe construction and maintenance on site, inspect testing labs, and study the organization and administrative activities of various state and local highway departments.401

The technical exchange program took place in the context of changes in both the planning phase and the administrative structure of the highway initiative in Turkey. On August 8, 1948, the Cabinet approved the plan to build roads in the amount of 23,000 kilometers through a nine-year plan that would unfold over the course of three 3-year stages.402 After a series of negotiations and some standstills in Parliament, an autonomous organization, KGM was founded in 1950, with Vecdi Diker appointed as its first Director. In line with the recommendations laid out in his and Hilts’ reports, the new organization, unlike the Department of Roads and Bridges it replaced, was given the authority to decide the location and design of roads, as well as determine priorities in road maintenance and construction.

Vecdi Diker was born in 1908 in Istanbul and educated at Robert College and later at Columbia and Missouri Universities, until his return to Turkey in 1937 when he started working at the Department of Roads and Bridges. He became the head of that

401 Jack Killalee, Division Engineer to Aziz Torun, Regarding Turkish Engineers Attending the Highway Course at DC Starting on May 16, March 4, 1949. The training trips became longer in duration over the course of the years (six to nine months), with some requirements, such as participants being English-speakers, becoming relaxed (See Orhan Mersinli, Assistant General Director of Highways to Harold Hilts, November 28, 1951; Hilts to Mersinli, February 11, 1952). (KGM Records)
402 The plan was to build 7,184 kilometers in the first 3 years, 7,011 in the second, and 8,353 in the third three years, with an expected cost of 649,580,000 Liras. The initial 9-year plan was reconsidered and modified in 1952, with a second revision undertaken in 1954, taking into account the connection of touristic locales to one another. 1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor Report on the Work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records). See Figure 5
department in 1948 and later KGM in 1950 before resigning the next year in order to work in the private sector. It was his initial stay in the United States as a student of engineering during the 1930s, Diker explained, that “opened his eyes”: “In my opinion there were two factors that made America what it is. First, the education system. Second, a road network that connected the states and America like a body. This opened my eyes.” As will be discussed in the next chapter, this sense of connectivity, which Diker extolled in anatomical terms, would become a central trope in the physical reconfiguration of Turkey through the implementation of highways.

Soon after his return from his studies in the United States, Diker delivered speeches that depicted the American highway system as a replicable model at home: “A student or a teacher can go to a school that is 50-60 kilometers away each day. A businessman, an engineer, a doctor can work in cities where they do not reside. Provinces and villages about 150-200 kilometers away from the city can benefit from the goods of urban life. For instance, people can travel between cities as far away from each other as Ankara and Konya in order to attend a conference or play. These things are done [in the States] all the time.” In his 1945 report, too, Diker made clear that his foremost wish

403 After his resignation from KGM, Diker remained involved in governmental initiatives, such as the founding of the Middle East Technical University (METU) and the transformation of the upper section of Robert College into Boğaziçi University. He later served on METU’s Board of Advisory, along with other important highway figures such as Zafer Pamir, Daniş Koper and Orhan Mersinli. Yollar Türk Milli Komitesi, Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü’nün Kurucusu Vecdi Diker’in Ardından (Ankara: YTKM, 1998)
404 Interview with Diker (1989), Ibid., p. 67
405 “Amerika’da Yol Sistemi ve Türkiye’de Tatbiki İktisadi Olabilecek Yol Tipleri” The Roads System in America and Economically Viable Road Types for Turkey (1938) in Vecdi Diker’in Ardından, p. 16
was for an administrative organization similar to the one in the United States, given the latter’s relative insulation from politics.\textsuperscript{406}

Though Diker idealized the seemingly apolitical nature of the American organization, a brief foray into the history of that institution reveals a more complicated relationship between technical knowledge and political action than is often assumed. Though BPR was not allowed to construct roads in the United States, it emerged as an authority on technical questions whereby its engineers would visit individual states and provide counsel to contractors carrying out road projects. During the early phases of its existence, BPR could emerge as a neutral party of “scientific expertise” precisely given an alignment with “the widespread Progressive belief in the value of eliminating waste and political influence by applying scientific expertise to problems.”\textsuperscript{407} Yet that organization was capable of positing itself as a conduit for scientific expertise that refrained from dictating highway policy to states given its alliance with a series of organization such as the AASHO (American Association of State Highway Officials), which helped establish national standards by means of lobbying in Washington. In that regard, the early success of the Bureau depended less on their self-proclaimed practice of “apolitical expertise” and more their adeptness “at politics, especially on legislative questions at the state and federal level.”\textsuperscript{408} Indeed, cooperation with other highway organizations, particularly under the leadership of Commissioner Thomas MacDonald, provided the Bureau with “an effective lobbying tool,” helping them adjust and cater to

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\textsuperscript{406} Diker, \textit{Amerika Birleșik Devletleri Yol İşleriinde Yapılan Tetkikat Hakkında Rapor}, p. 11. It is telling that the KGM had four directors during its first ten years, with Diker himself staying on duty for only a year and a half. The BPR, by contrast, had four directors over the course of 60 years.
\textsuperscript{408} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 65
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of rural roads in lieu of transcontinental superhighways. As BPR astutely maneuvered between shifting political rationales for road building across the United States, the strategies and adaptability they deployed would provide guidelines for both their recommendations to KGM in Turkey and their heated dealings with the ECA at home.

Of Things and Men

In May 1950, F.G. Draper of the Economic Cooperation Administration delivered a speech to Turkish highway engineers on their way to the training center in Washington and explained that the objective of the Marshall Plan was “to raise the standard of living of all peace loving democratic countries while maintaining sound economic and political policies so as to preserve the basic elements of individual freedom and develop international and joint resistance against the disease of communism.” One way of “fortifying [the free nations of the world] against those who would destroy freedom” was the establishment of the ECA and the regulation of the “investment of money towards lasting results in the form of economic development and stabilization of the free countries of the world.” Given the stakes of ECA investment in rendering “available information” in the form of technical assistance programs, Draper admonished the Turkish engineers: “Your studies in the United States…are an investment both in dollars and in lira. It is your responsibility to bring back information to Turkey and apply it to your work so as to

410 Talk presented to Turkish engineers at the General Directorate of Highways by F.G. Draper during their preparation for highway studies in the U.S. under the ECA Technical Assistance Program, May 2, 1950, Ankara, Turkey (KGM Records)
increase the economic value of what you produce, whether it be designing, or blueprinting, or engineering or constructing or something else.\textsuperscript{411}

The ECA representative’s ultimatum to the Turkish engineers to prove worthy of their participation in the exchange program reveals the extent of that organization’s investment in technical aid. Though framed in terms of the responsibilities assigned to the recipients of such aid, Draper’s proclamation of an equivalence between information and investment (and attendant ramifications of profit and risk) are indicative of the Administration’s understanding of technical cooperation, as well as anxieties about their task and measure of success, anxieties that came to inform their interactions with the other organizations involved in the highway initiative in Turkey. Seeing as how that initiative initially started under the purview of military assistance, the ECA was never quite secure about its authority or function, and was particularly preoccupied with taking due credit for the provision of roads. These insecurities often unfolded over the allocation, transfer, and dissemination of material things, such as road building equipment, machinery, meticulously kept records and maps painstakingly designating areas of “economic interest” for the European Recovery Program. As ECA apprehensions increasingly took the form of impositions on the American and Turkish engineers alike, competing visions of expertise equally transpired over the pace, means, and methods of highway building, and the degree of modernization those methods would come to acquire.

While the ECA, and later the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), persistently interfered with the amount of money being spent on roads (as well as where they should

\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
be built in the first place), the KGM cannily adapted their terminology to meet their interests. A 1948 report prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works suggests that the engineers were adept at changing their vocabulary from emphasizing security concerns to formulating improvement in the highway system as “a basic step in the economic development of agriculture, of productive enterprise, and of world trade.”

Echoing Diker’s original report which was premised upon notions of similitude, this latter document included a map that compared Turkey and the United States in terms of population density, road works, and area, based on degrees of semblance between the two locations. The visual aid encompassed within the request for Marshall Plan funds was accompanied with an emphasis on the salience of internal trade, the transcontinental route between Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as import and export goods catalogued by their respective regions, such as wheat, cotton, olives, tobacco, timber and corn, among others. Regions of Turkey during this period were increasingly identified by the goods they could proffer, wherein the spatial composites of the country and indices of agricultural production became interchangeable units of development. As Turkey’s role as an agricultural provider to its run-down European neighbors was being consolidated, the ECA was already in the process of circulating agricultural machinery across the country. Those goods, in turn, would inform the changes that the Marshall Plan

412 “Why Turkey Should Negotiate a Hard Currency Loan to Finance Modern Road-Building Equipment” (prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, 1948), RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder, Roads: 1948-49
413 See Figure 6
414 See Keyder, State and Class in Turkey A Study in Capitalist Development (London: Verso, 1987); A Committee of the Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization in Turkey (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953)
representatives suggested to the military-led roads program. Of additional interest to the ECA were roads built around a variety of industrial projects, such as the Zonguldak coal basin, the Ağaçlı lignite works, the Ereğli steel works and the salt works at Tuz Göllü.

While the Ministry of Public Works’ request for ECA assistance for further work on highways received a positive response, Russell Dorr, the Chief of Mission to Turkey, remained conflicted as to which agency the Public Roads Group would report to since the latter continued work on “strategic military roads,” even as the road program was being financed by ECA funds. Dorr was discomforted by the fact that the PRG appeared to be involved in “two quite distinct programs, the first under the auspices of AMMAT [American Mission for Military Aid to Turkey], the other under the auspices of ECA,” with the organizational arrangement appearing “rather anomalous.” Dorr’s discomfort with the split nature of accountability and his insistence that the PRG report to ECA instead of AMMAT, would set the tone for further disagreements about the meaning and degree of cooperation and assistance in the Turkish context.

An important point of contention exemplifying the relations between the two agencies was Dorr’s suggestion that private contractors be brought in from the US to accelerate the building of highways in Turkey. A clause allowing the use of American

415 Bakanlar Kurulunca Tasdik Edilen Devlet Yolları Ağı, Marshall Plani için Kabul Edilen Devlet Yolları, Bu Yolların Birbirile Mukayesesi The Network of State Roads Approved By the Cabinet, State Roads Approved for the Marshall Plan, a Comparison of these Roads (1949, KGM Records). Military interests were also retained in the ECA proposal, with emphasis on continuing work between Iskenderun and Erzurum.

416 Orren McJunkins (Deputy Chief of ECA Mission to Turkey) to Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu (Minister of State), November 22, 1950. Also see McJunkins to Diker, September 9, 1950. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 26, Folder, Roads-1952.

417 Russell Dorr to Ambassador George Wadsworth, August 27, 1949, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder, Roads-1948-1949
contractors had indeed been included in the original agreement at the insistence of ECA representatives who believed that “the Public Roads staff was not qualified to train Turkish engineers, administrators and laborers in administrative techniques and modern machine methods of construction and maintenance.” That lack of qualification, ECA representatives believed, stemmed from the BPR tendency to teach the Turks too much “theory” and not enough “down-to-earth training,” a problem that would be solved by bringing in American private road contractors. The PRG, on their part, opposed not only the import of contractors, but also the sale of road machinery delivered through American aid to private Turkish contractors, maintaining that the KGM hold on equipment would ensure faster construction on roads.

The American engineers were thus resolute that their task was to help build a Turkish administrative organization and provide technical assistance up to the point where Turkish engineers and contractors would be able to take over. Hiltz believed that Dorr was instead “approaching the entire road problem in Turkey from the point of view of a contractor who wants to build a lot of high-priced roads which the economy of the

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418 Lehman, “Building Roads,” p. 374
419 Memorandum on Public Roads Program for Turkey, December 14, 1949, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder: Roads—1948-1949
420 Lehman, “Building Roads,” p. 401. Private contractors had in fact been active in Turkey prior to the onset of the assistance program, with the Department of Roads and Bridges overseeing routine maintenance “on ‘force account’—i.e., by the Department directly, hiring and supervising its own labor force” (ibid., p. 398). The new arrangement gave KGM the task of not only maintenance work, but also engineering control and inspection rights over heavy construction, now undertaken by Turkish contractors, who were subject to stricter qualification tests (Robert Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” Middle East Journal, 4 (2), 1950, p. 203). As Tekeli points out, this presented the interesting situation that “while Turkey was distancing itself from etatism in broad political strokes, it was shifting from private sector to state involvement in the building of highways due to technological reasons and the internal discrepancies between the American aid groups.” İlhan Tekeli, Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernin Altyapısı Oluşarken The Plaster of the Republic: Forming the Modern’s Infrastructure (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 413
country would not be able to support.” Unlike the former experiences of the BPR in international assistance programs, such as the Pan-American Highway system which was launched in 1930, Hilts argued that Dorr’s assault on the American Road Group was indicative of “his lack of experience in handling cooperative intergovernmental construction.” Hilts went so far as to persuade Commissioner MacDonald that the PRG could not stay in Turkey should American contractors become involved.

With the backing of the BPR in Washington, Jesse Williams, who was now in charge of the Roads Group in Ankara, could inform Dorr that “under the present conditions [private contractors] would result in little acceleration of the program of highway improvement beyond that possible of achievement by the Turks themselves.” Dorr, in turn, was adamant that his organization had authority over the use of ECA-funded machinery, given priorities such as the “European recovery point of view” and “lighten[ing] the Turkish government’s burden.”

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421 Hilts to Williams, November 8, 1949. RG 30, Box 508, Folder 2
422 At the beginning of the highway program in Turkey, Hilts noted: “The conditions here are quite similar to those encountered in highway work in Latin America and I anticipate a very interesting time for the next two or three months.” (Hilts to MacDonald, December 5, 1947. RG 30, Box 509, Folder December 1947). Following the onset of technical assistance programs in the aftermath of World War II, BPR’s initiatives across Latin America were expanded to include the Philippines (1945), Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Yemen and Pakistan, to name a few (See Seely et al., “Push” and “Pull” Factors)
423 Hilts to Williams, November 8, 1949. RG 30, Box 508, Folder 2. MacDonald remained firm on this issue and explained to Turkish officials as late as 1952 that American contractors could not be employed: “It was agreed that because extremely high prices will have to be paid for their services, because, in view of the extensive construction programs being carried out in America at present that, they will not be able to bring over to Turkey the best qualified personnel, and because they will not be able to do work on a credit basis that while carrying out the program of the State Highways the services of the American contractors shall not be considered and solicited. It was stated by Mr. MacDonald that U.S. Bureau of Public Roads does not intend to build roads directly for Turkey but rather is interested in helping to build a qualified organization both for the General Directorate of Highways and for Turkish road contractors, so that they may do the work themselves.” (Memorandum: A Summary of the subjects discussed with various officials and statesmen during Commissioner MacDonald’s stay in Turkey from May 30 until June 20, 1952, KGM Records)
424 Williams to Dorr, November 9, 1949. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder: Roads-1948-1949
425 Dorr to Williams, November 15, 1949. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder: Roads-1948-1949
over private contractors might “endanger the continuance of the whole road program through the creation of a lot of bad public relations and a permanent rift between ECA and Public Roads,” these disagreements came to exemplify deep divergences in terms of the timing, pace, and methods of modernization techniques, as well as the overall well-being of the Turkish economy. Dorr, for instance, complained of the “childish” and “far-from-conciliatory attitude” displayed by Hilts and the Roads Group who “must be made to realize that the Turkish economy is our business, and that when it comes down to questions of priorities, ours must be the last word…The word ‘gradual’ (which Hiltz [sic.] kept using all the time) is no part of our ECA vocabulary.” The broader ECA concern with Turkey’s economic well-being and concomitant claims of exclusive ownership of its economy were thus mapped onto incompatibilities in terms of the pace of the technical assistance program.

Dorr seems to have been correct about the Road Group’s belief in “gradual learning.” As Hilts remained resentful of visits from American contractors arranged by Dorr, he repeated that “we were interested in educating the Turkish department in all fields so that they could eventually make their own plans and designs…I told [Dorr] that this procedure had to be handled with care and patience and that it could not be accomplished over night.” In his communications with Williams, Hilts praised Turkish trainees in the US, such as Zafer Pamir, who seemed “thoroughly sold” on the methods of

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426 Edward Dickinson, Director of the Program Coordination Division at ECA to Dorr, March 8, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 25, Folder: Roads-1950
427 Dorr to Dickinson, December 8, 1949. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 25, Folder: Roads-1950
428 Hilts to Williams, March 8, 1949. He repeated the sentiment to a representative from the American Embassy in Ankara: “It is felt very strongly that our progress depends more on working quietly and consistently so that the Turks can, the more promptly, begin to think constructively for themselves and take up the work aggressively where we will leave off.” Hilts to Killalee, March 25, 1949. RG 30, Box 508, Folder Turkey—1942-1950
cost accounting and will “take back with him some ideas that can be used.”\textsuperscript{429} Taking a close and often personal interest in the building of roads in Turkey, Hilts often wrote Diker, advising, among other things, “patience” in their proceedings: “From long experience I know the troubles that you are encountering on cost account work, and I have written Mr. Williams today that what you need most of all is patience—and then more patience!”\textsuperscript{430}

Disagreements over private contractors and the pace of road building thus pertained to the cultivation of necessary skills, competence, and knowledge to undertake the highway program. ECA discomfort with the unruly attitude of Hilts and other engineers is one dimension of the politico-technical complexities entailed in negotiations of expertise. The Administration’s efforts to enlist other agents, such as paperwork and highway equipment, in turn, are exemplary of the material devices that proved crucial to those negotiations. The ECA request for monthly reports on where funds were spent, despite Hilt’s insistence that the Roads Group in Turkey report to the “Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads and no one else,” was one instance of the enrollment of such devices.\textsuperscript{431} The head of the Administration, Paul G. Hoffmann, personally informed

\textsuperscript{429} Pamir served as a Regional Director upon his return to Turkey, and was in charge of organizing the UN Highway Training Center which convened in Ankara with the purpose of training Middle Eastern engineers on an annual basis. Hilts to Williams, September 19, 1950. RG 30, Box 507, Turkey Folders. Also see Hilts to Williams, September 20, 1950: “You well know that if those who attended the meeting at Mersin are thoroughly sold on these fundamental points that they, in turn, will be the best advocates that the Ministry can have in carrying out a well-conceived and conservative program within the funds that could be, with justice, allocated to that territory.”

\textsuperscript{430} Hilts to Diker, November 9, 1950, RG 30. Box 507. Turkey Folders. The feelings of intimacy seem to have been mutual. Personal statements from Turkish engineers were published in the \textit{Highway Bulletin} upon Hilts’ death, depicting him as a “great friend of the Turks,” worthy of his nickname “Hilts Baba” or “Father Hilts.” (3: 35, September 1953)

\textsuperscript{431} Ibid. The question of which organization the PRG was responsible to seems to have remained a point of contention over the course of several months, with Hilts making “very plain to Mr. Dorr…that we would accept no dictation from ECA in Ankara and that we were resentful of McJunkins’ attitude in his attempts

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Commissioner Macdonald that the recent isolation of ECA from the details of the Turkish Roads Group had been “ill-advised”: “Although the Bureau of Public Roads has been good enough to manage, as well as plan, the Turkish highway construction improvement programs…it is clear that ECA must at all times have rather complete knowledge of the operational plans and progress.”\textsuperscript{432} Comprehensive knowledge of highway activity required the submission of monthly progress reports, lists of equipment, and project completion dates to both the ECA in Washington and the Mission in Turkey.

Attendant to the request for carefully kept records were tensions regarding questions of visibility and reputation, attesting to the centrality of sight and exposure to the negotiations of not only expertise, but also the circulation of equipment, technical knowledge, and funds alike. The Administration insisted that all equipment procured by the BPR be “conspicuously marked with the ECA emblem” since it was “required to see that people of countries participating in the Marshall Plan be informed of the activities carried out under the plan.” The proper and conspicuous identification of ECA equipment was “obviously of major importance in this connection.”\textsuperscript{433} Dorr asked Robert Huse, the Director of Overseas Information Division of ECA, to inform the BPR of “the requirement of adequately labeling ECA financed purchases. You might also point out at intimidation and dictation” (Hilts to Williams, March 8, 1949, RG 30, Box 508, Folder Turkey—1942-1950).

\textsuperscript{432} Hoffmann to MacDonald, March 3, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 26; Folder: Roads-1950.
\textsuperscript{433} Ibid. This request was consistent with Article III of the Aid to Turkey agreement, which was signed on July 12, 1947 and marked the onset of Truman Doctrine assistance: “The Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information concerning the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. To this end, insofar as may be consistent with the security of the two countries: 1) Representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance, and 2) The Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such assistance.” United States Department of State. \textit{Aid to Turkey: Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey}. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1947)
the importance of the Road Program to the Turkish economy as a whole and the blunt fact that this Road Program is now underwritten by ECA, which fact ought also to be acknowledged publicly.”434 In other contexts, ECA representatives conceded to having been “irritated here at home by the publicity which BPR is giving to the Turkish project but never mentions the fact that ECA plays any part in making it possible.”435

Such outbursts suggest that ECA’s investment in technical aid programs was not limited to the dissemination of information or an increase in the economic value of the recipient countries’ offerings. In settings where the agency could claim ownership of the economy, given extensive investment in programs of technical aid and equipment alike, it was imperative that their efforts be acknowledged publicly and in full sight of their beneficiaries. The circulation of carefully marked machinery was to ensure exposure and gratitude in the midst of a Cold War being fought over alternatives of technical progress.436 That exposure, in turn, was undercut by the fragility of competing visions of expertise. As ECA officials questioned American engineers’ ability to oversee highway building in Turkey, after all, they seem to have remained equally insecure about their own capacity for undertaking intergovernmental cooperation.

434 Emphasis in the original, Dorr to Huse, December 2, 1949, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder: Roads-1948-1949
435 Emphasis added, Memorandum on Public Roads Program for Turkey, December 14, 1949. Similarly, Henry W. Wiens, later Acting Chief of ECA Mission to Turkey, wondered whether the Roads Group trainees in the U.S. were getting their expenses paid from ECA funds: “If so, it would seem that ECA should get special credit for this.” Wiens to Dorr, November 22, 1949. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 27, Folder: Roads-1948-1949
The respective efforts to secure expert power, furthermore, were not exclusively lodged within the sphere of administrative issues such as the employment of contractors or to whom the Roads Group ought to report on the field. Equally important was the establishment of authority through the meticulous circulation of reports, whose inscription of power was augmented through their public display and visibility.437 Following Pickering, claims of ownership over sites of intervention unfolded over a wider sphere of material objects, such as machines, records, and maps, attesting to the “temporal intertwining between nonhuman and human agency.”438 Far from serving “as a ‘backdrop for human action,’” these objects also exercised the ability to “authorize,” “permit” or “block” the various agencies, as well as “influence” and limit their spheres of action.439 In that regard, ECA yearning for public acknowledgment was not merely in response to the obduracy of the Bureau of Public Roads, which seemed to imperil the Administration’s claims at aptitude in technical cooperation. If the equipment were the conspicuous markers of progress in road building methods, the encounters between private contractors, aid officials or engineer-tutors could not unfold in a social (and political) realm devoid of material expediencies.

While the branding of machinery was one way in which the Administration hoped to secure its authority, their demands from the American engineers regarding the promulgation of practical knowledge and the submission of progress reports would in

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439 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 72
turn be projected onto expectations from Turkish engineers. While successful in making their case against the employment of American contractors, the Roads Group remained sensitive to the necessity to respond to ECA requests for use of equipment, accurate maps, and spending of funds alike. In that regard, the reputation of the American engineers was just as precarious: every time the ECA suggested that the engineers were not up to the task, they became stricter in their comportment towards their Turkish counterparts, more exacting and obstinate, leading the latter, in turn, to question the basis of their cooperative efforts.

*Engineering Time*

The Press and Public Relations Unit at the Turkish Directorate of Highways retains a plethora of reports, maps, and correspondences that catalogue the highway assistance program. The records of the weekly meetings that took place between Turkish and American engineers, spanning the period between 1948 and 1950, are incomplete and intermittent. The gaps between various communications and the missing weekly summaries of the meetings (as can be discerned through references to previous meetings that were either not recorded or could not be salvaged for archival purposes at the KGM) are telling. Dispatches pertaining to the regional directorates, it seems, did not make it to Ankara at all—a failure in centralized record-keeping that would deeply trouble the American experts.\(^{440}\) The sporadic nature of the archival record is indicative of the frailty of the demands for scrupulous documentation.

\(^{440}\) November 2, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting), KGM Records

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The standstills and disputes exemplifying the encounters between the Bureau of Public Roads and the Economic Cooperation Administration swiftly mapped onto the relations between the American Public Roads Group (PRG) and the employees of the Department of Roads and Bridges in Ankara. Once the Roads Group embarked on their work in Turkey, they enumerated their own expectations and demands from the Turkish engineers, which ranged from practices of bookkeeping and cost-consciousness to the cultivation of cooperative skills. The civil engineer who was to carry out the material reconfiguration of the Turkish landscape by delivering highways to the countryside was to re-orient himself physically, temporally, and attitudinally. He was to acquire a flair for cost analysis and be prepared to “get his hands dirty” if necessary, since the handling of spare parts and the maintenance of newly arrived machinery—and a concurrent grasp of waste, delay, and expenditure—was a crucial component of American understandings of highway expertise. The concomitant conceptions of rational organization, future-orientation, and linear thinking (as required by the maintenance of machinery, itself a byproduct of unprecedented mechanization during this period) were questions that preoccupied the American experts, who argued among themselves, as well as the Turkish engineers, who were simultaneously cast in the image of their American counterparts, subject to the same demands as the latter were, but circumvented those demands and countered with their own.

While the temporal reorientation required of the highway engineer entailed acclimation to linear thinking and attunement to future prospects alike, the prevailing mindset the Americans encountered seemed to be inflected with impatience and an excessive preoccupation with the future to the detriment of the expediencies of the
present moment. The American group committed to the vision of a nine-year plan as laid out in the Turkish division’s report, at the same time as they questioned the feasibility of such long-term and open-ended planning.\textsuperscript{441} The prospect of a decade-long plan seemed bold and impetuous, particularly given uncertainties regarding the availability of funds, equipment and classified personnel. The time of the engineer was troubling in its split display and deemed to be in need of prudence, common sense, and caution in its forward-looking dimension.

The cultivation of organized methods of road building proceeded along protracted lines, as one American engineer explained to a Turkish counterpart:

For many months back emphasis has been made on the importance of the preparation of individual Province maps showing location and physical data of all Provincial roads. Before leaving for the States Mr. Burdick advised of the need for the early completion of the maps because of their value in the orderly planning and programming of highway activities and future construction and he instructed that this phase of the work be actively carried on during his absence. Mr. Williams has recently made inquiry and expressed his concern in respect to the progress of this important phase of the work. On a recent check of the status of the progress of the mapping project I find that the work is now at a complete standstill.\textsuperscript{442}

The requests for maps, which were meant to chronicle and ensure the timely completion of highway projects contingent on ECA expectations, were commonplace items on the agenda at the weekly meetings of the Planning Unit at the Department of Roads and Bridges. In one instance, division engineer, and an often verbal presence at these meetings, Chester C. Burdick insisted that more work be done on a particular road between Aydın and Denizli along the Aegean coast, insisting that promises had been made to “the Marshall,” and that these roads had to be completed in order for aid “not to

\textsuperscript{441} Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” pp. 206-7
\textsuperscript{442} R. W. Gehring, Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public Roads to Lütfi Göze, Chief, Planning and Programming Section. September 7, 1949 (KGM Records)
be revoked.” Burdick’s specific requests for a timeline and his insistence that he had to report back to the Marshall by the next day were met with dithering responses (“we need to think about it”) and evasion at best (“that’s quite difficult”). In response to the threat that it would be “disastrous” if the map displayed plans that “cannot be completed,” Seyfi Tunga of KGM politely reassured Burdick that promises had also been made to an unnamed Minister, and that they would “work in a more rational manner from now on.”

The American engineers’ requests, interspersed with threats about withholding further aid and equipment, were usually met with assurances on the part of their Turkish counterparts. Oftentimes, the Turkish engineers committed to the vision of an administrative unit incorporating meticulous organization and rationality. One instance of the voluntary adoption of American standards was the preparation of a guidebook that outlined the principles of cost accounting in 1950. During a meeting at the Planning Unit also attended by Hilts, Diker assured his American colleagues: “I remember when I was in school. Some teachers praised us, others emphasized our mistakes, forcing us to learn what we did not know. It is thought that Turks do not like to be criticized, but once

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443 June 6, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting, KGM Records). These threats were not rare with insistence that unless definite plans were made, ECA funding would not be assured (January 31, 1950, ibid.)

444 Şen, Tükriye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci, pp. 182-3. Also see the yearly progress reports and various guidelines about inventories and road maintenance methods published by the Directorate. Inventories, in particular, were modeled after American ones. See Şehir Dişli Yollari Envanter Talimatnamesi Guidelines for an Inventory of Roads (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Şose ve Köprüler Reisiği Planalastirma Şubesı, 1948, KGM Records)
we accept that your criticisms are meant to be helpful, I don’t think my friends will be offended. When Mr. Hilts returns next year, he will notice the progress.”

In fact, Harold Hilts periodically returned to Turkey during the early phases of the program, and his months-long visits were fervently chronicled in newspapers across the country. He took time to talk to reporters during these trips, providing updates on recent developments, such as the launching of a scientific commission at the Department of Roads and Bridges, which would be equipped with the task of identifying and examining the import of economic and commercial sources. Hilts also attended the weekly meetings at the Highway Department, recounting his observations from various field trips across the country. During these meetings, he advised caution and patience to the Turkish engineers, at time same time as he admonished them of potential problems that awaited them in ten years, such as increasing volumes of traffic. With design engineer Eric Erhart complaining of the weakness of the “organization on the planning side,” Hilts insisted on the necessity for bookkeeping and contracts, which would facilitated the saving of material and having the personnel abide by standardized measures. The activities of

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445 February 16, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting, KGM Records).
446 “1948’den Yapılacak yol ve Limanlarımız” The Roads and Ports to be Built in 1948, Ulus, January 13, 1948. For reports on Hilts’ various visits, see “Mr. Hilts’ in Demeci” Mr. Hilts’ Speech, Ulus, April 7, 1948; “Mr. Hilts Gidiyor” Mr. Hilts is Leaving, Ulus, December 21, 1949; “Türkiye’nin Yol Programı” Turkey’s Road Program, Vatan, February 13, 1948; “Türkiye Yolları” Turkey’s Roads, Ulus, November 13, 1948 (where Hilts was reported as calling Turkey his “home in the Middle East”); “Memleketin Yol İ şaatını Tanzim” Arranging Road Building for our Country, Vatan, March 26, 1948; “Mr. Hilts İ ntibalarını Anlatıyor” Mr. Hilts Relates his Impressions Ulus, November 18, 1948; “Amerikan Yol Heyeti Başkanının Demeci” The Speech of the Head of the American Roads Group” Ulus, December 27, 1947; “Mr. Hilts Dün Ankara’da’n Hareket Etti” Mr Hilts Left Ankara Yesterday, Ulus, April 27, 1948.
447 February 16, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting, KGM Records). During this same meeting, Hilts was critical of the Turkish engineers’ seeming impatience and requests for additional American personnel: “I told Williams last year during my visit that the personnel shouldn’t be more than forty-eight people. When I was informed this year that the number was fifty, I accepted it as close to the number forty-eight. They keep asking us in America, why are these friends not coming back? I guess they like Turkey and you all very much.”
the regional divisions should also be monitored closely by the center, he suggested, with stricter regulations regarding accounting and the collection of reports at the center in Ankara. As Hilts observed the waste of equipment, he often offered examples of standard procedures from the Bureau in Washington, not neglecting to turn to the Turkish engineers who had just returned from training in the US for confirmation. In line with his praise for Turkish engineers who seemed “thoroughly sold” on American methods of road-building, Hilts seems to have mastered rhetorical flourishes that would help him recruit more engineers on the side of those methods. Enlisting the help of recently American trained Turkish engineers, such as Cahit Özgen who had spent time in Kansas, Hilts could swiftly revert to the “hands-off” and gradual attitude that so frustrated ECA representatives: “The only way for success is that you do your own job. You will find your own mistakes, which will help you succeed. God helps those who do their own job.”

Hilts was more vocal about his dedication to gradual methods of highway building in private communications with engineers of higher ranking. He warned Diker, for instance, about the roads being built around the Salt Lake in Central Anatolia:

You have a wonderful opportunity on this route...However, I am worried whether your old slipshod methods of handling excavation and embankment will carry over on this work. You will remember that we both commented on the excellent work that had been done by your maintenance division on one section of the route north of Konya where I told you this looked like a good American highway with 4 to 1 slopes, with ditches well removed from the roadbed, and with a good workmanlike appearance to the whole highway right-of-way. Unless you begin to instill pride into your men for the appearance of the road you will be losing a golden opportunity to achieve results for which the traveling public

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448 December 14, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting, KGM Records)
would commend you highly. I am also fearful that in your haste to get things done you will not follow your design layouts and your specifications.449

In addition to familiarizing both the Turkish engineers and the “traveling public” with the import of methodically crafted highways, modeled after American ones, commitment to realistic plans also remained a priority for Hilts: “we must continue to oppose schemes that from our experience we know cannot be carried out efficiently. We must do our best to stabilize their thoughts, and we must adhere strictly to the insistence that programmed items must be finished in workmanlike fashion before attempting to carry out other large schemes. You will never do any harm in opposing schemes which are paper schemes only.”450 Hilts’ reprimands suggest that his vision of efficiency would best be ensured by stability in thinking and practice. The KGM penchant for “paper schemes,” in turn, was indicative of hasty methods and dreamscapes at best, which prevailed at the expense of punctual, assiduous, and precise workmanship.

