The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership

Barbara Elias
University of Pennsylvania, barbarella.e@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations

Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership

Abstract
In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in-country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in-country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of "power" in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests complied with, 1/3 complied with in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled.
THE CRITICAL ALLY:
COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS

Barbara Elias

A DISSERTATION

in

Political Science

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2013

Supervisor of Dissertation

________________________

Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science

Graduate Group Chairperson

________________________

Nancy Hirschmann, Professor, Department of Political Science

Dissertation Committee

Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science
Edward Mansfield, Professor, Department of Political Science
Michael Horowitz, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
Alex Weisiger, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Turns out, this is harder than it looks. I am enormously grateful to my professors, Avery Goldstein, Ed Mansfield, Mike Horowitz and Alex Weisiger. Avery who was patient, smart and incisive, Alex who invested enormous energy reading every draft and challenging important details. I owe Alex a debt I can never repay for converting me from a one-trick national security document researcher to a proper political scientist complete with quantitative tools (amazing!). Thank you also to Mike who gave me perspective and Ed who, after listening to the initial proposal, asked, “wait, can you actually do this?” He was not convinced, but let me try anyway. Thank you.

In addition, I am grateful to the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania for an incredible opportunity and education, as well as Brown University for my first education in international relations under Jim Blight and janet Lang. Enormous thanks are due to the National Security Archive, where badass academics and intellectual troublemakers go to dig up evidence and do great research. Several institutions were wonderfully supportive of this project. I would like to thank the Browne Center for International Politics, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, GAPSA, the Teece Family, and the Jewish Family Service Association of Cleveland for honoring me with funds and encouragement.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my family. I am grateful to my mom, dad, and poppou, Cameron, Aimee and Mary. Yia-yia, who taught me that you could be very small and very strong, much like clever political actors in international relations. Thank you to Anna and my other sisters Rosella Cappella, Kim Turner and Johanna Lacoe who picked me up, dusted me off and were my flashlight in the dark. Finally, thanks to Nathaniel who set this project back a few months, but made it better because he made me better.
ABSTRACT

THE CRITICAL ALLY:

COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS

Barbara Elias
Avery Goldstein

In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in-country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in-country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of “power” in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability of
intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and
the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-
ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can
implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in
order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found
remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests
complied with, 1/3 complied with in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ IV
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................... IX
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................... XI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1
The Central Argument .................................................................................. 4
Why Examine These Alliances? .................................................................. 8
CHAPTER 2: THEORY, ARGUMENT, AND LITERATURE ....................... 14
Literature Review .......................................................................................... 17
Military Studies—Counterinsurgency Warfare ...................................... 17
International Relations ............................................................................. 19
Re-conceptualizing Ideas in International Relations on Allied Commitment,
Dependency, and Interests ...................................................................... 26
Commitment .............................................................................................. 26
Dependency ............................................................................................... 30
Interest ........................................................................................................ 33
Variables and Hypotheses ....................................................................... 35
Independent Variables – What Determines Compliance? .................... 37
Control Variables—Other Important Factors ....................................... 45
A Note on the Interaction Between Variables ...................................... 48
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 51
The Reliability of U.S. Department of State Cables from Wikileaks ........ 59
The Foreign Intervening Force—Selecting Requests to Allies ............... 66
The Dependent Variable—Compliance .................................................. 67
Independent Variables ........................................................................... 74
CHAPTER 4: VIETNAM ............................................................................ 91
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Vietnamese Compliance .... 92
Summary Findings ..................................................................................... 93
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance .................................. 100
Capacity .................................................................................................... 100
Dependency and Unilateral Action ....................................................... 104
Interests .................................................................................................... 111
Conditions of War, Internal Politics and External Threats .................. 128
The End of the War and U.S. Withdrawal ............................................. 137
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 142
CHAPTER 5: IRAQ ........................................................................................................ 144
Summary Findings ........................................................................................................... 144
The U.S., Coalition Provisional Authority and the Government of Iraq ............ 146
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ................................................................. 147
The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) ........................................................................... 153
The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and Permanent Government of Iraq (GOI) .... 155
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Iraqi Compliance ....................... 161
Data on Iraqi Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary .............................. 165
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance ................................................. 171
Capacity ..................................................................................................................... 171
Dependency and Unilateral Action ......................................................................... 173
Interests—Costs and Benefits .................................................................................. 181
Conditions of War and Internal Politics ................................................................. 191
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 195
CHAPTER 6: THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN ................................................................. 199
Summary Findings ........................................................................................................ 200
Hamid Karzai and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan ................. 202
The U.S. Civilian Advisory Effort .............................................................................. 209
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Afghan Compliance ............... 211
Data on Afghan Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary ......................... 213
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance .................................................. 219
Capacity ..................................................................................................................... 219
Dependency and Unilateral Action ......................................................................... 222
Interests—Costs and Benefits .................................................................................. 237
Conditions of War and Internal Politics ................................................................. 242
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 245
CHAPTER 7: THE U.S.S.R. IN AFGHANISTAN .................................................... 247
Summary Findings ........................................................................................................ 247
The KGB Factor .......................................................................................................... 251
The Soviet Bureaucracy .............................................................................................. 253
Finding a Scapegoat .................................................................................................... 256
Strategy and the Soviet Intervention in the Afghan Regime, 1979-89 ............... 258
Methodology ............................................................................................................... 262
Afghan Compliance with Soviet Demands ............................................................. 266
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Proposed Hypotheses on Interaction Effect between Dependency on the Host Regime and Allied Interests ................................................................. 15

Table 2. Summary of Arguments ........................................................................ 16

Table 3. Post WWII Insurgency Wars with 1000+ Foreign Military Casualties: Cases Examined in the Study ........................................................................... 54

Table 4. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War ..................... 93

Table 5. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War ........... 94


Table 8. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War .................. 165

Table 9. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War ........ 166

Table 10. Compliance & Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Iraq ............. 170

Table 11. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability .............................................................. 174

Table 12. Baghdad’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2003-2010, Interaction Effect With U.S. Unilateral Capabilities and Allied Interest ............................... 175

Table 13. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War ............... 213

Table 14. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War ........ 214

Table 15. Compliance and Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Afghanistan .... 218

Table 16. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability .............................................................. 223

Table 17. Kabul’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2002-2010 Interaction Effect With U.S. Unilateral Capabilities and Allied Interest ............................... 223

Table 18. Timeline of Soviet Military and Political Takeover of Afghanistan .......... 248

Table 19. Kabul’s Compliance with Soviet Demands ........................................... 273

Table 20. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War ............... 298

Table 21. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War .......... 300
Table 22. Compliance and Non-Compliance with Indian Demands—Sri Lanka... 303

Table 23. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability.......................................................... 308

Table 24. Sri Lanka’s Compliance with Indian Demands, 1986-1990 Interaction Effect With Indian Unilateral Capabilities and Allied Interest ................. 308
# List of Figures

- Figure 1. Traditional Counterinsurgency Models—Two Players at War ........................................ 2
- Figure 2. Revised Counterinsurgency Model .................................................................................. 3
- Figure 3. Diagram of Theory ......................................................................................................... 36
- Figure 4. General Diagram—The Research Project ..................................................................... 58
- Figure 5. Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Kabul and Number of U.S. Requests ............................................................................................................. 62
- Figure 6. Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Baghdad and Number of U.S. Requests ...................................................................................................................... 63
- Figure 7. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks in Iraq & Afghanistan ......................... 64
- Figure 8. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time - Vietnam .......................................................... 94
- Figure 9. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability .......................................................... 109
- Figure 10. Rates of Verbal Compliance Without Substantive Compliance Vietnam With Interaction Effect ........................................................................... 110
- Figure 11. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S to Vietnam .................................. 113
- Figure 12. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types - Vietnam ..................................................... 114
- Figure 13. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – Iraq .................................................................................. 167
- Figure 14. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S to Iraq ........................................... 183
- Figure 15. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types - Iraq ............................................................. 184
- Figure 16. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – U.S. in Afghanistan .................................................................................. 215
- Figure 17. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S to Afghanistan ............................ 238
- Figure 18. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types – Afghanistan (U.S.) .................................... 239
- Figure 19. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan ........................................................................... 269
- Figure 20. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – Sri Lanka .................................................................................. 300
- Figure 21. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from India to Sri Lanka .................................. 310
Figure 22. Rates of Compliance and Issue Type – India in Sri Lanka .........................310
Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

For domestic actors, losing a counterinsurgency war can mean losing power, livelihood, and possibly life altogether. Upon arriving in Kabul in 1996 the Taliban killed former pro-Soviet President Najibullah, while in 1975 the North Vietnamese put thousands from Saigon into notorious “reeducation camps.” These types of actions are not unusual in these wars. Insurgencies are often waged for control of the state, territory, and identity of the nation. If victorious, insurgents rarely treat former officials with kindness.

In light of the ominous consequences of defeat, it is puzzling why at times we observe domestic regimes knowingly behaving in ways that are likely to undermine the counterinsurgency war effort. In Vietnam, for example, Saigon limited the strength of its army by resisting efforts to lower the national draft age from 20 to 18.1 Similarly, the Karzai Administration has refused to investigate brazen banking thefts in Kabul that have undermined national economic stability. And Baghdad resisted increasing funding to rebuild the city of Fallujah, a hotbed of insurgent activity that Americans feared would continue to destabilize Iraq without extensive development. What are the primary motivations for these decisions? Considering the potential costs of defeat and the pressure to perform on counterinsurgency tasks being exerted by allies, why not prioritize efforts to contain the insurgency above other interests?

Disregarding the policy goals of the ally can undermine the war effort, the strategic alliance intended to win the war, and efforts to ensure the preservation of the

---

1 After years of resistance, the Government of South Vietnam eventually lowered the draft age. Following the Tet Offensive (1968) Saigon decided it should fill in Army ranks by dropping the age of draftees. Meanwhile Americans fighting in Vietnam were always drafted at 18 years of age.
domestic regime. So why do it? This dissertation gains leverage on this puzzle by answering the critical question: in counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, \(^2\) under what conditions does the domestic host regime comply with the policy demands of their foreign ally and under what conditions do they dismiss such demands?

Building on work in international relations on alliance politics and coercion, I revisit debates in political science regarding definitions of “power,” and sort through thousands of primary source diplomatic documents from these wars in order to isolate demands from foreign allies and trace their outcomes and influences. Policymakers, historians, military strategists, and scholars frequently mention the political component of counterinsurgency warfare in passing, but it is rarely thoughtfully examined. This study aims to flesh out one critical political element of these highly political wars: the alliance between intervening states and their host allies.

This approach requires moving beyond the standard frame in the military literature of treating counterinsurgency (COIN) as a two-player contest focused on insurgent and counterinsurgent. Existing models either fail to differentiate between counterinsurgencies with foreign intervention and those without, or acknowledge that there are different types of counterinsurgency wars, but largely assume the foreign state and the domestic regime cooperate seamlessly.

![Figure 1. Traditional Counterinsurgency Models—Two Players at War](image)

\(^2\) Large-scale foreign military counterinsurgency intervention is defined as a counterinsurgency with more than 1,000 allied foreign troops killed in action. See methodology chapter for more information.
Instead, I examine the dynamics of the alliance in counterinsurgency wars with foreign military interventions.

\[\text{Counterinsurgent} \quad \text{Domestic Regime} \]
\[\text{Alliance} \]
\[\text{Counterinsurgent} \quad \text{Foreign Ally Supporting Domestic Regime} \]
\[\text{War} \]
\[\text{Insurgent (& Allies)} \]

*Figure 2. Revised Counterinsurgency Model—For Counterinsurgency Wars with Foreign Military Intervention, 3+ Players*

This project examines the darkened arrow on the left, the alliance between foreign and domestic counterinsurgents. A systematic study of this relationship is curiously absent from the prevalent counterinsurgency literature. This deficiency is surprising considering the extraordinary costs of these wars and of the importance of this alliance to counterinsurgency war fighting and outcome. High-profile counterinsurgency conflicts involving foreign military interventions, including Vietnam and Afghanistan (both the Soviet and the American experience), have been deeply frustrating for intervening forces. Superpowers have retreated from these wars and millions lost their lives in the fighting. Historical accounts of these conflicts are littered with anecdotes describing conflict between allies and the resulting potential impact on outcome, yet the structural nature of these dynamics has not been systematically
examined. As Robert J. McMahon wrote about Vietnam, “Although the nature of the South Vietnamese regime inspired a flood of polemical tracts in the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s, relatively few scholars have probed deeply into the underlying structure(s).”

