Anchoring Communities: The Impact of University Interventions on Neighborhood Revitalization

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Anchoring Communities: The Impact of University Interventions on Neighborhood Revitalization

Abstract
Urban universities have long, often contentious, histories in neighborhoods, characterized by demolition, displacement, and expansion. Since the 1990s, however, they have become important players in urban revitalization. By adopting place-based identities, universities have directed their development expertise and resources into distressed areas, transforming them into amenity-rich assets. Yet, even as the media anoints universities the “saviors of cities,” these interventions tend to deemphasize community priorities in favor of market demands. This dissertation uses mixed-methods to evaluate the outcomes of university interventions in neighborhood revitalization. It includes a national survey of university strategies, a quantitative assessment of neighborhood outcomes between 1990 and 2010, and three case studies (the University of Pennsylvania, University of Cincinnati, and Duke University) with “typical” interventions, but differing approaches to community outreach. The national evidence confirms that university interventions are, in fact, improving neighborhoods. Institutions are leveraging their real estate expertise to generate development-driven revitalization and attract new populations. Using median home values and rents as proxies, these interventions are stimulating greater improvement in university neighborhoods than other areas in the same cities and counties. Further, the presence of a university intervention predicts a twenty percent increase in a neighborhood’s relative median home value in 2010 over its 1990 value. The case study evidence identifies four interrelated factors that drive a university’s intervention, including the consideration it gives to community development priorities. The revitalization factors extend to a university’s core competencies, mission, leadership, and its institutional and neighborhood context. While the findings validate that university investments are catalyzing neighborhood change, they also suggest an inherent conflict between an institution’s market-based interests and the community’s priorities. As vested urban neighbors, however, universities do possess abundant resources and opportunities, in the form of diverse employment, purchasing and consumption of goods, innovation, and civic engagement, to overcome this conflict and support a wider range of community-sensitive strategies. Thus, the dissertation contends that planning policy should actively engage with universities to align place-based interests and pursue opportunities to supplement university investments with community-focused efforts, thereby generating mutually beneficial outcomes for town and gown.

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ANCHORING COMMUNITIES:
THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY INTERVENTIONS ON NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

Meagan M. Ehlenz

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ANCHORING COMMUNITIES:

THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY INTERVENTIONS ON NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

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Meagan M. Ehlenz

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Dedication

To A, for encouraging me to make this journey and putting up with me while I did.

Your enthusiasm has taught me more about cities than I can say.

And your endless curiosity inspires me to learn more.
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At the conclusion of nearly a decade’s worth of higher education, most of which was spent learning about planning, I have many people to thank. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor and dissertation committee chair, Domenic Vitiello. Your ongoing advice and support has made me a better scholar. You have been so generous with your time and thoughtful in your comments, both of which have vastly improved my work. I am very grateful. I am also indebted to the rest of my dissertation committee, Genie Birch and John Landis, for their time and guidance. Genie, thank you for encouraging me to come to Penn for my PhD—the experience has been more rewarding than I could have imagined. And I am thankful for all the opportunities you have sent my way, as well as your continuous support as I have developed my scholarly identity. John, thank you for always pushing me to think more critically about my work and to strive for more. Your encouragement has shaped me as a researcher and made my scholarship more “interesting and important.” Last, I would like to extend my thanks to many of the Penn Planning faculty for your enthusiastic support, including Francesca Ammon, Erick Guerra, Amy Hillier, Megan Ryerson, and Laura Wolf-Powers. You have all been wonderful role models and I have benefitted from your mentorship.

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been possible without support from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s C. Lowell Harriss Dissertation Fellowship.

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Last, but not least, to my family—I do not have words to adequately express my gratitude for your unwavering support. You have encouraged me through more years of education than I care to count, but I think I can officially say that I am done being a student! Thank you for always believing in me and for sparking my love of learning. I cannot think of a better gift.
ABSTRACT

ANCHORING COMMUNITIES:
THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY INTERVENTION ON NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

Meagan M. Ehlenz
Domenic Vitiello

Urban universities have long, often contentious, histories in neighborhoods, characterized by demolition, displacement, and expansion. Since the 1990s, however, they have become important players in urban revitalization. By adopting place-based identities, universities have directed their development expertise and resources into distressed areas, transforming them into amenity-rich assets. Yet, even as the media anoints universities the “saviors of cities,” these interventions tend to deemphasize community priorities in favor of market demands. This dissertation uses mixed-methods to evaluate the outcomes of university interventions in neighborhood revitalization. It includes a national survey of university strategies, a quantitative assessment of neighborhood outcomes between 1990 and 2010, and three case studies (the University of Pennsylvania, University of Cincinnati, and Duke University) with “typical” interventions, but differing approaches to community outreach. The national evidence confirms that university interventions are, in fact, improving neighborhoods. Institutions are leveraging their real estate expertise to generate development-driven revitalization and attract new populations. Using median home values and rents as proxies, these interventions are stimulating greater improvement in university neighborhoods than
other areas in the same cities and counties. Further, the presence of a university intervention predicts a twenty percent increase in a neighborhood’s relative median home value in 2010 over its 1990 value. The case study evidence identifies four interrelated factors that drive a university’s intervention, including the consideration it gives to community development priorities. The revitalization factors extend to a university’s core competencies, mission, leadership, and its institutional and neighborhood context. While the findings validate that university investments are catalyzing neighborhood change, they also suggest an inherent conflict between an institution’s market-based interests and the community’s priorities. As vested urban neighbors, however, universities do possess abundant resources and opportunities, in the form of diverse employment, purchasing and consumption of goods, innovation, and civic engagement, to overcome this conflict and support a wider range of community-sensitive strategies. Thus, the dissertation contends that planning policy should actively engage with universities to align place-based interests and pursue opportunities to supplement university investments with community-focused efforts, thereby generating mutually beneficial outcomes for town and gown.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Early Friday morning, January 18, 2013, parents began forming a line outside the Penn Alexander School (PAS). By nightfall, more than seventy parents had literally set up camp with tents and sleeping bags extending down the block to guard against the twenty-nine degree (F) chill. Although the scene could easily be mistaken for a high profile concert ticket sale, the inhabitants of this encampment, comprised of parents with 4 year olds, had a single goal: to enroll their children in kindergarten when class registration opened on January 22\textsuperscript{nd}, four days later.

When PAS opened its doors in 2001, few anticipated the implications of its first-come, first-serve enrollment policy. The Penn-sponsored public school had been conceived in 1998 at a time when West Philadelphia was plagued by crime, families were fleeing the neighborhood, and the public school system was in disarray. In response and conjunction with neighborhood associations, Penn had fostered a relationship with the Philadelphia School District to establish a neighborhood elementary school. The university donated the land for the K-8 facility and invested substantial resources into its construction and operations. These investments were a key component of Penn’s broader neighborhood revitalization strategy, the West Philadelphia Initiatives (WPI), which aimed to stabilize neighborhood conditions, improve property values, and attract and retain residents.

At the outset, Penn and the School District were committed to PAS, yet they could not envision a day when their classrooms would be at capacity and parents would
be clamoring to claim slots for their children. To the contrary, they were holding their breath and hoping this seedling of revitalization would take hold. More than fifteen years after the implementation of the WPI, the neighborhood has changed dramatically. Crime rates have fallen, beautification and commercial development projects have rejuvenated neighborhood amenities, Penn’s homeownership incentives have brought in several hundred new residents, and the PAS has developed a reputation as a stellar school. Collectively, the WPI investments contributed to the January 18th scene with families prepared to brave the winter weather for four days in order to gain access to PAS. The school had reached its enrollment capacity; the neighborhood’s housing sales prices now had a $100,000 premium to live within the PAS catchment zone.

Simply, Penn’s WPI was a huge success—but was it? The answer is largely dependent upon who responds to the question. While the neighborhood-at-large has realized positive change over twenty years, it is but a sum of its parts and each part—the institutions, businesses, and residents—have experienced change differently. The university, commercial district, and some existing and incoming homeowners derived benefits from the WPI, but other residents and businesses did not profit as much.

The University of Pennsylvania is an anchor institution—a non-profit institution with deep ties to its neighborhood, as well as its city and region (Taylor and Luter 2013). While many non-profits qualify as anchors, universities and hospitals—“eds and meds”—are the foremost examples. Their roots encompass substantial physical assets, including real estate holdings and institutional infrastructure; their missions and clients
may also root them in place. Anchors are believed to be largely immobile, as compared to a city’s other large employers or institutions, such as corporations or manufacturers.

The importance of anchor institutions stems not just from their fixed locations, but also their contributions to place. In their host cities, eds and meds are critical components of the local and regional economy. They are among the largest employers in their communities, harnessing workforce productivity and providing wages that stimulate local economic demand. Their products, knowledge and innovation, are the driving forces in the 21st century economy—the contemporary equivalent of the manufacturing plant during the industrial era. Through research and education, eds and meds generate significant economic opportunity for their cities in the form of patents, grant funds, and an educated workforce. In addition, they contribute to and generate demand for a larger economic system via basic (e.g. complementary professional services, such as tech companies, medical offices, research or consultant firms) and non-basic (e.g. vendors and service sector businesses) activities.

Anchor institutions have long been a propelling force for cities. They have served as the hub of innovation and technological change in cities since before the Industrial Revolution. As regional economics shifted away from industrial activities, eds and meds have taken center stage, becoming bastions of regional strength, but also representing their cities in the global marketplace. In 2010 alone, eds and meds in the five major cities of the Northeast Corridor collectively employed nearly a million people, claimed nearly $100 billion in aggregated operating budgets, and attracted $28 billion in
sponsored programs, gifts, and contracts (Birch 2013). In short, anchor institutions, including universities, are important to cities at a macro-scale.

As place-based institutions with people-based economic activities, anchor institutions also have a distinct relationship with their neighborhoods. Whereas major corporations and manufacturers are often physically separate from residential communities, anchor institutions are typically integrated into neighborhoods and, in fact, rely on them to function. As a result, they are embedded in their neighborhood ecosystem, which includes a heterogeneous collection of uses, demands, and values, and they contribute to the physical, economic, and social make-up of the place.

This relationship makes the university as an anchor institution, as well as their investments in place-based intervention, an important phenomenon to examine. Across any given neighborhood, stakeholder interests and values are divergent, reflecting the individual needs of a household, proprietor, or organization. By virtue of its unified mission, physical mass, and monetary resources, anchor institutions have a great deal of influence over their neighborhood ecosystems. Yet, these same factors contribute their “rootedness” and establish their mutual dependence with its neighbors.

Anchor institutions exist in a symbiotic relationship with their neighborhoods. Derived from biology, this term signals that two different organisms—the anchor and its neighbors—live in close proximity and are engaged in some type of long-term interaction. Extending the metaphor, such relationships can be positive, neutral, or negative. In the case of universities, their interactions with neighborhoods traverse all three categories. In the mid-20th century, the demolition and destruction of the
neighborhood fabric for university expansion epitomized a breakdown in the relationship between anchor institutions and their neighbors. Subsequently, universities largely withdrew from direct interventions in their ecosystem, preferring to exist as a separate entity apart from the neighborhood. In the 21st century, however, many universities, including Penn, felt pressure to reengage with place in order to secure their institutional future. This time, however, university leaders elected to invest in the strengthening of the neighborhood ecosystem, rather than its demolition or isolation.

From a market perspective, an abundance of uncontested territory both motivated and incentivized universities to pursue place-based interventions. In many cases—certainly a majority of universities in this study, urban anchors were among the few remaining champions of declining central cities and their neighborhoods. As households and corporations left for suburban locations, disinvestment initially represented a threat to universities and their immobile assets. Subsequently, the lack of rivals for land or redevelopment transformed neighborhood risk into an opportunity to seed change. Through their interventions, the anchor filled a void in the neighborhood’s uncontested market territory, thereby stimulating renewed interest and improvement. At the same time, the lack of market competitors in disinvested neighborhoods meant that university leaders possessed greater authority over the intervention and, often, the intended outcomes. Under these circumstances, a lack of neighborhood rivals suggests universities retained control over not just how the intervention was implemented, but also who benefitted.
Although today’s anchor institution investments intitate a more sympathetic attitude towards neighborhood interests, the effects of these investments remain largely unexamined. As major community stakeholders and institutions with a long history of civic-mindedness, universities have the potential to catalyze a symbiotic, mutually beneficial relationship with their neighbors, while mitigating or minimizing any negative impacts. This dynamic, however, is predicated on institutional policies that seek to evaluate neighborhood investments and consider impacts and opportunities across the entire spectrum of neighborhood stakeholders.

1.1 **Context: Universities and Their Neighborhoods**

In the last two decades, university investments in neighborhoods have become a critical revitalization tool in many communities. A university’s willingness to invest signals a renewed commitment to its city, even as other employers and landholders leave. Several media outlets have anointed anchor institutions as the “saviors of cities,” bringing jobs, generating knowledge and innovation, and supporting the “back to the city” movement. But do these investments by anchor institutions pay off and to whom do the benefits accrue? Few scholars have an empirical grasp of the place-based impacts of university interventions. This gap also exists among university administrators and policy makers. Absent such an understanding of whether and how neighborhoods improve, as well as identifying the beneficiaries of these improvements, institutions and communities do not truly know what goals university investments in neighborhood revitalization are serving.
University intervention in neighborhoods is not new. Involvement dates from the post-World War II period and draws from three streams of federal funding (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011; O'Mara 2005). The first stream was the federal government’s decision to decentralize basic research to universities; as part of the initiative, the government paid for new science and medical research facilities. The second stream was the GI Bill that sent thousands of veterans to college, stimulating campus expansion plans. The third stream was inclusion of universities as accepted developers in Urban Renewal after 1954. In each instance, universities acquired additional land to accommodate expansion; the third stream also provided a redevelopment model to clear and, often, redevelop blight land near the campus borders.

Since the 1990s, universities have professionalized their development skills and their efforts are more varied than in the past. Their investments go beyond campus expansion to address broader neighborhood improvement. A belief that a campus is not an island, but engaged in a mutually dependent relationship with its neighborhood, distinguishes this work from prior decades. Rather than viewing neighborhoods as subordinate or an obstacle to overcome, many universities now plan for and invest in the intersection between campus and neighborhood, treating it as a porous boundary. With this change, it is vital for public and private decision-makers, university administrators, and community members to understand the potential for institutional interventions in central city markets and the range of outcomes associated with such interventions.
1.1.1 Universities and Urban Revitalization

Increasingly, universities, as part of the urban “eds and meds” infrastructure, are central players in neighborhood revitalization. Nearly 2,000 universities, more than half of US higher education institutions, are located in cities (Coalition of Urban Serving Universities 2010; CEOs for Cities 2007). Their assets—primarily real estate holdings—tend to be fixed, though, like any non-profit institutions, they are not subject to property taxes. Often, universities are the major property owners in their neighborhoods. An urban university’s real estate holdings and investments can have substantial economic spillover effects raising, or depressing, local property values and enhancing, or curbing, commercial vitality.

In the latter half of the 20th century, many cities experienced decline, losing population and employers, and, thus, could not compete well with suburban counterparts for jobs, residents, and tax base. Further, they had multiple neighborhoods subject to the ills associated with blight—high rates of crime, housing disinvestment or abandonment, and poor amenities and services. At the local level, cities had few resources to intercede in this decline. Many universities, anchored in these deteriorating neighborhoods, felt these conditions threatened their ability to attract faculty and students and maintain the value of university properties (Birch 2007). Motivated by enlightened self-interest, they began to invest actively in their neighborhoods in order to protect their institutional health (Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; Webber and Karlstrom 2009; Perry 2008).
Leveraging their roles as major physical and economic stakeholders, universities employed fiscal and organizational resources to improve neighborhood services, property values, and local economies. Included in this approach were strategies to augment local police services with expanded public safety zones that extend beyond campus boundaries; enhance lighting and public amenities to supplement neighborhood infrastructure; devise local procurement and hiring policies to support the local economy and labor markets; invest funds and technical expertise in neighborhood schools to improve their quality; engage in off-campus real estate development for institutional, commercial, and/or residential uses; and craft homeownership incentives to stabilize property turnover and values.

At the federal level, policy makers began to recognize the new role of universities as key players in the health and stability of urban centers as early as 1996. A Henry Cisneros, US Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary and a city planner by training, expressly called for universities and cities to pursue revitalization together, stating their futures “are so intertwined that one cannot—or perhaps will not—survive without the other. Universities cannot afford to become islands of affluence, self-importance, and horticultural beauty in seas of squalor, violence, and despair.” (Cisneros 1996). Through this declaration, Cisneros directly acknowledged the mutual stakes that government and anchor institutions held in city revitalization.

In support of this declaration, HUD began to dedicate federal resources to universities engaging in community revitalization in the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 2005, HUD’s Community Outreach Partnership Center (COPC) program allocated $78
million in grants to nearly 200 academic institutions for a broad range of revitalization and outreach activities. Recently, HUD’s Promise Zone Initiative awarded preferential support to multi-partner revitalization efforts, seeking to promote collaborative investment in high-poverty communities. Each of the first five Promise Zone communities, designated in January 2014, included a university or college in the local partnership.

Many community stakeholders, however, have mixed feelings about university interventions in neighborhood revitalization. Some resent the work, as they remember with bitterness the damage of slum clearance from earlier forms of urban renewal and its projection of alien values on long-time residents (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011; Teaford 2000; Etienne 2012). Others laud the university for underwriting improvements (Rodin 2007; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012). At a time when corporations and households were fleeing cities, universities not only stayed but also became active champions of urban neighborhoods.

While universities recognize the opportunity and necessity of reshaping their town-gown relationships, they have found these tasks complicated. Scholars, policy makers, universities, and neighborhoods often ascribe diverse, lofty, and, sometimes, conflicting goals to neighborhood revitalization strategies (Bartley 2014; Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009). Evaluation of university intervention outcomes, for both institutions and neighborhoods, is necessary to clarify these expectations and goals, identifying the opportunities for university-led neighborhood revitalization as well as their limitations.
1.2 Research Problem, Objectives and Queries

As urban universities engage in revitalization, existing research offers little insight into the impact of these activities on the surrounding neighborhoods or the wellbeing of the residents over time. To date, research has focused on descriptive case studies to highlight the character of university investments in neighborhood revitalization. It primarily describes why and how a university intervenes. Some scholars synthesize these cases into prescriptive recommendations. Yet, while they declare certain strategies to be “best practice models,” often they provide limited supporting evidence. Further, they may describe how a particular university implemented a successful initiative, but, as this dissertation will elucidate, they do not offer either a policy definition or metrics of success metrics. Equally important, their policy prescriptions rarely give sufficient consideration to the institutional and place-based context. Finally, their studies do not systematically measure the impacts of revitalization for neighborhoods and households over time. Previously, scholars have been describing relatively new initiatives—ten years old or less, and, perhaps, a lack of post-intervention data prevented robust longitudinal analyses. However, nearly two decades have passed since the implementation of the “new brand” of university investments in neighborhood revitalization discussed earlier, so access to sufficient data now exists to evaluate neighborhood change over time.

Several questions remain unanswered within the anchor institution literature. They are: What are the direct and indirect results of university neighborhood revitalization initiatives? How do these activities change the physical, economic, and
social conditions of neighborhoods? How do universities use revitalization strategies to shape neighborhood conditions and markets? Axelroth Hodges and Dubb’s study (2012) comes the closest to responding to these questions by identifying the intended impacts of university revitalization strategies; it emphasizes aspirational objectives and does not measure the impacts on actual neighborhood land values or socioeconomic conditions.

As this dissertation seeks to build a deeper understanding of the impacts of university revitalization initiatives on neighborhoods, as physical entities, as well as communities, it has three objectives:

1. To document the character of and motivations for university investments in expansion and neighborhood revitalization activities since 1990, evaluating the range of universities engaged in this work and the types of investments they make;

2. To analyze the extent of neighborhood change in target neighborhoods between 1990 and 2010 in relation to non-target neighborhoods as well as in relation to the host cities; and

3. To assess the role of institutional and neighborhood context in university revitalization through in-depth investigation of three distinct approaches to community partnership and neighborhood intervention.

Two sets of queries drive the study:

1. How do university revitalization motivations and strategies compare across institutions? To what extent do neighborhoods targeted by university
investments in neighborhood revitalization undergo substantial neighborhood improvement?

2. What role does community context play in the development and implementation of a university’s neighborhood interventions? How does a university’s partnership style with its neighborhood affect the community experience of revitalization interventions?

1.3 Research Design and Scope

The dissertation has three primary components. The first component examines campus expansion and neighborhood revitalization investments through a national survey of sixty-five universities, drawn from a 1,030-unit sample with the following characteristics: four-year, degree-granting, accredited universities located in urban settings. A review of the anchor institution literature identified the sixty-five universities making investments in expansion and/or neighborhood revitalization. The author sent a survey to this sample and twenty-two universities, located in nineteen cities, participated (thirty-four percent response rate). The survey tool collected information about a university’s expansion and/or revitalization motivations, its tenure with these types of activities, and the nature of its investments in its neighborhood. In addition, it asked universities to provide information on their efforts to conduct internal evaluations of their work and the relationship between their investments and broader university missions. The survey data serves as a foundation for a quantitative analysis of
The second component of the dissertation employs statistical analysis to measure the extent of improvement realized in targeted university neighborhoods between 1990 and 2010. For the twenty-two universities participating in the national survey, the study identified the neighborhoods in each university’s host county. Using median home value and rent as proxies for neighborhood improvement, the researcher divided target and non-target neighborhoods into three categories (low, medium, and high value) based on their relative relationship to the city’s median value. The researcher used cross tabulation analyses to track the movement of target and non-target neighborhoods across the three value categories over the study period, seeking to understand what proportion of neighborhoods shifted into another category. In effect, this analysis demonstrates the mobility of the real estate market for university target and non-target neighborhoods relative to shifts in the macro (city) economy. Subsequently, the researcher used a regression model to demonstrate the statistically significant impact of a university intervention on a neighborhood’s trajectory. The model used the 1990 home value ratio and the presence of a university intervention as (statistically significant) predictors for the neighborhood’s 2010 median home value ratio (see Chapter 4).

Together, the national survey and neighborhood outcomes analysis provided the basis for selecting three case studies, which form the third component of this dissertation. While the previous sections of the research assessed university
interventions in aggregate to try to uncover generalizable findings, the case studies bring the contextual nature of town-gown engagement into sharp focus. The case studies, discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, seek to understand the role context plays in the development and implementation of an intervention, as well as the impacts of varied university partnerships on the community’s experience, through qualitative and quantitative analyses.

The study used a collective case study method to develop descriptive narratives for three similarly situated institutions, highlighting their contextual similarities and differences. The researcher used a sampling method that relied on the national survey and neighborhood outcome analyses to identify cases that represented the “typical” institution, using “typical” tools over a significant period (beginning before 2000) to produce “successful” neighborhood outcomes between 1990 and 2010 (Figure 1.1). The primary differentiating factor for each case was the style and depth of community partnerships and/or involvement in the university's efforts, defined as limited, moderate, or extensive.
### Figure 1.1 Collective case study: Sampling criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Penn</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>Duke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Typical Institution</td>
<td>Large research universities&lt;br&gt;Real estate + multiple approaches</td>
<td>Ch 3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical Tools</td>
<td>First generation (1990s)</td>
<td>Ch 3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Strategy</td>
<td>“Strong” to “moderate” improvement Community context + partnerships</td>
<td>Ch 3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ch 4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Moderate approach</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiating Variable</td>
<td>Community context + partnerships</td>
<td>Ch 3 + literature</td>
<td>Limited approach</td>
<td>Moderate approach</td>
<td>Extensive approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theoretical replication logic informed the selection of sampling criteria and cases. The method uses the cases to “predict contrasting results but for a predictable reason” (Yin 2014). In other words, the researcher chose cases that differed along the variable of interest—limited, moderate, or extensive community involvement and/or partnerships, which was the basis for predicting divergent community experiences and outcomes for each university’s neighborhoods. The researcher justified the choice of differentiating variable with an operating hypothesis, positing that university strategies with extensive community partnerships and/or outreach efforts will result in more positive revitalization outcomes and experiences for the residents. In simpler terms, the more a university considers people in the development and implementation of a place-based revitalization strategy, the greater the accrual of benefits to the community, beyond the market-based improvements predicted in the neighborhood outcomes assessment. The dissertation tests this hypothesis with the following case studies: the
University of Pennsylvania, University of Cincinnati, and Duke University. Figure 1.2 describes the basic elements of each case, as well as the expected findings derived from theoretical replication logic.

*Figure 1.2 Selected case studies: Justifications and expected findings*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case 1: University of Pennsylvania</strong></td>
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</table>
| Typical Institution (Carnegie Classifications, Basic) | A large, four-year, highly residential campus  
A research university: Very high research activity |
| Typical Tools | A multi-faceted neighborhood revitalization strategy, including: public safety, neighborhood service district (greening, cleaning, branding), commercial development, residential development, economic inclusion policies (local procurement, local/minority/women hiring), homeownership + rehabilitation incentives, public education partnership |
| Durable Strategy | Principal strategy, the West Philadelphia Initiatives (WPI), began in the mid-1990s |
| Successful Strategy | In the neighborhood outcomes analysis, Penn’s target neighborhoods improved moderately in median home value ratios and strongly in median rent ratios. |
| Differentiating Variable | **Limited**: Penn’s neighborhood revitalization efforts have been institutionally led, with minimal community involvement in the development or implementation of the intervention. Penn did not have an official neighborhood outreach strategy during the development of the WPI, though select neighborhood associations contributed ideas informally (before WPI was created, which influenced WPI priorities). Penn did not establish any partnerships for the implementation of their efforts. |
| Expected Findings | The predominance of real estate and market-based strategies and lack of community partnerships will result in fewer benefits accruing to the existing community, while boosting the market-based impacts. |
| **Case 2: University of Cincinnati** | |
| Typical Institution (Carnegie Classifications, Basic) | A large, four-year, primarily non-residential campus  
A research university: Very high research activity |
Typical Tools

A multi-level neighborhood revitalization strategy, including:

(1) Micro-scale: the development of neighborhood community development corporations (CDC) for the purpose of acquiring key parcels, assembling sites, and redeveloping properties for mixed-use projects (residential, retail, entertainment, and office uses). Primary focus on corridor revitalization, though some investment in residential areas and safety initiatives.

(2) Macro-scale: the founding of a multi-anchor alliance between local universities, hospitals, and a zoo for the purpose of key redevelopment projects, corridor planning and revitalization, coordinated neighborhood investment strategies, and clean-and-safe initiatives.

Durable Strategy

Initial strategy for CDCs developed during the mid-to-late 1990s; multi-anchor alliance developed during the early 2000s.

Successful Strategy

In the neighborhood outcomes analysis, UC's target neighborhoods showed strong improvement in median home value and rent ratios.

Differentiating Variable

Moderate: UC's initial micro-scale strategy rested on the formation of neighborhood-based CDCs, in effect giving the community a direct voice in revitalization/redevelopment investments—CDC boards include four representatives from the community and one from the university. Cincinnati neighborhoods have distinct identities and strong neighborhood organizations; the UC model built on this local context.

Expected Findings

The inclusion of the community voice in the CDCs, as well as the collaborative multi-anchor alliance, will give the neighborhoods more control in the revitalization intervention. As a result, they will be able to direct more benefits/investments towards community priorities.

Case 3: Duke University

Typical Institution

(Carnegie Classifications, Basic)

A large, four-year, highly residential university

A research university: Very high research activity

Typical Tools

A multi-faceted neighborhood revitalization strategy, including multiple non-profit partnerships that focus on homeownership, housing rehabilitation, commercial development, health, and education. In addition, Duke’s strategy includes significant investment in downtown redevelopment/revitalization through partnerships.

Durable Strategy

Principal strategy began in the mid-1990s.

Successful Strategy

In the neighborhood outcomes analysis, Duke’s target neighborhoods showed strong improvement in median home value ratios and median rent ratios.
Differentiating Variable | Extensive: Duke’s neighborhood revitalization efforts were shaped by neighborhood priorities, developed through extensive community outreach, and implemented almost entirely through partnerships with non-profit community development organizations. Their investments in downtown revitalization have been developer led, with Duke contributing resources (direct investments or leases) for projects that meet Duke’s mission for developing a strong Duke-Durham partnership.

Expected Findings | The primary reliance on community outreach and non-profit partnerships will result in revitalization interventions that are highly responsive to community priorities and accrue significant benefit to the existing neighborhoods.

The researcher triangulated data for each case study with a range of sources, including key informant interviews, direct observation, primary documents (e.g. university reports and plans, CDC and other partner reports and plans, city planning documents, university and partner websites), and secondary sources (e.g. journal articles, local and student newspapers). She used semi-structured interviews with key informants to capture a range of perspectives on the development, implementation, and outcomes of key neighborhood strategies. The study included the following types of interviews:

- **University Perspectives**, including current and former representatives for university leadership (President, Executive Vice President, Vice President) and key program administrators (e.g. program-specific staff and/or faculty);

- **Community Perspectives**, including representatives from formal and informal community partners. Formal partners included CDC, city, or other non-profit organizations directly involved in the university’s intervention. Informal partners included representatives from neighborhood associations (e.g.
neighborhood association president), business associations, or other community organizations within the neighborhood.

- **Other Perspectives**, including representatives from the city planning department, city planning faculty members, or other faculty or neighborhood advocates with a long-term view of the town-gown dynamic.

The researcher secured initial university interview contacts via the survey instrument and other primary and secondary sources; initial contacts helped identify additional interviewees through a snowball sampling method.

### 1.4 Summary of Findings

This study illustrates how universities are leveraging their neighborhoods as part of their institutional brands. University populations—leaders, students, parents, faculty, and staff—incorporate the adjacent neighborhoods into their experience of the institution, where they can be a value-added benefit or a detriment.

As Chapter 3 portrays, universities self-identify as active participants in neighborhood revitalization and underline the importance of creating a “sense of place.” While traditional forms of civic engagement, including student volunteerism, community-based research, and service learning, formed the backbone of institutional strategies, nearly seventy percent of participating universities also invested in at least one of the key revitalization activities—housing, commercial, and/or economic development. Private universities invested in a more diverse mix of revitalization activities than public ones, however large research institutions, public and private,
tended to be active participants. Further, universities leveraged their affinity for property management and development in their revitalization work, demonstrating a strong preference for real estate investments that could catalyze change in the market over programs or incentives that emphasized wealth building, skill development, or other socioeconomic change. The survey results suggest that university investments in neighborhood revitalization left an imbalance between the property market and community improvement.

An analysis of neighborhood change between 1990 and 2010, described in Chapter 4, underscores the idea that university preferences for real estate interventions are driving market-based changes in their neighborhoods. For neighborhoods located within university intervention zones, the demographic and socioeconomic trends suggest a bifurcation of the population with increases in poverty and educational attainment—likely attributed to a growing off-campus student population—and significant increases in median home values and rents—a probable sign of greater demand and growth in higher income brackets as well. A close analysis of neighborhood trends in home values and rents demonstrate that university target neighborhoods improved appreciably more, on a relative scale, than their cities and all other neighborhoods in their counties. Whereas nearly half of all university target neighborhoods were classified as “low value” (falling below seventy-five percent of the 1990 city median home value) in 1990, less than twenty percent remained that way by 2010. Similarly, less than fifteen percent of university target neighborhoods were comprised of “high rent” neighborhoods (exceeding 125% of the 1990 city median rent)
in 1990; by 2010, nearly half of those same neighborhoods were in the high rent category.

These quantitative observations tell a powerful story of neighborhood change in aggregate and illuminate the ways universities are fundamentally integrating neighborhoods into their campuses. These also hint at the contextualized nature of university interventions in neighborhood revitalization. Four interrelated factors emerge from the research as critical components of university interventions and drivers of mutually beneficial strategies. They include: (1) the institution’s core competencies, which often relate to its real estate capacity but can also incorporate community building capacities; (2) the institutional mission, including the degree to which it recognizes place and/or community as a meaningful part of the university’s identity; (3) the university leadership, including its long term vision for town-gown engagement and its willingness to commit university resources towards place and/or community; and (4) university and neighborhood context, which includes the degree of urgency driving the university to invest and the state of the community development infrastructure. Collectively, these elements contribute to a university’s evaluation of the neighborhood problem and the focus of its intervention strategy.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation discusses university revitalization into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature, including a discussion of the evolving relationship between universities and communities, the emergence of anchor institutions as a
specific type of stakeholder in urban neighborhoods, university investment in neighborhood revitalization since the 1990s, and urban revitalization processes, debates, and methodological frameworks. Chapters 3 through 7 present the research findings, including the national survey (Chapter 3), the neighborhood outcomes analysis (Chapter 4), and the case studies illustrating three university approaches to neighborhood revitalization (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). The final chapter (Chapter 8) offers policy recommendations for public and private decision-makers based on the research, including context-specific considerations and opportunities to leverage university investments for community benefit. In addition, Chapter 8 identifies an agenda to guide future work.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the last decade, scholars have produced a body of literature to document the scale and scope of university investments in community revitalization (Friedman, Perry, and Menendez 2014; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Perry and Menendez 2010; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; Rodin 2007; Perry and Wiewel 2005; Maurrasse 2001). The research spans single cases and comparative analyses, as well as histories and typologies of university-community engagement.

A review of university-led revitalization scholarship reveals two common themes: (1) the studies are most often one sided, either representing the university’s perspective (e.g. Bromley and Kent 2006; Kromer and Kerman 2005; Fulbright-Anderson, Auspos, and Anderson 2001) or, less frequently, on the critics’ viewpoint (e.g. Etienne 2012); and (2) most cases, lack longitudinal data that would provide a foundation to construct a robust evaluation of the outcomes.

This chapter reviews bodies of literature that inform the landscape of university interventions in neighborhoods. The review begins with a brief overview of anchor institutions as distinct stakeholders in urban neighborhoods; it then traces the evolution of university-community interaction and intervention, from the late 19th century through the 21st century. An assessment of modern ideological debates about the roles—and responsibilities—of urban universities and the current research questions defining the field follows, providing context for the scope and research methodology of this dissertation. Lastly, a review of neighborhood revitalization and gentrification
scholarship explores methods for evaluating neighborhood-level interventions and impacts.

The literature review contextualizes this research, summarizing ongoing conversations and debates happening among anchor institution and neighborhood revitalization scholars. It identifies prevalent research gaps in the anchor institution literature and, through a review of complementary urban revitalization scholarship, assesses the validity of specific research methods. Collectively, these components constitute an intellectual framework for this research.

2.1 **Anchor Institutions: Stakeholders Rooted in Place**

Anchor institutions are an integral part of many urban neighborhoods and, broadly speaking, much is known about them, including their status, direct and indirect contributions, and engagement with communities. The Aspen Institute first coined term "anchor institution" in a 2001 study (Taylor and Luter 2013). The authors defined "anchor institutions" as urban institutions "that have a significant infrastructure in a specific community and are therefore unlikely to move" (Fulbright-Anderson, Auspos, and Anderson 2001). The Aspen Institute’s definition touches upon a point of broad, albeit not unanimous, consensus: By definition, anchor institutions are largely immobile, rooted in their communities by substantial fixed assets (i.e., real estate) and/or their urban constituency (Taylor and Luter 2013; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Perry and Menendez 2010; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; CEOs for Cities 2007; Rodin 2005).
Educational and academic medical centers (“eds and meds”) are the foremost examples of anchor institutions. Beyond their brick and mortar presence within a neighborhood, eds and meds are critical components of local and regional economies in every U.S. city [or metro region] today. Universities serve as massive generators of economic development through traditional academic research and service provision, as well as consumption through the attraction of a large student body (Goddard and Vallance 2013; Perry and Wiewel 2005; Felsenstein 1996). In 1996 (the last known data available), urban universities spent $136 billion on salaries, goods, and services. They employed two million workers, two-thirds of which were in non-faculty administrative and support positions. And they owned more than $100 billion in fixed assets in cities (Initiative for a Competitive Inner City and CEOs for Cities 2002). Similarly, in 2010, eds and meds in the five major cities of the Northeast Corridor collectively employed nearly a million people, claimed nearly $100 billion in aggregated operating budgets, and attracted $28 billion in sponsored programs, gifts, and contracts (Birch 2013).

While the economic impact literature for anchor institutions—particularly eds and meds—is prevalent, it tends to emphasize the city-wide or regional contribution and fails to evaluate the distribution of wealth directly or indirectly generated by the institution (Goddard and Chatterton 1999). For instance, impact multiplier studies often quantify an institution’s total monetary impact, but remain silent on the distribution of wealth across the community or region. This omission is particularly relevant where universities are intervening directly in community revitalization.
Indeed, institutional immobility and intimate ties to a regional economy do not account for the motivations driving universities investments in neighborhoods. While there are certainly connections, scholars do not make the argument that universities should invest in neighborhood revitalization efforts for economic gain—likely because it recalls urban renewal justifications, nor have they drawn connections between localized investment and regional benefits. Instead, some scholars argue there are historic precedents for active university involvement in matters of social and economic equity, such as the role of universities in public health and settlement houses of the early 20th century (Taylor and Luter 2013; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012). Others posit “enlightened self-interest” motivates urban institutions to engage in place-based interventions (Taylor and Luter 2013; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; Webber and Karlstrom 2009). Dependent upon their ability to attract faculty, staff, and students, as well as maintain the value of their fixed assets, universities possess a natural stake in the quality and “prestige” of their neighborhood. Thus, from the enlightened self-interest perspective, university investments in neighborhood improvement are as beneficial to the institution as the community.

2.2 Universities in Place: A Brief History of Neighborhood Development & Engagement

Nationwide, academic institutions have a long history of engagement with socioeconomic issues and, by extension, their communities. The models of university-community engagement evolve across four eras. The first begins with the designation of land grant institutions in the late 19th century; the early 20th century introduced a
second era, as some major universities opened their doors to urban laboratories, addressing the physical and social ills in the surrounding neighborhoods. The Post-WWII era brought direct intervention in neighborhoods, as universities—incentivized by the federal government—simultaneously invested in rapid expansion and blight elimination; the resulting town-gown tensions set the stage for current era of university-community engagement. The scholarship describing the evolution of town-gown relationships rarely makes connections across the four eras. Further, outside of the Post-WWII era, there is little discussion about how university interactions with and interventions for neighborhoods changed over time or influenced subsequent attitudes.

The Morrill Act, passed in 1862, represents the first federal intervention in the US higher educational system (Mumper et al. 2011). The legislation allocated land to states for the creation of land-grant colleges as part of westward expansion efforts; states either used the land directly for the institution or sold the land and established an endowment with the proceeds (Mumper et al. 2011; Bromley 2006). Most institutions in the land-grant university system were new, although a few states expanded existing institutions to meet the mandate. The Morrill Act’s principal aim was to expand the reach of higher education beyond traditional liberal arts and theology and provide practical education. Land grant institutions provided industrial (e.g., engineering, mechanics, mining) and agricultural education, supporting population migration in the west and establishing an enduring connection between an institution and its regional community and economy.
The land-grant system was fundamentally located in rural areas and engaged with communities on a regional scale. In urban areas, industrialization, rapid expansion, and an influx of immigrants and poor initiated a different kind of university-community relationship. At the turn of the 20th century, universities primarily engaged with urban communities around social issues—the settlement house movement is a prime example of how universities extended itself into the community (O’Mara 2012; Bromley 2006). Originating in London, the settlement house movement brought university faculty and students out of the ivory tower and into urban settlements; there they could experience slum living, conduct participatory action research, and provide basic education, public health, and other social services. An exemplar in the US was Jane Addams’ Hull House, a partnership forged with the University of Chicago. However, as the 20th century marched forward, the priorities of urban anchors shifted and community partnerships around social issues declined.

By the mid-1940s, university engagement shifted towards physical expansion in response to federally funded demands for research and growing enrollments via the GI Bill (O'Mara 2005). A large body of literature documents the design, implementation, and outcomes of urban renewal strategies, including the role of universities in slum clearance and redevelopment projects (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011; Birch and Silver 2009; Teaford 2000).

The common outcomes of university-affiliated urban renewal projects can be summarized by a few characteristics (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011). First, universities and cities alike viewed the program as an opportunity to “clean house,” clearing away
physical, social, and economic blight from the neighborhoods (Winling 2011; Teaford 2000). Broad demolition and population displacement preceded the development of new university-affiliated facilities; other times, universities failed to realize their ambitious development plans, leaving cleared, vacant land in their portfolios. Second, universities often drew redevelopment inspiration from Modernist architecture, redesigning the campus to be inward-looking and reinforcing the vision of the university as an isolated academic enclave (Carriere 2011; Cohen 1998). Third, universities and their host cities approached urban renewal projects through top-down hierarchies, artificially engaging the affected communities, at best, or excluding the neighborhoods, at worst (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011; Cohen 1998). As a result, growing mistrust characterized town-gown relationships as clear breaches emerged between the interests of the university and those of the surrounding neighborhood.