The American Group’s demands for bookkeeping, cost-consciousness, and orderly work can be subsumed within the contours of a rationality that harbors and prescribes a Weberian modernity. Following Manu Goswami, identifying the terrain of such practices as an increasingly rationalized modernity requires an attunement to the representational and material constellations and contexts that render them conceivable in the first place.451 In this case, the imperative for keeping records and accounts, as well as

449 Hilts to Diker, May 26, 1950. RG 30, Box 508
450 Hilts to Williams, August 29, 1950, RG 30. Box 507
451 In Goswami’s analysis, that context is industrial capitalism, given the mutually constitutive relationship between representational practices such as accounting, bookkeeping, and statistics on the one hand, and the “materiality of capitalist time (serial, cumulative, irreversible)” on the other (Goswami, Producing India, pp. 78-9). While my reading of the implications of the highway initiative at the territorial level carries a resemblance to her account of the crafting of a “unified pan-Indian political-economic space” (which is predicated on the quantification of otherwise “disparate localized transactions”), her analysis seems to
fastidious maps that were to depict the “promises made to the Marshall,” are precisely the kinds of material practices that inscribe modes of organization and spatial authority alike. Such technologies of power are readily mapped onto “a conceptual geography” that is predicated on the “legibility of accounting,” the routinization of bookkeeping, and attendant practices of codification. In the case of the Turkish highway unit, these transformations unfolded along concrete and conceptual registers alike, given their location within a regime of calculation that was to incorporate perceptions of risk, waste, savings, and profit: as a mirror image of the American administration, the Turkish engineers were expected to master and cultivate such skills, at the same time as their shortcomings continued to be the object of censure and frustration.

**Teamwork in Particular**

Despite incompatible work habits that ostensibly warranted the disciplinary demands imposed on the Turkish engineers, Thomas MacDonald, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads, praised the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed between the two groups:

> My first impression of Turkey is the similarity in thinking and effort on the part of Turkish and American people. This has resulted in the remarkable development in highway activity. I do not think that one can find any two nations that are so far geographically yet so similar and close in characteristics...Ever since I stepped foot in Turkey, I have not felt myself in a foreign country at all. Before coming to Turkey, I was in Ethiopia, Egypt and Iraq. But it is only in Turkey that I feel as though I am among my fellow compatriots in any city of the United States...I think the most important reason behind our collaboration is the emotional proximity between these two nations.  

453 *Karayolları Bülteni* 2(20), June 1952
MacDonald’s statement postulated a vision of intimacy and similarity between the two countries that found resonance in subsequent formulations of the highway initiative. In a series of speeches he delivered across the United States, Harold Hilts also praised the “characteristic cordiality of the Turkish technicians [which] eased a difficult first stage development of mutual understanding,” adding that the Turks reacted to the highway program no different than “the average American” would. As the American experts’ public renditions of the program drew on tropes of mirroring between the two countries, the Turkish engineers who participated in the training center in Washington also returned with accolades for the accommodating and cordial reception they received.

Conceived and propagated in concrete terms, the road network was expected to be a close approximation of the claims of similitude with an Americanized modernity. Such claims or the necessity to follow an American template in the construction of highways (in administrative as well as technical terms), however, was by no means uniform, revealing the necessity for further attunement to negotiations and standstills stemming from these efforts.

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454 Orhan Mersinli, who succeeded Diker as the second Director of KGM, praised the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed between the two groups in that organization’s publication: “We see now that if the people of two nations put forward their knowledge as technical professionals independent of personal gain and political aims, not only will their work result in efficient and positive results, but it will also lead to these nations to get to know, understand and love each other in intimate terms.” Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 1 (10), August 1951. Hilts, during various speeches, likened the Mediterranean Coast to Southern California and was reminded of “Kansas on a train ride between Istanbul and Ankara.” Karayolları Bülteni 1 (12), October 1951 and “Amerikalı Yol Uzmanları” American Road Experts, Ulus, December 8, 1947

455 Hilts, “Highway Planning in Turkey,” delivered at the Fall Meeting of American Society of Civil Engineers, November 3, 1949. (Different versions of that speech were delivered at the New Jersey Highway Department’s Lecture Series, the Harrisburg Chapter of Pennsylvania Society of Professional Engineers and the Utah Highway Engineering Conference). See Papers and Speeches of Harold Hilts, Office Files and Correspondence Concerning Particular Bureau Activities, RG 30, Box 4

456 Karayolları Bülteni 3 (27), January 1953 and 3 (28) February 1953. The accounts belong to returning engineers Abdullah Parla and Şükrü Kaya. The reports of other engineers in the KGM Records, such as those of Dürri Süder, Salim Somer, Ekrem Yeşilada, Haydar Sicimoğlu, Cahit Özgen and Zafer Pamir were also full of praise, citing among other things, trips to tobacco and automobile factories of interest. The Reports of those who went to America” (1949-1950) (KGM Records).
from translation, as well as the manifold frustrations resulting from bureaucratic roadblocks. While MacDonald publicly reiterated the view of the technical exchange program as a success story in collaboration, there were disagreements, among political figures, as well as other engineers, as to the applicability of the American model and the nature of the Road Group’s task at large. According to one member of Parliament, the unreflexive replication of the American template through such means as the replacement of “Makadam” roads with stabilized ones merely “resulted in errors and waste” in the Turkish case.457 A similar point of contention pertained to techniques in bridge construction, whereby changes proposed by PRG engineer Fred Hartford to replace the durable yet costly stone or steel and concrete structures with “a steel-pile bridge with timber deck and asphalt surfacing (or with reinforced-concrete deck)” were met with initial resistance.458 One returnee from the training program, Mithat Bölgen, addressed this issue in his report which objected to American bridge construction methods on aesthetic grounds: “The lattice girders used at the top of bridges in some cities ruins the view. Cities like Pittsburgh have been divided in two by such bridges and have lost their original beauty.”459 The durability of these bridges was also of a dubious nature, the engineer noted, with the linings of bridges, “which are done according to the advice Mr. Hartford gives us,” failing to retain water in rainy weather: “Whether or not this is a

457 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönen 9, Cilt 3, December 11, 1950. “Makadam” roads are the Turkish approximation of Macadam roads.
458 Lehman, “Building Roads,” p. 395
459 “The Reports of those who went to America” (1949-1950) (KGM Records). Bölgen also objected to copying American roads with no regard for differences in conditions, such as the number of pedestrians on Turkish roads which far exceeded those in the States or the Pennsylvania Turnpike, which saw a volume of traffic over the course of a week that could only be observed in a year on the busiest roads in Turkey.
problem is a separate issue. But to let the beams get dirty and the hinges wet and soiled is not right.”

Similarly, during Parliamentary debates about the Law for the Founding of the General Directorate of Highways, some members did not hesitate to voice objections to extensive American involvement in the highway initiative. Emin Sazak, for instance, took the floor with thespian embellishments:

There is one thing that causes me pain. These days, our engineers have let themselves go. When a foreigner shows up, they lose themselves. I have witnessed this many times...I cannot insolently deny the benefits of American aid; I am also grateful and obliged. But I would take their machinery, their advice, and tell them I will do the rest. Friends, if a nation cannot do its own work, it cannot say that it will live. All this needs to be done by our own children.

Following Sazak’s calls for self-sufficiency in road building, Ahmet Ali Çınar also expressed gratitude, at the same time as he questioned the influx and quantity of American engineers: “The American experts have brought a new thinking, a new understanding to our nation. I accept that. But this understanding and thought can arrive with one or two engineers, not through masses of engineers.” Çınar suggested that the foreign experts should offer suggestions, instead of dictates, since they only fully understood “the history, geography and economic conditions of their own nation.” In the aftermath of the uproar, Şevket Adalan, the Minister of Public Works, was put to the task of defending the entire aid program, and explained that the Americans were present as

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460 Ibid.
462 Ibid., p. 23
“merely consultants,” whose “knowledge and experience” the Turkish engineers benefited from, without ceding authority to them.\textsuperscript{463}

As for the Turkish engineers who were subject to this official rebuke, the first conversation regarding technical cooperation took place a year and a half into American presence at the Department of Roads and Bridges. Vecdi Diker breached the topic, suggesting that there was much to learn from the Americans, who offered their services as consultants or advisors at best, and added: “I think there are valuable experts at the center. Yet we often hear complaints; they are said to be willful, stubborn, uninformed.”\textsuperscript{464} When Diker asked the engineers if there was truth to these complaints, Mithat Özarar pointed out that “they think things are the same here as they are in America, and then they are furious with us.” Confirming the concerns raised in Parliament, Cihat Başak, along with other engineers, questioned the extent of cooperation between the two groups: “they are supposed to be cooperating with us but we treat their written requests as commands.”\textsuperscript{465} Other engineers also complained of problems in language, as well as the Americans’ lack of familiarity with Turkish conditions and their organization. While Diker was sympathetic to these grievances, he added: “We are not behind them in terms of ideas, but the problem is that we do not know how to work in systematic fashion…They have worked in American states for many years, they have much to teach us. As you know, there is specialization in America, a man doesn’t know

\textsuperscript{463} Ibid., p. 38
\textsuperscript{464} August 31, 1949, Planlama Şube Müdürlüğü Toplantı Tutanağı (The Minutes of the Planning Unit Meeting, KGM Records)
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid. Orhan Gümüşel repeated the sentiment: “they give us commands, they call us, tell us where to send the machinery.” Rüştü Üçler confirmed: “I hear that cooperation is not genuine.”
everything. You cannot call a man ignorant just because he doesn’t know outside his field.”

The American-trained Diker, who singlehandedly spearheaded the collaborative project, thus proffered explanations to appease the anxieties of the engineers in his division, anxieties that called into question the nature of the American presence. That presence, after all, could be construed as advice or command, counsel or dictate alike. In addition to conveying skepticism about the extent of their collaboration, however, the debates also amounted to a questioning of the American engineers’ level of competence and technical knowledge. Joining Dorr and critical ECA members, the Turkish engineers seemed to hold reservations about the timidity, particularization, and narrowness of the Americans’ comportment and expertise. Such assessments, however, came at the expense of the American engineers’ professionalization through their “command of esoteric knowledge, a specialized jargon by which to communicate that knowledge, and the technical skills to turn that knowledge to practical advantage.” The translation of that esoteric knowledge into “technological universalism,” after all, was precisely what secured the engineers’ positioning as the harbingers of progress and civilization across disparate sites of technical assistance, such as the Philippines, Turkey or India.

This provisional demarcation between general and particular knowledge was inscribed in the American Roads Group’s reservations about the Turkish engineers’ conduct. If the latter provided bewilderingly vague answers to requests about progress reports and completion dates for projects, after all, they did not necessarily remain quiet.

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466 Ibid.
467 Adas, Dominance by Design, p. 142
468 Klingensmith, One Valley and a Thousand, p. 75
during the weekly meetings. Williams found the meetings “exceedingly long and cumbersome;” another division engineer who was responsible for taking notes in the meetings labeled them “confused” given “considerable cross talk in Turkish and English” and explained: “In these meetings the three deputies and other Turks present participate freely and at length in the discussions, all in Turkish, whether the subject is within their jurisdiction or not or whether they are informed or not.”

While the American chairman was hesitant to interrupt the flow of the conversation, he continued, “the issues are unnecessarily confused. Should not the deputy whose function is under consideration take the lead, talk briefly and to the point, with the other two deputies ‘sitting on the sidelines’ and participating only when the question affects their sections?”

The overwhelming tension between particular and general knowledge was found to characterize the bulk of administrative processes as well. Burdick wrote a memorandum outlining the manifold obstacles that the law for the reorganization of the Department of Roads and Bridges met in the Parliament, insisting on an “intentional and planned sabotage of the Turkish highway improvement program” by a “top-bracket group of Turkish persons.”

Beckoning back to and seemingly confirming Diker’s complaints about the Department’s lack of insulation from politics, Burdick continued:

Unfortunately, each time a law for the reorganization of the Department of Roads and Bridges has been prepared by persons designated and qualified to do so, or that a law providing adequate financial support for a highway program has been outlined, it has been immediately reviewed by a group of unknown persons, and rewritten into largely unrecognizable and changed form…It appears to me that the laws so far presented…have been based on incomplete comprehension of the

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469 Office memorandum from Jesse E. Williams to all staff members. February 11, 1949; Office memorandum, Jack A. Killalee, May 8, n.d. (KGM Records)
470 Ibid.
471 Chester Burdick to Jesse Williams, March 3, 1949, Memorandum: Outline of the Provisions of Turkish Highway Finance Laws (KGM Records)
size of the highway problem, and that inadequate opinion has been substituted for factual reasoning and experience.\textsuperscript{472}

If the Turkish engineers were frustrated with the American proclivity for silence on issues that eluded their area of specialization, the Americans, in turn, did not want to hear the opinion of every passerby on questions they had little (or, according to Burdick, no) knowledge about. The qualifications of each side were put to test in this scheme, thus revealing that mastery over technical knowledge, in its particularized and general iterations alike, remained crucial to contesting visions of expertise. The capacity for collaboration, preached by the Americans, yet found to be lacking by the Turks, was thus predicated on a measure of reconciliation between two different types of knowledge. That reconciliation, in turn, simultaneously required the universalizability of road construction methods and produced detours in the very conjecture of those methods as replicable models. Accounts of similarity and mirroring between the two nations were thus revealed to be hollow vis-à-vis the universalist and de-territorialized discourse of professionalism and technical expertise.

The American conception of highway expertise necessitated that bookkeeping, rationality, and particularized experience replace “inadequate opinion,” ignorance, and “slipshod methods.” If promises made to the “Marshall” could not be kept on account of insufficiency and unreliability in planning ahead, the disorderly nonchalance that hampered the timely carrying out of plans indicated that gaps in record-keeping were equally culpable. The most important way in which those gaps were manifest was the

\textsuperscript{472} Ibid.
treatment and maintenance of machinery, which in turn, figured into complaints about the competence, knowledge, and cooperative skills of the Turkish engineers.

*Getting Hands Dirty*

In his memoirs reflecting on Cold War-era Turkish-American relations, George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador and coordinator of aid to Turkey, spoke with pride of the familiarity he observed: “Soon there appeared all over Turkey highway equipment compounds with strong iron fences and locked gates painted the same distinctive orange colour as the equipment, just as the depots are built in the United States.”

McGhee’s reminiscences underscore the centrality of highway equipment to the initiative, at the same time as they reiterate the themes of similitude central to that project. As with the problems and tensions characterizing the relations between the ECA and American engineers, furthermore, the latter’s grievances with their Turkish counterparts unfolded over the realm of road-building machinery. Given the Turkish Department’s requests for an increase in the amount of machinery circulated, maintenance units, portative buildings, and portable repair shops rapidly became visible across the country. Given the onset of mechanized highway building, however, there was the attendant problem of available and qualified personnel who were familiar with the imperatives of machinery maintenance.

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474 The amount of highway machinery in Turkey increased from 1,127 in 1948 to 1,441 in 1949 and 2,561 in 1950 and 3,812 in 1951, with the aid program bringing a total of 23.5 million dollar worth of machinery. Leyla Şen, *Türkiye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişimi Süreci*. See Figures 7 and 8

475 See *Yol Programı Makine İhtiyacını Muhtevi* for those demands (The Need for Machinery for the Road Program (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Şose ve Köprüler Reisliği, 1948, KGM Records). Also visible at this time were repair-shop equipment such as steam cleaning machines, spares for brake repair stands and blades tots, which were delivered from the States. (*Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey* Number 2, December 31, 1949-March 1, 1950)
Reports that were penned to assess the viability of American aid to Turkey frequently addressed the treatment of machinery. According to a report sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “foreign visitors to Turkey, for example, are forcibly struck by the improvidence and recklessness with which trucks, tractors and automobiles are driven, used and maintained. Trucks and tires, which in Turkey cost more than twice as much as in the United States, have an estimated average life only one half to two thirds as long.”\(^{476}\) Oil magnate Max Thornburg, who would later act as economic adviser to Prime Minister Menderes recounted: “In 4,000 miles of travel over roads in nearly every region of Turkey, the author counted eleven power-driven road rollers. Four of these were abandoned by the roadside, and apparently were stripped of accessories. Of the remainder, only one was working on an important highway job.”\(^{477}\) The problem, Thornburg proclaimed, was the lack of operators who would maintain the machinery: “No further substantial dollar requirement is likely in the near future” until the highway personnel received proper training.\(^{478}\)

The shortage of personnel was also noted in editorials published in mainstream newspapers at the time. The arrival of a “tremendous army of machinery” required the opening of specialized occupational schools.\(^{479}\) The machinery, after all, were not only indicative of a new mentality that was burgeoning in road building methods, but also required an attunement to their biological life: “If we want to deter the machinery from turning into scrap before they complete their natural life cycle, we need to breed


\(^{477}\) Max Thornburg, *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), p. 82

\(^{478}\) *Ibid.*, p. 86

\(^{479}\) Nazim Berksan, “Yollar Kanunu Görüşülürken” As the Highway Law is Being Debated, *Ulus*, January 5th, 1950
experienced personnel who know not only how they are used, but also appreciate how each one of them needs to be cared for.”480 In the lack of such personnel, the machinery would lead “abused, roughed up, miserable” lives, unable to endure until their “natural death.”481 The worth of mechanical life, in turn, was calculated in terms of monetary value: costing up to 80,000 Turkish lira by one account, and 20 to 30,000 dollars a piece by another.482

Given the frequent depiction of machinery as living creatures, whose worth was computed in dollars and liras in the public imaginary, the training of mechanically attuned highway engineers was an increasingly pressing issue. The temporal reorientation expected of the civil engineer was thus equally about encounters with machinery. Insofar as linear thinking was a necessity in the prevention of waste and unnecessary expenditure, material “things” proved central, once again, to the making of expert selves. The Turkish engineers’ future-oriented temporal outlook, otherwise rash, brazen, and impatient, was belied, after all, by their treatment of machinery. The maintenance of equipment, so intrinsically linked to questions of saving and rationally cautious behavior alike, was perceived to be alien to Turkish mentality. Spare-parts were requested at whim, regardless of gaps in written records and related repercussions:

The idea of waste in terms of not properly using equipment for the work for which it is designed is not as easily apparent to the Turk as the concept of waste of labor or materials. Thus, for example, a large truck is often sent to do a small truck’s job with no thought of the ton-mileage costs involved. Lack of standardized practices in use of equipment hampers the keeping of records and accounts on use and depreciation. When a tire blows on a truck, a replacement is frequently ‘cannibalized’—taken from another vehicle rather than ordered from

480 “Yol İnşaatımızda Yeni Bir Zihniyet” A New Mentality in our Road Building, Ulus, July 26, 1948
481 Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Türkiye’de Makine Devri” Machinery Age in Turkey, Vatan, March 5, 1948
482 “Yol İnşaatımızda Yeni Bir Zihniyet;” “İskenderun-Erzurum Yolunun İnşası” The Construction of the İskenderun-Erzurum Highway, Vatan, July 22, 1948
the equipment depot...The fact that depreciation records would be incorrect in that one vehicle would be charged for rings which it did not use while another’s records would not show ring replacement made little impression.\footnote{Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” p. 207. Robert Kerwin’s article, which was published in both the \textit{Middle East Journal} and the \textit{Journal of the Economics Faculty of Istanbul University}, incorporates anecdotes relayed to him by the American engineers. Kerwin, who had served in Turkey and the Middle East through the OSS during the war, was a Middle East Institute Fellow preparing his dissertation thesis at Istanbul University at the time. (See “Türkiye’nin Karayollarının İnişafı” \textit{İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası} 10 (1-4), October 1948- July1949)}

The interchangeability of equipment was indicative of a disregard for their proper function and life cycle alike. That frugality, in turn, suggested an evasion of grasp when it came to questions of cost consciousness, central organization, and accountability.

For all their zest and impulsiveness in the planning and building of roads, the Turkish engineers, it seemed, did not wish to “get their hands dirty.” Once again, it was the “engineer’s inexperience” that interfered with the cultivation of knowledge about proper means of maintenance.\footnote{Zeyyat İnaloğlu was the subject of fervent communication between Daniş Koper and Arthur Williamson, who replaced Mersiili and Jesse Williams as directors of the KGM and the American Roads Group respectively. (KGM Records, 1952 Communication Folders)} During the training program in Washington, at least one Turkish trainee wished to remain in the office at the Bureau of Public Roads, and refused to go out in the field.\footnote{Lehman, “Building Roads,” p. 390} Such occurrences fueled the perception among the Americans that the Turks refused to get “dirt under their nails,” given their “executive attitude” and “caste attitudes rooted in a pre-mechanical community.”\footnote{Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” p. 205} The breach between engineer and laborer was found to be persistent, particularly given the former’s perception of manual labor as “degrading”: “The men [Turkish engineers attached to road-survey crews] seem to think that because they are graduates of engineering schools they do not
have to do the minor jobs…they think the work is beneath their dignity.”

As the engineers developed a reputation as “managerial” or “desk executives,” it was hoped that mechanization would gradually diminish such attitudes by interposing “between the mass of unskilled laborers and the small elite a sizeable class of trained and skilled workers.” The favorable effects of mechanization would thus cultivate the “spirit of teamwork” prescribed by Hilts and Williams alike, and seemingly internalized by Mersinli: “we need to conceive of ourselves as a member of the group, regardless of our task, be it a driver, a worker, or an administrator…We should not weaken our team by dividing it into classes of chiefs and officers [civil servants].” Contending visions of expertise were mapped onto a division of labor that kept asunder the engineer and the worker, suggesting that mechanization could alleviate the manifestations of uneven, classed habitus.

488 Ibid., p. 387. Lehman faulted the prior training of Turkish engineers by European standards: “Most Turkish engineers, until the war, were trained in German universities and absorbed German engineering practices and views…Most of the engineers who came to the United States through the training project returned to take key posts in the Directorate, and so were in a position to extend among their colleagues their professional views and approach they had acquired” (p. 390). This seems consistent with perceptions of “mechanical work” as degrading or vulgar in the European context from the 17th century on (Patrick Carroll-Burke, “Tools, Instruments and Engines: Getting a Handle on the Specificity of Engine Science” Social Studies of Science 31 (4), 2001, p. 600). This is in contrast to the celebration of the American engineer “not only as exemplars of American ingenuity but also as innovators, managers, and planners” in the context of interventions in the Philippines or as “pragmatic visionaries intent not only on building modern projects but on making modern men” in attempted replications of the Tennessee Valley Authority in India (See Adas, Dominance by Design, p. 142 and Klingensmith, ‘One Valley and a Thousand,’ p. 82)
489 Orhan Mersinli, “Karayolu Takımı” The Highway Team Karayolları Bülteni 1 (2), December, 1950. Hilts wrote: “One of the most crucial aspects of efficiency is to work as a group. Nothing is more important than working as a team, be it in football, in industry or in the planning and building of a road network,” Hilts wrote in an article published in an architectural journal (“Yol Yapım İşleri ile Yolların Kullanılışına Ait Bugünkü Görüşler” Contemporary Views on the Building and Use of Highways, Arkitekt 193-4 (1948), p. 42). Jesse Williams echoed Hilts’ dictum, addressing his colleagues on the occasion of the third anniversary of the American group’s presence in Turkey: “In order for an organization to be efficient, each member needs to work as an important element, and everybody needs to work as a team, in collaboration, towards the same goal. That way, when the team achieves its goal, each member knows its part in the winning of the game and feels satisfied.” (Karayolları Bülteni 1 (3), 1951)
While the efforts to foster a cooperative spirit were derailed by seeming presumptions about dignity, degradation, and refusal to associate with machinery and manual labor alike, the culprit for the “caste system on construction projects” were deemed to be “significant problems which can be traced to the behavior patterns characteristic of Turkey, and to the elementary stage of its economic development.”

Such evaluations were in fact commonplace in debates about military, technical, and educational assistance projects, as well as the prospects for economic development across the country at this time. At a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, Edwin Cohn, who acted as economic adviser to Turkey under both the MSA and AID missions, attributed the lack of preventative measures to the Turkish disinclination for collaboration. He believed that such attitudes were rooted in a “short time horizon” that suggested an “inability to visualize the consequences of non-maintenance, a tendency to live only in the present and ignore the future.” Elsewhere, Cohn wrote that “the distaste on the part of the educated for manual work, for getting one’s hands dirty” had “unfavorable implications for bringing education, health, and other services to rural areas, for field work and experiment, and for establishing industries outside of metropolitan areas.” In these accounts, personal and bodily involvement with the maintenance of machinery or lack thereof became indicators of modernity and backwardness respectively.

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490 Robert Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” p. 204
The authors of the volume, *Is the World Our Campus?*, which was otherwise critical of the attitude of American scholars abroad, observed that similar problems prevailed at Ataturk University in Erzurum and the “Spring Garden Project” for an automotive repair school in Izmir.\(^{493}\) Suspicion of “applied” or “vocational” knowledge was found to imperil the prospects for the propagation of technical skills: “the average teacher of automobile mechanics prefers the classroom to the shop. ‘Once he gets his teaching certificate, said ‘Mickey’ Rathgeb, an instructor in the Spring Garden project, ‘he thinks of himself as a white collar man. He no longer wants to get his hands dirty.’”\(^{494}\)

Regardless of initial skepticism on the part of the Turkish trainees, success was bound to follow such initiatives, as the authors recounted with approval: “Cooperation replaced hierarchical subservience in student-teacher relations…Spring Garden instructors did not merely point to the engine. They crawled under the chassis and forced their students to do the same. Clean hands, the unsoiled white coat, reliance on the *Meister*, were things of the past.”\(^{495}\)

Finally, the Turkish officer who initially “objected violently to assignment to the task of greasing and cleaning equipment” would be transformed by the unprecedented effects of mechanization in the military realm.\(^{496}\) That transformation, in turn, was facilitated by the American military mission itself, which served as a “school-teaching

\(\)\(^{493}\) Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, *Is the World Our Campus?* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1960). The “Spring Garden Project” in Izmir started with ICA funds in 1955. For a detailed examination of the Ataturk University initiative, which was modeled after the land-grant university system with collaboration from Nebraska University, see Richard Garlitz, “Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950-1970,” Unpublished PhD manuscript, Ohio University, 2008

\(\)\(^{494}\) Adams and Garraty, *Is the World Our Campus?*, p. 36

\(\)\(^{495}\) Ibid., p. 21

\(\)\(^{496}\) Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” p. 204

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operation,” and helped “break down the traditional reluctance of Turkish officers to getting their hands dirty” rooted in the “old ‘Pasha complex’ which the American mission is trying subtly to eliminate.”\textsuperscript{497} The officers’ haughty attitude towards manual labor was only exceeded by the ignorance of “Turkey’s peasant soldiers” as a “U.S. instructor explained”: “Willing as the Turks are to learn, this is not something that can be corrected overnight. It’s one thing to make a tank mechanic out of an American boy who has grown up with a tractor and a combine, and another thing to make one of a Turkish boy who has grown up with a donkey and a scythe.”\textsuperscript{498}

The image of “young Turkish farm lads,” who returned to their village to disseminate methods of mechanization, in turn, was one that captured the imagination of social scientists hailing the benefits of military modernization:

They acquired new habits of dress, of cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most profound sense, they acquired a new personality. Along with the physical and social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of \textit{psychic mobility}. The military corps became, in this decade, a major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this key sector of the population a new sense of identity—and new skills and concepts as well as new machines.\textsuperscript{499}

Thus, as “the tractor” replaced the “wooden stick plough” as “the most complicated piece of machinery” the peasant-soldier ever encountered, his participation in a “modern military formation” meant that he, too, could become, “upon his return to civilian life, a qualified modern man.”\textsuperscript{500} Just as taking a survey was expected to imbue the peasantry

\textsuperscript{497} “Turks Pick up U.S. Methods Speedily” in Robert Hartmann, \textit{Uncle Sam in Turkey}, pp. 6 and 14 (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1951). The articles were gathered from Harmann’s articles published in LA Times during September 1951.

\textsuperscript{498} “Fight? Turks are Ready and Willing,” in Hartmann, \textit{Uncle Sam in Turkey}, p. 6

\textsuperscript{499} Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force” \textit{World Politics} 13 (1), 1960, p. 32

\textsuperscript{500} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 35, 29, 30 and 33
with affinity for empathy and mobility alike, teaching them “how to operate a tractor”
went beyond the acquisition of new skills: “Before the peasant can become a skilled
tractor operator, he will have to acquire a new system of habits, standards, and values
peculiar to the thinking and behavior of a modern farmer.”

The significance of mechanization is manifold in these accounts. Surmounting
technical glitches entails a temporal dimension that is simultaneously future-oriented and
rooted in the present moment, insofar as it incorporates a grasp of waste, efficiency, and
expenditure. The ever-feared breakdown of machinery, given their status as always too few and prone to unnatural decay, can only indicate a lack of comprehension of severe repercussions down the line. As machinery surface as a “powerful supplement to the
time-keeper,” expert power demands an understanding of linear, cumulative time that is
predicated on mastery over the equipment. Preventive measures take on a predictive
force, as well as a protective one against the predicaments of technological advancement.
The taming of machinery amounts to their being rendered intelligible; they are no longer
strange portents of a future inconceivable, a future simultaneously yearned for, and yet
relentlessly unpredictable. The discrepancy between desire and ambivalence can only be
partially overcome, since imagery of debris continues to ail, even if phantasmatically,
provisional attempts at modernity.

Apprehension of risk, danger, and malfunctioning, coupled with the
comprehension of probability and vigilance are thus indices of an acquaintance with
machinery within the contours of a particular regime of calculation. The machines

501 İlhan Özdil, *A Causative-Diagnostic Analysis of Turkey’s Major Problems and a Communicative Approach to their Solution* (Dissertation submitted to Ohio State University, 1954), pp. 159-60
themselves surface as “epistemic engines,” “generative of knowledge production” within that regime. At the same time, the necessity for intimate acquaintance, indeed, a personal engagement with the equipment is suggestive of the corporeal component of a mechanized conception of expertise, at the same time as that necessity reintroduces measures of detached mastery over machinery. The imperative to “get your hands dirty” is simultaneously a call for “going out on the field.” Dirt is imagined as a leveling force in this scheme, breaking down barriers of class, as against the suspect, hierarchical, and hygienic vision of expertise that otherwise seems to prevail. Not unlike the laboratory architecture that characterizes the social scientific endeavor, immediate knowledge and experience gathered from the field are privileged in this account. The field is not merely a testing venue for theories conjured up in the laboratory or a site of application for recently acquired skills in mechanization. Rather, it is central to the myriad depiction of the engineers, “working tirelessly over their drafting tables or in the field, in high spirits despite the hardships of the rugged terrain or adverse climactic conditions,” which is in turn ineluctably linked to the “diligence of bulldozer operators, graders, etc., ploughing [sic.] their way through the trails and paths which were to become the lifeline of a nation’s prosperity.”

In addition to paving the way for a prosperous nation, mechanical erudition will lead to the proliferation of edifying institutions. Not unlike the army that was presumed to function as a school of mechanized modernization, the Directorate of Highways also launched a program in Iskenderun with the aim of training machine operators. The initial

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504 Turkish Roads and Highways (New York: Turkish Information Office, n.d.), p. 4
employment of American officers as teachers in this project is telling. In the retrospective words of one participant:

This place concerned itself not only with the distribution of spare parts and the dispatch of material, but also with education. Every engineer who graduated from college would go to Iskenderun before starting duty...It was hard at first but they learned. A new atmosphere was created with this novelty and mechanization. It was this effort that raised masses conscious of the import of mechanization. Other institutions started having these training programs as well.505

As the training program in Iskenderun was hailed as the indicator of the propagation of a mechanized mindset, conceptual familiarity and corporeal intimacy with machines remained a crucial component of that particular way of thinking. If a machine was to break down and if ECA headquarters were to deliver a spare-part in its stead, the engineer ought to kneel down and show its delicacies to a group of technicians-in-making, technicians otherwise unfamiliar with the workings of an increasingly mechanized landscape. The dissolution of prevalent attitudes of arrogance, “managerial executives,” and the “Pasha complex” was thus predicated on acquiring the parley of tractors, excavators, and spare-parts.

Physical and personal familiarity with machinery, as measures of those who operated them, paved the way for designations of the engineer as a tutor of mechanization for others. In the case of the highway organization in Turkey, which increasingly prevailed as a mirror image of the American one, one could speak of an “experiment in grassroots technical assistance” that was to become a “model in the rapidly expanding sphere of technical cooperation.”506 Even the “variety and depth of the difficulties”

505 Interview with Zafer Pamir, Anlarla Karayolları Tarihi History of Highways in Memoirs (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007), p. 31
506 Herbert J. Cummings, “Turkish Highway Program—An Interim Economic Appraisal” Foreign Commerce Weekly 45 (8), November 19, 1951, p. 3
encountered in this experiment would prove illuminating “of the problems likely to arise if American assistance in the economic development of Middle Eastern countries [was] undertaken.” The prospect of setting an example to the rest of Middle East through the Turkish assistance initiative was also internalized by representatives of the Bureau of Public Roads such as Commissioner Thomas Macdonald, who expressed his desire “to do everything possible for the success of the Highway program of Turkey so that it may become an example for the neighboring countries and the whole Middle East.”