Foreign militaries routinely criticize the shortcomings of their domestic allies. The Pentagon Papers documenting American involvement in Vietnam, for example, is full of details of South Vietnamese failures. “[U.S.] Colonel Sam Wilson was able to say plainly that the [South Vietnamese 46th Regiment] was poor and that its commander was ineffective and, without a doubt, corrupt. [South Vietnamese Major General] Ky explained that the commander in question was a close friend of the division commander who was a close friend of the corps commander who was a close friend of Ky. That seemed to explain the matter.”

The commander was not removed. U.S. officials were frustrated.

As this example illustrates, there are tensions in these alliances that can potentially influence counterinsurgency performance and war outcome. Ineffective commanders left in change due to domestic political connections could detract from effective force employment on the battlefield. Over time and across political and military institutions, these dynamics could influence who wins and who loses these conflicts.

The Central Argument

Military analysts, policy makers and historians tend to attribute the wartime failures of allied counterinsurgency partners to the foibles of particular governments or
personalities. From the corruption of the Diem Regime, to incompetence in the Najibullah Government, and present frustrations with Hamid Karzai, commentators repeatedly bemoaned the presence of the “wrong” people in charge. These comments imply different individuals would have done better.

This study takes a different approach. I argue dynamics in the alliance and war produce incentives or disincentives to cooperate with allies. The decisions of host regimes to behave in particular ways are, at least in part, rational responses to the presence of an intervening military. Specific policymakers are essential figures in the wars examined, but these individuals are making decisions within a specific counterinsurgency environment. The context of the military alliance and conditions of the war affect the decision making process, making certain decisions by in-country political actors more or less likely. This project identifies important elements of the given counterinsurgency environment and the influence they have on the behavior of in-country regimes. Additionally, due to the importance of structural elements of the alliance and the war influencing behavior, I argue that similar patterns in compliance outcomes will emerge across this subset of wars regardless of regime type, military strategy, leadership personalities, financial investment, or the length of the intervention.

Detailed explanations of the important structural aspects of counterinsurgency wartime alliances, that I argue influence the behavior of allies, are provided in Chapter 2. Briefly, however, I will summarize that this study holds that host allied regimes tend to either comply with, or defy, the demands of their foreign allies based on multiple factors including: 1) their short-term benefit from seeing the request fulfilled, 2) the potential capability of the foreign ally to implement the request independently, 3) the capacity of the domestic regime to undertake the activity demanded, 4) complications from
operating in a war zone, and 5) a substantial, acute enemy offensive that may restructure host regime interests, at least temporarily. In total, these five variables interact to create incentives for compliance or non-compliance with the requests of an intervening force.

Keep in mind that counterinsurgency wars are notoriously complex. The importance of, and connections between political and military actors, variables, conditions and mechanism can be overwhelming. A 2009 PowerPoint slide was created as an attempt to illustrate the connections between dozens of the most important elements of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, including, for example, terrain, government corruption, tribal belief systems, tax revenues, Afghan popular sympathies, the experience level of U.S. soldiers, insurgent casualties, U.S. domestic opinion and perceptions of security. The resulting graphic was so convoluted The New York Times reported that although it intended to “portray the complexity of American military strategy,” it “looked more like a bowl of spaghetti.” This project examines one strand of counterinsurgency spaghetti, the relationship between foreign and domestic political allies and the tools available to each ally to coerce one another.

Limiting this investigation to a small piece of the counterinsurgency puzzle does not mean the inter-alliance relations in question are simple. In fact, based on the evidence, I argue that variables do not always have a straightforward affect on the behavior of allies; they also interact with one another. In particular, I argue there is an interaction effect between allied interests and dependency on the in-country regime to implement the policy. Whether allies agree over the action requested, and the potential

---

unilateral ability of the intervening force to implement the request, if necessary, create specific incentives for in-country compliance with, or defiance of, foreign demands.

Specifically I argue that when allied preferences diverge and the external ally cannot implement the request unilaterally, the local government is unlikely to comply with the demands of its foreign ally. Under these circumstances, foreign forces cannot undertake the action independently, and the ally it is depending on is not interested in seeing the request fulfilled. Unless other factors intercede, the request will likely never be implemented. On the other hand, if allied interests had converged over this request, compliance would be likely since the participation of the local regime is required to implement the policy and the regime would prefer to see the request realized.

Conversely, when allied preferences align and, if necessary, the intervening force is able to undertake the requested policy unilaterally (without local help), the local ally has an incentive not to participate, despite its clear benefit from the policy, because it can wait out the foreign ally and free-ride off efforts of intervening forces. Lastly, divergent interests between allies combined with an independent capacity of the intervening force to implement the request, if necessary, actually promotes compliance from the local ally, because the regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid being left behind, isolated, or undermined by its ally acting independently and implementing a policy it doesn’t care for. Even though the local partner is opposed to the request, it is likely to participate to exercise some control over implementation. Examples of the mechanisms and variables described are provided in every chapter and further specified in Chapter 2.

It should be noted that because this study gets into the nooks and crannies of foreign policy decision-making processes and negotiations between allies, it requires a
systematic analysis of materials detailing inter-alliance relations. To test the hypotheses proposed (also detailed in Chapter 2), I analyzed nine wars and gathered thousands of primary source documents to detail specific policy requests made from intervening allies, as well as the outcome of those requests. Due to the amount of information being processed, in addition to qualitative analysis of each high-level request made in this wartime environment between political allies, I also constructed a database of requests and outcomes to quantitatively test the theories proposed. This process is detailed in Chapter 3. The findings of this study are constructed around the 460 requests identified by intervening counterinsurgency forces on their domestic allies and the outcomes of each of those policy requests.

**Why Examine These Alliances?**

This study enables a more sophisticated understanding of a complex form of war that has real-world interest and application. Because I analyze the conditions necessary for a foreign ally to translate material wealth into coercive influence, the study is also an opportunity to reexamine concepts of “power” in international relations. It contributes to greater understandings of alliance politics in international relations by specifying mechanisms that can cause alliance entrapment, and forces better specificity of variables frequently discussed in the alliance literature, such as “dependency” and “interests.”

If the interaction effect I specify between interests and dependency-creating incentives or disincentives to cooperate is accurate, future scholars studying alliance politics will have better tools for analyzing inter-alliance coercion because they will be better able to specify when and why one partner (or the other) is likely to be influential in bargaining encounters. Currently the study of these issues relies on nebulous terms, such as one partner having “greater interest” in an issue. Existing models can only say that
sometimes this matters and sometimes it doesn’t. The specification of the interaction effect offered in this study, on the other hand, better contextualizes the likely effect of “greater interest” on policy outcomes and explaining when “greater interest” is likely to be important and when it is unlikely to have effect at all on which partner prevails in inter-alliance bargaining encounters.

The study is also compelling by specifically targeting dynamics in counterinsurgency conflicts. Despite the inclination of great power militaries towards conventional war, irregular warfare has become increasingly prevalent. In the Correlates of War database, Dr. David Kilcullen found that 385 of 464 (83%) of armed conflicts were considered civil wars or insurgencies, while 79 (17%) were coded as conventional interstate wars. “Indeed, though military establishments persist in regarding it as ‘irregular’ or ‘unconventional,’ guerilla war has been the commonest of conflicts throughout history.”

And in these increasingly common wars aiming to contain insurgent movements, foreign forces have run into serious trouble. By definition, as foreigners, intervening parties have difficulty establishing domestic legitimacy justifying their use of force. Before the Taliban killed him, mujahedeen commander Abdul Haq warned American forces this would be the definitive political dynamic for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Afghans “will fight. Despite everything the Taliban has done to destroy human rights, to destroy people’s health, education, their livelihoods, they will fight. Afghans will always unite in the face of what they see as a foreign enemy and this will help strengthen the Taliban.”

---

7 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, ix–x.
In other words, the very concept of a foreign military intervention provides a strategic advantage for local enemies of the intervention. In order to counteract this dynamic, intervening forces typically turn to domestic allies to help fulfill their policy agendas and legitimize their presence. But as documented in this study, this is also problematic. Foreign intervening forces do not always have the ability to compel local allies to follow instructions—yet a failing performance by this local regime can contribute to defeat. For this reason, examining the particular dynamics of counterinsurgency alliances is important. It will better explain important aspects of regime behavior and counterinsurgency war outcomes.

This project is divided into nine chapters. As explained in the previous pages, this chapter (Chapter 1) explores the general context of the research question and the framing of the relevant issues at hand. Chapter 2 details the primary arguments offered and provides a brief literature review situating this study in the context of existing scholarship. Subsequent chapters test my theory while addressing alliance dynamics across specific counterinsurgency wars. Chapter 3 addresses case selection and methodology. Foundations of the study are detailed including definition and data collection. Each chapter on a particular counterinsurgency war also has its own methodology section to discuss issues and sources of data specific to that conflict.

In Chapter 4, I examine the U.S. war in Vietnam. Having identified 105 U.S. demands on Saigon, I find the proposed interaction effect between interests and potential unilateral ability of the intervening ally. In Vietnam, the Tet Offensive also provides a valuable test case for the fifth variable proposed in the study: the influence of an acute enemy offensive. I find the shock of the Tet Offensive provided powerful incentives for South Vietnamese compliance with U.S. demands. The communist
offensive not only refocused President Thieu on specific counterinsurgency tasks, but also momentarily shifted the behavior of South Vietnamese government (GVN) bureaucracies. Provoked by the fear of impending defeat, GVN employees accomplished multiple tasks that had previously languished for years.

In Chapter 5, I study the U.S. in Iraq, identifying 106 U.S. demands. The theorized interaction effect is again significant in Iraq. Additionally, there was an interesting dynamic in Baghdad’s response to American economic demands. Iraq’s historically statist economy conflicted with American demands for free-market solutions to development problems. This created a unique tension based on conflicting economic philosophies. Furthermore, Iraq was directly governed by the Americans under the Coalition Provisional Authority (March 2003 – June 2004). This period provides an excellent comparison to the Soviet takeover of the Afghan Government from 1980-89.

Chapter 6 explores the U.S. war in Afghanistan by examining 148 American demands posed to the Afghans. The hypothesized interaction effect between interests and American unilateral ability was again statistically significant, with an Afghan twist. Surprisingly, I find the Karzai Regime less likely to free-ride off American efforts when compared to other allies. The Afghans had a tendency to comply, at least in part, with U.S. projects that Americans could implement independently because Afghan officials saw these demands as opportunities to make money. In situations where other allies would have been inclined not to participate, instead opting to benefit indirectly from the unilateral actions of their foreign allies against their collective enemies, Kabul participated so it could tap into project revenues and better dictate which specific Afghan parties would benefit.
Chapter 7 addresses the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, exploring the dynamics of Moscow’s takeover of the Afghan state. Only 22 demands were identified, all made within the first 13 months of the nine-year Soviet intervention, as thereafter the U.S.S.R. simply assumed direct control over Afghan policy. According to the available documents, the Afghans agreed to all Soviet demands. But despite this perfect record of verbal compliance, there was no increase in rate of substantive compliance when compared to other conflicts examined in this study. The Afghans appeared to always agree with the Soviets, without necessarily being able to fulfill their promises. This chapter also briefly discusses several other interventions instigated by authoritarian regimes, including Egypt’s involvement in Yemen, Vietnam in Cambodia, Cuba in Angola and Syria in Lebanon.

Chapter 8 discusses the relatively short Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. In less than three years, over 1,150 Indian troops were killed attempting to implement an Indian-brokered solution to Sri Lanka’s “Tamil problem.” Again, the interaction effect proposed in this study was found significant in a statistical analysis of 79 demands from New Delhi to Colombo. This is a fascinating intervention due to India’s shifting alliances between the insurgents and government counterinsurgents. From 1983-1990, New Delhi’s allegiances alternated between belligerents in the Sri Lankan conflict, switching from arming, funding, and training Tamil independence groups to sending troops to Sri Lanka to suppress those same Tamil separatists. Indian soldiers were killed by militants Indian intelligence agents had trained and armed just years before. New Delhi sought to coerce the Sri Lankan Government into compromising with Tamil leaders by funding the Tamil Tiger insurgents (LTTE), while also attempting to coerce the LTTE by sending troops to uphold a primarily Indian-designed agreement seeking to disarm the LTTE.
This overestimation of its coercive influence over all parties in Sri Lanka came at a high cost for India. The Indian mission did not succeed.

Chapter 9 provides a concluding summary and thoughts on the potential impact of these findings on war outcome.
Chapter 2:
THEORY, ARGUMENT, AND LITERATURE

“The present GVN [Government of South Vietnam] continued, as they had so often before, to agree readily in conversations with us to the principle of national reconciliation; yet any concrete implementation remained elusive even through another top level meeting with the President.”