Following the top-down engagement of the 1950s and 1960s, urban institutions largely disengaged from physical planning within their neighborhoods and returned to their “scholarly enclave” roots (Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009). Many were dealing with constricted budgets and the energy crisis of the 1970s, while also retreating from the acrimonious effects of urban renewal. However, activists within academia did pursue new forms of university-community engagement, principally though service-learning projects that extended classroom into the neighborhood (Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012). Eventually, federally supported initiatives developed to support this type of engagement, such as the National Center for Service-Learning. While federal support
has waxed and waned over the last several decades, service-learning engagement remains prevalent in the anchor institution literature.

After a downturn in the economy, augmented by rising crime and disinvestment rates, several urban universities faced deteriorating neighborhoods once again in the 1980s and 1990s (Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Rodin 2007; Kromer and Kerman 2005). A decrease in federal research funding shifted the focus of many institutions from national to local, as physical deterioration loomed at campus doorsteps (Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Perry 2008; Rodin 2007; Rodin 2005). Given the lingering consequences of the Urban Renewal era, several universities recognized an opportunity (and necessity) to reshape the town-gown relationship. University neighborhood revitalization strategies were born out of this paradigm shift and present-day scholarship is largely defined by an ethos of university-community engagement.

2.3 Post-1990 University-Community Engagement: A Synopsis of Research

Since the 1990s, universities have embraced revitalization as a means of blurring the lines between town and gown, with a number of scholars stepping forward to document the scale and scope of university investments in neighborhood revitalization (Goddard and Vallance 2013; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; Rodin 2007; Bromley and Kent 2006; Kromer and Kerman 2005; Martin, Smith, and Phillips 2005, 1-16; Perry and Wiewel 2005; Maurrasse 2001). Several studies emphasize single cases, documenting the decisions that led an
institution to dedicate administrative and/or fiscal resources towards neighborhood improvement. These case studies provide detailed descriptions of a given revitalization program, including its selected interventions (e.g., crime and safety programs, new construction, and mortgage incentives) and its implementation. The most complete case studies conclude with preliminary evaluations of the revitalization initiatives, which occasionally include the initial changes observed in the neighborhood or early projections that suggest initiatives are beginning to be impactful.

Some scholars have undertaken comparative analyses of several university-initiated neighborhood revitalization efforts (Goddard and Vallance 2013; Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009; Perry and Wiewel 2005; Maurrasse 2001). In addition to documenting the permutations of university-led neighborhood revitalization, these studies consider lessons learned and propose best practices to inform future strategies.

A number of case studies indicate that strong institutional leadership and university-wide commitment are critical to a successful neighborhood revitalization strategy. Beyond developing a revitalization plan, the most transformative interventions integrate standardized university resources and business practices (e.g., institutional purchasing, vendor contracts, construction contracts) with community assets and needs (e.g., neighborhood entrepreneurs, local workforce), as well as the components of the university’s revitalization initiative. Additional best practices from the university-led revitalization scholarship include: targeting resources and interventions in a specific geographic area; developing partnerships with a range of neighborhood stakeholders,
including residents, local businesses, neighborhood organizations, and city
government—including financial and/or implementation partnerships; planning for and
managing spillover effects of university-initiated revitalization in order to balance
university and community needs; and incorporating social and economic inclusion
strategies into the revitalization initiative to minimize displacement and maximize
community benefit.

A few researchers have devised classification systems to distinguish among the
styles and strategies of university-community engagement. One, developed by HUD’s
Office of University Partnerships (OUP), captures the types of interactions between
anchor institutions and neighborhoods (US Department of Housing and Urban
Development). It identifies seven types of university-community engagement, including:
service learning, faculty involvement, student volunteerism, ‘community in the
classroom,’ applied research, major institutional change, and service provision. The last
category, service provision, specifically relates to a university’s involvement in physical
revitalization strategies, defined as “coordinated, sustained, long-term projects towards
a specific community” by university faculty and staff (Martin, Smith, and Phillips 2005).

Axelroth Hodges and Dubb created a second taxonomy with a framework for
assessing engagement styles and resource commitments used by universities pursuing
neighborhood revitalization (2012). The authors highlight three key dimensions of
engagement in a comparative analysis of ten urban universities nationally recognized for
their community engagement and development efforts. The researchers asked: how
each university engaged and/or partnered with its community; why each one chose to

33
pursue engagement and/or investment in community development; and what outcomes each expected for its initiatives. They identified three distinct types of university engagement roles:

1. **Facilitator**: A university mission focused on civic engagement and partnership-building, but with limited fiscal investment;

2. **Leader**: A large university-led engagement strategy supported by significant fiscal resources, often in response to crisis in the immediate neighborhood; or

3. **Convener**: A university mission dedicated to strategic community development within the broader community, often achieved through coalition building and supported by less direct investment.

Collectively, these taxonomies may be useful for making some broad statements about how universities are thinking about revitalization. They can also point to some common ingredients in successful cases, such as the importance of university leadership. They cannot offer much more than a general roadmap, however, as the taxonomies are wholly based on institutional characteristics and do not give serious consideration to the place-based context.

Since 2009, a discrete number of scholars have started to look beyond how universities are investing in neighborhood revitalization in favor of establishing benchmarks and indicators. This does not remedy the lack of place incorporated into the existing taxonomies, but it does begin to narrow the gap. The Coalition for Urban Serving Universities (USU) has undertaken two detailed surveys of universities engaged in their communities since 2009 (Friedman, Perry, and Menendez 2014; Perry and Menendez 2010). In both instances, the surveys sampled from USU members—comprised of 40+ public urban research universities across the US—to collect
information about the activities and resources institutions are dedicated to neighborhoods. The most recent survey, conducted in 2013, included 13 universities and represents the baseline for a 10-year, multi-survey analysis. This data-rich, national survey is the first of its kind, although it is limited by virtue of the fact it only samples USU members, thereby excluding non-USU public universities and all private institutions.

The Democracy Collaborative, a progressive research institute at the University of Maryland, is also beginning to change the way anchor institutions are discussed in the literature with its work. One of its most recent publications worked with a wide range of university-community engagement stakeholders to establish a series of measurement indicators (Dubb, McKinley, and Howard 2013; Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013). The study compiles interviews and readily available data sources to propose an “anchor institution dashboard” with indicators for social and economic equity, community building, K-12 education, and health, safety, and neighborhood conditions. The research is both an acknowledgement of the dearth of outcome assessments in the field and a practitioner-focused resource to fill the same void. As a next step, the Democracy Collaborative is developing a pilot project for universities to adopt (and adapt) the proposed indicators for application with existing neighborhood revitalization strategies.

2.4 The University’s Civic Mission: Ideological Debates

Universities’ increasing involvement in neighborhoods has stimulated an ideological debate about the roles, responsibilities, and obligations of an institution within its
community. Universities, over the last twenty years, have actively repositioned themselves as stakeholders within the urban landscape, seeking to incorporate their neighborhood into their institutional branding. In light of this transformation, some institutions—particularly public universities dependent on funding from state legislative bodies—are making the case for an urban land-grant designation (Bromley and Kent 2006; Bunnell and Lawson 2006). Traditional land-grant institutions and university extension programs, with fiscal backing from the state, support the advancement of rural communities and regions. In much the same way, albeit without official designation or support, urban universities are fulfilling a similar role in their communities. While this argument has gained modest traction in a limited number of places (e.g., the Ohio State system, Portland State University) (Bunnell and Lawson 2006; Bromley and Kent 2006), it also illuminates a broader theme.

In recasting themselves as distinct urban anchors, universities are purposefully defining their neighborhood and community initiatives as part of their institutional missions, not singular short- to mid-term efforts intended to stave off threats. This is the juncture where the ideological anchor institution debates lie. These debates are nascent with limited scholarship describing the spectrum of positions; instead, the various perspectives are embedded within the individual portrayal of university motivations and approaches to neighborhood intervention.

Anchor institution ideologies are arranged on a continuum. On the more restrictive end are institutional interventions motivated by enlightened self-interest (Axelroth Hodges and Dubb 2012; Sangu-Eryilmaz 2009). As described above, this
ideological position situates an institution’s needs within the context of place, but does not explicitly assign responsibility for community wellbeing to the anchor. While spillover benefits accrued to the existing community are welcomed, they are not the inherent objective for the intervention; instead, institutional investments are calibrated to satisfy the university’s needs, which offer de facto benefits to the neighborhood. For instance, under the guise of enlightened self-interest, a university may invest substantial resources in neighborhood upgrading, but would not necessarily adopt policies to mitigate gentrification pressures that could negatively affect existing residents.

The shared value ethos is incrementally more progressive than enlightened self-interest. Instead of fostering implicit spillover benefits for the community, the shared value ideology is driven by a “win-win” value system (Dubb, McKinley, and Howard 2013; Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013). Shared value interventions intentionally seek opportunities to mutually satisfy university and community needs. While this approach does not guarantee equal benefits (or costs) for all affected parties, it does explicitly adopt a value system by which revitalization objectives and strategies can be evaluated.

Democratic civic engagement is at the most liberal end of the ideological continuum. Unlike its counterparts, democratic civic engagement expressly states that anchor institutions have an obligation to adopt sustained civic engagement, which includes physical, economic, and social investments, as a core part of its mission (Harkavy and Axelroth Hodges 2012; Saltmarsh, Hartley, and Clayton 2009; Harkavy 2006; Benson and Harkavy 2000). The democratic engagement ethos extends to all parts of a university’s mission—academic, research, and administrative. The literature most
frequently points to service learning, academically based community service, and applied research. Increasingly, some argue that universities have a responsibility to engage with the community on an economic, social, and physical basis. Not only should anchor institutions be a good neighbor, but they should also engage meaningfully with their community and use their resources for the “public good.”

While an institution may not explicitly align with a specific ideology, it is critical for researchers (and stakeholders, including universities and neighborhoods) to understand the range of ideologies, values, and/or motivations that underlie a university’s investment in a neighborhood. Some institutions may adopt a single philosophy to guide their university-community engagement strategy; more frequently, a single institution will draw from an amalgamation of perspectives and invest in a multi-faceted approach to engagement and revitalization. Recognizing the drivers behind these choices, however, enables institutions, policy makers, and leadership to make considered decisions about investment costs, benefits, and outcomes.

2.5 The Anchor Institution Research Agenda: Questions and Gaps

Anchor institution research continues to be relatively young; a strong interest in identifying permutations of anchor institution engagement and developing case studies persists. Yet, as more urban institutions readily don the title of “anchor institution” in their neighborhoods and cities, a subtle shift in scholarly inquiry is emerging. Researchers are beginning to implement systematic national scans of the population, particularly university neighborhood revitalization endeavors. These ongoing surveys
include in-depth data collection on the costs and benefits associated with university-community engagement investments. To date, the Coalition of Urban Serving Universities is at the forefront of this work (Friedman, Perry, and Menendez 2014; Perry and Menendez 2010); however, as previously discussed, their research is restricted to public research universities on the USU membership rolls.

There is also a growing interest in assessing the impacts of anchor institution interventions (Initiative for a Competitive Inner City 2014; Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013). Specifically, researchers are introducing the idea of “return on investment” (ROI) into the anchor institution conversation, calling for a review of the internal (i.e., institution) and external (i.e., neighborhood or community) ROI. Simultaneously, a small contingent of progressive scholars are underscoring the importance of “shared value” in evaluations, pushing the conversation beyond passive assessment of what has been done into a policy discussion of how initiatives could be modified to achieve greater benefit (Dubb, McKinley, and Howard 2013; Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013; Dubb and Howard 2012).

Lastly, researchers in the anchor institution field are beginning to ask questions about transferability. To date, urban universities have been the most active—and studied—actors in the anchor institution landscape. Researchers and institutions are now asking how the model and best practices might translate to other types of anchor institutions, particularly hospitals (Zuckerman 2013).
2.6 Neighborhood Revitalization and Gentrification: Filling a Gap in the Literature

The literature discussing university interventions in neighborhood revitalization neglects to incorporate any mention of outcome measures into its discussions. While a few studies—particularly recent work by the Democracy Collaborative—has inched closer to place-based framing of anchor institution investments, they do not attempt to move the discussion beyond program evaluation within the university to external neighborhood effects (Guinan, McKinley, and Yi 2013). Thus, this study—and Chapter 4 in particular—uses robust neighborhood revitalization and gentrification literatures to examine neighborhood-level interventions, drawing parallels to anchor institution strategies.

2.6.1 Neighborhood Revitalization: Methodological Approaches and Application

Universities are just one of many actors intervening in urban neighborhoods, attempting to prime the revitalization pump with their investments. Policy initiatives aimed at neighborhood revitalization range from federally funded Promise Zones and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program to local “transformation initiatives” and CDC efforts. From an evaluation perspective, the literature on large-scale policy interventions, such as HOPE VI or CDBG investments, is particularly relevant to university place-based investments, as it demonstrates direct and indirect impact measurement in target neighborhoods (Cloud and Roll 2011; Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006; Galster et al. 2004; Zielenbach 2003).
Methodologically, large-scale revitalization scholars frequently employ three different assessment strategies (Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006). The first approach undertakes a descriptive analysis of change, which is the most straightforward method and produces the most general results. These studies assess conditions at static points in time, often pre- and post-intervention, and offer a snapshot of a neighborhood (Cloud and Roll 2011; Zielenbach 2003). They rely on a diverse set of neighborhood indicators to give a complete picture of change, including demographic and socio-economic measures. The studies frequently analyze multiple treatment neighborhoods side by side and incorporate qualitative case studies to provide greater insight into neighborhood impacts.

The second approach for evaluating neighborhood revitalization measures post-intervention absolute change (Cloud and Roll 2011; Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006). Similar to a descriptive analysis, these studies use several demographic and socio-economic indicators to quantify neighborhood change before and after the intervention. The studies often include a set of similar control (non-intervention) neighborhoods and/or a city- or MSA-level aggregate to assess differences in revitalizing areas (Cloud and Roll 2011). These studies also include qualitative descriptions of change.

The third strategy for measuring neighborhood revitalization uses statistical models to estimate the difference between treatment neighborhoods and control neighborhoods (Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006). These studies employ a range of methods to evaluate change including difference-in-difference, hedonic regression, and
adjusted interrupted time series models (Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006; Galster et al. 2004; Schill et al. 2002). Unlike descriptive or absolute change analyses, these models rely on a discrete set of variables selected to measure neighborhood improvement while minimizing redundancy; they also incorporate control variables to account for other factors that may influence revitalization outcomes.

Key neighborhood improvement variables vary across studies, responding to the intervention and context. After a robust analysis of neighborhood variables, Galster et al. (2005) conclude that home mortgage approval rates (HMDA), number of home purchase mortgage applications (HMDA), median dollar amount for home purchase mortgage loans (HMDA), and number of businesses (Dunn and Bradstreet) are the most robust proxies for measuring neighborhood change. Researchers have used statistical models to measure neighborhood revitalization interventions at both a national and regional/local scale (e.g., Galster et al. 2004; Schill et al. 2002). Many models utilize publicly accessible data sources, although some draw from local or specialized data sets (e.g., municipal property assessments, geocoded crime data, private commercial databases, local vacancy surveys). Relative to other approaches, statistical models provide the most direct measure of intervention-induced change and contribute to an empirical understanding of neighborhood revitalization.

Collectively, this body of intervention research offers a framework for testing the outcomes of university investments in neighborhood revitalization. The target neighborhoods, revitalization strategies, and timeframe of many revitalization interventions are similar to the conditions found in university target neighborhoods.
And, while the revitalization efforts frequently assess public sector interventions, anchor institutions, as non-profits with long histories in urban neighborhoods, often face similar scrutiny from and are held to a similar standard by their neighborhoods. Whereas private sector actors might be decried for gentrifying a neighborhood, community residents do not have a means of holding them accountable for their actions. As institutional actors, communities hold the expectation that government entities, universities, hospitals, and community development corporations, by virtue of their non-profit status, have a de facto commitment to the neighborhood.
CHAPTER 3. DEFINING THE “ENGAGED” UNIVERSITY

A growing number of universities are utilizing their physical and monetary assets and development experience to address incongruity between town and gown. Place has always been an essential component of a university’s identity. In the early 20th century, universities moved away from the industrializing urban centers, deeming the “evils of the city” an inappropriate setting for their work. Often, they relocated to pastoral environs considered more conducive to scholarship. Urbanization followed, however, and, by the 1950s, academic institutions found themselves surrounded by disinvestment and deterioration as cities fell out of favor. Once again, university leaders faced discontinuity between their academic enclave and the chaotic city, requiring another intervention in “place.” This time, however, institutions did not run away; they partnered with government entities and harnessed urban renewal funds to create blank slates, reshaping “place” to accommodate their expanding research needs and enrollments.

University attempts to cleanse and buffer their campuses from “place” was not a permanent solution. Urban neighborhoods were in crisis, yet again, by the 1980s. At this point, university facilities and infrastructure were too big to move—the relocation strategy of the early 1900s was not an option. The “cleanse and buffer” strategy was also off the table, as it had generated too much animosity and there were no longer federal supports for that style of intervention. Instead of resisting or buffering it, many university leaders harnessed their natural skills to embrace “place,” blurring the town-
gown lines. Boosted by an urban renaissance, universities are now intervening to make place an asset to their brand, rather than a detriment.

This chapter profiles twenty-two universities who invest in neighborhood revitalization, enumerating their institutional characteristics and the types of activities they pursue. It represents the first national survey of its kind, expanding upon previous foundational surveys conducted by the Coalition for Urban Serving Universities (USU), which limited its sample to public, USU-member universities (Friedman, Perry, and Menendez 2014; Perry and Menendez 2010). The chapter begins with a methodology section, reviewing the survey criteria and instrument. The survey findings follow, beginning with a university profile that answers the question “who is the engaged university?” Subsequently, it discusses the characteristics of expansion and neighborhood revitalization initiatives to explore how universities are conceiving of and intervening in place.

3.1 National Survey Methods: Definitions, Criteria, and Instrument
The national survey responds to the study’s first query and probes the breadth of the phenomenon. The research employed a survey tool to understand the scale and scope of university interventions—both expansion and revitalization. The survey findings were incorporated into a constructed database, which included publicly available institutional and neighborhood socio-economic data. Collectively, the dissertation uses the data to construct an understanding of university motivations and predominant strategies
towards neighborhood revitalization. It also serves as the basis for the second phase of the research.

3.1.1 Defining University Interventions in Neighborhood Revitalization

This dissertation defines university interventions in neighborhood revitalization as institutional investment that targets neighborhood-wide quality of life issues, including physical conditions (e.g. crime and safety, public infrastructure and amenities, housing), socioeconomic conditions (e.g. poverty, unemployment), and services (e.g. commercial and retail, neighborhood schools). It represents a special form of university intervention that simultaneously addresses neighborhood conditions (a “public” interest) and institutional needs (a “private” interest).

University interventions in neighborhood revitalization can be contrasted with university investments in campus expansion. University campus expansion includes: physical development activities that extend beyond the existing campus boundary and primarily address institutional needs, such as university dorms, academic facilities, research buildings, or support services (e.g., hotel or conference center). Additional criteria distinguish university interventions in neighborhood revitalization:

- Revitalization activities extend beyond the existing campus boundary and encompass more than university-specific needs (e.g., university dorms or academic facilities).
- University investments include physical revitalization activities that target both university- and privately-owned properties.
• Beyond physical revitalization, university investments may extend to human capital development, such as (but not limited to) community capacity building, service learning, or technical expertise (e.g., expertise to support primary or secondary education, workforce development, homeownership counseling).

3.1.2 Selection Criteria

To qualify for the survey, universities had to satisfy four criteria. The first criterion used a compound definition to isolate a particular subset of higher education institutions. To qualify, the institution had to be categorized as an (1) accredited, (2) four-year, (3) degree-granting (4) urban university in the Institutional Post-Secondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) in the 2012-2013 reporting year. “Urban” is defined as an urbanized city or suburb with a population greater than 250,000 in the IPEDS database. The purpose of this criterion was to narrow the field to those institutions that are predisposed to engage in revitalization activities, due their neighborhood context (e.g. density, socio-economic conditions, town-gown proximities) and institutional capacity. This requirement narrowed the population from 7,735 possible institutions to 1,030 urban universities.

Second, the anchor institution literature had to identify universities as engaging, in some capacity, in revitalization and/or major campus expansion activities. Given the nascent state of the field, this criterion aimed to constrict the sample to those institutions that were already familiar with university revitalization techniques. An
institution may not be engaged in an active conversation about revitalization interventions with its peer institutions, but its presence in the literature ensured the institution was, at a minimum, aware of the trends. The literature review included articles, books, reports, and conference presentations or proceedings. It revealed sixty-five qualified universities who were investing in some form of expansion or revitalization. Subsequently, experts in the field validated the list.

Third, selected universities had to self-identify as investing in campus expansion or neighborhood revitalization activities between 1990 and the present. This builds on the rationale for the second criteria. In order to provide an accurate account of their activities, survey participants had to possess an understanding of the trends in university revitalization, including the types of activities described in the survey. In addition, the participant needed to have an awareness of their institution’s investments (ongoing and in the recent past), as they pertained to town-gown interventions. An initial email, as well as the first section of the survey, offered revitalization and expansion activity definitions to participating universities; participants were asked to verify their involvement in one or both of these efforts before proceeding with the study.

Last, qualified university interventions had to occur in a geographically defined target area—they could not represent dispersed region- or city-wide efforts. This criterion limited participation to those institutions embarking on place-based interventions. In the survey, universities were asked to report the boundaries of their
post-1990 expansion activities and/or neighborhood revitalization initiatives; they were asked to provide supporting documentation, if possible.

3.1.3 Survey Instrument

Following the identification of a valid population, an online survey tool (1) determined if an institution satisfied the third and fourth criteria, and (2) collected information about the motivations, scale, and scope of university interventions. The initial contacts for the survey were university administrators. University leaders were more likely to have a comprehensive view of their institution’s investments as compared to a program administrator who would know a lot about one strategy, but not necessarily all strategies. The initial point of contact included Presidents, Executive Vice Presidents, and/or Vice Presidents of finance, administration and/or operations; subsequently, these leaders included other university representatives in the survey.

The survey instrument asked participating institutions to focus on expansion and revitalization activities since 1990, which corresponds with the earliest documented cases of the university intervention in revitalization. It collected information on four major components that frame a university’s investment in expansion and revitalization. Each section of the survey attempted to gather information about the scope of the investment and the status of the project. The four major survey components included:

- The geographic boundaries for university expansion and/or neighborhood revitalization activities since 1990;
• Details about campus expansion efforts, including broad categories of investment and basic project details (e.g., project budgets, total square footage);

• Details about neighborhood revitalization activities, including broad categories of investment and project-specific details for housing, commercial, and economic development activities; and

• A summary of the motivating factors for the university to invest in neighborhood revitalization efforts, as well as any efforts to evaluate their strategies and neighborhood outcomes.

Institutions reported their activities using pre-determined categories of investment, in addition to soliciting supporting details. This enabled the researcher to consider not just individual approaches, but also establish trends across institutions. To formulate activity categories, the survey extracted a menu of university revitalization investments from existing anchor institution literature. Activities ranged from physical and economic development to K-12 school partnerships and community service.

For institutions investing in housing, commercial, or economic development, the survey asked for additional information about specific sub-sets of activities. These categories of investment signaled a departure from town-gown traditions of community service and explicitly engaged with the neighborhood through place-based intervention. They also represented a departure from campus planning and demonstrated university investment in non-institutional spaces, which has direct impacts for neighborhood revitalization, as Chapter 4 will illuminate.
3.1.4 Survey Respondents

Between August and October 2014, twenty-two universities responded to the survey (thirty-four percent response rate), including twelve public and ten private institutions in nineteen cities and fifteen states (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). On most counts, the respondents were typical of the sixty-five universities in the sample. Geographically, engaged universities existed in every region of the country, though survey respondents were modestly over-represented in the Midwest and under-represented in the South and West relative to the sample (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). They were also comparably dispersed among large cities (more than 250,000 people), mid-sized cities (100,000 to 250,000 people), and large suburbs (more than 250,000 people). From an institutional perspective, public and private universities participated in revitalization activities in nearly equal numbers with a roughly equal distribution among both the survey respondents and the sample. In addition, the distributions of Carnegie classifications for university types and enrollment profiles were similar, though they skew slightly towards research universities with large enrollments.
Table 3.1 Universities engaged in neighborhood revitalization, survey respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES</th>
<th>PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State University, main campus</td>
<td>Case Western Reserve University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland State University</td>
<td>Duke University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers University – Newark</td>
<td>Emory University</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Akron</td>
<td>Harvard University</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Northeastern University</td>
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<td>University of Memphis</td>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
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<td>University of Washington – Tacoma</td>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago</td>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Massachusetts – Boston</td>
<td>Widener University</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Nebraska at Omaha</td>
<td>Yale University</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of South Florida – St Petersburg</td>
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<td>University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee</td>
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</table>
Table 3.2 Distribution of universities engaged in neighborhood revitalization, sample and survey respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBANIZATION</th>
<th>University Sample</th>
<th>Survey Respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City, large (&gt;250,000)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City, medium (100,000 to 250,000)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb, large (&gt;250,000)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>University Sample</th>
<th>Survey Respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
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<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
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<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64</td>
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<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>University Sample</th>
<th>Survey Respondents</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Institution</td>
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<td>Private, not for profit</td>
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<th>CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION, BASIC</th>
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<th>Survey Respondents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, very high activity</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, high activity</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, doctoral</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (non-research)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION, ENROLLMENT</th>
<th>University Sample</th>
<th>Survey Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively undergraduate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high undergraduate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High undergraduate</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority undergraduate</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority graduate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.3 Location of universities engaged in neighborhood revitalization, by city size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LARGE CITIES ( &gt; 250,000)</th>
<th>MEDIUM CITIES (100,000 to 250,000)</th>
<th>LARGE SUBURBS ( &gt; 250,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston, Massachusetts</td>
<td>Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>Atlanta, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, Illinois</td>
<td>Durham, North Carolina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati, Ohio</td>
<td>New Haven, Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>St. Petersburg, Florida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, Ohio</td>
<td>Syracuse, New York</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, Tennessee</td>
<td>Tacoma, Washington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee, Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark, New Jersey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha, Nebraska</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland, Oregon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2 Who is the Engaged University? Institutional Profiles

Regardless of institutional or neighborhood character, all universities self-identified as “engaged” and investing in neighborhood revitalization. The importance of this finding is not readily apparent, but it illustrates that universities are participating in neighborhoods and conceiving of their roles differently than they have previously. While the literature scan would predict university involvement in neighborhood revitalization for a number of universities in the sample—particularly a handful of pioneers mentioned in several case studies, it did not find indicators for all institutions; the sample also included several institutions with documented instances of expansion, but little to no mention of neighborhood investments. Their unanimous self-identification speaks to the widespread value universities put on place, which extends to the neighborhood, as well as the institution’s ability to adapt revitalization strategies to meet a variety of town-gown contexts.

Universities pinpointed their initial involvement in neighborhood revitalization to three timeframes. Aligning with the anchor institution literature, the first generation of institutions began pursuing revitalization during the 1990s, while the second generation...
began investing during the early to mid-2000s. The third category of respondents saw themselves as legacy institutions, choosing to define their revitalization work broadly and extending their place-based commitment back to the inception of the university and/or its existing campus.

Institutional characteristics, collected from IPEDS and layered onto the survey results, offer a profile of the types of universities gravitating towards neighborhood revitalization. Major research and/or large institutions pursued neighborhood revitalization interventions more often than other types of universities, with private “very high research” universities (RU-VH, formerly known as R1s in the Carnegie classification system) claiming the most active and diversified roles in housing, commercial, and economic development initiatives.

Stratifying universities by institutional sector and research classifications reveals a strong bias towards major research institutions and, specifically, private research universities in neighborhood revitalization efforts. Figure 3.2 breaks out public and private universities by Carnegie classification. Within institutional sectors, major research universities are the predominant actors in university neighborhood revitalization strategies. In the US, thirty-two percent of all private universities are RU-VH institutions; in the survey, seventy percent of private universities are from RU-VH schools. For public universities, there are fewer RU-VH institutions than one would expect—twenty-five percent in the survey versus forty-one percent in the general population of public universities, but there are more “high activity” research universities
(RU-H) than expected—fifty percent in the survey versus forty-two percent in the general population.

Figure 3.2 Public and Private Universities by Carnegie Classification

Comparing institutional sectors—public versus private, RU-VH private institutions invest in neighborhood revitalization efforts in greater proportions than RU-VH public universities (Figure 3.3). In the general university population, public universities comprise sixty-eight percent of all RU-VH schools; in the survey, only thirty percent (n=3) of the RU-VH schools are public. At the high activity research universities (RU-H), however, the proportion reflects the overall university population: seventy-five percent of “engaged” universities are public (n=6) and twenty-five percent are private (n=2).
In another clear pattern, the majority of universities pursuing neighborhood revitalization strategies were large institutions with enrollments exceeding 10,000 students (Figure 3.4). Public institutions claimed a much higher proportion of undergraduates, with Carnegie Classifications ranking them as “very high” (comprised of more than ninety percent undergraduate students) or “high” (comprised of seventy-five to ninety percent undergraduate students) in undergraduate students. Private universities were split between “majority undergraduate” (comprised of fifty-one to seventy-five percent undergraduate students) and “majority graduate” (comprised of more than fifty percent graduate students). The student enrollment profiles likely explain the bifurcation of public and private universities with respect to their residential profiles (Figure 3.5). All public universities in the study are considered “primarily non-residential,” meaning they house fewer than twenty-five percent of undergraduates on
campus; all private institutions are classified as “highly residential,” indicating they house more than fifty percent of their undergraduates on campus.

Figure 3.4 University enrollment profiles (Carnegie) by institutional sector

Figure 3.5 University residential profiles (Carnegie) by institutional sector
3.3 The Engaged University: Expansion in the Post-1990 Era

A variety of universities expressed a commitment to revitalizing their neighborhoods, but what kinds of investments are they making? As a counterpoint to neighborhood investments, the survey’s interventions conversation begins with expansion activities as a more traditional form of place-based investment. Unsurprisingly, all universities reported investments in campus expansion during the post-1990 period. Expansion was diverse and often quite extensive with all institutions pursuing an array of project types including academic and research facilities, on-campus dormitories and residential buildings, university open spaces and recreation facilities, and commercial support services such as hotels, conference centers, and dining choices (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 University investment in expansion by sector, 1990 to present

Across the sample, universities were consistent in their expansion approaches and their motivations fell into three major categories. First, most universities cited space constraints as the driving factor behind their investments, including the need to accommodate increasing enrollments, new programs, or specialized space demands.
(e.g., research-specific space). In addition, several institutions—particularly public universities—discussed the need to expand their residential capacity as they transitioned away from their historic roles as commuter campuses. Second, institutions expressed a desire to invest in “quality of life” improvements. They strove to increase amenities and create a “sense of community” or “academic destination,” in order to recruit and retain students, faculty, and staff. Third, many universities drew connections between the “space constraint” and “quality of life” factors to a supplementary category of motivations, characterized by the presence of a positive community or citywide impact. In this category, institutions referenced the intersection between town and gown, such as their campus’s contributions to city development plans or off-campus facilities that enabled interaction with the neighborhood.

The physical relationship between town and gown also affected the location of post-1990 expansion investments. Universities pursued expansion both within their original 1990 campus boundaries and in the adjacent community in equal measure (Figure 3.7). For private and public universities, approximately one-third of expansion projects occurred within the existing campus footprint, while one-third of projects were developed in adjacent neighborhoods. Respondents reported off-campus expansion was often driven by land locked conditions within the campus or opportunities to link university investments with larger community revitalization projects and/or city investments (e.g., downtown revitalization plans). Beyond proximate expansion, approximately one-fifth of all projects reported by either type of institution occurred in a satellite campus or location—these sites often represent strategic locations, such as a
downtown hub or research-driven site (e.g., water-based research center built near a body of water).

Figure 3.7 University expansion activities by location, 1990 to present

3.4 The Engaged University: Investments in Neighborhood Revitalization

In contrast to expansion activities, universities varied substantially in their definitions of, motivations for, and approaches to neighborhood revitalization. Their responses were context-driven and reflected the array of opportunities that can shape a university strategy, including the presence of willing partners (e.g., local government, non-profit organization, or neighborhood associations), availability of various funding (e.g., university resources, grants, partner contributions, or private investment), and neighborhood conditions.

3.4.1 University Motivations

When asked to discuss their motivations for pursuing neighborhood revitalization, university responses were more fragmented than they were for expansion. While the
anchor institution literature nearly always links university action to the presence of crime, blight, and disinvestment in the neighborhood, few survey participants made mention of neighborhood decline directly. Instead, their motivating factors tended to fall into three broad categories. One category showed considerable overlap with expansion motivations, citing quality of life opportunities and physical conditions. A few respondents mentioned “physical deterioration” or “neighborhood stabilization” as factors, but others spoke more generally about creating a “sense of place” and connections between the neighborhood and campus life. A second category referenced administrative leadership directly, including presidents and chancellors, vice presidents, provosts, and boards of trustees. A few of the public universities also intimated that outside political support helped motivate their revitalization efforts, including backing from a regional council or the state legislature. The third set of motivators was the most ideological and reflected the civic debates within the anchor institution literature. It spoke to the civic mission of the university, captured in phrases like “commitment to the community,” “neighborhood engagement,” and “community support and engagement [as part of] the mission statement.”

**3.4.2 University Partnerships**

Universities generally headquartered their revitalization strategies in one of four administrative offices (Figure 3.8), including physical development offices, the office of administrative leaders, offices charged with community relations, or community outreach divisions. The vast majority of institutions did not pursue revitalization efforts
alone—eighty-four percent reported at least one partner (and often several), though the university was the lead partner seventy-one percent of the time. Partnerships spanned across the university, including university colleges or departments, divisions of public safety, and applied research centers; they also included a range of external stakeholders from city government and philanthropic organizations to neighborhood associations and other anchor institutions (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Summary matrix: University revitalization initiatives, lead offices and partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAD PARTNER</th>
<th>SUPPORTING PARTNER: UNIVERSITY</th>
<th>SUPPORTING PARTNER: COMMUNITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Development</td>
<td>University Relations</td>
<td>City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Planning</td>
<td>University Colleges/Departments</td>
<td>Elected Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>City Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Leadership</td>
<td>Public Affairs and Communications</td>
<td>Neighborhood Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President/Chancellor</td>
<td>Public Safety</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Executive Vice President</td>
<td>Academic Innovation Centers</td>
<td>School District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Vice President</td>
<td>Applied Research/Practice Centers</td>
<td>Other Community Anchors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>University Relations</td>
<td>Neighborhood Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Relations</td>
<td>University Colleges/Departments</td>
<td>Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Engagement</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Outreach</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Other institutions (e.g., zoo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Partnerships</td>
<td>Public Affairs and Communications</td>
<td>Neighborhood Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/Neighborhood Institutes or Centers</td>
<td>Public Safety</td>
<td>Community Development Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academic Innovation Centers</td>
<td>Other Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Applied Research/Practice Centers</td>
<td>Commercial/Business Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philanthropic Organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey did not capture the depth of these partnerships, but, as the case studies in Chapters 5-7 make evident, they vary greatly. Partnerships can range from the superficial, convening meetings but not contributing to a shared vision or effort, to the functional, but not fully representative, to highly integrated, deep partnerships. In process, as with implementation, context matters greatly.
3.4.3 University Neighborhood Revitalization: All Investments

University investments in neighborhood revitalization differed substantially across institutional sectors, as well as between individual universities—both in terms of how universities defined revitalization and the kinds of activities they pursued. The two most popular investments made by universities in the study included community service, reflecting the conventional definition of university-community engagement, and public amenities (Figure 3.8). While neither of these investments reflects the physical interventions of the post-1990 era, a majority of universities reported activity in these areas as well. A majority of university strategies included investments in housing (seventy-three percent), commercial (sixty-eight percent), or economic development (seventy-seven percent).

Figure 3.8 University revitalization initiatives, total universities by activity (n=22)
Stratifying respondents by institutional sector provides a clearer picture of how universities are shaping their neighborhood revitalization strategies (Figure 3.9). Public universities followed the overall trend, pursuing community service and public amenities more frequently than other initiatives. They were also more likely to define their revitalization activities broadly. For instance, the University of Washington-Tacoma cited their partnership with the City of Tacoma to develop environmental impact statements as a commercial development activity. While the effort did not directly result in property development or entrepreneurship opportunities, it did pave the way for developers to continue investing in the revitalization of downtown Tacoma.

In contrast, private universities were significantly involved in all three of the post-1990 revitalization approaches, in addition to the more conventional engagement strategies. On average, a private institution invested in six out of the seven revitalization categories in the survey; all invested in at least two out of the three post-1990 activities. Public universities invested in 4.5 revitalization categories on average and were divided on the post-1990 activities—thirty percent invested in one activity, thirty percent in two, thirty percent in all three, and one institution did not report any involvement in these categories.
As primary institutions engaged in neighborhood revitalization interventions, major research institutions also gravitated towards different investment patterns. These differences are illustrated by comparing RU-VH to RU-H respondents (Figure 3.10). For instance, RU-VH schools reported substantially more engagement in housing and commercial activities than RU-H institutions—all RU-VH schools had made some type of investment. Both types of universities valued investments in public safety, with all eighteen respondents reporting activity, though RU-H universities were more likely to pursue community service (one hundred percent versus seventy percent of RU-VHs) and economic development efforts (eighty-eight percent versus seventy percent of RU-VHs). It is worth noting, however, the RU-VH respondents are mostly from private universities and RU-H respondents are mostly from public institutions, which makes it impossible to discount governance structure as a factor.
3.4.4 University Neighborhood Revitalization: Housing, Commercial, and Economic Development

Focusing on the primary post-1990 revitalization interventions—housing, commercial, and economic development, project-based, physical and market interventions dominated the landscape, as opposed to programmatic interventions targeted to specific populations or socio-economic conditions. New construction projects, often comprised of private development on university-owned land, were at the center of most university revitalization strategies and were represented far more often than homeownership programs or targeted workforce development initiatives, for example.

In housing activities, private universities were significantly more active than public institutions (Figure 3.11). The majority of investments consisted of new construction or major rehabilitation projects that mostly addressed off-campus student
housing needs, although a few respondents reported investment in market rate and affordable housing projects. Property management also contributed to more than half of university housing strategies; most properties were multi-family buildings, though one university managed single-family properties as well. More than half of private universities investing in housing revitalization included homeownership incentives in their strategies; conversely, only one public institution offered a homeownership incentive. Private university programs typically targeted full and part-time permanent university employees, though two institutions also had programs for low-income households unaffiliated with the university. Benefits were typically delivered through grants, forgivable loans, and/or guaranteed mortgages; in some cases, households had the opportunity to participate in both university and city homeownership incentives, which enhanced the institution’s ability to attract faculty and staff to the neighborhood.

*Figure 3.11 University off-campus housing initiatives by sector*
In the commercial investment category, universities—public and private—were fairly consistent in their approaches (Figure 3.12). More than half of private institutions reported activity in all three subsets of commercial investment—property development, management, and tenancy. Public universities were equally diverse in their investments. Similar to housing development, commercial property development largely consisted of private developers building on university-owned land via long-term leases. Property management strategies varied: Some institutions held commercial property as part of their long-term asset plan, leasing to a commercial tenant as an interim strategy; others actively managed their commercial property as part of their amenity-driven, “sense of place” strategy, seeking a mix of tenants to satisfy the needs of students, university employees, and neighborhood residents.

*Figure 3.12 University commercial initiatives by sector*
Economic development strategies represent the last post-1990 revitalization category. While universities reported activity in this category (Figure 3.13), their responses were the least consistent in terms of types of activities and definitions. Eighty percent of private universities in the study reported economic development strategies; fifty percent of public institutions invested in some form of economic development. Approximately half of the universities participating in economic development efforts claimed comprehensive programs, meaning they were involved in at least three of the four sub-activities in the category. However, only two institutions—both private—described strategies that deliberately sought to concentrate institutional resources (e.g., procurement, hiring, contracting) in a specific neighborhood, which would reflect their other revitalization strategies. Others described diffuse investments in economic development that spanned the city or region, for instance.

*Figure 3.13 University economic development initiatives by sector*
Responses to economic revitalization questions suggest three things. First, though several universities report investments in economic development, the geographic focus was distinct from other physical revitalization interventions. While housing and commercial projects were typically neighborhood based, economic strategies often targeted the entire city or region.

Second, many of the economic strategies were rooted in existing policies or protocols; they often were not part of a focused revitalization initiative. For example, public universities were already participating in a version of local procurement and contracting as an extension of their state mandates; some private universities were required to comply with local hiring and/or procurement as a condition of their city-approved institutional master plans or community benefits agreements. Here, too, “local” was a relative term and often referred to the city or region.

Third, economic development activities often occurred at a high level, intersecting with citywide initiatives or community service activities. While some strategies represented direct investments in wealth generation, via job creation, skills training, procurement investments, or entrepreneurship, other programs sought to build awareness or opportunities more broadly. For instance, one institution described a neighborhood newsletter project, staffed by university students and designed to highlight residents and opportunities in a low-income community; another referenced a career development program intended to provide skills for regional business sectors.
3.4.5 University Neighborhood Revitalization: Funding Sources

Funding mechanisms are a critical, though rarely discussed, component of university interventions. This section provides some insight into the sources and patterns of funding employed for housing, commercial and economic development activities. Collectively, universities primarily funded their revitalization efforts with operating funds, followed by university financing and/or grants (Figure 3.14). Endowments, contrary to what one might expect, were often not a major source of capital. Meanwhile, “other” sources of funding included private investments—often leveraged development projects, loans from endowment funds, or dedicated community investment funds.