The foremost expression of the fulfillment of such desires was the United Nations Highway Training Center, which convened annually in Ankara between 1954 and 1958. The proclaimed rationale behind the Center was requests on behalf of “various Middle East countries to the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration for receiving training in modern principles and practices of highway planning, design, construction and administration,” and thus resulted, “for the first time in United Nations Technical Assistance history that a Government agency is requested to organize and conduct an international training center singlehandedly.” The training program, overseen by the Turkish Directorate of Highways and attended by engineers of Middle Eastern countries along with others, consisted of joint sessions, field trips, and specialized courses, which addressed highway administration and planning, road surveys and design, mechanized

507 Kerwin, “The Turkish Roads Program,” p. 196
508 Memorandum: A Summary of the subjects discussed with various officials and statesmen during Commissioner MacDonald's stay in Turkey from May 30 until June 20, 1952 (KGM Records). Given their previous experience in assistance programs, Hilts also believed that “this cooperative work” was to “become an inspiration to many other countries in the Middle East and will be the best contribution that the Bureau of Public Roads can make in furthering the President's Point Four Program.” (Hilts to Williams, August 31, 1949. RG 30, Box 508, Folder 2)
509 “Special Issue for the UN Highway Training Center of Ankara” Karayolları Bülteni 5 (47), September 1954
road construction and maintenance, bridge surveys, design and construction.\textsuperscript{510} The training center in Ankara was a reflection of the program in DC to such an extent that the \textit{Highway Bulletin} could proudly report the words of an Iranian participant who had inspected the American roads administration prior and marveled at the similarities he found between that organization and the Turkish one.\textsuperscript{511} During an inaugural ceremony, H. Charles Weitz, resident representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board, gave a speech that confirmed the positive assessments of the aid program and the possibilities for its extension across the Middle East:

\begin{quote}
Turkey nominally is a country which receives technical assistance, and yet in many fields Turkey is also uniquely able to provide assistance for others. In the field of Highway development Turkey has made vast strides within the past ten years, and while she still continues to work shoulder to the wheel to expand and improve her highway system in every respect, she can at the same time offer a helping hand to other countries.\textsuperscript{512}
\end{quote}

Despite and through the various trials, miscommunications, and frailties characterizing the highway initiative, then, the two organizations could be said not merely to mirror each other in administrative terms, but overlap in refractive terms in their instructional capacity as centers of expertise.\textsuperscript{513} A final expression of that conjoined capacity was accounts of the reception of the Turkish and American highway engineers across the country.

\begin{footnotes}
\item The first program only had 5 people attending (from Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). The second one had 5 participants from Pakistan, 2 from China, 3 from Iraq, 2 from Syria, 1 from Iran, 2 from Japan, 4 from Jordan, 2 from Lebanon and 5 from Egypt. The third one had 3 from Ethiopia, 2 from Iraq, 1 from Iran, 5 from Egypt, 3 from Pakistan, 3 from Sudan, 2 from Syria, 4 from Jordan. In the last one in 1957, there were 16 participants from 12 countries, adding Afghanistan to the list. \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} 5 (47), September 1954; 5 (55), May 1955; 6 (70), August 1956; and 7 (83), September 1957
\item “Special Issue for the UN Highway Training Center of Ankara” \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} 5 (47), September 1954
\item \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} 5 (55), May 1955
\item One member of Parliament went so far as to praise the Turkish Department as a “small archetype” of the American one. \textit{TBMM Meclis Tutanakları}, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951
\end{footnotes}
Intimate Encounters

The 1948 report that delineated the nine-year plan for road building in Turkey addressed the imperative of “motorization” that was found to be in need of implementation in both the highway initiative and the Turkish economy at large. The document also depicted, in detail, the onerous nature of the work that awaited the highway engineer: it entailed leading a monotonous life and working in construction sites and mountainous areas deprived of “civilized living standards,” despite its compensation with wages barely comparable to other line of work. Increased mechanization, however, would not only decrease the cost of highway building, but also ensure the propagation of technical standards necessary for working under “healthy and civilized conditions” within an organization that incorporated “western methods” and a “western mentality.”

By 1961, a promotional pamphlet entitled “Wouldn’t you like to work at the Highways?” was being circulated around Turkey. The booklet boasted of high salaries, social security provisions, and possibilities for rapid advancement and occupational development, as well as research in the United States for potential recruits to the Directorate. The promise of “comfort” and “western mentality” culminated in the description of a particular item that exemplified the tangibility of that mentality: the Highway Directorate’s acquisition of the country’s first IBM 650-electronic data processing machine, also dubbed the “Electronic Brain.” The IBM Section’s

514 *Yol Davamız: 9 Yılda 23000 Kilometre* Our Road Cause: 23000 Kilometers in 9 Years (Ankara: Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, 1948), p. 28
515 Ibid., pp. 24-5
516 *Karayollarında Çalışmak İstemez Misiniz?* Wouldn’t You like to Work at the Highways? (Ankara, 1961, KGM Records)
517 See Figure 9
employment of experts from a wide range of disciplines, in turn, was cast in terms of
developmental expediency:

In light of the mental energy, time and costs necessitated by increasing volumes
of labor, which advances alongside degrees of civilization, mechanization is an
unavoidable necessity. In order to meet this imperative, new and respectable
work opportunities are created for engineers, mathematicians, and economists in
Turkey as elsewhere in the world. The Directorate of Highways has been
organized in a very short period of time and has already reached a level of
mechanization comparable with the United States and many nations in Europe.518

Having completed its own mechanical revolution, in line with the requests of the
American experts and convictions of Turkish engineers, such as Diker, Mersinli and
Pamir, the Directorate could thus situate itself as the vanguard of modernization across
the country and inquire of aspiring highway workers: “Wouldn’t you also like to be an
outstanding commander in this outstanding army?”519

Not unlike the peasant-soldier returning from duty to his village, then, the
highway engineer was fully equipped to impart the boons of mechanization to the rest of
the nation. In one respect, their task of edification was a necessity borne out of
administrative arrangements that delegated the building of rural roads to their primary
beneficiaries, on the condition that the Directorate would provide technical and material
resources.520 Recruiting high school graduates from particular provinces for the
mechanical course in Iskenderun was one way of addressing the pressing dearth of

518 Karayollarında Çalışmak İstemez Misiniz?
519 Ibid.
520 Though the “village roads program” was addressed in the 9-year plan, it was not elaborated as a priority.
(Yol Davamız: 9 Yılda 23000 Kilometre). The Law for the Administration of Highways in fact came under
attack for not paying enough attention to villages, and leaving the great masses “to their own devices”
(TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 9, Cilt 3, December 11, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950;
Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 3, 1950)
technical personnel in villages. The Directorate of Highways’ attitude towards the rural roads program was thus one of detached paternalism, echoing Hilts’ dictums about “gradual learning” and the provision of technical knowledge: “There is no doubt that our rural citizens who have suffered from the lack of roads will work with body and soul on their own roads and succeed in this great cause as long as the government provides technical and material aid. Our task is to become their guide, to seek and find the maximum opportunity for help.”

If the highway engineer could be viewed akin to the military modernizer, previously unaccustomed to the intricacies of mechanization but familiar enough with its urgency, the engineer’s task was now to spearhead the dissemination of techniques and roads alike to otherwise remote and even less mechanically amenable rural populations. The disputes between the experts stationed at the three agencies, then, did not unfold in a vacuum or the absence of recipients whose lives the implementation of their projects transformed. It was the villagers, as well as the Turkish highway engineers, whose experience of space, time, and movement would be significantly altered, leading to an appreciation of the import of mechanization and access to roads alike. According to official accounts, that transformation was already underway, since, as Orhan Mersinli proudly proclaimed:

The grasp for the need for roads is now rooted in the character of the people…As Commissioner Mr. MacDonald of the Bureau of Public Roads has suggested, road work in a nation is a question of public philosophy. That is, if a people do not feel the need for roads and do not express that need, no matter what the administrators do, the roads in that nation will not develop…Seeing as how the wish for roads exceeds all other needs in even the most remote corners of our

521 “Köy Yolları Çalışmaları” Village Roads Program Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 1 (1), November 1950
nation, we can see that this is no longer a problem for us. As long as the love of roads prevails as it does in our nation, road administration becomes more than a service to the people, it becomes something more, something like a national treasure. Those who work on highways become the guardians of this treasure.\textsuperscript{523}

Mersinli’s statement, which extols the task of the engineer, as well as the seeming internalization of the “highway cause” on the part of the people, found resonance in mainstream publications, which depicted rural populations as the joyful recipients of road projects. Newspapers ardently reported road opening ceremonies, which were greeted by local people with “deep gratitude,” shedding “tears of joy,” as though celebrating a “bayram.”\textsuperscript{524}

The \textit{Highway Bulletin} saw the enthusiastic reception on the part of “citizens asking for roads” as a distinct measure of success.\textsuperscript{525} It was not “long examinations, analyses, interpretations” that would help explicate the “positive character of our road cause on our economic and social system.” Rather, it was the purportedly carnivalesque meaning attributed to the delivery of roads across the countryside: “The completion of roads in villages and towns result in a true atmosphere of bayram. Citizens gather in squares, playing games and slaughtering hundreds of sheep and celebrate this happy day. In the verse of local poets one can find open expressions of the deep gratification of the people.”\textsuperscript{526} In the official imaginary, the celebrations unfolded in a semi-religious atmosphere, complete with the slaughtering of sheep and the shedding of tears. The

\textsuperscript{523} Orhan Mersinli, “Yol Mühendisliğinin Türkiye’de Son Onuz Sene Zarfindaki İnşkişafıları” The Development of Highway Engineering in the Past Thirty Years in Turkey, \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} 6 (72), October 1956

\textsuperscript{524} Bayram is a word that denotes Muslim holidays (eid) as well as secular and official ones (“the Republican Bayram,” commemorating the proclamation of the Republic). \textit{Ulus}, November 18, 1949 and October 22, 1949

\textsuperscript{525} Kemal Cümbüşoğlu, “Şark, Garp, Şimal, Cenup Hepsı Vatan” East, West, North, South, All is Our Land, \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} Highway Bulletin 3 (36), October 1953

\textsuperscript{526} “Yol Davasının Gerçek Manası” The True Meaning of the Road Cause, \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} Highway Bulletin 3 (30), April 1953
festive occasion was one of enraptured communal experience, carefully chronicled in local games and poetry, and further indexing the engineer as the provider of goods to those in need.

The highway engineer’s status as the purveyor of benefits, furthermore, did not relegate him to the ranks of anonymous civil service. The immediate and intimate recognition of both the Turkish and American experts across the country was a further indicator of the success of the highway initiative: “I know that the people of Turkey, the peasants of Rize, of Gaziantep, of Diyarbakir, of Afyonkarahisar, in fact of every city and village that I have visited, want an improved highway system. We have seen whole villages lay down their work to talk to American and Turkish road engineers and beg for quick highway improvements.”

In the words of Herbert J. Cummings, the Director of the Near Eastern and African Division of the US Department of Commerce, the delivery of roads was not among the “numerous changes which peasants resist or accept reluctantly.”

The wholehearted embrace of the roads program, in turn, was contingent on an appreciation for the hardships encountered by the highway engineer:

Some [American engineers] would live in such unfamiliar places as [Elazığ], Iskenderun, and Konya. The bridge engineers and their families would for months at a time live in trailers and associate with Turkey’s real hewers of wood and drawers of water—the Turkish peasants. Few, indeed, of the Bureau of Public Roads engineers and their families were to be exposed to the rigors of Ankara’s nightly cocktail-party grind and the gossip of the capital city’s smug foreign colony…In many of the remote villages where it is doubtful whether a single inhabitant could name any of the numerous foreign Ambassadors accredited to his government in Ankara, dozens will be able to tell you when Marsh or Burdick or Hartford or Erhart of the United States Roads Group last

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527 Chester Burdick to Williams, March 3, 1949, Memorandum: Outline of the Provisions of Turkish Highway Finance Laws (KGM Records)
528 Herbert J. Cummings, “Turkish Highway Program—An Interim Economic Appraisal” Foreign Commerce Weekly 45 (8), November 19, 1951, p. 32
visited them, and, furthermore, will tell you in specific terms what the new or greatly improved road through their villages meant to them.  

In one respect, Cummings’ account preserves the Bureau of Public Roads narrative that posits technical work as distinct from the political realm. The former, after all, is suffused with instances of recognition and familiarity in ways that the secluded circles of Foreign Service officers in Ankara cannot fathom. At the same time (and in corroboration of ECA anxieties about taking due credit for the highway initiative), Cummings seems to conceive of engineering as a superior supplement to diplomatic work itself.

Amidst these sweeping declarations regarding the benefits of transportation to a modern(izing) nation’s socio-economic well-being, then, seemingly personal encounters are revealed to be crucial for designations of expertise. Despite the respective shortcomings of the Turkish and American engineers, as well as the misunderstandings that exemplified the relations between them, they did not hesitate to conceive of themselves as extra-technical experts, indeed household names, spreading mechanized means of modernity across the nation. Beyond their presumed technological prowess, their delivery of roads to remote corners of the country put them on a first-name basis with their recipients, indicating an oft-neglected component of formulations of expertise: claims to intimacy. In the case of the Turkish engineers, those claims are readily reconciled with their overall socialization away from “managerial desk executive attitudes” towards an attunement with machinery and the people alike.

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529 Ibid., p. 3. The article was reprinted in the Highway Bulletin shortly thereafter. Herbert Cummings, “Türkiye’nin Karayolları Programı ve Geçici bir İktisadi Tahlili” Karayolları Bülteni 2 (14), December 1951.
Though the peasants themselves remain nameless in these accounts, their function as eager recipients is also crucial to the self-important proclamations of the experts insofar as they would like to be perceived (and hailed) as the providers of movement, prosperity, and freedom to all. Their immediate recognition of the engineers and their reception of new roads with open arms, after all, was equally contingent on an appreciation for the modernizing function of roads, which ranged from ensuring “economic movement” and raising “the level of citizens’ prosperity” to the delivery of “doctors, medicine, modern tools and machinery; the various boons of the civilized world.”

The task of engineers, then, exceeded that of breeding technicians who could return to their villages and instruct their parents in the way of road-building and agricultural machinery: the roads they built would also bring those villages back into the nation, folding it into one along political, economic, and tempo-spatial registers alike. The material transformation of the Turkish landscape through the delivery of highways, which also captured the imagination of American and Turkish social scientists alike, is the subject of the next chapter.

530 Yol Davamız: 9 Yılda 23000 Kilometre, p. 43 and “Yol Davasının Gerçek Manası” The True Meaning of the Road Cause, Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 3 (30), April 1953
Figure 5. The 9 year highway plan, Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
Figure 6. “Why Turkey Should Negotiate a Hard Currency Loan to Finance Modern Road-Building Equipment” (prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, 1948), National Archives, College Park, Maryland
Figure 7. Road Roller operated by hand, prior to the “mechanization” of road building methods. Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey.
Figure 8. An excavator. Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
Figure 9. “Highways are the first institution to use an Electronic Brain in Turkey.” Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
Figure 10. Harold Hilts and Vecdi Diker. Archives of the General Directorate of Highways, Ankara, Turkey
Chapter 4: “It’s not yours if you can’t get there”: Modern Roads, Mobile Subjects

You may ask yourself, where does that highway lead to?
*Once in a Lifetime*, Talking Heads

In 1945, Ibrahim Yasa of Ankara University penned a monograph examining the effects of railroads on the tempo-spatial perceptions of the inhabitants of Hasanoğlan village. Prior to the extension of the railway system, explained Yasa, it took the villagers eight to twelve hours to commute to Ankara by donkey and up to fourteen hours by ox-cart in wintertime: “Today he can reach Ankara by horse-cart in three to four hours, and by train in one hour. Trucks and cars cover the same distance in three-quarters of an hour.”531 The railway, accompanied with the proliferation of other means of communication, such as “letters, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, newspapers and magazines” facilitated immediate contact with the outside world, and led the villagers to “reevaluate their idea of time and space.”532 Fifteen years later, sociologist Cavit Orhan Tütengil conducted a similar study, identifying the changing perceptions of time, measurement, and space among the population of Adapazarı, which, in his view, was transitioning from a “closed society” to an open one. In Tütengil’s text, the impetus for change was the building of highways, which enabled an unprecedented ease of travel, and brought about a “new conception of time and space. In villages and towns which are close to highways, and in places where means of transportation are punctual, ‘alaturka’ time is being forgotten. The speed with which papers spread the news is an accessory to the way in which the radio is making Turkey and the world smaller. The convergence that

532 *Ibid.*, p. 34
we see in terms of ‘time’ between the cities and towns of Turkey within the past century is captivating.”

The fifteen years that lapsed between the two studies saw the provision of American funding, machinery, and expertise for a highway network in Turkey. Highways initiated a sweeping reconfiguration of the countryside, facilitating a vast urban migration that resulted in a seventy-five percent increase in the population of the four largest cities of Turkey, and in the process, introduced “a mentality of geographical and social mobility which cannot easily be captured in statistics.” This unprecedented sense of mobility, as Yasa and Tütengil observed, also manifested itself in spatial compression, as well as the expression of space in terms of travel time. Highways were believed to grant access to otherwise remote corners of the nation, provide mobility to its members, and in doing so, shrink the distances between them, thereby allowing them to participate in a shared national space and economy alike. The beneficiaries of roads were expected to cultivate a reflexive orientation toward an imagined and empirical space of circulation, deemed to be crucial to the production of modernized subjectivities.

The primary subject of circulation via roads was the figure of the peasant as an object of intervention—one whose mobility marked him as the model subject for a new political economy. The spatio-temporal and cognitive predicates of the roads project were thus a corollary to piecemeal celebrations hailing the birth of the “new peasant,” now fully integrated into the national economy. Politicized as the participatory units of a

533 Cavit Orhan Tütengil, İctimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları Turkey’s Highways from a Sociological and Economic Perspective (Istanbul: Elif Kitabevi, 1961), p. 97
recently expanded field of multiparty politics, rural populations were expected to produce for an increasingly unified market, at the same time as they became the consumers of commodities previously unavailable in villages and smaller towns. Unlike railroads that privileged timetables for centralized production and regimented subjectivities, highways were believed to accommodate flexible schedules for volitional travel through a national space increasingly organized around the figure of the individual consumer.

In that sense, the negotiations between the engineers, ECA representatives, Turkish and American officials, which were addressed in the previous chapter, did not unfold within the exclusive purview of expert knowledge and practice. The competing visions of expertise that were implemented and rewarded by the various agencies involved in the extension of highways across the Turkish landscape need to be considered against the background of concrete and conceptual transformation of the country. These altering conceptions had a counterpart in the minds and habits of not only the engineers who were now being trained in novel and mechanized methods of road building, but also the recipients of those roads across the countryside. The transformations in the habitual comportments of the experts and peasantry, as well as the spatio-temporal coordinates of the landscape, were among the reasons why roads would literally become a conduit for modernization theory.

In the discussions of the experts and the policymakers, as well as the writings of the modernization theorists, highways were imbued with the ability to remake the peasantry precisely because they occasioned the possibility for a particular mode of liberal governance. Roads were capable of remaking the territory, demarcating and merging its discrete regions, at the same time as they induced attitudinal change for their
beneficiaries, functioning at once as a “work of state representation as well as a technical process.” The techno-political work performed by infrastructure can be located within broader (and spatialized) technologies of security in this scheme. As governmental practice, roads forced otherwise disparate units of governance into its space of circulation, whereby pervasiveness of travel would make it easier to manage the territory of the nation, as well as arrange the circulation and disposal of populations and things therein. As an exercise in liberal governmentality, the “political economy” and the “representational logic” of roads facilitate, at the same time as they intervene in the movement of people and goods alike, thereby conditioning the possibility of the emergence of new subjects, amenable to regulation, leisure, and measurement alike.

While this new rural figure was deemed to be no longer sequestered in “isolated units” dispersed across the country, however, depictions of the highway initiative were nonetheless propelled by attendant discourses about regional backwardness and civilization.

Roads, after all, could also be mobilized in the exercise of classification, control, and policing on account of their presumed civilizing import—not unlike the work they performed in colonial settings. The delivery of civilization and democratic ideals was

deemed to be particularly urgent for the remaining outposts of the country, particularly those villages in eastern provinces that denied access and defied homogenization in physical, political, and linguistic terms. Insofar as the imperative for the erasure of difference required remaking the nation’s tempo-spatial coordinates, the highway project was to pick up where Kemalist nation-building had left off with its railway-led offense into the dark corners of the country. Discourses of enlightenment thus designated the least accessible members of the nation as the primary beneficiary of roads, whose modernizing, democratizing, and civilizing import was hailed by engineers, policymakers, and intellectuals alike. The task of folding the nation into one proceeded along tangible and material registers, as well as discursive and ideological ones, insofar as the attendant project of highway-led modernization was predicated on the tangible remaking of the landscape.

Anna Tsing suggests that “roads are a good image for conceptualizing how friction works,” insofar as they “create pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of confinement.” Indeed, highways connect and bring people together, at the same time as they keep certain segments of the population asunder, given their production and perpetuation of tangible exclusions and hierarchies. The seemingly unifying function of roads captured the imagination of modernization theorists, who treated highways as their object of inquiry and the conduit for their theories. It was the extension of railways, see Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise; On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013)

539 Tsing, *Friction*, p. 6
bus service to Balgat that transformed the lives of the grocer and the chief; it was through roads that rural population surveys were circulated across the country. Yet such visions persistently neglected the restrictive thrust of highways; a corollary of their presumed ability to uplift the different and the backward, rendering them closer to more developed regions of the country in physical and cognitive terms alike.

The aim of this chapter, then, is to detail the modernizing, civilizing, and democratizing tasks assigned to roads, while not losing sight of their exclusionary, disciplinary, and hierarchical functions, as well as their unexpected consequences. As a crucial mediator for assembling modernization theory, highways were the material site through which modernization theorists, experts, and policymakers encountered existing visions of modernity, nation, and statecraft. These different understandings were interwoven with the aforementioned reworking of the figure of the peasant from regional, linguistic, and geographic other to the symbol of the modern nation in its liberal, unified, and marketized guise. That reworking proceeded in tandem with a series of modernizing imaginaries; civilizational, territorial, and commercial ones grafted onto one another through the implementation of roads. Highways, after all, were utilized to (re)make nations and subjects through overlapping exercises in circulation and discipline. Through their preoccupation with the spatial organization of bodies, goods, and ideas, they occasioned discourses of modernity and backwardness alike. As with other material objects that were crucial in the assemblage of modernization theory, however, roads,

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maps, and buses were capable of exceeding the intentions of their makers and overflowing their expectations.541

_The Path to Democracy: Rural Roads Program_

During the second annual United Nations Highway Training Center which convened in Ankara in 1955, Charles Weitz, resident representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board, delivered a speech to a group of engineers. Weitz suggested that the ease of movement of people, material goods, and ideas was one of the reasons why highways, as well as the engineers who designed and built them, could be seen as the purveyors of development: “Men and machinery must move to the sources of raw materials, goods must move freely from city to city and to all the villages as well and the produce of the farms must reach the market. Men must be able to associate freely for trade and commerce and for social and cultural ends.”542 Two years later, Weitz elaborated on the benefits of mobility enabled by the extension of highways:

Your roads are changing the face of your own country not because you are cutting down mountains and filling in valleys but because you are opening paths of communications between your own peoples. Health, education, economic activity—progress—are theoretical concepts so long as people are land-locked and unable to come together and move freely. You are offering to the remote villages and towns of your own countries a host and range of social activities which were feared and impossible before people could move easily to and from the villages.543

Weitz’s speeches exemplify the ways in which connotations of “modernity” and the construction of roads were coupled in the reports, accounts, and publications of Turkish and American experts and officials alike. The provision of roads, in particular to the

542 _Karayolları Bülteni_ Highway Bulletin 5 (55), May 1955
543 _Karayolları Bülteni_ Highway Bulletin 7 (83), September 1957
countryside, was construed as a civilizational necessity, one that would deliver increase in education and access to an “open society.”\(^{544}\) Highways were framed as the “blood vessels” of the nation and the “coil spring” of economic movement, facilitating the creation of national markets and the uplift of culture alike.\(^{545}\) Roads were the conduit for national unity, as well as commercial, economic, and agricultural development, an overall increase in life standards and tourism flows.\(^{546}\)

Highway engineers themselves postulated a conception of roads as the solution to all problems ailing developing countries: “every nation wants to attain prosperity. It is now understood everywhere and by everyone that the fastest and surest way of delivering prosperity and accomplishment to nations is via roads.”\(^{547}\) Though conjured as indices of progress and modernity, roads were also believed to extend and provide passage into the past, dating from “the first caravan routes [which] linked the great population masses in Europe with those in Asia,” they “broke down barriers of time and distance,” and “hastened man’s progress by promoting the exchange of ideas and making the movement of goods easier and cheaper.”\(^{548}\) If the road industry was “one of the prizes of our present day civilization,” the quest for highways was a perpetual and insatiable one: building

\(^{544}\) “Karayolları Çalışmaları” Work on Highways, Arkitekt (Volume 253-4), 1954, p. 245
\(^{546}\) Yavuz Abadan, “Yol Siyasetimiz” Our Road Politics Ulus September 5, 1948; 1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor, pp. 8-9
\(^{547}\) Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 6 (70), August 1956
\(^{548}\) Highway Transportation in Turkey (Ankara: Turkish General Directorate of Highways, 1957), p. 1
roads bred the need for more, attesting to the timelessness of their function and desirability alike.\textsuperscript{549}

If the history of roads could substitute as a curious sign of their modernity, they could also be invoked in forging a democratic people.\textsuperscript{550} This was particularly evident in the dissemination of the highway network in the context of the transition to a multi-party regime, whereby the nation’s “democratic will” became the foremost “guarantee that the road cause will be completed.”\textsuperscript{551} Thus, an engineer explained, it made sense for the highway project to come at the expense of railroads, which had been emblematic of the landscape under the Kemalist nation-building process (exemplified in the popularized phrase, “Demir ağlarla ördük bu vatana”/“We wove this country with webs of iron”), but had failed to complete the task of democratization.\textsuperscript{552} It was roads that ensured the travels of “civilization,” which was, after all, suffused with “ideas of democracy”: “Countries without roads, where cities, towns, villages are not connected, and where the people do not engage in close relations with one another, can never become forward nations, and democracy will not develop in such places either.”\textsuperscript{553} Roads were to enable the crystallization of new forms of political consciousness, dissolving obsolete allegiances and static hierarchies, whereby the individual choice of political party would map onto the individual choice of alternative modes of transportation.

\textsuperscript{549} Ibid; 1948-1960 KGM Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor Report on the work of KGM between 1948 and 1960 (KGM Records), p. 49
\textsuperscript{550} See Nicholas Dirks, "History as a Sign of the Modern" Public Culture 2 (2), 1990
\textsuperscript{551} Kemal Cündübyoğu, “Türkiye’nin Yol Davası” The Road Cause of Turkey, Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 5 (50), October 1955
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{553} Şevket Rado, “Türkiye’nin yol davası hal yoluna girmiştir” Turkey’s Road Cause is going to be solved. Akşam, October 12, 1950
A tangible component of the democratizing thrust attributed to roads was the emergence of the peasantry as a decisive political contingent during this period. While the US-aided highway project was initiated when the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) was still in power, its expansion continued under the reign of the Democratic Party (DP, 1950-1960) when “party politics [were] frequently tailored to woo the agrarian sector.” In that regard, the politicization of the peasantry not only coincided with, but was also the crucial impetus behind DP’s rise to political power. Self-avowedly attuned to the “ideological and economic aspirations in the countryside,” and in particular, the rich and middle strata of the peasantry, DP could readily fault their predecessor for having failed to fulfill the promise of the Kemalist maxim, “the peasant is the master of the country.”

CHP’s seeming mistreatment of rural populations had been particularly pronounced throughout the 1930s, which set the stage for etatist attempts at industrialization contingent on the “extraction of agricultural surplus.” The Second World War saw further stagnation of agricultural prices, conscripts from the agricultural labor force, and ensuing disillusionment with the government on the part of the peasantry. Following a series of failed educational reforms, CHP’s final attempt to reestablish a rural electoral base was the Land Reform Bill of 1945. Though moderate in

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554 Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 132
555 Çağlar Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” *New Left Review* (115), 1979, pp. 16-7. On DP members’ presentation of their party as “finding the most genuine echo in the conscience of Turkish villages and villagers,” see Taner Timur, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş: The Transition to Multi-Party Life in Turkey* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 34
556 Faruk Birtek and Çağlar Keyder, “Agriculture and the State: An Inquiry into Agricultural Differentiation and Political Alliances: The Case of Turkey” *Journal of Peasant Studies* (2), July 1975, p. 446. While this arrangement briefly benefited the wheat-growing middle farmers, the allliance between this sector and the government had come to a halt by 1936 (*ibid.*, p. 457).
scope, the Bill contained the infamous Article 17, which sought to eliminate landless peasantry by targeting absentee landlords and redistributing their land to the tenants and sharecroppers working on them.\footnote{Ibid., p. 460; Faruk Birtek, “The Rise and Fall of Etaatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semiperipheral Economy” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 8 (3), 1985, p. 424} The Land Reform Bill was approved in June 1945 but never fully implemented: its gradual reversal would mark the beginning of a series of concessions to landowners on the part of an apprehensive CHP on the eve of the 1950 elections, which ultimately removed them from office.\footnote{One such concession was President Inonu’s approval of Cavit Oral as the Minister of Agriculture: Oral had previously condemned the Bill as a dangerous “extremity.” This appointment was in stark contrast to Inonu’s initial enthusiasm for the Bill, to the extent of denouncing those MPs who opposed it as “not his own.” See Yahya Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950) An Economic History of the Republican Era (Ankara: Yurt Yayıncılık, 1982), pp. 327-31} 

An unintended but cardinal consequence of the Bill was a permanent rift within CHP, leading to the formation of DP by Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes in 1945. Menderes, himself a landowner from the Aegean region, would become Prime Minister in 1950, having first displayed his oratorical skills in his strident critique of the Land Reform Bill in Parliament. Those skills were later (and conversely) employed in the crafting of DP’s brand of “populist democracy,” facilitating Menderes’ courtship of the rural vote.\footnote{Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, pp. 328-9. On Menderes’ populist democracy, see Reşat Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1949-1961” Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993). For a fine-grained account of Menderes’ life and career, leading up to his hanging by the military junta in 1961, see Şevket Sürreyya Aydemir, Menderes’ in Dram, 1899-1960, Menderes’ Drama (İstanbul: Remzi, 1960)} That populism, in turn, found expression in inflationary policies such as credits and price support programs that favored the agricultural sector, as well as Cabinet programs that purported to prioritize improvements in infrastructure and transportation for rural areas throughout the 1950s.\footnote{Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, pp. 128-34. See the Program announced for May 22, 1950 and March 8, 1951 cited in Faik Kirbaşlı, 1920-1972 Döneminde Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yörelere İlişkin Ala}
The alleged relationship between roads and the march of democracy mapped onto the seeming contrast between the DP populism which relied (and thrived) on rural votes and the CHP legacy of paternalistic nation-building. DP’s populism, in turn, was faulted with a tendency to “exploit village romanticism” which exacerbated “the division borne by the expressions, villager and urban.”\(^{561}\) A more sinister expression of this romanticism, according to Aydın Yalçın of the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University, was its failure to provide rational solutions to the “village cause”: “Instead of providing coolheaded explanations, objective analyses or realistic measures, they settle for fanciful commentary, imputations, and utopian advice…Our task is to leave aside fantasy and utopia; to abandon the vulgar and cursory solutions offered to this problem; to start benefiting from the lessons of science and experience.”\(^{562}\) Scientific thought demanded that barriers between the village and the city be removed, by means of “a government policy that is supported and driven by an enlightened public opinion,” and in particular, by speeding up urbanization through an improved transportation system.\(^{563}\) The extension of an all-weather road network was imperative for “[shortening] the distance between the townsman and the villager;” a process intimately linked to democratization, which ensured that the latter would be “respected, taken into account,

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\(^{561}\) “Şehirli ve Köylü Hakkında” About the Urbanite and the Villager Forum 4 (47), March 1, 1956, p. 5.

\(^{562}\) Aydın Yalçın, “Köyü Kalkındırma Muamması” The Village Development Conundrum, Forum, 4 (43), January 1, 1956, p. 13-4

\(^{563}\) Ibid., p. 14
and have his ideas inquired after.”

Frequent contact with the “outside world” would reduce the discrepancy between urban and rural populations, expediting the urbanization of the villager.

The continuing rift between the urban and rural parts of the country, particularly conceived in terms of access to roads, was seen as the culprit for the country’s persistent underdevelopment by Turkish and American social scientists and policymakers alike. Kemal Karpat cautioned that “the dual social structure of the village-city will continue for a long time despite the pace and influence of industrialization.”

Edwin Cohn observed that “the educated Turk from the city tends to look down on the villager, whom he considers to be ignorant, lazy, and dirty, while villagers, in turn, do not concede the city man the superior status to which he thinks his education, clothing, and style of life entitle him.”

The urban Turks, in this narrative, did not desire to learn about their rural counterparts, “perhaps because these aspects remind them painfully of how backward much of Turkey remains.”