– The Pentagon Papers⁹

This study analyzes the decision of host regime allies in counterinsurgency wars to either comply with or defy the demands of their foreign allies. I argue that five variables explain variation in host regime compliance: 1) The short-term interest of the host regime in seeing the request fulfilled, 2) the potential capability of the foreign ally to implement the request unilaterally, 3) the capacity of the domestic regime to undertake the activity demanded, 4) complications from operating in a war zone, and 5) substantial, acute enemy offensives that may restructure host regime interests, at least temporarily. In this chapter, I define each of these variables and offer hypotheses about the influence each variable has in determining whether or not the host regime is likely to cooperate.

The political dynamic of these alliances is complex. I argue that the variables identified in this study do not always have a direct impact on compliance outcomes. Instead, certain variables, like interest and dependency, promote or discourage cooperation when combined. This indirect pathway is logical, but not initially obvious. It has gone undetected by busy policymakers coping with these difficult partnerships and by academics who have acknowledged the importance of each variable, but have been

unable to specify how they interact. The chart on the following page explains how interests and dependency combine to affect the likelihood of domestic regime compliance with foreign allied demands.

**Table 1.** Proposed Hypotheses on Interaction Effect between Dependency on the Host Regime and Allied Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allied Interests</th>
<th>Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Compliance (Free Riding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverge</td>
<td>Non-Compliance (Coercion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance (Harmony)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I reason that if the interests of allies diverge over a given policy proposal, and the intervening state is not able to undertake the action unilaterally, compliance is unlikely (bottom, right box). Under these circumstances, there is nothing to motivate the partner to participate in a request from its ally that it would rather not see implemented. If, on the other hand, allied interests converge, and the host ally must participate in order for the request to be fulfilled, compliance is likely (top, right box).

A reverse relationship is hypothesized when the participation of the domestic ally is not required for the request. If allied interests diverge, host allies are likely (perhaps surprisingly) to participate, even though they disagree with the request (bottom, left box). These actors would rather contribute and gain a say in the implementation of the policy, and avoid being isolated or undermined by the policy if implemented unilaterally.
by their ally. Lastly, if the intervening force can implement the policy on its own and allied interests converge, the domestic ally is unlikely to comply (top, left box). It can instead free ride off the efforts of its partner, benefiting from the activity without paying the costs.

Table 2 summarizes the primary arguments of the study based on these two variables (dependency and interest) as well as the remaining three variables (capacity, the wartime environment and a substantial enemy threat).

**Table 2. Summary of Arguments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conditions making compliance more likely</th>
<th>Conditions making compliance less likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity (Capabilities)</strong></td>
<td>High domestic government capacity</td>
<td>Low domestic government capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests and Dependency</strong></td>
<td>Divergent interests between allies and the demand does not require the participation of the domestic regime</td>
<td>Divergent interests between allies and the demand requires the participation of the domestic regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convergent interests between allies and the demand requires the participation of the domestic regime</td>
<td>Convergent interests between allies and the demand does not require the participation of the domestic regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Environment</strong></td>
<td>No impact from war fighting on conditions related to the demand</td>
<td>War fighting impacting conditions related to the demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantial Enemy Threat</strong></td>
<td>Substantial, acute enemy threat</td>
<td>No substantial, acute enemy threat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter details each of these hypotheses, situates my arguments in existing scholarship, and offers examples to clarify the arguments made.

**Literature Review**

This project is grounded in previous work in international relations, military analyses, and comparative politics. Relevant works can be organized into two categories. The first are military studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. The second are materials from political science that deal with political, military, and social patterns in alliances, wars, security, and state interests. This dissertation draws from both categories, using insights from each to better construct an understanding of this type of counterinsurgency war and interstate alliance.

**Military Studies—Counterinsurgency Warfare**

The first category of relevant work derives from studies of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Relatively little from international relations directly analyzes COIN war or COIN alliances. The strongest effort to analyze this specific type of war has come from the military and policy communities. That said, these groups tend to be compelled by the issue if actively involved in fighting a COIN war, but soon lose interest when the conflict ends. This is unfortunate, as counterinsurgency remains a dense, complex problem that merits careful examination. It is, as one U.S. Special Forces officer in Iraq noted, “Not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.”10

COIN conflicts have been called small wars, guerilla wars, revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) wars, or what Robert Taber famously called “the war of the

---

flea.” From 1940-1970, as colonial powers battled emerging leftist and/or nationalist revolutionary movements, several foundational studies of insurgencies were produced by American, French, British, and Australian military scholars. These large militaries tended to dislike counterinsurgency projects. In this type of conflict, technologically advanced national armies were unable to decisively apply their overwhelming conventional military advantage, and furthermore were typically not organizationally prepared for fighting insurgencies. According to Andrew Krepinevich, COIN was detested by the U.S. Army because it contradicted the American “army concept,” “the Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged.” These are the foundational ideas that guide how the Army “organizes and trains its troops for battle.” Notable failures in counterinsurgency wars (involving both Cold War superpowers in Vietnam and Afghanistan) caused great power militaries to focus their studies almost entirely on explaining war outcome—neglecting the study of other, more specific or relational aspects of counterinsurgency wars, such as the alliances examined in this dissertation (despite the importance of difficult alliances for the troubles superpowers faced). These outcome-oriented studies do not make generalizable or testable claims about alliances in counterinsurgencies, or even the impact of these alliances on outcome. Nevertheless, a number of them relate directly to the wars studied in this dissertation and therefore are used throughout the study as sources of important information dissecting and analyzing the dynamics at work in specific counterinsurgency conflicts.

International Relations

The study follows a long tradition in international relations of explaining how states behave by examining the structural forces motivating certain behaviors. The project is an analysis of state responses to pressures exerted by a certain type of interstate alliance, aiming to explain when and why allies make particular decisions. Even though counterinsurgency alliances are a very particular category of interstate relationship, this research question is an important one, as COIN alliances are habitually misunderstood (and frequently frustratingly complex) partnerships that are critical to fighting and winning a certain kind of war.

This study builds upon aspects of studies in international relations on coercion, intervention, foreign assistance, and alliances, but re-examines established variables in the literature to offer new insights on alliance politics. According to Glenn Snyder, despite their importance, alliances remain “one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations.”14 Much of the existing work on alliances relates to balance of power, polarity, alliance formation, and alliance termination—none of which are particularly useful to the question of this study.15 Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman’s 2008 book on alliance restraint, argues that the ability of one ally to influence another is contingent on the “willingness of the most powerful ally to mobilize its power resources,” the quality of information, a unified leadership, and the importance

of the issue to national security. These observations are interesting, but also not helpful for this study. In the large-scale counterinsurgency interventions examined in this project, the “powerful ally” has mobilized its resources and has very good information since it is occupying the warzone. Furthermore, as detailed in the methodology section, in this study, I control for domestic disunity for both allies and account for allied interests, breaking away from traditional models that discuss which ally has more or less motivation to “win” the negotiation. Instead, I argue that whether allied interests converge or diverge over a given issue being debated better explains bargaining outcomes in the context of COIN alliances.

Unfortunately, no scholar in international relations has asked the question addressed in this project. Aspects of alliance theory developed by political science scholars help provide insight and structure of this COIN alliance question, including the work on alliance management, intra-alliance bargaining, asymmetric alliances, and burden sharing. This project, however, is the first systematic examination of alliance politics in the counterinsurgency context in international relations.

**Economic Theories of Alliances**

In their 1966 economic theory of alliances, Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser developed a model based on the logic of collective action to explain why there is unequal burden sharing in security alliances such as NATO. Inequality in defense burdens, they claimed, was a logical outcome of allies simultaneously pursuing their independent national interests, while also striving to provide a public good to be

---


shared between allies.\textsuperscript{18} According to Olson and Zeckhauser, strong allies (also occasionally referred to in the literature as “large states”) will carry the burdens of weaker (“small”) states because smaller alliance members “find they have little or no incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good once the larger members have provided the amounts they want for themselves.”\textsuperscript{19} Due to their size and security requirements, contributions from the larger state to the alliance are usually greater than the amount the smaller state would have chosen in order to secure itself.

Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley further develop this economic theory, illustrating incentives for “free riding” in an alliance, a behavior frequently observed in COIN alliances. According to their model, the weaker state can take advantage of its deficient resources or an enhanced threat to convince stronger states to shoulder more, if not all, of the burden of defense. If for example, the large ally spends $250 billion on defense and a small ally only desires to spend $50 billion ....when equating its marginal willingness to pay marginal costs, then the small ally is unlikely to spend very much.\textsuperscript{20} They admit that this argument falsely assumes that defense is perfectly substitutable between allies, but their work nevertheless provides an initial framework for explaining free riding by weaker alliance members. In this study I take an important step forward by explaining specific elements of COIN alliances that foster free riding, namely a particular combination of the unilateral ability of the intervening force to implement the requested policy and the match-up of allied interests in the outcome of the request.

Although still useful (as will be discussed below), these economic models are an imperfect fit for the asymmetric alliance question at hand in this study. First, they focus


\textsuperscript{19} Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” 278.

on alliances such as NATO’s during the Cold War, which relied on deterrence rather than defense for security. This makes a difference in conceptualizing these issues as it has been reasonably argued that deterrence remains “a relatively pure or inclusive public good,” whereas in active physical defense “allies are partially rival,” as they may compete for the material use of collective forces.\(^{21}\) In addition to being partially rival, collective benefits from alliances are arguably also excludable, as allies can be abandoned. As Avery Goldstein argued,

States can act to reduce, but cannot eliminate, the grave uncertainties of life in an anarchic realm where the fear of abandonment reflects the fact that alliance security is a benefit that actually fails the key public goods test of non-excludability. Although the probability of abandonment might be small, the consequences, especially in the nuclear age, could be disastrous.\(^{22}\)

It is important to only cautiously draw from deterrence-based alliance models, or large-N alliance studies that group all types of interstate partnerships together, when considering military alliances engaged in applying (not just threatening) force, such as those found in counterinsurgency wars.\(^{23}\) Even categorizing counterinsurgency wars as offensive or defensive—a standard distinction in international alliances—is surprisingly problematic as “a state may have to undertake a tactical offensive in order to defend itself, its ally, or its interests effectively.”\(^{24}\) This observation may be particularly applicable in modern COIN war, as David Kilcullen explains in *Counterinsurgency Redux*:

---


\(^{24}\) Glenn Herald Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2007), 12.
Classical counterinsurgency theory posits an insurgent challenge to a functioning (though often fragile) state. The insurgent challenges the status quo; the counterinsurgent seeks to reinforce the state and so defeat the internal challenge. This applies to some modern insurgencies—Thailand, Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples. But in other cases, insurgency today follows state failure, and is not directed at taking over a functioning body politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an “ungoverned space”. Chechnya, Somalia and East Timor are examples of this. In other cases (like Afghanistan) the insurgent movement pre-dates the government.25

With these caveats in mind, economic models of alliances remain interesting because they explain how decisions regarding defense levels made by individual states will cause alliances to function below Pareto-efficient levels of collective allocation “as the marginal benefits that an ally's defense provision confers on the other allies is ignored.”26 States will look to alliances to optimize their own utility, as opposed to making efforts to optimize the utility of the alliance itself. This lays the theoretical foundation for the question addressed here that an optimal level of efficient counterinsurgency war fighting from the alliance may not be aligned because decisions regarding the support of the alliance are made by individual regimes. These decisions will aim to optimize what each state achieves from the alliance, not necessarily what the alliance achieves in the war.

**Power Asymmetry**

There are powerful domestic political forces at work influencing the dynamics of international alliances, including the counterinsurgency interventions examined in this study. Work in the field of comparative politics on state building, predatory states, neopatrimonialism, corruption, and institutional development are helpful in setting parameters for complex ideas and terms used in this study, such as “state capacity.” The

---

26 Sandler and Hartley, “Economics of Alliances,” 873.
idea of accounting for important domestic political forces in studies of inter-state politics is of course not new. Studies by Putnam (1988), Schultz (1988) and Merom (2003) have each flagged the role of domestic politics in international bargaining processes.