*Figure 3.14 University funding sources by revitalization activity*
Stratifying responses by institutional sector and revitalization category reveals variations in funding strategies (Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17). Private universities were more likely to leverage operating funds for their projects than public institutions. They were also more likely to draw from multiple resources to fund housing or commercial projects. For instance, private universities relied on one to five sources of funding for housing revitalization initiatives, averaging 2.75 sources, including operating funds, financing, and gifts. In contrast, public universities used one to four sources, averaging 2.6, with an emphasis on operating funds and university financing. For commercial investments, private institutions drew upon one to three sources, averaging 1.6, including operating funds and financing; public institutions accessed one to two sources and, primarily, university financing.

Figure 3.15 University funding sources for off-campus housing activities by sector

Funding Sources: Housing

- University Operating Funds: 60% (Public), 60% (Private)
- University Endowment Funds: 20% (Public), 10% (Private)
- University Gifts: 30% (Public), 20% (Private)
- University Financing: 50% (Public), 0% (Private)
- University Grant Funds: 40% (Public), 30% (Private)

Public, 4-yr (n=5)  Private, not-for-profit, 4-yr (n=10)
Figure 3.16 University funding sources for commercial activities by sector

Figure 3.17 University funding sources for economic development activities by sector

Economic development activities did suggest a different trend. Here, public universities leveraged multiple sources of funding—an average of 2.5—and were more
likely to be driven by grants, followed by matching funds. Private institutions were more focused, using one to two sources of funding and, principally, operating funds, which reflects their focus on procurement, contracting, and hiring.

3.5 Implications and Conclusion

The survey findings underscore the importance of place for 21st century universities. Though their strategies varied widely, all universities self-identified as active participants in neighborhood revitalization. For many, the neighborhood represented a value-added condition that enabled the university to establish a “sense of place” or a “destination” for university constituents—students, parents, faculty, and staff. Yet, the institutional embrace did not necessarily imply a mutualistic relationship between town and gown. Rather, the survey results suggest universities approach neighborhood revitalization as an asset and academic learning investment, leveraging the tools that are most readily available to them.

While all universities reported investments in neighborhood revitalization, community service and volunteerism was the most frequent activity, reflecting a long-held tradition of civic engagement by universities. These activities often include academically-based community service courses, which integrate community based research into student learning, or university requirements for student volunteer activities. They are often an important part of an institution’s mission to engender civic responsibility among their student body. With deep roots in higher education
philosophy, community service activities are most likely to focus on people-based issues, such as education, poverty, or health, and incorporate a social justice framework.

Civic engagement programming, however, rarely extends to community development efforts that might change the socioeconomic fortunes of a neighborhood. Instead, civic engagement projects are often criticized for their lack of community benefit. Some neighborhoods lament the imbalance of these efforts, where university faculty or students mine a place for its research value but do not provide the community with anything it can use in return. Others point to the fleeting commitment of civic engagement projects, which are not present long enough to sustain change. In their current format, these types of activities rarely generate the kinds of transformative impacts required for neighborhood revitalization, nor do they effectively address issues of place.

The vast majority of universities engaged in the primary neighborhood revitalization activities—housing, commercial, and economic development, relied on their asset management skill sets to fulfill university-driven consumer demand. Universities with established, oft-cited neighborhood revitalization strategies tended to have clearer programs and geographic boundaries, while others were looser in their interpretation of revitalization activities. On average, major research and large universities—those enrolling 10,000 or more students—were most likely to participate in the post-1990 approach to revitalization, with private major research universities playing the most active and diversified roles.
As large institutions, these universities have a natural affinity for managing real estate and project development, as well as physical planning. As a result, universities were most likely to use property development to catalyze change in the real estate market. University investments in real estate often responded to deficits in the commercial corridors surrounding the corridors. In many of these cases, universities were not the principal investors in a project, but leveraged their land holdings to incentivize private actors to invest. Through long-term land leases, institutions were able to attract capital to the neighborhood, offsetting some of the investor risk, and manage the land uses. Led by an institution’s desire to create a destination, real estate investments targeted a mix of retail, entertainment, and student-focused apartment complexes.

In contrast, few universities made significant investments in projects or programs that targeted neighborhood needs, such as housing affordability protections, rehabilitation efforts, workforce development programs, or employment opportunities. Where they did invest in non-development revitalization, institutions were inconsistent in their application of terms—especially in the economic development category. For instance, the “workforce development” category was selected to describe job training programs, as well as a workforce development “newspaper,” run by students and designed to increase community awareness of many issues including job openings. Similarly, some universities described “local procurement” efforts that directed dollars to businesses within the university’s zip code, while others referenced state mandates to purchase from vendors located in the region or the state.
The difficulty with inconsistent definitions of revitalization is not that some institutions are investing in the “right” activities, while other universities are pursuing the “wrong” ones. Neighborhood revitalization interventions are complex, influenced by physical conditions, local and university politics, and town-gown relations, among other factors. Further, university responsibilities and interests are varied. Their fiduciary responsibilities and educational missions must be balanced with the need to protect their institutional brands—a critical component of attracting and retaining students, faculty and staff—and commitments to their neighborhoods, cities, and/or the public good. However, the lack of consistency in university definitions of and/or metrics for neighborhood revitalization makes the work of evaluating initiatives and extracting best practices or policy lessons much more challenging.

The lack of standardized definitions or conceptions of neighborhood revitalization initiatives also represents a limitation in the survey data, as well as a finding unto itself. University responses to the survey were limited by their own perceptions of the work. As mentioned, some institutions defined their efforts broadly, citing a number of community service activities and citywide initiatives that reached beyond the specifications of the survey question. Yet, in other instances, a respondent chose to define the university’s work narrowly, focusing on one aspect of the university’s investments—perhaps the projects they were most familiar with—and neglecting to mention other investments or programs all together. For instance, Syracuse University emphasized its off-campus student housing development, faculty and staff homeownership incentives, and workforce development programs in the
survey; they did not, however, mention any of the programs or development associated with their Near West Side Initiative, a celebrated comprehensive revitalization intervention initiated by the former Chancellor of the university.

Taken together, the survey findings suggest a gap between people and place. In the post-1990 era, universities recognize the contributions of place to their institutional success and future. Yet, the people in those places do not appear to have a prominent role in the way universities conceive of revitalization. Real estate development dominates university strategies and those projects frequently contribute to an institutional appetite for restaurants, retail, entertainment, and/or apartment choices. While both of those trends leverage the skills and interests at the forefront of university planning, they do so in a way that largely creates an imbalance between town and gown benefit.

This imbalance foreshadows an important question: if universities are facilitating private development in the name of neighborhood revitalization and the university population is the primary beneficiary, is this a new form of market-based urban renewal? The answer is not a simple or obvious one. At present, however, university reliance on real estate development to catalyze change suggests that institutions are not harnessing the full strength of their special skills—as employers, economic generators, and civic-minded institutions—to ensure that neighborhood transformation is both vibrant and equitable. The subsequent chapters explore the implications of the town-gown gap further by, first, evaluating if neighborhoods actually changed in
response to university investments and, second, considering three different instances of change through in-depth case studies.
Chapter 3 demonstrated the ways universities have extended their expertise beyond higher education and research to reshape their neighborhoods. Not only are they investing in off-campus redevelopment, but also they are incorporating their neighborhoods into their institutional brands. University of Chicago’s (UChicago) recent corridor revitalization initiative is illustrative of these types of investments, showing how universities pursue development to stimulate neighborhood change. It is, perhaps, the institution with the longest history of engagement with its neighborhoods. Since its founding, the university has been an active member of the community through academics and civic engagement. During the 1950s, like so many other institutions, the university was an active participant in Urban Renewal, designating 885 acres for improvement in an urban renewal plan and bulldozing 101.2 acres of land in an attempt to reverse blight and eradicate crime (Webber 2005). Yet, the institution’s continued commitment to neighborhood improvement and community engagement makes it a prime example of university intervention.

Since 2010, UChicago has invested in the 53rd Street commercial corridor, signaling a return to physical revitalization. Dubbed a “once in a generation” commercial redevelopment opportunity by the New York Times, the university’s current focus aims to close a quality of life gap in the Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhoods. In characterizing
the project, David Greene, UChicago’s Executive Vice President, explained: “We’ve always been very competitive when it comes to providing a great intellectual community. But we found there was something missing when we looked at the quality of life for students and faculty who are used to the kinds of amenities you find in places [like] New York, Boston, and Palo Alto... Over the years and particularly in the 1950s and ’60s, there was a lot of development aimed at creating a barrier around the campus. We’re now trying to reverse that trend” (New York Times, October 23, 2012).

Situated approximately a mile from the center of campus, 53rd Street has been an important, if not underutilized, commercial corridor for the neighborhood. Primarily comprised of marginal businesses and vacant storefronts, the university used its power as a landowner, property lessee, and resource-rich institution to reimagine 53rd Street (Ehlenz, Birch, and Agness 2014). These investments have resulted in the development of two anchor projects at either end of the corridor. The eastern anchor is Harper Court, a $125 million, privately developed mixed-use retail, office, parking garage, and hotel development. UChicago agreed to lease the twelve-story office tower, relocating some of its administrative operations to the corridor; the remainder of the project includes 77,000 square feet of fully-leased retail space, including six eateries, an LA Fitness center, Ulta Beauty, and Villa Shoes, and a 131-room Hyatt Place hotel—the first new hotel in Hyde Park since the 1960s. The western anchor consists of a multi-family residential project with 267 apartments and 28,600 square feet of ground floor retail. In addition, UChicago owns and manages several commercial properties along 53rd Street. In support of the revitalization, the university has invested in façade improvements and
signage, as well as a tenant management strategy that targets a mix of national, regional, and local businesses. The strategy includes an innovative “pop-up” retail program that aims to fill vacant storefronts, while providing local start-ups with a rent-free “test-run” of their retail concept before either party makes a longer-term commitment.

University strategies vary in how broadly (or narrowly) it defines its mission, as well as its expected returns. Most universities pursue neighborhood revitalization through corporate strategies, leveraging their land and financial assets to subsidize and/or catalyze private development and physical transformation. Some institutions conceive of their non-institutional real estate investments as an asset management strategy. In these cases, universities often invest in real estate—either alone or in partnership with private investors—to meet student-centered demands for retail, dining, and entertainment, as well as improved private housing for students. Here, the neighborhood is not a focus, as much as an indirect beneficiary. Others, like UChicago, carry a broader purpose for revitalization investments, allying the university with the neighborhood to address an array of revitalization and quality of life concerns—physical, economic, and social.

The evidence, up to this point, underlines the fact that a subset of universities believe neighborhoods are important. The “sense of place” neighborhoods provide is directly tied to the institution’s reputation and health and, thus, universities see revitalization as a worthy investment. Yet, few institutions have completed any evaluation of their interventions. It is not uncommon for university leadership to
highlight the quantity of retail space added to the neighborhood or the amount of private investment dollars the university leveraged, but, much like a ribbon cutting ceremony, this one-dimensional perspective reflects a single moment in time. For university interventions, there is an inadequate understanding of how neighborhoods change once those ribbons are cleared away. Have these investments resulted in neighborhood improvement?

This chapter considers the neighborhood-level outcomes of university revitalization interventions. It builds on Chapter 3, assessing neighborhood change in each of the areas surrounding the twenty-two universities in the survey. The neighborhood outcome analysis asks two questions. First, how did university neighborhoods change between 1990 and 2010? And, second, how did university neighborhoods change relative to the citywide trends and other neighborhoods in the host county? While the first question is important, the second question is critical, as it accounts for macro-trends in each university’s city and contextualizes a neighborhood’s improvement (or deterioration) relative to other tracts in the local area. To answer these queries, the chapter uses cross tabulation analysis and regression modeling to evaluate changes in median home values and rents, relative to each host city, during the study period. Findings show that not only are university target neighborhoods improving, but they are also appreciating more than one would expect given the city-level trends or the rate of change in other neighborhoods. In other words, university revitalization investments are, in fact, altering the ecology of neighborhoods.
4.1 Neighborhood Outcomes Analysis: Methodology

The operating hypothesis for this chapter is that universities are effectively investing in the planned gentrification of their neighborhoods. While this is not stated as an institutional objective, it is an assumed outcome of university interventions due to the predominance of real estate driven strategies that aim to catalyze private investment and correct “market failures.” This hypothesis is rooted in a production side theory of gentrification (Brown-Saracino 2013). The institution invests in new retail or housing projects, homeownership programs, or public amenities, which jumpstart changes in the neighborhood and give confidence to investors. In turn, new households move into the neighborhood to take advantage of the amenities and additional private investment follows.

The neighborhood outcomes assessment relies on city- and tract-level indicators, including housing, demographic, and economic data from the 1990 and 2010 Decennial Census, as well as the American Community Survey (2008-2012, five year estimates) where necessary. In order to control for changes in tract boundaries over time, the researcher collected 1990 data from the Neighborhood Change Database, which normalizes 1990 tracts to 2010 tract boundaries. Most universities in the sample began investing in their revitalization strategies during the late 1990s or early 2000s; thus, 1990 is used as a pre-investment measure and 2010 represents a “post” investment indicator. For the purposes of this study, a Census tract is synonymous with a neighborhood.

The researcher constructed a neighborhood database for the study, which compiled institutional and neighborhood data for each of the twenty-two universities...
surveyed in Chapter 3. The database matched neighborhood-level Census data with survey responses. The database also used standardized data from the Institutional Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS)—a Department of Education database, updated annually with nine broad categories of information for every higher education institution in the United States, including: institutional characteristics (e.g., public or private governance structure; Carnegie classification and degree offerings; city size and density), enrollments, and financial resources.

The assessment used the survey data from Chapter 3 to assign neighborhoods to “target” and “non-target” categories. For every university in the study, the researcher identified all census tracts within the university’s county (i.e., host county). Collectively, host county tracts—nineteen counties for the twenty-two universities—comprised the sample for the neighborhood outcome analysis. To identify “target” neighborhoods, the researcher used a combination of survey-reported target areas and a three-quarter mile campus buffer to create “university intervention zones”. Utilizing GIS, the researcher assigned neighborhoods with their centroid inside a university intervention zone to the “target” category; all other neighborhoods within the host county were assigned to the “non-target” category. In total, the study sample included 5,352 neighborhoods, of which 210 (four percent) belonged to the “target” category during the 1990 to 2010 period. At an institutional level, a university’s intervention zone included as few as three neighborhoods (i.e., Harvard’s investment in the Allston neighborhoods of Boston) and as many as twenty-seven neighborhoods (i.e., Northeastern University’s reported
investment area, also in Boston); on average, a university intervened in ten neighborhoods.

To track neighborhood outcomes, the researcher used median home value and median rent as proxies for a neighborhood’s relative position within its host county. In order to facilitate an apples-to-apples comparison, the researcher measured values—home and rent—in constant dollars, using the Consumer Price Index to adjust 1990 values to 2010 dollars. While a variety of indicators can describe physical and/or socioeconomic variation, this study aimed to develop a lean assessment of neighborhood change. The relevant literature—particularly work by George Galster (Galster, Tatian, and Accordino 2006; Galster, Hayes, and Johnson 2005; Galster et al. 2004) and Lance Freeman (Freeman 2005; Freeman and Braconi 2004)—suggests that home values can serve as a robust proxy for neighborhood outcomes. However, given the predominance of rental properties in many university neighborhoods, it was not sufficient to use home value alone, as it only reflects one dimension of the lived experience in these neighborhoods. Thus, the researcher conducted two complementary neighborhood change assessments. The first used median home value as the dependent variable; the second used median rent to consider the neighborhood change implications for non-owner occupants.

To measure neighborhood change, the researcher utilized a relative measure of median value (home or rent, respectively): the ratio of the neighborhood’s median value divided by the city’s median value (Figure 4.1). This ratio, calculated for 1990 and 2010 values, expresses each neighborhood value as a percentage of its host city, thereby
controlling for macro-economic trends between 1990 and 2010 (e.g., a rapidly growing or declining city). In other words, the purpose of this analysis is to discover if, all other things equal, university interventions affected their neighborhoods differently than one would expect given the behavior of other neighborhoods in that city. Rather than discovering that a neighborhood’s home values appreciated in a rapidly appreciating city, the researcher wishes to determine if the rate of appreciation was greater than one would expect given the overall citywide trend. Further, the value ratio enables the researcher to compare neighborhoods from a variety of different cities, setting each relative to its own market (e.g., Boston versus Cleveland).

*Figure 4.1 Neighborhood value ratio*

\[
1990 \text{ Value Ratio} = \frac{1990 \text{ Neighborhood Median Value}}{1990 \text{ City Median Value}}
\]

\[
2010 \text{ Value Ratio} = \frac{2010 \text{ Neighborhood Median Value}}{2010 \text{ City Median Value}}
\]

For 1990 and 2010, the researcher stratified the value ratios into three categories based on the neighborhood’s relative position to the city median (Figure 4.2). Low value neighborhoods had value ratios less than 0.75, indicating their median home values or rents were less than seventy-five percent of their host city. Medium value neighborhoods had value ratios between 0.75 and 1.25 and high value neighborhoods had value ratios greater than 1.25. Subsequently, the researcher conducted a cross tabulation analysis to trace a given neighborhood’s movement across categories between 1990 and 2010. The study included two cross tabulations—one for median home values and another for median rents. In both cases, the researcher completed an
initial cross tabulation of all neighborhoods \((n=5,352)\) to establish an overall trend. A second cross tabulation followed, assessing trends for target and non-target neighborhoods, from which the researcher evaluated changes in neighborhood patterns. Subsequently, the researcher used regression models to estimate the contribution, if any, of a university intervention to changing median home value and rent ratios in target neighborhoods. Both the models and results are discussed in the findings section.

*Figure 4.2 Neighborhood value categories: Low, medium, high*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE CATEGORIES</th>
<th>Value Ratios ((r))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Value Neighborhoods</td>
<td>(r &lt; 0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Value Neighborhoods</td>
<td>(0.75 \leq r &lt; 1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Value Neighborhoods</td>
<td>(r \geq 1.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2 Findings

As previously noted, university intervention in neighborhoods frequently utilizes real estate development as a revitalization tool and focuses investments in targeted areas, with the goal of stimulating upwards momentum in the market. The primary benefit—and, for some, concern—of this strategy is the anchor institution’s ability to drive rapid, highly visible change in a neighborhood, often reversing years of instability. But does this perception of university-induced revitalization match the reality of neighborhood change? The research begins with an overview of descriptive mean statistics, reviewing neighborhood change between 1990 and 2010 for university target neighborhoods and their non-target counterparts in the university’s host counties.
As Table 4.1 illustrates, university target neighborhoods tend to be less well off than non-target neighborhoods. As compared to non-target neighborhoods, university target neighborhoods claimed higher poverty rates and lower mean median household incomes across the study period; however, university target neighborhoods did have slightly more income stability between 1990 and 2010, falling 1.5% versus 7.4% in non-target neighborhoods.

Unsurprisingly, university target neighborhoods also reported significantly higher educational attainment thresholds. For the population twenty-five years and older, 44.3% of the population in university neighborhoods possessed a bachelor’s degree or more in 2010—a 28.9% increase over 1990 levels. The university rate is fifteen percentage points above the educational attainment rate in non-target neighborhoods, which rose to 29.9% in 2010 (a 38.5% increase). Taken together, the poverty, income and educational attainment metrics suggest that university neighborhoods possess a greater share of students and other university-affiliated households—a logical assumption in many college communities.

When it comes to diversity, the descriptive statistics indicate that university target neighborhoods had more diverse populations than their non-target counterparts in 1990. However, by 2010, the racial composition was nearly equal, with university target neighborhoods reporting moderate declines in the proportion of African American residents (14.0% loss) and non-target neighborhoods showing similarly moderate gains (23.3% increase). Real population means also increased slightly for both university target and non-target neighborhoods.
The most dramatic difference between university target and non-target neighborhoods, however, unfolds in the real estate market via median rents and home values. For both tenure types, university target neighborhoods increased in value at nearly double the rate of non-university target neighborhoods. In 1990, the average rental price spread between neighborhood types was nearly $80, with university target and non-target neighborhoods charging $776 and $855, respectively. Twenty years later, the difference narrowed to $20—rents in university target neighborhoods increased by 15.0% to $892, while non-target neighborhoods increased only 6.4% to $910. The gap was more significant for median home values. The two neighborhood types had relatively equal median home values in 1990—$153,205 for university target and $162,791 for non-target neighborhoods; in 2010, median home values in non-target neighborhoods had grown by 38.7% to $225,819, while university target neighborhood values appreciated more than $130,000 to $285,082 (86.1% increase). The remaining sections use cross tabulations to examine these housing market changes between target and non-target neighborhoods, in order to see if the structural patterns hold and to gain greater insight into the effect of university interventions.
### Table 4.1 Descriptive mean statistics: Neighborhood changes for target and non-target neighborhoods, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>University Neighborhoods (target)</th>
<th>Other Neighborhoods (non-target)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population, mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>3,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% African American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with BA or more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($2010, nearest $100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$39,011</td>
<td>$38,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Below Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent ($2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$776</td>
<td>$892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Home Value ($2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$153,205</td>
<td>$285,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner-occupied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2.1 Median Home Value: Neighborhood Outcomes, 1990 to 2010

When grouped by relative median home value (low, medium, high), the sample neighborhoods illustrate the moderate stability of place over time (Table 4.2). In all three categories, the majority of neighborhoods remained in the same value category in 2010 as in 1990. For instance, 77.8% of 1990 high-value neighborhoods were also high-value in 2010; 20.5% of 1990 high-value neighborhoods fell into the medium-value category two decades later and only 1.7% transitioned to the low-value category. Neighborhoods with low median home values in 1990 were the most likely to move into another category by 2010. The majority remained low-value (57.9%). However, nearly one-third (32.8%) of 1990 low-value neighborhoods had become medium-value...
neighborhoods by 2010; another 9.3% realized enough appreciation to transition to the high-value category, suggesting a fundamental change in the neighborhood.

Table 4.2 Cross tabulation: Median home value by category (low, medium, high), 1990 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cross tabulation of median home value categories with the variable of interest, the presence or absence of a university intervention in a given neighborhood, begins to explain the outcomes of university revitalization efforts relative to other neighborhoods. Using 1990 as a baseline, nearly half of all university interventions occurred in low-value neighborhoods (48.1%) (Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3). By comparison, the distribution of neighborhoods without university investments was skewed towards higher value neighborhoods—nearly three-quarters of all non-target neighborhoods were medium or high value (71.5%). However, twenty years later, neighborhoods receiving university investment showed a substantial upward trend. By 2010, the proportion of university target neighborhoods in the low-value category had fallen by two-thirds to 18.2%—now lower than the share of non-target neighborhoods (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.4). Similarly, the number of target neighborhoods in the medium-value category doubled (41.9%, compared to 21.0% in 1990). Rather than trailing non-target neighborhoods, target
neighborhoods claimed a slightly higher proportion of both the medium and high value
categories by 2010.

Figure 4.3 1990 distribution of university target and non-target neighborhoods by value category, home value

Table 4.3 Cross tabulation: 1990 median home value by category (low, medium, high) and university target variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University Target?</th>
<th>1990 Low</th>
<th>1990 Medium</th>
<th>1990 High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5352</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 Cross tabulation: 1990 median home value by category (low, medium, high) and university target variable
The distribution of target and non-target neighborhoods over time demonstrates the divergent patterns between the two groups (Figure 4.5). In each value category, the neighborhoods without university intervention showed modest changes between 1990 and 2010—the share of low-value neighborhoods fell by 22.9%, medium-value neighborhoods increased by 14.5%, and high-value neighborhoods remained stable (1.2% decline). Conversely, neighborhoods receiving university investment magnified each of these trends—the proportion of low-value neighborhoods decreased by 64.4%, while medium and high-value neighborhood climbed by 88.6% and 21.5%, respectively.
Isolating university target neighborhoods from the remainder of non-target neighborhoods revealed substantially more movement between home value categories during the 1990 to 2010 period (Table 4.5). While neighborhoods across all cities were relatively stable, median home values in neighborhoods receiving university intervention trended strongly upwards and were more likely to move into a higher home value category (low to medium, medium to high). For instance, in 1990, ninety-two neighborhoods in university target areas were low value. By 2010, only twenty-seven neighborhoods (29.3%) remained in that category, while forty-nine neighborhoods (53.3%) shifted into the medium-value category and sixteen (17.4%) became high-value. 1990 neighborhoods in the medium-value category also experienced substantial appreciation—45.2% remained stable, while 40.5% moved into
the high-value category. High-value university target neighborhoods mirrored the overall trend for all neighborhoods—71.9% of 1990 neighborhoods retained their high value position and less than one-quarter (23.6%) fell into the medium-value category by 2010.

Table 4.5 Cross tabulation: Median home value by category (low, medium, high), university neighborhoods alone, 1990 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Median Rent Value: Neighborhood Outcomes, 1990 to 2010

While median home values exhibited stability and moderate growth between 1990 and 2010, median rents across the entire sample showed considerably more appreciation (Table 4.6). The vast majority of high rent neighborhoods (86.7%) remained in that category throughout the study period. The majority of medium rent neighborhoods (55.1%) also held steady between 1990 and 2010; however, an additional 43.9% had shifted into the high rent category by 2010. The low rent category showed the most variation: between 1990 and 2010, 49.9% of 1990 low-value neighborhoods transitioned to the medium-value category; an additional 21.4% moved into the high rent category.
Less than one-third of 1990 low rent neighborhoods remained in the low-rent category by 2010.

Table 4.6 Cross tabulation: Median rent value by category (low, medium, high), 1990 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>3235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In home values, more than three-quarters of university interventions occurred in low- or high-value neighborhoods. The trend is different for the median rent categories. The majority of university interventions (63.8%) took place in neighborhoods with medium-value rents during 1990 (Figure 4.6 and Table 4.7); only 21.9% of university target neighborhoods were classified as low-value in 1990 and fewer (14.3%) were high rent. Over the course of the next two decades, neighborhood rents within university target areas shifted dramatically upwards. By 2010, the share of medium-value university target neighborhoods had fallen twenty percentage points to 43.1%, as did the proportion of low-rent target neighborhoods, decreasing by half to 9.1% (Figure 4.7 and Table 4.8). Conversely, high-value target neighborhoods increased sharply, rising to 47.8%.
Figure 4.6 1990 distribution of university target and non-target neighborhoods by value category, rent value

Table 4.7 Cross tabulation: 1990 median rent by category (low, medium, high) and university target variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University Target?</th>
<th>Low #</th>
<th>Low %</th>
<th>Medium #</th>
<th>Medium %</th>
<th>High #</th>
<th>High %</th>
<th>Total #</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>5142</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.7 2010 distribution of university target and non-target neighborhoods by value category, rent value

99
Table 4.8 Cross tabulation: 2010 median rent by category (low, medium, high) and university target variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University Target?</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2113</td>
<td>2775</td>
<td>5026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2203</td>
<td>2875</td>
<td>5235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike median home values, the median rent distribution of target and non-target neighborhoods shows similarities between the groups—with one very notable exception (Figure 4.8). In the low- and medium-value rent categories, all neighborhoods demonstrated declining trends of similar strength. Consistent with national rental trends between 1990 and 2010, neighborhood rents appreciated and suggested a tightening of supply, irrespective of the target variable. Low-rent neighborhoods declined between 58.7% and 67.1%, while the share of medium-rent neighborhoods fell by 32.6% to 32.8%. The high-rent category, however, showed substantial divergence between university target and non-target neighborhoods. While the proportion of high-rent neighborhoods without a university intervention increased by 75%, university target neighborhoods surpassed this figure with a 233% gain between 1990 and 2010.
When university target neighborhoods are evaluated apart from non-target neighborhoods tracts, they confirmed the strong upward trend (Table 4.9). By 2010, more than 60% of low rent 1990 neighborhoods receiving university intervention had transitioned into medium (42.2%) or high (20.0%) rent categories. Meanwhile, the majority of medium rent 1990 neighborhoods (50.7%) remained in the medium category, although 47.8% had shifted into the high rent group by 2010. Last, nearly all of high rent tracts (90.0%) remained stable between 1990 and 2010.
Table 4.9 Cross tabulation: Median rent by category (low, medium, high), university neighborhoods alone, 1990 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>1990 (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3 University by University: Mixed Neighborhoods, Mixed Patterns

The analysis of university target neighborhoods illustrates clear upward momentum in home values and rents during the twenty-year study period. Using the relative expense of living in a neighborhood as a proxy, the neighborhood outcomes analysis demonstrates that university investments did change a neighborhood’s trajectory and induce “improvement.” It is also worth noting, however, these results are in aggregate, which suppresses neighborhood variation at the university level. Consistent with most place-based interventions, the individual interventions show considerably more variation in the types of neighborhoods they address, as well as more nuanced outcomes.

At the institutional level, most university target areas included a mix of 1990 home value classifications and there was no clear pattern (Table 4.10). Some university intervention areas were comprised of majority low- and medium-value neighborhoods in 1990—for example, Duke University and Ohio State University. Other universities
focused on both low- and high-value neighborhoods, such as Northeastern University, or were fairly well distributed across all three categories, like University of Cincinnati. By 2010, nearly all universities (seventy-seven percent) saw a positive shift in their neighborhood distribution with significantly fewer neighborhoods in the low-value category and corresponding gains in the medium and/or high value categories. Five universities experienced declining trends, as indicated in the “no improvement” section. In these cases, the institutions either saw modest downward shifts in the share of neighborhoods across home value categories or did not see any improvement at all.

Interestingly, the University of Chicago falls into this sub-category, showing a declining trend across its eight neighborhoods between 1990 and 2010. However, the 2010 snapshot does not account for the recent investments described at the beginning of the chapter—the first development projects were completed in the fall of 2013. Based on visual evidence, the University of Chicago’s investments have likely generated upward momentum for many of their neighborhoods in the post-2010 period. This example underlines the fluid nature of this work, particularly for real estate-focused strategies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University Name</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STONG IMPROVEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland State</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCincinnati</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ullinois-Chicago</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USouth Florida-StPete</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisconsin-Milwaukee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWashington-Tacoma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE OR MIXED IMPROVEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Western</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPenn</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMass-Boston</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widener</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With respect to rents, university target areas were mostly likely to include medium rent neighborhoods in 1990 (Table 4.11)—Case Western Reserve University, Syracuse University, and Yale, for example. A smaller number of universities had a significant number of low-rent neighborhoods, such as Duke University or University of Illinois at Chicago; even fewer claimed more than a few high-rent neighborhoods, such as Emory University or University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. By 2010, the majority of neighborhoods within university intervention zones had appreciated in rent value, with eighteen of twenty-two universities (eighty-two percent) claiming a greater share of high-rent neighborhoods than they did in 1990. More than three-quarters of universities (seventy-seven percent) observed strong upwards trends in their neighborhoods, possessing a greater share of medium- and/or high-rent neighborhoods in 2010. Three universities saw moderate or mixed trends with either an increase in low- and decrease in high-rent categories or modest upward shifts. One university—University of
Chicago—experienced a downward trend, although it was a minor change with one tract moving from the high rent category in 1990 to the medium rent category by 2010; another university—Portland State University—realized no change in its rent distribution.

Table 4.11 University neighborhoods: Median rent by category (low, medium, high) in 1990 and 2010

| University Name       | 1990       | 2010       |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|-----------------------|------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                       | Low | Medium | High | Total | Low | Medium | High | Total |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| STRONG IMPROVEMENT    |     |         |      |       |     |         |      |       |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Case Western          | 1   | 5       | 0    | 6     | 0   | 5       | 1    | 6     | 17% | 83% | 0% | 0% | 83% | 17% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Duke                  | 4   | 6       | 0    | 10    | 0   | 6       | 3    | 9     | 40% | 60% | 0% | 0% | 67% | 33% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Emory                 | 0   | 8       | 4    | 12    | 0   | 2       | 10   | 12    | 0% | 67% | 33% | 0% | 17% | 83% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Harvard               | 0   | 1       | 2    | 3     | 0   | 1       | 2    | 3     | 0% | 33% | 67% | 0% | 33% | 67% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Northeastern          | 8   | 15      | 4    | 27    | 8   | 8       | 11   | 27    | 30% | 56% | 15% | 30% | 30% | 41% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Ohio State            | 2   | 11      | 0    | 13    | 0   | 6       | 7    | 13    | 15% | 85% | 0% | 0% | 46% | 54% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Rutgers               | 4   | 8       | 2    | 14    | 2   | 6       | 6    | 14    | 29% | 57% | 14% | 14% | 43% | 43% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Syracuse              | 1   | 4       | 0    | 5     | 0   | 2       | 3    | 5     | 20% | 80% | 0% | 0% | 40% | 60% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| UAkron                | 1   | 4       | 0    | 5     | 0   | 3       | 2    | 5     | 20% | 80% | 0% | 0% | 60% | 40% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| UCincinnati           | 3   | 13      | 0    | 16    | 0   | 9       | 7    | 16    | 19% | 81% | 0% | 0% | 56% | 44% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Ullinois-Chicago      | 13  | 6       | 5    | 24    | 4   | 6       | 14   | 24    | 54% | 25% | 21% | 17% | 25% | 58% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| UMass-Boston          | 0   | 2       | 1    | 3     | 0   | 2       | 1    | 3     | 0% | 67% | 33% | 0% | 67% | 33% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| UPenn                 | 1   | 11      | 1    | 13    | 0   | 8       | 5    | 13    | 8%  | 85% | 8%  | 0% | 62% | 38% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| USouth Florida-StPete | 2   | 1       | 0    | 3     | 1   | 2       | 0    | 3     | 67% | 33% | 0% | 33% | 67% | 0% |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
4.2.4 Regression Models: Predicting Home Value and Rent Ratios

The results of the cross tabulation analysis demonstrate an association between university interventions and categorical median home and rent values. Within two decades, university target neighborhoods saw substantially more upward momentum than non-target neighborhoods, amplifying the more moderate growth across the entire sample. But how much did university interventions boost median home and rent values? To investigate the role of university interventions in neighborhood change, the final test used regression models. Specifically, the models attempt to discover if the presence of an intervention helps to explain changes in a neighborhood’s median home value or rent ratios between 1990 and 2010.
The models are lean, focusing on two predictor variables (Figure 4.9). In both models, the outcome variable is the 2010 home value or rent ratio from the earlier analysis—once again, an expression of the neighborhood value relative to the city’s median value. The first predictor variable is the 1990 median home value or rent ratio and controls for neighborhood durability—if we know something about the neighborhood’s 1990 status, we can develop a reasonable expectation for its condition ten years later. The second predictor represents the variable of interest—a dummy variable indicating the presence (or absence) of a university intervention in the neighborhood. In both cases, the models test whether university investment in target neighborhoods is associated with relative gains in median home value or rents as compared to neighborhoods without a specific university intervention. Based on the cross tabulation analysis, the expectation is that university target neighborhoods will produce statistically significant neighborhood changes for both home values and rents.

*Figure 4.9 Regression models: Median home value and median rent ratios*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \epsilon$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Model 1** Median Home Value Ratio Model | $y_i = 2010$ Median Home Value Ratio  
$x_1 = 1990$ Median Home Value Ratio  
$x_2 = University Intervention (dummy variable)$ |
| **Model 2** Median Rent Ratio Model | $y_i = 2010$ Median Rent Ratio  
$x_1 = 1990$ Median Rent Ratio  
$x_2 = University Intervention (dummy variable)$ |

Table 4.12 presents the regression results for median home value and rent ratios. Estimates from Model 1 confirm that university neighborhoods do experience
neighborhood change differently with respect to median home values. First, the model establishes a trend line between the 1990 and 2010 median home value ratios ($\beta = 0.751^{**}$), confirming relative neighborhood durability over time. However, the presence of a university intervention alters the trend line, boosting the estimate of the 2010 median home value ratio by twenty percent. In short, Model 1 confirms that university investments in revitalization amplify the home values in target neighborhoods in a way that differs from home value trajectories in non-target neighborhoods.

Table 4.12 Summary of regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 2010 Median Home Value Ratio ($\beta$)</th>
<th>Model 2 2010 Median Rent Ratio ($\beta$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 Median Value Ratio (home, rent)</td>
<td>0.751**</td>
<td>.672**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University intervention (dummy)</td>
<td>0.201**</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.322**</td>
<td>0.598**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $r^2$</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample N</td>
<td>5245</td>
<td>5235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $p \leq 0.01$

Conversely, the estimates for Model 2 do not predict a statistically significant change in relative rents for target neighborhoods. While the rent model does establish a slightly weaker trend line between 1990 and 2010 median rent ratios ($\beta = 0.672^{**}$), it does not find a statistically significant association between a university target neighborhood and relative rent change. Despite changes in distribution patterns in the cross tabulation analysis, a university’s intervention did not account for a different experience of relative median rents between 1990 and 2010.
4.2.5 Summary: University Neighborhood Outcomes, 1990 to 2010

Between 1990 and 2010, the overall trend for neighborhoods in the sample was one of appreciation, though it varied some across tenure types. For homeowners, the majority of neighborhoods were stable between 1990 and 2010 and, relative to their city median home value, they did not shift into a different category (low, medium, or high). In contrast, renters were much more likely to see an increase in their relative rents. Over the course of twenty years, the majority of neighborhoods moved into a higher rent category—two-thirds of low rent neighborhoods became medium or high rent and more than forty percent of medium rent tracts shifted into the high rent category.

In neighborhoods receiving some type of university intervention, the trends also leaned towards growth, though median home value trends were slightly different than median rents. University investments occurred most frequently in neighborhoods with low (48.1%) or high (31.0%) home values, but their rents were most frequently in the medium category (63.8%). By 2010, more than 80% of all university target neighborhoods were in the medium or high categories with respect to both home value (81.8%) and rents (90.9%).

As compared to non-target neighborhoods, university-targeted neighborhoods were more likely to have low median home values, but they were also much more likely to shift into a higher value category by 2010. On the rent side, neighborhoods with university interventions were playing catch up with neighborhoods that did not: in 1990, university target areas had a higher proportion of low rent neighborhoods and a much lower percentage of high rent neighborhoods. By 2010, neighborhoods located in
university target zones had moved significantly upward and were nearly equal (if not slightly better than) to their counterparts without university intervention. At the level of an individual institution, most universities saw their target neighborhoods make positive categorical shifts in the median home values and rents, though there were a few instances of modest decline or no change.

The regression models confirm the real impact of university interventions on neighborhoods. While the presence of a university intervention in a neighborhood did not predict higher relative rents in 2010, it did estimate a twenty percent increase in the median value of homes relative to the host city. These findings convey two things.

On the homeownership side, the estimates validate the assumptions of hedonic pricing models by underscoring the price contribution of amenities to home value. As Chapter 3 describes, universities are principally using redevelopment tools to catalyze revitalization. They are investing in mixed-uses, bringing new retail, restaurants, entertainment, and apartments to their neighborhoods. And, through these amenities, they are generating new demand for place. Despite the fact that few institutions pursue any kind of homeownership or housing rehabilitation interventions directly, the model estimate predicts greater changes for relative home values, confirming the amenity value of a vibrant urban “college neighborhood.”

On the rent side, the regression model did not support a statistically significant difference between target and non-target neighborhoods. While universities are adding new units to the market, either directly or indirectly through private spinoff projects, their investments are not causing rents to rise—not consistently—relative to the non-
target rents. What does this mean? For renters, at least, it calls into question arguments of gentrification. While some university neighborhoods may be experiencing displacement through rent increases, the evidence does not support this outcome as a widespread policy issue.

The critical contribution of this model is to understand the salutary effect of university investments on neighborhood improvement. These initial “lean” models provide a fundamental basis for confirming that university interventions do alter their neighborhood trajectories, yet they also introduce a host of inquiries for future research. For instance, Model 1 demonstrates a measurable increase in the estimates for relative median home values over twenty years, but what effects do the interventions have on residential mobility and household incomes? Are existing homeowners able to cash out of (or stay in) the neighborhood with positive equity gains? Or are they experiencing housing cost burdens due to increased tax assessments?

The questions are murkier for rents. Model 2 is not indicating predictable differences in rents for university neighborhoods, but how are target neighborhoods accounting for growing student populations and new multi-family developments? Is there greater pressure on the rental stock, which stimulates an outward movement of non-university renters? This scenario is unlikely because rental units are commodity goods and, thus, sensitive to demand pricing. In a more likely scenario, an influx of units aimed at a growing student population could be inducing preference-based moves, as students change the residential culture of the neighborhood. Future mixed methods
research could begin to account for home value, rent, and population trends, developing a clearer picture of change.

4.3 Conclusion

Across university leaders and advocates, there is a consensus that the fortunes of anchor institutions are tied, at least in part, to those of their neighborhoods. Institutional assets are rooted and, thus, subject to the same market forces as the adjacent properties. University constituents—faculty, staff, students, and visitors—depend on the neighborhood for housing and commercial amenities. And, as much as a neighborhood derives some sense of identity from the university—the urban equivalent of a “college town,” a university increasingly extracts its institutional identity from its surrounds. Under this pretext, universities face mounting demands to establish porous boundaries with the neighborhood, fostering a “sense of place” in both town and gown to support institutional stability.