As the peasantry came to stand as a sign for all “backwards” aspects of the country, the sharp contrast between the city and the village was only accentuated by the rise of provincial towns (itself a consequence of the dissemination of highways); towns that appeared to be “amalgamate patterns” between the rural and the urban, and yet faced both directions perplexingly: “The face which is turned in the direction of the city is the economic face of the merchant, the trader and the small-scale

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564 Aydınl Yalçın, “Türkiye’de Demokrasi” Democracy in Turkey. Speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University. Forum, 10 (119), March 1, 1959, pp. 7-8
565 Tütengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 116
566 Kemal Karpat, “Köy Kalkınmasının Esasları” The Principles of Village Development. Forum 7 (81), August 1, 1957, p. 15
567 Edwin Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change: The Development of a more Prosperous and Open Society (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 82
568 Ibid.
entrepreneur, as well as the government official. The face that remains turned in the direction of the village, is the face of the mind, the face of social custom and tradition, including particularly religious belief and observance.\textsuperscript{569} The divergence between the rural and the urban, hallmark of theories of modernization, was a customary item in Parliamentary debates about administrative issues pertaining to road building. The Law for the Department of Highways and Bridges, which delegated the building and maintenance of rural roads to their recipients, for instance, came under attack for leaving the great masses “to their own devices.”\textsuperscript{570} This abandonment, according to Kazım Arar of Çankırı, did not go unnoticed by villagers who refrained from expressing gratitude to DP for the delivery of roads: “We all know how CHP used to build village schools. They had them built through force, pressure, and collective labor. This new method that is being used today is the same one that was responsible for the dissolution of the CHP.”\textsuperscript{571} Against the objections that the law assigned the task of building urban roads to the state to the detriment of rural ones, other Members of Parliament pointed out the danger in distinguishing between the two since each road in the country should belong to every one of its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{572} Kemal Özçoban, a proponent of the view that it was inevitable for villagers to abandon villages lacking


\textsuperscript{570} TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Parliamentary Records, Dönem 9, Cilt 3, December 11, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 3, 1950 (Ankara)

\textsuperscript{571} TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 9, Cilt 28, February 4, 1954. The reference is to the employment of local students in building Village Institutes, a short-lived CHP experiment in the uplift of rural populations. For an insightful account, see Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1998, 25 (1), 47-73

\textsuperscript{572} TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950
hygiene and cultural opportunities, came under attack for calling attention to the 
indigence of villagers and inciting a difference between urban and rural populations 
during a debate that was otherwise exclusively about roads. “I have traveled a lot and 
have never seen prosperous villagers,” Özçoban defended himself: “Their life standards 
are much lower than those of civilized people; they are sick and in pain. They are far 
from levels of civilization.”

According to Kemal Zeytinoğlu, the Minister of Public Works, the villagers were actually willing participants in a division of labor that accorded 
them the task of building their own roads so they may attain levels of prosperity and 
civilization comparable to their urban counterparts: “On the contrary, they [the villagers] 
tell me that the province offices are late in delivering technical and material aid and they 
entreat me to mediate on their behalf so that assistance can be delivered. The truth of the 
matter is that we are unable to provide the necessary personnel, equipment and machinery 
to meet our villagers’ desire to build the village roads.”

Regardless of these pledges, the “village roads program” that both parties seemingly committed to during their terms in power remained incomplete: by 1960, only 11,000 kilometers out of the goal of 
150,000 kilometer-long rural roads had been built.

Despite continuing derailments in their delivery, roads were nonetheless believed 
to posit a corrective to the dearth of “civilization” characterizing rural settings. It was 
highways, so enthusiastically coveted by villagers according to the Minister of Public 
Works, which were capable of transmitting “culture, democracy, and technology” to 

573 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950; Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 3, 1950 
574 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 8, Cilt 24, February 1, 1950 
575 A new organization called The General Directorate of Road, Water, and Electricity took over the task of 
building and maintaining rural roads in 1965. Şen, Tükrıye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci, p. 169
villages: Ignorance would leave the countryside traversing the same paths that carried
teachers, medicine, and books.\textsuperscript{576} The extension of the “road network” was not only
inseparable from “social and economic development,” after all, but also had to be
“coupled with efforts for national education.”\textsuperscript{577} Villagers, otherwise, were doomed to
remain “outside of time”: “Thanks to the development of transportation means, all
nations benefit from new discoveries immediately but in our villages, the years go by
without a trace.”\textsuperscript{578} Since problems of backwardness, ignorance, and disease were linked
in the minds of policymakers, the civilizing thrust of roads also pertained to their capacity
to purvey immediate benefits, such as “modern instruments and machines, which are the
boons of the civilized world.”\textsuperscript{579} Access to “better schools, better medical and hospital
care,” as well as “better seeds and improved farm implements” via roads was bound to
render the villagers grateful: “to him good roads constitute a new horizon; and his hopes
for a better future, at least for his children, have been aroused.”\textsuperscript{580} The tangible benefits
of roads, extending back into the time of caravan routes could also be evoked as a
projection onto future times. Generational overturn would ensure continuity between a
recently democratizing landscape and impending promises of mechanization, hygiene,
and education.

The modernizing thrust of roads was thus crucial for providing outreach to rural
populations, particularly those secluded in the less developed outposts of the country. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{576} “Köye Gidecek Yol” The Road to the Village, \textit{Hürriyet}, September 2, 1950
\item \textsuperscript{577} Tütengil, \textit{İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları}, p. 161
\item \textsuperscript{578} Süha Somer, “Ana Davalarımız” Our Primary Causes, \textit{Vatan}, March 6, 1948
\item \textsuperscript{579} “Yol Davasının Gerçek Manası” The True Meaning of the Road Cause \textit{Karayolları Bülteni} Highway
Bulletin 3 (30), April 1953
\item \textsuperscript{580} Herbert J. Cummings, “Turkish Highway Program—An Interim Economic Appraisal” \textit{Foreign
Commerce Weekly} 45 (8), November 19, 1951, p. 32
\end{itemize}

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addition to breaching the gap between urban and rural settings, highways were to “bring the isolated rural villages and provincial towns into direct contact with the national or ‘great’ society.”  

This entailed attunement to and an identification of the parts of the country that otherwise appeared to be “social oases,” waiting to be integrated with the rest of the nation.  

It was the “breakthrough” in transportation that would generate the “final change from one thousand Turkeys to one,” liberating these “severed cells” from the remote lives they were otherwise doomed to lead.  

Capable of providing “access to areas that had been isolated both economically and culturally,” roads would also facilitate their possession, categorization, and regulation.

**Of Maps and Regions**

A publication commemorating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Directorate of Highways includes an anecdote by Tahsin Önalp, a mechanical engineer who accompanied Ralph Agnew of the Bureau of Public Roads on a trip across Van and Hakkari in Eastern Turkey during the early phases of the highway initiative. During a stop at a coffeehouse, Önalp recounts, Agnew overheard a conversation and inquired as to its contents:

> I did not know how to respond, and blushing I said: ‘Mr. Agnew, I could only understand what you understood.’ Our citizens in that neighborhood spoke every language but Turkish (Arabic, Farsi, Kurdish) and yet they did not understand Turkish. This truth made me realize what Halil Rifat Pasha, the Governor of Sivas, meant when he said ‘it’s not yours if you can’t get there,’ and why it was...

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581 Haluk Ülman and Frank Tachau, “Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy”, p. 154

582 Tütengil, *İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları*, p. 131


that we of the Highway Administration have chosen this meaningful maxim as our motto. Years later, when I visited Hakkari again, I saw that our highway district facilities were the most valuable work of art in that magical and beautiful corner of the nation and hearing that Turkish was also being spoken in the streets, I was delivered from a great embarrassment.585

The colonial undertones of the roads project is palpable in Önalp’s account, and is further encapsulated in the KGM motto, “it’s not yours if you can’t get there,” which often decorated the header of Highway Bulletin issues. The statement is predicated on an assumption of possession: the ease of travel to otherwise inaccessible regions of the country will ensure their ownership. Yet, curiously, the negation entailed in the statement suggests a degree of recognition, perhaps resignation, with regards to an originary state of lack that interferes with access and ownership alike. Önalp’s concession to his personal embarrassment is also telling in this regard: his own modernity, premised on the possession of modern state territory, is revealed to be hollow, as he comes to terms with his fraught and uncertain standing as a modern subject. Given the prevalence of incomprehensible and foreign (perhaps even archaic, in the modern(izing) engineer’s mind) languages, the motto opens with a concession to that which refuses to be folded into the nation. The present tense of the formulation is a statement to the expediency of that refusal, but also an indication of the engineer’s certitude in the success of his task. The scheme of possession cannot be postponed to a future time: the urgency is pressing; the unruly persistence of difference a problem to be tackled in the present moment.

The irreconcilable differences that characterized “Eastern Turkey,” with its foreign populations, customs, and languages, loomed large in the minds of those who

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envisioned highways as equipped with the power of social transformation. The persistence of difference was particularly urgent in contexts where “Turkish culture, even Turkish language have not penetrated.” These areas presented a glitch in “the solid linguistic uniformity of the rest of the country,” and would have to be brought back into the nation. Roads, after all, were conceived not only as an infrastructural service to the people but an investment in the creation of a new Turkey: “the road has a remarkable role in eliminating the spirit of resignation, scant living, separatist differences, backwardness, and sectionalism, in short, our social and economic contrasts.” It was for this reason that the Directorate of Highways should set an example to other “government agencies” in the country: “From the laborers to the high ranking engineers, all the members of this organization share an enthusiasm that comes from the knowledge of working with modern techniques, and they have a work ethic that conquers Anatolia again.”

As the engineers, too, reconciled themselves with the task of assimilating wayward portions of the country, the kinship between their task and military conquest came to characterize depictions of new highway projects, such as the road between Rize and İspir along the northeastern coast: “In our national struggle, we were saved from enemy servitude. In this new struggle, the great men of the highways have introduced the automobile from Rize to İspir and have gained a new victory. In this great war with mountains, we move closer to our target each day, thanks to our compressors which

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586 Turhan Feyzioğlu, “İki Türkiye” Two Turkeys, Forum, 1 (7), July 1, 1954, p. 8. By one account, this was particularly true of regions to the east of Euphrates, with Kurdish being spoken by 65% of the people, followed by Turkish at 27% and other languages at 8% (Tütengil, İctimal ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 134). See Figure 11
588 Tütengil, İctimal ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 163
589 Ibid., p. 136
sound like rifles.”  The building of highways, especially in the Eastern provinces of the nation, was often framed in terms of forays into foreign territory; an imagery that was also confirmed by American observers readily proffering points of comparison: “A road linking the eastern border provinces with the open Mediterranean ports of Mersin and Iskenderun would, for example, be of great value by either yardstick. East Turkey is, like the old American West, a pioneer region less developed than the rest of the country.”  If Eastern Turkey was open territory waiting to be acquired, its conquest necessitated the creation of new spatial structures, namely roads.  Given their designation as alien territory, eastern provinces were to be rendered accessible, knowable, and controllable. The planning unit at the Directorate of Highways, for instance, carefully studied the population density and economic values of each region of the country; studies that were dispatched to the eleven regional divisions within the Directorate.  The ordering of the material landscape was occasioned through a series of representational practices, such as maps that identified areas of economic interest in the country. The demarcation of the country into regions entailed their classification and comparison in terms of developmental progress. Regional categorizations were accompanied with the ranking of different sections of the landscape, as well as its transformation along conceptual and material registers. If regional maps were productive of “spaces of modernity,” their circulation also entailed the making and application of knowledge pertaining to spatial

590 Lütfi Yeleşen,  Karayolları Bülteni 4 (38), December 1953
591 Robert Hartmann, “Turkish Production Boosted by ECA” in Uncle Sam in Turkey (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1951), p. 29
594 See Figures 12 and 13
Knowledge of space, in turn, assigned regions to designated grades within a developmental scheme. The task of these maps surpassed that of supplemental mediums necessary to secure and display the authority of the governing apparatus: they were classificatory exercises that occasioned the possibility for the crafting of such authority in the first place. Conjured as efforts to conceptualize space as “abstract, homogeneous, and universal in its qualities,” the effects of these maps amounted to a spatial and social ordering with material and palpable consequences.

One such map that amounted to an exercise in cartographic ranking was a byproduct of the Rural Development Research Project of USAID and the Turkish State Planning Organization. A report associated with this project aimed to gauge the existence of “attitudinal regions” within “several Turkeys.” The behavioral units, compiled through indices such as relative isolation and living conditions, broadly overlapped with the geographical regions of the country, at the same time as they imposed a developmental scale between them. “Region,” explained Frederick Frey, the main rapporteur of the survey, is a “concept that in some ways has more interest for the policy-maker than it does for the social scientist.” It was for this reason that an account of regional differences, pertaining not merely to “a different topography, different climate,

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595 Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*, p. 191. For more on the work maps do in terms of representation, classification, and control, see James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* and Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*
596 Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 254
597 Frederick Frey, *Regional Variations in Rural Turkey* (Cambridge: CENIS, 1966), pp. 4 and 1
598 “Usually the Aegean and Marmara Regions display the greatest degrees of village development or modernity, followed by the South Central, Mediterranean, North Central and Black Sea Regions in an intermediate position, with the Northeastern, East Central and Southeastern Regions generally being in the least developed or least modern position.” *Ibid.*, p. 9. For a customary overview of the geographical regions in Turkey, see Besim Darkot, *Türkiye İktisadi Coğrafyası* Turkey’s Economic Geography (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Coğrafya Enstitüsü, 1967). Also see Figure 14
599 Frey, *Regional Variations*, p. 3
and different level of economic development,” but also “a different psychological atmosphere” would prove to be “critical for the policymaker.” Of particular concern to the policymaker invested in the developmental progress of rural populations should be “the village’s remoteness from the nearest regularly travelled road, the nearest kaza (prefectorial) center, the nearest railway station, and the nearest city over fifty thousand, plus the length of time the village is closed in by weather conditions,” as well as “proximity to the west and coastal location.” Given these distinctly spatial measures of development, persistent underperformance of Eastern regions, particularly the Southeast, was troubling for those surveying regional development in conceptual and concrete terms alike.

Mastery over space was thus predicated on identifying and measuring the developmental gap between different parts of the country, given “centuries of difference” between eastern provinces and their western counterparts. If this time lag meant that Eastern Turkey was backwards in terms of its hygiene, civilization, and economic development, highways were once again conjured as the solution to the region’s distinct lack of development—hence the investment of more than 55 million liras by the three eastern highway administrative units and the building of 2,451 kilometers of roads in the region between 1950 and 1953. In the words of one engineer, such investment was “a numerical harbinger of the social and economic development of the East...The East, in a

600 Ibid., p. 34
601 Frey, Regional Variations, pp. 11, 10
602 Kemal Çündübeşoğlu, “Şark, Garp, Şimal, Cenup Hepsı Vatan” East, West, North, South, All is Our Homeland Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 3 (36), October 1953
603 “Doğudaki İllerimizin Kalkındırılması İçin” In order for our Eastern Provinces to Develop, Ulus, September 3, 1948
nearby future, will stop being the subject of gloom and grief, and will become a new source of respite in our hearts.”

One way to ensure and accelerate the progress of the region was the short-lived “Eastern development project,” which was approved by the Cabinet on May 10, 1949, with a budget of 10 million Turkish liras allocated to the Ministries of Public Works, Education, and Health. Though the three Ministries prepared separate reports on the region in the period building up to the project’s implementation, not only were their responsibilities seen as interrelated, but priority was accorded to all-weather road networks in quantitative, as well as qualitative terms. In the words of Tahsin Banguoğlu, the Minister of Education: “As you know, our eastern provinces are backwards in terms of civilization and economic development. A primary cause is the scarcity of means of transportation. The first condition for assessing land productivity and for establishing civilized institutions and facilities in these regions is building roads.” Once again, the provision of roads would by necessity precede the delivery of hospitals, schools, and agricultural organization.

Though a commitment was made towards allocating 13 million liras for a second year of the Eastern development project, it was prematurely terminated in 1950. The

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604 Cündübyoğlu, “Şark, Garp, Şimal, Cenup Hepsı Vatan”
606 Out of that 10 million, the Ministry of Education was allocated 1,940,000 Liras (for school buildings and teacher housing), the Ministry of Public Works 5,260,000 Liras (for all-weather roads between Nizip and Silvan, Rize and Erzurum, Bitlis, Hakkari, and Ağrı, among others), and the remaining 1,200,000 was given to the Ministry of Health (for local health centers and a traveling hospital. TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 8, Cilt 19, May 9, 1949 (Parliamentary Records). Some of the money appears to have been spent on housing for civil servants in Diyarbakır, Mardin and Urfa. See “Doğu Kalkınma Planı Gerçeğleşiyor” The Eastern Development Plan is Implemented, Ulus, January 1, 1950
607 “Doğudaki İllerimizin Kalkınması İçin” For Our Eastern Provinces to Develop, Ulus, September 3, 1948
608 Doğuda Yapılacak Yeni Yollar” New Roads to Be Built in the East, Vatan, October 21, 1948
project’s abandonment was politically charged, echoing the mutual accusations between DP and CHP with regards to the rural roads program, whereby heated discussions in Parliament provided panoramic overviews of policies pertaining to the “Eastern situation.” Nihat Erim of CHP claimed that the hasty abandonment of the project was instigated by Members of Parliament who believed that it merely perpetuated assumptions of difference between the western and eastern parts of the country. Members of DP, in turn, faulted CHP for its long-standing neglect of the East, with Mustafa Ekinci of Diyarbakir, insisting that the Eastern development project was merely a ruse to console the people of that region, “whose lives of neglect, injustice, and cruelty, is reminiscent of the Middle Ages.”

CHP partisan Aydın Yalçın protested that such indictments only aided the separatism, specifically the “Kurdism” that ultimately benefited the Soviets: “There have always been uprisings in that region. Dersim is fresh in our memory. But it was CHP that took railways and the sleeping car,” along with social development, peace, and order to the rest of the East:

Naturally, sheikhs who perform miracles by handing out amulets to women and feudal lords who collect money by forcing people to drink horse urine will not be pleased with the awakening of the innocent people in their clutch; they will provoke and try to preserve the mentality and life of the Middle Ages…This behavior will only increase as long as the Democrat Party people continue their blind and narrow-minded propaganda.

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609 Nihat Erim, “Yol Davamız” and “Doğu Bölgesi Yolları” Our Road Cause and Roads in the Eastern Region, Ulus, April 18, 1951 and February 23, 1952
610 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 9, Cilt 14, June 28, 1950

The Dersim uprisings of 1937-38 and ensuing atrocities on the part of the Turkish state, including the displacement and deaths of tens of thousands of Kurdish and Alevi subjects in the region, were erased from official narrative in the following decades.
As with charges of romanticism against DP’s populist rhetoric, regionally specific policies were seen as the culprit for exacerbating, rather than erasing the differences between urban and rural, western and eastern parts of the country. If the latter was crippled with obscure “ways of thinking, traditions, and value orientations,” at best frozen in time, the timeless remedy of roads could readily be summoned by policymakers. In response to claims about feudal sheikhs reigning over eastern villages, DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes demurred: “as long as roads are extended, electricity and water are delivered to villages, as long as tractors and other machines enter the villager’s life, these people will no longer get carried away with superstition.” Leaving the realm of superstition, in turn, amounted to entering the space of the nation: DP’s 1951-54 cabinet program identified rural roads and schools, especially in Eastern Turkey, as the government’s “locus of action,” given the imperative of “mobilizing our youth around the ideal of ‘Nation.’”

Despite the abandonment of the Eastern development project, representatives of the region continued their lobbying for state-funded roads during yearly Budget meetings. It was the difficulty of transportation and the climate conditions severing Kars from Central Anatolia that resulted in price differentials between that city and Ankara, one Member of Parliament insisted. The city of Muş suffered from similar problems of desertion and deprivation, its delegate Ferit Kılıçlar explained, as it did not have access to agriculture, art, commerce, civilization and health, especially given its isolation during

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612 Tütengil, İc̦timai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 134
614 Kirbaşlı, 1920-1972 Döneminde Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler, p. 111
615 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951

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winter months. "The dreariest scenes” one encountered in the East came at the
“expense of making Ankara beautiful,” a favoritism that spelled not merely regional
differences, but also the persistent segregation between rural and urban settings.

The debates about the delivery of highways thus unfolded during a time when
mainstream, official, and social scientific discourse addressed the imperative for uniting
different portions of the country. That unification required not only the elimination but
also the discursive delineation of particular “problems” or “issues”—hence the
widespread circulation of phrases such as the “Eastern issue” or the “rural problem,”
themselves counterparts to and rendering necessary “causes” to rally behind, such as
transportation or tourism. Allusions to the Eastern issue were markedly elliptical in
nature, with occasional acknowledgment of linguistic difference substituting for the
otherwise unspoken (and unspeakable) “problem” of Kurdish populations. The
ineffability of the “Kurdish question” necessitated that it be cast in terms of regional
underdevelopment in lieu of ethnic difference—a gesture of erasure that would
characterize intellectual and public discourse throughout the following decades. The
seeming abstraction that characterized the delineation of such problems was leveled with
the particularity and materiality of the solutions proposed to counteract them. The

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616 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951
617 “ Doğu Vilayetleri” Eastern Provinces Hürriyet, November 14, 1948
increasingly spatial and regional nature of the “problems” carved up by journalists, policymakers, and experts led to the depiction of roads as fulfilling the promise of moral hygiene and uplift, as well as the possession of otherwise inaccessible parts of the country. “It’s not yours if you can’t get there,” the highway motto read. The “there” was a region marked by inscrutability but one that could nonetheless be folded back into the nation, contingent on the ease of travel and access.

It was expected, then, that villagers, especially those residing in the East, would be greeting their saviors with open arms and tears of joy, given the promise of modernity, democracy, and prosperity associated with roads. That promise, in turn, was contingent upon the assumption of a profound lack characterizing those regions—a lack so patent and pressing that parliamentary records, newspaper editorials, and academic publications were devoted to its articulation and elaboration alike, even in circuitous terms if necessary. Villages were accordingly depicted as the dark corners of civilization, desperately in need of reform and progress by way of their inclusion in the nation—especially in regions where difference in identity and language persevered and was deemed to be in need of erasure. The efforts to tame, civilize, and enlighten particular segments of the population thus required a project of unification that was increasingly conceived in terms of spatial and colonial conquest. The foremost expression of that unification was in the realm of the market.

A New Type of Farmer

On August 24, 1950, Jesse Williams, head of the American Roads Group in Turkey, enclosed a booklet in a dispatch to Harold Hilts, the Deputy Chief of the Federal Bureau of Highways in Washington. The booklet was a companion piece to the highway
pavilion on display during the 1950 Istanbul Fair and depicted the unprecedented flow of goods and people across the country, starting from Kayseri, expanding at Kırşehir in Central Anatolia, before reaching Istanbul via Ankara, Bolu, and İzmit: “The band almost doubles itself in Turkey in Europe, and thins out as it goes through [Lüleburgaz] on to Edirne. It is full of hidden meanings.” The sense of obscurity attributed to the highway system may appear curious in light of the connectivity and openness it was expected to convey. The booklet elaborated: “One of the posters in this pavilion refers to idiomat meaning of the term ‘lack-of-roads’ (yolsuzluk) which means in Turkish ‘improper doings’ in a general sense, and notes that a nation with roads (yolu olan) shall no longer suffer from the ‘lack-of-roads’ (yolsuzluk).” The most patent way of circumventing “yolsuzluk,” as demonstrated by “other posters of the same booth,” was to submit to the fact that “prosperity comes through roads—in the economic, social, cultural, and military development of the country, the increase of passable roads increases exchange—the increase of exchange increases consumption and the increase in consumption brings about prosperity.” The highway pavilion, which was a source of fascination and item of correspondence between the American engineers was unambiguous about the various functions assigned to roads. On the one hand, the mystifying increase in traffic volumes was likely to evoke a sense of disarray given the speed with which exchange and consumption spread throughout the country. Yet, the seemingly unparalleled rate of circulation could also present a corrective to improper conduct on account of its orderly invocation and delivery of prosperity.

619 “The State Highways: A Report from the Highway Pavilion,” enclosed in Williams to Hilts, August 24, 1950, RG 30, Box 507
620 Ibid.
The promise of prosperity, so intimately identified with the extension of the highway network, took on particular import in the milieu of drastic transformations in the political economic landscape of the country. Deeply rooted in DP’s move towards a liberal restructuring of the economy under the auspices of American advice was the belief that “the market was the mechanism to deliver material benefits” and “transportation facilitated market access.”

Highway transportation would increase the distribution of production across space, functioning as a counterpart to the distributive powers of capital itself. The roads project was a guarantee in the “development of the internal market”: “Not only did this programme accelerate the marketing of peasant production, but it also helped create a new concentration of small non-urban capital around the leading sector of automotive transport.” Capitalist expansion, however, remained distinctly rural in character, with highways operating as the “infrastructure through which the positive externalities of state expenditures were distributed to rural interests with sufficient economic base.”

In that regard, these developments were consistent with DP’s promise to “aid the birth of a [class] of capitalists in agriculture.”

The broader context for the emergence of this agrarian mode of capitalism was the period of unprecedented exchange between Turkey and the United States. In the

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621 Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 120
622 İlhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernin Altyapısı Oluşurken* The Plaster of the Republic: Forming Modernity’s Infrastructure (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 343
623 Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” p. 22
625 Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” p. 19. In fact, the marketization of certain segments of the peasantry dated back to the 1920s, when the “middle farmer stratum was beginning to grow a surplus, and the large farmers were tightly integrated into the world markets.” (Birtek and Keyder, “Agriculture and the State,” p. 451). Nevertheless, this was a low-level marketization and the “entire period between 1929 and 1945 may be characterized by the closure of isolated villages when agricultural stagnation implied a substantially decreased level of economic integration with both national and world markets” (Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 129)
aftermath of the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the initial aid agreement with the US also addressed the need for “the movement of agricultural, mineral, and other products to domestic markets and to Turkish ports for export to countries in urgent need of such Turkish surpluses as food and coal.”\textsuperscript{626} After all, postwar economic reconstruction required Turkey to become a source of agricultural goods for Europe, further necessitating the development of highways. American experts concurred that transportation was the answer for “every possible advance in Turkey, whether for development of agriculture and industry or for improvement of health, education and other social and political goods”: roads, in particular, helped “reduce the psychological barriers to the spread of scientific knowledge and modern ideas, thereby facilitating economic growth as well as cultural and political development.”\textsuperscript{627} Insofar as American aid itself “carried specific instructions extolling the virtues of a market-based world division of labor,” then, “both American aid officials and DP politicians aimed at complementing rural development with a road network designed to facilitate the marketization of agricultural products. The government invested in infrastructure, and the motor car was to integrate the national market.”\textsuperscript{628}

The roads project was viewed as not only an indispensable component of Europe’s economic reconstruction, but also a “test of Turkey’s real intentions about economic development”: “A simple all-weather road, adequately maintained, between a fruit and sugar growing area and a preserving and shipping point might in one season

\textsuperscript{626} United States Department of State, \textit{Aid to Turkey: Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey.} (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 7
\textsuperscript{628} Keyder, \textit{State and Class}, pp. 127-8
return more foreign exchange than would be needed to pay the whole cost of the road and the vehicles which used it.”

Roads were expected to raise levels of productivity, public purchasing power and consumption of goods, in addition to “strengthen bands of interest and understanding between city and country dwellers.” They would grant access to the nation’s hitherto “unprocessed sources of fortune,” opening up new regions with rich sources to habitation.

The “peaceful economic revolution” spawned by all-weather highways was most visible at the rural level: “More and more the peasants of the interior are able to bring their products to market and thus to obtain money with which to buy the manufactured goods from the cities to raise their own standards of living.” Opening up the country to “the benefits of modern commerce” was a palpable consequence of “this penetration” in a setting where “82 per cent” of the population lived in “small villages.” Problems of isolation, lack of access, and integration in physical and linguistic terms would thus be addressed by increasing networks of commercial connectivity. Given the incentive to grow crops for the rest of the country, the villager would be invested in other parts of Turkey: the crafting of a national imaginary, discussed in the previous section in terms of regional unification, also entailed investment in one’s neighbors through the terms of production.

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629 Thornburg, *Turkey, an Economic Appraisal*, p. 86
631 Ibid.; Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 344
632 Russell Dorr’s speech in the wake of his departure from Turkey. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 41, Folder: Russell Dorr Speeches.
633 *Highway Transportation in Turkey*, p. 3
634 Ibid.
The imagery of villagers producing “cash crops for distant markets” in the midst of this sweeping economic integration was one that captured the imagination of social scientists and policymakers alike. The heightened degree of connectivity facilitated price uniformity and an unprecedented sense of speed in the circulation of staples and commodities alike, at the same time as this mobility remained circumscribed in regionally differentiated terms. The seemingly incessant circulation of trucks was the foremost expression of the new division of labor between the country’s regions: “Along the main highways trucks are moving fruits, vegetables, wine, and fish from producing areas, especially the Çukurova and Aegean to Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and secondary cities and transporting a reverse flow of manufactured goods from Istanbul and other industrial centers for use on farms, in construction activities, in other industries, and for personal consumption.” In the midst of dizzying rates of transportation, the historically “bashful peasant” was “awakening” and “demanding service in return for his vote;” his entry into the “money economy for the first time” would prompt accounts of the emergence of a “new type of farmer.”

635 Helling and Helling, Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach, p. 10. Priority in extending the road network was in fact accorded to areas of concentration of economic activity across Western Turkey. Reports on early project completion dates included the road between Pendik, Gebze and Izmit, just outside of Istanbul or the road between Akhisar and Gördes, which would deliver the industrial and agricultural goods of Izmir and the Aegean region to Central Anatolia and back to the port of Izmir (Karayolları Bülteni Highway Bulletin 1(3), January 1951). For a more detailed account of the prioritized roads in Western and Central Anatolia in the initial 9-year program, see Tütengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, pp. 34-7 and Şen, Tükriye’de Demiryolları ve Karayollarının Gelişim Süreci, pp. 130-33. Also see figures 15 through 18

636 Daniel Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, pp. 29 and 56

637 Howard Reed, “A New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey” Middle East Journal 7 (1), 1953, p. 35; Tütengil, İçtimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkçe’nin Karayolları, p. 50; Edwin Cohn, “Turkish Development 1922-57,” Background Paper for the First Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, October 14, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records); Ülman and Tachau, “Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy,” p. 154
The most arresting depictions detailing the emergence of the national market addressed the new farmer. Journalist Robert Hartmann, who mainly reported about Turkish-American military cooperation during the Korean War, recounted a specific encounter with a peasant whose life was seemingly transformed by roads: “One such beneficiary is Gazi Esen, a 32-year-old farmer who works 100 acres of wheatland along the highway. Gazi owns his land and hires a couple of hands for the harvest, now in full swing all over Turkey. His house of mud-plastered adobe brick stands at the edge of the new road…With the new road, he can easily transport his surplus melons to market not only in the nearest village, Ahiboz, but also to Ankara.”638 By another account, the sale of surplus produce was not only made easier by relatively swift access to wholesale markets in nearby cities, but also through wholesalers’ increased ability to drive their citrus fruit-loaded trucks to distant villages in spite of previously debilitating weather conditions.639

A speech delivered by Russell Dorr, ECA Chief of Mission, on the occasion of his departure from Turkey, summed up the effects of the “expanding economy” in the “hypothetical case of a peasant in Central Anatolia”:

For the first time a year-round highway has penetrated his region. Three years ago it would have taken him days of difficult travel to reach a city. That made the idea of selling food to the city a little remote, if not possible, for him. Therefore there was no incentive for him to raise more than his own needs and those of his immediate community. Now he can get to the city or he can send his crops there more easily. He can get money in exchange for his crops. With the money he can buy household utensils, tools, furniture—any of the things that put together add up to a higher standard of living for himself and his family. Therefore he has the incentive to grow more, to open up new fields if necessary or to try to raise the yield of his present land. Along with the incentive, he now has the means to grow

638 Robert Hartmann, “Turkish Farming Being Modernized” in Uncle Sam in Turkey (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1951), pp. 25-6
639 John Kolars, Tradition, Season, and Change in a Turkish Village (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 113-4 and 187
more—the agricultural tools provided through the agricultural banks at low interest rates….raises standard of living.640

In Dorr’s account, the extent and pace of roads’ transformative powers is indistinguishable from other dimensions of the American aid program. In the case of the hypothetical Central Anatolian peasant, the specific benefits of the highway project are palpable: a new capacity for incentive, investment, and possibility of movement is bestowed upon him. All-weather roads enlarge the scope of movement not only for his crop, but also the goods he has acquired, goods that will spell higher standards of living upon his return to the village. Though the acquisition of agricultural tools and furniture is primarily intended for his family, the peasant’s face is also turned outward, whereby the barriers between him and the rest of the nation are seemingly surmounted. The unprecedented sense of mobility is not only posed as a corrective to previous problems of isolation and self-interest, but also occasions the emergence of a new type of farmer. Now deemed a force of democracy, and no longer sequestered in the outposts of the country, the new peasant is also marked by the changes in the tools he acquires and uses. The homogenization of the space of production and circulation, in turn, is reflected in the material reconfiguration of the country, given the simultaneity in the “accelerated temporal circulation of capital,” and of “cultural imaginaries.”641 One measure of that acceleration in material and conceptual terms was its expression in terms of savings and efficiency, mediated, in turn, through new means of transportation such as the truck and the bus.