Furthermore, insights from work in international relations on asymmetry in war also relate to the alliance dynamic being examined in this study. This includes Jeffery Record (2007), Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2006), T. V. Paul (1994) as well as Andrew Mack’s influential 1975 article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” and British imperialist strategist C.E. Callwell’s 1896 book, “Small Wars,” which notes that guerilla warfare is a “petty annoyance rather than operations of a dramatic kind.” Work on power asymmetry provides a critical context for various underlying political dynamics permeating the partnerships examined in this study. Nevertheless, part of the contribution of this project is to better specify the mechanisms for influence in an alliance, instead of relying on assumptions that one state or another ought to have more or less influence over another. By examining hundreds of specific bargaining encounters between asymmetric actors across multiple wars, this project provides new insights into the influence of the “weak,” and the motivations and capabilities of smaller states to resist the designs of their larger allies.

**Bargaining Theory**

Given the political tension in alliances between promoting the agenda of the partnership and a state’s foremost desire to further its own national interests, international relations scholars frequently turn to bargaining models to explain inter-alliance dynamics. In between the two extremes of dissolving an alliance and sacrificing state autonomy to save it, allies have a strong interest in negotiating with partners to

---

ensure they get favorable terms out of alliance policies. Allies are dedicated to supporting the alliance in order to resist the enemy, but partners will inevitably disagree when it comes to determining how to shoulder the responsibility of this resistance.

In their work on alliances, Glenn Snyder and Stephan Walt identify three primary elements in a partnership that explain an ally’s bargaining power: interest, dependence, and commitment. Asymmetries in each of these areas impact a state’s relative advantage or disadvantage within inter-alliance negotiations. According to Walt,

when the recipient cares more about a particular issue, the supplier’s ability to influence the recipient is reduced... even powerful patrons are unlikely to exert perfect control over their clients. Because recipients are usually weaker than suppliers, they have more at stake. They are thus likely to bargain harder to ensure that their interests are protected. In general, therefore, the asymmetry of motivation will favor recipients.

Snyder neatly summarizes the variables by arguing that the party with the most interest in the issue being discussed will have a bargaining advantage, the party that is the least dependent on the alliance will have a bargaining advantage, and the party that is the least committed to the alliance will have an advantage. The interaction of these variables determines which policy terms are adopted by the alliance.

The next section of this chapter takes these general ideas from the literature on alliance politics and embeds them in a counterinsurgency context. This detailed re-specification of each of these variables will make them more useful in this study, as well as in more general discussions of alliance in international affairs.

---

29 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 44.
Re-conceptualizing Ideas in International Relations on Allied Commitment, Dependency, and Interest

Following Snyder, Walt and others, this study first begins the analysis of bargaining and compliance in counterinsurgency alliances by examining interests, dependence, and commitment between allies. However it is important to note that despite the excellent insights of works by these scholars, there is a tendency in the literature to conflate or ignore the difference between analysis of these variables in terms of the specific issue being negotiated and analysis in terms of the alliance as an institution. In Afghanistan, for example, Washington may depend on Kabul to pass legislation ratifying a new constitution, but the U.S. is not dependent on its alliance with Afghanistan for American survival. These issues should not be conflated. This study makes a point to better specify these variables in order to identify how they uniquely affect inter-alliance relations.

The following section isolates each of these elements (commitment, dependence, and interest) in order to discuss traditional understandings of each variable in the field of international relations, the approach adopted in this study on counterinsurgency interventions, and the contribution of my framework for each variable to understanding of inter-alliance coercion in international relations.

Commitment

In this study, a partner’s commitment to the alliance is considered both substantial and constant. By nature of these interventions, the security interests of the foreign ally are intimately tied to the survival of the host ally. When South Vietnam fell to communist forces, for example, American Cold War interests in Southeast Asia collapsed. Commitments to these allies are high, because these domestic regimes are
critical vessels for protecting the geopolitical interests of the intervening power. Additionally, the willingness of the foreign intervening ally to accept a large number of casualties is a strong signal of dedication to the survival of the host ally. Since the cases examined in this study are limited to interventions with over 1,000 foreign military deaths, very high commitment to the local ally is built into the analysis, as well as very high commitment from the local ally, which has a lot at stake in the outcome of the insurgency. That said, since commitment is essentially constant across wars and demands, commitment to an alliance is not a particularly helpful variable explaining variation in compliance outcomes across demands.

This is not to argue that commitment is unimportant in the inter-alliance dynamics examined in this project. On the contrary, a primary motivation for isolating these counterinsurgency interventions from other wars, alliances, and inter-state partnerships is to create an opportunity to look across this type of conflict with high alliance commitment. Following the logic of Glenn Snyder, “the more firmly a state is committed to defend its ally, the less influence it will have in intra-alliance bargaining.”

This dynamic is evident across the wars examined in this study. In Vietnam, for example, Washington’s belief that the war was preventing communist revolutions across Asia caused the U.S. to become deeply committed to Saigon’s survival. It was a costly reputational commitment, which meant that any American threat to break the commitment or to adopt positions that might harm their South Vietnamese partners were not necessarily credible.

Since the United States now correctly saw that its entire mission was contingent on the RVN’s stability, which only [Prime Minister] Thieu was able to provide, it in turn was wholly dependent on Thieu remaining in

---

30 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 199.
power, a fact he perceived and exploited ruthlessly. Ironically who was master and who was puppet was increasingly blurred with time.\textsuperscript{31}

Accepting this context of diminished influence due to strong commitment to an ally as a given, this study then examines the tools at the disposal of the intervening force to compel its allies, considering the constraints high commitment can place on the foreign force.

In addition to providing an opportunity to examine how high commitment to an ally weakens leverage, this study also illuminates conditions that enable the foreign intervening force to coerce its host ally, even within the context of high commitment. Scholars of alliance politics frequently discuss the tension between the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment.\textsuperscript{32} Too little commitment to an alliance and states dependent on their allies for security will fear abandonment. Under this condition, dependent actors will focus on their own interests instead on the greater goals of the alliance, even if doing so is detrimental to their security. Too much commitment and states are left supporting their allies even if they disagree with their actions. These are interesting dynamics in counterinsurgency interventions. For example, entrapment as a consequence of high alliance commitment is evident in the prevalence of free riding by the host ally. As hypothesized in this study, if allied interests converge and the intervening force has the unilateral ability to implement the policy, non-compliance is likely due to incentives to free ride. The intervening ally is trapped by its commitment to strengthen the domestic ally. For the most part, intervening states will gain more by undertaking the action unilaterally (which tolerates free riding) when contrasted with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Michael Mandelbaum, \textit{The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries} (Cambridge University Press, 1988); Ole R. Holsti and etc, \textit{Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance: Comparative Studies} (John Wiley & Sons, 1973).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the alternative of potentially weakening its partner by not working towards joint
counterinsurgency goals.

This study also shows that high commitment to an ally does not entirely eliminate
coercive leverage. I argue, for example, that the intervening force’s unilateral ability to
implement a policy can provide leverage over an ally if interests between allies diverge.
Despite its high commitment, an intervening ally can compel its partner to participate in
actions it initially opposes if that partner believes the intervening force will otherwise
implement the policy unilaterally. In other words, high commitment does not eliminate
all opportunities for influence over an ally, but it does make it more difficult.

Alliance Commitment and Foreign Allied Withdrawal?

In this universe of counterinsurgency wars, some form of abandonment is in fact
guaranteed, as the foreign ally is not interested in fighting indefinitely. Indeed, the
purpose of these interventions is usually to aid the domestic ally just enough to get them
fighting the war independently. Beyond that point, the foreign power would prefer to
depart.

A logical question regarding the consistency of commitment considered in this
study arises from the withdrawal of foreign allied forces. Do rates of compliance change
once the foreign ally declares it is withdrawing from the conflict? According to prevailing
theories, a decrease in commitment signaled by a withdrawal announcement should lead
to increased levels of compliance from the ally left behind. However, there are multiple
reasons why I do not believe this to be the case and why an increase in compliance is not
expected in response to withdrawal. The simplest demands are likely to be fulfilled
earlier in the war, spiking compliance rates early in the conflict. This leaves more
complex or arduous tasks to be dealt with later. Demands that remain unfulfilled by the
end of the war will tend to be more difficult to complete. At this stage, host allies acting under the fear of abandonment will focus on securing the survival of their regimes, potentially at the cost of ignoring an ally on its way out. Furthermore, even though the foreign ally is withdrawing, it is still very interested in the success of the host ally. Therefore, despite lessening its involvement in the war, the foreign ally is largely unable to credibly issue threats for allied non-compliance because fulfilling threats would conflict with its strong interest in the survival of the allied regime. As a result, any leverage that supposedly results from a lesser commitment is largely lost in the type of alliances examined in this study. In order to study these dynamics, rates of compliance-over-time through every stage of intervention are tracked in the study.

In summary, as described by international relations scholars like Glenn Snyder, commitment as a variable explaining inter-state alliance dynamics lies at the general level of the partnership. It can only be conceptualized as commitment to the alliance, not commitment to the issue being bargained. Issue commitment is essentially relative interest, which is accounted for by the interest variable introduced later in this chapter. Due to the nature of this variable, in this study, I set aside commitment from the dependency and interest variables drawn from existing work on alliance politics. In contrast to commitment, interests and dependency can be specified to the individual demand or policy being debated. As discussed in the upcoming sections, this dynamic makes these two variables applicable to my study investigating hundred of policy demands between counterinsurgency allies.

**Dependency**

For Snyder, “dependence refers only to the degree of harm the partners could inflict on each other by terminating the relationship, just as capability means the damage that
adversaries could inflict in war.\textsuperscript{33} This perspective is not terribly helpful for this project because dependency on a specific alliance in this universe of cases is largely fixed. To varying degrees, in these conflicts the domestic regime is more reliant on the foreign power for its national security than can be said of the reverse relationship. By virtue of its position and the type of threat the enemy insurgent poses to each ally, the foreign state is less dependent on the domestic for its national survival.

I argue that an issue-specific conceptualization of dependency regarding the requirement of host regime participation in implementing the particular issue being negotiated affects compliance outcomes. This concept of dependency acknowledges that allied duties and functions are not perfectly substitutable. Sometimes only one partner can fulfill a particular role or undertake a particular action, and this can affect bargaining and compliance outcomes.

As an example, during the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. sought local supply routes. It was dependent on Turkey because there were no other viable alternatives. Taken in total, throughout its modern history, Turkey has been more dependent on the U.S. than in reverse, but during this particular alliance negotiation, Turkey has the relative bargaining advantage, as the U.S. had no alternatives and an acute security need.

If it were simply an issue of greater dependency on the alliance in general, we might expect resource-rich countries to prevail in the majority of bargaining encounters. Both Snyder and Walt note of course that this is not the case and that in order to be useful, theories on alliances need to acknowledge that “the relative influence of allies turns not simply on their relative military strength and potential, as is often assumed, but on their comparative dependence on, or need for, each other’s aid, which is a more

\textsuperscript{33} Snyder, \textit{Alliance Politics}, 170.
complex notion.” This study tests and further refines the theories outlined by Walt and Snyder in specifying these complex notions of alliance dependency.

The fact that resources do not always translate into influence has been the focus of several other works in international relations on power asymmetry. Robert Keohane (1971) notes how “alliances have in curious ways increased the leverage of the little [less powerful state] in their dealings with the big [more powerful state].” Weakness, according to Keohane, “does not entail only liabilities; for the small power, it also creates certain bargaining assets.” The worse shape the regime is in, the more assistance it can squeeze out of donors.

Working from these observations that resources should not be conflated with influence, this study contextualizes dependency within the context of the specific policy issue being bargained. Which state is more dependent than the other for the implementation of the particular issue being negotiated? Can the foreign ally implement the policy without the domestic regime? Can it enlist other domestic political factions to undertake the policy?

The impact of this issue-specific concept of dependence is not as straightforward as prevailing theories might imply. According to the dominant thinking on alliance management, it would be logical to assume that if the foreign ally is dependent on the domestic regime for implementing a policy, it should lose leverage in bargaining encounters and experience increased rates of non-compliance with its demands. I argue, however, that based on the evidence, the effect of dependence can only be observed in combination with allied interests. More simplistic models that ignore the

34 Ibid., 31; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 43–44.
interactions between these variables fail to accurately describe the behaviors observed in these wars.

**Interest**

Existing works on inter-alliance bargaining assume that the state with the most interest in the issue being negotiated will have an advantage over its partner. “Ceteris paribus, allies with the most interest at stake in bargaining encounters will have the most influence in such encounters.”\(^{36}\) This theory rests on the assumption that the ally with the most at stake regarding the issue being negotiated will push harder in the bargaining process and will have an advantage as a result of this effort. The theoretical framing of interest as a variable in these works focuses on which ally has more or less interest relative to the other.