This neighborhood outcomes analysis constitutes the first evaluation of the neighborhood-level impacts of university interventions. It is a critical step forward in understanding the benefits, as well as the risks and opportunities, of anchor-led investments in neighborhood revitalization. The study highlights two major findings, in addition to illuminating future pathways for university-neighborhood revitalization research.

First, the review of neighborhood changes between 1990 and 2010 offers substantial evidence that neighborhoods targeted for university intervention are
changing (and improving) in ways that are statistically significant from their counterparts. University target neighborhoods are experiencing greater upward momentum in housing costs than non-target neighborhoods in their host counties and their improvement extends beyond what one might expect given citywide growth trends. Further, regression models predict that the presence of a university intervention adds twenty percent to the 2010 home value ratio.

Second, consistent with this chapter’s hypothesis, the strong market changes support the idea that university preference for physical investments—real estate projects and corridor enhancements—are driving change. The influx of new investment capital stimulates corresponding increases in the residential property market. The initial descriptive statistics do not give the impression that the underlying neighborhood population is improving, so much as bifurcating. Amenity rich university neighborhoods appear to be increasing the off-campus student population, as indicated by the growing educational attainment rates and declining economic statistics (i.e., poverty, median household incomes), while also attracting middle- and upper-class professionals and families who can afford more expensive housing choices. Collectively, these observations point to the million-dollar question for university interventions—who benefits from university interventions in neighborhoods? And, perhaps more importantly, who does not?

The remaining chapters begin to broach these questions through case studies of three universities: the University of Pennsylvania, University of Cincinnati, and Duke University. Collectively, the case studies exemplify the core findings from Chapter 3 and
4, representing the “typical” large research institution with “typical” intervention strategies and strong neighborhood improvement outcomes. On the issue of context and partnerships, however, each institution is different. The case studies offer an in-depth look at the role of context and communities on the ground. Each case considers the ways a university defined the town-gown “problem” and explores the “solutions” the university employed in response. Subsequently, each study dissects the neighborhood outcomes of the intervention with quantitative and qualitative metrics.
CHAPTER 5. “IN FOR A PENNY, IN FOR A POUND”: THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY CITY, AND THE WEST PHILADELPHIA INITIATIVES

5.1 Introduction to the Case Studies

The national evidence, as conveyed by the survey (Chapter 3) and outcomes analysis (Chapter 4), supports that universities are not only investing in revitalization, but their efforts are improving neighborhoods. Whereas universities spent much of the 20th century believing urban neighborhoods were a threat to their academic enclaves, institutional leaders now recognize the opportunity to shape their environs into amenity-rich assets. The national survey illustrated how large universities are redirecting their expertise as facilities managers and developers to catalyze private development outside of the campus. Relying on attraction strategies, these developments often target consumer demands for apartments, retail, dining and entertainment, while cultivating a vibrant “college town” brand.

The neighborhood outcomes analysis (Chapter 4) demonstrates that these interventions are realizing their intended effect, catalyzing change in neighborhoods. Although target neighborhoods were more likely to fall into low value categories in 1990, they had caught up to non-target neighborhoods by 2010. For both median home value and rent ratios, target neighborhoods showed substantially more upward momentum in the value distribution patterns over a twenty-year period relative to their
non-target counterparts. Better yet, the presence of a university intervention predicted a twenty percent increase in a neighborhood’s relative 2010 median home value ratio.

These national patterns are important for understanding the anchor institution landscape and gaining a comprehensive perspective of how universities are interceding in urban neighborhoods. Yet, they cannot account for the dynamism of neighborhoods or the institutional factors that might shift a strategy from sufficient to exemplary or an outcome from improved to equitable. Thus, the remaining chapters of this dissertation present case studies, evaluating three different “typical” approaches to neighborhood revitalization. The cases include the University of Pennsylvania (Chapter 5), University of Cincinnati (Chapter 6), and Duke University (Chapter 7).

Through the case studies, the dissertation aims to assess the role of community and context in a university’s approach to neighborhood revitalization, as well as its impact on a community’s experience of the intervention. It used a collective case study method to select each university. The intent was to identify cases that exemplified the norm, as defined by the evidence in Chapter 3 and 4. Thus, eligible cases were comprised of large research institutions that invested in a multi-initiative, pro-development revitalization strategy with successful outcomes, as determined by Chapter 4. In addition, the final selections also needed to illustrate different degrees and/or styles of engagement with its community, which would become the fulcrum to examine the research question.

The differentiating attribute for the case selection was the institution’s approach to community and/or partnerships. The operating hypothesis was that interventions
with higher degrees of direct community involvement and/or representation would result in greater community benefit and experiences, beyond the market-based outcomes. The researcher selected cases that, when arrayed on a spectrum, denoted three different approaches. The University of Pennsylvania comprised a limited approach to community involvement, with no significant community outreach mechanisms or partnerships. The University of Cincinnati represented a moderate approach, which rested on the creation of community development corporations (CDC) to implement its revitalization investments. The CDCs created a formal mechanism for community partnerships, but did not actively engender broad community involvement. And Duke University embodied an extensive approach to community involvement. It placed itself in a supporting role to achieve its revitalization goals, electing to design a strategy around neighborhood priorities and provide human and capital resources to non-profit representatives in lieu of an institutionally led intervention. Through independent and collective examination, the case studies help identify the various context-based factors that can inform how a university responds to its neighborhood, but also the critical decision points for universities as they seek to satisfy their own place-based needs.
5.2 Introduction: The Story of the University of Pennsylvania

When the University of Pennsylvania’s leaders began investing in its University City neighborhoods (a subset of West Philadelphia) in the mid-1990s, they were motivated by necessity. As had happened in the 1950s, the threat of violence against Penn’s students and employees precipitated the need for swift, visible action—the university had to “get control of a landscape that felt almost out of control” (Sorrentino 2015). Although Penn’s mission placed value on practical education and academic engagement with Philadelphia’s communities, it did not have robust physical ties to the adjacent neighborhood. Its institutional identity stopped at the campus’s western edge, creating an invisible wall that students were advised not to wander past. Yet, this intangible barrier did not buffer Penn from the effects of urban decline and, in time, Penn’s leaders elected to intervene. They did so first “through better enhanced safety and priming the pump economically. [Penn had to] demonstrate to the market that we weren’t going anywhere. We were dug in and we were invested. We were going to anchor this [neighborhood] and put our own money on the table. [It] was a gamble and it might not have worked” (Sorrentino 2015).

Penn’s neighborhood revitalization intervention used a limited approach to community involvement and/or partnerships. West Philadelphia’s weak community development infrastructure and widespread neighborhood distress in Philadelphia inhibited Penn’s ability to form extensive partnerships around revitalization. The depressed neighborhood conditions also suppressed interest from other investors, leaving the neighborhood an uncontested territory for a resource-rich developer willing
to take the risk. Thus, when Penn moved forward alone, its efforts were largely unchallenged and it invested in several integrated strategies to induce catalytic change. Its aim was to not only quickly solve core problems, including public safety and a depressed real estate market, but also transform University City into a distinct place that could enhance Penn’s brand. To re-establish the neighborhood as an asset, university leaders leveraged Penn’s extensive campus development experience to invest in real estate interventions. While a few well-organized community groups—principally made up of Penn faculty and staff—informed the process through unsolicited reports and recommendations, the neighborhood’s contribution to the intervention was limited.

As one of the first major university-led revitalization initiatives of its kind, Penn has informed the way scholars define university-community engagement. In the years since its strategic intervention, Penn has used major redevelopment projects to cultivate a vibrant brand for University City. It has merged its institutional identity with that of its urban neighborhood, adopting the mutual dependence of anchor and place. And it has solidified its economic commitment to the region by stabilizing its neighborhood and, thereby, increasing its ability to attract new residents (and consumers) into Philadelphia, in addition to strengthening its position as a premier educational and research institution. Today, Penn is the largest private employer in Philadelphia and the second largest in Pennsylvania; in 2010, it employed more than 31,000 and contributed $2.3 billion in annual payroll (Econsult Corporation 2011). In a given year, Penn educates more than 20,000 students and received a record-breaking 37,267 undergraduate applications for the 2015-2016 academic year.
However, despite its gold-standard treatment in the anchor institution literature, Penn’s approach has not been able to reverse all signs of decline in University City. Its economic inclusion programs have not lived up to their full potential as community wealth building tools. Where poverty rates have decreased, the demographic changes suggest it was due to residential turnover. Penn’s investments in real estate and a high quality public school have altered the ecology of the neighborhood. They have attracted new families to University City and stimulated demand beyond the school’s enrollment capacity; meanwhile housing prices have appreciated steeply and the neighborhood has become inaccessible to some. The university’s core emphasis on “place making” has enabled middle-class values to flourish in University City, with few strategies for protecting the demographic and economic diversity of the area. In other words, Penn’s transformative intervention appears to have elevated the neighborhood brand without fulfilling the community-level potential described by anchor institution scholars.

5.3 History

The University of Pennsylvania is the nation’s first university, founded by Benjamin Franklin to provide a practical, secular education to the young men of Philadelphia. The institution’s founding began with Benjamin Franklin’s proposal to establish a college for local youth, which he circulated in a pamphlet titled *Proposals for the Education of Youth in Pensilvania* in 1749 (Friedman 1996). As Thomas writes in *Building America’s First University*, Franklin’s vision was for “an academy that would train leaders for the growing city and in turn lead to the demand for a college of the sort already established
in New England and Virginia” (Thomas and Brownlee 2000, p 26). It would emphasize modern languages and applied subjects for business and commerce, departing from the Latin and religious traditions of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and the College of William and Mary. In 1751, Franklin and his newly convened board of trustees opened the Public Academy of Philadelphia in an unfinished hall at Arch and 4th Streets, situated in the city center. A few years later, in 1755, the College of Philadelphia was chartered and appended to the Academy.

In 1779, in the midst of the American Revolution, the state of Pennsylvania revoked the charters for the Academy and College, reissuing a new charter for the University of the State of Pennsylvania—the first university in the United States (Friedman 1996). The institution would change once again in 1791, when it officially became a private university known as the University of Pennsylvania. The campus moved to another location in the bustling city center in 1802, where it remained for the next several decades.

By the late nineteenth century, enrollments and curriculums were expanding and Penn had outgrown both its campus and the increasingly urbanized Center City (University of Pennsylvania 2013). To escape the “evils of the city,” Penn looked across the Schuylkill River to West Philadelphia, where it resettled on a bucolic ten-acre campus (Thomas and Brownlee 2000). The university trustees oversaw the construction of College Hall, Medical Hall, and the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, all American Gothic buildings set within green space. By 1900, the campus spanned fifty acres and thirty buildings, including new academic facilities, multiple dormitories, a
dining and recreation hall, a new library, a museum, a power plant and laundry, and buildings for the new Veterinary, Dental, and Engineering departments (University of Pennsylvania 2013). Collectively, these buildings marked the first wave of growth for Penn, solidifying its research reputation. It remained, however, a primarily commuter campus, drawing its students from across Philadelphia and its suburbs (O'Mara 2005).

The intervening period between World War I and the Great Depression slowed Penn’s expansion (Thomas and Brownlee 2000). However, World War II soon sparked a second wave of growth—dubbed the Great Expansion (Puckett and Lloyd 2015), as the university became a major research contributor to the war efforts. Under the leadership of President Gaylord P. Harnwell, Penn transformed from “a ‘sleepy’ commuter campus with a regional orientation to a residential campus with a geographically diverse student body; from an institution landlocked by an increasingly congested urban environment to a tree-lined, pedestrian enclave with closed streets and quadrangles, buffered if not protected from the encroaching city” (Puckett and Lloyd 2015, p 25).

As veterans returned home, the GI Bill taxed Penn’s enrollment capacity and the landlocked university faced expansion challenges. It found a solution in the Urban Renewal Act. Between 1950 and 1970, Penn expanded dramatically to the west, focusing on consolidating its campus within the area bordered by Spruce to Walnut Streets and 34th to 40th Streets (Duffin 2015). The university vacated portions of Locust Street and Woodland Avenue to create a pedestrian promenade and establish a new spine for the campus, acquired and demolished several blocks of rowhomes and small commercial storefronts to accommodate new academic and administrative buildings,
and cleared streetcar-era Victorian homes to construct new high rise dormitories and green spaces (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). In the process, Penn and its partner, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (RDA), cleared several blocks along Walnut Street, only to have them lie fallow for decades as parking lots. These underutilized swaths of land, in particular, would become contentious during subsequent decades, as they attracted criminal activity and played a key role in Penn’s early revitalization strategy.

Between 1954 and 1964, Harnwell’s achievements included the completion of forty-five major construction projects (Cohen 1998); by the close of his presidency, Penn and the RDA had redeveloped nearly 165 acres of land and largely insulated the institution from the chaotic fabric of the city (Rodin 2007). The most divisive effort took place in urban renewal “Unit 3,” where Penn, the RDA, and several institutional partners banded together to demolish more than twenty blocks of residential and commercial properties to the north of Penn’s core campus (Rodin 2007). The clearance of Unit 3, better known to the community as Black Bottom, a predominately African American neighborhood, made way for the University City Science Center (UCSC), the nation’s first and largest urban research park. It also sparked bitter protests from both the neighborhood and Penn students and faculty.

The most visible of these protests was a February 1969 sit-in in College Hall. At this point, the neighborhood had already suffered through demolition and the UCSC was complete, but many recognized an opportunity for Penn to right some of its wrongs through future actions. As Puckett and Lloyd write, the protestors rallied around three
demands: “(1) a transfer of UCSC land to Renewal Housing, Inc., an African American nonprofit, which would build low-income housing on Unit 3; (2) development of a fund for low-income housing by trustees; and (3) revision of the UCSC charter to ban classified military research” (2015, p 128).

After six days, the student leaders and trustees came to an agreement; the Executive Board of the Trustees approved the creation of a “Quadripartite Commission,” which would serve as a review body and ensure university development did not overrun community development needs. The commission was comprised of students, faculty, university administrators, and—importantly—representatives from West Philadelphia’s African American community. Unfortunately, the commission was fractured by internal tensions and, as a result, short-lived. By October 1970, the commission had disintegrated and, shortly thereafter, the Great Expansion era ended, shunted by the energy crisis and financial constraints of the 1970s, as well as the waning popularity of urban renewal. While the commission represented a false start for university-community development, it hinted at a new approach to town-gown engagement.

5.4 Investing in Place: The West Philadelphia Initiatives

Penn’s commitment to University City, as the story is often told, begins in the mid-1990s with the murders of two members of the Penn community—a graduate student assaulted at a payphone in August 1994 and a research associate stabbed on Halloween night in 1996 (Rodin 2007; Rodin 2005). These events occurred shortly after Judith Rodin, a native West Philadelphian and Penn graduate, returned home to become
Penn’s first female president. The violence was part of a disturbing trend and the murders brought university tensions to a head. During Family Weekend of 1996, Rodin was practically booed off the stage by a crowd of angry parents, some of who threatened to pull their children out of the school.

The Rodin administration followed these contentious events with a broad assessment of its options for the university’s future. It evaluated a range of solutions from pulling up Penn’s roots and retreating to the university’s property in pastoral Valley Forge to building a fortress around the institution, establishing a bright, impenetrable line between town and gown (Rodin 2007; O’Mara 2005; Kromer and Kerman 2005). Yet, from these dire circumstances, Penn made the difficult—but civic-minded—choice to remain in West Philadelphia and invest in neighborhood revitalization within University City. Rodin and her team dug in their heels and launched a comprehensive revitalization initiative intended to transform campus and community alike—a phoenix rising from the ashes of urban disinvestment.

While this timeline of events is true, it is a shorthand version of a much longer history (Puckett 2015; Harkavy 2015). While Penn’s decisions are often compressed into the heroic, visionary tale of an institution catalyzing neighborhood-wide change, the West Philadelphia Initiatives (WPI) were built on building blocks put into place by previous administrations. The extended version of Penn’s revitalization work begins with Sheldon Hackney’s leadership during the 1980s.
5.4.1 The Hackney Administration: Sowing the Seeds of Revitalization

Hackney became Penn’s president in 1981 (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). He followed in the footsteps of Martin Meyerson, whose presidential legacy was defined by financial difficulties, largely related to the energy and inflation crises of the 1970s—“Penn was broke. It was running into big time budget deficits and it was overbuilt like a lot of the universities” (Puckett 2015). Its relationship with the community was not in much better shape. In the wake of the tumultuous Urban Renewal Era, as well as the midst of serious budgetary constraints, Meyerson focused his attention inward. He promulgated a “One University” philosophy, which sought to consolidate Penn into a single scholarly community and rectify the physical and intellectual fragmentation that occurred during the Post-WWII expansion boom (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). Meanwhile, the neighborhood was deteriorating, the crime rate was accelerating, and “you’ve got the community relations director at Penn say[ing] there are no community relations” (Puckett 2015).

When Hackney arrived at Penn in 1981, the neighborhood was embroiled in a cycle of crime and violence fueled by a crack epidemic. For the Penn community, the crime wave was comprised of assaults, robberies, and general insecurity in the blocks immediately adjacent to the campus (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). A long-time faculty member and scholar of this period “read article after article about how faculty members [were] going to parking lots and finding their cars totaled—smashed windows, smashed windshields, smashed this and that and the other. Parking lots were open sores and, at night, people would be [threatened]... and sometimes in daylight” (Puckett 2015).
Neighbors living through this dark period experienced the crime wave, as well as signs of disinvestment, abandonment, and socioeconomic shifts that were precipitated by “white flight” and the loss of manufacturing jobs. For some, however, the neighborhood still held a certain charm. Interviews with Penn faculty who moved in to University City during this downtrodden period reference the “good bones” of the neighborhood and the camaraderie of neighbors:

“Yes, it was tenuous... it was very, very tenuous... You know, a few years after we moved in, we had to get a security system for the house. We had one or two break-ins before we had the system. You know, you could see the crack vials on the street... [But] I remained a partisan of the neighborhood. And a number of our neighbors, wonderfully, did... We had great, great neighbors and there’s just kind of a sense of commitment to this neighborhood that was very palpable.” (Katz 2013)

Simultaneously, the quality of housing stock and presence of committed, like-minded neighbors was a sign of potential for those residents with a long tenure in University City:

“[E]ven though it was really gritty at the time, at least there was a little thing... I saw at the time, believe it or not, that this place was a rusty thing that needed polishing. And that this was really a place that had a lot of potential. You know, having seen gentrification in [other] neighborhoods take a place that was in rough shape and transform it, I knew that this place had that potential...” (Culhane 2013)

Hackney recognized that the socio-economic pressures on the neighborhood, as well as Penn, were building and there was no mechanism to release it. The collective memory of town-gown interactions was rooted in the hegemonic strategies of Urban Renewal; understandably, there was little love lost between the two camps. Yet, Hackney believed it was necessary to change this dynamic. The Associate Vice President and Director of the Netter Center, who is also a former student and long time faculty
member at Penn, pointed to three factors that motivated Hackney’s interest in Penn’s role in West Philadelphia:

“Sheldon Hackney really did begin, during his presidency, the process... [T]here were a few motives that Sheldon had. One was his vision of the university, [which drew from the concept of One University]. Second, he was facing deep problems in West Philadelphia. And, the third, was an intellectual interest.” (Harkavy 2015)

Over the next twelve years, Hackney instituted a number of initiatives, many of which would become the precursors to Rodin’s later work. Through his efforts, he “began the movement to reintroduce Penn to the stage of national consciousness, laying much of the groundwork to the model of the modern-day urban institution” (Zweifler 2013).

Some of Hackney’s earliest investments in the neighborhood related to crime and safety. As Puckett and Lloyd state, his measures were defensive, not proactive, and the university did not have the financial wherewithal to make a long-term commitment (2015). The approach included a larger, professionalized on-campus police force, additional campus security guards, ID card protocols, an off-campus shuttle service—a forerunner to the present-day Penn Bus, and improved coordination with the Philadelphia Police Department. As the Associate Vice President and Director of the Netter Center recalls, Hackney’s investments were not necessarily popular at the time, nor did they go far enough to address the problem, but they did become a central piece of the WPI several years later: “The increase in police. If you look, he was criticized for it. [But] Judith Rodin increased it and Amy Gutmann increased it more. Hackney made the [initial] $2 million investment, as I recall” (Harkavy 2015).
Hackney also made three critical overtures into town-gown engagement, which signaled an attempt to rebalance the power dynamic of the 1950s and 1960s. First, in 1983, he created the Office of Community-Oriented Policy Studies (OCOPS), which would later spawn the Center for Community Partnerships (CCP), a predecessor to the Netter Center for Community Partnerships (Harkavy et al. 2014; Puckett and Lloyd 2015). The entity represented—and continues to represent—the university’s academic commitment to West Philadelphia through service learning and civic engagement. Since its inception, the center has been wholly sustained by the university and integrated into Penn’s administrative structure (Puckett and Lloyd 2015).

Second, also in 1983, Hackney reconceived of the West Philadelphia Corporation (WPC). The WPC was a non-profit community development corporation created in 1959. Much like the WPI was nearly four decades later, the WPC was born out of tragedy. In April 1958, a Penn graduate student was murdered in Powelton Village while placing a letter in a post office box (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). Though Penn and the City were already deeply entrenched in efforts to rid University City of blight via urban renewal, leaving institutional buildings and parking lots in their wake, they had not yet pursued redevelopment Unit 3’s northern neighborhoods. The murder underlined the urgent threat residing in the “blighted” neighborhoods.

Shortly thereafter, the WPC was created as alliance between several institutional members, including Penn, Drexel Institute of Technology, Presbyterian Hospital, Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science, and the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy, though, as O’Mara points out, it was fundamentally an offshoot of Penn
(and its interests) (2005). For the next several years, the WPC was a cheerleader for urban renewal, promoting a renewed vision for University City. Its crowning achievement was the UCSC development, a model merger of academia and industry.

When Hackney, as Penn’s president, joined the WPC board twenty years later, he saw an opportunity to reverse course. In his estimation, the non-profit corporation was disingenuous and did not claim any representation by the West Philadelphia community (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). This was in step with the community’s perspective, as they protested against UCSC and other WPC endeavors, and, especially West Philadelphia’s African American community, who bore many of the consequences of WPC’s efforts (O’Mara 2005). As Hackney wrote:

“It quickly became apparent to me that [the WPC] was not organized right. This was an organization that allowed [the major institutions] to coordinate their activities in West Philadelphia... but there were no West Philadelphia people in it. So, we reorganized it. I did the talking to the other institutions to get it together... This is something I’m actually pleased about and proud of: we got everybody together and changed the name of the organization to the West Philadelphia Partnership.” (Puckett and Lloyd 2015, p 223)

The West Philadelphia Partnership (WPP) afforded the neighborhood associations—six, in total—an equal proportion of the vote on the board of directors. As Puckett phrased it, through the WPP, Hackney took an early step towards civic engagement with West Philadelphia, converting the WPC, “which was really Penn’s hit man,” into a partnership that put town-gown stakeholders “on democratic footing, by bringing in community organizations and other groups that were previously excluded” (Puckett 2015).

Hackney’s last overture towards improved town-gown engagement was rooted in a gesture of goodwill towards the WPP (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). In 1985, he created
two policies that directed resources into the community. Buy West Philadelphia was a procurement policy that prioritized purchase orders from local vendors. Puckett and Lloyd find that Penn purchases increased from “a couple of hundred thousand dollars” in the early 1980s to $10 million by 1993 with $2.7 million directed towards black-owned businesses (2015). A second policy, Hire West Philadelphia, prioritized employing residents from the community. Both policy initiatives had staying power; the Rodin administration adapted them for the WPI a decade later (Sorrentino 2015; Harkavy 2015; Puckett 2015).

During his tenure, Hackney sowed a new rhetoric for civic engagement at Penn. Yet, despite the fundamental role he played in building the foundation for Penn’s neighborhood revitalization efforts, he is rarely credited. As some of the long-time faculty view it, Hackney represents the “pre-history” for the investments that were on the horizon in the 1990s (Harkavy 2015; Puckett 2015):

“[T]he pre-history wasn’t just Judy [Rodin] by any means. It was actually Sheldon [Hackney]—he was the one who broke it up, who started it and did a lot of it. Then Judy took it to the next level. This is how I see it. That’s what [the Netter Center] writes about. And then Amy [Gutmann] took it to the next level... Did he go far enough? Not [in] my judgment. Did Judy go far enough? Not [in] my judgment. Did Amy go far enough? More than the others, but not [in] my judgment. I think there’s still more to do, but you see there is a trajectory.” (Harkavy 2015)

Hackney set a clear tone through his work, but it was not enough to reverse neighborhood trends (Puckett and Lloyd 2015; Harkavy et al. 2014). Crime and disinvestment persisted and, much like the violence of 1958 catalyzed the creation of the WPC, the 1994 and 1996 murders in the Penn community ignited, again, urgency within Penn and the University City communities. The parental anger and threats to the
university’s reputation catalyzed Penn, under Rodin’s direction, to develop a sustained, multi-pronged investment in University City. By 1997, the WPI was getting underway; the seeds planted by Hackney were about to bear fruit under the Rodin administration.

5.4.2 The West Philadelphia Initiatives: Developing a Plan for Neighborhood Revitalization

Two years into her presidency, Rodin had already faced two murders, in addition to other non-fatal assaults, in Penn’s community. Parents were angry and demanded swift action, faculty and staff lobbied for an urgent response, and current students were moving away from University City and into Center City, while matriculation of admitted students fell. Rodin characterized the Halloween murder as the final straw:

“Sometimes there is one decisive moment—one seminal incident—that leaves no choice but to seek an entirely new paradigm. With the events of Halloween night—a random act of violence in a neighborhood that had become increasingly rife with crime—that moment was foisted on me. As President of the University of Pennsylvania, I knew that the time for unprecedented action had arrived.” (Rodin 2007)

According to a university-commissioned report, Penn weighed four potential responses to its environment: (1) engage in community service activities with the neighborhood, knowing that these activities may not address decline in a significant way; (2) reconceive of the Penn campus as a fortress, building walls, gates, and checkpoints to barricade the institution from decline; (3) vacate the existing West Philadelphia campus and relocate to a more stable location; or (4) develop a broad neighborhood revitalization strategy supported by substantial institutional resources (Kromer and Kerman 2005). Ultimately, Rodin’s administration elected to invest in the
fourth alternative, committing to neighborhood revitalization for the long term (Rodin 2007; Kromer and Kerman 2005).

Penn built its neighborhood revitalization strategy, the WPI, on a five-point platform. Broadly, Penn’s approach sought to leverage the university’s financial, organizational, and human capital to catalyze neighborhood revitalization (Kromer and Kerman 2005). As the university launched each element, phased in over a several year period, it addressed immediate needs—namely safety and neighborhood services, while envisioning University City as a vibrant neighborhood of choice over the long-term.

WPI’s multi-pronged strategy included:

1. **Cleanliness and Safety.** Penn aimed to improve neighborhood services by establishing the University City District (UCD), a special services district focused on boosting city services, amenities, and branding. It addressed safety objectives through increased neighborhood policing and public safety patrols, improved pedestrian lighting, and beautification initiatives, such as graffiti removal and greening programs.

2. **High-Quality Housing Choices and Homeownership.** Penn sought to overcome abandonment and disinvestment by attracting residents to the neighborhood. Homeownership programs included guaranteed mortgages and forgivable loans to Penn-affiliated faculty and staff to purchase or rehabilitate homes within the targeted West Philadelphia neighborhoods. Development initiatives included a targeted acquisition and rehabilitation program, which sought to stabilize deteriorated properties for resale. This
program focused on vulnerable blocks on the cusp of instability. The Neighborhood Preservation and Development Fund (NPDF), a Penn subsidiary, targeted disinvested apartment buildings for rehabilitation. Rather than reselling the properties, NPDF retained ownership, enabling them to set below-market rents in an attempt to moderate rent increases across the neighborhood.

3. *Commercial Development.* Penn leveraged its role as a major landowner to establish a vibrant mixed-use commercial corridor along the northern and western edges of campus. Through this investment, Penn sought to redevelop underutilized land, establish a porous link between the academic campus and adjacent neighborhoods, and stimulate private investment within the target area. In the early years, Penn developed projects on former parking lots; subsequently, private developers pursued projects on Penn-owned land via long-term land leases.

4. *Economic inclusion.* Penn expanded its “Buy West Philadelphia” policy, which gave purchasing preference to local vendors in its procurement contracts. In addition, the university adopted local and minority goals for its construction contracts.

5. *High-Quality Public Education.* Penn initiated the Sadie Tanner Mossel Alexander University of Pennsylvania Partnership School (K-8)—more commonly called the Penn Alexander School (PAS), providing capital,
operations, and technical resources to develop a public school in partnership with the Philadelphia School District (Kromer and Kerman 2005).

Penn’s investment in University City is well known in the anchor institution field, with think tanks and scholars using the WPI as a best practice model. In the retelling, Penn’s WPI origin story has become very polished, cast as a logical, step-wise process. In practice, however, “we talk about the [WPI] as five interrelated fronts, happening comprehensively, but it took years for it to mature” (Sorrentino 2015). Motivated by the tragic circumstances in the neighborhood, university administrators tackled public safety and amenities early on, marking the university’s commitment with high-visibility, high-impact initiatives. Gradually, Penn diversified its investments and strategies, solidifying WPI’s five-point platform.

From the start, Penn was the sole anchor in University City’s revitalization strategy. The City was on the brink of bankruptcy and many of its neighborhoods were in distress; it was unable to commit significant resources to a concentrated revitalization effort. Further, West Philadelphia did not have a strong community development landscape, leaving Penn with no clear partnership opportunities (Sorrentino 2015). However, Penn did not develop its strategy in a vacuum. While it did not have an official partnership, there were stakeholders invested in creating a new vision for University City behind the scenes. Two of the most prominent groups include the Penn Faculty and Staff for Neighborhood Issues (PFSNI) and the Spruce Hill Community Association (SHCA).
PFSNI, as Puckett and Lloyd describe it, was a “sizable, well-organized, politically savvy group” who effectively lobbied Penn’s administration to respond to declining conditions in West Philadelphia (2015). Founded in 1992, PFSNI’s core belief was that, however well intentioned, the Hackney-era initiatives were not sufficient to protect the neighborhood. Instead, it demanded the university mount a multi-faceted campaign to stabilize the community and, thereby, the institution. PFSNI’s final report, delivered to the administration in 1993—a year before Rodin assumed the presidency and three years before the infamous Family Weekend protest—called for Penn to: enhance public safety through expanded police presence, lighting, and other public safety measures; improve neighborhood schools; attract faculty and staff via homeownership programs; upgrade neighborhood housing stock; and enrich the quality of University City’s commercial corridors (Puckett and Lloyd 2015; Harkavy 2015). In addition, PFSNI proposed a multi-anchor service district that provided a blueprint for the creation of UCD.

In 1995, SHCA, assisted by Penn’s Center for Community Partnerships, also put forth a vision for its neighborhood (Puckett and Lloyd 2015; Grossbach 2015; Harkavy 2015). Positioned immediately west of Penn’s campus border, SHCA’s recommendations reflected many of PFSNI’s priorities, including assistance for homeownership and home rehabilitation and enhanced retail offerings and amenities on the 40th Street corridor. It called for Penn to provide homeownership incentives for faculty and staff to move into the neighborhood. SHCA also proposed Penn form a partnership with the Philadelphia
School District to create a neighborhood K-8 school on a Penn-owned, former divinity school site at the center of the neighborhood.

Penn may not have found any formal partners to implement its WPI initiatives, but, as the PFSNI and SHCA examples illustrate, the institution was not alone in its appetite for change in the neighborhood (Sorrentino 2015; Grossbach 2015; Puckett 2015; Culhane 2013). In truth, many of Penn’s initiatives intersected with submitted proposals and reports from pro-neighborhood alliances:

“Rodin was not a visionary, she was an implementer. She implemented ideas that were already in play. There were a number of things there that already pre-figured the West Philadelphia Initiatives.” (Puckett 2015)

Rodin’s administration did not develop the WPI blueprints in isolation; instead, the degree of overlap suggests the neighborhood’s proposals informed Penn’s approach. The WPI may often be characterized as “heavy-handed” (Zitcer 2015)—and rightfully so—but the core recommendations actually grew out of neighborhood sources, which were then subsumed into the administration’s strategy.

Even while Penn incorporated neighborhood priorities into its intervention, this agenda did not evolve out of community outreach and the lack of process has been problematic. Penn did not expressly solicit the community’s participation and, as a result, the concerns of the vocal—Penn faculty and staff and members of the SHCA—were privileged over those who went unasked. And, despite the criminal activity, University City did have an active middle class. As a former Penn staff member and long-time University City resident, characterized it:

“[T]here was a crime problem, but the bones in the neighborhood were solid. It was a middle class, diverse [population]. Middle class by my standards, not necessarily
middle class by census standards, but... You know, Baltimore Avenue was fairly similar to what you see today. Obviously, [there have been] many improvements, but a lot of the same businesses were there. You had Penn and Drexel professors living there. You had Powelton School, which was a strong school. You had Lea School, which was sometimes a strong school. Yes, there were these flash points of crime and there was disinvestment, but it was not [as poverty-stricken] as Mantua." (Zitcer 2015)

In practice, this meant that beyond the safety and security concerns, “middle class” interests and expectations, including homeownership and vibrant retail amenities, held sway over other economic or affordability concerns (Kerman 2015; Grossbach 2015; Culhane 2013; Katz 2013).

In some ways, the decision to “fight for middle class values” (Kerman 2015) was a decision to return to an earlier point in University City’s history, when a vibrant middle class occupied its Victorian-era homes. As a result, even though Penn’s revitalization strategy did not actively reject the needs of University City’s low-income households, it also, as a long-time Penn faculty member and West Philadelphia resident elucidates, did not take intentional steps to protect or preserve demographic and/or economic diversity in the neighborhood:

“All that said, there’s always been a working class and low-income population in West Philadelphia, who, I don’t think, felt these interventions were immediately helping them out. Especially to the extent it was going to raise some rents. And the rental stock became more of a target for higher income people and grad students and working professionals and immigrants, than the native population who had been here for 15, 20, 30 years.” (Culhane 2013)

Others would argue that Penn’s decision to throw its weight behind a particular subset of the neighborhood was pragmatic. For instance, a long-time faculty member and resident of University City pointed out:

“For the right reasons, there are people who are deeply suspicious of anything Penn wants to do. And the process was... the process was not the strong part of the
initiative. But, you know, I hate to say it, but if it was a really democratic process, we’d probably still be arguing about it... I really believe that Rodin and Fry, [the Executive Vice President at the time,] did the right thing and they were courageous and the evidence is all around us in West Philly.” (Katz 2013)

The process—or even the outcomes—may not be perfect, but many will concede, if not insist, that the status quo was no longer an option and time was of the essence.

5.4.3 Place-making: Implementing the West Philadelphia Initiatives

As a former Penn administrator and the current Vice Provost for University and Community Partnerships at Drexel University phrased it:

“Penn absolutely had to respond to something quickly and it was very much about self-interest... And the concern around public safety was really paramount... There was a whole lot of activity really focused on just shaking up what was seen as really dangerous. So, yeah, I think that crisis pushed a lot of very fast activity...” (Kerman 2015)

The need to “shake up” the neighborhood and the demand for a swift response to criminal activity drove Penn’s implementation decisions from the outset—“public safety and real estate started out hand in hand” (Sorrentino 2015). As the Executive Director for the Office of the Executive Vice President describes Penn’s initial foray into neighborhood revitalization, he invokes the broken window theory, contrasting the deleterious effects of crime with the (envisioned) vibrancy of a college neighborhood (Sorrentino 2015). The urgency of this contrast informed Penn’s preliminary investments, which took advantage of the institution’s open parking lots to create highly visible change:

“Real estate was thought of first and foremost as a way to change the image of the place, which had been pockmarked with all these surface parking lots from a different era—one where we fell in love with the automobile and people were going to commute to work and not live where they worked. If you wanted to literally
change the landscape, you had to do urban infill on these parking lots.” (Sorrentino 2015)

Penn’s first development project was along the Walnut Street commercial corridor, which traverses the campus and is—has always been—one of the area’s major retail districts. The one-way, westbound corridor is also a primary gateway into the Penn campus from Center City. The Sansom Common, now referred to as University Square, was constructed on Penn’s largest Urban Renewal Era parking lot at the intersection of Walnut Street and 36th Street (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). Initially, Rodin’s team had hoped to attract outside investors to the project, leveraging the university-owned land, “but [the administration was] rejected by almost all the private developers, who thought the area was dangerous, blighted… they used words like ghetto. And, so, the university was, in some ways, if it was going to see this [project] realized, forced to do it itself” (Sorrentino 2015). By 1999, Sansom Common was complete with a hotel, Barnes & Noble bookstore, and 300,000 square feet of fully-leased retail space. It took Penn $150 million, but, by the time the project opened, it had “primed the pump, demonstrating that there was a market and exciting people to say ‘wow, let me get in on that!’” (Sorrentino 2015).

After the successful completion of Sansom Common, Penn continued to redevelop its other underutilized parcels. This time, however, private investors were convinced of the neighborhood’s market trajectory. In some instances, Penn subsidized projects, but in others, private developers signed long-term land leases with the university and bore the full cost of the project. In the interim, Penn became quite savvy
in its real estate endeavors, pursuing projects to strategically blur the line between town
and gown. The Executive Director for the Office of the Executive Vice President gives
credit for Penn’s real estate success to its professionalized staff:

“We professionalized our facilities office and brought in really seasoned real estate
people who knew how to do this. And, so, the capacity and talent of our own staff
changed. The complexion of the university administration changed to add skills you
normally wouldn’t find at a university. Universities don’t normally have real estate
developers working for them, but we systematically went about hiring those people
and they’ve been with us ten or fifteen years... These are people who spent [a large
part] of their career bought into the idea that [revitalization] takes generations to
change the landscape.” (Sorrentino 2015)

Since 1998, Penn has invested more than $165 million in University City development
projects, including a neighborhood grocery store, movie theater, restaurants, and a
hotel; in doing so, the university has leveraged more than $700 million in private capital
(Division of Facilities and Real Estate Services, University of Pennsylvania 2012). These
projects contribute more than 400,000 square feet of retail space to the neighborhood
with occupancy rates consistently outpacing Center City rates between 2003 and 2010.

The development of a Penn-assisted neighborhood K-8 school, PAS, is the
university’s other major achievement. Aside from the institution’s highly visible
investment in University City’s retail landscape, PAS has catalyzed the most change—
and drawn the most ire—in the neighborhood. Drawing from the PFSNI and SHCA
recommendations, Penn began pursuing a public school partnership in 1998. Penn
already owned the former divinity school property, situated in the middle of Spruce
Hill’s residential neighborhood (Puckett and Lloyd 2015)—the neighborhood petitioned
the university to purchase the land as a defensive measure in 1977 (Sorrentino 2015).
Twenty years later, the Rodin administration began talking with the Philadelphia School District and neighborhood about what a partnership might look like.

Ultimately, the agreement was that Penn would lease the land at a nominal cost to the school district; the school district would construct the building with specified upgrades (e.g. better windows) paid for by the university (Puckett and Lloyd 2015). In addition to capital costs, Rodin agreed to augment the school’s operating costs by a total of $7,000,000 over a ten-year period. In exchange, the district agreed to smaller class sizes and Penn’s Graduate School of Education committed to curriculum support. Last, Rodin demanded the new K-8 school be a neighborhood school with enrollment determined by a local catchment area—it could not become a magnet or citywide lottery school.

The school opened in 2002 and, at the time, it was a risk. The neighborhood asserted that Penn’s moniker be incorporated into the schools name: “The neighbors insisted on it because they were afraid we would back away” (Sorrentino 2015). Parents were also unsure, as one parent (and Penn faculty member) suggested: “Penn Alexander [started as] a place that was deliberately small because there wasn’t that much support for it... Parents had to convince each other to go and to [enroll] because it was a risk” (Hillier 2013). Yet, as the opening of Chapter 1 portrays, the demand for PAS has now exceeded the enrollment maximums. The parent’s quote continues: “[Now the school has] too much demand, where parents were planning to stay out in the cold, in the middle of January for four days to ensure their kid got a spot. There’s no guarantee” (Hillier 2013). Due to the pent up demand for high quality public schools in Philadelphia,
PAS-eligibility carries a sticker price in the residential real estate market with PAS-catchment homes commanding a $100,000+ premium (Steif 2013; Katz 2013).

The comprehensive nature of Penn’s neighborhood revitalization strategy is an important component of its philosophy. The consensus across the Hackney and Rodin administrations was that the institution had to attack neighborhood conditions on a number of fronts in order to effect lasting change. Since 1997, Penn has spent more than $1.25 billion in West Philadelphia, including $6 million in homeownership and rehabilitation incentives, $40 million in contributions to UCD for neighborhood services, and more than $1 billion in procurement of local goods and services (Sorrentino 2014).