640 Russell Dorr’s speech in the wake of his departure from Turkey. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 41, Folder: Russell Dorr Speeches.
641 Manu Goswami, Producing India, pp. 39 and 106

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In 1939, geographer John Morrison prepared a monograph on the village of Alişar in Central Anatolia, a text that would serve as a model for the conduct of rural sociology in Turkey throughout the following decades. The newly launched railway line, Morrison explained, transformed Alişar’s “external relationships,” drawing the village “into the national economy.” Morrison added that an “all-weather highway from Şefaatli eastward through the middle of the Kanak Su basin” was now a growing necessity due to the development of the grain trade; yet the primary task of such a highway would be to “expedite the movement of grain to the railway.” In the period that preceded the implementation of the roads project in 1948, Morrison was not alone in depicting highways as a “supplement” to railroads in a division of labor that accorded the latter the task of long-distance haulage. The portrayal of roads as appendages to the main mode of transportation in the country was a recurrent formulation in law proposals that depicted them as “arteries” or “tributaries nourishing the railways.”

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643 Morrison, *Alişar*, p. 104

644 Ibid., p. 105

645 Tekeli and Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, p. 381

The relegation of roads to a subsidiary role was customary practice throughout the 1920s and 1930s when the railway network functioned as an “infrastructural element for the Etatist economic program.” The valorization of highways as singularly equipped with the task of national and economic unification was not one that resonated in official and public discourse at the time. The budget set aside for railways in a 1947 economic development plan which was prepared with the aim of securing Marshall Plan funds, for instance, exceeded the funds for roads by four times. The proposal was consistent with the commonly held view that it was railways that would ensure national integration and “congruity of the national economy.” According to one account that otherwise hailed the development of roads, railways were equally capable of “spreading science, wisdom and civilization to the dens of ignorance in the nation,” and in particular of contributing to the reconstruction of Eastern Anatolia by removing the ongoing lack of order in that region. Bill proposals regarding the extension of railways into Eastern territories emphasized that it was through this mode of transportation that “the difference between eastern and western provinces [would] disappear.”

649 Mühendis Nazır, “Demiryollarımızda Nakil Ücretleri” Transportation Costs in Our Railroads Kadro (32), August 1934, p. 13
650 Tütengil, İletim ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, pp. 28-9

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The relatively abrupt reversal in the favored mode of transportation was accompanied with the assignation of new tasks and capabilities to highways.\textsuperscript{652} This was partly due to recent changes in the political economic landscape, wherein highway construction was deemed to be to the new “organizational form of capitalist accumulation,” “what railways had been to the Etatist expansion.”\textsuperscript{653} Another reason for the increasing popularity of highways was their association with speed, savings, and efficiency, especially when it came to intraregional circulation within the country, given their ability to transport perishable goods, minimize distribution costs, and offer wider geographical coverage than trains.\textsuperscript{654} In his 1948 report which spearheaded the highway initiative, Harold Hilts explained that highways could not only be built for lower costs, but would also ensure door-to-door delivery and faster haulage relative to railroads.\textsuperscript{655} The claim, popularized by the reports of the American experts, that railways somehow lacked the “flexibility and extensiveness of highway transportation” now found expression in Parliamentary debates: if priority had been given to roads during the early

\textsuperscript{652} It should be noted that comparisons between the capabilities of trucks, buses, and trains were being debated as early as the 1930s. See Muhlis Etem, “Otobüs ve Kamyon Nakliyatı ve Bunların Demiryolu Nakliyatıle Mukayesesi” Bus and Truck Transportation and Their Comparison with Railroad Transportation, \textit{İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası}, 10 (61), 1933 and Vedat Nedim, “Demiryolu Tarife Siyasetimizde İnkılap” A Revolution in our Railway Pricing Policy \textit{Kadro} (32), August 1934, p. 13. I would like to thank Selim Karlıtekin for drawing my attention to these texts.

\textsuperscript{653} Birtek, “The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey,” p. 436


days of the Republic, some argued, the nation’s “economic visage” would be much more
developed by the 1950s.\footnote{Edwin Cohn, \textit{Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change: The Development of a more Prosperous and Open Society} (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 55; \textit{TBMM Meclis Tutanakları}, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951. Proponents of this view of belatedness were MP’s Himmet Ölçmen and Ahmet Tokuş}

The changing perception about the potential of roads and the lamentation of their
previous underutilization vis-à-vis railways could be expressed in quantitative terms as
well. In 1950, highways were responsible for 32.5\% of the haulage of goods across the
country, with 63\% of that task performed by railways. By 1970, the percentage that roads
were transporting had increased to 73.9\%, as opposed to the 25.8\% overseen by trains.\footnote{Tekeli and Ilkin, \textit{Cumhuriyetin Harcı}, p. 444. Between 1950 and 1956, the amount of goods transported by highways increased from 957,059 tons per kilometer to 2,234,229. During the same period, the number of highway passengers increased from 2,597,311 to 12,910,634. See Türkiye Karayolları Istatistik Bülteni, 1958 cited in Geoffrey Ireland, \textit{Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi} The Administration of Highway Transportation in Turkey (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1961)} The increase in haulage also proceeded from the belief that roads contributed to savings
by preventing waste and spoilage. During the year 1952 alone, the official publication of
the International Road Federation declared, “the Turkish government estimates that its
road program saved it and the people of Turkey 72,800,000 dollars.”\footnote{\textit{World Highway Report} 4 (16), September 1, 1952, p. 10} Keeping with the
narrative of public enrichment, “unestimated were the countless millions saved by
farmers, consumers, and shippers and the increased productivity resulting from better
roads.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The truck was the primary medium for this rhetoric of efficiency in the context of
rural marketization: as the purveyor of “material and moral values alike,” it indexed the
renewal of the country.\footnote{İltimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 42.} If the truck was the symbol of economic unification, enabling
the likes of Gazi to bring his surplus melon to the nearest city, the task of transporting people in an equally orderly manner fell to the bus. Like the truck, which displaced the train and the obsolete oxcart that preceded it, the bus became the unmistakable means of reduction for intra-city travel time and costs alike.\textsuperscript{661} The relatively frequent departure time for buses, as well as more convenient routes for pick-up and drop-off, increasingly made them the preferred mode of transportation, at the same time as they contributed to the shrinking of distances across the country.\textsuperscript{662} One consequence of the growing visibility of trucks and buses was the expression of distance in terms of temporal categories.\textsuperscript{663} Travel time between Ankara and Istanbul was reduced from 15 to 6 hours between 1948 and 1959; that between Ankara and Iskenderun from 21 to 9 hours.\textsuperscript{664} The assessment of distance in terms of hours and prices can be considered within the purview of what Harvey has termed “space-time compression,” the increasing temporalization of space taking on an ephemeral and dilated nature alike.\textsuperscript{665}

Though the compression of time and space would appear to be imbued with a sense of acceleration beyond comprehension, the elusiveness of speed is tempered with the certitude of its measurement in terms of duration.\textsuperscript{666} That certitude is predicated on the mastery over nature and the prospect of territorial stability alike: remote corners of the

\textsuperscript{661} While the express train took 23 hours to travel between Ankara and Istanbul, the truck covered the same distance in 10 hours. Haulage costs, in turn, were 13 and 8 Kuruş for the train and the truck respectively. As for passenger transportation, the bus cost 25 Lira as against the first class train rate of 85 Liras, with travel times of 8 and 14 hours respectively. Ireland, \textit{Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi}, pp. 254-5

\textsuperscript{662} \textit{Tütengil, İctimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları}, p. 79

\textsuperscript{663} Between 1948 and 1959, the number of buses increased from 2,198 to 8,291 and trucks from 10,596 to 36,919. Planlama Fen Heyeti Müdürlüğü cited in Ireland, \textit{Türkiye’de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi}, p. 262. See Figures 19 through 22

\textsuperscript{664} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 258

\textsuperscript{665} Harvey, \textit{The Condition of Postmodernity}

\textsuperscript{666} Virilio, Paul, \textit{Speed and Politics}. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1977)
nation, otherwise impenetrable over lengthy stretches of wintry months, are now permeated with the imperative for openness and swift exposure. The contraction of the landscape is instigated by the mounting circulation of goods, people, and capital insofar as proximity itself is measured in terms of efficiency. The people of Balgat finally attain the bus service to Ankara they have been coveting. Coal uncovered in Ereğli reaches its destination in Zonguldak. Newspapers of Istanbul are delivered to the denizens of Edirne. Each novelty is a step towards condensing and commanding the space of the nation. But the conviction and expansive logic of modernizing roads (simultaneously upgrading the methods of road building and administration, and imbuing roads themselves with a distinct civilizing capacity) readily exceed regional and temporal circumscription. Measures of space are formulated not merely in terms of travel time, but also in terms of the tonnage of material atop trucks, the cost of inter-city bus transportation, and profit-generating capacities of door-to-door delivery, presumed, in turn, to exceed the abilities of railway haulage. At the level of individual perception, the compression of space is presumed to have the effect of telescoping the layout of the nation. Once unable to identify the neighboring cities within one’s province, residents will now be able to accommodate far-flung regions within their dreamscape. That dreamscape, in turn, will be rendered amenable to leisure, travel, and amusement, as well as greater familiarity with other members of the nation.

Leisurely Times

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667 The daily Hürriyet started the first distribution service in 1955—a truck would leave Istanbul at 3 am and deliver copies of the newspaper to Edirne by 7 am. Tekeli, Cumhuriyetin Harcı, p. 423
The discourse about the efficiency of the new buses readily morphed into discussions about their comfort. As was intimated in the booklet accompanying the highway pavilion, the increasing acceleration and mobility associated with roads was capable of producing ease and orderliness, as well as disarray and bewilderment. The *Highway Bulletin* acclaimed the comfort of newly launched bus services between İzmit and Istanbul.\(^{668}\) Members of Parliament marveled at the smoothness of the ride: “There was a time when I considered myself fortunate when it took me eight hours to commute between Antalya and Burdur. There were times when the driver would curse the day he was born and sob. The last time I traveled, it took me 50 minutes, not a single jolt.”\(^{669}\) Even Eastern provinces benefited from the transformation, according to Feridun Fikri Düşünsel’s account of the trip he took between Bingöl and Elazığ: “I did not feel a single jolt; if it were possible I would have been able to drink tea on the bus.”\(^{670}\)

The smoothness of the bus ride was no doubt permeated with connotations of access and uplift in the minds of policymakers. The convenience of travel indicated that provinces previously deemed to be frozen in the Middle Ages could now be targeted for moral and temporal reform. Consider Rudolph Mrázek’s depiction of colonial road building in Indonesia: “The newness, the hardness and cleanliness—it was the roads’ modernity. Cleanness of the roads, in this logic, was purity of times, democracy even, we might say…New roads through Java and in the whole colony, to Kartini, were to be fully made of progress, and, as long as they were made of that hard and clean stuff, nothing

\(^{668}\) *Karayolları Bülteni* Highway Bulletin 5 (52), April 1954
\(^{669}\) *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, Dönem 9, Cilt 5, February 25, 1951
\(^{670}\) *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre 9, Cilt 28, February 25, 1954. Tea is a customary treat on intra-city buses today.
could stop the wheels. The jolt-free ride and the attendant promise of cleanliness would deliver the peasants from filth, backwardness, and slavish deference to the authority of tradition. The lack of bumps on the trip, the reduction of agony for the driver, and the desire to consume tea on the ride were also indicative of a novel sense of pleasure associated with travel. Signs of comfort accompanied this new conception of leisure, crucial in the context of the initiative for a tourism industry, which is the subject of the next chapter.

The awakened peasantry was thus to cultivate a penchant for spare time activities, rather than passively await the delivery of doctors, medicine, books or manufactured goods to their village: hence romanticized depictions of the peasant traveling in his free time in order “simply to pass the time of day,” “go to a motion picture” or “see wrestling matches” thanks to the dissemination of highways. The desire to travel and “investigate new avenues for pleasure and enjoyment” would eventually lead to the building of “bars, restaurants, and tea gardens,” especially in prosperous rural regions. For those with “extra time and income,” amusement was no longer at the exclusive disposal of the city dweller. The mobile farmer, who found his way to the market thanks to his newly acquired truck, was also expected to participate in the exercise of this novel and self-

671 Mrázek, Engineers of Happyland, p. 8
672 The Directorate of Highways was quick to perform its part in the immediate aftermath of the passing of the Law for the Encouragement of Tourism, publishing a bulletin called the Touristic Roads Program. The extension of all-weather roads was promoted as a precondition for the spread of hotels, restaurants, and service stations given the nascent transcontinental, as well as domestic tourism industry. See Turistik Yollar Programı Touristic Roads Program (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1951) (KGM Records)
674 Kemal Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages” Social Research 27 (1) 1960, p. 95
675 Ibid.
chosen leisure. It was for this reason that inquiries after spare-time activities began to populate surveys targeting rural populations, as well as students and administrators.  

Leisurely conduct was necessarily coupled with practices of conspicuous consumption. Social scientists carefully chronicled the new items decorating the shelves of the new grocery stores in villages and small towns. Peasants, now equipped with the means to transport their excess produce, also had access to commodities previously deemed unimaginable in rural settings. A geographer studying Boğacıca recorded the array of items that arrived from the neighboring city of Antalya by way of peddlers and artisans: “cotton seed, fertilizers, silkworms, bread, fuel, tools, clay, hardware, tiles, window glass, candy, dry goods, cotton cloth and so forth.” Tütengil, the sociologist of highways, observed new brands of cigarettes, margarine, soda, canned and baby food, bar soaps and toothpaste, among others in Şile outside of Istanbul. Lerner’s Balgat boasted not only of its infamous grocery store, but also a clothing shop in the “newer part of the village, just across the new road from the ‘bus station’”: it displayed “dungarees, levis, coveralls,” and “ready-made suits, shirts, even a rack of neckties.” As the tangible benefits associated with roads broadened to include luxury items, depictions of the peasantry, too, came to address their covetous and curious conduct.

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677 Kolars, Tradition, Season, and Change, p. 111
678 Tütengil, İctimali ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, pp. 125-6
679 Lerner, Passing, pp. 39-40
The villager, otherwise deemed to be “intuitively distrustful of the ‘outsider,’” appeared to acquire a “yearning for communication,” surely “a symptom, too, of a nascent confidence in life and people.” The frequency and regularity with which he could visit town, after all, brought him into “weekly contact with the Westernized ways of the urban population,” whereby “the terminal of the overland bus lines at the cobblestone corner has joined the bazaar, and in part replaced it, as a center for urban-rural communication.” The transformative effect of highways exceeded that of other means of communication in this scheme:

Railways, airplanes, the telegraph and telephone, the press, and even radio seem to have been trivial in their force compared to the real revolution created by the motor vehicle. The peasant appears to need tangible evidence of previously unexperienced and strange phenomena introduced to him from outside his environment—to need to see and touch—before he believes. Moreover, the ideas emanating from the newspaper that is read to him or from the radio on the coffee house wall are always very strongly filtered through a cognitive screen manufactured from his own limited experience…such selective interpretation is much less able to mitigate the impression that visiting the town or city and seeing things with his own eyes, feeling it with his own hands, and stumbling over it with his own feet make on him. The development of road transportation in the past decade or so has made this experience possible for untold villagers who formerly remained immured behind mud-brick walls even though only five miles from town. This change in road transport may be the real heart of the communications revolution that has unquestionably struck Turkey in the last few years.

Functioning as the vessel of unmediated contact, roads broadened the peasant’s vision by enabling the sensory experience of novelty items. Familiarization with foreign phenomena, lifestyles, and consumption habits removed the barrier of otherwise insurmountable mud-brick walls. Visual and physical interaction with neighboring towns

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680 Morrison, Alişar, p. ii; Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 87

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was the true measure of mobility, which could be exercised in cognitive and affective
terms as well. Unlike the train which remained sluggish and inconvenient by comparison,
or the radio which merely served as a “one-way street,” highways facilitated intimate and
immediate encounters, making it possible for “villagers to get to the cities and at the same
bring city people, especially politicians and civil servants, to the villages.”683

Familiar Places

The farmers’ desire to visit neighboring towns and cities, “whenever they have
time or pretext to do so,” was viewed as a further testament to the modernizing thrust of
highways.684 Roads were capable of introducing urban ways to rural populations by
rendering such trips easier and more alluring than before. Given increasing familiarity
with novel means of transportation, peasants could display and act on their curiosity
about foreign places. The punctuality of the bus rendered it a recognizable item, which
could then be employed at the service of discovering other novelties. In Lerner’s account:

    Tosun’s words of 1950 returned to us: ‘It could have been half an hour to Ankara
if it had a road.’ Now it did have a road. What was more, a bus was coming down
the road. As it passed, jammed full, none of the passengers waved or even so
much as stuck out a tongue at us. Without these unfailing signs of villagers out
on a rare chartered bus, to celebrate a great occasion of some sort, we could only
make the wild guess that Balgat had acquired a regular bus service.685

No longer an occasion for playful or festive behavior, the sighting of the bus is an
unmistakably pedestrian incident. The prevalence of travel, its frequent and punctual
nature, is not limited to the circulation of agricultural produce or consumer goods.
Itinerant demeanor becomes a feature of the landscape, eliminating “Turkey’s
fundamental problems,” such as “‘inertia’ on the part of the peasantry,” “a lethargic state

683 Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change, p. 56
684 Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 88
685 Lerner, Passing, p. 29
of mind, and a stagnant life.” 686 Suddenly faced with the technology of the twentieth century in its most appealing aspects,” idleness is a thing of the past. 687 Bodies now regularly move in space, lacking even the punctuation of a hand wave or stuck out tongue. As the bus and the tractor become familiar sights, the physical mobility they facilitate is inscribed on rural mindsets, imbuing them with a cognitive capacity ineluctably linked to psychic movement and empathy, seeing as how “mobility tends to be systemic, i.e., physical, social and psychic mobility ‘go together’ in every village.” 688

The “mobile person,” after all, is one who is capable of “identification with new aspects of his environment,” and putting himself in the place of the other. 689 Empathy itself, as the foremost signifier of modernity, does not only entail a flair for answering survey questions or displaying hospitable behavior to guests, but also a desire to travel to otherwise alien settings. Anticipating the other’s needs and wishes is akin to an ability to imagine the nation as compact and easy to traverse. Given the ease and speed of travel, the shrinking of physical space is subsumed within the psychic imaginary. Spatial (and interpersonal) proximity, in turn, is one of scale, prevailing at the local, national, and global level alike. In Tütengil’s Adapazari, increased opportunities for travel generate attitudinal change in domestic interactions: children learn to speak directly to their fathers without fear, husbands and wives refer to each other on a first-name basis. 690 The removal of psychic barriers at home is inevitable in “the age of Sputnik,” when the “world itself is

686 İlhan Özdiil, A Causative-Diagnostic Analysis of Turkey’s Major Problems and a Communicative Approach to their Solution (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1954), p. 20; Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 103
687 Ibid.
688 Emphasis in the original. Lerner, Passing, p. 132
689 Ibid., p. 49
690 Tütengil, İctimai ve İktisadi Bakımdan Türkiye’nin Karayolları, p. 143
shrinking,” and “the stereotyped notion of the peasant as a man unaware of the world beyond his horizon” is beginning to erode.691

Familiarity with an increasingly condensed landscape also leads to changes in the “sense of space, distance, time—the geotemporal universe”: “Only in the measure that they come into contact with urban society do villagers acquire the concepts, indeed the language, of precise and standard units.”692 Accuracy in measurement will bring the peasants not just into the space, but also the time of the nation; time that encapsulates constancy and precision, as well as leisure within its dimensions. Orderly bus schedules and punctual delivery times for trucks are one way of ensuring this mode of predictability. Seasonal and cyclical conceptions of time, where the “day’s activities are regulated by the rising and setting of the sun,” the shadows, the farming routine or the call to prayer are supplanted by synchronized and linear accounts of temporality in the social scientists’ writings.693 The division of the day into standardized units is accompanied with changes in perceptions of space and measurement: “the ‘step’ as a measure for length, the ‘height of a man or a minaret’ as a measure for depth…are things of the past.”694 Distances will no longer be formulated as “within a bullet’s reach, ‘as far as my voice can go,’ ‘as far as (it takes) to smoke a cigarette.”695 The dissemination of

691 Aydı̇n Yalçın, “Türkiye’de Demokrasi” Democracy in Turkey. Speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University. Forum 10 (119), March 1, 1959, p. 8; Kolars, Tradition, Season, and Change in a Turkish Village, p. 110
692 Lerner, Passing, p. 132
694 Yasa, Hasanoğlan: Socio-Economic Structure of a Turkish Village, p. 180
standards in precision and scope is also a measure of “what is familiar and what is ‘strange.’” The evenness of time and space is readily comprehended across the country, wherein their “objectification, abstraction and standardization” have “come to mark modern life,” as well as “modern governance.” The “new vehicles,” after all, “do not only ‘change the conception of time and space’ and lead to the forgetting of the old clock, but also increase the field of movement for people…Contact between people increases in intensity, public opinion is born, etiquette and experience spread in a larger field.” As units of time and measures of distance are rendered orderly, attitudes, too, are presumed to be normalized and increasingly open to regulation.

In Mübcecel Kıray’s study of Ereğli, a coastal town on the Black Sea, it is changing means of communication and transportation that inform the questionnaires gauging the worldviews, behaviors, and perceptions of time and space on the part of its inhabitants. Kıray attempts to discern the contours of the shrinking geotemporal universe by probing the respondents’ conceptions of Turkey and the world. Asked to identify the farthest place from Ereğli in the country, those who are able to identify regions other than their own (almost half the respondents who cite Eastern Turkey) are hailed as the fortunate beneficiaries of the expanding steel industry in the adjacent city of Zonguldak. Knowledge of Hakkari’s location in Southeastern Turkey and that of Berlin, London, Tokyo and New York are evaluated on the same terrain, as indications of
the urbanization of Ereğli and its “openness to the outside world.” Ereğli’s inhabitants are reconciled with and cognizant of their place in an exceedingly mobile and connected world. While fewer people use their hands to indicate the size of objects or rely on prayer times to regulate their sleep schedule, however, the recently launched bus service to Zonguldak has curiously failed to standardize conceptions of space: more accuracy is observed in measurement of distance by sea, rather than by land.

Even if the regularization of spatial perceptions took on a gradual nature, the desire for travel was now deemed to be a prominent feature of the landscape. Lerner’s fascination with Balgat’s Grocer, at once the ideal survey respondent and the modernizing subject, for instance, stemmed from the latter’s simultaneous appreciation for physical and psychic mobility: “As president of Turkey, he said: ‘I would make roads for the villagers to come to towns to see the world and would not let them stay in their holes all their life.’” Capable of envisioning himself as the purveyor of infrastructural modernity, the Grocer hoped to instill a similar sense of wanderlust in his fellow Balgati. According to the reports of social scientists and policymakers, in fact, the peasants’ demand for roads did not merely derive from an urge to leave their villages:

As related by Niyazi Aki, the governor of Antalya, villagers themselves come to the district seat and propose road-building projects in their respective areas, offering to pay whatever is necessary. In one village visited during the trip, peasants demanded that a small hill obstructing the view from the highway be removed, so that everyone could ‘see that we also live in this world.’

At first sight, the governor’s proclamation amounts to official propaganda, echoing the Minister of Public Works in its conviction of the ostensibly insatiable desire for roads on

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701 Ibid.
702 Ibid., pp. 173-6
703 Lerner, Passing, p. 24
704 Karpat, “Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 88

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the part of the peasantry. Yet the account culminates in the suggestion that the villagers’ longing to see other places, to be closer to their neighbors (on a physical and psychic plane alike) was also motivated by a drive to be seen. The demand for visibility unhinges the certitude of the roads project that was to render eastern regions more western, rural populations more urban, and the peasantry eager participants in market practices. Roads, otherwise expressive of technologies of liberal governance, could readily exceed the intentions of their makers. The request for their delivery, at the expense of conquering and drastically remaking the physical landscape, was also a means to overcome the obscurity associated with mud-brick walls and hills along the highway. Roads could convey a plea for recognition, providing visual and concrete proof that “we also live in this world.” It may be suggested, of course, that ruminations on the peasant’s desire to be seen are consistent with romanticized depictions of the “new type of farmer,” one who is “enlarging his horizon of ideas and wants…bestirring himself and working hard to satisfy these wants.”

By the same account, however, “Turkey’s new man—Mehmet the peasant” also happened to be “her oldest citizen.” The span of Mehmet’s occupancy suggested that he could do as he wished with the new roads, machinery, and objects at his disposal.

Wayward Subjects

Between 1948 and 1957, Richard D. Robinson, working as an area specialist for the American Universities Field Staff, dispatched a series of letters detailing the various

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705 Reed, “A New Force at Work,” p. 44
706 Ibid.
changes he observed across rural Turkey. The content of his missives ranged from the physical features of Turkish people (“all physical types from out and out Oriental complete with slanting eyes to what is generally called Nordic or North European, blonde and blue-eyed”) to detailed descriptions of village houses, dietary habits, and clothing.

On the subject of the rapid onset of agricultural mechanization, Robinson adopted a wary tone:

I have always raised a skeptical eyebrow at the manner in which some would bring ‘help’ to primitive and semi-primitive peoples. It seems to me that bringing only an isolated feature of 20th century civilization—such as farm machinery—into a primitive society is lifting something from context and turning it into a dangerous weapon for destruction. Lacking the prerequisite philosophical, educational, and socio-political structure to control and condition the manner in which modern machines will be used to shape the lives and destinies of men, I would hesitate to wish those machines on my worst enemy—let alone, my friends. And yet, that is just what some would have us do. A somewhat similar case would have existed if the atom bomb had suddenly been presented to the America of 1776, by some super-intelligence. I doubt that the world would still be in one piece.

Robinson’s hesitant stance would be reiterated in increasingly skeptical accounts of the pace of modernization in Turkey and elsewhere in the developing world throughout the following decades. American experts involved in building highways or the Hilton hotel viewed the speed with which such projects were embarked upon as indicative of an impatient mindset on the part of their Turkish counterparts. For some, the incessant

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707 Robinson’s initial assignment had been with the Institute of Current World Affairs. For an overview of his career which culminated in a joint appointment at the Harvard Business School and the Middle East Center, see Richard Robinson, “A Personal Journey through Time and Space” Journal of International Business Studies 25 (3), 1994

708 Robinson to Walter S. Rogers, December 15, 1948; March 1, 1949; October 25, 1949; March 15, 1949; Letters from Turkey (Reprinted for the Peace Corps by Permission of the Institute for Current World Affairs) (Istanbul: Robert College, 1965)

709 Robinson to Rogers, August 8, 1949, Letters from Turkey

demands for agricultural or road building machinery were suggestive of intellectual limitations on the part of the recipients: “The desire to move directly from ox-cart to jet airplane, ignoring the intervening steps or, at best, compressing them into too short a period, exemplifies this inability to grasp the nature of growth.”

According to the ever-cautious Robinson, however, those who dispatched the machinery were equally culpable, at the same time as they continued to “doubt that a machine such as the tractor can be a weapon.”

The expansion of the road network, Robinson argued elsewhere, joined forces with the perilous tractor, resulting in uninhibited levels of urbanization. Highways in fact facilitated the vast urban migration that resulted in the seventy-five percent increase in the population of the four largest cities of Turkey in the decade of the 1950s. Given the growth of squatter colonies in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Izmir, a series of experts were summoned by the DP government in order to investigate means to ameliorate the pressing housing shortage. If the truck and the tractor were potential weapons of destruction, rural displacement, and urban overpopulation, however, they could also be put to use for purposes that exceeded the original intent of their creators.

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711 Cohn, “Some Propositions Concerning the Role of Human Factors in Economic Development,” Background Paper for the First Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, October 14, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records)
712 Robinson to Rogers, August 8, 1949, Letters from Turkey
714 Keyder, State and Class, p. 135
715 Abrams, “The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning”; Bernard Wagner, Housing Advisor, “Housing in Turkey” (Ankara, October 1955). Abrams’ report included the recommendation to breed “in-perts,” in lieu of experts, resulting in the founding of the Middle East Technical University (METU) through the sponsorship of UN Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA), and later, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as an advisory committee from the University of Pennsylvania.
Social scientists and policymakers apprehensive of increasing rates of urban migration were nonetheless celebratory of leisurely visits into town or the city. It was the means by which such trips were undertaken that continued to be a matter of debate. By one account, transportation between “country seats and the capital” was pregnant with ingenuity, evident in the implementation of a daily truck service: “This latter service is a matter of local entrepreneurship and usually consists of a large flat-bed truck into which all the travelers crowd for their trip to town. Trucks leave the villages early in the morning, and return from the town by four or five o’clock in the afternoon. Fares depend roughly upon the distance traveled, but no schedule of rates is enforced by the local government.” Freed from official regulation, villagers devised their own times and costs for travel, at the same time as they reappropriated the truck (and the tractor) as the vehicle for passenger transportation—a misuse that could spell more than mere mischief if engaged in excessive terms:

The tremendously increased number of inter-city buses are still packed to the luggage racks, and the number of extra passengers hitching rides on trucks mounts daily. Even remote villages are within striking distance of roads along which come two or three trucks per day which will let them clamber aboard. Moreover, most of the 40,000 tractors which have been wisely or unwisely injected into the Turkish economy by American aid are used for regular excursions from villages to towns and cities—though most peasants still refrain from taking their relatives to Germany on the family tractor as one atavistically bold Turk did not long ago.

No longer confined to its designated terms of use within the village boundaries, the tractor readily becomes a mark of unmanageable behavior. Innocuous curiosity about

716 Kolars, Tradition, Season, and Change, pp. 16-7
717 Frey, “Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey,” p. 322. Frey seems to have been made aware of this particular peasant through Karpat’s article: “Tractors are being extensively used for transportation between villages and towns; the extreme example concerns a peasant from Pamukova, a village in western Anatolia, who used his tractor for a family trip to Germany” (“Social Effects of Farm Mechanization,” p. 92)
foreign places is undercut by innovative excess—excess that reverts the villager back to obsolete audacity, rather than advance him into the future. The use of tractors to commute to “weddings or even movies” is also suggestive of a sinister materialism: “The satisfaction derived from the tractor is not an indirect one related to the increase in production, but a direct satisfaction connected with the form and size of the machine.”

Familiarity with the material dimensions of travel, furthermore, results in corporeal playfulness, rather than the proper units of measurement and gesture it was expected to inculcate: “Instead of pulling a bell, conductors shout at the top of their voices when somebody wants to get off the bus. Drivers use their hands and arms; taxi drivers keep their left arms outside the car to be able to make any signs required by the traffic rules or not.” It was not just traffic rules that physical demeanor defied. Despite accolades for the peasant deemed to be eagerly anticipating the delivery of roads, there were those who feigned ignorance about the Village Law which required that each village “construct its own feeder road to connect it to the nearest highway or to the next village”: “Many peasants questioned on this point grinned and replied that they ‘hadn’t read’ the law, although failure to know its provisions is an offence.” The peasants’ refusal to abide by law and their proclivity to replace it with their own set of rules (in physical, temporal, and material terms) led to further ambivalence in assessments of the “far-reaching effects the highways are having”: “The old Turkish custom of free hospitality to the stranger cannot survive beside a busy highway, and with the developing

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718 Sabri Ülgener, “Value Patterns of Traditional Societies: Turkish Experience” Social Aspects of Economic Development: A report of the international conference on social aspects of economic development held at Istanbul, August 4-24, 1963, sponsored by the Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, p. 128
719 Ibid., p. 129
720 Reed, “A New Force at Work,” p. 42
commercialisms this and other virtues of the old way of life are passing.”

Mobility could undercut, rather than induce empathy, it seems, thus exceeding the expectations of its adherents.

It is in the “chronotope of the road,” Bakhtin has suggested, that “the unity of time and space markers is exhibited with exceptional precision and clarity.” Insofar as the trope of roads occasions encounters between people by collapsing “social distances,” its temporal dimensions also incorporate chance, contingency, and accident. The fortuitous implications of the highway program were not limited to the willful misuse of vehicles or the seeming erosion of traditional values (or their relentless return in the form of primal impertinence). The forward march of roads in enabling circulation and demarcation alike, in designating some sections of the population as filthy or backwards could be hindered by an unforeseen turn of events. Resilient subjects refused to be accessed and digested by the infrastructural state. Mountains, relentlessly inaccessible by highways, became the venue for the flourishing of prohibited languages and identities, in lieu of their eradication. The very democratic process that was seen as the hallmark of the roads project was curtailed by a military coup in 1960, which saw the hanging of four DP leaders, as well as a return to etatist measures in economic development. Such detours accompanied the delivery of highways, further rendering them seminal exercises in representation and governance alike.

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721 Helling and Helling, *Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach*, p. 10
723 *Ibid.*, pp. 243-4
Figure 11. Linguistic Regions. Source: Barbara Helling and George Helling, *Rural Turkey: A New Socio-statistical Approach*
Figure 12. Agricultural Regions. Source: Frederick Frey, *Regional Variations in Rural Turkey*
Figure 13. Connecting Agricultural Regions. Source: Bakanlar Kurulunca Tasdik Edilen Devlet Yolları Ağı, Marshall Planı İçin Kabul Edilen Devlet Yolları, Bu Yolların Birbirleriyle Mukayesesi The State Road Network Approved by the Cabinet, The State Roads Approved for the Marshall Plan, A Comparison of the Two (KGM Records)
Figure 14. Developmental Regions Source: Frederick Frey, *Regional Variations in Rural Turkey*

Figure 15. Truncated Transportation. *Turkish Roads and Highways*, Turkish Information Office, n.d.
Figure 16. Uneven circulation. *Turkish Roads and Highways*. Turkish Information Office.