Based on these studies, it would seem reasonable to assume something similar for this project: the partner with the strongest interest in the issues addressed in the demand might have an advantage in bargaining encounters. Because the domestic partner is often in a battle for its survival, it would be expected to have greater interest in the issue being negotiated more often than not. The foreign ally does not usually have as much at risk in the war, despite substantial investments and reputational interests.

Breaking away from the prevailing theoretical frame of “more” or “less” interest as an explanatory variable determining the outcome of bargaining encounters, I argue that greater interest in the issue being negotiated is not always an asset for an ally. Instead, I suggest that the most critical aspect of interests that influence bargaining

---

\(^{36}\) Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 199.
outcomes in the wars examined in this study is whether or not the interests of allies converge or diverge over a given policy.

For example, in negotiations to end the U.S. war in Vietnam, Saigon was more interested in specific concessions made to Hanoi than was Washington. South Vietnam had a lot to lose from allowances that would advantage the North in its push towards reunification. Nevertheless, the U.S. was able to coerce the South Vietnamese into an uncomfortable agreement during the Paris Peace Accords because it could sign a treaty with the North ending U.S. involvement with or without South Vietnamese participation. According to historian Larry Berman, there was a “pattern of exclusion for the next four years—Kissinger negotiating an American troop disengagement with the North Vietnamese while informing [South Vietnamese President] Thieu only after the fact.”

Eventually Thieu signed on to the negotiation process in order to save face and protect his interests as well as possible under the circumstances.

The fact that South Vietnamese interest did not “win” this negotiation process with the U.S. does not refute Snyder or others’ argument that *ceteris paribus*, allies with greater interest will have the most influence bargaining, because Snyder would likely note that circumstances of dependency and a weakening commitment outweighed the greater South Vietnamese interests in this particular example. But this conclusion is unsatisfying. It fails to specify when interests might be important or discuss the mechanisms causing interests, dependency, and commitment to interact to produce certain outcomes. My theory, on the other hand, is able to better predict American success in this negotiation with its ally. Allied interests over the concessions diverged, but the U.S. could act unilaterally to sign the agreement with the North. I argue Saigon

---

would likely comply because it has more to gain from participating in the process as opposed to leaving it up to the Americans.

This study provides a better specification of interest as a variable in alliance relations by arguing that the asymmetry in motivation driving allies to negotiate hard or compromise relatively quickly largely assumes allies want different things. But what happens if allies agree? There is likely still a negotiation over the terms of implementing the policy. Is greater interest in the issue still an asset? This study argues that whether or not the interests of allies converge or diverge is critical to understanding the influence one ally may have over another, not just which ally is more or less interested.

From the demands identified in this study, allied interests usually diverge over issues such as how to pay for programs, election reforms that empower political opposition groups, cracking down on corruption networks that profit the domestic regime, or, from the example given previously on Vietnam, providing concessions to enemy forces. Interests tend to converge over development programs and economic restructuring programs.38

**Variables and Hypotheses**

In order to measure complex variables such as “interest,” I make several assumptions about the actors involved. First, I assume that the host regime wants to stay in power. Second, I assume that both parties to the alliance would generally prefer to have their ally do as much work as possible on behalf of their collective interests. Third, I assume that the host regime has domestic political interests to consider in addition to the examined pressures from international allies. Fourth, I assume that the intervening

---

38 Interestingly in Iraq, Washington, and Baghdad had divergent interests regarding economic reforms. The U.S. was seeking market-based solutions, while Iraq favored more familiar statist economic solutions.
force would like the domestic ally to thrive, but also seek to minimize the costs of the intervention.

Figure 3. Diagram of Theory
I argue that some of the proposed variables (capacity, interests, dependency, complications from the war, and external threats) have a direct effect on compliance outcomes. Variable 1 (capacity) is one example. If the domestic regime does not have sufficient capacity to fulfill a request from its ally, compliance is less likely. Other variables, including 2 (interest) and 3 (dependence), have an indirect effect on compliance outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed relationship between capacity, interest and dependency to clarify the arguments offered. A substantive discussion of each variable is provided in the upcoming pages.

**Independent Variables – What Determines Compliance?**

*Domestic State Capacity*

| Hypothesis 1 – Domestic regimes with insufficient resources, capabilities or institutional capacity to fulfill a given request from an ally are less likely to comply with that request. |

Mapping the conditions for domestic state compliance with the policy demands of its foreign ally first requires determining whether or not the domestic partner has the capacity to execute the policy. Capacity is a threshold issue for compliance. If the state lacks the ability to implement the policy, then non-compliance is inevitable.

Domestic regimes allied with foreign powers in a counterinsurgency inevitably have limited capacity. If they were more institutionally sound, these regimes would not be fighting an insurgency, or, at a minimum, they would be able to fight the insurgency on their own without a large-scale foreign military intervention. Nevertheless, the domestic regime’s governance capacity has an impact on the regime’s ability to implement requested policies. This does not mean, however that the ability to implement
a request is always correlated with compliance. The upcoming variables discuss how compliance is determined by other factors in addition to capacity.

*Interests and Dependence*

**Hypothesis 2A** – If allied interests *diverge* over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is *less* likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation.

**Hypothesis 2B** – If allied interests *diverge* over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is *more* likely to comply if the proposal does not require its participation.

**Hypothesis 3A** – If allied interests *converge* over a given policy proposal, the

I hypothesize that there is an interaction effect between allied interests and issue dependencies influencing compliance outcomes. If the foreign ally is not dependent on its domestic partner to implement the demand, and allies have a shared interest in the likely outcome of the policy, the domestic regime is likely to *not* comply because there is an incentive to free ride. For example, in Afghanistan in April 2009, the U.S. requested that Kabul create “longer and better coordinated opening hours at Af-Pak border crossing points.”[^39] The government of Afghanistan had a lot to gain in customs revenue from the increased cross-border traffic that would likely result from longer hours at crossing points. But the U.S. also would benefit from increased efficiency at the border. NATO troops in land-locked Afghanistan rely on resupply routes either through Pakistan or the Northern Distribution Network, a series of circuitous routes that run through a combination of Central Asian states including Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia,

Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Frustrated with border inefficiencies and the lack of Afghan initiative, in late 2009 the U.S. opened two Border Coordination Centers (BCCs). In principle, these centers were a “joint effort,” but in practice were “reliant upon U.S. sources” which “pre-determines a U.S.-heavy solution, not necessarily the ideal for a facility with aspirations to multi-national cooperation.” They are commanded by a U.S. colonel or lieutenant colonel, while “the Afghan National Army has provided representatives more-or-less as a show of goodwill; and the Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Border Police are represented by officers who essentially drop-in as a part of their daily beat in the local neighbourhood.” The Afghans benefit, but due to the shared allied interest in the request and U.S. ability to implement the policy without Afghan participation, Kabul did not have the motivation to comply. They were able to free ride off American efforts.

If, on the other hand, the foreign ally does not depend on its partner, and allied interests diverge, there is a higher probability of compliance. The domestic regime is likely to comply in order to protect its interests since action may be undertaken without them. Unilateral action by an ally could leave them isolated or undermined. As discussed in detail in the chapter on the U.S. war in Iraq, one example is Baghdad’s decision to begrudgingly comply with American demands to match funding to the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program and incorporate a percentage of SOI members into the government. The

---

Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Regime was wary of the American SOI program that had armed local Sunnis pledging to resist al-Qaeda. Even though promised SOI salary payments from the government were frequently delayed and there were widespread reports that Baghdad was discriminating against SOI elements, eventually the Iraqi Government largely went along with U.S. demands on SOI in order to take control of the program and eliminate it as an independent threat.45

Allied interest convergence has a reverse impact on compliance outcomes if unilateral action by the foreign intervening force is not possible. If independent action by the foreign ally is not possible and interests converge, there is a higher likelihood of compliance because the domestic actor is required to act if it wants to see the policy implemented. Take for example the May 1987 Indian request that Sri Lankan forces in the northeast retreat and stay in their barracks.46 In order to give Indian forces the opportunity to approach the Tamils, New Delhi wanted Sri Lankan forces to withdraw peacefully in order to set the stage for Indian-led negotiations. Colombo, of course commanded its military. Their organized retreat from entrenched positions in northeast Sri Lanka was not something India could ensure without Sri Lankan participation. At this point in time, Colombo was hopeful the Indians could broker a solution to the Tamil problem, and were willing to let Indian forces take the lead for the moment.47

Lastly, if interests diverge between allies and the foreign partner cannot implement the requested policy without the participation of the domestic ally, I argue that there is a lower probability of compliance. Because the implementation of the policy relies on host regime participation, they can avoid executing the request, effectively protecting their short-term interests. Because the foreign ally is dependent on its partner, it does not have an alternative route for implementation and will have difficulty compelling reform. There are multiple examples of these circumstances in the wars examined in this study, including Indian requests that Sri Lanka cut off independent negotiations with Tamil militants, or American demands that Iraq renew legislation granting legal immunity to foreign contractors. These requests were not fulfilled.

The theory postulating this interaction effect between interests and dependency is summarized in hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B. The influence of having to rely on an ally to implement the proposed issue being bargained over has a contrary effect on compliance outcomes depending on whether the interests of the allies converge or diverge over the issue.

*The Effect of the War*

Hypothesis 4 – Complications from military activities will make compliance with allied demands less likely.

This variable is related to the previous variable on capacity and accounts for complications from the war influencing compliance. However, I discuss it separately in order to better specify the effect of a specific external environmental factor (the conduct of military operations) on compliance outcomes. Complications from military efforts can shift what it takes to “comply” with a demand. It can strain the capacity of the host
regime to cope with mounting wartime issues, making it increasingly difficult to comply. Capacity, as a variable, measures the assets of the host ally, whereas complications from war zone considers the difficulty of the environment. Since counterinsurgency wars are difficult political problems, these variables are designed as rough estimates of 1) the capabilities of the actor faced with that difficult problem, and 2) the impact of that difficult environment on that actor.

It is easy to imagine aspects of a war influencing compliance outcomes. Friction and fog are notorious in warfare. Friction, as Clausewitz wrote,

is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult...Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal. Iron willpower can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course it wears down the machine as well.48

Unforeseen complications from combat operations can influence compliance outcomes.

Initially, this variable may seem constant, as each request in the sample is complied with or disregarded within a wartime context. But I argue that even though each request is impacted in some capacity by conflict, there are some instances where military efforts fundamentally change the compliance environment, making particular requests more or less complex while other requests remain relatively unscathed. Despite the fact that the war is a constant, complications arising from the war are not. The multitude of potential consequences of military operations cannot be predicted and certainly will not have a uniform effect on all demands or compliance conditions. This variable includes issues such as increased demand on government support services, migration and refugee concerns, mobility constraints, or civilian casualties. In

Afghanistan, for example, the U.S. requested that its Afghan allies expand state judicial services into each province in order to counteract Taliban efforts to win popular support through the provision of reliable legal processes in rural areas. But deteriorating security from the war meant that the government not only had to set up buildings, judges, and clerks, but also had to insert police to protect them and set up supply and reinforcement protocols. This would likely require costly infrastructure projects such as road reconstruction, which also would require security and supplies. These escalating and costly requirements strained the frail capacity of Kabul. Without the threat of violence from the war itself, complying with the American demand would be much simpler, as it might have been limited to training and inserting judicial personnel.

Some demands made from the foreign ally will be impacted by military action; some will not. This study predicts that requests that are affected by military operations of the war will tend to have lower rates of compliance because combat is likely to complicate the social and political environment, not simplify it.

An Existential Enemy Threat

| Hypothesis 5 – A significant, acute enemy offensive will make the domestic counterinsurgent ally more likely to comply with demands from foreign partners. |

All enemy action threatens the domestic regime. However, I hypothesize that an organized, acute enemy offensive, like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, is likely to increase, not decrease, the likelihood of compliance with allied demands. There are several reasons for this prediction. First, behaviors such as free riding will seem less attractive to domestic allies when faced with a security crisis. A significant threat is likely to draw allies together, inspiring the domestic ally to participate in efforts to bolster security, as opposed to leaving survival in the hands of its allies. Second, domestic regimes are not
single, unified, rational actors. Like all political organizations, they have factions, infighting, and bureaucratic constraints. A state security crisis can unify domestic groups, creating opportunities to fulfill requests put forth by the external ally that might otherwise be stalled by internal conflict. In essence, this variable is an external shock that reorients the interests of the domestic regime from national interests to allied interests in the war effort. It is isolated from the more general variable of interest in order to better specify the effect of a specific external shock on compliance outcomes.

A Summary of the Proposed Hypotheses

1. Domestic regimes with insufficient resources, capabilities, or institutional capacity to fulfill a given request from an ally are less likely to comply with that request.