Yet, the central feature—the one with the greatest visibility and impact—has been a corporate-side approach, emphasizing real estate’s ability to stimulate the private market. As a former Penn administrator and the current Vice Provost for University and Community Partnerships at Drexel states:

“Penn absolutely... You know, the local purchase, the focus on hiring, particularly the operational hiring. I think that stuff was incredibly good. This is not in any way to diminish that. But you know, the biggest place that Penn made [a difference was in its] real estate presence... We absolutely didn’t have a community-facing infrastructure, which [Drexel] is trying to do now. I think partly it was the culture at Penn.” (Kerman 2015)

In this sense, “the culture at Penn” portends to Penn’s need to address ongoing and foreshadowed threats to its wellbeing, as well as Rodin’s leadership style, wherein she ran Penn as a CEO—a trend that continues under President Amy Gutmann (Puckett 2015). The Executive Director of the Office of the Executive Vice President summarizes the last two decades of work this way:
“We didn’t do real estate to effect social change. We did real estate to do place making to enhance the image and brand of the university. Well, after you’ve done that, then what? Then why are you doing it? Is it to be a better brand, a better image? I mean, at some point the [motivation] tops out. No. [Penn] continues to do this work because, if you’re going to be engaged as an anchor, you don’t just put your hammers down after you’ve made the place more attractive. The work continues. It may not be every piece of land that we owned is developed and it may not be that being a land developer is what makes you an anchor. But we changed our mindset, I think, under Craig, [the current Executive Vice President], as to [the reasons] why we develop land.” (Sorrentino 2015)

Taken together, these comments encapsulate the most significant critique of Penn’s work to date: Penn did not incorporate the voice of the community into the process that defined the problem or devised the solutions. When Penn faced place-based threats, it made a place-based decision that privileged real estate development above other considerations. A former Penn staff member described it as “very structured. I’m not sure I would have done it any other way, but... [the community] was pulled into the university [vision], [the university was] not pushed out into the community [vision]” (Zitcer 2015). It has left middle-class homeowners and parents of PAS students feeling quite positive about the changes, but other residents—especially those outside of the catchment or just beyond the primary neighborhood-policing zone—feel neglected (Froehlich 2015; Culhane 2013; Sorrentino 2015). In their estimation, Penn is not much of a neighbor at all and the institution is operating in its own self-interest.

Penn’s decision to use real estate as the primary tool for spurring revitalization in University City has almost entirely negated community-focused improvement. One might quickly point to the institution’s investments in a public school and procurement as evidence to the contrary. However, even PAS, arguably Penn’s most community-
focused strategy, has shaped and been shaped by the real estate market. The presence of a high quality, neighborhood school gave families the confidence to purchase homes in University City, but now the school population is at capacity and those same homes are more elusive (and expensive). As property values climb, residents confess to knowing homeowners and renters who have been displaced (Froehlich 2015; Hillier 2013), though others question the extent of the phenomenon (Sorrentino 2015; Katz 2013).

While Penn does not dictate the trajectory of the real estate market, nor can it prevent speculative development from capitalizing on Penn’s initial investments, the institution also chose not to implement policies or programs that could limit the consequences of market forces on the existing community. This is not surprising given that Penn was responding to an urgent call for action and middle-class values were driving the process. Negative consequences, such as loss of affordability and displacement, were not on anyone’s radar at the time (Sorrentino 2015; Kerman 2015; Zitcer 2015).

Of more critical interest is the fact that it has taken twenty years for Penn to reflect on the strategy actively and evaluate the need for a course correction. Even if the community, in the broadest sense of the word, was not fully considered during West Philadelphia’s most incendiary period, there has been ample opportunity for Penn to revise its strategy in the subsequent decade. And, while it is currently undergoing a period of reflection, it would be much more difficult, if not too late, to preserve affordability or improve economic opportunities in areas that have already undergone
gentrification. The alternative is to increase Penn’s sphere of influence by expanding its program boundaries, as it has done recently with the employee assisted housing subsidy in order to increase the number of affordable housing choices. Residents beyond the PAS catchment area, however, remain skeptical about Penn’s interests:

“There’s a palpable feeling [that] ‘Penn doesn’t care about me because I live at 58th Street and they stop the safety ambassadors at 48th Street’... How hard would it be to move the boundary? The amount of community support that [Penn] would get for doing that would be enormous.” (Froehlich 2015)

Meanwhile, Penn is considering investments that move beyond place making. With University City stable, there is a sense that Penn is in a position to support initiatives that build community capacity and wealth. Whatever form future investments take, however, the administration is clear that Penn is committed to its neighborhood:

“While [Penn] doesn’t have a 2.0 plan, we’re in the process of asking the questions and doing research as to what we’re doing. And I think first and foremost is the university is never going to back away. Never. The university has no intent of backing away from community and economic development. If you’re going to be an anchor institution, it’s kind of in for a penny, in for a pound.” (Sorrentino 2015)

As Penn evaluates its next steps, it continues to identify homeownership and economic development as core components of its strategy while being less focused on real estate development. New areas of interest include health and literacy, possibly through citywide partnerships:

“Penn doesn’t have to do everything. Sometimes Penn can join forces with people who already have infrastructure in place. Bring our own resources to it and help. One of the things that [Penn is] exploring right now is who are the best people to partner with? [Which organizations] are already underway citywide? Not that we’ll ever turn our back on West Philadelphia. We never will, but can we do more with a bigger footprint?” (Sorrentino 2015)

This shift in focus, despite Penn’s stated commitment to West Philadelphia, is worrisome, as illustrated in the neighborhood outcomes section below. For residents,
the neighborhood continues to face persistent challenges, in addition to emergent concerns like affordability. No one denies that the neighborhood is safer, but many residents suggest that Penn believes “the hard work is done” and it can turn its attention elsewhere; residents disagree (Froehlich 2015; Grossbach 2015; Culhane 2013; Katz 2013; Hillier 2013).

5.5 Transforming University City: Two Stories of Neighborhood Change

As a model of intervention, Penn’s investments in University City have been widely replicated by urban universities across the country (Bromley 2006; Perry and Wiewel 2005). While self-preservation was a strong motivator for the development of the WPI, the resulting neighborhood revitalization strategy, “as heavy handed as it was, it was amazing. It was really transformative. There are a lot of people who are upset, specifically about the school, and I am too, as someone who can’t get my kid in there, but it was really transformative” (Zitcer 2015). This sentiment is very common in West Philadelphia—the WPI was successful in some ways, but not all. Qualitatively, the neighborhood’s experience of the WPI depends on a household’s tenure in West Philadelphia and its socioeconomic status at the time of intervention; even then, residents often hold a mixed perspective of change.

During interviews, residents who lived through West Philadelphia’s years of disinvestment, accompanied by increasing crime rates and occurrences of property abandonment, expressed a feeling of satisfaction with respect to Penn’s investments and the state of the neighborhood after the implementation of the WPI (Grossbach
These residents moved into the area because it had “good bones,” including proximity to the university and diversity. They valued its potential to be a vibrant, urban neighborhood in spite of the crime rate and deterioration. Though no one stated it directly, there seemed to be a common understanding that Penn was part of the neighborhood and it would not abandon ship.

This segment of the population felt rewarded for its commitment to West Philadelphia during the more difficult years, even as many of their neighbors left for more stable neighborhoods with better schools:

“... And then a lot of people, especially people with kids, started bailing out. And the rough years of the neighborhood set in... [Then the WPI] started to take place... And, so, a real vibrancy came back. I feel very, kind of rewarded for having stayed...” (Katz 2013)

Importantly, these residents are not simply referring to the emotional vindication they felt at standing by their neighborhood and being able to experience its renaissance. The reward also took the form of dollars and cents, as homeowners realized a return on their initial investment that was far from guaranteed when they initially purchased their homes:

“I think most people are people of good will and were willing to give this effort a go... like, ‘what do we have to lose?’ And most of us, in fact, gained tremendously... most of us didn’t buy in this neighborhood to get a real estate windfall, because that certainly was not guaranteed [or] even likely, at that time. But people who were here and stayed here, have witnessed a huge appreciation in their property values. So, there’re a lot of people who have good reason to be satisfied that, you know, things have moved in that direction.” (Culhane 2013)

Alternately, residents that moved to West Philadelphia during the WPI intervention expressed a much more conflicted version of neighborhood change. They recognized the direct benefits that accrued to incoming families, including mortgage...
incentives for Penn-affiliated households and access to a “stellar” public school. However, they also valued the demographic and socioeconomic diversity of the neighborhood, which was more apparent during the early WPI years. During these conversations, there were frequent references to winners versus losers, highlighting a nuanced, uneasy theme about the uneven nature of benefits:

“[T]here are winners and losers... There were long-term homeowners who may have benefited from what happened with property values. But I also know that it has been... part of the pressure. I think it was extremely helpful for families with young children... you know, high quality childcare, the incredible police safety presence that, you know, is directed towards Penn. But the scope affects people whether or not they work at Penn, a park, farmer’s market, coffee shops, restaurants where kids are welcome within walking distance of the biggest private employer in the city, public transportation. That’s the cohort, my cohort, and I think my profile... we’re the ones who benefited the most. [But] I think it’s disproportionate to people who are middle- and upper-income and students. You know, and there’s probably not been much benefit to people who were lower-income unless they were ready to sell their houses and really were able to cash in, which presumably there were some of them.” (Hillier 2013)

Other residents talked about the conflict of moving into a neighborhood that has experienced substantial turnover and has shed diversity for more Penn-affiliated households:

“The involuntary displacement though that rising property costs cause is very real and very significant... There is no doubt though that their rents are going way up very fast... I think everybody in my neighborhood can tell you a story either that they personally or their friends have experienced, where they just can’t afford to live in the neighborhood anymore. That is so weird, because in 1997 to 1999, when I first moved to the neighborhood, people moved to Cedar Park because they could not afford to live in another neighborhood. Now, 15 years later, people are moving out of Cedar Park because they can’t afford to live here anymore.” (Froehlich 2015)

The interviewee continued, describing a house-by-house account of who lives on his block and remarking on the increased concentration of Penn faculty and staff in the neighborhood. He expressed concern over Penn’s expanded homeownership program
boundaries, musing that perhaps it could limit the number of eligible houses for a given block. However, in practice, such a policy would likely be ineffective—over the life of the program, approximately 1,000 households have received mortgage assistance from Penn, which is a fraction of the 15,500 households in University City in 2010. There are certainly more than 1,000 Penn-affiliated households in the neighborhood, but they are not participating in Penn’s homeownership program.

Ultimately, the neighborhood perspective appears to be cleaved. On one side, residents are concerned that the revitalizing tide has not lifted all boats in the neighborhood. For households who moved into the neighborhood since 2000 and, especially, Penn-affiliated households who received mortgage incentives and/or sent their kids to PAS, there is also a conflict between living in a vibrant, amenity-rich area and being an active contributor to neighborhood change. In these instances, the central issue is the impact of Penn’s investments on the ecology of the neighborhood and the widening disparity gap. On the other hand, many long-time residents readily declared the WPI a “roaring success” and were much more enthusiastic about the outcomes. While they recognized the program did not address all the challenges in the neighborhood, including affordable rental housing, they did not observe the same level of disparity or gentrification and were more likely to accept the WPI as a work-in-progress.

While resident opinions of the WPI outcomes diverged based on the length of their tenure, they converged around the role of leadership in Penn’s decision to engage
with the neighborhood, as well as a unanimous call for continued engagement moving forward:

“I do really feel that under the Gutmann administration, the commitment has... it was a high priority for the previous administration. And now it’s Judith-Rodin—been-there-done-that and we’re going to go global. We’re going to build to the east, all that stuff. I mean, it’s beautiful – [Penn Park], it’s fantastic. But I think their commitment to West Philadelphia has really dropped to a lower point in their list of priorities. And I think it should remain very high. Because—you know, you’re a planner—neighborhoods are fragile, they are very fragile.” (Katz 2013)

“I don’t believe that other than [PAS]... that there seems to be a very visible or, you know, noticeable investment on the part of Penn in the community. And I think that that is problematic. It’s not a problem right now, but I would like to see that the institution has to be thinking in a renewable way about how it’s going to continue to engage the community... We tend to very narrowly think about the university’s relationship to the community through these tutoring programs, these things, these voluntary things with undergraduates, which may or may not have value. I mean, they certainly are [valuable], but it’s not a deep engagement. It seems to me that there could be a much more fuller embrace of the Lea School, there could be much more done to promote engagement between the university and other organizations in the neighborhood, [who] they don’t connect to. And do more to keep pushing west in terms of connections—not development and real estate, but helping people... And that would benefit the neighborhood tremendously.” (Culhane 2013)

Overall, participants believed there was value in continuing the existing WPI program, while also extending the benefits outside of the current boundaries. While not all residents focused directly on the disparity engendered by the WPI, there was agreement around the substantial benefits received by families within the PAS catchment—students attending the school, as well as homeowners throughout the area—and the belief that Penn should extend the same level of deep engagement to other neighborhood schools, including Lea School. Interviewees recognized that Penn did not have unlimited resources to dedicate towards neighborhood revitalization, but they also believed that Penn had an obligation to its neighbors by virtue of its role as an
urban anchor institution. To that end, it was the “right thing” to invest in deep engagement with West Philadelphia.

There was also consensus around the importance of administrative leadership in both the development and the success of the WPI. Most interviewees attributed Penn’s motivation for investing in West Philadelphia to self-preservation, though they also repeatedly tied the vision, innovation, and personal commitment of Penn’s leadership, including Presidents Hackney and Rodin, to the success of the program. The conscious decision by the administration to make neighborhood issues a priority was, according to interviewees, a critical part of the neighborhood’s renaissance and a necessary ingredient for continued stability and revitalization moving forward. At the same time, participants expressed concern over the durability of Penn’s investment in West Philadelphia and its ability to sustain high levels of engagement across changing administrations.

While the most recent Penn administration, led by Dr. Amy Gutmann, has continued to implement the WPI, there are mixed feelings about how wedded the institution remains to the neighborhoods. University administrators clearly emphasize that West Philadelphia was, is, and will be an ongoing priority for the neighborhood. The interim Dean of the Law School, who is also a long-time West Philadelphia resident, underscores the point:

“I do think [civic engagement] actually relates to [Penn’s] founding as a practical institution, as opposed to religious institutions. I think that [engagement work] has always been a part of the DNA at Penn—their connection to the community. And I think that we’ve learned a lot in the last 20 years or so. I’m fairly optimistic that this
is going to be sustained because I think it really is part of the DNA and there’s been a realization that it actually benefits the institution.” (Pritchett 2015)

Many other residents, however, feel that there has been a shift in priorities under the Gutmann administration and neighborhood engagement is no longer a primary focus:

“I think Penn has made a real difference. But I think it’s...You know, it’s not neglect, it’s sort of like benign neglect. We did it, we’re not taking anything away. But, we’ve had it, we’ve put enough in’ and so on. And it’s time to do something in the east.’ Well [Penn], [to] the east are fields, the expressway and railroad tracks. You know, it’s not people. So, when [Penn] says they’re looking east, what does that mean? You know?” (Grossbach 2015)

The administration’s comments about the potential direction of Penn’s future commitments, including citywide support for health and literacy, hints at this passive shift away from University City. The neighborhood has changed and, in many respects, stabilized, but, as the demographic numbers will support below, the work is certainly not done.

Last, some residents felt that even while Penn made great strides in the neighborhood with its investments in safety, public education, and vibrant commercial districts, it simply did not deserve all the credit (Zitcer 2015; Puckett 2015; Culhane 2013; Katz 2013). In the Clinton-era economy, real estate was booming on its own and, given West Philadelphia’s proximity to Center City and affiliation with Penn—a major employer, revitalization was bound to occur in the end:

“[University City] is a pretty great place to live a middle-class academic life existence and it’s... You know, it’s much better than it ever would have been without the intervention, although it probably is only 30% better than it might have been because I think a lot of those forces were macro forces. But, certainly, it’s the icing on the cake and then some.” (Zitcer 2015)

Which begs the question, how did University City change between 1990 and 2010?
5.5.1 Setting the Context: Philadelphia between 1990 and 2010

Philadelphia’s trajectory over the last several decades follows that of many former-manufacturing centers across the US. The 2010 Census registered Philadelphia’s first population increase in six decades, as the city gained approximately 8,500 people [Table 5.1]. In terms of racial composition, a minority-majority population continues to characterize the city. While the White population decreased by nearly 225,000 people between 1990 and 2010, the Black population remained fairly steady, and the Asian population more than doubled (a gain of nearly 53,000 people).

Table 5.1 Neighborhood changes: Philadelphia, Center City, and West Philadelphia, 1990 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>City of Philadelphia</th>
<th>Center City</th>
<th>West Philadelphia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,585,577</td>
<td>1,517,750</td>
<td>1,526,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total White, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>648,586</td>
<td>683,367</td>
<td>626,221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Black, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>631,936</td>
<td>655,024</td>
<td>661,839</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Asian, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>43,322</td>
<td>67,614</td>
<td>96,405</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty rate</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income, adjusted to 2010 $ (nearest $100)</td>
<td>543,300</td>
<td>540,200</td>
<td>536,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dwelling unit</td>
<td>624,099</td>
<td>641,914</td>
<td>670,171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vacancy rate</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median housing value, adjusted to 2010 $ (nearest $100)</td>
<td>580,700</td>
<td>577,200</td>
<td>513,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the wealth front, Philadelphia’s poverty rate steadily increased between 1990 and 2010 to 25.1 percent; correspondingly, its median household income dropped by $6,000 (constant 2010 dollars). Home values across the city rose during the study period, although the median value remained modest at $135,200. Rather than signaling an affordable housing stock, the median value is an indication of wide variation in the
city’s housing market, which will become evident later in the analysis. Lastly, homeownership in Philadelphia remained higher than many urban centers, but fell from 62 percent to 54.1 percent in the past two decades.

By all accounts, Philadelphia was in 1990, and continued to be in 2010, a city struggling to stabilize its economic base. While the overall population experienced a recent (and modest) rebound, there were significant demographic shifts at play. Further, population increases did not turn the tide on increasing poverty rates and decreasing household wealth across the city. At the same time, there were pockets of investment and growth in Philadelphia between 1990 and 2010, including Center City.

5.5.1.1 The City’s Revitalization Intervention: Center City, 1990 to 2010
Since the City, under the direction of Mayor Edward Rendell, sparked the rebirth of Center City in 1992, the area has changed dramatically. More than 17,000 new residents moved to the area, bringing higher incomes and lower poverty rates. The racial distribution of the neighborhood remained majority-White (and significantly so), although the African American and Asian populations also increased between 1990 and 2010. Meanwhile, the ten-year tax abatement and other revitalization efforts catalyzed the addition of nearly 8,000 new dwelling units and residential vacancy rates fell by 13 percent. Homeownership rates increased to 32 percent by 2010, although they remain far below the citywide rate. Lastly, median home values jumped nearly $90,000 (constant 2010 dollars) to $392,600, though it is worth noting that Center City’s median home values were roughly three times higher than the city as a whole throughout the study period—even during the crisis period in the early 1990s.
Penn initiated the WPI in University City neighborhood shortly after Center City began to revitalize. Even as the area was feeling the consequences of rapid disinvestment and decline, it was located between two opposing forces. To the east, Center City was beginning to see the effects of what would become a significant transformation of Philadelphia’s downtown; and, to the north and west, the larger West Philadelphia neighborhood continued to face mounting urban challenges as the area became more segregated and poor.

5.5.2 A Parting of Ways: University City and Its West Philadelphia Neighborhood

University City’s socio-economic trajectory between 1990 and 2010 is mixed [Table 5.2]. The total population remained relatively steady throughout the period, increasing by less than 1,500 people over twenty years. However, the neighborhood’s racial composition underwent a fair amount of change. In 1990, before the WPI, the neighborhood’s population was fifty percent White, thirty-five percent Black, and eleven percent Asian; during the subsequent decade (2000), the White population decreased by nearly 4,000 people, while the Black and Asian populations increased by 1,839 and 1,426 people, respectively. This trend, however, was reversed during the WPI decade. Between 2000 and 2010, the White population rebounded to 1990 levels and the Asian population continued to grow; conversely, the Black population experienced a significant decrease, losing nearly 6,500 people (a twenty-nine percent decrease from 1990).
Wealth in University City flagged over the course of the study period and remained below that of the city. When the WPI began in 2000, the poverty rate in University City reached thirty-five percent—a full thirteen percentage points above the city’s, and it remained at thirty-two percent a decade later. Unsurprisingly, the median household income for University City mirrored the poverty trends. In the whole of University City, median household incomes, adjusted to 2010 dollars, fell eighteen percent between 1990 ($37,900) and 2010 ($31,200) and remained roughly $5,000 below that of the city median.

Last, over the course of the last twenty years, University City experienced greater demand for housing. In 2000, the vacancy rate peaked at sixteen percent, before falling to nine percent a decade later. During the same period, the total number of dwelling units declined by 2,000. This decrease can likely be attributed to the
demolition of blighted properties and conversion of multi-family homes back to their original single-family structures, which will be discussed more in the next section. Homeownership across the neighborhood also remained low, but steady, at seventeen percent, fluctuating less than a percentage point during the study period.

To understand what these trends really mean and to surmise any correlation with the WPI at all, University City must be put in the context of its larger West Philadelphia neighborhood, which extends from Penn’s campus along the western banks of the Schuylkill River to the city’s western edge. Penn has long served as an anchoring force in University City, providing an economic engine and a natural flow of faculty and student residents for the neighborhood. While Penn’s strength may have moderated some of the socio-economic trends, during the 1990 to 2000 period, University City shared many of the distressed characteristics of the larger West Philadelphia community.

On all accounts—population, poverty, median household incomes, and residential vacancy and tenure, University City was in step with the larger neighborhood trends during the pre-WPI period. Population in both areas increased between 1990 and 2000, but so did poverty rates. Meanwhile, incomes diminished substantially for both areas—more than $11,000 in West Philadelphia and nearly $5,000 in University City. The demographic profiles revealed that Whites were leaving the neighborhood, although University City remained integrated relative to West Philadelphia, where Black residents represented more than ninety percent of the population in 1990 and eighty percent in 2000. Vacancy rates were on the rise throughout the area, but so were
median home values. In 2000, University City’s homes were worth nearly twice as much as those in the remainder of West Philadelphia—$125,600 versus $51,600 (constant 2010 dollars).

During the 2000 to 2010 period that coincides with the WPI, University City did experience a rebound—or at least a softer landing, diverging from the rest of West Philadelphia in subtle ways. The overall population increased throughout West Philadelphia (eleven percent or 24,575 people), but University City residents were more likely to be White and claim modestly more wealth. As median incomes fell in the rest of West Philadelphia ($23,900 to $20,900), University City reversed the trend with a nearly $2,500 increase (to $31,200). The vacancy rate held steady at 14.5 percent in West Philadelphia, but dropped below ten percent in University City by 2010—a decrease of seven percentage points. Meanwhile, homeownership rates remained steady, but low, at seventeen percent in University City, while falling by nearly six percent in the greater neighborhood to 45.8 percent. Most significantly, median home values in the University City portion of the neighborhood skyrocketed by 2010, increasing more than $200,000 in constant 2010 dollars to $326,400. Conversely, West Philadelphia experienced only a modest increase to a median home value of $79,600 in 2010—the dramatic increases in University City certainly contributed to that increase by skewing the median home value upwards.

Taken together, these indicators suggest that the WPI did make an impression in University City. In some respects, the university’s presence always differentiated University City from the rest of West Philadelphia—it attracted its own constituents,
faculty and students, to the area, fostering a natural demand for housing and modestly higher median incomes. Despite this, the trends portray a pre-WPI neighborhood that was eroding in many of the same ways as West Philadelphia and a subtle improvement in University City after Penn began investing. These deviating patterns suggest a correlation between Penn’s intervention and neighborhood improvement. However, upon closer evaluation, the story becomes more complicated and a more complex understanding of University City and the WPI emerges.

5.5.3 Disaggregating University City: Inside and Outside of the PAS Catchment Area

If University City’s trends diverged from West Philadelphia and showed modest improvement during the WPI years, disaggregating the neighborhood to account for the presence of a strong neighborhood school shows an even greater improvement gap (Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2, above). Before the WPI began, the whole of University City, as previously discussed, was experiencing disinvestment. Declining trends in area closest to campus, which would later be served by the PAS, were slightly less steep, but they remained readily apparent; decline in the area beyond the future PAS catchment was more severe.

In the years preceding the WPI, University City’s overall population was relatively stable. A look past the surface reveals much more fluctuation: The blocks inside the PAS lost more than twenty percent of its population base or more than 3,500 people, while the remainder of University City gained 5,865 people (a twenty percent increase). Conversely, the trends reverse during the WPI years, as the PAS gained nine percent of
its population back and the area outside of the PAS declined by more than 2,200 people (a 6.5 percent decrease).

Figure 5.1 University City study area, PAS and University City (UCD) boundaries

With respect to the composition of residents, the narrative shifts towards proportions rather than absolute numbers. As indicated above, the total population within the PAS fluctuated between 1990 and 2010, resulting in a fourteen percent decrease over twenty years. The White population accounted for most of this loss, shrinking by nineteen percent between 1990 and 2010; however, all of that loss was realized during the 1990 to 2000 period, when the White population decreased by more than 4,000 (a forty-four percent decline). From 2000 to 2010, the White population regained 2,294 people, bringing the overall proportion of Whites in the PAS to fifty-five
percent. The Asian population experienced a similar pattern: Decreasing by twenty-five percent between 1990 and 2000 (548 people), before adding 826 people (thirty-four percent increase) between 2000 and 2010, for an overall increase of thirteen percent during the study period. By 2010, the Asian population represented eighteen percent of PAS residents, as compared to fourteen percent in 1990. The Black population in the PAS experienced an opposing trend. While it increased by almost 800 people (twenty percent) between 1990 and 2000, the area lost nearly half of its Black population (2,250 people) during the subsequent decade. Whereas the neighborhood was thirty-seven percent Black in 2000, the proportion decreased sharply to seventeen percent by 2010. Outside of the PAS catchment, the White and Asian populations increased between 1990 and 2010 (twelve percent and 117 percent, respectively). The Black population also grew between 1990 and 2000 (ten percent increase or 1,231 people), but fell steeply in the following decade (4,353 people or a thirty-three percent decrease). Between 1990 and 2010, the proportion of Whites outside of the PAS remained constant (forty-six percent), but the proportion of Blacks decreased sharply from forty-one percent to twenty-seven percent and Asians increased substantially from ten percent to nineteen percent of the area.

While, anecdotally, the impression is that the PAS zone changed most significantly during the WPI, a review of demographic changes suggests otherwise. The portions of University City within the PAS have changed significantly with sharp population decreases (White and Asian) and increases (Black) in the 1990-2000 period, followed by a reversal for each of the population groups in the subsequent decade.
Importantly, the analysis of racial composition suggests that the remainder of University City also underwent dramatic change over the last 20+ years with White and Asian populations steadily increasing, while the Black population dropped sharply after 2000.

When considering wealth, the areas inside and outside of the PAS are located on opposite ends of the spectrum. Within the PAS catchment, the Census data confirms what many have long suspected: After holding steady at thirty percent during 1990 and 2000, the poverty rate decreased twenty six percent in 2010—close to the city’s twenty-five percent poverty rate. Median household incomes also showed marked improvement: they fell by $5,000 between 1990 and 2000, but rebounded to $41,300 by 2010—a thirty-four percent increase that countered downward trends in the city and West Philadelphia, putting the PAS area well above their median income levels ($36,300 and $20,900, respectively). Outside of the PAS, however, the story is fairly grim. In 1990, the poverty rate was thirty-one percent; the rate increased to thirty-eight percent in 2000—higher than the city (22.9 percent) or West Philadelphia (32.8 percent) at that time—and decreased only slightly to thirty-five percent by 2010, which remained above the city and West Philadelphia. Whereas median household incomes outside of the PAS exceeded those inside the PAS before the WPI ($38,800 and $35,600, respectively), they fell precipitously in the following decade and stabilized at $27,200 in 2010 (a thirty percent decrease).

In an economic sense, the area inside the PAS fared substantially better than the rest of University City, overcoming losses in income and increases in poverty experienced during the 1990s and realizing significant gains during the WPI period (2000
to 2010). The neighborhood outside of the PAS is characterized by continued decline—median household incomes fell by thirty percent between 1990 and 2010 and its poverty rate exceeded the city’s, as well as the PAS area’s, by approximately ten percent in 2010. The overall trends for University City, discussed previously, mask the observed socio-economic divergence between the areas inside and outside of the catchment zone. In fact, it appears that the PAS area served as the bright spot in University City during the WPI years, while the remainder of the neighborhood experienced continued economic decline.

Housing trends are the last major category of neighborhood change, further distinguishing the PAS area from the remainder of University City. Over the last twenty years, the total number of dwelling units in University City decreased by ten percent (approximately 2,000 units). This decline is comprised of the area inside of the PAS, which lost more than 700 units during the first decade and added approximately 170 during the second, and the area outside of the PAS, where dwelling units increased by more than 2,500 in the first period, followed by a loss of nearly 4,000 units between 2000 and 2010. While Census data does not account for the drivers behind these trends, one explanation is the demolition of vacant units and restoration of previously subdivided rowhomes and single-family structures. Vacancy rates in the PAS support this hypothesis, as they steadily fell from 11.5 percent (1990) to 7.5 percent (2010). Outside of the PAS, the story is less straightforward: Dwelling units decreased by thirty-six percent, despite the addition of several new multi-family buildings in the area adjacent to the Penn campus. However, here too, the most likely explanation is
demolition in the neighborhood. The vacancy rate supports this theory: Between 1990 and 2000, the vacancy rate outside of the PAS increased sharply from thirteen to twenty-nine percent; this was followed by an equally steep decrease to 10.3 percent in 2010. The sharp decline in vacancy and dwelling units suggests that a number of structures were demolished after 2000; by 2010 some sites had been redeveloped, but others remain vacant.

As described earlier, a major thrust of the WPI was to increase homeownership, thereby mitigating abandonment and stabilizing blocks within University City. While 1,000 Penn-affiliated faculty and staff have participated in Penn’s homeownership and home rehabilitation programs since 1998, nearly 46,500 people lived in the neighborhood in 2010. How much of an effect could these programs have? The answer appears to be: not very much.

The homeownership rate in Philadelphia has always been high relative to many urban centers; although it was decreasing throughout the study period, the city remained majority homeowner. West Philadelphia has also traditionally been comprised of homeowners; by comparison, University City has long been a renter-majority neighborhood with ownership not exceeding twenty percent. This is not surprising, given the neighborhood’s association with not just Penn, but also Drexel University, University of the Sciences, and several hospitals. However, this is not the only explanation; Penn students only account for a fraction of University City’s 46,500 residents and, geographically speaking, the concentration of students tends to diminish rapidly as one moves beyond a three to four block radius from campus. Alternatively,
University City’s density, housing typology, including rowhomes and mid-sized multifamily buildings, and proximity to Philadelphia’s core likely enable the neighborhood to serve as an extension of the Center City housing market, which is also renter-majority.

Taken together, these two factors contextualize the fundamentally different homeownership conditions in University City. Despite the WPI’s emphasis, the neighborhood’s homeownership rate remained steady. Inside of the PAS, owner-occupancy increased slightly from 14.5 percent in 1990 to 17.8 percent by 2010; conversely, homeownership rates fell outside of the PAS catchment. Despite claiming incrementally more owner-occupants than the PAS area in 1990 (17.9 percent) and 2000 (19.1 percent), the homeownership rate outside of the PAS decreased to sixteen percent in 2010.

In contrast to tenure, the median home value for owner-occupied properties changed dramatically between 1990 and 2010. Since the 2000s, anecdotal knowledge has been that home values with University City, generally, and inside the PAS, specifically, have increased substantially. While Census data does not provide the same degree of specificity as real estate transaction or tax assessment data, it remains a useful indicator of change within the neighborhood. Between 1990 and 2000, the blocks inside and outside of the future PAS catchment both realized modest increases in their median home values. Inside the PAS, the median home value grew by approximately $30,000; outside of the PAS, median values rose more modestly, increasing by $8,000. During the subsequent decade (2000 to 2010), the median values increase exponentially; values inside the PAS more than doubled (from $154,500 to $334,600).
and those outside the PAS nearly tripled (from $107,900 to $300,900). In a more
detailed assessment of real estate transactions in University City, Steif (2013) revealed
an even greater gap. His study showed a $100,000+ price differential between the two
parts of University City.

5.5.4 Implications

Based upon a twenty-year assessment of Census trends, it appears that University City
experienced a distinct shift in the composition of its neighborhood, though the changes
were not uniform. While many of University City’s indicators trended towards
revitalization and growth, the reality is that the PAS often claimed more than its “share”
of positive change and, as a result, buoyed the remainder of the neighborhood.
Structural changes to the population, made evident by shifts in the racial composition,
occurred throughout University City; meanwhile socio-economic and housing trends
inside of the PAS catchment diverged from the remainder of University City and West
Philadelphia, reflecting many of Center City’s revitalization trends.

Penn employed many strategies that the anchor institution proponents classify
as best practices: It targeted its resources towards a specific location and invested in
interventions that would resolve “market failures” (e.g., crime and safety, public
amenities and services, distressed properties), thereby priming the neighborhood for
private investment in the future. Measured by these standards, the WPI has been a
success. The intervention addressed major concerns raised by the university community
during the early 1990s and helped change the neighborhood’s trajectory. Yet, while the
WPI satisfied many of Penn’s criteria for neighborhood improvement, the analysis is relatively ambiguous from the perspective of the community. Across University City, and especially inside of the PAS, the worst indicators showed some improvement between 1990 and 2010, in spite of worsening trends in West Philadelphia. Significant improvement, however, is not uniformly evident and socio-economic indicators outside the PAS remain well below those of the city, as well as nearby blocks located within the PAS catchment.

On the housing front, the evidence points to an increase in demand and a constrained housing market, clearly distinguishing University City from the rest of West Philadelphia. Within University City, the implications are more nuanced. Inside of the PAS, rising home values occurred in tandem with rising incomes, falling poverty rates, and a significant shift in the racial composition. Collectively, these indicators point towards the gentrification of the PAS area, as new households brought more wealth and drove up housing demand. Yet, the PAS area is not necessarily stable—the housing market is now so restrictive, in terms of affordability and vacancy rate, it limits access for many households. Conversely, Census data suggests that housing demand outside of the PAS also increased, but it was decoupled from wealth gains. In other words, even as housing became more expensive, the population was less equipped to shoulder the burden, illustrated by decreasing incomes and increasing poverty rates. Moving forward, Penn must now grapple with two opposing forces. On one end, the institution continues to face decline within its neighborhood; on the other, it must reconceive policies—particularly housing strategies—to address limited housing affordability and access for
both affiliated and non-affiliated households in the high-demand PAS, as well as the remainder of the neighborhood.

The neighborhood change analysis clearly suggests that Penn’s approach was most transformative in the area receiving the highest concentration of resources and opportunity. The presence of a strong neighborhood school, complemented by the WPI’s other safety, economic development, and housing investments, appears to have been the winning factor for improvement. Like the PAS blocks, the area outside of the PAS is served by a public K-8 school—Lea Elementary School (Lea); and, like the PAS, Lea receives curriculum support from Penn’s Netter Center and the Graduate School of Education. However, the similarities end there. Unlike Lea, Penn’s financial commitment to the PAS—its initial investment towards the school’s development, as well as its annual contribution towards operations—makes smaller classroom sizes, specialized curriculum development, and professional development opportunities possible. These features have transformed the PAS into not just a beacon within Philadelphia’s troubled school district, but one of the highest ranked schools in Pennsylvania.

5.6 Conclusion

One of the most remarkable things about Penn’s revitalization strategy is the amount of investment it has directed into the neighborhood and the durability of its commitment. Since the mid-1990s, Penn has invested more than $1.25 billion in WPI initiatives, including $165 million in commercial development, which, in turn, has leveraged more than $700 million in private development on university-owned properties. The
institution has sustained many of these initiatives for more than twenty years. Yet, this exceptional fact is marred by a notable shortcoming. While Penn has invested in sustained action over the past two decades, there seems not to have been a corresponding appetite for reflection. As a result, the various investments and interventions have been running at full tilt without adequate regard to the increasingly apparent disparities in the outcomes.

Based on quantitative and qualitative evidence, University City has indisputably improved since the 1980s and 1990s and Penn deserves credit for the transformation. But how much credit can Penn claim? There are some Penn faculty and residents who believe that Penn was investing in the right place at the right time (Puckett 2015; Culhane 2013; Zitcer 2015). Between the Clinton-era economy and Center City’s renaissance, Penn’s intervention boosted a “back to the city” movement in University City a bit sooner and, perhaps, a bit higher than the neighborhood would have experienced on its own. Yet, even while macro forces likely flowed in Penn’s favor, the residential and campus communities agree that the WPI made the neighborhood safer and more desirable.

Penn’s approach, however, points directly towards the most pertinent question for anchor institutions intervening in neighborhood development: Who are the beneficiaries of anchor-led revitalization? In Penn’s case, the leadership invested in a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy over two decades, but to what end? Beyond an undefined goal of “place making” and “vibrancy,” Penn did not enumerate any metrics or objectives for the WPI. The interventions did not incorporate explicit strategies to
build wealth for an existing community, direct benefits towards low-income populations, or protect affordability for long-time residents. As a result, the marketplace derived the most benefit from physical transformation, increasing property values and diminishing risk for private investors:

“The West Philadelphia Initiatives basically made it appealing for investment because people knew you had this long-term partner who wasn’t going anywhere. And it suddenly took something that seemed risky and made it much less so. And I think that – the confidence factor – was probably as important as anything.” (Culhane 2013)

Under these circumstances, Penn’s intervention has done little to allay the fears that often define the town-gown dynamic. As the Executive Director of the Office of the Executive Vice President describes it, neighborhoods often express three primary concerns about their institutional neighbors (Sorrentino 2015). The first is encroachment, as “[residents] are fiercely proud of where they live and they don’t want encroachment... But research universities grow. It’s what they do.” In Penn’s case, it has consciously avoided westward expansion since the 1970s, instead purchasing underutilized, former industrial lands to the east. It has been a double-edged sword from the neighborhood’s perspective, however. In one sense, residents still feel the weight of Penn’s institution in their community due to the presence of the PAS and, for some, its “heavy-handed” investment strategy; on the contrary, others worry that Penn’s eastward expansion is a sign that the leadership is turning its back on the neighborhood.

Second, neighborhoods are concerned with economic opportunities and, specifically, the “people in West Philadelphia who don’t feel as if there are opportunities
for them at the university... Job opportunities or contracting opportunities. That was why [Penn] came up with the economic inclusion program” (Sorrentino 2015). Anchor institutions’ abilities to direct procurement dollars and jobs into the local community is a powerful tool for community development. Yet, Penn’s program, despite its significant financial commitment, has not meaningfully changed the economic fortunes of the neighborhood; where it has, the outcomes are a consequence of residential turnover and new populations, not economic security for an existing population. Here, too, the neighborhood has expressed doubt that Penn is concerned with their wellbeing (Froehlich 2015; Zitcer 2015; Culhane 2013).

The third neighborhood fear is “not encroachment, not economic opportunity, but gentrification. Gentrification is the watchword right now and not just here, but across the country. I think it’s the fear of gentrification—that the quality of life as you know it and the affordability as you know it is going to change. That’s not predictable. That scares people... [It] generates animosity and maybe a little hostility” (Sorrentino 2015). Based on an assessment of the neighborhood outcomes, as well as interviews with residents, gentrification and displacement concerns are well founded after nearly twenty years of intervention. And one would not expect otherwise. Without conscious efforts to invest in market controls that slow the pace of growth or subsidies to limit the negative externalities of growth on certain populations, a “hot” real estate market—not to mention a strong neighborhood school—will generate increased competition for its housing stock.
Almost two decades after President Rodin inducted the WPI, Drexel University—Penn’s northern neighbor—has also started to invest in the revitalization of its adjacent West Philadelphia neighborhoods. In many ways, Drexel represents the next generation of the WPI, led by several of the same leaders, including Drexel’s President, John Fry, who was Penn’s Executive Vice President during the Rodin administration, and Drexel’s Vice Provost for University-Community Partnerships, Lucy Kerman, a former Special Projects Manager at Penn during the Rodin years. It, too, is implementing a multi-faceted strategy that addresses safety, education, economic opportunity, housing, and commercial development. Yet, as Kerman describes, Drexel has modified its approach to acknowledge two realities. The first reality recognizes an institution’s limitations when it comes to delivering community development products:

“[At] Drexel, we are just deeply tied to partners… We, [as an institution], represent the demand side. We’re not the supply side. And, in fact, universities are really bad at affordable [development]. We’re the gentrifiers. And I don’t think universities can authentically own the affordable agenda. I think we need a nonprofit…What I came out [of Penn] realizing was that Penn’s work was limited because we didn’t have a nonprofit partner that could really deal with housing price changes, equitable retail, and good job training. You know, all the things that the nonprofit sector owns that we couldn’t handle…

We have to have partners on the affordability side. And, for [Drexel], our partner is Philadelphia LISC. So, I will organize the demand side and I will work with a partner who will organize the supply side. So, we’ll analyze our procurement budget. We’ll identify what we could purchase locally, but I need [a nonprofit] to build the capacity of the local business. It’s not going to be us.” (Kerman 2015)

To remedy this weakness, as Kerman describes, Drexel has consciously aligned itself with non-profit partners in the neighborhood, including local CDCs (e.g., People’s Emergency Center) and community development intermediaries (e.g., LISC).
The second factor actively ties Drexel’s corporate approach to revitalization, including development and purchasing, to its academic mission. The integrated, “single university” approach means that Drexel makes an effort to direct research, student volunteerism, and outreach into the neighborhood in a coordinated way. Evidence of this strategy includes the Dornsife Neighborhood Center, which emphasizes civic engagement and provides neighborhood outreach support, as well as Drexel’s contribution to the federal Promise Zone initiative, which was awarded to West Philadelphia’s Mantua neighborhood in January 2014.