Figure 17. Uneven circulation, 2. *Turkish Roads and Highways*. Turkish Information Office.
Figure 18. Uneven circulation, 3. *Turkish Roads and Highways*. Turkish Information Office.
Figure 19. The oxcart. Source: KGM Records.
Figure 20. The road between Izmit and Istanbul, 1957. Source: KGM Records
Figure 21. Intercity bus. KGM Records
Figure 22. The density and direction of intracity bus services. Source: Geoffrey Ireland, *Türkiye'de Karayolları Nakliyat İdaresi* The Administration of Highway Transportation in Turkey (Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 1961)
Chapter 5: Landscapes of Hospitality: The Istanbul Hilton and the Makings of an Industry

“A Hotel is much more than a collection of materials of steel, bricks, and furniture.” (Welcome to the Istanbul Hilton, Employee Handbook, 1955)

In June 1955, Conrad Hilton delivered a speech marking the grand opening of the Hilton Hotel in Istanbul, a speech that incorporated the revisionist account of the continuities between the Ottoman and Turkish Republic eras proclaimed by the historians and social scientists of the time. “It was indeed fortunate for the Western world that the new Republic chose to continue one element of the foreign policy of the Sultans,” Hilton exclaimed, “a deep and very sound mistrust of its great northern neighbor.” While the hotel mogul conceded to the monetary objectives behind the recent expansion of his establishment abroad, he insisted that their rationale exceeded a consideration for financial return:

Beyond mere size, we view our international hotel ties as a first-hand laboratory where men of Turkey and Egypt, of Rome and Madrid, and of other world capitals, may inspect America and its ways at their leisure. Each hotel is a ‘little America’ not as a symbol of bristling power, but as a friendly center where men of many nations and of good will may speak the languages of peace. We mean these hotels too as a challenge—not to the peoples who have so cordially welcomed us into their midst—but to the way of life preached by the Communist world. Each hotel spells out friendship between nations which is an alien word in the vocabulary of the Iron Curtain. The Marxian philosophy with its politically convenient dialectic has a way of reducing friends to slaves. To help fight that kind of thinking and that kind of living we are setting up our hotels of Hilton International across the world.

724 “The City of the Golden Horn,” Address by Conrad N. Hilton. Hilton Hotels International, Box 16, Folder, Turkey-Istanbul, Hospitality Industry Archives, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas (HHI, hereafter). I would like to thank Dr. Mark Young for his hospitality and assistance with navigating the archives. For similar accounts of Turkey’s “long-standing enmity” with Russia, see McGhee, “Turkey Joins the West”; Thomas and Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran. See Citino, “The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization” for an overview.
725 “The City of the Golden Horn”
Hilton’s words are seemingly forthright about the task delegated to the International enterprise: each hotel is to function as a sentinel against the malicious spread of Communism, situated conveniently, indeed valiantly, at its frontiers. Erected as a showcase for an Americanized modernity (peculiar to Cold War era formulations), the hotels were also designated to embody the proverbial motto of Hilton Hotels International Corporation: “World Peace Through International Trade and Travel.” Hilton’s efforts to devise a narrative of familiarity, harmony and amity out of the hotel enterprise, however, conceal the litigious history of the implementation of the Istanbul Hilton and the convoluted nature of its reception.

The Istanbul Hilton Hotel was financed by Emekli Sandığı (Turkish Pension Funds) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the US government. The securing of funding from the latter required the outmaneuvering of other suitors, such as the Park Hotel of Istanbul, and the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation, then a subsidiary of Pan American Airways. The design of the building grew out of a fraught collaboration between Turkish architect, Sedad Hakkı Eldem, and Gordon Bunshaft of the American firm, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM). Though its reinforced concrete and white cubic forms would be imitated across the country, the domineering iconic status of the building, inscribed with traces of the “local” and the “global” alike, was challenged at each turn. Rather than surfacing as a medium for the top-down imposition of an Americanized modernity or the material expression of the politico-ideological concerns of its builders, then, the history of the Hilton was marked by contention from the outset,

in terms of its style, funding, and site, as well as the various meanings it was expected to communicate.

For ECA representatives, the Istanbul Hilton helped deflect criticisms about its neglect of tourism promotion across Europe. For the Turkish government, the hotel was a turning point in the consolidation of its efforts to establish and expand the tourism industry in the midst of debates about the incursion of foreign capital and expertise. In lieu of conveying, encoding or representing capital, imperial power or a conception of modernity peculiar to the Cold War milieu, however, the hotel rendered such circuits tenable in the first place. Its location, structure and form are less sites of functionality than constitutive of the social, political and cultural “life” of the building as a material artifact. The hotel is not so much the product or passive recipient of commercial competition, complicity between the private sector and governmental agencies or competing visions of expertise, but rather an object that occasions the possibility for the emergence of such complex networks, at the same time as it renders concrete the protean visions of “modernity” conjured up by Hilton, the Turkish government, ECA representatives, Eldem and Bunshaft alike. Concurrently an object of desire and an


artifact with its own set of interests, attributes, and agency, the biography of the Istanbul Hilton appears to be as prone to wanderlust as those it was designated to host.

Hospitality surfaces as the common thread that weaves together the material and immaterial forces at play in the virtual and actual construction of the Istanbul Hilton. Taking on the role of host, the hotel ought to offer itself as the site of immobility, at the same time as it is concocted as a temporary haven for the tourist, the itinerant, and the transient passerby. Even though it was conceived as a place for stopping and resting, however, the hotel itself served as a site of mobility, with people, capital, and visions of expertise and modernity flowing through it. The imaginary endemic to overlapping notions of hospitality, mobility, and empathy is one that is rooted in spectacles of pleasure, circuits of consumption and manifestations of power. Insofar as the hotel is envisioned as a receptacle to flows of people, capital and desire, that is, human and non-human agencies alike, its embodiment of hospitality is also inscribed in its material façade. Overlooking the Bosphorus and highly visible (and transparent, given its crafting out of reinforced concrete and glass), the Hilton surfaces as a template that is expected to disseminate an aesthetic of modernism that it prescribes to an urban landscape, which in turn plays host to the hotel itself. The openness to replicability on the part of the building, however, can only unfold despite and through the instabilities in the signification, circulation, and reception of its ubiquitous image. The vagaries of hospitality and reluctance on the part of the designated host thus suggest that the latter cannot not repel, reject, and repudiate: to perform as mere recipient would belie the nature of the hotel, which necessarily entails multiplicity in function, mutability in design, and multivalence in meaning.
As a boundary object between local and global forms, between governance and hospitality, the hotel was self-consciously manufactured to be hybrid, in its financing, cultural elements, and design. Hilton’s status as a hybrid space of travel and flows can be glimpsed through the movement of its modernist aesthetic between Turkey and the United States, as well as the commodities used in its construction and running. Yet, the privileging and dissemination of hybrid forms merely resulted in undermining, if not altogether subverting, the very modernism they were expected to prescribe and proliferate. Given the fragility and multiplicity of visions imbued in the hotel, its conceptual and material components were expected to occasion the flow of capital, consumption, and desires, deemed to be constitutive of modernity. The hotel’s construction, however, was marked by instances of misunderstanding and mistranslation between funders and experts, calling into question the very coherence and stability of the meanings it was expected to convey.

This chapter traces the attempts targeting the cultivation of a hospitable mindset and landscape in the context of the Hilton’s implementation in Istanbul. That particular conception of hospitality required openness to foreign capital and expertise, as well as the showcasing of ostensibly (and globalized) local artifacts rendered available by modernizing subjects whose capacity for empathy in business dealings and propensity to travel made them welcoming hosts in otherwise alien settings. Claims to hospitality, however, were offset by disruptions in the flows and allocation of capital, the hesitations of traveling experts, and misunderstandings between the various actors involved in the hotel initiative. An account of the tensions and failures encapsulating the biography of the Istanbul Hilton helps dislodge the seeming success and certitude of that project, also
revealing the fragility of the competing visions of modernity, diplomacy, and functionality it was presumed to communicate.

I begin with an overview of the purported alignment of interests between the Hilton Corporation, the ECA, and the Turkish government in the context of tourism promotion in the aftermath of World War II. Thereafter, I examine episodes in the life of the building that unsettle the tenacity of the claims regarding its status as a showcase of American modernism and the uncontested provision of foreign capital and expertise. These latter interludes, such as Turkish architects’ protests, parliamentary debates about the desirability of American conceptions of hospitality, and rival projects in the tourism industry, are a testament to the circuitous trajectory of the Hilton hotel and its reception in the Turkish landscape.

*Dollar-Earning Tourism*

The broader milieu for the Istanbul Hilton project was the breakthrough of mass international tourism over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. During the early phases of this process, the Marshall Plan, launched in 1947 and put into effect the following year with the establishment of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), played a crucial role in the configuration of its recipient countries as tourism destinations for American travelers. As a Travel Development Section (TDS) was created within the ECA, the Department of Commerce came to incorporate a Travel Branch, with the two organizations often collaborating in their efforts to promote tourism across Europe.²⁷⁹ The endeavors of these organizations

included the encouragement of transatlantic transportation through the establishment of tourist class airfares and the near-elimination of visa requirements, as well as the “modernization” of accommodation facilities in recipient countries through Technical Assistance Program-funded trips to the United States for delegations of European hotel and restaurant owners.\textsuperscript{730} Such measures were in line with Section 117(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which instructed the ECA to “facilitate and encourage, through private and public travel, transport, and other agencies, the promotion and development of travel by citizens of the United States to and within participating countries.”\textsuperscript{731} Accordingly, ECA grants, loans, and counterpart funds were rendered available for the restoration of transportation systems, the survey, rehabilitation and construction of hotels and tourism facilities, and the adoption of travel promotion techniques across Europe.

The tourism promotion program also found support from Congress, with allies such as Senator William Fulbright who reiterated the view of tourism as an asset in the reduction of the “dollar gap” and a stable “dollar earner” that would contribute to the economic reconstruction of ERP countries in the aftermath of the termination of ECA loans and grants.\textsuperscript{732} For war-stricken Europe, then, tourism guaranteed the arrival of


\textsuperscript{731} “Tourism in the European Recovery Program” (The Statistics and Reports Division of the ECA, June 1950), enclosed in Theodore Pozzy to Halim Tefvik Alyot, August 10, 1950. RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 58, Reports: T-Z, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 469 hereafter)

\textsuperscript{732} William Fulbright, (“Promotion of tourism can supply Europe,” Wednesday, 26 April, legislative day of 29 march 1950, U.S. Congressional Record) and “Tourism in the European Recovery Program.” The “dollar gap” referred to the imbalance in trade between the United States and Europe. The Marshall Plan was supposed to alleviate the trade deficit on the part of Europe, and the trade surplus on the part of the US by enabling Europe to earn enough dollars so they could purchase American goods through a series of
much-needed hard currency, at the same time as it proved an “easier political sell than foreign aid” in the policy circles of the United States.\textsuperscript{733} As tourism continued to function as a crucial component of foreign policy under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations alike, it not only helped dispel the skepticism of “fiscal conservatives fearful of conventional foreign aid,” but also stood as a testament to the linkage between “tourism and US global expansion.”\textsuperscript{734} Such a perception was particularly salient in the context of the postwar status of the United States as a world power, wherein the promulgation of the standards and methods of American tourism were likely to conjure up images of colonial dependency across European and other tourist destinations.\textsuperscript{735} This did not deter the proponents of tourism, however, from underscoring its importance as a measure for “breaking down the barriers of ignorant prejudice between ourselves and our allies” and a means of fostering international understanding and harmony.\textsuperscript{736}

The tourism question was becoming increasingly visible in the circles of Turkish policy makers and popular press against this backdrop of ECA representatives’ bid to sponsor travel to the beneficiaries of Marshall Plan aid. Unlike its European counterparts where the industry had entered stagnation following the war, the ECA Mission was measures facilitating the influx of dollars into Europe, as well as the elimination of tariffs, import quotas, and bilateral trade agreements.

\textsuperscript{734} Endy, \textit{Cold War Holidays}, p. 34; Klein, \textit{Cold War Orientalism}, chapter 3
\textsuperscript{735} Endy, \textit{Cold War Holidays}, pp. 72-3. For Europe’s postwar participation in the spread of mass beach tourism across the Middle East, see Waleed Hazbun, \textit{Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Arab World} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). For further reflections on tourism as a “neo-colonial political economy” or perpetuating uneven relations between a traveling center and the “pleasure periphery,” see Malcolm Crick, \textquote{\textquote{Representations of International Tourism in the Social Sciences: Sun, Sex, Sights, Savings, and Servility}}\textit{ Annual Review of Anthropology} 18 (1989); Louis Turner and John Ash, \textit{The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery} (New York: St. Martin’s, 1975); David Engerman, \textquote{\textquote{Research Agenda for the History of Tourism: Towards an International Social History}}\textit{ American Studies International} 32 (2), 1994
\textsuperscript{736} Fulbright, “Promotion of Tourism”
cognizant of the fact that tourism in Turkey was in dire need of wholesale construction. The sole step taken in this direction during the early Republican era was the founding of the Türkiye Seyahhin Cemiyeti (later, Turing [sic.] Club) in 1923 under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal. Süreyya Ergün, the Chief of the Tourism Branch of the Directorate of the Press and Broadcasting, called attention to this state of neglect in the immediate aftermath of the war, articulating a vision of tourism as a dava (cause) of civilization and national honor. Recommending, among other things, measures of stimulus and protection, and the provision of various credits for the creation of a national hotel industry, Ergün contended that tourism was more than a commercial enterprise, and would help foster the capacity for national mobility, political and cultural unity, as well as the spiritual and physical well-being of the nation. Ergün’s avowal of the necessity to cultivate a sense of “leisure time” among the “hardworking new generations” of Turkey and his insistence on the need to promote “cultural capital, tourism etiquette, and a climate of hospitality” prefigured the debates pertaining to the tourism industry throughout the following decades.

In August 1949, ECA commissioned Charles White, a tourism expert, to survey the prospects for tourism development in Turkey. In his report, White laid out a series of legislative measures that would help ameliorate the shortage of tourism facilities in Turkey, such as visa exemptions, improvements to transportation and the construction of

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737 “Memorandum on the Tourism Requirements of Turkey,” undated, (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 58, Reports T-Z)
739 Ibid., p. 149
740 Ibid., p. 152 and 158-9
741 “Turizm Uzmâni Raporunu Verdi” (Tourism Expert Delivers Report) Ulus, August 30, 1949
accommodation facilities, in particular through the implementation of laws to encourage local private and foreign capital investment alike. White suggested that the ECA Mission to Turkey actively set up a tourism program for the year 1950-51, making available “5 million dollars to be used for loans in the erection of first-class hotels...on the basis that private capital invests a minimum of 50 percent and the loans be made on a 20 year basis with very attractive interest rates.”

A series of institutional arrangements followed on the heels of White’s report and the proclaimed interest in extending ECA funds to the Turkish tourism initiative. A Tourism Advisory Board was formed and held its first annual meeting in December 1949. Among its tasks would be to review the draft of the law for encouraging tourism development, as well as the determination of qualifications for touristic hotels. In March 1951, the Travel Association of Turkey was launched with Vedat Nedim Tör appointed as its General Secretary. That association frequently informed Dorr, the Chief of the ECA Mission, of their endeavors, such as assisting pilgrimages to Ephesus, collaborating with the Turkish group of the inter-parliamentary tourist union, and the

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742 Charles White, “Tourism Survey of Turkey” (August 1, 1949, for ECA Turkey-Paris), (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 58, Reports T-Z)
743 For early expressions of that interest, see “ECA Mission Chief Dorr Lauds Tourism Activities” (August 29, 1949) (RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 58, Reports T-Z). Theodore Pozzy, the Chief of the TDS of ECA, based in Paris, also took an interest in the development of tourism in Turkey, periodically requesting, among other things, information for hotel equipment surveys and free dollar expenditures for tourism promotion in the United States. See Pozzy to Dorr, February 27, 1951 and March 15, 1951 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 59, Reports: Z-Trade). Most of the task of tourism promotion in the United States was left to the Turkish Information Office in New York. For an insightful discussion of that organization, see Ela Kağel, Intellectualism and Consumerism: Ideologies, Practices and Criticisms of Common Sense Modernism in Postwar Turkey, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2009
744 Out of 61 hotels that applied to the Board to be qualified as a “touristic hotel,” only 10 were approved. “Turizm İnişafi İçin Tedbirler” (Measures for the Development of Tourism), Ulus, September 28, 1953
opening of a school for hotel management. Suad Yurdkoru, of the recently established Aegean Tourism Association, suggested that the ECA take an even more active part in assisting the development of the tourism industry, and that “American enterprise and know-how can provide the means and equipments necessary for the establishment of touristic organizations and can supervise the technique of propaganda in partnership with Turkish private enterprise.” Also in accordance with the dictates of White’s report, the Directorate of the Press and Broadcasting was expanded to include Tourism under its title, with Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, its Director, joining representatives from other Marshall Plan recipients on a trip to New York and Washington, D.C. in order to discuss the possibilities for the take-off of the tourism initiative. Among the activities of the newly expanded Directorate of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism was the creation of a Commission for Tourism Education and Etiquette in 1951.

Selahattin Çoruh, a participant of that Commission prepared a series of reports that were published by the Turing Club. Drawing on the earlier report by White, Çoruh not only framed the “tourism cause” in terms of attracting foreign capital to the country, but also proffered examples from the American tourism industry, and in particular, the hotels in that country, as the standard by which the Turkish tourism initiative was to be evaluated. He described, in detail, for instance, the interior structure of American hotels, complete with a “lobby that is as spacious as possible,” a cloakroom, an easily accessible reception, phone cabins, shops selling postcards and cigarettes, as well as barbers.

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745 Süreyya Ergün to Russell Dorr, June 11, 1951 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 59, Reports: Z-Trade)
746 Yurdkoru to Dorr, June 25, 1951 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files: 1948-56, Box 59, Reports: Z-Trade)
florists, and dry-cleaning facilities.\textsuperscript{748} Çoruh compared the ideal lobby of the American hotel with that of existing Turkish facilities:

Squeaky stairs lead to the lobby of the hotel. At the corner is a tin faucet, painted an ugly green or red, erected on a darkened, filthy base made of zinc, irritating the eye. On the walls are worn-out mirrors that distort the human face. Next to the mirror are twisted, humpy little tables. When one enters the rooms, it is as though one is entering third class hospital wards...The clothes of the employees are miserable. Most are round bearded baldheads, with clogs on their feet, and gawking glares in their eyes...It is impossible not to be revolted, disgusted.\textsuperscript{749}

Çoruh’s contrasting depictions are indicative of the desire to provide amenities that would prove enticing for the American tourist. The competence, appearance, hygiene and conduct of the Turkish personnel are revealed to fail by the standards of the American hospitality industry in this scheme. Failure to abide by such norms, in turn, has repercussions for both the role of tourism within the development of the national economy, and the reputation of the nation. It was for this reason that Çoruh’s report for the Tourism Education and Etiquette Commission emphasized the need to cultivate a mentality and understanding of hospitality for primary, middle and high school students alike.\textsuperscript{750} By integrating tourism into school curricula, the arrival of foreigners would no longer be met with nonchalance, diffidence or internalized feelings of animosity.\textsuperscript{751} The delegation of tourism expertise onto the students was a further testament to overlapping concerns with the cultivation of hospitality and empathy. Among the after-school activities Çoruh suggested in line with this program were trips to touristic centers in the students’ towns, which would ensure the provision of accurate directions to such places,

\textsuperscript{748} Selahattin Çoruh, \textit{Herkes İçin Turizm Bilgisi} (Tourism Knowledge for Everyone) (Ankara: Turing Yayınları, 1954), pp. 57 and 61-2
\textsuperscript{749} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 95-6
\textsuperscript{750} Selahattin Çoruh, \textit{Turizm Bilgi ve Terbiyesi: Turizm Öğretimi} (The Knowledge and Etiquette of Tourism: Tourism Education) (Ankara: Turing Yayınları, 1958), p. 3
\textsuperscript{751} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5
as well as the cultivation of principles of courtesy for strangers, and the practice of commercial integrity and honesty in business interactions with them.\textsuperscript{752}

Çoruh’s emphasis on the necessity to cultivate a hospitable mindset was consistent with the editorials of leading newspapers in Turkey throughout the 1950s. The foremost concern shared by these figures was the shortage of adequate accommodation facilities, despite the “good fortune” of the natural attractions of the landscape.\textsuperscript{753} The editors of these newspapers, which otherwise reflected a broad political spectrum, concurred that it was the task of the Turkish state to encourage potential investors by means as varied as tax exemptions, provision of land to hotel builders, stimulus policies, and the founding of a tourism bank.\textsuperscript{754} Other questions of concern were the treatment of tourists, and in particular, Americans who were believed to fear being deceived as a result of haggling practices or losing money given the gap between the official and black market dollar exchange rates.\textsuperscript{755} Indeed, the idea that the tourist was often viewed as “a wretch bound to be robbed and duped” tied into the idea that the necessities of tourism were factors that would serve the cause of elevating the level of civil manners,

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\textsuperscript{752} Ibid., pp. 13-7
\textsuperscript{754} Hüseyin Cahit Yağcın, “Döviz Açığı ve Turizm” (The Dollar Gap and Tourism), Ulus, September 20, 1953; Sedat Simavi, “Turist Otelleri” (Tourist Hotels) Hürriyet, October 6, 1948; “Turizme Yeni Veçhe” (New Direction for Tourism) Hürriyet, December 12, 1948
\textsuperscript{755} Sedat Simavi, “Turist Kafilesi” (The Tourist Convo) Hürriyet February 26, 1950
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professional ethics, national order, conduct and hygiene, further positing tourism as a 
“public question of etiquette and civilization.”

Within the interstices of this apprehension about Turkish hospitality, the initiation of an hitherto underdeveloped tourism industry, and ECA avowal to aid these causes came a venture that seemingly answered the prayers of all the parties involved. A brief foray into the motivating vision behind the various projects undertaken by Conrad Hilton casts light on the ways in which the Istanbul Hilton emerged as a seemingly serendipitous and auspicious endeavor in this context.

*The Innkeepers of Peace*

Born in San Antonio in 1887, Conrad Hilton purchased the Mobley Hotel in Cisco, Texas in 1919, which marked his initial foray into the hotel industry. The Hilton Hotels Corporation was founded in 1946 and quickly expanded with the purchase of the Waldorf-Astoria of New York in 1949. That same year, Hilton also won the contract to operate the Caribe Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Caribe would present the formula for further ventures abroad, wherein local investors were expected to build and equip the hotel. Hilton International not only provided technical assistance and consultants in the planning, design and building phases, but also operated the hotel under a long-term agreement, keeping one third of the profits for itself, while the rest went to local owners.

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757 The Hilton Hotels International Corporation started as a subsidiary of Hilton Hotels Corporation, until 1964 when it became an independent publicly owned company. By that date, the Hilton International enterprise had spread to Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Madrid, Rome, Istanbul, London, Rotterdam, Tehran, Cairo, Jamaica, Panama, Hawaii, Hong Kong and Tokyo, among others.
Throughout the various speeches he delivered over the course of the 1950s, Conrad Hilton elucidated the manifold meanings he attributed to the expansion of the hotel industry. In one respect, the hotel business abroad, too, was part and parcel of the romance of profit-making that exemplified Hilton’s endeavors at home, endeavors that commenced by “developing a real crush on each perspective hotel…Romance blossomed the minute I could see through a frowsy façade to potential glamour—the inherent ability to make money. I had no interest in hitching onto any hotel without a dowry.”758 Readily reconciled in this account of Hilton’s initial involvement in the hotel industry are the relentless quest for financial gain and the quixotic pursuit of splendor, which are, in turn, consistent with the romanticized rationales provided for the Company’s expansionist proclivities abroad.

As intimated by the inaugural speech of the Istanbul Hilton, the international hotels were to display “the fruits of the free world” to the “countries most exposed to Communism.”759 The direction and scope of extension was of utmost importance if the Hilton hotels were to match the Communist sprawl at its own game—hence the modeling of the expansionist pattern of the Hilton Hotels International after that of the Communist one, albeit in “its friendly, industrial way.”760 Proximity to the Iron Curtain propelled the outreach to Istanbul, Baghdad, Berlin; Cairo held “the key to Africa and the Middle East,” Japan to Asia, and India to the “great ‘neutral’ bloc,” with West Berlin and Spain helping “close the pincers over Europe.” Seeping through Hilton’s rhetoric was a

758 Hilton, Be My Guest, p. 112
759 Ibid., p. 236
760 Conrad Hilton, “Toward a Foreign Policy for Hotels,” July 27, 1956, Speech before the Los Angeles Rotary Club, HHI, Box 6
civilizational mission, triggered by the fear that Western civilization might be at risk of extinction: “I am convinced that it is to be our business in the next half of the twentieth century to see to it that our civilization continues, that our revolution spreads over the world, that our western spark ignites and lights the world of the orient, Africa and northern Europe.” 761

Hilton’s harkening back to turn-of-the-century imagery of imperial advancement took on particular import in the context of decolonization and the concomitant appeal of the Communist alternative in the battle fought over capturing the “hearts” of the non-aligned. Given his lifelong insistence on the “the necessity of prayer and work,” as well as the annual Prayer Breakfasts he hosted, which were attended by the likes of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, Hilton could devoutly proclaim that the battle was characterized not by “the Suez Canal, oil, trade, atomic bomb tests, even the great markets of Africa and Asia,” but rather the conflict between “spiritual movements [extending] into eternity.” 762 Hilton thus articulated his understanding of a rapidly changing world order where a “billion faceless men are standing up and demanding to be counted—[their faces] black and yellow and brown”—a demand, Hilton believed, was reminiscent of 1776. 763

Within the contours of this historically recursive conjuncture, the role of the hotel industry in its American rendition was at once variegated and palpable. On the one hand, the buildings were marked as “edifices of peace,” precipitating the circulation of “trade

761 Ibid.
763 Hilton, “The Uncommitted Third;” “Toward a Foreign Policy for Hotels”
and ideas and men around the world.” Among the ideas to be promulgated by means of travel and transient dwelling was a particular conception of hospitality:

We are all innkeepers, you and I—innkeepers of the most sturdy and hospitable inn ever erected for a human guest, the United States of America. A world-famous hostess stands at the door, her torch held high to light the way for seekers of freedom and opportunity. Our inn has sheltered the hungry and homeless, princes and potentates, and the victims of religious purges and persecutions. Each guest on arrival, is given a complimentary gift—the gift of individual freedom. And the price? Guests pay as they stay—they work for their keep and are expected to become self-sustaining. They keep the inn clean. They defend it and above all, they learn to love it.

The vision of hospitality preached by Conrad Hilton is one that accommodates the needs and conditions of a changing world, at the same time as it is exacting in its demarcation of appropriate guest behavior, marked by traits such as self-sufficiency, diligence, and gratitude. As Hilton’s inns, modeled after that of the United States, proliferated across the world, preaching the dictates of the proper relationship between guest and host, they were also to serve as “ambassadors of good will” in an otherwise belligerent world, further taking on an edifying task.

The optimal way of winning over the hearts and minds of the uncommitted third world, after all, was by sharing “know-how in agriculture, technology, medicine and atomic energy…our wealth of knowledge.” Dispatching not only “bulldozers instead of tanks,” but also a “stream of good men around the world, scientists, technicians, doctors, crop experts, yes even hotelmen and Rotarians” would further guarantee the favorable outcome in a war waged at the level of technical knowledge. Having started

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765 Hilton, “We are the Innkeepers,” Speech delivered at the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Kansas City, January 11, 1962. CNH, Box 16, File 3, Speeches, 1957-1962
766 Hilton, Be My Guest, p. 237
767 Hilton, “Toward a Foreign Policy for Hotels”
“its own little spearhead of the economic offensive across the world,” the Hilton International could thus “assist—in a small but very important way—can assist Mr. Dulles in his foreign policy…President Eisenhower concisely summarized the economic and political policy of Hilton International when he said, ‘aid, which we wish to curtail; investment, which we wish to encourage; convertibility, which we wish to facilitate; and trade, which we wish to expand.”’ 768 Indeed, Hilton took great pride in having been approached by “both the State Department and the Department of Commerce” in order to build hotels that would “stimulate trade and travel, bringing American dollars into the economies of the countries needing help,” as well as “create international good will.” 769 Juxtaposed with Hilton representatives’ pledge to the Travel Development Section of the ECA of their commitment to “the importance of creating dollar earners in Western European countries” and “helping bridge the dollar gap,” it seemed that there was, indeed, a tailored fit between the interests of the two institutions. 770

Within the coordinates of a decolonizing world marked by ambivalence and sanguinity alike, Conrad Hilton simultaneously presented himself and his company as “inn-keepers” and “peace-makers” at the service of the objectives of American foreign policy. In addition to showcasing American modernity against the dangers of

768 Hilton, Speech Delivered at the Ezra Cornell Dinner, May 8, 1954. CNH, Box 12, Folder 5. The transportability of the formula developed in Puerto Rico as an alternative to ongoing foreign aid led to praise for the Hilton enterprise elsewhere: “This isn’t charity, but partnership with most of the profits going to the people we’re trying to win. One of the facts apparently established by our bumbling efforts at ‘foreign aid’ seems to be that even primitive peoples hate charity, despise us for being in position to offer it, and themselves for having to accept it…This Hilton system, if it could only be blown big enough, would preserve their dignity and also better serve the general purpose, because it would be handled by business experts, with business efficiency and not on the glorified breadline basis that has been such a tragic failure under the aegis of the Messrs. Hoffman, Strassen, et al.” (“Hilton Spreading Right Type of Aid,” Bill Cunningham. Boston Sunday Herald, June 24, 1956. HHI, Box 7, Newsclippings)

769 Hilton, Be My Guest, p. 233.

770 “Memorandum of Hilton Hotel Project for ERP Countries,” enclosed in Pozzy to Dorr, June 6, 1950 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files 1948-56, Box 35, Folder: Hilton Hotel-Private Projects)
Communism, the Hilton hotels were uniquely equipped to disseminate the dictates of an industry predicated upon the premise of hospitality. One place Hilton claimed to have uncovered the “authentic” display of hospitality was Istanbul, insofar as it was a venue that seemingly attested to the commensurability between the worldwide expansion of his corporation, the efforts of the ECA, and the interests of the Turkish government.

Thirty Years of Friendship

The agreement for the construction and leasing of the Istanbul Hilton was signed on December 15, 1950 between Hilton and the General Directorate of the Pension Fund of the Turkish Republic for a period of twenty years. Subsequently, an agreement for architectural services was signed between the Turkish Republic and the firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and Turkish architect, Sedad Eldem. The services of this firm, in turn, would be covered by ECA counterpart funds in the amount of 210,000 dollars. The Istanbul Hilton project was announced at the Waldorf-Astoria on October 29, 1951. Standing before the model of the building, Hilton gave a speech, delineating the manifold functions that the hotel would fulfill. As a “monument to the foresight, courage, and international cooperation of the new Turkey,” the hotel would “serve as the “foundation for the building of a hotel industry in all parts of Turkey.”

771 The lease follows the formula developed at the Caribe. CNH, Box 137, File 6: “Istanbul Hilton Hotel.”
772 “Agreement for Architectural Services between the Republic of Turkey and Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and Sedad Eldem,” (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files 1948-56, Box 35, Folder: Hilton Hotel-Private Projects)
773 Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey, Number 7 (4/1/1951-6/30/1951) and Number 13 (10/1/1952-12/31/1952)
774 “Expansion in Turkey” Hilton Items 15 (8), January 1952, p. 4. See Figure 23
valor, the Istanbul Hilton was thus expected to spearhead the forward development of a nation over the course of its habituation within the hospitality industry.\textsuperscript{775}

Given the ways in which the hotel would take on an educative role of the expansion of the tourism industry, Conrad Hilton could boast of the ready receptivity on the part of the Turkish government—a sense of hospitality he noted in his account of his trip to Istanbul. Despite complaints on the part of Turkish journalists and various participants during the onset of the Turkish tourism initiative, Hilton, now granted the key to the city of Istanbul, an honor bestowed “never before to an innkeeper,” found the Turkish landscape already prepared to receive the hotel enterprise.\textsuperscript{776} The hotel, after all, had not only been a “sound business investment” but also became the “social and diplomatic focal point for local residents and distinguished visitors,” hailing from the United States and Europe, as well as China, Pakistan, Thailand, Trinidad, and India:

I found myself hoping that they had found time at least to drink a cup of coffee together. Drinking a cup of coffee in Turkey has a very special significance. It was explained to me the first time I was offered a demitasse of the strong local brew. ‘After you drink a cup of coffee with me,’ said my host, ‘that commits you to friendship for thirty years.’ Imagine what would happen if everyone in that hotel (from thirty-eight different countries) were to drink coffee together in the Turkish tradition!\textsuperscript{777}

Hilton’s idealized account, whose contours exceed the fleeting nature of the guest-host relationship and gesture towards a commitment to long-term friendship, was likely

\textsuperscript{775} This formulation was consistent with early proposals that Hilton representatives extended to the TDS of the ECA, wherein the hotel in Istanbul would “serve as a pool of trained help for other hotels,” as well as facilitate economic development by bringing in large currency as had already been the case in Puerto Rico. See John Houser, “Memorandum with Respect to Proposed Hotel for Istanbul Turkey,” and “Memorandum of Proposal for Hotel Project in Istanbul and Certain Matters Relating Thereto,” enclosed in Pozzy to Dorr, September 7, 1950 (RG 469, Entry 1399, Central Files 1948-56, Box 35, Folder: Hilton Hotel-Private Projects).