2A. If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is less likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation.

2B. If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is more likely to comply if the proposal does not require its participation.

3A. If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is more likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation.

3B. If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is less likely to comply if the proposal does not require its participation.

4. Complications from military operations will make compliance with allied demands less likely.
5. A shock or sudden increase in enemy activity threatening the domestic counterinsurgent ally will make compliance more likely.

Control Variables—Other Important Factors

Several additional variables included in this study are not mentioned in the proposed hypotheses above for the sake of simplicity and clarity. However, I will describe them briefly in order to provide a better picture of the overall scope of the project. These variables are also contextualized in the upcoming chapters on specific conflicts.

The substantive subject of a request, for example, is one obvious potential issue that could influence compliance outcomes. Not all requests ask for the same thing. Whether or not an actor does what it is asked at least in part depends on what is being requested. In order to account for this basic dynamic, the study accounts for potential short-term costs and benefits as well as the general subject of request, based on six issue areas for demands: political reform (governance), military strategy, military reform, development, economic reform, and specific counterinsurgency strategy.

It initially may seem tempting to expect variation in compliance based on subject areas. For instance, one could imagine that host regimes might be more likely to comply with development projects rather than painful political reforms. However, for multiple reasons, I do not expect the general subject of requests to be significant in explaining compliance outcomes. First, because policies designed to fulfill a counterinsurgency strategy can attempt to address social, cultural, military, economic, and political factors, the demands studied in this project frequently apply to multiple subject categories. Consider, for example, the 2007 American request to Kabul for the establishment of a
“Counter Narcotics Trust Fund.” The request pertains to economic reform (funding management procedures), development efforts (alternative livelihood campaigns), and specific counterinsurgency protocols focused on counter narcotics. The coding rules for organizing data in this project, including issue areas, are specified in the next chapter on methodology. However, this overlap illustrates how requests can cross cut numerous topics, which makes categories of subjects less helpful explaining variation.

Secondly, seemingly “easy” requests can quickly become exceedingly difficult. The Indian request for copies of Tamil-area electoral rolls from 1982-1986 seemed fairly straightforward. The registers were available through the Sri Lankan commissioner of elections and open to the public. But the commissioner said the Indian request “defied my understanding...there is no apparent valid reason” for providing copies. Officials in Colombo were suspicious of Indian motives. Just a few years earlier, New Delhi had been the primary sponsor of the Tamil insurgents that wreaked havoc on Sri Lankan security. The Sri Lankan commissioner concluded it was not possible to allow Indians photocopies of “the old electoral registers. [The Indian High Commissioner] can be allowed access to the current registers. If he wishes he can take the photocopies of the current registers.” The general subject of requests may not be significant in determining compliance outcomes because subjects that seem easy or appealing can rapidly transform into other subjects and issues that are not initially apparent in the general subject of the request.

---

Finally, the hypotheses previously outlined in this chapter predict that domestic allied interests are important for determining compliance outcomes, but causality is not as straightforward as it might initially seem. The domestic ally does not simply comply with the requests it is most interested in and defy requests it is not. As previously discussed, under certain circumstances, the ally can fail to comply (free ride) on requests it is interested in, and comply (be coerced) on requests it would rather not see materialize. In light of these dynamics, I do not expect general topics of requests to be significant in explaining compliance outcomes. Despite the likelihood that host regimes may tend to oppose recommended political reforms more frequently than development projects or proposed military strategy, for example, these general interests are not expected to translate into reliable trends in compliance, as other factors such as capacity and the interaction between interests and dependency are expected to be more significant determining outcomes. Development requests, for example, can be very complex and time consuming and can require significant infrastructure. This may make compliance difficult despite interest.

Following the tradition of economic models of alliances, this study also monitors whether or not the ability of the intervening force to exclude the domestic ally from benefiting from projects has an impact on compliance. However, I do not hypothesize that this will affect compliance. This prediction is in part due to the strong tendency in counterinsurgency interventions to bolster, not threaten, the allied government. As discussed earlier in terms of commitment in this type of alliance, undertaking actions to weaken the partner regime contradicts the national interests of the foreign state and, therefore, weakens the credibility of threats to exclude them from benefits. The ability of the intervening state to exclude its partner from benefiting thus should not be significant
in compelling reform because the intervening state rarely would exclude its ally since its mission is usually to strengthen this regime and withdraw.

**A Note on the Interaction Between Variables**

The alliance between the foreign and domestic actors is an evolving and complex relationship. It is important to note that the interactive nature of this relationship creates variation between the independent variables included in this project. Take the issue of corruption, for example. In Vietnam, historical reports claimed that U.S.-backed Prime Minister Thieu sought to make [the civil service] a reliable instrument of his power. Although their nominal salaries were low and kept falling, he allocated to them a whole panoply of corrupt practices to deepen his hold on their loyalties...corruption suffused and financially lubricated the state bureaucracy at all levels.51

Such corrupt practices may arise in part out of the interests of the regime, as it may use corrupt practices to appease opponents, buy loyalty, and create coalitions. However, once these practices are in place, the domestic regime may fail to undertake anti-corruption reform because it lacks *both* the interest in jeopardizing its control of the established organizations and the capacity to reign in corrupt practices. It may not have enough institutional support, without these side payments, to implement painful reforms. Similarly we can imagine that a regime would turn to these corrupt practices in the first place because it lacked capable rational-legal institutions.

Even though there are circumstances where independent variables interact (as in the case of the above examples of corruption networks), they should not be confused as a single variable. State capacity (or lack of capacity) may be impacted by a regime's

---

interest in preserving its control of government, but it is certainly not produced by these preservation policies alone. Something as amorphous as “state capacity” is determined by a multitude of factors—resources, bureaucratic traditions, and infrastructure, just to name a few. Furthermore, such policies can potentially impact state capacity in a variety of ways. It would be erroneous to assume there is only one form or direction of causality between these variables, as it is possible that the interest in the issue being negotiated could either bolster or hinder state capacity, depending on the given situation.

The interaction between variables should not be considered a drawback to this study. Understanding the different ways these variables interact is part of what makes this examination compelling. Systematically studying the impact of each variable on the dependent variable as well as documenting the conditions and consequences for the variety of ways they interact is a remarkable step forward in our understanding of this complex foreign-domestic COIN alliance and its impact on domestic state behavior.

Studies like this, which specify interaction pathways to predict the behavior of allies reacting to a complex set of incentives, advance the study of alliance politics in international relations. It is largely accepted that interest, dependency, and commitment in alliances impact how much influence one ally has over another. But it is not well understood how these factors interact to create the type of alliance dynamics observed in the political world. How does an ally’s divergent interest affect cooperation? Under what conditions can an intervening force coerce an ally, despite a high level of commitment to the alliance? These questions are not answered by previous studies that simply observe that interest, dependence, and commitment are (somehow) important in determining alliance dynamics. This study, on the other hand, comprehensively addresses a specific type of counterinsurgency alliance to isolate patterns of allied behavior. I argue the data
shows an interaction effect between interests and dependency which enables better understandings of how these variables interact in the political world to create outcomes to demands from foreign intervening forces on their domestic ally that may initially seem unsystematic to academics and frustrating to policymakers.
Chapter 3:  

METHODOLOGY  

In short, this study utilizes over 4,000 government documents to analyze coercion between allies in nine counterinsurgency wars. For five wars (U.S.-Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, India-Sri Lanka, and U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan) sufficient primary source documents exist to conduct quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis. For these five wars, I was able to identify 460 specific policy demands from the intervening ally to its domestic political partners. Using these 460 demands, I built a database to track trends in compliance. The variables tracked and the coding rules for producing the variables are detailed in this chapter. For the other four wars (Vietnam-Cambodia, Egypt-Yemen, Cuba-Angola, and Syria-Lebanon), the lack of documentary evidence released by these regimes prevented quantitative analysis and detailed discussion of alliance relations in these wars. Reliable evidence on alliance dynamics is unfortunately unavailable. These wars are instead discussed qualitatively and are used as comparative examples throughout the project. 

This study is built on within-population case studies from post-WWII counterinsurgency wars with 1000+ foreign military casualties. These wars were identified using the Rand Corporation’s 2008 study on counterinsurgencies, “War by Other Means,”52 which updated James Fearon and David Laitin’s 1999 dataset “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.”53 From this data, I found 28, or approximately a

third, of post-WWII insurgency wars had some level of foreign troop military intervention on the side of the counterinsurgent.\textsuperscript{54}

This project is limited to investigating large-scale foreign military intervention in order to further understanding of counterinsurgency alliances with a high level of alliance commitment. Other types of interventions and the commitments these operations entail, such as colonial wars or covert interventions, are likely to have their own influence on the behavior of allies. I would risk sacrificing the internal validity of this study by including such cases, effectively treating dissimilar phenomenon as similar events.

This study does not compare counterinsurgency (COIN) wars with foreign intervention to COIN wars without foreign military involvement for several reasons. First, the independent variable is not foreign intervention; it is specified aspects of foreign intervention in these types of wars, namely the impact of alliance dynamics, such as interests and dependencies, on the behavior of the domestic counterinsurgent ally. Second, a comparison of wars with and without interventions is unlikely to identify the impact of these aspects of the alliance on the domestic regime’s behavior because there could be several intervening variables that would likely cloud the actual relationship between the incentives produced by the alliance and the behavior of the domestic regime. There is a naturally-occurring selection process dividing counterinsurgencies

\textsuperscript{54} Note: Colonial counterinsurgency (COIN) wars such as Algeria (1954-1962) and Mozambique (1962-1974) have been coded as wars without foreign COIN military intervention even though we might commonly think of them as foreign-involved COIN wars. There is good reason for excluding these wars. Firstly, a colonial project is fundamentally different from a foreign policy mission that has an established exit goal – especially in terms of the dynamics of the alliance between “foreign” and “domestic” COIN partners. In colonial wars “domestic” state institutions are officially part of the foreign state apparatus. Furthermore, by definition in colonial wars outside powers are fighting for the inclusion of these contested areas into their “domestic” territorial holdings – a dynamic that changes definitions of “domestic” and “foreign.” In colonial wars powerful states are not fighting as foreigners, but as landowners. Secondly, this study hopes to say something about the future of counterinsurgency warfare, which in this post-colonial age may not be served by incorporating colonial-era political and military dynamics.
without foreign military interventions and those with, as only domestic counterinsurgencies in dire need of assistance welcome foreign military intervention

The 1,000-military-death threshold is drawn from the Correlates of War dataset on civil wars (note that insurgencies are frequently considered a subset of civil wars). As stated in the dataset, “In order to be classified as a civil war, the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war.”55 Furthermore, the data naturally separates into two categories, with a notable gap between 83 foreign military deaths (Somalia) and the next highest, 1150 (Sri Lanka). Taking this 1000+ battle-death metric, I find nine conflicts56 of the initial 28 with foreign military intervention that are directly relevant to the research question (see Table 3).

---

55www.correlatesofwar.org Note that these are general battlefield deaths, not specified to one side or the other. But this study borrows this 1,000+ death threshold as a metric specifically regarding the foreign force.

Table 3. Post WWII Insurgency Wars with 1000+ Foreign Military Casualties: Cases Examined in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Initial Year</th>
<th>Foreign COIN Intervener</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Insurgency Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>COIN Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Insurgency Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>COIN Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>COIN Victory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each of these wars, I sought to identify specific demands from foreign allies to their host regime partners made during the time of the intervention. For all wars that have available source documents (namely Vietnam, both Afghanistan cases, Iraq, and Sri Lanka), I systematically analyzed thousands of high-level executive branch materials in order to identify requests made to the primary leadership of the domestic regime. For wars where there is unfortunately very little evidence on alliance politics (Yemen, Angola, Lebanon and Cambodia), even within reliable historical accounts of these conflicts, I am limited in the information that can be provided and discussed in this project. Discussions of these wars are made periodically throughout the study, in particular in Chapter 7 in order to provide contrast with the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

\[57\] In 2009, the Sri Lankan military finally defeated the insurgent Tamil movement, long after the March 1990 withdrawal of Indian forces from the conflict. The Indian intervention is largely considered a strategic failure. See the Sri Lankan Chapter for more details.
It is important to clarify that these demands are the unit of analysis of the study, while the wars are the boundaries from which these observations are drawn. To use the specific terminology of King, Keohane and Verba for methodologically structuring a social scientific study, these specific policies are the unit of analysis, the “individuals, institutions, entities, or objects about which data are collected.” As King, Keohane and Verba articulate, the term “case” in social scientific research can be used in a variety of ways and can ultimately be a confusing term. In conventional terms, it might seem that the individual wars from which I am drawing policy demands would be cases. However, according to King, Keohane and Verba, these wars “merely define the boundaries within which a large number of observations are made.”