Drexel’s outreach and partnership efforts are important and they could change the way the neighborhood experiences institutional interventions. While Drexel’s initiatives are nascent, they have helped facilitate—not direct or dictate, as Kerman is careful to point out—neighborhood planning processes in partnership with neighborhood non-profits. The initiatives have also, for example, proactively identified homes that qualify for weatherization and rehabilitation programs, helping homeowners to apply for funding.

Yet, Drexel also lacks one of the critical ingredients for equitable neighborhood improvement. It does not have a front-end strategy to help absorb the impact of a real estate boom on the neighborhood; for instance, neither Drexel nor its partners have considered the possibility of a community land trust or rent control policies (Zitcer 2015). Similarly, it does not have a strategy for addressing the speculative development that will certainly follow in its wake. Already, private developers are snapping up single family homes and converting them into student-centered apartments or developing
poor quality, infill student housing—"some of them, they don’t have steps and they
don’t have porches. They don’t have any of the kind of look of even a neighborhood like
Mantua... They’re very disruptive and upsetting to the neighborhood" (Kerman 2015).
As Drexel continues to invest in its own expansion and pursue its plans for an
"innovation neighborhood," it becomes less certain how it—or its non-profit partners—
will navigate the pitfalls of a market-heavy strategy (Drexel University 2015).
CHAPTER 6. FROM VICIOUS TO VICTORIOUS? CATALYZING CHANGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI’S NEIGHBORHOODS

6.1 Introduction: The Story of the University of Cincinnati

The University of Cincinnati’s (UC) neighborhood revitalization efforts began with grand plans to transform its campus. Whereas it started as a small collection of buildings along a streetcar line, the UC campus had undergone several periods of growth during the 20th century, resulting in a mishmash of development without a clear identity. During the early 1990s, university leaders set out to rebrand the institution, investing in a campus master plan by the nationally recognized firm, Hargreaves Associates, and, subsequently, implementing its vision through a series of signature development projects, including buildings by Frank Gehry, Michael Graves, and Peter Eisenman.

UC’s administration soon realized, however, that a makeover could not protect the institution from feeling the effects of the adjacent Uptown neighborhoods. As the university spent millions on architectural gems, its neighborhoods were struggling with gang violence, crack houses, and deterioration. Parents and prospective students were arriving on campus and unable to reconcile the impressive brochure photos with the realities of a declining neighborhood; matriculation rates dropped and enrollment decreased to the lowest levels in years. UC had to take its revitalization program beyond the campus and focus on the neighborhood.

UC’s neighborhood intervention relied on two mechanisms to spur revitalization—one micro and one macro. It used a moderate approach to community
involvement and partners, while focusing principally on real estate and prioritizing physical infrastructure improvement. At the micro level, UC established individual community urban redevelopment corporations (CURCs) within several of its neighborhoods. Functionally, CURCs are similar to community development corporations (CDCs) and include both UC and neighborhood representation on the governing board. Charged with assembling and redeveloping key sites, the CURCs relied on an UC-governed endowment loan fund, to catalyze revitalization. Initially seeded with a $20 million revolving loan fund, UC trustees had to approve an additional $130 million just to get projects off the ground. By the time the CURCs were able to begin repayment, several years later, UC trustees elected to eliminate the “revolving” option for the fund and, instead, focused solely on collection.

On the macro scale, UC was a founding member of the Uptown Consortium Inc. (UCI), a multi-neighborhood CDC supported by five Uptown anchor institutions and “dedicated to the long term sustainability of Uptown Cincinnati” (Uptown Consortium 2014a). UCI pools resources from each of the anchors, in addition to leveraging outside funding such as New Markets Tax Credits. Similar to the CURCs, UCI pursues redevelopment projects. However, it also undertakes broader planning initiatives and quality of life strategies for the Uptown neighborhoods, including cleanliness and safety, transportation, urban design, housing, and economic development.

Since UC began lending its financial resources to the Uptown neighborhoods, the area has transformed into a vibrant, urban “college neighborhood.” While students have always been a significant part of Uptown, the revitalization has introduced several new
mixed-use projects along major commercial corridors, as well as a number of large apartment complexes in the neighborhood. It has not only attracted new households to the area, but also boosted UC’s enrollments by more than 11,000 students in ten years. In addition, UC’s commitment to place, along with its UCI partners, has strengthened Uptown’s economic contributions to Cincinnati. UC is the second largest employer in the region, while the Uptown anchors, collectively, account for more than 50,000 employees and contribute more than $1.4 billion in payroll and $3 billion in economic impact annually (Uptown Consortium 2014a).

UC’s approach to neighborhood revitalization is conceptually innovative, leveraging its endowment assets to reinvest local dollars in place. HUD and the Democracy Collaborative, among others, have held it up as a best practice approach to community development (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2014; Democracy Collaborative 2014). However, its implementation has been difficult and its structural integrity has been altered. While UC’s original “micro-level” commitment was “pitched as a revolving loan fund of about $20 million,” the institution overestimated the willingness of the private sector to participate in the work (Siegert 2015). What began as an opportunity to catalyze local revitalization interest became a wholesale commitment by the university to fund redevelopment projects. And this outcome was simply not in line with UC’s mission; ultimately, its leadership backed away from the approach as an enduring strategy:

“[The board] bit off more than they could chew. [The CURCs] needed more money to do this and to do that. It was like the classic… there was a loose thread on the sweater and [UC’s board] pulled the thread and the arm fell off. They got to the
point where it was $150 million. They said, now we need to recoup this. We need to get it back.” (Siegert 2015)

The UCI strategy, alternately, balanced UC’s commitment with other institutional allies in Uptown, citing their collective strength and dependence. Yet, similar to the CURCs, UCI predominantly pursues market-driven real estate projects and its work is constrained by funding uncertainties.

The true potential of UC’s approach remains theoretical; in practice, UC’s investments have only scratched the surface of community development. Even though UC has invested in tools that offer immense opportunities to steer development in a pro-community direction, its corporate realities—including fiscal responsibilities, as well as institutional expansion and branding priorities—mean that market factors drive the process, leaving little room for the softer side—and real potential—of community development. UC’s intervention has changed the neighborhood ecology, but its achievements are tied to market gains; as it relates to community empowerment, UC’s approach has been hampered by a lack of durability in leadership values and institutional mission.

6.2 History

The University of Cincinnati’s history was fragmented throughout much of the 19th century (University of Cincinnati 2008). Initially founded in 1819, the university received its charter from the Ohio legislature and was known as the Cincinnati College and Medical College of Ohio. It struggled financially for a number of years and took a number of different forms as other colleges emerged in the city. However, seeded by a
$1 million endowment from the estate of Charles McMicken in 1870, these disparate colleges merged with Cincinnati College to form a unified University of Cincinnati.

UC’s campus design and its physical relationship to the Uptown neighborhoods was shaped by its initial role as a commuter school. Initially, the campus operated out of existing buildings—first, a high school and, subsequently, at the McMicken estate on Clifton and Vine Streets (University of Cincinnati 2008). However, there was no room to expand and, by 1893, the UC campus relocated a short distance to its present-day location along Clifton Avenue. Its new campus was bucolic, set apart from the congested city, near the burgeoning suburbs, and adjacent to Burnett Woods, a large city park. Importantly, it was also located along a streetcar line, which would become central to the university’s commuter identity. As UC built its first three buildings, it made a strategic decision to forgo the quadrangle design that defined many campuses of the era in favor of a plan that consciously oriented buildings along the transportation corridor.

For UC, the 20th century brought significant expansion that took place in three major waves (University of Cincinnati 2008). The first period of expansion was a direct continuation of the initial campus construction. From the early 1900s to the 1920s, the university added a variety of programs and was continually undergoing construction to meet enrollment demands, until the chill of the Great Depression set in. The second expansion period occurred in the wake of WWII, as federal investments fueled both growth in enrollment and research. To meet demands from returning veterans, UC pursued rapid construction of housing and classroom space; by 1949, more than half of
UC’s graduates were veterans. Soon, the university had to acquire new acreage to accommodate its needs. In response, the campus design shifted to expansion along UC’s edges, as opposed to its more purposeful orientation along the streetcar. This period also introduced a surge of cars to the campus as commuting modes changed. The technological shift drastically affected UC’s physical character, as parking lots became part of the landscape. Urban Renewal serves as a bookend UC’s second expansion period, as the institution acquired land and developed superblock dormitories, academic buildings, an 8,000-seat field house and additional parking lots, changing the neighborhood fabric in significant ways (University of Cincinnati 2008; Casey-Leininger 1993).

UC’s third period of growth began during the 1990s and continues to the present day. The university’s growth strategy during this phase occurred on two fronts. Internally, university leadership expressed a clear desire to redefine its hodge-podge campus and develop a cohesive building program (University of Cincinnati 2008). Hargreaves & Associates, a landscape architecture firm, tackled this problem in the 1991 Campus Master Plan. The university implemented the plan over the next decade, investing in several renowned architectural projects that injected life into the campus and raised UC’s national profile. As Herbert Muschamp, a New York Times architectural critic, described it:

“With a master plan by George Hargreaves and individual buildings by Michael Graves, David Childs, Wes Jones, Harry Cobb and Frank Gehry, Cincinnati is one of the most architecturally dynamic campuses in America today. More than that, the state university has risen to one of the major challenges of the contemporary city.
Show us something new. Give us big, urban objects that we can look at, discuss, love or despise.“ (Muschamp 1996)

Simultaneously, many of the neighborhoods surrounding UC were showing signs of distress. Gangs, drugs, and crime became a defining feature of the neighborhood and absentee landlords dominated the housing stock, seeking to make the maximum dollar from student tenants without investing in their properties. By the mid-1990s, the university was feeling the impacts of disinvestment. As UC’s Associate Vice President for Community Development characterized it:

It was, basically, a commuter college and a lot of people did not want their kids to drive here. A lot of people would come down to orientation and turn around to go back. I mean, people from out of town maybe didn’t know—they had seen all the splashy [UC] publications. And then they got here and hypodermic needles are on the sidewalk and that kind of stuff. That is part of why the enrollment dropped... the school was just drifting.” (Siegert 2015)

UC’s enrollments flagged during the mid-1980s and fell to their lowest points between 1999 and 2002 (Fuller 2011). In 1980, the university’s student population peaked at 39,772; by 2002, it had dropped below 33,000. Neighborhood residents also felt the impacts of disinvestment, as poverty and unemployment rates climbed, vacancy and crime rates increased, and property conditions deteriorated (Keogh-Jurs 2015; Varady 2015; Curnette 2012).

University leaders recognized the opposing trends within the campus and the adjacent neighborhoods. Even while UC invested heavily in an improved campus, architecturally significant buildings would not compensate for threats—real or perceived—in the neighborhoods. The large campus also did not have the neighborhood infrastructure to support its institutional aspirations, including supporting retail,
restaurant, and entertainment options, as well as sufficient off-campus housing choices. In order to transform its campus, UC would have to look beyond its footprint and towards its neighbors.

6.3 UC’s Recipe for Neighborhood Revitalization: Community, Development, and Patience

Joseph Steger was inaugurated as UC’s president in 1984, shortly after enrollments began to fall. Professionally, Steger had roots in both the academic and corporate worlds, which informed his strategic plans for the university. He conceived of UC as a brand, rationalizing “if you have a product, you need to make your customers happy. You need to have an environment that they are comfortable with” (Siegert 2015). Declining enrollment rates were a symptom that something was wrong with UC’s product, so Steger initiated a plan to correct its course, beginning with the Hargreaves Master Plan and subsequent capital improvements program.

Over the span of a decade, new buildings by Michael Graves, Frank Gehry, and Peter Eisenman injected new life into the campus. Each development project supported UC’s long-term plans to transition from a commuter campus towards a more residential one. However, a key ingredient seemed to be missing: despite the critical acclaim garnered by UC’s new facilities, enrollment rates continued to plummet. Administrators polled students who were admitted, but elected not to enroll, and discovered the chasm between the university and neighborhood conditions (Siegert 2015; Bourgeois 2015). In response, Steger added a new play into his playbook that would extend the university’s investments into the neighborhoods and stabilize the town-gown borders.
UC evaluated its surroundings and found its institutional trajectory was inextricably linked to the neighborhood’s stability—a factor, as one of the CURC executive directors described it, “we don’t control, yet we’re at the mercy of” (Bourgeois 2015). As Steger spoke with neighborhood stakeholders and elected officials, he was aware the university could not repeat the methods of the past. It “needed to be competitive and they need to make sure that these areas around the university are topnotch” (Keogh-Jurs 2015). Yet, the neighborhood remembered the days of urban renewal and carried a general sense of mistrust. A planner for the City of Cincinnati posed the community’s concerns this way: “how would [UC revitalize] without, sort of, bulldozing over the community? Physically and metaphorically, how does [UC] do it without tearing everything down and building from scratch, because that’s not what anybody wants to see” (Keogh-Jurs 2015).

6.3.1 UC and the Uptown CURCs: Putting “Community” in Development?
UC’s answer was a strategy that leveraged two complementary strengths—one internal and the other external to the university. On the institutional side, the university had the financial muscle to affect neighborhood conditions. The board of trustees had the ability to direct university endowment monies towards community development projects, in addition to university capital dollars. However, without community support, they understood it would be untenable for UC to exercise its development capacity outside of the campus. The alternative was for the university to establish partnerships with community groups.
Collectively, Cincinnati has “very strong community organizations...” Each neighborhood has its own character and its own unique history and leadership structure... Our community councils are a very important voice in [the city’s development] process” (Keogh-Jurs 2015). Yet, while many neighborhoods had active community councils—essentially neighborhood associations that provided a forum for the local issues and served as an informal review board for neighborhood development issues with the City—and, often times, business associations, these groups were not formal non-profits and did not have the capacity to implement revitalization projects. Thus, when UC thought about establishing community partnerships, it did not see any natural partners. Its solution was to actively develop a capable partner within each of the target neighborhoods.

Beginning in the late 1990s, UC went to into the neighborhoods and founded seven place-based CURCs (Siegert 2015; Luther 2015; Bourgeois 2015). Each non-profit corporation had a five-person governing board, comprised of a member of UC’s administration and four members of the neighborhood’s community council and business association. As UC’s Associate Vice President for Community Development tells it, “there were a couple of corporations were we really had to look to find residents and businesses” who were committed to a new vision for Uptown and would sit on the board (Siegert 2015). “We were not about to put gang members [from the neighborhood] on the board... We had to kind of grab everybody by the belt and pull [the neighborhood] back” from deterioration.
The CURCs efforts were principally focused on real estate projects and, initially, they were charged with facilitating the development process for private investors. The strategy began with the university’s trustees, who agreed to divert a percentage of their endowment dollars from bonds into a revolving loan fund for the CURCs (Siegert 2015). The CURCs, poised at the edges of UC’s campus, would borrow from the university’s loan pool to stimulate the real estate market within their focus areas. The original intent was for each CURC to focus on catalytic projects—projects that were difficult for the private market to initiate, perhaps due to site conditions or ownership issues, but, with some initial assistance, could transform the neighborhood. The CURCs, leveraging university funds, would identify key opportunities, acquire properties and assemble the land, at which point private developers could submit a development proposal.

Together, UC and the CURCs identified fifteen such projects and UC’s board of trustees signed off on the revolving loan fund. Armed with their redevelopment goals and target projects, the CURC executive directors began to purchase land. One executive director summarizes his CURC’s charge this way:

“So, in 2002 or 2003, they started giving us seed money. What can you do with it? How do you change neighborhoods? The idea was to think big and big is what we did—at least we think so. The idea was to do something and then maybe you’ll trigger private dollars. You get private dollars and the cycle becomes a victorious cycle instead of a vicious cycle... We went first. We all knew [the neighborhood] could change, but somebody had to prove it. Instead of crack houses, [the CURCs] have beautiful luxury apartments, class A office space, and new condos.” (Luther 2015).

A few of the CURCs have been successful in their redevelopment efforts, redeveloping key sites with apartments, retail, and office uses. The Clifton Heights Community Urban Redevelopment Corporation (CHCURC) was the first corporation to
start implementing projects. In negotiations with residents from the adjacent Clifton Heights, University Heights and Fairview neighborhoods—collectively referred to as the CUF neighborhood, CHCURC’s scope of work was precise and narrowly targeted. It would focus exclusively on a pair of one-way commercial corridors, located immediately south of UC’s campus and sports venues and north of the residential portions of the neighborhood. At the time, fast-food chains, deteriorated housing stock, and other low-density buildings dominated the commercial strips. The executive director of CHCURC rationalizes “the community council didn’t trust this redevelopment corporation that was funded by UC. They basically said you can do what you want in the business district, just don’t screw with our neighborhood” (Bourgeois 2015).

Ten years later, CHCURC’s efforts have completely transformed the corridors with positive and negative effects. The central project is known as U-Square @ the Loop, a multi-block, mixed-use midrise development with apartments, ground floor retail and restaurants, 40,000 square feet of office space, two parking garages, and a public piazza (Neyer 2013). CHCURC borrowed approximately $32 million from the UC endowment fund for acquisition and spent more than four years assembling land, which included eminent domain litigation with the owner of two fast food properties on the corridors. By the time the legal disputes were resolved in 2006, Cincinnati’s economy was beginning to stall and UC’s trustees put a moratorium on additional loans to CHCURC. There were several other bumps in the road, including UC and CHCURC’s decision to select a new developer for the project in 2008, but, by 2013, U-Square officially opened and the corridor is unrecognizable.
The street, formerly dominated by parking lots and drive-thrus, is now an active, urban pedestrian destination. On weekends and, especially, during UC sporting events, the sidewalks and restaurants are filled with diverse groups of people, from students to sports-fans and visitors. Yet, these changes have been controversial, particularly for the CUF neighborhood. As CHCURC’s executive director remarks, “It’s been weird. I was trying to remind the board that all this new construction that happened... it’s not like we tore down brownstones. Because it was McDonald’s that lost its market and Taco Bell. It was not nice stuff” (Bourgeois 2015). And, while that is true, the sheer magnitude of new development—by UC and the CURCs, but also the private sector—has been hard for some residents to swallow.

While many benefit from better retail and service amenities on the corridors, CHCURC’s investments have stimulated a torrent of private multi-family developments throughout the neighborhood, which aim to serve the student population. In less than a decade, these large apartment complexes have popped up on the blocks adjacent to CHCURC’s sites and have transformed the area’s character, which was comprised of older two-story homes. For residents and, particularly, the small percentage of homeowners in CUF (ranging between eleven and thirty-three percent in 2010), these externalities are unwelcome. Despite the fact these same homeowners initially supported CHCURC’s efforts being confined to the commercial corridors, they now feel that CHCURC and UC—thought of as the real power behind the CURCs—have been unsupportive of neighborhood priorities, including homeownership. In their perception,
the neighborhood is being inundated by university-centric uses. A CUF resident, who also sits on the CHCURC board, expresses his frustration this way:

“There is no back and forth. We [the neighborhood and UC] communicate. [UC] comes to some of [the neighborhood’s] meetings. They represent themselves nicely—’we care, we care.’ But nothing happens. It was a good excuse. [Being] proactive counts for a lot—they’re here talking. They are proactive and they are saying ‘let’s get in front of the problem.’ [The neighborhood] says ‘ok, what is it going to take to keep [development] from advancing further?’ But they have done nothing, really.” (Kussmaul 2015)

This exchange illustrates one of the areas where UC’s approach to community revitalization falls short. In theory, the CURCs are embedded in the adjacent Uptown neighborhoods and are designed to give those communities a voice—the university only occupies one seat, out of five, on the governing board. However, in practice, UC values market-rate development projects for its endowment loans, while the CURCs are almost entirely dependent on UC for funding. This arrangement makes it difficult to integrate financing decisions with other community priorities, meaning pro formas tend to trump alternate neighborhood benefits. In Uptown, where student demand is strong, this market-based strategy results in a de-facto pro-university development policy. The CURCs, with support from UC dollars, have built mixed-use projects with apartments and vibrant commercial and retail amenities. Private investors have quickly followed suit, igniting a boom in multi-family residential construction that specifically targets students and reverberates throughout many of the adjacent Uptown neighborhoods. With several cranes in the air, it does not show signs of slowing down.

Internally, UC’s funding strategy is also problematic, owing to wavering support for “patient capital.” In the early years, UC’s leadership, including the president and
board of trustees, fully supported the concept of diverting endowment dollars into community development and, in exchange, forgoing income on that portion of their investment. All parties understood the endowment loan pool would become “patient capital.” The executive director of the Corryville Community Development Corporation (CCDC), another CURC on UC’s southern edge, characterizes the university’s philosophy this way:

“[President] Steger’s idea, I think, was the university is going to get paid back in the form of students—not necessarily in the form of dollars and cents, but we do have to track dollars and cents and we will. His idea was ‘you know what? I’m going to be dead in twenty or thirty years. The university is not going to be dead in thirty years. It’s an institution that is over a hundred years old. I’m going to die before it dies.’ So, the university has time—patient capital—to put a bunch of money into a project. And the university can take a second position on the loans and not say anything or do anything—it can wait for [monetary] payoff. Unfortunately or fortunately, it’s working exactly according to plan. It’s going to take a little while... before the university really gets a heck of a lot of money. But they will [eventually] recoup every one of their dollars with interest.” (Luther 2015)

This philosophy, which leverages the UC’s fiscal strength and reinvests endowment assets as local dollars in the neighborhoods, was the real innovation in the university’s approach. It is a strategy the anchor institution literature frequently holds up as a best practice. Yet, the reality is a bit muddier. At its apex, UC’s endowment loan fund was $150 million, but its initial investment plans were never so grand. As time went on, however, the loan pool’s depth grew, projects took longer than anticipated (such as CHCURC’s project), and, as university leaders changed, patience became less of a virtue as far as the endowment was concerned. The Associate Vice President for Community Development explains:

“In [some cases], [UC] was paid back, but we did not redeploy [the loans]. We stuck [the money] back in to other things because the board... The board is a nine-member
board and everyone has a nine-year term, so someone moves out every year. [The current] group is about one and a half revolutions past the original board—the ones who thought this was a great idea. The [current board] all say ‘these are lousy real estate investments.’ Well, they were not intended to be real estate investments. So, all the [board members] who bought in to it, all the people who sold the concept, [they] are gone. And I go out to the investment committee or real estate committee and try to explain what we’re doing. They just shake their heads like ‘you idiot!’ (Siegert 2015)

The loss of tolerance for patient investment has had several ramifications for UC’s policy, particularly with respect to its willingness to invest in community wealth-building and/or other neighborhood priorities.

UC’s original intent was to pledge a portion of its endowment to a revolving loan fund. That plan, however, did not come to fruition and resources are not revolving; they are being returned to traditional investment vehicles as payments are collected from the CURCs. This reversal, in part, can be attributed to the role UC has assumed within the development process, which has left the leadership feeling both financially overextended and overexposed to risk. Initially, UC administrators expected the endowment loans to function as a seed fund. The university would assist the CURCs with site assemblage and preparation with “the idea [that] once have assembled land mass and everything was unified, the developers would love that. They would come in. And they did. But the idea that they would put skin in the game and they would participate and they would take risks—that did not happen” (Siegert 2015). What began as a $20 million seed fund, quickly mushroomed into a $150 million loan pool that was used to mortgage development projects. In addition, UC’s willingness to invest in neighborhood development projects has made it an “easy mark” for private investors:
“Office [projects] don’t seem to go because the first thing [the developer does] is ‘ok, university. We built this office building. How many square feet do you want to rent?’ [The university] doesn’t really need it, but we will take a little. It’s like buying cookies from a Girl Scout. You don’t really want them, but I will buy a box. What has been very, very difficult is some of these developers come in and they hold a gun to our head and say ‘Well, this project is not going to go unless you rent 40,000 square feet.’ And there are some good things about the project. You hate to say, ‘no, sorry’ and lose it.” (Siegert 2015)

Today, UC has collected approximately $60 million of the $150 million it lent to the CURCs. While several of the CURC developments are realizing positive cash flows, it will be two to three decades before the university will fully recoup its loans. Given the lack of philosophical support for “patient capital” by the current board of trustees, the administration does not appear to be overly optimistic about the future of UC’s financial commitment to the neighborhoods. This is not to say the university intends to turn its back on the community, but administrators intimate university leadership has—and will have in the foreseeable future—much less tolerance for investment risk than it did twenty years ago. However, the neighborhoods have necessarily not received this message.

The CURCs express optimism about the future. Across the board, executive directors acknowledge that the loan pool has dried up considerably. Yet, they also share an underlying belief that UC will resume a financial partnership once the CURCs demonstrate an ability to pay back the loans. Two executive directors from the most active CURCs share their insights:

“I don’t think [UC] will [lend our CURC money] for a little while yet. I think I’m cut off for quite some time. Now, that’s not to say that—‘hey, this little park space can be dressed up. Are there any grant opportunities within the city or university?’ I think they would be receptive to that. But the amount of money I borrowed? They’re going to want those pots filled up a little bit before they start dishing it out again... if they
ever dish it out again. I think they’re done for the moment. I think they did what they wanted to do and, now, I think they’re done for the moment. (Luther 2015)

“[Borrowing money] would have been much more possible ten years ago. But, today, they got much more disciplined in the way they use their endowment. [UC has tried] to basically say, ‘Let’s hit pause and deal with what we’ve got now. We’ll revisit this whole community development thing on kind of a year-by-year basis.’ But, for us, we were the one they have loaned the most money to—and, so, [our CURC] was in the most, kind of, limbo. Over the last five years, we’ve been able to lessen the strain by getting a big development like U-Square off the ground. They can look at cash flow and know that they will be paid at some point in time.” (Bourgeois 2015)

Some residents, too, share a belief that the university will be more responsive to the neighborhood’s priorities, particularly now that the big redevelopment projects have been built. The sentiment, it seems, is that UC has illustrated a willingness to listen to the neighborhoods. While these conversations have not resulted in concrete actions, residents can see the potential through their frustrations:

“Frankly, after I have said all of this about UC, there are some from UC that are supportive of [our homeownership priorities]. This is all, kind of, talking so far and we haven’t gotten as far as actually having a plan, but UC might actually be of some value to us. They might actually do something. My senses say they might actually help us out with that” (Kussmaul 2015).

Yet, despite their hopeful outlook, UC has not made any promises to either the CURCs or the residents. Thus far, its revitalization strategy has been reliant on real estate strategies; without market demand, there is no indication that university leaders would be willing to invest in other types of revitalization activities.

6.3.2 Uptown Consortium: Anchor institutions working together in Uptown

Nineteen years after his inauguration, President Steger retired from UC. At that point, UC was deeply invested in the CURCs, many of which were actively acquiring land and had projects under construction—there was no turning away from the strategy. However, UC’s new leadership, led by President Nancy Zimpher, did inculcate a new
philosophy into the university’s neighborhood efforts. Whereas the CURCs were meant to operate at a micro-level, focusing on specific projects and in specific neighborhoods, she saw an opportunity to leverage macro-resources across Uptown.

Uptown Consortium Inc. (UCI) grew out of a conversation among the leaders of Uptown’s five major anchor institutions. UCI is a CDC and represents a collaborative multi-anchor effort to improve the Uptown neighborhoods. UCI’s ten-year report characterizes the CDC’s founding this way:

“In 2003, the leaders of Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, Cincinnati Zoo & Botanical Garden, UC Health, TriHealth, Inc. and the University of Cincinnati decided that together they could accomplish more—for themselves and the Cincinnati neighborhoods where they are located—by working together.” (Uptown Consortium 2014b)

It focuses on four key areas: transportation, urban design, and planning; community and economic development; cleanliness and safety; and marketing and communications (Robinson 2015).

UCI functions as a neighborhood alliance, playing two primary roles within Uptown. First, it facilitates overall planning processes. For instance, UCI, along with the City of Cincinnati, has convened a planning process for the new Highway 71 interchange. The interchange will be a critical access point for Uptown’s anchors and is expected to transform two of Uptown’s major commercial corridors: MLK Drive, which will intersect the interchange directly, and Reading Road, which runs parallel to Highway 71 and represents the first major local intersection west of the interchange. The State and City Departments of Transportation expect the interchange to open in Fall 2016. As part of its work, UCI, in partnership with its anchor members, other neighborhood
stakeholders, and the City, facilitated a corridor study for MLK Drive and Reading Road. The study includes transportation corridor recommendations, but also sets the long-term vision for land uses and economic development. It has also been central to UCI’s work in Uptown for the last several years.

Second, UCI plays a more traditional CDC role, serving as a developer for key sites throughout the neighborhood. Much like UC, market-driven factors are central to its real estate strategy and it principally focuses on commercial corridors. As UCI’s executive director explains, the CDC’s fundamental belief is that a strong business district supports strong neighborhoods: “We recognize in our work that we need to stabilize [the commercial corridors] because... a strong business district will help the residential areas—they all kind of work together. So, we’re doing that” (Robinson 2015). Their recent development projects include the Herald Building, a 25-acre redevelopment project in the low-income Avondale neighborhood (northeast of UC in Uptown). The LEED Gold Certified office project houses the Cincinnati Herald, an African-American newspaper, and offices for the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital. UCI also partnered with CHCURC on the U-Square project, contributing $40 million from the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program.

For alliance-based work, the CDC taps into two complementary sources of funding. The first is a $37 million revolving loan pool, collectively funded by the member anchor institutions. The consortium used this fund to seed its early efforts and, at present, it is fully leveraged by existing projects (Robinson 2015). NMTC is another significant source of capital for UCI’s efforts. Since 2006, UCI has received nearly $140
million in three rounds of funding; they did not obtain credits in 2013, though UCI has
applied for credits during the 2015 cycle (Uptown Consortium 2014b). According to UCI,
these outside funding sources are critical to their success—especially since the member-
funded loan pool is fully deployed:

“You have to be well-funded... The other thing that’s really important is we’ve been
successful in getting New Markets Tax Credits. As the years go on, [NMTC] is highly
competitive and we didn’t get any this year. We reapplied this year. That will really
inhibit our ability to invest and make those catalytic kind of investments if, going
forward, we don’t get New Markets. That’s one of our risks out there because it’s
been such an important tool.” (Robinson 2015)

Through these primary activities, UCI works to facilitate conversations and
implement change across anchors, in tandem with other neighborhood stakeholders
and the City. As a convener of an alliance, UCI can consider a wider array of interests
than any of the individual anchors can; it also strives to build consensus across their
members and the larger neighborhood. At the city level, planners have noticed a
difference:

“How from where I sit, I really feel like Uptown has helped with [developing
relationships]. I feel like they understand. [UCI] understands the good that the
[anchor] institutions can do in the community, but I think they have also played a
significant role in making the institutions understand that they need to talk to the
community. And that having [community] support is actually going to be helpful and
it’s going to move their project along better and more smoothly. So, I think [UCI] has
played a pretty significant role in that. From where I sit, it isn’t something that [the
city planning department] has to jump in on and mediate. You know, it’s something
that UCI is already doing—building those relationships.” (Keogh-Jurs 2015)

In addition, UCI engages with member anchor institutions individually, serving as
a broker to implement the institutions’ neighborhood-specific initiatives. Essentially, UCI
lends its CDC skills as a developer and community convener to execute discrete anchor-
institution-funded projects. For instance, the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical
Center (CCHMC) serves as the primary anchor for Avondale, the low-income, African-American majority neighborhood on Uptown’s northeast side. For CCHMC, its mission is to have the “healthiest kids in Cincinnati” (Miller 2015); the institution defines the mission broadly, inclusive of neighborhood development and education activities. Its most recent investment includes a small townhouse development with eight subsidized, owner-occupied units. While CCHMC is footing the bill, UCI has stewarded the project through the development process, aiding in site acquisition, issuing a request for development proposals, and selecting a developer for construction.

The anchor institutions receive significant benefits from the UCI-convened alliance. The consortium offers a mechanism for the institutions to pool resources for long-term projects. UCI also enables the anchors to invest in neighborhood development issues that lie outside of their expertise, but affect their institutional existence all the same. A representative from CCHMC described it this way:

“It allows the [anchor institutions] to say ‘don’t come to us directly, go to Uptown,’ so we can all use Uptown. They’re specialized in real estate development and community investments and safety. So, they have the expertise, whereas for us, as a hospital, our core function is treating kids. That’s where we want to maintain our focus... Our view of investing in community and making healthy community does impact our mission, but as far as getting into the actual development side of things, it’s better suited for others.” (Miller 2015)

So, the Cincinnati Zoo, which attracts more than 1.5 million visitors in a given year, can contribute to transportation improvements and beautification initiatives—programs with direct ties to their visitors’ experience—without the burden of managing efforts outside of its core mission.
UCI also delivers a secondary benefit to its anchor institution members. For many anchor institutions, their willingness to engage in neighborhood improvement efforts can give the impression the anchor is a “bank.” For UC and other “engaged” universities, the administration is often inundated with competing funding requests, which pose two risks. The first is that the institution says ‘yes’ to all or most of the requests, thereby investing in neighborhoods without a clear strategy and diluting their potential impacts. The second is that the institution says ‘no’ to many of the requests, which can cast the anchor in an unsupportive light, straining the all-important relationship between town and gown. Alternately, UCI behaves as mediator between town and gown, distancing the anchor institutions from the financial requests that can threaten town-gown relationships. A representative from CCHMC describes the funding dynamic this way:

“As [institutions] do make commitments, what happens—or what was happening—was you get someone from Avondale saying ‘well, the Children’s Hospital gave us this amount of money to do this project.’ And, then, someone else will come to us and say, ‘well, you gave Avondale this money…’ But, we can’t [fund them all]. So, [UCI] is another way to help us consolidate all the requests. And everyone in the Uptown area knows that if you have something you need, to start with Uptown Consortium and then, you know, the organizations and institutions can help through that medium.” (Miller 2015)

As a town-gown mediator and convener of a multi-anchor alliance for place-based investment, UCI has made strides in bridging the traditional gaps between town and gown. Whereas UC and many other universities have longer histories of neighborhood engagement, UCI has drawn other “non-traditional” anchor institutions into neighborhood improvement efforts, including the hospitals and a zoo. It has worked to make anchor investments more efficient, functioning as a project
clearinghouse to minimize duplicative efforts and maximize common interests across anchors and neighborhoods. In doing so, UCI expressly targets initiatives where it can be effective over those that may have more subtle, but still important, benefits to the community. Similar to UC’s strategy, real estate projects are at the top of UCI’s list, as the executive director explains:

“We’ve been focused on real estate and we focus [those investments] on the commercial corridors. One of the reasons we have to focus is just to be strategic because we can’t be friends to all people and solve all issues. One of the challenges when the consortium was first funded… The mission was so broad—it involved the schools, it involved home ownership, it involved… [UCI] quickly—maybe three years—realized this is too big and we’ve got to narrow our scope. So, from the consortium’s perspective, we’ve narrowed our scope and we really have these strategic focus areas that we pour our attention into. Clean and safe is something basic… it touches everything. While there are these socio-economic issues, we don’t feel that’s our charge necessarily to work on this.” (Robinson 2015)

Yet, even while it makes sense to pursue a focused strategy with the ability to catalyze improvement, this model privileges physical revitalization over community- or household-level benefits. Secondarily, funding sources—NMTC among them—further support UCI’s emphasis on real estate and physical improvements. In this respect, the priorities of neighborhoods and residents are not well represented in the alliance. And, as the apparent development boom in Uptown continues, the misalignment between neighborhood concerns and institutional investments will likely foster new town-gown rifts.

6.4 Transforming Uptown: Neighborhood Change

A drive around the Uptown neighborhoods clearly illustrates the extent to which the area has changed over the last fifteen years. In the neighborhoods surrounding UC, the
new mixed-use retail and office developments are fully-leased and bustling with people. On a Saturday evening during a home basketball game, traffic nearly comes to a halt as students and visitors flock to the many new restaurants in CHCURC’s U-Square district on their way to the game. Meanwhile, these amenities have helped UC’s enrollment explode. Since 2002, the university has welcomed more than 11,000 new students to its campus and currently boasts the highest enrollment in its history; administrators project an additional 4,000 students will be enrolled by 2017. Collectively, these factors have contributed to change within the Uptown neighborhoods—some of it good and some of it bad.

UC’s community development strategy has prioritized market-based investments, executed by professionalized CURCs. Not all CURCs have been successful—some have dissolved, transferring their real estate holdings to UC or other private investors. However, the CURCs that have succeeded have taken a very traditional approach to revitalization, allowing the market to define their priorities and without much guidance from the community. Where UC and/or the CURCs have attempted to respond to community interests, including increasing homeownership and non-apartment alternatives, they have been unable to make the projects feasible. UC’s Associate Vice President for Community Development describes one attempt the university made to invest in condominiums in 2006/2007:

“The opposition we got was when [UC] started knocking stuff down and talking about what we were going to build. We built student housing with retail and office buildings with some student housing and a hotel. Everything was good for students or the transient visitor... And we hit a point about 2006 or 2007 where one of the neighborhoods really dug their heels and said, ‘No, damn it. This is our...
neighborhood. We want owner-occupied stuff!” They made a very, very impassioned plea to look at condominiums. Well, 2006/2007 was not the time to build condos, but they did not want to listen to that... So, [UC] said, ‘Ok, we will take the time and incur the expense to look at feasibility of a project... Well, obviously, when you have owner-occupied, you want parking. The more we had to go underground to build parking, the higher we had to go. The next thing you know, we got to a point where we have to build 425 units to break even... [We] had to tell the neighbors, ‘No, thank you. And, by the way, we have a developer who wants to come and he is going to put in restaurants, student housing, and offices.” They just screamed bloody murder about students, students, students…” (Siegert 2015)

CHCURC can tell a similar story, as they attempt to secure hotel and condominium uses for its last remaining development site. At present, it has an interested hotel operator for the project and is working through financing options, but “[developers] are still [proposing] apartments and, you know, we could finance that tomorrow and it would be successful” (Bourgeois 2015). It is truly the pitfall of a pragmatic neighborhood investment strategy—neither UC nor the CURCs can force a project’s pro forma to work and, when it does not, the institutions and neighborhoods are both left unsatisfied. The executive director of CHCURC sums it up this way:

“It’s this bizarre world, where we have to balance market realities with what we want. And that is the most imperfect science that I, personally, have had to deal with. You know, you can’t just ignore the fact that the market is saying we need more apartments and we need more of this. But you have to try to spend more energy focusing on what is the market might support, but hasn’t really gotten around to yet.” (Bourgeois 2015)

CCDC’s executive director takes this musing further, suggesting that future cash flow from the CURC projects, after all the loans are paid down in twenty or thirty years, could be a huge benefit to the community: “After you get done paying the university, wow, you’re throwing off a lot of money in this apartment building. What can you do for the neighborhood then? And my eyes get real big... In a community council, they’re going to have priorities about what happens with that money” (Luther 2015). Yet, thirty years is a
long time to ask neighborhoods to wait for “real” benefits and too many factors will change between now and then. UC’s path to neighborhood improvement may be paved with good intentions, but market feasibility has been the dominant consideration and real estate markets do not give much credence to community building.

The mismatch between neighborhood aspirations, which include homeownership and condominium development, and the reality of widespread apartment construction activity and UC’s dramatic enrollment increases, has spurred other qualitative problems in the neighborhood. Off-campus student behavior is one of the most contentious town-gown issues for the Uptown neighborhoods, particularly those along UC’s southern edge (Kussmaul 2015; Luther 2015; Siegert 2015). Neither UC nor UCI address the community discord through their neighborhood revitalization strategies, which generates significant ill will among residents. The dynamic has led to a stalemate between town and gown. UC has a limited ability to regulate off-campus behavior, which includes not just UC students, but other young adults who move into the neighborhood to partake in the “student lifestyle” (Siegert 2015). Meanwhile, the neighborhood residents perceive the university as unwilling to address their most pressing concerns (Kussmaul 2015). The influx of privately developed apartment complexes only amplifies the contentious situation. From the resident’s perspective, the new development is not only creating an imbalance in a neighborhood that was already a college community; it is undermining a forward-looking vision for what the community would like to become.
The market emphasis on student-centric housing also creates a “marketplace” for other externalities. By principally focusing on property development, UC’s neighborhoods have not realized much improvement along quality of life metrics. Crime and safety, specifically, continue to plague many sections of the Uptown neighborhoods, where it preys upon a growing student population. UC’s Associate Vice President for Community Development aptly describes the current situation: “The bad guys suddenly realized, ‘Now, I have this population of thousands of kids on the borders of campus.’ [Criminals] were always very leery of coming on to campus, because they looked out of place. But now, [they can go to the neighborhoods]—it’s like shooting fish in a barrel” (Siegert 2015). UC has invested in some tangential initiatives, including better lighting, Segways for university patrols, and a better partnership with the City of Cincinnati police, but those efforts have done little to intervene on the crime problem. Similarly, UC has fostered some grassroots-style community policing, including “citizens on patrol,” to the same end. Without a central philosophy or sustained investment in the “soft” aspects of neighborhood revitalization, it is inherently difficult to steer the neighborhood’s trajectory one way or another.