\textsuperscript{776} Conrad Hilton, “We are the Innkeepers.” The badge of the city of Istanbul, which was conferred upon Hilton by the municipality of Istanbul on June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1955, is now among the prized possessions of the Hospitality Industry Archives at the University of Houston, decorating its walls.

\textsuperscript{777} Hilton, \textit{Be My Guest}, pp. 265-66
informed by the various reports sent by John Houser following his negotiations with the ECA and the Turkish government. Houser, the Vice President and General Manager of Hilton Hotels International, praised not only the assistance of the Ambassador and the “ECA people” in these letters, but also the enthusiasm of Turkish officials, who “like the idea since it appeals to their pride… They will agree to American architects and I believe contractors as well, if we feel they are needed. This is the real crossroads of the East and West and if there isn’t a war will be in for a great advance and development.”

Two years after his initial encounters in Turkey, Houser insisted that “the top people are really enthusiastic about the hotel…It is one of the most popular efforts of Americans in that vital country and I feel proud to have been a part of it.”

Houser was particularly pleased with his conversation with Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, the Governor of Istanbul, who explained to him that the Hilton was conceived not “as just a hotel,” but also an expression of Turkey’s commitment to its participation in the United Nations and the Atlantic Pact to “nations from other free countries”: “It’s a big and serious thing to them and a responsibility. The new ambassador, [George] McGhee is equally laudatory, [and] said to the head of press etc. that we were establishing a pattern for private enterprise he hoped would be followed by others and added that he foresaw the day the words ‘Hilton’ and ‘hotel’ would be interchangeable.”

Turkish officials reiterated visions of the hotel as a landmark in the recently burgeoning tourism industry and a signifier of Turkey’s status as a staunch ally. Prime Minister Menderes envisioned the Istanbul Hilton as a cornerstone in overturning the

778 Houser to Hilton, August 27, 1950, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1950
779 Houser to Hilton, January 27, 1952, HHI Box 1, General Correspondence 1952
780 Ibid.
neglect that the industry had endured through the years, while Halim Alyot, the Director of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism, hailed the signing of the agreement as “the first triumph of the Turkish tourism cause.” Though such declarations betray a sense of ingenuousness (implying that the erection of one hotel would solve the problems of the burgeoning tourism industry), various publications about the building phase of the hotel corroborated these visions. Architectural journals depicted the hotel not merely as an object of desire, consumptive luxury and spectacular modernity, but also articulated its function in terms of its utility—hence their ceaseless allusion to the previous lack of hosting space for diplomatic and business functions, as well as international conferences in Istanbul. The Hilton was to respond to an absence and fulfill this lack, but only insofar as such a formulation would help conceal its excessive standing, its extravagant form, and its extraneous imposition.

*Milkshakes at the Old Seraglio*

It was the Turks, *Architectural Record* reported, who had been seeking to interest “American capital in such a venture” and “demanded” the International Style, attested by the fact that modern and large buildings were becoming so prevalent in the landscape that “mosques and minarets, earlier native architecture of Istanbul will one day soon be scenic contrast to the latest American-aided project in the East, the Istanbul Hilton Hotel.” The vision of the city and the hotel alike standing at the crossroads of the East and West thus came to prevail in promotional efforts, incorporating romanticized accounts of the country’s political trajectory:

781 “Turizm Sanayine Hız Verilecek” (Speed to the Tourism Industry) *Vatan*, May 7, 1953; “İstanbul’da Yapılacak Büyük Otel” (Large Hotel to be Built in Istanbul) *Ulus*, December 16, 1950

782 “Tourist Hotel for Istanbul, Turkey” *Architectural Record* 113 (1953)
High above the minarets of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey builds a symbol of progress, a focus for entertaining and a magnet for the tourist trade…To many Turks, who long discarded the fez and the veil in favor of Western ways, the new Istanbul Hilton symbolizes something else: the hope that Turkey, once called the ‘sick man of Europe,’ will become a healthy, wealthy and much-visited member of the international family.”

Hilton publications also spoke with authority about the politics, history and aspirations of the region, noting that “Turkey formerly was the focal point of all the Middle East,” but was now becoming “definitely a European country,” “making great strides in developing its economy and social structure close to Western European thinking.”

The purported, multivalent functionality of the hotel thus came to be imbricated, in the minds of its designers, proponents, and funders, with the readily receptive nature of the Turkish landscape. Designated to host official functions, jumpstart the tourism industry, and ensure the move towards “Western European thinking,” the hotel surfaced as the anchoring point for visions of diplomacy, modernity, and hospitality. What could be more natural than this great ally, “located ten miles from the Iron Curtain,” enthusiastically accepting the makings of a building that signaled receptivity to foreign capital and expertise alike? The hotel was to provide a bulwark against two distinct threats by these accounts: the territorially and ideologically expansionary Soviet Union on the one hand, and the inertia of traditional society, on the other. That inertia, in turn, was simultaneously periodized as Turkey’s still visible past (manifest in its minarets), and spatialized as the Middle East (whereby Turkey’s past was reconceived as the present of its neighbors to whom it was to provide a future model of “the West,” broadly

783 “Hilton’s Newest Hotel” *Architectural Forum* December 1955, p. 122
784 “Expansion in Turkey” *Hilton Items*, 15 (8), January 1952, p. 5
785 Ibid. p. 4. The hyperbole of the proximity to the “Iron Curtain” is in line with Conrad Hilton’s personal rhetoric, as we have seen.
construed). At once deflecting critiques of technical aid and putting to apt use much-coveted counterpart funds, the Istanbul Hilton thus came to be seen as the foremost expression (and blueprint) of Turkish hospitality, which existed prior to the ventures of American aid and capital, but was in need of being modified and perfected by the standards of the tourism industry from across the Atlantic.

That perfectibility required modernist interventions in the form of amenities that the hotel was to provide. Accounts of the Hilton were embellished with paeans to the building’s modernity, which was reportedly “Corbusian” in character; “raised on concrete pilotis, faced with box-like balconies, and capped with shaped equipment housing and a domed nightclub.”786 Built of reinforced concrete (given the shortage of steel), the hotel housed 300 guest rooms, which sprawled across eight floors extending over the “lower floor which contains shops, offices, and lounges around an enclosed patio.”787 Tennis courts, a swimming pool, a roof terrace bar, a cocktail lounge and a spacious lobby, not unlike the one Çoruh yearningly described in his ruminations situated during the initial phase of the tourism cause, were among the luxurious surroundings that would make the American tourist feel at home, importing “suburban United States” to “the core of urban Istanbul.”788

Other amenities that would ensure a sense of familiarity included specialty items on the menu, such as milkshakes, cheeseburgers and soda fountains. Steam heated and automated coffee making machines, as well as “revolving hors d’oeuvres trolleys, hot

787 “Istanbul Hilton” *SOM News*, Number 8, October 15, 1954
788 Wharton, *Building the Cold War*, p. 22
food service trolleys and mobile service tables with electric food warmers [permitted] a personalized service at all guest tables.”

Novelties in the Turkish hospitality industry, such delicacies were a further testament to the Hilton’s position as a vanguard in the modernization of that industry.

Depictions of the hotel also incorporated visions of technological convenience into the expeditions of the American traveler. Items of American manufacture, such as “high velocity Hobart mixers, dishwashing machines and bake ovens,” “charcoal grills,” dry cleaning plants, and laundry service were distinct measures taken to guarantee the comfort of the guests. Turkish architectural magazines expounded on the “modernity” of the building’s design, providing detailed accounts of plumbing, climatization, and the private bathrooms in guest rooms:

Each bathroom contains a shiny, enamel built-in bathtub, a counter around the washbasin, a modern “a la franca” toilet with a flush, and a bidet. The plumbing contains a safe mixing system that prevents getting scalded. The showers have mechanisms that help adjust the flow and pressure of the water. A third faucet added to the sink will provide ice cold drinking water.

The bathroom is not the demarcated space of privacy or the venue for poetic reveries in this account: its utilities are put on display precisely on account of their embodiment of

789 “Istanbul Hilton” The Hotel Monthly, November 1955, p. 27
790 Ibid.
791 “Turistik Hotel” Touristic Hotel Arkitekt, V (243-44), 1952, p. 62. For an elegant account of the role of the bathroom within discourses of modernization, see Ali Cengizkan, Modernin Saati:20. Yüzyılda Modernleşme ve Demokratikleşme Pratığınde Mimarlar, Kamusal Mekan ve Konut Mimarlığı (The Hour of the Modern: Architects, Public Space and Residential Architecture in 20th Century Practices of Modernization and Democratization) (Istanbul: Boyut, 2002). It should be noted, of course, that the Istanbul Hilton was not novel in its provision of these facilities: “When it was opened in 1927, the Ankara Palas was popularly acclaimed as the symbol of modernity and civilization, with its pressurized water and central heating systems, its Western type toilets and bathtubs and its powerful electric generator, a unique feature in this rural Anatolian town accustomed to dim kerosene lamps.” Yet, “in spite of all the modern services it offered to its guests, the building’s facades were treated according to the principles of the First National Style, reflecting a nostalgia for Ottoman heritage,” Yıldırım Yavuz and Suha Özkan, “Finding a National Idiom: The First National Style” in Ahmet Evin and Renata Holod, eds. Modern Turkish Architecture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), p. 56
hygiene, efficiency, and mastery, in turn, associated with manifestations of modernity.\footnote{Gaston Bachelard, \textit{The Poetics of Space}, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994)} In stark contrast to Çoruh’s “tin faucet, painted an ugly green or red…irritating the eye,” the Hilton bathroom welcomes each hotel guest, be they in search of familiarity (the American tourist), novelty (the Turkish guest) or technical know-how (the Turkish architect perusing the professional magazine).

Such facilities embodied the Hilton vision which insisted that the “back of the house” in their hotels be set up “along practical, businesslike and efficient lines…incorporated from our experience in the United States.”\footnote{“Memorandum: Hilton Hotel Project for ERP Countries,” enclosed in Pozzy to Dorr, June 6, 1950, op. cit.} That experience, however, was also accompanied with a certain international outlook: from Holland came the linen, from France the glass, from Switzerland the silver, china and elevators. Hailing from England were bathtubs, furniture, and kitchen equipment, with Sweden providing draperies and laundry machinery: “Many of the business machines and much mechanical housekeeping equipment have been brought from the United States,” noted Hilton publications, but “Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg also contributed.”\footnote{“Gala Opening in Istanbul” Hilton Items, 19 (2), July 1955} Hilton’s inn-keeping practices would accommodate not only guests from “thirty-eight different countries,” ready to share coffee over the expansion of world peace, good-will and harmony, but also the latest items of luxury, displaying the manufacturing capabilities of the West, broadly construed.

The modernity of the hotel (necessarily global, as well as American in the International Style) was also mingled with vestiges of the local and the authentic,
“adapting many Turkish features of styling and design.” The foremost expression of this blend was the Lalezar (Tulip Room), where Turkish coffee was served by Turkish women donning “traditional clothes.” One did not have to enter the hotel to experience “the delicacies of Turkish taste.” Highly visible were the pavilions bracketing the cocktail terrace, “cupolas with golden pinnacles,” and the infamous canopy at the gate, which was dubbed the “Flying Carpet” and believed to be “inspired by the gate of the Old Seraglio.” In that regard, the local was not relegated to the interior of the hotel or tucked away for the enjoyment of the hotel guests—the notably conspicuous “Flying Carpet” marked entry into the global, modern space, and it was only through this (in)authentic passageway that the seemingly eclectic pleasures of the Tulip Room and the soda fountain could be consumed. Even the Marmara Roof Bar, itself, which had a dance floor and an American-designed garden came with a dome believed to convey distinctly Turkish characteristics: “Forty metal fins with perforated designs taken from Turkish carpets converge on the center to form a six foot diameter medallion with relief motifs of dragons symbolizing clouds, a subject widely used in Turkish works of art. Hundreds of small lights concealed from behind shimmer through the perforations creating a fairy tale effect.”

The “fairy tale effect,” with its Orientalist and phantasmatic undertones alike, was leveled with Hilton official accounts of their contribution to otherwise forgotten local

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795 “Expansion in Turkey” Hilton Items 15 (8), January 1952, p. 4
796 “Istanbul Hilton” The Hotel Monthly, November 1955, pp. 24-7
797 “Hilton Oteli Film Yıldızlarının Huzurıyla 10 Haziran’da Açılacak” Hilton Hotel to Open with the Participation of Film Stars, Hürriyet, March 11, 1955
799 “Istanbul Hilton” The Hotel Monthly, November 1955, pp. 24-7
industries. The delivery of carpets handwoven in Konya was “organized and controlled under the watchful eye of Kemal Seli, an American-trained business executive who, several years ago, returned to his homeland especially to carry out a planned revitalization of the Turkish carpet industry which once commanded the whole world market in luxury carpets.”

Conrad Hilton similarly (and characteristically) took credit for the recovery of the authentic tiles that decorated the walls and ceilings of the building: “Generations ago the Turks had been famous tile-makers but the art had largely died out. Evidence of their handiwork, however, abounded in the old Sultan’s Palace. When we decided we wanted to use similar tiles, a local architect searched out a few old men who could teach the younger ones and today, long after the completion of the hotel, tile-making is again quite a thriving business.”

The hotel surfaces, in these depictions, as an object of consumption that also enables the consumption of that which is ostensibly local and authentic, as well as that which is global and modern, equivalently and unequivocally American. In the process, it reorients, remakes, and rehabilitates local or regional form, as can be evinced by the canopy at the entrance and the details of the roof garden. The local, in this scheme, is the recipient and the supplement alike, a marker of authenticity, ready to displace the foreign parasitic site of the hotel—a site that is meant to fulfill lack but remains one itself. By these accounts, the Hilton exudes American modernity at the same time as it juxtaposes the seemingly global and the (carefully invented) local within its contours. The glass façade of the building seemingly conveys a display of power, embodied in the

800 “Gala Opening in Istanbul” Hilton Items, 19 (2), July 1955
801 Hilton, Be My Guest, p. 265
encroachment of the global onto the local, but it is a local whose authenticity is spontaneously fabricated or “staged” on the spot—hence the palpably ersatz references to coffee being served in “traditional attire,” “the flying carpet” marking entry into the “Old Seraglio,” and the recuperation of long-lost local crafts.  

Times, too, are hybridized in this space of mobility: people in the hotel move in time to an “authentic” past that has been recovered and folded into the present, to a technological present marked by the flow of steam-heated coffee and frosted milkshakes, and an aesthetic future populated by replicas of Corbusian modernism, as we will see.

An advertisement from the time of the opening of the hotel reiterates these visions in its celebratory proclamation of the arrival of the Istanbul Hilton “to the land of the Blue Mosque.” With the Mosque relegated to the background of the luminous hotel, the image may at first sight suggest, as Annabel Wharton has argued, the domination of “an alien territory” by “American Modernity” or “the visual control of the unfamiliar from a familiar location.” Yet, such mastery could only take place in the imaginary realm: the spectral Blue Mosque, darker by contrast, hovering behind the hotel is superimposed onto a new venue, taken out of its original locale. That forcible extraction is a testament to a juxtaposition that can only occur at the register of the imaginary. It is the (land of) the Blue Mosque that is designated as host in this vein, surreptitiously taking over the task of hosting from the hotel itself which is now rendered the unfamiliar, the alien, the guest—not unlike those it was designated to host for brief periods of time. The advertisement is

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803 See Figure 26  
804 Wharton, Building the Cold War, p. 6
suggestive of the ways in which dichotomies unravel in the body of the building. The
global and the local are one such pair waiting to be undone: rendered legible within the
hotel are both a Turkey of the past (provincial, miniature, backwards-looking) and that of
the future (expectant, receptive, accelerated). The duration of the present in such a place
can only be brief, momentary, fleeting, not unlike the transience circumscribing the stay
of its guests. Folded into that brief instantiation is the history of the Blue Mosque, of the
green and blue tiles decorating the building, and coffee girls in “traditional” attire,
alongside novelty items such as the fountain soda, burgers, and ice cubes. Both sets of
artifacts are offered up for inspection and consumption, and the Hilton is their
intermediary, offering itself as a site of cohabitation for guests, investors and spectators
alike.

It is tempting, on the one hand, to speak of a series of conjoined, superimposed,
overlapping alignments in the depictions and proclamations encapsulating the Istanbul
Hilton. The series of imaginary alliances belie a comfort in certitude with regards to the
function, objectives, and meanings attributed to the hotel. Expected to inculcate a sense
of hospitality in a landscape already amenable to the offer of Americanized modernity,
technical aid, expertise and capital alike, these accounts of the hotel purport to prescribe
what the recipient already is. It is the already hospitable gesture of coffee-sharing that
enables commitment to a friendship that is to endure thirty years. That gesture is enacted
in the building of the hotel through the uncovering of local motifs such as the long-lost
tradition of Kütahya tiles and Anatolian carpet-weaving. It is the unquenchable yearning
for the inscription of the International Style within the urban mold that marks the hotel
building as at once a novel pioneer and a retrospectively familiar landmark. It is the
desperate lack of adequate facilities for tourism and official functions, international conferences, as well as the random passersby that makes the Hilton investment a much awaited grant finally bestowed on the otherwise neglected city of Istanbul. Unsettling the veracity and tenacity of such claims, however, is the way in which each proclamation invokes its opposite, occasioning the possibility that the seemingly concentric circuits of amity, hospitality and necessity were in fact undercut by the conscious efforts to cultivate each. The precarious coupling of the local and the global—otherwise presumed to be complementary—is one venue of exploration into the fragility of such circuits and claims.

The following sections detract from the seemingly coherent narrative arc of the Hilton enterprise. That coherence, after all, is only possible at the register of the imaginary—itself a noteworthy effect produced despite and through the fraught entanglements of its hybrid components, human and non-human alike. The collaboration behind the building and its reception did not signal the top-down imposition of the International Style onto the Turkish architectural scene. The tourism industry did not encounter a readily hospitable environment in Turkey from its inception, as parliamentary debates for its encouragement were undercut by broader questions about the desirability of foreign capital and expertise. An earlier venture to build a hotel in Istanbul, undertaken by the Intercontinental Corporation, further reveals a series of standstills and diplomatic roadblocks behind the portrait of Turkey as a willing ally and pliable receptacle for foreign aid and private investment. The following interludes and the series of events they spun thus weave a net of entanglements around the Hilton enterprise, at once disrupting the otherwise linear biography and trajectory of the hotel as an artifact, and revealing the
forebodings attendant to the travels of foreign ventures into unknown lands. Each claim about the hospitable landscape (the Turkish government’s enthusiasm, the relentless demand for American modernism, the tailored fit with ECA interest in tourism promotion) is overturned by these intermissions. It is for this reason that the story of the Hilton reels between the certitude of entrepreneurial conquest, alignment with foreign policy objectives, and visions of Turkish hospitality on the one hand, and the vicissitudes of capital and aid, the consternations of official and commercial representatives, and the febrile character of the designated host on the other.

*Children of Hilton*

In his memoirs, Nathaniel Owings, partner at the architectural firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM), proffers an account of the Istanbul Hilton that is consistent with depictions of the hotel’s embodiment of the local and the global alike:

> Again, entirely conceived by Louis Skidmore, through his imaginative use of Marshall Plan funds for foreign building designs, like a meteor in the sky came an Arabian Nights’ job: the Istanbul Hilton Hotel on a promontory overlooking the Dardanelles in the magic city of Istanbul. With the Santa Sophia and the Bosphorus for inspiration, we had to do a great building. The result is a salubrious blend of strong Turkish architectural motifs and American plumbing and heating. Sedad Eldem, our associate, a resident of Istanbul, master of five languages, proved that the legendary toughness of the Turks extended to the character and fiber of their architects. Sedad Eldem is famous for having defeated Bunshaft on his own ground, maintaining the supremacy of rich, lush, romantic Turkish architecture over Bun’s more classic international predilections. The resulting building is considered by both Sedad and Gordon as a satisfactory compromise between two worlds of culture.805

Owings not only reproduces the romanticized depictions of the “fairy tale effect” exemplifying the Hilton initiative, but he readily maps the demarcation between the global and the local onto the distinctive styles of the collaborating architects. Carol

Krinsky, the author of a monograph on the work of Gordon Bunshaft (Eldem’s American collaborator on the Hilton) presents a different account of that project, based on interviews with the architect. According to Krinsky, though Eldem “insisted on teakwood for balcony grilles, reflecting his interest in regional wooden houses,” it was Skidmore who suggested “the domed rooms, which he considered similar to those of the madrasahs, schools adjacent to mosques.” Dismantling Owings’ strict assignation of local and global motifs onto the preferences of the two architects, Krinsky relays Bunshaft’s insistence that “everyone agreed on the need for opulent effects.”

By Krinsky’s account, the collaboration between the two architects was amicable, with them concurring about not only the use of characteristic features of American modernism, such as reinforced concrete, but also the “Ottoman-inspired” opulent effects. Bunshaft’s depiction of Eldem as a “charming man who ‘looked like an elegant French prince’ and behaved with assurance suggestive of distinguished ancestry,” furthermore suggests a perception of the latter as a willing and welcoming host. If it was indeed the case that the “local” motifs could not readily be attributed to Eldem, and the classic “international predilections” to Gordon Bunshaft, a closer look at the professional trajectories of the two architects suggests overlaps, in lieu of divergences, between the careers and stylistic proclivities of the two architects.

Sedad Eldem was trained at the Academy of Fine Arts at Istanbul University between 1924 and 1928, then in Paris and Berlin between 1929 and 1930, where he

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807 Ibid., p. 55
808 Krinsky, *Gordon Bunshaft*, p. 53
discovered the work of Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, whom he visited occasionally. Upon his return to Turkey, Eldem started offering a seminar on national architecture at the Academy, which became the basis for jumpstarting the second national architectural phase in Turkey, of which he became a prominent participant.\footnote{Ilhan Tekeli, “The Social Context of the Development of Architecture in Turkey” in Ahmet Evin and Renata Holod, eds. Modern Turkish Architecture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), p. 20. Tekeli argues that the first national architectural movement (1923-27) had been displaced by a cubic, functional architecture (1929-1939), most readily visible in the remaking of Ankara as the new capital of the Republic. The second national architecture (1940-49) was in turn displaced by the turn towards the International Style between 1950 and 1960.}

His iconic contribution during this era was the Taşlık Coffee House of 1947, which was meant as a “showpiece of all the essentially modern qualities of traditional Turkish House; a demonstration of the contemporary potential of history.”\footnote{Bozdoğan, “Modernity in Tradition: Works of Sedad Hakki Eldem” in Suha Özkan and Sibel Bozdoğan, eds., Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey, (New York: Aperture, 1987), p. 50} Even though Eldem had been critical of the German and Austrian architects whose cubic forms dominated Ankara during the early Republic, he collaborated with foreign professors, such as Paul Bonatz and Clemens Holzmeister throughout the 1940s, an alignment that consolidated his status within the profession.\footnote{Ibid., p. 61. For an account of the cubic high modernism of the Kemalist nation-building era and the “architectural component of republican discourse” during the 1930s, see Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001)} Under the influence of Bonatz, Eldem abandoned his previous work in houses, and began to design public edifices and government buildings, culminating in his collaboration with Emin Onat on the Istanbul Palace of Justice (1949), which signaled the turn towards the International Style in the Turkish architectural scene.

Given this change in the trajectory of Eldem’s career during the 1940s and 50s, his match with Gordon Bunshaft, once hailed as the prophet of “corporate architecture,”
could be deemed a customized fit. Bunshaft traveled across Europe on a Rotch Traveling Fellowship between 1935 and 1937, where he met Walter Gropius, and returned to Paris as part of the Army Corps of Engineers between 1942 and 1945, where, like Eldem, he made the acquaintance of Le Corbusier, the vanguard of International Style. His long-standing tenure with the architectural firm SOM, which was renowned for the design of postwar office buildings, as well as various American embassies and diplomatic posts across Europe, also resulted in landmarks such as the Lever House in New York, as well as the Chase Manhattan Bank headquarters and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas.

The end-product of Eldem and Bunshaft’s work has been singled out as not only the “precursor of high-rise hotels in Turkey,” but also as having contributed to the belief that the International Style could be undertaken in Turkey. As the influence of Italian and German architecture waned with the end of the war, attendant with their ideological appeal, the stage was set for a building like the Hilton which would usher in the decisive onset of the International Style within the built environment of Turkey. That style incorporated prismatic forms, geometric elements, and extensive use of the grid system;

trends to which the Istanbul Hilton was deemed the “forerunner.” Hilton’s reinforced concrete and white cubic forms would be replicated in buildings such as the Istanbul City Hall (1953) and the Anadolu Club (1959), as well as housing blocks in Ataköy and Levent which were built with the extension of low-interest credit by the Emlak Kredi Bank as a means to alleviate the housing shortage in Turkey throughout the 1950s.

Given the standing of the Hilton as a model to the rest of the urban landscape during this period, it should be noted that Eldem’s “involvement with modernism ‘proper,’ while designing as a regionalist, must not be interpreted as diversion or compromise.” Though it has been suggested that the hotel could be construed as “a training ground in Modernity for both Turkish architects and Turkish workers,” the dissemination of that style was not imposed from without. As Sibel Bozdoğan has cogently demonstrated, the propagation of the International Style did not have the Turkish architects as the “passive recipients of an imported aesthetic,” nor was there a singular Americanization to speak of: rather “mediterraneanized” forms with perforated bricks, pre-cast concrete grills, geometric grids were combined, as in the Hilton, with shells and curves, which were not “oriental” in outlook, but rather international, further destabilizing binarized accounts of the building’s visage.

818 Wharton, Building the Cold War, p. 37
Furthermore, it would be a gross understatement to suggest that the collaboration between Eldem and Bunshaft or the proliferation of the International Style took place in the lacunae of resistance. The year 1949 saw a series of protests organized by Turkish architects and engineers across Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara in response to the hiring of American architects for the construction of the Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University. These public outbursts resurfaced in 1953, while the Hilton was still being built, when the Ministry of Public Works decided to import experts from Germany for construction work. Renowned architect Şevki Vanlı was an early and vocal opponent of the Hilton in particular, raising concerns about the delegation of the hotel’s operation to an American firm prior to its buildings. “To hand over the management of a hotel that does not yet exist expresses an American mentality,” Vanlı noted, and inquired: “what is this rush?”

Vanlı was not only critical of the hasty hand-over of the hotel’s operation to a foreign firm, but also the style that it spurred in the Turkish architectural scene, dubbing that trend “Hiltonculuk.” He argued that it was now easy to identify the “legitimate children” of the Hilton, given their façades decorated with rectangular balconies, as well as the addition of “eccentric, flamboyant touches” to the protruded corners of the entrance and terrace of various buildings. Such addendums were expected to instill the

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820 See Zeki Sayar’s support of the protests in the professional magazine Arkitekt. “Yabancı Teknik Elemanlar Meselesi” The Problem of Foreign Technical Staff Arkitekt (1953, 261-2), as well as “Yabancı Mimarlar Problemi” The Problem of Foreign Architects (1946, 177-78) and “Mimarlık Politikamız” Our Architectural Policy (1946, 169-70). For details on these protests, see Çetin Ünalın, Cumhuriyet Mimarlığının Kuruluşu ve Kurumlaşması Sürecinde Türk Mimarlar Turkish Architects During the Establishment and Institutionalization of Republican Architecture (Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği, 2002) and Ela Kaçel, Intellectualism and Consumerism.
821 “Olmayan Otelin İşletilmesi” The Management of a Non-Existent Hotel Akşam, December 23, 1950
822 Şevki Vanlı, “Hiltonculuk” Kim, November 28, 1958. Vanlı’s coined phrase can be translated as “Hiltonism” with pejorative undertones.
new modernist buildings with “personality,” as could be discerned in the imposition of pavilions, canopies, cupolas and domes onto the otherwise “easy façade.” These children, however, failed to comprehend the ways in which the SOM architects could be deemed “merchant-architects” at best, more commercial sensations than artistic ones. Deficient in architectural value, the Istanbul Hilton nevertheless became the prototype for various buildings that won architectural competitions during this period, thereby impeding projects that may otherwise reflect “our own fantasy, research and thought.”

Vanlı’s compelling critique of “Hiltonculuk” is further indicative of the ways in which the “local” flourishes of the hotel (as well as its disciples) were less markers of “authenticity” than embellishments “staged” as afterthoughts to an increasingly prevalent International Style. The various protests launched around the time of the Hilton and Vanlı’s censure of its wholehearted replication across the urban landscape are thus suggestive of some Turkish experts’ discomfort with the project. That unease, in turn, was mirrored in the apprehensions of their American counterparts responsible for building the hotel.

Strange Attitudes

Soon after SOM’s assignment to the design of the Istanbul Hilton, Gordon Bunshaft spent two months in Turkey with Bill Brown, the housing expert and partner at SOM, G.L. Schamuder the construction engineer, and David Hughes, architect and town planner, at the behest of the Turkish Republic and in connection with the technical assistance program of the ECA in 1951. Their task was to offer an overview of the

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823 Ibid.
824 “Turkey 1951,” Bunshaft Papers, Box 5, Folder 4
housing, public building construction and town planning problems in Turkey, with their main recommendation being the creation of a “National Planning Agency” charged with the responsibility of “coordinating all programs for the creation of physical facilities required in carrying out the national policies for economic and social development.”

The rapporteurs noted the “wide gap between the technical proficiency of architects and engineers and their ability to use that proficiency for the improvement of building construction,” as well as problems within the labor force, given “social attitudes centuries old, political moves and the industrial revolution [which] have had an unfortunate effect on the development of craftsmanship in Turkey.”

Bunshaft’s diagnosis of the shortcomings of the Turkish building industry (and the attitudinal dimensions of those shortcomings) are illuminating in light of his account of the instances of misunderstanding and mistranslation that were endemic to his collaboration with Eldem:

During the design stage, [Eldem] came here for six months. We had our problems. I remember we would do designs and stick them up on the wall for us to discuss with him. I would walk around and point out things and he kept saying, ‘Yes, yes, yes,’ I thought he was approving it. After about three months he came up to me and said, ‘You know, we go around looking at these things, and I make some comments and you pay no attention to me. You just proceed the way you want to go.’ I said to him, ‘But you keep saying ‘yes.’” He said, ‘No, in Turkey, or in that part of the world, when we say ‘yes, yes,’ that means, ‘yes, yes, I understand what you are saying,’ not that I agree.’ That was unfortunate for him, but I’m glad it ended up that way, or we would still be designing the building.

825 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, *Construction and Town Planning in Turkey* (New York: Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, 1951), p. 4. Ela Kaçel suggests that this was a “diplomatic tool to legitimize SOM’s presence in Turkey,” *Intellectualism and Consumerism*, p. 190

826 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, *Construction and Town Planning in Turkey*, pp. 25 and 28

827 Interview with Marion L. Vanderbilt, September 1979, as part of the oral autobiographies of the partners of SOM. Bunshaft Papers, Box 8
According to Bunshaft, it was the irrevocable nature of linguistic (and cultural) difference that ensured the completion of the project. Rather than verbalizing his objections to the convictions of the SOM residents, Eldem, resembling an “elegant French prince,” spoke in affirmatives, which were in turn misconstrued as unconditional acceptance of their premises. Contrary to Owings’ triumphant proclamation of a ‘satisfactory compromise’ between the two distinct styles of the architects, then, Eldem’s unwitting consent is marked as the condition of his misfortunes in a foreign land, whose mode of communication seems to have eluded him.

Bunshaft immediately follows his depiction of the muddle characterizing Eldem’s stay in New York with his own trip to Turkey:

I went with him, when the building was designed, with a huge model to present to the Turkish people of the Pension Fund. Incidentally, we had a marvelous site, which I had been over to see prior to that. This meeting of three days drove me up a wall, because Sedad was doing all the talking in Turkish, naturally—none of them spoke English—and every once in a while I would whisper to him and say, ‘What’s going on?’ he would say ‘it’s not important that you know; it’s important that they understand.’ So I spent three days at meetings not saying anything or understanding anything, which is kind of unusual for me. But in spite of that, we remained friends, and the hotel was built.\textsuperscript{828}

The tables are turned in this mirroring image of Eldem’s term as an interloper at SOM. It is now Bunshaft who surfaces as the unwanted guest, literally lost in translation, and frustrated by the silence imposed on him. Stripped even of the capacity for “yes’sing” the project that is now being pitched to Turkish officials, the corporate architect loses the grounds for authority, necessarily predicated on access to knowledge and familiarity with

\textsuperscript{828} \textit{Ibid.} Bunshaft and Eldem’s friendship seems to have persevered well into the 1970s, with Eldem asking to find work for young protégés at SOM (with no success) and Bunshaft visiting him in Istanbul. See Eldem to Bunshaft, June 19, 1973; Bunshaft to Eldem, July 10, 1973; Bunshaft to Eldem, December 10, 1971 (Bunshaft Papers, Box 1, Folder 4)
local norms. Both architects remain unheard when placed into new settings; yet they manage to work together, producing a Corbusian result, albeit with emendations.