For example, in the U.S. war in Vietnam, the U.S. asked Saigon to “offer of amnesty to all Viet Cong adherents who cease fighting.” This proposed program of amnesty is my unit of analysis, not the war in Vietnam. Did Saigon offer a program of amnesty as a result of this request? Why or why not? What motivated the Government of Vietnam’s response to the American demand? For wars that do not have open archival materials or available documentary evidence (namely Yemen, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Angola), I rely on secondary historical accounts or primary source observations from outside actors such as U.S. intelligence agencies to identify the dynamics of these alliances. Each chapter in the study has a specific methodology section to explain exact sources of information and the ways those sources were utilized in the investigation of that war.

---

59 Ibid., 117.
One recurrent issue came up when identifying demands. I found it was important to differentiate between general desired results and specific policy requests. A statement of desired outcome is not specific enough for an ally to implement. Take, for example, the Soviet statement to Afghan President Karmal that he is to “do everything to revive and develop the national economy, to raise the standard of living of the population and, first of all, of all workers and peasants.” What is “everything?” How exactly is President Karmal to “develop” the national economy and raise the standard of living for workers? A higher living standard and economic expansion are potential consequences of policies but are not policies themselves to be complied with or denied. Furthermore, such categories of issues are so broad they are difficult to analyze and code as meaningful data. It is more methodologically sound to limit “demands” to specific policy recommendations that can be carefully followed and coded. For example, in a different meeting, the Soviets were more specific with their Afghan partners, proposing they adopt new policies emphasizing foreign trade that were designed to expand the Afghan economy. Determining whether or not the Afghans implemented these new foreign trade policies provides more reliable data about compliance with Soviet demands than general trends in economic growth that may not indicate much about the alliance or Afghan compliance.

---


62 Certain policy requests have multiple components. Consider, for example, U.S. requests that Kabul fund and expand the Community Defense Initiative (CDI). Since the diplomatic correspondence treats these two actions (funding and expanding the CDI) as a unified CDI-related issue, it was coded as a single request. Kabul funding, but not expanding, or expanding, but not funding the CDI would have been coded as partial compliance with a single request. If the intervening force considers the proposed program as a cohesive unit in terms of creating a budget and allocating personnel, it is coded as a single request.

Additionally, it is important to carefully differentiate specific policy requests (means) from policy goals (ends) because there is no guarantee that the requested policies of the foreign ally will accomplish what they intended. Whether the Afghans are able to expand the economy is a different issue from whether Soviet policies designed to expand the Afghan economy were effective. This, in turn, is a separate issue from whether the Afghans complied with Soviet demands for economic reform. This study must measure compliance, not strategic effectiveness, making the differentiation between “requests” and “goals” vitally important. For example, a domestic ally can do exactly as requested, yet still fail to achieve the expected outcome. This is an example of compliance, even though the result was not what was hoped for. Ultimately, the failure of expected outcome is a problem with strategy, and many scholars grapple with measuring the effectiveness of various counterinsurgency approaches. But that is not the question of this study and not what it intends to measure.

Once specific demands have been identified from the available evidence, I then analyzed compliance outcomes. This information was gathered again through primary source materials (where available) as well as media reports, research publications, and historical analyses. Sometimes the outcome of the demand was readily self-evident. For example, if the U.S. asked its Iraqi partners to construct a school, the existence of that school on a map with photographs and media announcements would provide tangible evidence. A file for each request was created detailing relevant developments and sources of information. The demand was then coded into an original database that tracked relevant conditions of the request (such as allied interests) as well as compliance outcome. Quantitative statistical analysis enabled me to investigate patterns across demands, wars, and alliances. Adopting a multi-methods approach allowed me to test
my hypotheses and create new opportunities for understanding aspects of a complex political relationship across wars without losing the complex context of inter-alliance relations detailed in primary source documents.

Figure 4. General Diagram—The Research Project
Gathering requests and measuring their outcome was conducted in a systematic and careful process. The project gathered and analyzed as much information as possible. Thousands of documents were evaluated, and hundreds of books and media reports were used to bring together both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the essential questions of this study. Nevertheless, because primary source national security documents are not usually meant for public consumption or for use as quantitative data points, the evidence in the project can be uneven across requests and the processes of alliance politics are unavoidably messy and difficult at times to fully appreciate. But political processes that are difficult to measure are no less important to analyze than those that are prone to number crunching or readily made data for comparison. This study is intended to provide a general map explaining how allies relate under a given set of pressures in counterinsurgency war. By nature of the complex issues investigated, as well as the unevenness of available data, this study undoubtedly contains flaws, but nevertheless provides thorough information and new insights about an important political relationship that has been woefully ignored in international relations.

**The Reliability of U.S. Department of State Cables from Wikileaks**

Due to current classification barriers, most of the data for the chapters on the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan relies on the U.S. Department of State cable database released by Wikileaks.com. Because this source of information was vital for identifying U.S. demands and compliance outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the substance of the material in Wikileaks merits examination in order to be sure the information used to compile the data in this study for the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is not biased.
Only a portion of U.S. Department of State cable traffic produced from 2002-2010 are contained in the Wikileaks cable database. Specifically, only documents tagged for the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET, SIPDIS) were included. The SIPRNET databank was established in the 1990s to facilitate interagency file sharing, and was later expanded after September 11, 2001. The internal U.S. State Department cable guide advises staff to tag cables for inclusion in SIPDIS only for “reporting and other informational messages deemed appropriate for release to the U.S. government agency community.” According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “(SIPRNET) is the Department of Defense’s largest network for the exchange of classified information and messages at the SECRET level.”

The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required substantial interagency coordination and therefore a significant portion of cable traffic from the U.S. embassies in Baghdad and Kabul were routed through SIPRNET. Interestingly, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which only opened in June 2004, originated the third most cables in the leaked version of SIPRNET (6,677 messages). This is second only to Department of State Headquarters (8,017), which sends messages across the world, and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara (7,918), which sent 1,850 messages through SIPRNET before the U.S. diplomatic post in Baghdad was established in June 28, 2004. This means from the time the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was functioning in 2004, it sent the most messages in SIPRNET of any American embassy.

There were 2,961 documents released by Wikileaks that originated from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which is less than half of the 6,677 messages from the Embassy in Baghdad. This is likely because Kabul was only a fraction of the size of the U.S. mission in Iraq during the time the documents in the Wikileaks database were produced. Sitting on 104 acres, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, a.k.a. “Emerald City” was “physically larger than the Vatican,” while housing between 5,000 and 16,000 employees during the war. According to the U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, on the other hand, had only 179 federally employed staff members in 2005, 320 in early 2010, and 1,572 by the end of 2010.

Comparing the characteristics of the documents released by Wikileaks against requests identified in this study may provide some insight regarding potential bias in the findings of the chapter. For example, does the number of U.S. requests identified simply follow the trajectory of what is available in Wikileaks? This might indicate that findings about the number of requests per year were perhaps a product of what was in SIPRNET instead of a reliable indicator of trends in demands and inter-alliance relations. Although some similarities can be expected since an increase in activity at the Embassy would likely result in an increase in demands to allies as well as cable traffic.


Graphing the trend in the number of documents available from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in Wikileaks against the number of requests from the U.S. to Kabul identified in this study reveals the following:  

Figure 5. Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Kabul and Number of U.S. Requests

Illustrated by Figure 5, there are similarities in the trends over time between the number of documents included in the Wikileaks database from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and the number of U.S. requests identified, in particular in the period between 2004 and 2009. The number of documents contained in the Wikileaks database and the size of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan both expand after 2005, reflecting an increase in U.S. diplomatic correspondence produced regarding Afghanistan. However, this does not

---

The graph ends in 2009 because the Wikileaks database ends February 28, 2010, providing barely two months of data for 2010. Providing two months of figures for the year 2010 could provide a false impression of a decrease in requests, which may or may not be the case depending on what transpired in 2010. It is hard to say at this point in time since 10 months of 2010 are missing from Wikileaks and these materials have yet to be declassified.
mean characteristics of the Wikileaks data are determining the observed patterns in requests made in this study. As violence in Afghanistan begins to rise in Afghanistan after 2006, increasing attention is paid to the U.S. mission, including a rise in the number or requests to Afghan allies.

Graphing the trend in the number of documents available from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in Wikileaks against the number of requests from the U.S. to Baghdad identified in this study reveals the following:

![Graph showing the trend in the number of documents available from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in Wikileaks against the number of requests from the U.S. to Baghdad.](image)

**Figure 6.** Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Baghdad and Number of U.S. Requests

According to Figure 6, documents from Wikileaks are increasingly available from 2004-2008. Yet the number of unique requests from the U.S. to Baghdad identified in those documents peaks in 2007. This indicates that the number of requests identified is not necessarily due to the number of materials in the database. Note also that 2009 has significantly more documents available than requests made, signaling that there is not a
strong correlation between the number of documents in Wikileaks and the number of demands identified in the study.\textsuperscript{71}

Interestingly, trends in the number of requests made per year in Iraq and Afghanistan may correlate with the level of violence in these wars. Consider Figure 7 estimating violence by IED incidents.

\textbf{Figure 7.} Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks in Iraq & Afghanistan\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} The years 2004 and 2010 are largely unreliable as the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad did not exist for most of the year in 2004 to submit cables, and the Wikileaks database ends February 28, 2010, providing barely two months of data for 2010.

Comparing Figures 5, 6, and 7, it appears that increases and decreases in American demands roughly correspond with levels of violence, in particular in Iraq. As attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq increased in 2007, so did American pressure on its Iraqi allies to reform. Note, however, that there isn’t a corresponding spike in Iraqi compliance in this same period (See Chapter 5). There are several reasons why this may be the case. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, violence in Iraq and Afghanistan created complications that made compliance with demands increasingly difficult.

As a precaution against bias, most requests identified in this study through Department of State documents in Wikileaks were correlated with declassified documents and public statements. In Iraq for example, in May 2007 President Bush publicly laid out 18 “benchmarks” for the GOI to achieve as a precondition for additional funding. These demands included policies to disarm militias, establish minority rights, hold provincial elections, perform a constitutional review, implement hydrocarbon legislation and support the Baghdad Security Plan. Each benchmark was the subject of debate in the cable traffic in the Wikileaks database and was also captured as 18 unique demands in data analysis. In Afghanistan, the 2006 “The Afghanistan Compact” (also called “The London Compact”) was similar. Benchmarks from the compact included policies to promote the employment of youth and demobilized soldiers, implementation of public administrative reform, increased judicial personnel in the provinces, providing assistance to refugees and the disabled, and programs to re-structure state owned

---

73 IEDs were a favorite method of attack for insurgents in Iraq, but they took some time to catch on in Afghanistan and were never as prevalent.
banks. Many benchmarks identified in the compact were discussed in Wikileaks documents.

**The Foreign Intervening Force—Selecting Requests to Allies**

Throughout the wars examined, to a certain extent intervening forces chose requests with some consideration for the capacity limitations of the domestic regime. In Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq Washington regularly tailored its requests to actions it felt were in the grasp of their in-country allies. This tendency influenced the population of requests analyzed in this study, since there is a self-selection against requests with overwhelming capacity obstacles. However, there are a couple of reasons why this is not problematic to the findings of this study. First, intervening states frequently have no choice but to ask for difficult reforms if those actions were critical for the war effort or if the intervening ally is dependent on the domestic regime to adopt the given policy. Second, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam were somewhat naïve early on in their interventions, underestimating the difficulty of certain tasks and overestimating the ally’s ability to reform. Third, a bias in the sample towards requests the foreign power felt the domestic ally had the capability to adopt would not be unique to any particular war. I would expect such a phenomenon to exist across the population of counterinsurgency wars and to exist in similar future alliances. Finally, such a bias does not adversely impact the finding that lacking capacity tends to lead towards non-compliance. If anything this bias causes the influence of a lack of capacity to be underestimated.

---

The Dependent Variable—Compliance

Compliance is defined as the act or process of conforming, submitting, or adapting to a desire, demand, proposal, regimen, or to coercion. Specific policy demands from the intervening state to the domestic ally are the units of analysis for the study. Consider, for example, New Delhi’s 1987 request that Colombo “hold elections to [the] provincial council of northern and eastern [province] before 31.12.87.” The dependent variable being measured is Colombo’s compliance with the demand. The full spectrum of potential compliance outcomes is accounted for in substantive chapters of each war, and qualitative analysis of individual demands. On the other hand, in the quantitative analysis, for the sake of simplicity, compliance is divided into two categories, verbal compliance and substantive, material compliance. Within each of these categories, the data it is coded on a continuous scale: 0 = non-compliance, 1 = partial compliance, 2 = full compliance.