An analysis of neighborhood outcome statistics for the Uptown neighborhoods supports this image of conflicted change between 1990 and 2010. As a caveat, however, the descriptive statistics represent a snapshot at a single point in time; in 2010, the second point in the analysis, many of the present day development projects were under some phase of construction. In other words, the 2010 data points represent a neighborhood in flux and, in several instances, are not representative of the “outcome”
state. With that caveat in mind, many of the indicators point to a continued downward trend in the neighborhoods, consistent with what one might expect from a growing concentration of undergraduate and graduate students.

Between 1990 and 2010, the City of Cincinnati lost approximately twenty percent of its population. The Uptown neighborhoods, for the most part, followed suit with most census tracts losing between ten and thirty-five percent of their population during a period of significant change (Table 6.1). However, an assessment of 2013 ACS data (five year estimates from 2009 to 2013) shows that the trends reversed just a few years later; the population loss dropped significantly for many neighborhoods, while several tracts actually claimed moderate population increases. Similarly, the longer view of neighborhood change showed a decrease in the share of African-Americans for most of the Uptown neighborhoods. Even while several of the tracts saw an increasing share of African-Americans between 1990 and 2010, many reversed course by 2013 with some falling below their original 1990 levels.
Table 6.1 Demographic trends: Uptown neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

The economic indicators for the Uptown neighborhoods provide the clearest insight into the changing condition of the neighborhood (Table 6.2). A significant uptick in educational attainment rates, paired with substantial increases in poverty rates and falling median household incomes, speak to the growing influence of students in the neighborhood, including students in graduate programs and the medical school. For many neighborhoods and, particularly in the neighborhoods at the southern edge of UC (Mt. Auburn, CUF, and Corryville), census tracts saw the proportion of the adult population (twenty-five years and older) with a BA or more grow by more than fifteen percentage points. Across all census tracts, any declines in educational attainment were limited to single-digit losses and most were in BA-or-higher majority tracts. Poverty rates showed a comparable pattern with most neighborhoods showing double digit...
increases in the proportion of households living below the poverty threshold. Excepting the Clifton neighborhood and one tract in Mt Auburn, all tracts claimed a lower median household income than the city with most falling below their own 1990 levels.

Table 6.2 Economic trends: Uptown neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicators</th>
<th>Educational Attainment, % with 8th or more</th>
<th>University of Chicago</th>
<th>Uptown Neighborhoods</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tract 17</td>
<td>2% 28% 17% 9%</td>
<td>18% 27% 39% 4%</td>
<td>64% 17% 27% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 19</td>
<td>3% 5% 4% 3%</td>
<td>13% 21% 35% 4%</td>
<td>64% 17% 27% 6%</td>
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<td>1% 1% 1% 1%</td>
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<th>Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Tract 17</th>
<th>Tract 19</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<th>Median Household Income, $1,000</th>
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<th>Tract 19</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<tr>
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<td>$33,333</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The worsening trends in the demographic and economic data diverge with the neighborhood indicators, including growing rents and home values (Table 6.3); together, this analysis supports a strong, student-centric real estate market in the Uptown neighborhoods. Vacancy rates from 1990 to 2010, as well as from 2010 to 2013, climbed in the vast majority of census tracts, a likely signal of development but also a function of a transient rental market. Similarly, the homeownership rates across the Uptown neighborhoods decreased, mostly by double-digit percentages; by 2013, the homeownership rate was below twenty-five percent in the majority of Uptown census areas.
tracts. Conversely, the median rents in Uptown showed moderate stability with single digit fluctuations in either direction, except for the Mt Auburn neighborhood, which had more significant gains. Whereas a number of tracts claimed rents at or below the city’s median rent level in 1990, nearly all of them exceed the city’s rent by 2010. In most instances, median home values also grew in Uptown with rates above the city’s ten percent growth rate.

Table 6.3 Neighborhood trends: Uptown neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

6.5 Conclusion

While the initial strategy may have been sound, UC leadership seems to feel as though “they bit off more than they could chew” (Siegert 2015). In theory, leveraging the institution’s endowment as patient capital made sense as an economic and community-
minded strategy. Yet, the implementation of the strategy has been underwhelming, relative to its possibility.

The university—in addition to other Uptown anchors—has accrued significant benefits from its efforts, including major redevelopment projects that have improved the attractiveness of UC as a “college neighborhood” and supported substantial growth in student enrollment. To that end, many residential landlords, developers, and incoming students have also benefitted. Residents, too, have gained from the enhanced commercial corridors, but the benefits have not been distributed across the neighborhood. Further, residents also perceive indifference from the university to the neighborhood’s quality of life (Kussmaul 2015). New development has stimulated the market and delivered improved amenities, but it has also, much to the neighborhood’s dismay, led to the demolition of several historic properties, encroached upon the residential fabric, and placed unwelcome pressure on the neighborhood to support greater student densities (Twey 2015; Kussmaul 2015; Goldschmidt 2013). A story that began with crime and crack houses also ends with crime—opportunistic crimes amplified by a large student population—and new multi-family apartment complexes.

These varied outcomes in the Uptown neighborhoods speak to the weaknesses in UC’s implementation. One of the principal difficulties rests with UC’s leadership, whose fiduciary duties elevated the university’s internal goals and, indirectly, handicapped any discussion of community priorities. At the outset, UC appears to have underestimated the contribution it would need to stimulate redevelopment, while overestimating the willingness of the private market to “put skin in the game.” Without
the benefit of a strong institutional philosophy to substantiate its revitalization strategies—one that linked the university mission to its neighborhood, the miscalculation was a fatal flaw for future generations of UC’s leadership.

Over a decade, UC’s leadership went from committing a portion of its endowment to stimulate neighborhood redevelopment to rejecting the premise of patient capital all together. When early projects failed to attract private capital, the university was forced to commit significantly more endowment money than it anticipated. Subsequently, as original trustees rotated off the board, their replacements did not possess the same strategic vision or risk tolerance for university capital. So, today the board is left with a strategy that has all but disintegrated—its priority is on collecting UC funds from the CURC’s without any promise of redeployment. The leadership’s slow reversal of attitude towards community development has created ripple effects across Uptown, leaving the CURCs and UCI with funding uncertainties. Meanwhile, private investors are rapidly redeveloping Uptown properties to capture the student market without the benefit of a broader neighborhood vision. It is unclear how—or if—UC will intercede moving forward.

Investments rooted in real estate transactions and corporate metrics of success can change the physical character of neighborhoods; yet, the physical change alone rarely changes the social and economic circumstance of a community. The latter, as we will see in the case of Duke University, is achieved by investing in the grass roots of a community and in embracing a shared goal-setting process where the genius of a
community is harnessed to articulate its own needs. The fulfillment of these needs becomes the shared goal of the anchor institution and the community.

The inherent problem in the case of UC is not that the community development tools are not available in Uptown. UC constructed a strategy that is, theoretically, embedded in the neighborhoods and gives the community an equal seat at the table. Similarly, UCI’s stated mission is to bring the neighborhood’s institutional allies together for the long-term benefit of Uptown. Both models are flexible and could be directed towards any number of objectives. In implementation, however, UC’s approach has been limited by the wavering support of university leaders, who do not recognize a clear link between the university’s mission and its place-based investments. Further, UC’s institutional goals to build its brand and grow its student body have overshadowed any opportunities to empower community development via the CURCs. Where UC’s strategy is founded on real estate and the market supports university-centered consumer demand, community priorities have not been able to successfully compete for funding. Under these parameters, community empowerment objectives remain aspirational.
CHAPTER 7. “CAN YOU IMAGINE WHAT’S HAPPENED IN DURHAM?”
DUKE UNIVERSITY, THE DUKE-DURHAM NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIP, AND DOWNTOWN TRANSFORMATION

7.1 Introduction: The Story of Duke University
When Duke University (Duke) began investing in neighborhood revitalization in the mid-1990s, self-preservation motivated its leaders to act, but community informed how it acted. At the time, the university’s rising reputation stood in contrast to the struggling circumstances of Durham, which had fallen on hard times since the slow disappearance of the tobacco industry from its economy. As prospective students and employees arrived at Duke’s doorstep, they saw “this vast inequality that existed [in the adjacent neighborhoods] with accompanying crime rates... [and it was] just flat out embarrassing” for the institution (Jentleson 2015). Whereas Duke had long been a part of Durham’s civic infrastructure, it had conventionally participated in the city’s elite circle of Durham boosters. The dissolution those powerful growth coalitions along with the industrial economy meant that, when neighborhood decline became an issue, Duke no longer had access to the same political networks.

While the circumstances in Duke’s neighborhoods were not unique in the 1990s, its response to those problems was. In a mid-sized city were Duke employed half of the population and had long been an institutional fixture, university leaders “pretty quickly realized that the top-down approach was not going to work” to address decline (Johnson 2015). Simply, Duke did not have the political capital to implement a heavy-
handed approach in Durham’s neighborhoods—or at least not an approach that would derive long-term benefit for the institution. Instead, Duke accepted that investments in Durham would have to be supported by and targeted to the community, shifting the “story [from] look at what Duke did,” to “can you imagine what’s happened in Durham?” (Trask 2015).

Duke’s neighborhood revitalization intervention used an extensive approach that relied heavily on community outreach and partnerships. Instead of buying tools that Duke could use to fix the neighborhood, Duke conceived of itself as an instrument that could be used to effect change. Its philosophy rested on three primary factors. The first was the use of respected community representatives to facilitate a bottom-up community planning process, enabling “residents... to be in charge of their [own] programming” (Jentleson 2015). By employing community leaders with deep neighborhood roots to conduct extensive outreach, Duke ensured its interventions were aligned with neighborhood priorities.

The second factor integrated Duke’s neighborhood interests with those of other non-profit stakeholders in the community. Duke understood that the neighborhood was not uncontested territory—it may have been disinvested, but there were strong voices present who were also committed to change. It also knew that while the institution had financial resources, other non-profit experts were more adept at community development. Instead of reinventing the wheel, Duke’s leadership mobilized to establish partnerships with those organizations and overlay their efforts onto the neighborhood’s priorities.
The third factor enabled Duke to tailor its approach to the changing needs of place, allowing each neighborhood to interface with the intervention on its own terms. It also permitted flexible resource allocation based on the neighborhood context and efficacy of a particular investment. Duke’s primary “role was to provide the resources, expertise, and other kinds of things [the neighborhood] needed” (Jentleson 2015). In other words, Duke (and its partners) empowered the problem to dictate the solution, rather than allowing the solution to define the problem.

While Duke’s intervention adheres to many of the best practice recommendations presented by the anchor institution literature, its strategy is not widely known. Duke has sparked improvement in Durham, stabilizing the Duke-adjacent neighborhoods and transforming the downtown, but it has contributed to these efforts as a “quiet” partner. Its investments have aligned with the university mission, but they have not emphasized institutional branding to the same extent as other anchors. Although it has strategically invested in specific corridors to enhance the Duke experience and brand, most of its initiatives have focused on physical upgrading and wealth building for neighborhoods. In Durham more broadly, Duke has cemented its role as an economic engine and continues to be the largest employer in the city, as well as a major contributor to the region include the Research Triangle. However, it has also been a strategic investor in private redevelopment projects, quietly providing gap financing or leasing space to revive Durham’s downtown and diversify its economic base.
7.2 History

Duke University has been a part of Durham, NC since 1892 (King 2015). The institution began in 1838 as the Brown School, a Methodist and Quaker supported subscription school in rural North Carolina. During the 1850s, the school was reconceived as Normal College for a short time, before adopting a Methodist education model, inclusive of church funding, and new name—Trinity College. This model persisted until 1887, when a new college president, John Crowell, advised the institution to relocate to Durham and build an urban campus with greater access to students, faculty, and financial support. This strategic move, in many ways, foreshadows the investments Duke and other universities would make a century later to enhance their competitiveness within the higher education sector.

After lengthy debates and much anxiety, Trinity College traded its pastoral setting for a new urban campus in Durham in 1892 (King 1992). Two Durham philanthropists, each of whom had earned his wealth in the tobacco industry, made the relocation possible. Julian S. Carr donated ninety-seven acres of land for a campus and Washington Duke endowed Trinity with three $100,000 gifts, providing funds for construction and moving (Harkins 2007). Now known as the East campus, Trinity’s grounds were situated on the urban fringe, approximately one mile from downtown and the tobacco warehouses. By the early 1900s, the college’s enrollment was on the rise and the campus was growing, adding several more academic buildings, residential and athletic facilities arranged in a park-like setting (Harkins 2007; King 1992).
The institution’s final metamorphosis into Duke University occurred in 1924 (King 2015). At this time, the Duke family established The Duke Endowment, a $40 million trust whose income was distributed among Durham’s hospitals, orphanages, the Methodist Church, three colleges, and a university. The Endowment persists today as one of the largest 501(c)(3) private foundations in the US (The Duke Endowment 2015). The conversion of Trinity into a university was part of the institution’s long term strategy; the funding enabled them to act. The Duke Endowment allocated $19 million to the newly formed university for campus development and expansion. In turn, the university president renamed the institution Duke University, in honor of its benefactors. By 1925, Duke’s land holdings had grown exponentially. In addition to redeveloping its East Campus, the university purchased additional land to form contiguous West (720 acres) and Central (200 acres) campuses. These new campuses were, and continue to be, set within 7,200 acres of Duke-owned forested land, earning West Campus the moniker of “university in the forest.” Importantly, the university’s new purchases extended the urban fringe to the west, as opposed to impinging on the urbanizing downtown to the east. This strategic choice, along with the scale of land acquisition that took place, would lessen town-gown land disputes in later years.

As the institution transformed from Trinity College to Duke University, it also set a precedent for town-gown relations with Durham (Moyne 2004). The university was quietly brokering land deals and acquiring land to support its substantial expansion plans. While many of these efforts occurred under the radar to avoid conflicts and speculative pricing, Duke did engage in a dialog with Durham’s civic leaders,
emphasizing the university’s intention “to bring Durham to greatness” (Moyne 2004, p 216). In this respect, it served as one of Durham’s great boosters during the early 20th century, recognizing their shared futures and deliberately establishing a connection between town and gown in their own actions. Its campus development activities during the 1920s and 1930s further illustrate this relationship. As Duke built its West campus and established itself as a major research university, its investments and construction activity largely buffered Durham from the worst effects of the Great Depression. Decades later, Duke’s presence would shelter Durham from the brunt of the Great Recession.

Duke could not, however, shield Durham from urban decline in the mid-20th century. As the tobacco and textile industries retreated from Durham’s economy, the city began to show signs of urban decline (Ehrsam 2010; Wynn 2015). Yet, Duke and Durham’s leaders continued to cultivate a culture of mutual dependency. For instance, a newspaper article published during Durham’s 1953 centennial celebrations highlighted the substantial contributions Duke made to the local economy and proclaimed “[t]his is how a city and a university work together in forming a stronger community” (Moyne 2004, p 238). This attitude persisted in the subsequent two decades with one university president “recognizing” Duke’s responsibilities to the local community in his 1962 speech (p 250); in the 1970s, another president affirmed that “Duke needs Durham... [and Duke will strive to be] a good Durham citizen concerned with all its problems and hopes, and as useful as we are able to be in all its civic enterprises” (p 281).
Even as Durham pursued urban renewal strategies eagerly during this period, Duke maintained both a figurative and literal distance. Whereas many universities leveraged urban renewal programs to acquire land and pursue expansion plans, it already owned upwards of 8,000 acres, most of which was (and remains) undeveloped forestland. Further, its physical footprint spread away from downtown, not towards it, which diminished town-gown acquisition disputes. The institution’s one foray into urban renewal during the mid-1960s included the purchase of a former textile mill village situated between the East and West campuses (Moyne 2004). Duke land-banked the properties, which included 150 homes, for a time, before applying for demolition funds from the urban renewal program. While they were not successful in obtaining federal funds, Duke moved forward with their plans to clear the land and construct married student housing, thereby establishing its Central campus.

On the public sector side, Duke was consulted as a major Durham stakeholder, but remained politically “neutral” on city urban renewal plans. The institution quietly acknowledged the benefits of urban renewal projects, while taking pains to diminish its influence in the process and publicly calling for “sensitivity” towards existing communities. For instance, when the city cleared a large swath of land through several established African-American neighborhoods for the Durham Freeway, Duke very carefully stated: “Duke University has no vested interest, but does have always concern that the construction of any road be so located as to cause the least possible dislocation to residents, and especially is sensitive to the plight of its neighbors...” (p 279). Owing to its limited direct involvement with urban renewal, Duke’s town-gown relationship did
not bear the deep scars of slum clearance and institutional takeover that defined so many university neighborhoods during the mid-20th century.

### 7.3 The Plantation and Disinvestment

While Duke managed to come out of the urban renewal era relatively unscathed, its relationship with Durham neighborhoods was still tense. Unlike its northern counterparts, Duke’s town-gown relationships were shaped by the legacy of the Jim Crow and the Civil Rights era. Even as the institution proclaimed the mutual dependency with Durham, it was unwilling to advocate around Civil Rights issues or call for the abolishment of Jim Crow legislation (Moyne 2004). Instead, Duke officials demurred from issues of race and integration without expressly condoning (or condemning) the status quo. The first African American students matriculated into Duke between 1961 and 1963, while the first African American professor joined the faculty in 1966 (Duke University 2015a; Duke University 2015b).

Duke’s perceived ambivalence and its long-held segregation policies generated ill will in the community, which persisted into the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the fact that Duke’s leadership had verbally tied the fortunes of the university to Durham for decades, residents were not convinced (Moyne 2004). The university’s conversations about the future of Duke and Durham were with Durham elites, not the community writ large, and this generated mistrust. As opposed to being a partner, many in the community and, especially those in the African American community, referred to Duke
as *The Plantation*, “…a place where you work, you provide labor, but you don’t participate in other aspects of the university” (Palmer 2015).

By the 1990s, Duke’s academic star was rising as the university climbed in the college rankings. Meanwhile, Durham’s economic engines had gone up in smoke and the city was in distress—it was “a gritty, ugly tobacco community without any energy” (Miglarese 2015). As manufacturing corporations disappeared, so too did any sense of corporate leadership or ownership over the city (Burness 2015). Unemployment increased and many households fell on hard times or moved out of Durham to find new opportunity (Wynn 2015); vacant, boarded-up houses signaled their departure in the hardest hit neighborhoods (Palmer 2015; Miglarese 2015). Owing to the convenient intersection of two major interstate highways, Durham became the de facto drug distribution capital of North Carolina, which attracted increased crime and gang activity to the community (Burness 2015). And downtown was “going to hell in a hand-basket… [It] was deader than a doormat” with no one to step in and change its trajectory. By one estimate, there was approximately two and a half million square feet of vacant, boarded up space in downtown by the 1990s. Instead of drawing in economic and social activity, the police SWAT team was using abandoned downtown buildings for training (Trask 2015).

Collectively, these conditions placed pressure on Duke to formulate a response. The consensus within the university community was that Duke could not afford to detach itself from Durham’s problems—the city was too small and the scale of the deterioration was too large to ignore. Like other urban universities, its leaders
recognized the self-interest and social imperatives motivating an intervention in
Durham’s decline, as described by a Duke faculty member:

“[Y]ou’re seen as this wealthy, very privileged place with just a—and it’s true—
wealth of resources and what are you doing? What are you doing for the community
that’s immediately surrounding you? I mean literally at Duke you walk off campus
one block over... We’re a midsized community and function like an urban
community... Some of the poorest neighborhoods in Durham are literally a block or
two off campus. So there was that piece, just sort of a social pressure. If you’re a
rising university coming into national prominence, one of the top ten universities,
and then you bring folks on campus and they start to drive around the community
and see this vast inequality that exists with accompanying crime rates frankly. There
was that issue as well. There was a self-interest component to it—we have to do
something about this because this is just flat out embarrassing. And also it’s the
right thing to do.” (Jentleson 2015)

Duke’s reputation as The Plantation, however, still preceded it in the community.

For many residents, there had never been a reason or opportunity to engage with the
elite enclave in the woods (Palmer 2015). This was particularly true in those
neighborhoods with the greatest need, including Walltown, a largely African-American
neighborhood with blocks of abandoned housing and crime hotspots. If Duke was going
to get involved in the neighborhoods, it had to become a partner. The university would
not get any traction if it tried to drive the vision; it had to be comfortable supporting the
community’s vision.

7.4  Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership: Duke’s Answer to
Revitalization

In the face of Durham’s physical and economic conditions during the 1980s and 1990s,
Duke’s distant approach to town-gown engagement was not going to reverse decline.
Unlike the early 20th century, Duke no longer had a cadre of city boosters and Durham
elites to rally around a problem and it could not rely on others to make the big
investment, while lending its quiet support from afar. Whereas, Duke’s ivory tower status once inspired confidence, it now generated suspicion and painted the institution as aloof. Under these constraints, Nannerl Keohane, Duke’s first female president, arrived at the university.

When Keohane came in 1993, many in Duke’s existing administration were already aware of decline in the adjacent neighborhoods and they quickly updated the new leader (Burness 2015). Together, Keohane and Duke staff generated momentum for developing a more deliberate approach to Duke-Durham interactions. The previous administration’s modus operandi, led by President Keith Brodie, was rooted in indirect community engagement (Moyne 2004). Faculty and/or students participated in community service or volunteer with various neighborhoods, but their efforts were independent of one another and without a broader purpose. Brodie, formerly a faculty member in the School of Medicine, was relatively hands-off and did not go to any lengths to serve as the face of Duke in Durham.

During the last few years of his presidency, however, Brodie began making a conscious effort to invest in the city (Moyne 2004). In an attempt to change Duke’s reputation as an aloof institution, Brodie made a few small gestures to recognize Durham’s declining conditions, including the allocation of $1.2 million towards affordable housing and participation in Triangle Housing Partnership, an organization focused on housing issues within the Research Triangle region. Yet, while these investments were a departure from Brodie’s status quo, they were insufficient to address decline or build a meaningful bridge between Duke and its neighbors. When
Keohane arrived a few years later, with visible decline apparent in downtown and Duke’s neighborhoods, the opportunity for the institution to take a powerful stance on its role in Durham was ripe. From the first day, she reinstituted the Duke-Durham rhetoric that defined the university’s earliest days as an urban institution. She did more than speak about Duke’s civic duty, however; she formalized the university’s commitment with an institutional philosophy and concrete strategy.

Shortly after her arrival, Duke staff took Keohane on a tour of the neighborhoods. As they traversed the Walltown neighborhood, she saw one boarded up house after another (Miglarese 2015). Clearly, disinvestment and abandonment was an issue for the community, but its proximity also represented a looming threat to Duke. At the same time, former Duke administrators acknowledge that their experience was qualitatively different than many of their peer institutions engaged in revitalization work during this period (Trask 2015; Burness 2015; Miglarese 2015). Duke had not yet reached the same degree of “urgency” as other schools (Burness 2015); it was not contending with violent crimes against their faculty and students. In addition, Duke did not carry the same legacy of town-gown conflicts, particularly around issues of expansion and urban renewal. Without the pressure to fight immediate (metaphorical) fires in the adjacent neighborhoods, Duke took a deliberate approach to the question of neighborhood improvement.
7.4.1 Philosophy: To Empower and Partner

Duke’s revitalization philosophy relied on two basic principles. The first principle centered on an empowerment model, which privileged local knowledge and priorities over those of the institution, relegating Duke to a supporting role (Burness 2015; Palmer 2015). At the beginning of the process, Duke invested significant energy in building relationships with the neighborhoods (Burness 2015; Miglarese 2015). Through these interactions, the institution enabled community residents to establish and prioritize revitalization objectives. As one former administrator characterized it: “So, intentionally, we stayed behind the community. We didn’t want to say ‘look at what we did’ or ‘look at what Self-Help or these other folks did for you.’ We were structured behind their objective” (Palmer 2015).

In practice, Duke’s empowerment philosophy played out in a few different ways. Spatially, Duke administrators decided to focus their attention on the twelve neighborhoods surrounding the campus (Burness 2015; Palmer 2015). They were the areas most directly impacted by Duke’s presence, including its off-campus students, as well as the areas most likely to affect the institution. Duke administrators talked about being treated like a bank, inundated by requests for projects and initiatives from all corners of the city (Burness 2015; Miglarese 2015). The decision to target specific neighborhoods allowed them to give a “passionate yes” to requests from those communities and concentrate their investments, while saying no to unrelated requests (Miglarese 2015).
Strategically, the empowerment model allowed Duke to be flexible with the neighborhoods, tailoring its investments to each community. The twelve neighborhoods were diverse with respect to wealth, tenure, and race and ethnicity. In addition, each claimed a distinct social and political identity (Miglarese 2015; Johnson 2015). By engaging with each neighborhood on a one-to-one basis, Duke’s approach was able to address a wide spectrum of priorities and generate goodwill across diverse areas. In other words, it could address issues of student behavior and parking in the affluent neighborhoods, while also investing in affordable housing and community health centers in its low-income neighborhoods.

The second principle in Duke’s neighborhood philosophy focused on deploying institutional resources and talents as tools for neighborhood transformation. This mentality favored results over public relations or “taking credit” (Burness 2015; Jentleson 2015). Duke’s decision to pursue “quiet” investment in the neighborhoods was not altruistic, however; it was pragmatic. As a neighborhood association leader describes, relationships were tenuous and the neighborhoods would not have supported a Duke-heavy intervention:

“To Duke’s credit, they pretty quickly realized that the top-down approach was not going to work. So, one of the first things they did was to acknowledge that there was a massive lack of communication happening here. They gave access to one staff member, Mayme Webb-Bledsoe [a Duke staff member and long-time neighborhood resident] to organize a number of community meetings where people could come together and, instead of dealing with this top-down effort, to do a bottom-up effort. You know, to identify what problems they saw in their neighborhood, what kind of solutions they would be interested in…” (Johnson 2015)

Administrators within Duke, as a faculty member intimates, also realized how ineffective a very public “Duke effort” would be for neighborhood improvement:
“For us, while it would be really nice to have the photo ops and all the rest of it, what needed to happen was that the residents needed to be in charge of their programming. And Duke’s role was to provide the resources, expertise, and other kinds of things that they needed. That was fine and we could make that linkage. But the critique that we received later from external evaluators was ‘yeah, but then you don’t get the big credit.’ We did get the credit. We did. And what we would say is ‘we got the credit with the people that counted.’ And that’s just fine with us.” (Jentleson 2015)

In this regard, Duke’s calculus was two-fold. First, it did not need to be the face of neighborhood revitalization and, given the town-gown dynamics, its investments would probably be more effective if it played a supporting role. Second, Duke developed a neighborhood strategy that relied on its assets and minimized its deficits. Duke’s strengths included its financial resources, which included substantial funding support from The Duke Endowment. The university also had substantial human capital at its disposal in the form of student and faculty involvement. Despite these assets, Duke acknowledged that it was not the best equipped to pursue all aspects of neighborhood revitalization, particularly in the areas of affordable housing production and community development. To remedy that gap, Duke established partnerships with non-profit entities aligned with Duke’s revitalization strategies. The university became a hub for neighborhood transformation, helping to make connections between diverse community “problems” and multiple non-profits with “solutions” (Palmer 2015; Wynn 2015).

Duke allocates funding to its non-profit partners through fixed contributions or a revolving loan fund (Palmer 2015; Miglarese 2015). Its revitalization partners include organizations with expertise in community development, such as: Self-Help, a community development corporation (CDC) and credit union; Habitat for Humanity of
Durham, an affordable housing CDC; and Durham Community Land Trustees, a non-profit focused on building permanently affordable housing. Similar to its interactions with neighborhood stakeholders, Duke occupies a supporting role in its non-profit partner’s efforts and does not retain control of the intervention. Duke and its CDC partners engage in an ongoing dialog about neighborhood priorities and the non-profits target those issues with their own skills and missions (Palmer 2015; Wynn 2015).

Duke’s multi-partner approach established an informal coalition around revitalization in its low-income target neighborhoods. As the Vice President for Duke-Durham Regional Affairs (DDRA) characterizes it, the coalition enabled Duke to pursue its goals more effectively and sustainably:

“I sort of take a collective action approach to addressing these issues. We may identify crucial issues in the community that need some attention and, to create a sustainable sort of solution, we build collaborative relationships. So, we have to find other partners that perceive these issues the same way we do and are committed to the time and some degree of resources necessary to make a change.” (Wynn 2015)

By concentrating their efforts in proximate blocks and neighborhoods, the organizations have truly transformed the communities. Whereas boarded up homes used to define the Walltown neighborhood, today passersby are hard-pressed to find visual evidence of disinvestment. Beyond revitalizing these places, however, the non-profit partners have also introduced wealth building into the equation. Their mission-driven development practices have helped direct investments to existing and/or low-income households, providing them with an opportunity to build equity and benefit from neighborhood improvements. In addition, their approach to development has
ensured a significant proportion of new and rehabilitated housing remains affordable, thereby slowing rapid appreciation in the market.

7.4.2 Strategy: Lifting up Neighborhoods

Duke’s neighborhood efforts are housed in the Office of Duke-Durham Regional Affairs (DDRA), which includes the Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership (DDNP). The DDNP staff serves as the central hub for all neighborhood interventions and requests. Their strategy is deeply embedded in Duke’s empowerment model, as well as the “mobility of capital,” a belief that investment should be pliable and respond to changing needs over time (Wynn 2015; Miglarese 2015). Collectively, DDNP pursues an incremental strategy, tailored to the distinct neighborhoods and phased in over time. In this way, Duke’s approach is calibrated to a long-term vision, as opposed to specific objectives, for each neighborhood with the expectation that the strategy will evolve over time.

Duke’s neighborhood strategy started with a series of community meetings designed to elicit a set of marching orders for the university. Owing to its aloof reputation, however, Duke administrators realized that the institution would not be able to facilitate a meaningful conversation (Burness 2015). To remedy the town-gown disconnect, Duke hired two individuals with deep community relationships and charged them with generating a strategic neighborhood revitalization plan (Burness 2015; Palmer 2015; Miglarese 2015). Bill Bell was a long-time elected official in Durham, who, at that moment in time, was not in office (presently, he is in his seventh term as mayor of Durham); Sandy Ogburn was a long-time city councilperson. Together, Bill and Sandy
canvassed the neighborhoods surrounding the university. The result was a neighborhood-by-neighborhood priority matrix, which guided DDNP’s work plan for the next decade (Jentleson 2015; Palmer 2015).

In addition, Duke hired Michael Palmer, another former elected official, to lead DDNP. Together, these individuals possessed the community reputations required to move beyond Duke’s institutional baggage. As Palmer explained:

“I went to a neighborhood association meeting wearing, for the first time, a Duke hat. So, I started talking about what we would want to accomplish and all that. And, you know, the first reaction I got was ‘He’s from Duke. He’s here to take our neighborhood from us.’ Pretty much my response was ‘I’m not stupid. If someone hired me to take your neighborhood, then you wouldn’t see Michael Palmer doing that.’ The fortunate thing is most places I go somebody knows me. So, someone just says and validates ‘I know him. He’s a good person. You know, you can trust him.’ But lesson learned from that? Community folks don’t care what label you have, you know, whatever. They can read your heart. Because they’ve heard so much bullshit in the course of time, they can see whether you’re real or not. And they don’t judge the person first and then they’ll look at your message.” (Palmer 2015)

DDNP’s community meetings, at first, were overwhelmed by complaints from neighborhoods that had long felt ignored. However, after the initial venting, town and gown began to make progress. The result was a series of ten themes, arrayed in a matrix, including homeownership, education, community health, parks and public amenities, and crime. Utilizing this matrix as a blueprint, each neighborhood identified the issues that were most relevant to them; DDNP had its marching orders.

In order to respond to neighborhood concerns, DDNP staff did two things. First, they distilled the “neighborhood issues matrix” into four thematic objectives, which would become the cornerstones of the office’s mission. The themes involved: (1) academic enrichment and youth achievement, including partnerships with Durham
schools; (2) neighborhood stabilization, including strategies focused on safety, housing, neighborhood amenities and services, and neighborhood engagement; (3) strengthening partnerships, including efforts to develop, support, build capacity, and improve communication with community partners; and (4) university engagement, including programs to engage Duke students and faculty in the Durham community (Center for Assessment and Policy Development and Marga Incorporated 2006).

Second, DDNP established connections with non-profits whose missions aligned with Duke’s guiding priorities (Wynn 2015). Early on, DDNP earmarked affordable housing as a priority for neighborhood stabilization. From the perspective of DDNP’s staff, it was a win-win-win: responding to community priorities, generating wealth for low-income households, and building homeownership to combat crime and disinvestment (Miglarese 2015; Palmer 2015). To achieve these goals, Duke established a $2 million revolving loan fund for Self-Help, a local credit union and CDC with an empowerment-driven mission, to use in the target areas. Self-Help established a land bank and pursued affordable housing development. Their work has been so successful that Duke later renegotiated the loan fund to $4 million and, presently, $8 million (Miglarese 2015). In addition to acquiring residential properties and building affordable housing, Self-Help is currently undertaking its first commercial development project in the neighborhoods (Palmer 2015; Johnson 2015). It includes a cooperative grocery store and a mixed-use office building, in which Duke’s corporate arm agreed to lease space in order to make the pro forma work. These efforts are complemented by the work of several other affordable housing organizations. The layering of resources and expertise
has, from the neighborhood’s perspective, strengthened DDNP’s approach, as a representative of one of the neighborhood associations describes:

“One of the things that came out of [DDNP’s] focus on crime and housing was the partnership that developed between Self Help, Habitat for Humanity, Durham Community Land Trustees and, later on, Builders for Hope and Duke. One of the best things Duke did was to give Self-Help $2 million for the land bank. The land bank is really unique because its primary goal was to buy up some of these vacant properties, so that they could be sold to non-profit developers to develop affordable housing. And you know, it is true that in a span of about five years, with Habitat for Humanity and Durham Community Land Trustees and Self-Help working in primarily the West End and Lyon Park, the character of the neighborhood changed tremendously. When you drive through, all the boarded up houses are gone.” (Johnson 2015)

The Walltown neighborhood represents how far these partnerships have come over a decade. An African-American neighborhood just north of Duke’s East campus, Walltown was the victim of decline in the late 20th century—“a boarded up mess, begging for revitalization. Looking for the police to get the drugs and the gangs and episodic moments of violence [off the street]” (Miglarese 2015). As DDNP harnessed its resources for neighborhood change, Walltown became a natural starting point and was clearly one of the neighborhoods with the most need (Miglarese 2015; Palmer 2015). Duke’s initial loan to Self-Help spurred broad housing revitalization efforts; Habitat for Humanity of Durham and Durham Community Land Trustees soon began augmenting the work, adding their own projects to the neighborhood partnership. The revitalized homes were marketed to first-time, low-income homeowners, a function of the non-profit partnership mission and Duke’s empowerment strategy. DDNP and its partners also transformed the social fabric of the neighborhood, investing in a neighborhood health clinic, a community center, a children’s theater, and the transformation of a
troubled drug property into offices for Walltown Neighborhood Ministries, an interfaith coalition of five neighborhood churches (Miglarese 2015).

Over time, Walltown was transformed: crime rates fell, more homeowners were living in the renter-majority neighborhood, and property values began to increase. After about ten years, DDNP, Self-Help, and Habitat for Humanity found “there wasn’t a lot more work to do over there, where the math worked to buy houses, renovate them and make them affordable to first-time buyers. And the need was less” (Palmer 2015). Collectively, the partnership had exhausted the supply of opportune (and affordable) sites, as well as much of the neighborhood demand. Thus, they took stock of neighborhood need and deployed their resources elsewhere, relying on the “mobility of capital.” Today, DDNP and Self-Help are focused on other opportunities: “We’ve gone from Walltown to Southwest Central Durham. We’ve done some work on housing in Crest Street and, now, the Southside, which is outside the official boundaries but still part of this office’s conviction, and on commercial development” (Miglarese 2015).

In addition to shifting its geographic focus, DDNP is also revising its approach on a continuous basis, seeking to find the best tool for the problem at hand. For instance, the Southside neighborhood revitalization project consists of new single-family homes—half market rate and half subsidized, in partnership with the City of Durham. To help the project succeed, Duke offered its low-income employees a $10,000 forgivable loan to purchase in Southside. As it turned out, however, nearly 80% of the employees applying to the program did not have the credit to qualify for a mortgage; subsidies alone could not overcome the homeownership barrier (Wynn 2015). In response, DDNP shifted its
approach, collaborating with other non-profits to create Duke’s Home Buyers Club, which focuses on financial education, credit repair, and savings strategies. Duke’s nimbleness is paying off: “More than half of those that stay in the [Home Buyers Club] program for a year actually, sort of, moved into creditworthy status. I know we had, probably, twenty some [households] that had moved into creditworthy status. And a number of them wound up applying for mortgage loans outside of Southside” (Wynn 2015).

7.4.3 Strategy: Investing in the Downtown

In contrast to DDNP’s incremental approach, Duke has also invested in downtown Durham, where it takes a longer view of revitalization. The university’s corporate arm, led by Tallman Trask, the Executive Vice President (EVP), has relied on a “big vision” approach to transform the city’s center. Since the 1990s, the EVP has committed university resources to a number of downtown projects. However, Duke has not directly built or proposed any projects in the downtown. Instead, it has made strategic choices to lease space or invest in a project as a silent, secondary investor. This approach has leveraged other private investment and as a result, Duke has contributed to both the scope and quality of revitalization in the downtown.

On the quantitative side, Duke’s status as a worthy credit tenant has enhanced the financial feasibility of numerous projects. In several instances, Duke has committed to leasing space in downtown projects—a floor of a mixed-use office project or a small number of apartments. However, there are conditions. While Duke is willing to sign on
to a project, it will not be the primary tenant and it will not absorb the project risk. As
the EVP phrased it, “We’re not making this project go. We don’t want this to be Duke in
downtown. We want to be part of something bigger... I don’t want the story to be look
at what Duke did. I want the story to be ‘can you imagine what’s happened in
Durham?’” (Trask 2015).

The rehabilitation of the former American Tobacco Company (ATC) headquaters, once the largest cigarette manufacturer in the country, was one of the
first major investments in downtown and is a prime example of the ways Duke has
engaged in the transformation. In the late 1990s, Jim Goodmon, a local developer who
also owns a major broadcasting company and Durham’s minor league baseball team,
the Durham Bulls, approached Duke about renovating the property into a mixed-use
project. The site had long fallen into disrepair with collapsed roofs and trees growing
through abandoned brick warehouses. It was also adjacent to downtown and
Goodmon’s newly constructed baseball stadium. In Goodmon’s proposal, Duke saw the
opportunity to support a catalytic project, with the potential to breathe new life into
downtown. The EVP agreed to lease 100,000 square feet of space in the ATC project for
Duke’s administrative needs, under the following conditions:

“We’ll take 100,000 square feet, I said, but there are certain conditions on it. I’ll sign
the lease, but I won’t occupy it and I won’t pay rent until you have two times as
many square feet signed and occupied by for-profit companies... We’ll play, but
we’re not paying.” (Trask 2015)

Ultimately, Goodmon was able to obtain lease agreements from
GlaxoSmithKline, a large pharmaceuticals corporation, and McKinney, a major
advertising agency, to locate in the project. The renovation was completed in 2001 and has been a great success in downtown Durham. In addition to corporate uses, the project is comprised of apartments, a YMCA, and a variety of entertainment options, including a theater, galleries and shops, restaurants and a recreation space with outdoor basketball courts and a winter ice skating rink.

Duke has also contributed resources to a number of projects to enhance their quality and boost their amenity value. In the American Tobacco Historic District, Duke paid for the construction of an active river feature that runs the length of the district, once it became clear it was about to be value-engineered out of the development. From Duke’s perspective, the river “made” the project, defining the pedestrian experience and establishing the ATC project as “one of the great urban renovation stories of the last 25 years” (Trask 2015). Similarly, Duke’s EVP dedicated $7.5 million to the creation of the Durham Performing Arts Center (DPAC), elevating the proposed “standard concrete bunker building” into a vibrant facility with a striking glass façade, lighting, and a stage large enough to accommodate the annual American Dance Festival, as well as major Broadway tours. Today, DPAC is one of the most well attended event venues in the country, consistently ranking in the top five and in the company of New York City, Las Vegas, and Atlanta (Troyer 2015).