The much-praised, uncomplicated narrative of the collaboration behind the building begins to disintegrate in this version that pays heed to silences, outsiders and misunderstandings, thereby also calling into question the ease with which the project was undertaken by representatives of the Hilton firm. In his memoirs, Conrad Hilton praised the work ethic he believed to be characteristic of their Turkish counterparts, insisting on the presence of a “common interpretation of words,” despite the absence of a shared language: “For instance when a Turk used the Turkish word for ‘immediate’ he meant, as we do, ‘right now.’ When their government offered us ‘full cooperation’ they gave us exactly that. Hilton once again obscures the ways in which problems in linguistic equivalence necessarily interfered with the reception of ideas of hospitality. Interspersed with the seemingly welcoming attitude on the part of the Turks was the persistence of difference. Bunshaft’s inability to participate in crucial discussions and his (mis)interpretation of his Turkish counterpart’s attitude, were in fact shared by representatives of the Hilton who were responsible for overseeing the hotel’s construction in Istanbul.

Conrad’s brother, Carl Hilton, for instance, wrote of the “headaches Americans used to American ideas have in dealing in a business way with these people.

Appointment hours mean nothing; agreement with you and yessing you mean nothing;

829 Hilton, *Be My Guest*, p. 264. It is interesting to note that Hilton seems to have found a higher level of mutual understanding in Turkey than he did across Europe: “It was in England, however, that the fact was brought home to me that American business methods are uniquely American. This is not to say that other methods are better or worse. But I do mean to say they are different. All over Europe I found that the time sense varied most definitely. Ours is a new land. Theirs is very old. It makes for a variance in perspective,” *Be My Guest*, p. 236
there is a great gap between promise and achievement."\textsuperscript{830} Carl Hilton singled out his dealings with northern Europeans, who seemed to adhere to American standards of punctuality and reliability, adding: “But the Spaniards and the Turks: it is really something!! I don’t think they are basically insincere, I think they don’t know how to organize their efforts towards fulfilling their promise, and besides it is their country, their methods and—their money they are spending.”\textsuperscript{831} Elsewhere, he wrote of the “strange attitude” he encountered in Turkey, where people “won’t advertise; the theory being that if you advertise your product is of dubious quality. You find out about them by the grapevine or various and devious means. This characteristic also marks most business transactions.”\textsuperscript{832}

The otherwise hospitable context of the hotel initiative is under scrutiny in these correspondences, undermining John Houser’s previous dispatches acclaiming the enthusiasm of Turkish officials and experts. Unaccustomed to the norms and methods of business transactions, as well as timekeeping practices that were expected to facilitate such dealings, the Turks fail to deliver on their promise of empathy and ease-filled alliance. Such complaints were consistent with social scientists’ depictions of the prospects for a liberal market economy in Turkey during this period, which identified “human factors,” and in particular, conceptions of “time” as hindrances to economic development.\textsuperscript{833} Expectations for eager receptivity are once again derailed by the

\textsuperscript{830} Carl Hilton to Conrad Hilton, August 8, 1952, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1952

\textsuperscript{831} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{832} Carl Hilton to Conrad Hilton, January 27, 1952, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1952

\textsuperscript{833} Social Aspects of Economic Development: A report of the international conference on social aspects of economic development held at Istanbul, August 4-24, 1963, sponsored by the Economic and Social Studies Conference Board. Also see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (1958); Richard Robinson, Letters from Turkey (Istanbul: Robert College, 1965). Lerner and Robinson’s accounts relied heavily on
shortcomings of the host whose understanding of time is vague, and for whom “tomorrow” means “some other time” or simply “not now.”

The instances of disconnect and mistranslation that interfered with the hotel project led to moments of self-reflexivity for some Hilton employees such as Dean Carpenter. Carpenter, who was Hilton’s brother-in-law and replaced John Houser as Vice President of Hilton Hotels International, seems to have become increasingly skeptical of their endeavors abroad, and in particular, across the Middle East:

I have read two 600 page books, plus much else on the Arabs, the ancient Saracanic influences and the Middle East. How little we of the west, particularly in the US, understand Islam!...After two years of experience and association in this area of the world, I wonder if a second look of appraisal of our own position, and in Europe, may not be in order? In many ways I am disenchanted by the frustrations I have had, and also by those had by other large companies, even those with much money of their own to invest or spend. When we first came, there was trust. Now there isn’t. Then, these countries had all to gain and nothing to lose. Now I think they take a dimmer view, when it is a matter of investing their own...Many times have I been asked why, if we think prospects are so good, and our knowhow so productive, don’t we back them up with cash?...I think many of these people are quite content and happy with their own know how and in some ways, of service for instance, they can teach us a little. They like some of their standards better than they do ours, and are happy to do without some of our ideas of luxury in other things. Maybe I am in danger of becoming disillusioned—maybe the disillusionment unconsciously concerns our own personal future.


834 Edwin Cohn, “Some Propositions Concerning the Role of Human Factors in Economic Development” Background Paper for the First Meeting, Group on the Human Factors in Economic Development, 1957-58, October 14, 1957, and “Time, the Future and Economic Development,” Background Paper for the Second Meeting, November 12, 1957 Folder 4, Box 164 (CFR Records). Similar concerns, as we have seen, were found in the correspondence between the ECA, the US Bureau of Public Roads and the Department of Highways in Turkey.

835 Dean Carpenter to Conrad Hilton, April 28, 1954, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1953-54
Carpenter’s potent articulation of his disillusionment undermines Hilton’s confidence about the uncontested transportability of technical know-how, the effortless propagation of the standards of the tourism industry, and the lucrative replicability of the business model developed at the Puerto Rico Caribe as early as 1949. Personal interactions with the recipients of such projects were steeped with instances of incredulity, defiance and alternative conceptions of the industry. No matter how hard official statements and publicity efforts insisted on the presence of malleability, differences in business conduct, conceptions of time and language prevailed as indications not only of the frailty of the Hilton project, but also the discomfort and anxieties on the part of American experts and entrepreneurs. A closer look at some of the Turkish parliamentary debates pertaining to the tourism industry and the Hilton hotel in particular suggest that those hesitations were not entirely unwarranted.

The Rooster’s Crow

At the time of the opening of the hotel, Ahmet Emin Yalman, the Columbia-trained editor of the daily Vatan, penned an article in defense of Conrad Hilton, whose honorary citizenship in Istanbul in fact became a contentious matter. Yalman argued that Hilton added “ideals, art, taste, knowledge and experience” to the hotel business, despite his commercial interests and quest for reputation. Hilton’s objective in building the footholds of modern tourism in “backwards” locations, after all, was the merging of nations together. Yet the task of building a hotel suited to the most advanced American conception of hospitality in foreign milieus would necessarily prove strenuous. “Our context in particular presents a difficult frontier of resistance,” Yalman suggested,

836 Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Yeni Fahri Hemşerimiz” Our New Honorary Citizen, Vatan, June 10, 1955
unwittingly echoing the frustrations of Carl Hilton, “given its stationary methods, static viewpoints, and habits that pay no heed to time. In order to enter the age of modern tourism, we need a foothold and vaccine like the Hilton. Of course the troubles are not over: the Hilton initiative will meet obstacles, such as backwards mentality, demagoguery, stagnant thinking, and jealousy.”

Yalman’s reference to the “stationary methods” and “static viewpoints” standing in the way of the Hilton initiative is best understood in the context of parliamentary debates that convey the unease that some Turkish officials had with the project. The Pension Fund’s acquisition of the Bellevue site overlooking the Bosphorus from the Istanbul Municipality, its previous owner, required a law whose consideration was rife with dispute. The draft law that would ease the acquisition characteristically emphasized the centrality of this large and luxurious hotel to the tourism cause. Hayrettin Erkmen, of the Budget Commission, insisted that the hotel, being built by one of the most advanced and renowned firms of the world, would become a school for the tourism industry at home.

Hikmet Fırat, a Republican Member of Parliament from Malatya, protested that the “Bellevue location” had been expropriated and “promised to the people” for the purpose of building a public park. Fırat believed that though building hotels could be conceived as a “lofty cause,” such projects need not entail an assault on citizens’ rights: “Have you ever slaughtered a rooster? I have. Perhaps you have as well. We trample its

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837 Ibid.  
839 Ibid., p. 418  
840 Ibid., p. 413
feet and wings when we do…We do this, and it cannot flutter. But we don’t hold down its throat, it screams. Nobody can interfere with its scream. But this law bans the citizen’s yelling. This law blocks that road, blocks the gates of justice. This I object to.”

Though overwrought in his deployment of analogical flourishes (and ultimately defeated with the passing of the law), Fırat’s outburst did reflect a broader concern with the transfer of public property into the hands of a private American firm. The twenty-year long duration of the lease did not guarantee the uncontested provision of a site for the hotel, and this brief possibility of rootlessness was recognized by the most confident Hilton representatives as well.

The next year saw the Turkish Parliament discussing the Tourism Encouragement Law, which contained a special clause pertaining to the Hilton Hotel. The debates about this law addressed concerns about the arrival of foreign tourism experts, and the very meaning of notions of hospitality and the tourist. Hikmet Fırat was once again the prominent critical voice and pointed out the ways in which the new law would follow the precedent set by the previous one, furnishing foreigners with the ability and right to take the property of the state, villagers and municipalities with the purpose of building hotels, given its allowance for the purchase of public land for that purpose with a payment option over the course of twenty years. Feridun Fikri Düşünsel joined Fırat in labeling the law thoroughly “anti-democratic,” despite proponents referring to the example of the

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841 Ibid., pp. 416, 428
842 Houser to Hilton, January 27, 1952 (HHI Box 1, General Correspondence 1952)
843 Clause 30 involved the Hilton, wherein the tourism credit deposited at the İller Bankası (Provinces Bank) in the amount of 2 million dollars each year (beginning with the budget year of 1953, until reaching the amount of 50 million dollars) could be used towards the completion of this particular hotel. The exemptions provided for the project of a private firm were heatedly questioned, with Burhanettin Onat insisting that this clause expressed the spirit of this law. TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, S: 75, Dönem 9, Cilt 21, April 30, 1953 (Parliamentary Records)
Hilton as a venue that would provide as many as 500 Turkish workers with new opportunities.\textsuperscript{844} Given the dearth of qualified personnel in the tourism industry (and the childlike state of the latter), projects like the Hilton were once again commended for their educative function.\textsuperscript{845}

The question of hotel personnel took on a particularly contentious nature in these debates since the law also included a clause that would allow foreigners to work at tourism facilities for three years, provided they remained under 15 percent of the entire workforce at those facilities. This particular clause occasioned discussions about the very definition of experts, given concerns raised by some that the law would pave the way for hospitals and other public institutions to employ them, before lengthy debates limited the definition of “expertise” to waiters, maitre d’hotel, bartenders, porters, cooks and jazz musicians in this context.\textsuperscript{846} Despite Hidayet Aydiner’s objection that the law was increasingly reminiscent of capitulations, others retorted that this would not be the first time that foreign experts were summoned during the Republican era, citing Kemal’s invitation of German professors during the reconstruction of Istanbul University, as well as the architects and engineers who were responsible for the refashioning of Ankara as the capital of the country over the course of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{847}

The necessity to resort to foreign experts in the milieu of the development of the hospitality industry hinged on discussions about the needs and expectations of the tourist. Senihi Yürüten objected to the importation of musicians, suggesting that Turkish tourists

\textsuperscript{844} TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, S: 75, Dönem 9, Cilt 21, April 20, 1953
\textsuperscript{845} TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, S: 75, Dönem 9, Cilt 21, April 27, 1953
\textsuperscript{846} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{847} Ibid.
knew not to expect deference to their tastes when they traveled across Europe: “Let those foreigners come and see our customs...why this need to Europeanize our mentality?” This interjection led others, such as Burhanettin Onat, to prescribe a manner of respect for the refined preferences of the tourist. “A tourist,” Onat explained, “is a person who indulges his own tastes, his own needs. We are obliged to bring musicians who can play music that he is accustomed to, just as we are obliged to bring in cooks who can cook the food he is accustomed to. The Christian tourist who goes to Ephesus to see Mary’s tomb does not read the Bible all day long; he completes his pilgrimage during the day, and goes to a bar to dance at night.”

Namık Gedik concurred that though the tourist’s day might be taken up by visits to historical sites, he preferred going back to establishments like the Hilton at the end of a demanding day of sightseeing, establishments that would provide the comfort and ease he was accustomed to. The staged meeting of the local and the global resurfaces in this official imagining of the daily schedule and movement of the tourist, once again evoking the principles of empathy and mobility that were seen as the hallmarks of a modernized hospitality industry.

Cemal Kıpçak’s attempt to relate the preceding debate to broader understandings of hospitality dovetailed with the prioritization of the tourist’s preferences over the interests of Turkish workers:

Are we going to entice tourists? First we need to adapt our mentality to the formula required by tourism...What if the law pertained not to the building of hotels but to the incitement of our hospitality? For instance, if a tourist was coming to visit us at home, we would first ask someone who knows what kind of food he wants, what time he goes to bed and wakes up. We would sacrifice our customs to prove our hospitality to this man and create the system he accustomed to. When we go to the countryside, the villager brings us forks,

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848 TBMM Meclis Tutanakları, S: 75, Dönem 9, Cilt 21, April 30, 1953

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knives, plates as a treat since he knows that is our need. We have to do the same. Otherwise, this law would not be the tourism law but the law of protecting the Turkish worker. The thesis we are defending here is the encouragement of the tourism industry.  

Kırçak’s intervention is reminiscent of the earlier reports prepared by the likes of Çoruh and Ergün. The cultivation of a hospitable mindset is an arduous task that requires insight into the tourist’s standards of living and comfort, as well as his artistic and culinary predilections. Those norms, furthermore, are as foreign to the parliament members in Ankara as the customs of the Anatolian villager, who will apparently resort to cutlery only in the presence of esteemed guests from the capital.

It was accommodation facilities like the Hilton, furthermore, that would take on the task of familiarizing the nation with the tastes and needs of the tourist, as the same time as they were hailed as the single and foremost solution to the inadequacies of the tourism industry. As members of parliament grappled with the meaning and desirability of foreigners, expertise, as well as the quotidian pastimes of the tourist, their conflicting attempts at definition also betrayed uncertainties about Turkey’s capacity for hosting such novel guests. Though the debates revolved around the shortcomings of the Turkish waiter who remained uncertain of the etiquette for serving wine or the Turkish villager who lacked proper table manners, references to the misfortunes of the Turkish people, deprived of their entitlement to a public park by the Bosphorus (and their capacity to crow, unlike the rooster at the moment of its slaughter) are once again indicative of resistance to endeavors such as the Hilton.  

That resistance, furthermore, was not the

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849 Ibid.
850 Salamon Adato cited detailed examples of wine-serving as an indication of the failings of the Turkish waiter, *TBMM Meclis Tutanakları*, S: 75, Dönem 9, Cilt 21, April 27, 1953
first or only instance of the ordeals that the American tourism industry would encounter in this setting.

*The Spearpoint of Imperialism*

On June 22, 1950, Henry Mitchell relayed a letter to Russell Dorr, the ECA Chief of Special Mission to Turkey, suggesting that he catalogue the enclosed memorandum in the Mission’s “Moore file.” The author of the original memorandum, entitled “Obtaining Private Investment Capital from the United States for Turkey for Hotel Building and Tourism,” and addressed “apparently” to a “Minister of the Turkish government,” was Dan Tyler Moore, Jr., representative of the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation.851 In his letter, Moore inquires as to whether “investment of American capital in Turkey [would] be a good thing for Turkey,” only to arrive at an answer in the affirmative. A disarrayed and disjointed account of the purported affinity between Turkey and the United States, Moore’s missive entails lessons from the history of both countries, citing the former’s negative experiences with England, France and Germany in the era of capitulations, and the latter’s long-standing and “violently anti-imperialistic” proclivities, traced through encounters in Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the Philippines. Proffering a revisionist history of imperialism that agencies like the ECA likely wanted to conceal in their amnesiac reformulation of American presence abroad in the aftermath of World War II, Moore nevertheless insists that “the U.S. business man has never been the spearpoint of imperialism nor will he ever be,” but “must be assured that a fundamental change has occurred in the attitude of the Turkish people, and their newly elected government, to

foreign capital, and that it is now realized that foreign contractors can be enormously
helpful to Turkey in her task of converting her economy into a modern capitalist one
based somewhat on the U.S. model.”\textsuperscript{852}

Moore had expressed his broader concern for the prospects of American business
interest abroad in an earlier letter dispatched to George Wadsworth, the American
Ambassador to Turkey, where he cited the misfortunes of other companies, such as the
J.G. White Corporation, the Socony Vacuum Corporation, the Coca-Cola Corporation,
and the Middle East Company, and chidingly inquired: “What is the reason for this
almost complete failure of the American capitalist system to achieve anything in Turkey?
One American businessman oversimplified the problem the other day by saying that
American business in Turkey is dying form ‘yarinitus’ (‘yarin’ means tomorrow).”\textsuperscript{853} Not
only did Moore attempt to assess the implications of what he perceived to be an
irreconcilable difference in terms of temporal orientation in business dealings, but his
tirade also addressed the way in which each new project came to take on a “quasi-
diplomatic” façade given extensive involvement on the part of the Turkish state, thus
leading “American business” to “change its theory of two years ago that the wide-awe
progressive country of the future, in this part of the world, was Turkey.”\textsuperscript{854}

As Moore depicted Turkey as the resistant receptacle of the “American capitalist
system,” he also believed that the State Department and the ECA had been “lamentably
negligent” in the transportation of that system elsewhere, to the extent of “seriously

\textsuperscript{852} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{853} Moore to Wadsworth, November 11, 1949. RG 469, Entry 1399, Projects: Private H-I. Box 35. Folder:
Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2)
\textsuperscript{854} Ibid.
[injuring] the oil companies and the Pan American Airways System [which] certainly represent two of the most significant American capitalist developments abroad."855 Moore’s grievances were prompted, in particular, by statements delivered by Charles White, the ECA tourism expert whose 1949 report was crucial for jumpstarting the tourism industry in Turkey.856 At a broader level, Moore’s ramblings targeted U.S. officials and the byzantine structure of Turkish bureaucracy alike, at the same time as they offered an absolution of American imperial past and a veneration of the American investor. The piecemeal awkwardness of Moore’s missives and the failure of the Intercontinental initiative in Istanbul between 1948 and 1950 serve as a coda to the seemingly successful venture on the part of Hilton Hotels International Corporation during the same time period. Though the previous episode can only be reckoned with at the margins of an otherwise linear trajectory involving the Istanbul Hilton, its failings also help dislodge the ostensible certitude of the mission and vision of the latter.

Dan Tyler Moore, Jr. arrived in Turkey as a representative of the Intercontinental Hotel Corporation in order to negotiate the building a hotel in Istanbul in 1948. Moore was born in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1908, where his father served as military aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, having fought in Cuba and the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. Moore Jr. became an investment banker after studying physics at Yale, and drafted Ohio’s securities act in 1938. During the war, he served in the Office of Strategic Services and as Deputy to James Landis, Head of the Economic

855 Ibid.
856 According to Moore, White objected to the 5% commission feature entailed in the Intercontinental proposal to Turkey (whereby all equity capital would be advanced by Turkish private interest, with the rest to be provided in the form of a loan by the Export-Import Bank at an interest rate of 4.5%, as against the 2.5% interest rate to be offered by the Marshall Plan). Moore to Wadsworth, November 11, 1949
Mission to Middle East in Cairo. It was after his term as a stockholder at the Middle East Company of Cleveland, Ohio, which he cofounded with Landis, that Moore’s tenure as a representative for the Intercontinental Hotels Corporation commenced.857

Though initial contacts with Prime Minister Nihat Erim and Kasım Gülek, Minister of Public Works, seemed in favor of a hotel project in Istanbul, Moore’s efforts, by his own account, were frustrated by the arrival of Charles White. When irate correspondence with Dorr, the ECA Chief of Mission to Turkey, and Wadsworth, the Ambassador, proved futile, Moore turned to various US Congressmen, such as Robert Taft, Francis Green, Claude Pepper and Mike Mansfield (a family friend of Moore’s) to alert them to the fact that “many American businessmen and representatives of labor groups have suspected for some time that Marshall Plan money, although designed for emergency use only, is being used to stifle the normal flow of American private and Export-Import Bank capital to nations abroad.”858 Such an attitude, Moore argued, “strikes a blow at the very foundation of our hopes of ever getting rid of the Marshall Plan and returning to normal financial relations with nations abroad.”

Even if it was Moore’s personal connections that secured these critical outbursts, his reprobation of the ECA did resonate in certain circles of the American government and press, bringing that organization under public scrutiny.859 Pepper and Mansfield, for

857 The Intercontinental Hotel Corporation started out as a subsidiary of Pan-American World Airways in 1946 under Chairman and Founder Juan Trippe with a credit from the Export-Import Bank in the amount of 25 million dollars. Not unlike the Hilton enterprise, their initial overseas ventures started out in Latin America (Santiago, Chile, Bogota, the Caribbean) throughout the 1950s. A Room with a World View: 50 Years of Inter-Continental Hotels and its People: 1946–1996 (London: Widenfield and Nicholson, 1996)
858 Moore to Francis Green, September 15, 1950, enclosed in Green to Hoffman, October 11, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2)
859 Moore’s brother-in-law, the Washington pundit, Drew Pearson, published two articles about the matter in the Washington Post, censuring both the ECA and the Ambassador. In “ECA Snarls PanAm Hotel
instance, took it upon themselves to remind ECA officials, such as Paul Hoffman, the Director of the organization, of Section 117 (b) of the ECA Act and inquired after the use of counterpart funds for the purpose of tourism promotion.\textsuperscript{860} Mansfield declared a particular interest in Turkey “where hotel facilities are almost non-existent, but where Marshall Plan funds, both direct and counterpart, are being spent for objectives which have very little application to the future generation of dollars.”\textsuperscript{861} Such close scrutiny and expressed interest in the Turkish tourism cause left Dorr in a position to defend the Mission and the ways in which it had “been actively stressing to the Turkish Government the advantages of encouraging tourist trade.”\textsuperscript{862} Dorr maintained that the ECA had been striving towards the inculcation of US methods within the Turkish industry, by means of the employment of a tourism consultant, and added: “At the same time, other legislation was adopted embodying several ECA recommendations for the simplifying and relaxing

Plan,” Pearson suggested that the biggest handicap to the hotel enterprise in Turkey was the Marshall Plan, with the ECA helping to “stymie American enterprise.” (12/28/1949). In “Ambassador May Be On Way Out,” Pearson took on Wadsworth: “One American ambassador not likely to stay long at his present post is George Wadsworth, U.S. envoy to Turkey. Wadsworth follows a schedule that runs his staff ragged. He plays bridge until after 3 a.m., gets down to his office about noon, goes out for golf right after lunch, sees callers at 6 p.m. If an American businessman wants to see the ambassador, he is usually invited at 6, but finds so many other callers grouped around the martini tray that he can’t discuss anything private.” (12/29/1949). Pearson’s assault on Ambassador Wadsworth was also reported in Turkish newspapers—though it does not seem to have caused diplomatic strain, as it was cited as “family business” among Americans. (See “Amerikan Büyükelçisi Hakkında Neşriyat” Article About the American Ambassador Vatan January 13, 1950 and “Amerikan Sefiri Meselesi” The American Envoy Issue Vatan January 14, 1950

\textsuperscript{860} Pepper to Dorr, March 15, 1950; Mansfield to Hoffman (Administrator of ECA), March 14, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2)

\textsuperscript{861} Mansfield to Hoffman (Administrator of ECA), March 14, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2). Even Fulbright seems to have been privy to the circulation of Moore’s letters, since during his aforementioned speech in the Senate, he noted the lack of adequate accommodations for American tourists as “one of the principal bottlenecks” in travel abroad, and added: “I speak particularly, for instance, of a great city such as Istanbul, which could be an enormous source of dollar earnings if there were adequate hotel facilities there.” (William Fulbright, Congressional Record, April 26, 1950)

\textsuperscript{862} Dorr to Claude Pepper, March 29, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2)
of visa and passport restrictions with a view to facilitating tourist travel. I should like to point out that the adoption of this legislation is a rather revolutionary step in Turkey since up to now, the general philosophy has been one of state capitalism.”

As Moore’s various missives regarding the misfortunes of the Intercontinental initiative thus succeeded in catapulting the discussion of the tourism industry to an investigation about the nature of Turkish capitalism, the Democrat Party, under the leadership of Menderes, came to power, avowing its support for the expansion of private enterprise, infringements on étatism, and the encouragement of foreign investment.

It was soon after Moore’s demand that the prevailing mindset towards American business in Turkey be overhauled that negotiations between the newly elected Turkish government and the Hilton Hotels Corporation commenced in August, 1950. Congressman Mansfield found the timing of the Hilton negotiations suspicious, in fact, an “unbelievable coincidence” that attested to the Marshall Plan personnel’s desire to “get in on the act,” and warranted an investigation into the agency. While Dorr insisted that the Mission did not interfere “with a legitimate American business interest,” there were indeed suspicions of the possibility of “shut[ting] out competitive bidding,” and the Mission “knowingly [competing] with legitimate reasonable private capital.”

During a meeting with a Turkish Minister of State, Dorr conceded that the Mission was in a “ticklish situation” because of the uncertainties in the hotel situation, given two “very

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863 Ibid.
864 Emphasis in original, Mansfield to Hoffman, September 19, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2)
865 Dorr to Pepper, March 29, 1950; Hochstetter to Dorr, November 25, 1949, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder: Hotels—Intercontinental (1 of 2). In fact, Dorr seems to have been more inclined towards the Hilton offer, assuring them from the outset that “the new Government is very favorably disposed towards private enterprise and is extremely anxious to induce foreign capital to invest in Turkey” (Dorr to Houser, July 13, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder Hilton Hotel).
influential American firms contending over the project in Istanbul. The firm which would
not win the issue would, very likely, create great furor in the States…Being very
influential, they would press some Congressmen to take a belligerent attitude against the
ECA. “Dorr was careful to explain that any assail on the ECA would have
repercussions for Turkey’s allocations, and demanded that a decision be made between
the two firms as soon as possible.

Soon after Dorr’s ultimatum to the Turkish government, the Intercontinental
Hotel Corporation also indicated that it was growing weary of the repeated failures of
Moore, who was soon to become a “former employee.” George Asp of the
Intercontinental “expressed surprise at the variance between the story told by Mr. Moore
and the facts reported to the Mission” during a meeting with Dorr and Orren McJunkins,
Deputy Chief of the Mission in Ankara: “He confidentially indicated that Mr. Moore’s
veracity was apparently open to question in regard to this matter and that he himself had
felt considerable distrust of Moore. He indicated that he found it difficult to work with
Moore and that the latter was continually going off into long ‘tirades’ and making threats
and proposing all sorts of pressure campaigns.” It was less than two months after this
resignation that the lease between the Hilton and the Turkish government would be
signed.

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866 Memorandum of the Meeting at the Ministry of State between Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu, Minister of
State, and Russell Dorr, October 18, 1950. (RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 18, 1948-53 Meetings, Istanbul Hotel
Project)
867 Moore went on to become a public speaker and novelist. His *Terrible Game*, published a few years after
his taxing stay in Turkey, revolves around an atomic howitzer base in the TransBaikal region, which is
populated with a Turkish-speaking, oil-wrestling local population (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1958)
868 Memorandum of Conference with George Asp of Intercontinental Hotels with Dorr and McJunkins,
October 24, 1950, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder Intercontinental Hotel
The interlude of the Intercontinental episode and the misfortunes of Dan Tyler Moore Jr. are fruitfully compared with the seeming certitude, hygiene and orderliness of Conrad Hilton’s speeches and their alleged fit with ECA policy within the warped logic of Cold War era empire-making. Not unlike Hilton who insisted on the ways in which his hotels would help facilitate the circulation of notions of hospitality, Moore, too, believed that the incursion of traveling figures—be it American capital, businessmen or hoteliers—would help discipline the Turkish government into receptivity to American business ventures. His edifying assault on the Turkish mindset also resonates with the various correspondence dispatched by Hilton representatives in Istanbul, insofar as the latter mirror the portentous and skeptical undertones of Moore’s missives along the registers of difference, temporality, and hospitality.

Furthermore, the episode of the Intercontinental calls into question the objectives of the ECA and its role in promoting “tourism dollars” in ERP recipient countries. In that regard, it also facilitates a reading of the Istanbul Hilton’s biography as occasioning the possibility for the circuits of commercial competition and the vicissitudes of governance. The personal failures of Moore and those of the Intercontinental Corporation, after all, can be said to mirror the frailties entailed in the Hilton’s interactions with the ECA. Despite institutional histories’ willful erasure of early standstills, the hotel project in Istanbul in fact marked a favorable turning point in the relations between that agency and the Hilton since John Houser had encountered difficulties in Rome and London, describing interactions with the ECA as the “darnedest struggle.”

Conrad Hilton all but gave up on the idea of overseas expansion and predicted that “the whole European idea

869 John Houser to Conrad Hilton, August 13, 1950, HHI Box 1, General Correspondence 1950
[would] have to be abandoned," advising Houser to "forget the entire project" and added: "It seems to me that you are absolutely wasting your time and money trying to do anything over there and I am surprised at the behavior of the ECA people, when we were told in Washington that we would have their cooperation." It was within a week of this exchange that Houser informed Hilton of their reversal of fortune, declaring both Athens and Istanbul "ready for the taking," and confirming the coincidental degrees of fortuity and partiality that seem to have assisted the Hilton expansion abroad.

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Though its current interior decoration bears no trace of the original design, the Istanbul Hilton lobby today showcases an exercise in nostalgic self-commodification. Newspaper clippings and Hilton Items heralding the "star-studded gala opening" furnish the walls, conspicuously reminding guests, visitors and consumers of the Hilton experience of its majestic and celebrity-filled history. In a glass window case that retains advertisements for fashion shows that were once held in the ballroom is the restaurant’s first menu, carefully cataloguing varieties of frosted ice cream milk shakes and double rich ice cream sodas. Outside the hotel, a service car harkens back to the aesthetics of the 1950s. These artifacts of consumption, once proffered as expressions of Americanized modernity and vehicles for the onset of the Turkish tourism industry, now serve as the

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870 Hilton to Houser, August 22, and August 18, 1950. HHI Box 1, General Correspondence 1950
871 John Houser to Conrad Hilton, August 27, 1950, HHI, Box 1, General Correspondence 1950. This reversal did not only come at the expense of the Intercontinental. Attempts by Ali Nuri Okday to secure ECA assistance in expanding the Istanbul Park Hotel “in accordance with modern standards” was promptly turned down, with the “Korean situation” providing the convenient excuse that “counterpart funds are to be utilized for projects directly in support of a defense economy,” and no longer for tourism. (See Okday to McJunkins, August 20, 1951; McJunkins to Okday, August 31, 1951, RG 469, Entry 1399, Box 35, Folder Intercontinental Hotel)
872 See Figure 27
medium for a wistful, backward-looking glance, a melancholia that unfolds in “the productive space of hybridization.”

That hybridization is suggestive of the proliferation, percolation and permutation of the meanings attributable to the hotel. The economy of signs it encapsulates unveil a multiplicity of functions that render their circulation and mutability palpable. For Conrad Hilton, the hotel is the safeguard against the perilous march of Communism. For Bunshaft and Eldem alike, it is the venue for stylistic contestation and reconciliation, occasioning the fabrication of global and local forms alike. For ECA representatives, the Hilton indexes the success of foreign aid, at the same time as it imbues the allocation of that aid with choice, partisanship and authority. For the Turkish government, it signals a turning point in the tourism industry, as well as receptivity to foreign capital and expertise. The functions of the hotel are manifold, ably negotiating visions of diplomacy, modernity and hospitality.

The Hilton narrative can also be seen as the meeting point for a diverse array of traveling figures—the tourist, the diplomat, the businessman—all itinerants within the circuits of desire, commerce and empire. Those circuits are rendered (intel)legible through the biography of the hotel, whose façade materializes an aspiration towards an exceedingly visible modernity, one that requires, inspires and propels traveling mindsets, bodies, and artifacts—hence the importation of furniture from across Europe, the arrival of experts from SOM, and American waiters and jazz musicians who were supposed to school others in the Turkish hospitality industry. Over the course of this journey,

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873 Jose Munoz, *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics* (Minneapolis: 1999, University of Minnesota Press), p. 74
hospitality surfaces as a skill to be cultivated (a marker of modern subjectivities and particular modes of expertise)—despite claims about the authentic conviviality of the “Flying Carpet” marking entry into the hotel or Conrad Hilton’s claims about the ossified and arcane expressions of hospitality prescribed by Turkish idioms about coffee-drinking and decades-long alliances. The crafting of welcoming attitudes is offset by the vagaries of hospitality and the transience circumscribing the stay of the guest, the foreigner, and the traveler, those who require translation but cannot circumvent the whimsical conduct of their hosts.
Figure 23. Conrad Hilton with the model of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel (Hospitality Industry Archives, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
Figure 24. The building under construction (Hospitality Industry Archives, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
Figure 25. “The Flying Carpet” and the lobby, *Architectural Forum* (December 1955)
Figure 26. Advertisement for the Istanbul Hilton. (Hospitality Industry Archives, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton College, Houston, Texas)
Figure 27. Outside the Istanbul Hilton (07/25/2012)
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