Fifteen years after its initial investment in the ATC project, Duke now leases more than one million square feet of downtown space, which accommodates approximately 3,000 Duke employees. It has also played a major role in the feasibility of a number of catalytic downtown developments, including the Durham Bulls Athletic
Park, DPAC, and the adaptive reuse of another set of dilapidated tobacco warehouses into the mixed-use West Village development. Collectively, these investments commit the university to the future of downtown and support a larger vision for Durham. Duke has contributed to the viability of projects, but it has also enhanced the quality of what has been built. These are not altruistic investments—Duke has legitimately faced demands for administrative space and, one way or another, it needed to increase its footprint. Although the institution has more than enough land to absorb these demands within the existing campuses, the EVP’s office recognized a win-win opportunity for Duke and Durham:

“Duke was largely out of administrative space. So, we had to make a choice. Are we going to build a bunch of administrative buildings on campus or are we going to put people somewhere else? I really don’t want to be known as the person who built ten new administrative buildings on campus... The fact of the matter is [Durham’s downtown revitalization] worked and it worked extraordinarily well. But I keep trying to remind people, it’s not because we’re so smart. It’s because we have money and the right partner showed up at the right time. And if we had called somebody and said ‘We’re going to fix Durham, North Carolina. Would you like to bring your venture capital real estate investment trust and invest in us?’, they would have hung up on us.” (Trask 2015)

By leveraging its own space needs and playing a secondary role for innovative projects, Duke was able to catalyze the transformation of downtown Durham.

### 7.5 Transforming Durham: Neighborhood Change in Duke’s Target Areas

By most accounts, Durham and the neighborhoods surrounding Duke have changed dramatically since the 1990s. Qualitatively, Duke-Durham relationships are deeper; there is consensus that town-gown communication lines are well established and transparent. During interviews, most neighborhood associations held a favorable
attitude towards Duke. Even though the neighborhoods could still point to town-gown issues, residents also expressed confidence in their ability to communicate with and receive a response from the university:

“You know, Clay is the guy who handles a lot of that [neighborhood communication] and I see him on campus sometimes—just in the gym and things like that. I find him very responsive. He comes around to meetings whenever we ask. We involved Durham Department of Transportation to help us with some traffic issues. Clay attended and Duke was open to helping us. It didn’t lead to anything, but they came into the meetings. I think you could email him any time and they’ll respond.” (Hawn 2015)

In addition to attending meetings and, more generally, keeping lines of communication open, residents pointed to instances where Duke had supported the neighborhood in implementing improvement projects:

“By and large, if and when we need something from Duke or want something from Duke, they’ve been pretty responsive. For example, little things mean a lot to the neighborhood. Right across the street here we have a park—Orchard Park—and some neighbors said, ‘hey we’d like to do a community garden for our neighborhood and we’d like to do it right in the park.’ It’s kind of in the middle [of the neighborhood] and that seemed like a good spot for it. That’s not something that’s ever been done in North Carolina, a community garden in a park. So, the neighbors got together with Duke and the city—the parks and rec department, the planning department. And with a little funding from Duke—not a lot, it didn’t take much—and some cooperation with the parks and rec department, we built a little community garden in the middle of the park. The first one in NC and they are replicating that in other parts of the city and other parts of the State.” (Mitchell 2015)

In these respects, Duke’s investments changed the town-gown culture in meaningful ways.

The physical and economic impacts, however, have varied across neighborhoods. DDNP’s incremental approach meant it could tailor investments to meet the needs of each neighborhood. This has, perhaps, been more effective in some communities than others. In high-need neighborhoods, DDNP and its partners have initiated very effective
campaigns to transform the neighborhood from the ground up. Their reliance on affordable housing mechanisms, in tandem with educational, health, and community capacity supports, meant that initial investment could largely be delivered to those whom it would benefit the most. As the neighborhoods improved, private investors have entered into the market place, but a foundational supply of low-income housing and supports is already in place.

Duke’s affluent neighborhoods have had a different experience than the lower-income communities. In some respects, the concerns of affluent neighborhoods are more difficult to address. Spatially, the stable neighborhoods tend to be directly adjacent to the campuses and their largest issues include off-campus student behavior, as well as parking and traffic concerns (Miglarese 2015). Whereas DDNP can work with partners to renovate homes and fund community parks, it is more challenging to regulate behavioral issues and student citizenship within the neighborhoods. Most recently, Duke attempted to address these problems by working with the city to establish a “protocol” for residents. The document identifies the appropriate Duke or city department(s) to call in order to resolve behavioral issues, including late night parties, public drunkenness, and/or property damage. At present, neighborhood representatives are piloting the protocol and the associations are cautiously optimistic (Gruener 2015; Hawn 2015; Johnson 2015).

Residents in affluent neighborhoods do report better channels of communication with the university than in the past—they know whom to call and are confident a Duke representative will respond to them (Hawn 2015; Mitchell 2015). At
the same time, they lament the weakness of town-gown ties and cannot cite transformative changes that have occurred in other neighborhoods. They are also more likely to express doubts about Duke’s interest in the neighborhood, intimating that self-interest is a driving force behind its actions (Hawn 2015). While low-income neighborhoods, too, carry some suspicions about Duke’s altruistic intentions, the members of affluent neighborhoods were more likely to point to the shortcomings in the town-gown relationship during interviews.

Quantitatively, Duke’s neighborhoods have also changed. Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 illustrate the shifts in neighborhood indicators between 1990 and 2010. Neighborhoods are identified within their respective census tracts; while there is some overlap of neighborhoods within a tract, the boundaries generally group similar neighborhoods. DDNP’s target low-income neighborhoods included: Walltown, combined with the very small, but more affluent, Trinity Park neighborhood in Tract 3.01; Burch Avenue and West End, located within Tract 5; and Lakewood Park and Lyon Park, combined with the middle-income neighborhoods of Morehead Hill and Tuscaloosa-Lakewood in Tract 6. The more affluent neighborhoods included: Trinity Park (Tract 3.02 and Tract 22); Watts Hospital-Hillendale (Tract 4.01); and Old West Durham (Tract 4.02). The university campuses are largely represented by Tracts 15.01, 15.02, and 15.03.

Between 1990 and 2010, Duke’s target neighborhoods showed stable to moderate population growth (Table 7.1). During this period, the proportion of White (non-Hispanic) residents decreased modestly in most neighborhoods (seven to twenty-three percent decline); it held steady in Walltown, but increased to fifty-four percent in
Trinity Park. The share of African-Americans declined more sharply across the board, except in Watts Hospital-Hillendale. Collectively, these shifts are more indicative of larger demographic shifts in Durham, which is experiencing an uptick in its Hispanic population.

Table 7.1 Demographic trends: Duke-Durham neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

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<td>City of Durham</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Indicators</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White, non-Hispanic (%)</th>
<th>African-American, non-Hispanic (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,256</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic and neighborhood indicators reflect the varied impacts of DDNP’s tailored approach to neighborhood revitalization (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Walltown received the earliest and most prolonged investment from Duke and its partners. Further, those efforts appear to have been successful. Between 1990 and 2010, Walltown (Tract 3.01) showed significant improvement on all economic counts. The proportion of people with educational attainment levels at or above a bachelor’s degree rose almost twenty percentage points to forty-three percent in 2010. Poverty rates
decreased by sixty-seven percent to nine percent; median household incomes, in 2010 dollars, climbed thirty-seven percent to nearly $40,500 during a period where the citywide median had fallen seventeen percent. Physical conditions also changed as homeownership rates showed a fifty-five percent increase to thirty-one percent and median home values (in 2010 dollars) grew twice as fast as the city, increasing forty percent.

Table 7.2 Economic trends: Duke-Durham neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicators</th>
<th>Census Tract and Affiliated Neighborhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tract 3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welltown, Trinity Heights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment, % with BA or more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income, $2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$29,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$40,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The affluent target neighborhoods showed relative stability with respect to economic indicators. In most cases, the majority of neighborhood residents over twenty-five had at least a bachelor’s degree by 2010. Median household incomes remained within $5,000 of their 1990 levels (in 2010 dollars). And, with the exception of Trinity Park, the poverty rate fluctuated by five percent between 1990 and 2010. In 241
terms of neighborhood indicators, homeownership rates were mostly steady and only fluctuated a few percentage points; the exception was Old West Durham, whose homeownership level decreased thirty-five percent. These neighborhoods also saw the most gain in median home values during the period, gaining between thirty-seven and one hundred eight percent—substantially more than the citywide increase of twenty-one percent.

Table 7.3 Neighborhood trends: Duke-Durham neighborhoods, 1990 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Indicators</th>
<th>Duke-Durham Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Census Tract and Affiliated Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Tract 1.01</th>
<th>Tract 1.02</th>
<th>Tract 4.01</th>
<th>Tract 4.02</th>
<th>Tract 5</th>
<th>Tract 6</th>
<th>Tract 7</th>
<th>Tract 8</th>
<th>West Duke Campus, East Campus</th>
<th>Urban Durham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy Rate (%)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership Rate (%)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent, $/2010</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$682</td>
<td>$756</td>
<td>$824</td>
<td>$666</td>
<td>$641</td>
<td>$798</td>
<td>$620</td>
<td>$46</td>
<td>$652</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$685</td>
<td>$751</td>
<td>$806</td>
<td>$628</td>
<td>$728</td>
<td>$684</td>
<td>$680</td>
<td>$890</td>
<td>$656</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Home Value, $2010</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$96,300</td>
<td>$136,300</td>
<td>$115,600</td>
<td>$90,600</td>
<td>$184,200</td>
<td>$78,300</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$90,400</td>
<td>$345,400</td>
<td>$345,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$154,600</td>
<td>$222,100</td>
<td>$243,500</td>
<td>$167,300</td>
<td>$115,000</td>
<td>$198,700</td>
<td>$152,600</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$166,400</td>
<td>$376,600</td>
<td>$376,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>104%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>108%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, Duke’s other low-income neighborhoods displayed negative trajectories during the 1990 and 2010 period. The proportion of the population with bachelor’s degrees or more declined between eight and twenty percentage points. Poverty rates increased between nine and twenty-three percent and median household incomes, in 2010 dollars, decreased between $1,300 and $4,100. Homeownership rates
showed modest improvement, increasing five to six percentage points, and median home values were on par with the city, growing between eight and twenty-seven percent over twenty years.

At the same time, these same low-income neighborhoods are currently undergoing a transformation—one the Census cannot capture in a 2010 snapshot. Beginning in the late 2000s, DDNP and its partners shifted their focus towards the West End neighborhood, including West End, Burch Avenue, and Lyon Park. By that time, their initial target neighborhood, Walltown, had already started to revitalize after a decade of investment. Following the “mobile money” philosophy, the partners redirected their energies towards another neighborhood in need. Assisted by the non-profit partners, the neighborhoods developed community vision plans to guide future priorities (Williams 2013a). As of 2015, DDNP’s community development partners, including Self-Help, Habitat for Humanity of Durham and Builders for Hope, are renovating homes (Palmer 2015; Miglarese 2015; Johnson 2015) and new community parks dot the neighborhoods. By resident accounts, the neighborhood is already undergoing a transformation into a more stable version of itself.

Last, but not least, the downtown, as described by several stakeholders, has undergone a complete transformation over the last twenty years. The police SWAT team no longer uses buildings for training and, more importantly, Duke no longer needs to subsidize projects in any capacity. In recent years, “[downtown] turned the corner when, over a couple year period, four people the likes of whom we have never seen in Durham showed up—four billion-dollar REITs who didn’t need a tenant, who didn’t need
to go to a bank, and who didn’t need [Duke] to do anything” (Trask 2015). Whereas downtown used to be devoid of activity, it is now a regular between the pages of *The New York Times* (Moskin 2010, D1; Williams 2011, TR9; Williams 2013b, TR7; Williams 2014, TR11). This is not to say that everything is rosy in downtown. New apartment complexes and luxury hotels seem to be flooding the market to the bewilderment of many (Burness 2015; Miglarese 2015; Trask 2015). The demand for these units remains to be seen; as a former Duke administrator wryly stated: “I think it is speculative. And you know, one person jokingly told me, but I thought about it afterwards and it did not seem irrational, ‘one of them will fail.’ And Duke will buy it for 50 cents on the dollar and turn it into graduate housing. You know?” (Burness 2015).

### 7.6 Conclusion

Duke’s approach to revitalization in Durham has been both unique and successful. Its successes stem from a few factors—some related to luck and others to strategy. Most importantly, Duke made a choice to behave as a neighbor in the Durham community, not the neighbor at the top of a community hierarchy. This distinction was critical to soliciting input and support from the community. To Duke’s credit, it saw the value in quietly supporting initiatives from the sideline and empowering their neighborhoods, as well as individuals. As DDNP’s director highlights, Duke has consistently invested in “relationships” without succumbing to the temptation to take institutional credit:

> “From the very beginning, we valued the relationships formed with these neighborhood associations, neighborhood nonprofits, faith-based organizations, schools... I mean, you name it—and there are quite a few. And that’s why I think we’ve been able to maintain the core function of the neighborhood partnership, so
Duke’s partnership-driven strategy has also been effective in generating community support, but also directing resources towards target populations—specifically, existing residents and low-income households. Led by a community-generated needs assessment, Duke fostered an environment where several partners could, informally, find economies of scale in their work. The place-based focus of the work has enabled each partner to not only implement their own projects, but also augment what others are doing to leverage much larger impacts.

The pre-intervention conditions in the neighborhoods, as well as in the town-gown relationship, were critical to the design of Duke’s strategy and to a degree the product of luck. As Duke administrators stated, they did not have the same sense of urgency as other universities did. Crime was a problem, but they were not contending with significant violence against their students, faculty, or staff; faculty might not choose to live in the neighborhoods, but they “could live in Chapel Hill or somewhere else very comfortably” (Burness 2015). So, even though Duke felt pressure to address decline in Durham, it was not attempting to put out fires. This gave it the space to design a thoughtful philosophy and incremental revitalization strategy.

Lastly, part of Duke’s success must be attributed to its sustained institutional commitment. At the highest levels, the university’s administration has supported Duke’s investments in Durham and downtown, as well as its active support for neighborhood
empowerment. During interviews, Duke administrators and staff spoke of a civic engagement philosophy and mission, rather than specific objectives or programs. They have embedded change into their understanding of the problem, which has helped their strategies to evolve as the priorities shifted. Perhaps most importantly, for more than a decade, Duke had a dedicated stream of funding for DDNP’s work. The Duke Endowment, a separate non-profit entity, provided significant resources to DDRA and DDNP for thirteen years—a rather exceptional commitment from a philanthropic organization. However, that is no longer the case, which refocuses the discussion on Duke’s future challenges.

Since The Duke Endowment shifted its funding priorities away from DDNP’s efforts, Duke has had to find creative ways to continue its financial commitment to the neighborhoods. It has modified its approach in two ways. First, DDRA and DDNP have had to “become a lot more selective about where we place our resources. We were getting a large amount from The Duke Endowment, which enabled us to have much wider discretion on some of the things we did in the community. Now, we have to be a bit more selective and a bit more strategic and a bit more conservative in what we do” (Wynn 2015). Second, while the university continues to fund DDRA’s staff salaries and overhead, the office has had to seek alternative resources for its initiatives. Its hallmark fundraising program is the Doing Good in the Neighborhood Campaign—an employee giving campaign that netted more than $650,000 in 2014 (Wynn 2015). On an annual basis, employees can elect to donate to one of six funding pools. The pools are organized around neighborhood themes, including education, health, community
improvement, and youth. The campaign’s purpose is to enable Duke to continue supporting its non-profit partners; it has also established a competitive neighborhood grant program to provide a funding resource for grassroots improvement projects. In addition, DDRA receives individual donations from some of the university’s trustees—a gesture of commitment to the Duke-Durham partnership, and pursues other outside resources. Moving forward, maintaining resource levels will continue to be a significant challenge for DDRA and Duke, as well as their non-profit partners.

The other looming challenge in Durham is the same question being asked in neighborhoods across the country—what about gentrification? During interviews with Duke administrators, non-profits, and neighborhood associations, gentrification was not a major concern. People talk about it, but they have not experienced it as an immediate issue or perceived it as a near-term threat. A common perception was that the neighborhood is willing to tolerate some change as the neighborhoods improve (Johnson 2015; Palmer 2015). At the same time, the non-profits point to affordable housing mechanisms, including some long-term deed restrictions (fifteen to thirty years) and permanent covenants, as tools against runaway property values (Palmer 2015). If that is the case, Duke and its partners will need to consider how to maintain controls over the long-term. They are also constantly thinking about “the next project.” As they stabilize one neighborhood, where do they go next and what new (or revised) priorities do they focus on? Recently, they’ve elected to support a city-initiative with the Southside neighborhood, unofficially expanding their focus area to incorporate high-need neighborhoods. Duke’s and, more pointedly, DDRA and DDNP’s willingness to
continually evaluate and refine their strategy has been a singular strength of their model, but they will need to maintain and nurture relationships with the existing neighborhoods as this great story continues to unfold.
CHAPTER 8. UNIVERSITY ANCHOR INSTITUTIONS: LOOKING FORWARD

The 1990s mark a paradigm shift for urban universities and their relationship to declining neighborhoods. While cities have long recognized the value universities bring to place, attracting jobs, a diverse workforce, economic development, and innovation to the regional economy, universities have not always reciprocated. During the 1950s and 1960s, many universities perceived their neighborhoods as a detriment, addressing threats of deterioration and crime with wholesale clearance. Backed by federal legislation and local redevelopment authorities, universities wielded urban renewal plans and bulldozed entire blocks for redevelopment or, sometimes, for the sole purpose of blight removal.

Universities in this study, however, now perceive urban neighborhoods as amenity rich assets (or opportunities) and they actively incorporate them into their institutional identities. In this new era, they continue to form a central part of the economic infrastructure for their regions, cities, and neighborhoods. In the macro sense, they remain among the largest employers and increasingly play a proactive role in regional economic development strategies, attracting complementary skilled industries and firms, fostering innovation districts, and generating patents. At the neighborhood scale, universities are also driving their local economies. As they adopt neighborhoods into their institutional brands, they are fueling demand for commodity goods in housing, retail, food, and services. Their unique 24/7-campus culture distinguishes them from the
traditional central business districts, which sometimes have large fluctuations between their weekday and non-weekday populations. Instead, university neighborhoods are now serving both corporate and residential university demands at multiple scales, from large institutional procurement contracts to individual retail needs.

Within this framework, university investments have altered the political economy of place, drawing speculative investors back to the market. During the pre-revitalization years, many universities were anchored in neighborhoods that left them threatened by, and at the mercy of, declining conditions. Without market rivals who were willing to invest, universities were left to shoulder the burden of distress; yet, they were also empowered to shape the direction and extent of neighborhood change through their interventions. In the intervening years, universities have invested heavily in redevelopment projects, seeking to meet university-consumer demand and revitalize the local economy. At the same time, these investments have stimulated private interest in university neighborhoods, introducing new rivals to the speculative market.

Meanwhile, the neighborhood ecology has also evolved and the sledgehammer approach to revitalization is no longer politically or socially feasible. Instead, economic, political, and social dictates require university leaders to be more precise in their revitalization pursuits, surgically excising problems with strategic investments. Yet, university investments in market-based solutions, much like the modernist projects of the 1960s, continue to prioritize physical improvement over socioeconomic change.

This institutional preference for physical improvement is important because it reveals a misalignment between the aspirations, opportunities, and realities of...
university interventions in place. Media outlets and research think tanks have a penchant for crowning anchor institutions—particularly universities, but increasingly hospitals—the “saviors of cities,” expecting their economic and physical presence to stimulate an urban renaissance in neighborhoods across the country (Wang 2015; Misra 2014; Katz 2014; Bartley 2014). This study, however, demonstrates that university interventions, as they are most commonly implemented, do not necessarily respond to the full host of neighborhood issues.

Universities are changing neighborhoods, but their methods prioritize physical upgrading and market attraction strategies. They do not often extend to social or economic improvement. This gap in the interventions highlights underutilized anchor institution resources within the context of neighborhoods. By focusing on real estate tools, universities are fulfilling their immediate branding and market needs, but they are not embracing the full potential of their anchor status, including their roles as diverse employers, economic generators, and civic-minded institutions. As a result, there is an imbalance between town and gown, with universities claiming larger returns than their communities. Yet, if universities were willing to alter their approach, cities, neighborhoods, and institutions could derive even greater benefits—transformation that is both vibrant and equitable.

8.1 Revisiting the Research: Summary of the Research Questions and Expectations

This dissertation set out to answer two primary questions with a mixed-methods research design. The first research question was: How do university revitalization
motivations and strategies compare across institutions? To what extent do neighborhoods targeted by university investments in neighborhood revitalization undergo substantial neighborhood improvement? The query sought to move beyond individual narratives of anchor institution investments, in order to develop (1) an empirical understanding of how universities approach and invest in neighborhood revitalization and (2) an assessment of how neighborhoods receiving university investments change. The dissertation used a national survey of universities with revitalization strategies (Chapter 3) and a neighborhood outcomes analysis (Chapter 4) to respond to the first query. Together, this research represents the first broad outcomes analysis of post-1990 university revitalization interventions, going beyond “what was done?” to ask, “what has happened?”

The second query used the empirical results from the first question to build an understanding of the ways place and context might shape a university’s revitalization intervention. The second research question was: What role does community context play in the development and implementation of a university’s neighborhood interventions? How does a university’s partnership style with its neighborhood affect the community experience of revitalization interventions? Relying on a collective case study method, the dissertation used three case studies to explore the ways place- and community-based factors shaped the development, implementation, and outcomes of an intervention. In conjunction with the empirical work, the case studies provide a basis for making policy recommendations for how universities, neighborhoods, and cities might better develop the potential of anchor institutions.
Based on the literature and the researcher’s familiarity with the anchor institution landscape, the core hypothesis of the study was that universities were showing greater willingness to invest in and benefitting from revitalization interventions. The researcher anticipated finding evidence of significant neighborhood change in the target neighborhoods, fueled by university redevelopment projects—and did. In addition, the anchor institution literature predicted the study would find substantial investments in non-development activities, including employee-assisted homeownership programs, home rehabilitation programs, and/or economic inclusions policies at the university—which the dissertation did not. The researcher did not, however, expect to find much evidence of outcomes assessment or program evaluation among the universities engaged in revitalization work—and, indeed, did not.

8.2 Universities as Engines of Transformation: Summarizing the Results

Universities have become active players in the “back to the city” movement. Whereas institutional leaders once viewed their urban environs as a liability at best, they have now taken steps to blur the town-gown lines and embrace their urban locale as an amenity rich asset. As the survey demonstrated, many universities approach revitalization investments as an asset management and institutional branding strategy. While community service and volunteerism continue to form an important part of the institution’s academic identity in the neighborhood, its revitalization efforts primarily focus on real estate projects that meet university consumer demands. Large research universities are particularly active in real estate-driven interventions, reflecting their
institutional expertise in physical planning, development, and management, as well as the size of their consumer base.

The neighborhood outcomes analysis confirms the transformative nature of these investments. As universities become active investors outside of their traditional campus borders, they are changing the fabric of their neighborhoods. They do this directly through development projects built on university land and/or with institutional dollars, as well as through privately developed spinoff projects. Between 1990 and 2010, the distribution of median home values and rents across low, medium, and high value categories showed a different pattern for university target neighborhoods than non-target neighborhoods. University target areas may have started with a greater proportion of low-value neighborhoods, but they rebounded, reflecting a slightly better distribution pattern than their counterpart neighborhoods twenty years later. In short, university interventions appeared to amplify the upward market trends in target neighborhoods, enabling them to “catch up” with other areas. This was particularly true for median home values, where the presence of a university intervention predicted a twenty percent increase in a neighborhood’s 2010 median home value ratio.

The critical lesson learned from both the survey and the neighborhood outcomes analysis is that university interventions are targeting physical transformation and, with home values and rents as dependable proxies of neighborhood condition, these place-based investments are producing measurable (positive) changes. All three phases of the research—the national survey, neighborhood outcomes analysis, and collective case studies—suggest that the primary university revitalization interventions are rooted in
attraction, rather than retention strategies. The demographic trends, as well as the case interviews and site visits, appear to show a bifurcation of the target market. On one end, the university investments are seeking to provide housing and amenities for growing student enrollments. On the other, they are also trying to stabilize their surroundings by drawing in young professionals, university-affiliated homeowners, and/or empty nesters, who want to live close to work and/or benefit from the amenity-rich environment of an urban “college town.” Conversely, there is little to indicate much support for low-income and/or existing long-term residents in the communities.

These overall trends highlight the value of place to urban universities, but also the limitations of the typical intervention for neighborhoods. Many university strategies aim to improve the neighborhood’s amenity value by revitalizing the “college neighborhood” and enhancing the consumer’s quality of life. Not only does this meet institutional demand, but also it can prime the pump for private investors to enter the market. At the same time, development dollars rarely address the full scope of neighborhood concerns, which often include homeownership, employment, and income growth. Thus, alone and in its current form, the typical, pro-development university intervention is not a suitable substitute for neighborhood planning or community development efforts by the local public agencies, CDCs, or other community-focused non-profits.

The remainder of this chapter, first, identifies the primary factors behind successful university interventions. Drawing from the case studies, the factors are not only important for institutional success, but also illuminate some of the key elements
that support community benefits within a strategy. Subsequently, it addresses policy recommendations for university administrators and policy makers to develop mutualistic relationships between town and gown.

8.3 Elements of a Mutually Beneficial Strategy: Lessons from the Case Studies

The collective case studies confirm and elaborate on the aggregate findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The cases demonstrate that neighborhood context has a meaningful impact on the way a neighborhood experiences change, contributing to the university’s definition of its revitalization “problem” and the implementation of its “solution.” Four interrelated factors emerge from the research as critical components for a mutually beneficial revitalization intervention. The primary factors include core competency, mission, leadership, and context.

As institutions with great skill managing and planning for land, universities generally possess core competencies that bias them towards physical revitalization strategies. University policies and protocols, as well as professionalized facilities and development staff, wield influence over the design and implementation of an institution’s intervention. In other words, universities are predisposed, by their corporate management skills, towards pro-development revitalization investments. Further, as the policy recommendations will argue, universities are not always adept at modifying their skills to respond to neighborhood context or take advantage of existing opportunities (e.g. partnerships, other neighborhood projects), particularly when they are under pressure. As institutions with their own missions and constituents, their
interests are not intrinsically aligned with those of the neighborhood or city. This poses a challenge to a mutually beneficial town-gown strategy, especially when the university is the sole or lead partner.

A university’s mission and values also shape its approach to neighborhood revitalization. The presence of mission statement that integrates the university into its neighborhood provides a clear rationale for investing in revitalization strategies. In essence, it enables universities to give a “passionate yes,” as Duke University representatives phrased it, to neighborhood-based projects. As all three case studies suggest, urban universities, by virtue of their status as stable urban anchors, are often solicited to (financially) support a range of causes across the city. This can leave them feeling overexposed or aimless in their investment strategy. A place- and/or community-focused mission statement can help university leaders to direct their resources in strategic ways—and, hopefully, in ways that generate measurable impact. However, it is important to note that university missions tend to lack clear objectives. While universities with strong commitments to neighborhoods or civic engagement are more likely to augment physical revitalization with community-focused initiatives, they do not guarantee mutually beneficial interventions.

As the implementation body, university leaders are closely tied to institutional missions. The values held by university leaders, including the president and board of trustees, play a significant role throughout the revitalization process. In all three case studies, the arrival of a new president precipitated the formal adoption of a revitalization strategy. As the institutional leader, the president occupies a political role,
adopting a clear agenda to guide his or her tenure. For Penn, UC, and Duke, the revitalization intervention was able to further the incoming president’s political agenda in some way. In addition, each intervention has survived the transition to a new president (or multiple new presidents), as well as shifts in the board of trustees, which underscores the durability of place to an institution. Yet, as the interventions mature and near the fifteen to twenty-year mark, university leaders intimate some uncertainty with respect to the long game of revitalization. Neighborhood residents and community partners express an expectation that universities will continue to direct resources towards revitalization, but leaders change and there is no clear precedent for universities to follow with respect to long-term investments outside of the institution itself. Ultimately, place-based missions or pro-community values are only as strong as the willingness of institutional leaders to commit financial and organizational resources. And, likewise, the mutualistic benefits are largely dependent on the leadership’s definition of and expectation for “positive returns.”

Last, neighborhood and university context contribute to the tone of an institution’s revitalization strategy. For instance, the urgency of the neighborhood threat, as well as the presence of existing community partners, can influence how university leaders respond to place. For Penn, the leadership was under immense pressure to react quickly to the violence and deterioration surrounding the campus. The conditions were past the threshold of comfort for the administration, as well as members of the university community, and the need to act quickly superseded any desire to develop community partnerships. UC also contended with crime and
deterioration, though it did not have the same tragic impetus driving its actions and, as a result, had a bit more time to construct an approach. In conjunction with a larger campus planning effort, UC leveraged Cincinnati’s tradition of strong neighborhood identities by establishing neighborhood-level CDCs to participate in a neighborhood revitalization strategy. Duke displayed the most intentionality in the design of their process. Its highly inclusive and tailored approach to neighborhood revitalization is due, in large part, to the fact that Duke administrators did not perceive an urgent threat to its institutional interests from the neighborhood. While deterioration, poverty, and crime rates were real issues for Durham, the university had a natural land buffer for their students and had not yet faced tragedy, both of which diminished the pressure to act immediately.

Collectively, the four elements lend themselves to a matrix, which can be used to evaluate the contours of a revitalization strategy. Figure 8.1 applies the revitalization factors to the dissertation case studies. For each case, the university receives a factor ranking, ranging from weak to strong. Subsequently, the case earns an overall ranking for its neighborhood change outcome—a reflection of market-based neighborhood change and threat reduction (e.g. crime)—and its community outcome, which reflects the case study analysis.
Through the WPI, Penn invested in a strategy that produced neighborhood change without significant community benefit. As discussed in Chapter 5, neighborhood improvement in University City was uneven with the PAS zone showing substantially more upward momentum than the areas outside of the catchment. The initiative was heavily focused on place-making and leveraged Penn’s well-developed real estate skills. While Penn’s mission had a long tradition of civic engagement and university leaders adopted revitalization as a core part of their agenda, the urgency of the problem and lack of existing community capacity meant the intervention prioritized physical revitalization over other community benefits.

Despite its emphasis on community development corporations (CDC), UC’s intervention also prioritized physical improvement over community benefit. As described in Chapter 6, UC’s investments stimulated significant investment in the real
estate sector and transformed large segments of the neighborhood into a “college town.” It did not, however, solve the crime problem—crack houses are no longer an issue, theft and assaults have persisted as criminals take advantage of a larger student population in the neighborhood. Although residents have a seat at the table through the CDCs, UC holds the purse strings and has prioritized physical development over community initiatives, such as homeownership programs. Over time, the board of trustees has largely turned away from its revitalization approach, questioning its benefit to UC as an investment strategy, and there is no clear policy infrastructure to support continued town-gown engagement.

Last, Duke’s efforts stand apart from the other cases in the matrix, underlying its emphasis on mission-led investment and the strong community capacity in Durham. Like the other cases, Duke’s staff possessed strong core development competency, but it chose to provide investment support as a secondary partner rather than leading redevelopment projects. In addition, Duke built strong community engagement competency, hiring respected community leaders to guide its revitalization strategy and implement its investments. Last, university leaders based their decisions on a clearly articulated revitalization philosophy, which helped clarify the institution’s commitment. Together, these factors generated transformative revitalization outcomes, but also produced community-directed benefits to the neighborhoods. However, here too, the future funding status of Duke’s strategy is uncertain.

The case study evaluation suggests two things. First, a university’s core development competency is important for stimulating neighborhood change, but it is
not sufficient for generating mutualistic revitalization outcomes. In fact, a strong
development expertise without corresponding community capacity might inhibit
mutually beneficial outcomes, as a university’s skills shape its understanding of the
“problem.” Second, a university’s mission and leadership provide critical direction for its
intervention, as does the situational context. A mission with a strong community focus
and leaders that value shared town-gown outcomes will be more likely to have the
support required to pursue neighborhood investment over the long term. The presence
of these factors also provides a framework and/or language for extensive engagement
with the community. In addition, the context of the intervention, including the degree of
neighborhood distress and the existing community infrastructure, is also important as it
serves as the foundation for all future work. Universities in urgent situations often feel
pressure to act immediately, which poses a different kind of challenge for mutualistic
benefits than institutions with less pressing environmental considerations.

8.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Despite the fact some are casting anchor institutions as the “saviors of cities,” this study
finds that anchor institutions are not well suited or well versed in the opportunities to
become a panacea for struggling urban neighborhoods. The evidence shows that
university investments can catalyze neighborhood change, but an anchor’s skills and
motivations, naturally, lie within the institution. Place-making and institutional branding
are top priorities and we—policy makers, communities, university leaders and
administrators—should not assume this equates to community building or equitable
development. Further, if we do expect more shared benefits from university interventions, it will require, as Duke’s experience along with hindsight from Penn and UC suggest, universities and neighborhoods to adopt different expectations for priorities, strategies, and returns on investment from the outset.

As a vested neighbor, universities have abundant resources and opportunities to support a wider range of community-sensitive strategies. Their roles as diverse employment engines, major purchasers and generators of consumer demand, and skilled developers with an interest in neighborhood stability are all significant strengths. Universities do not, however, necessarily possess the capacity or inclination to develop extensive community-facing infrastructure. Nor does it necessarily support their institutional missions or fiduciary responsibilities to take on this role. On the contrary, the idea that a university’s non-profit status and fixed location obligate them to consider the community’s voice as part of their institutional strategy is still a new idea.

Suspending the “saviors of cities” expectation, the realities of an anchor’s potential and its structural limitations provides two alternatives for planning policy. The first is a readjustment of expectations to match the status quo. Given the evidence presented in this study, we could modify our expectations for university interventions in neighborhoods, acknowledging a university’s ability to stimulate markets and induce physical revitalization without expecting it to trespass into the public good. Alternately, we could identify opportunities to supplement anchor institution investments, providing the community-facing infrastructure and narrowing the neighborhood gaps left by market-driven interventions.
I contend that universities and communities should pursue the latter policy, pursuing an approach that supports opportunities to push the university intervention into the community, rather than pulling the neighborhood into the university’s goals. Further, I argue this alternate approach to university-community revitalization should occur on two fronts. First, universities and community development stakeholders should establish connections between existing university protocols and community goals. For instance, universities can modify procurement and employment policies, with support from workforce and economic development partners, to satisfy mutual town-gown priorities. Second, universities, in partnership with city and community development stakeholders, should conduct pre-intervention analyses to anticipate intervention outcomes and develop plans to mitigate negative impacts. To meet their own needs, universities will continue to invest in consumer-driven redevelopment as part of the revitalization process. Yet, through a deliberate town-gown strategy, the institution, community partners, and local government could anticipate the community impacts of significant development projects. In doing so, they could formulate a proactive response and invest in “circuit breakers” to ensure balance between an influx of physical, place-based investment and community needs.

8.4.1 Recommendation for Universities

The evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that universities are important players in the revitalization and health of urban centers. By incorporating neighborhoods into their institutional brands, universities have been able to direct their
development expertise into disinvested neighborhoods and, in doing so, have breathed new life into them. But universities also possess a particular set of strengths and interests, which tend to predispose them towards physical improvement. They are not always the ideal organization to manage community development, as they “represent the demand side... not the supply side. And, in fact, universities are really bad at affordable [development]. [They’re] the gentrifiers...” and they cannot “authentically own the affordable agenda” (Kerman 2015).

To move forward with a broader approach to neighborhood revitalization, universities must acknowledge this inherent conflict with communities. A university represents one of many stakeholders in their neighborhoods, but, given its mass and resources, its contributions carry more weight. In addition, its investments and goals often pose a direct conflict to the priorities of the neighborhoods. Given this intrinsic conflict of interest, universities are often not the ideal organization to pursue community development initiatives—at least not alone. Instead, they require strong community partners to “own [all the community capacity issues and interests] that [the institution] cannot handle” (Kerman 2015).

Rather than denying or minimizing this conflict, universities should build their neighborhood revitalization strategies on this premise. From the beginning, universities should engage in an assessment of the institutional and neighborhood conditions to highlight the intersections and gaps between town and gown priorities. Subsequently, university leaders should invest in a strategy that: (1) leverages institutional skills and assets, including land and development; (2) maximizes opportunities and local context
in the neighborhood, including prospective partnerships and opportunities to coordinate with non-university investments; and (3) minimizes deficits by seeking out strategic solutions to neutralize anticipated or under-addressed problems. The goal of this approach is not to cast universities as the caretaker for urban neighborhoods. Instead, it strives to reconceive of the neighborhood as a comprehensive unit—an ecosystem—and the university as a significant organism in its support system.

To achieve this paradigm shift, universities would need to make two major shifts. First, the institution should develop a porous community-facing infrastructure. This requires conscious efforts to overlay the university’s corporate and/or academic interests on to the priorities and vision of the community. As discussed at the end of Chapter 5, Drexel University is attempting to build this infrastructure through its current initiatives, establishing centers and academic benchmarks to build community capacity. Yet, Drexel’s intervention is still new and it is unclear if its community ideology will survive the weight of its place-making development demands. Alternately, strategic partnerships offer a promising means of developing community-facing infrastructure. Community partners, including local governments, CDCs, community development intermediaries (e.g. community development financial institutions), and other community non-profits, possess the skills to build local capacity, as well as implement neighborhood-supporting investments that complement university priorities. Further, many of these partners are natural facilitators, with the ability to make connections between multiple neighborhood interests and opportunities.
The second shift builds on the community infrastructure through an emphasis on intentionality and evaluation. Evaluating the institutional and neighborhood returns on revitalization investments does not traditionally lie within a university’s expertise. The institutional mission typically focuses on the practical and civic education of its students with very little overlap into community development or neighborhood improvement. Even so, an anchor’s place-based strategies could greatly benefit from more intentionality around both the means and the ends of an intervention. To achieve this, universities and neighborhoods should establish evaluation policies that include clearly defined objectives and metrics of success. Where the university success metrics are based on consumer demand and branding, community stakeholders (and supporting partners) should push for a broader definition of improvement. Further, community partners should advocate for ancillary initiatives that close the gaps between town and gown priorities. Unless the metrics and evaluations are put on the table, no one can have a productive conversation about benefits or consequences.

### 8.4.2 Planning Policy Recommendation

From a city perspective, universities are generating positive neighborhood outcomes. Through their investments, they are reversing decline, creating new amenities, and attracting new populations into urban neighborhoods. Yet, planning policy has been largely content to leave universities to their own devices. This needs to change. Planning policy should directly engage with universities on revitalization issues, where it could do
a much better job of leveraging benefits and institutional opportunities for communities.

While university interventions frequently mirror the investments of private developers, the long-term interests of universities are closely aligned with the neighborhood and city’s future. Thus, planning policy needs to make a stronger case for the integration of place-based anchor interests with other community-focused efforts, including local government (e.g. city planning departments, planning and zoning commissions, redevelopment authorities) and non-profit community development partners. Rather than regulating by zoning from a distance, city planners should become brokers for anchor institution neighborhoods, convening invested stakeholders and facilitating conversations. Planning policy should ensure the community voice is present in neighborhood interventions; it should also identify opportunities to overlay public and private sector investments, thereby generating positive spillover effects. Whereas neighborhood transformation often occurs because many individual actors are making overlapping investments in a specific place, city planners are in a unique position to coordinate investment and anticipate shortfalls in the work. They are perhaps best equipped to recognize the full potential of what anchor institutions can mean for both a neighborhood and a city.

8.5 Unresolved issues and future research

This research goes a long way towards broadening the conversation around anchor institutions. It builds a comprehensive framework for understanding (1) how universities
approach neighborhood revitalization and (2) how neighborhoods change in response to interventions. It also establishes a future research agenda.

A central finding of this dissertation is that university interventions are changing neighborhoods. Yet, neighborhoods are complicated and dynamic places. To better account for these complexities, future research should examine university interventions more closely and on two levels. First, the regression analysis should evolve to offer a finer grain analysis of neighborhood intervention impacts. Future assessments should account for variations in the intervention approach (e.g. pro-university development, community development, subsidies and programs), the scale of the effort (e.g. dollars invested), and context-based factors (e.g. neighborhood conditions). In addition, future work should attempt to account for other revitalization activities within a neighborhood. For instance, a researcher may try to distinguish between direct university investment, indirect spinoff investments from private developers, and/or other community development or public sector investments. These kinds of refinements would enable a much better understanding of what universities do and do not contribute to their neighborhoods through intervention.

Second, future work should refocus the research to the level of the household. One of the main questions growing out of this dissertation relates to how benefits are distributed within a neighborhood. The important question is not simply about revitalization, but also revitalization for whom? The neighborhood outcomes analysis (Chapter 4), as well as the assessments of change in Penn and UC’s neighborhoods, suggests that university interventions are stimulating change by attracting new
populations, including students, university-affiliated homeowners, and young professionals. The true extent of this phenomenon, however, is unclear, as are its implications for pre-intervention residents and low-income households. Future research should pursue this question through a detailed analysis of residential mobility and turnover in intervention neighborhoods. In addition, future impact assessments should account for not just neighborhood-level improvement, but socio-economic change at the household level. By providing detailed impact-based evaluations, universities and their communities will be better able to account for their actions and invest in a mutually beneficial outcome.


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