The following guidelines were used for coding the general outcome of each of the 460 policy requests identified: “full compliance” was assigned to a request when the domestic ally successfully fulfilled all major components of the request that were specified by the foreign ally. Minor aspects of the request may have gone uncompleted or been altered by the domestic ally, but because all major aspects have been fulfilled, the foreign ally is satisfied with the actions of its partner regarding the given request. “Partial compliance” was assigned when the domestic ally fulfilled some of the major components of the request, while leaving others unfulfilled. The foreign ally is satisfied with aspects of the response of its ally, while unsatisfied about others. Lastly, “non-compliance” was assigned to requests when the domestic ally failed to fulfill any major components of the
request. Minor aspects may be satisfied, but the primary components of the request have gone unfulfilled and the foreign ally is unsatisfied with the actions of the domestic ally.

Of course these are unsophisticated categories covering a broad range of outcomes. “Partial compliance,” after all, could mean a small or significant amount of compliance, lying somewhere in between non-compliance and fulfillment. Nevertheless, relying on these simple, rudimentary categories is the best way to ensure the validity of the data. The subjects measured (compliance, interests, dependencies, etc.) are not naturally prone to quantification. There is no physical or standardized unit to measure. As one team of scholars observed, “There is no one objective standpoint from which social scientists can study a social phenomenon like compliance.”76 The categories assigned in this study are perhaps best conceptualized as “most,” “some,” and “less” compliance. For the sake of simplicity, however, these categories are referred to as “full,” “partial,” or “non” compliance throughout the study, since in discussions it is confusing to refer to an ally providing “most compliance.” It begs the question, the most what, exactly? It is clearer to say “full compliance” to indicate a high degree of cooperation, despite the fact that there is no objective marker for what constitutes “full,” “partial,” or “non” compliance. Such an “objective” standard does not exist. These categories are relational.

Statistical tools can be instrumental in a study such as this, as long as categories assigned to the social phenomenon observed are conceptualized in relation to one another instead of in absolute terms. Individuals may disagree, for example, about whether a given outcome should be considered “full” or “partial” compliance, but such debates ultimately have little bearing on the data or the claims made in this project. Even though individuals

may have different definitions for what could be considered “full,” “partial,” or “non” compliance, individuals would be expected to nevertheless agree on what outcomes contain more or less compliance, and that assignment of “more” or “less” for any given outcome will correspond with the general scale given for “full,” “partial” or “non” compliance in this study. The findings of this study are not based on what is partial compliance, but on what conditions make compliance more or less likely.

Therefore, given the nature of this information, instead of attempting to assign a large variety of quantitative values to the spectrum of complex compliance outcomes, it is more appropriate to use broad categories and to investigate the phenomena and categories in question in terms of their relation to one another instead of their unqualified value. Reliability and validity in measurement come from analyzing the ways the general categories relate to one another varying circumstances, not in the assignment of any specific title. Thomas Thayer discussed a similar issue regarding the appropriate and inappropriate use of quantitative analysis of data in the Vietnam War:

Sir Josiah Stamp (1880-1941) had a few pertinent words on the subject: “The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases.” Perhaps. But the village watchman often pleases to tell the truth, and in any case he probably reports about the same way most of the time. So one must learn to look for a constant bias in reporting. The individual numbers may not be completely accurate, but the trends and changes in relationships among them may reveal quite a bit about what is going on in the village and how that village compares with other villages.77

Therefore after a substantive analysis using qualitative methods, in this study, the dependent variable (compliance by the domestic ally with a demand made by a foreign intervening ally) is coded quantitatively as full (more) compliance, partial (less) compliance, or non-compliance based on the available evidence. Consider the following three examples pulled from early in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In January 2002, the U.S. asked its partners in Kabul to make sure the selection committee for the Loya Jirga conference tasked with writing constitutional protocol include minorities and women in order to better protect their interests in the future post-Taliban Afghan state.\(^78\) Karzai followed through with this request and three women and multiple ethnic factions were represented, which was not difficult considering the Northern Alliance which dominated post-Taliban political life was itself dominated by ethnic minorities.\(^79\) This request was coded as “full compliance.”

Contrast the previous example with the outcome of a request from the Americans just a few days earlier that current military factions and weapons come under the control of the Interim Administration in Kabul.\(^80\) Efforts were made by the GIRoA to incorporate military factions into the Ministry of Defense and programs such as Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DAIG) were established to complement U.S. and U.N.-run programs on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Nevertheless localized armed groups remained exceedingly powerful in Afghanistan, and various regional groups remained obstinate in their control of territory, creating difficulty for

---


Kabul in implementing disarmament and reintegration.81 This request was coded as “partial compliance.”

Lastly, consider the November 2002 request that all police trainees be required to complete an anti-narcotics self-certification. The Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) conducted drug testing and recruits were vetted through the Afghan Criminal Investigation Department at the Ministry of Interior, but a self-certification was not required, as it was for individuals hired to work for USAID. The utility of the certifications would be questionable anyway with over 70 percent of recruits illiterate and oversight of the training programs transferred to the U.S. military in 2005.82 This request was not fulfilled by the Afghans and therefore coded as “non-compliance.”

In addition to substantive compliance, the database also notes verbal compliance, whether or not official representatives from the domestic regime indicated they intended to comply with the demand in question. Ideally this information is found in primary source documents recalling discussions between officials or public statements made by the domestic regime. It was coded according to the same general categories as substantive compliance: 0 = non-compliance, 1 = partial verbal compliance, 2 = full verbal compliance. Again, these are not exact categories, but are considered in relation to one another, as verbal agreement for the most part, some part, or no part.

Consider, for example, the Soviet request that the Taraki regime in Afghanistan unite Afghan communist political factions, asking Kabul to create “a single national front under the aegis of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan as the recognized leader of the people.” A subsequent politburo document noted the following:

In connection with the latest events, a few days ago we urgently appealed to Taraki and Amin, in the name of the CC CPSU Politburo and L.I. Brezhnev personally, with an urgent call to unite and in the name of saving the revolution act in concord and with unity. We warned them directly that a split in the leadership would be disastrous and that it would be immediately taken advantage of by internal counter-revolution and foreign enemies of Afghanistan. We called on the leaders of Afghanistan to demonstrate a high degree of responsibility to the revolution. Both Taraki and Amin at the time welcomed positively our appeal. However, in actuality, judging by incoming intelligence, Amin continued his activities to realize his plans, while Taraki demonstrated a high degree of indecisiveness in suppressing these activities.

The document indicates verbal compliance, as the divided communist parties welcome the demand, but perhaps not substantive compliance.

Inter-alliance bargaining over a demand proposed by an intervening ally can lead to partial verbal compliance where some, but not all, aspects of the request are agreed to. For example, consider the demand from the Government of India to the Sri Lankans that representatives from the Election Commission of India and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) inspect the 1988 voters list. The Sri Lankans responded to the request by

---

85 “Functionaries of the Indian Election Commission and the TULF may be associated with the preparation /scrutiny of voters List in the North and East. President may kindly invite representatives of the Election Commission of India to visit Sri Lanka in the last week of January. President may also kindly agree to
noting that this request was “Approved. Except TULF who may apply like any other registered Political Party.” Part of the request would be complied with; part of it would be rejected. Officials from the Indian Election Commission were allowed access to the voters list, but not members of the TULF. This was coded as partial verbal compliance.

Lastly, requests can be refused by domestic regimes in negotiations. Consider the 2007 request from Washington that Baghdad continue providing legal immunity to foreign contractors operating in Iraq. In response to increasing American pressure on the issue, Iraqi officials publicly refused to extend the conditions of immunity. This was coded as verbal non-compliance.

With verbal compliance, there was a notable percentage of data missing, up to 33% in the U.S. war in Afghanistan for example. There are two primary reasons for this lack of data. First, in recent wars such as Afghanistan, detailed diplomatic correspondence may remain classified and therefore not available for analysis. Second, even in older conflicts, because the information sought regarding verbal compliance can be somewhat obscure, it is not always preserved in archived documents. Because determinations regarding substantive compliance usually leave a trail of budgets, material, new organizations, buildings, media reports, or personnel employed, there is considerably more evidence available to piece together actual implementation of the request in question. But understanding whether or not there was verbal agreement

associate TULF with the preparation/scrutiny of the voters list in the North and East.” Points of Verbal Message of he Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Reaction of the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayawardene conveyed through the Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit, Colombo, January 13, 1988 (pp 2184-5 – Document 793 Bhasin)

usually depends on the release of diplomatic correspondence, which can frequently be classified or destroyed if it is not considered relevant to critical components of the history of the event.

**Independent Variables**

In order to monitor factors potentially influencing the probability of compliance, the database also tracks multiple independent variables. The first variable is *unilateral ability*, measuring whether or not the fulfillment of the request requires the participation of the domestic ally, or if the intervening force (who is making the request) can, if it so chooses, fulfill the request independently. In counterinsurgency wars, the intervening ally frequently makes requests that its forces can implement independently because there is an imperative to (1) provide legitimacy for the action, and therefore work through domestic actors, or (2) insist on the participation of the domestic regime in order to promote independent action by that regime and facilitate the withdrawal of foreign aid. The variable tracking unilateral ability is important because it measures dependencies within the alliance. As discussed in Chapter 2, dependency has long been observed as an important factor explaining leverage in alliances. In order to simplify the variable in this study, unilateral ability was coded as either unilateral ability = 1, indicating that the foreign force has unilateral ability to complete the task at hand in the request and therefore is not dependent on its ally regarding this particular issues, or unilateral ability = 0, indicating the foreign force is indeed dependent on its ally for the actualization of the goal of the request.

Examples may be useful for explaining the dynamics of this variable and how it was coded in the study. Take the September 1968 U.S. request that Saigon begin to pay for the “Lein Minh” program, an initiative designed to unify anti-communist political
groups in Vietnam. Since the U.S. had been funding the program and had the financial capacity to continue to do so, it could implement the policy (funding the program) without the participation of the Saigon government. The CIA was seeking to get the Vietnamese to take over funding because “without a direct GVN input (and, hence, vested interest) there will always be the risk of the program’s being considered, even in Thieu’s eyes, an American scheme the Vietnamese are indulging.” This request was coded as unilateral ability = 1 (yes) because the Americans had the ability to implement their request for program funding without the participation of Saigon. It was a request made out of preference for Vietnamese participation, not out of necessity for their action.

This is in contrast to Washington’s 2007 request to Baghdad that the regime “cease sectarian appointments and politically motivated prosecutions,” or the 2003 request that Kabul pass anti-money-laundering legislation. By the nature of these requests, the participation of the allied regimes in Baghdad and Kabul are required for their fulfillment. Washington is dependent on Baghdad to participate in stopping sectarian appointments and on Kabul for passing legislation. These requests were therefore coded as unilateral ability = 0 (no).

However, coding whether the foreign force has unilateral ability to implement a request was not always immediately straightforward. Consider a more difficult case. While the U.S. was asking the Government of Iraqi (GOI) to cease “sectarian appointments and politically motivated prosecutions,” (the example provided above), it was also asking Baghdad to seek the “vigorous prosecution of government and security

---

89 Ibid.
officials who break the law.”92 For the request that Baghdad cease sectarian appointments, the U.S. was dependent on Baghdad, because it cannot change personnel decisions made by Iraqi policymakers without their participation unless it was prepared to take over the Iraqi state, which in 2007 was not something Washington was contemplating as it was desperately seeking to transfer responsibility and withdraw. The Americans in Baghdad could provide incentives with the hopes of encouraging less sectarian decisions but they were nevertheless dependent on some action by the Iraqis to mitigate sectarian appointments in the Government of Iraq.

The request regarding prosecuting security officials that break the law is a more complex question regarding U.S. unilateral ability. At the time of the request, the U.S. was operating independent law enforcement agencies in Iraq. Americans were routinely detaining and prosecuting Iraqi nationals suspected of terrorist acts against the GOI or U.S. forces. Although the U.S. was unable to prosecute Iraqi government and security officials who violated Iraqi law, the institutions were in place in 2007 to detain Iraqi government officials suspected of certain crimes against U.S. interests. In theory, therefore, the institutions were in place for the U.S., if so motivated, to take over responsibility and prosecute “government and security officials who break the law.” This request was therefore coded as unilateral ability = 1 (yes). If the request had specified prosecution under Iraqi law, the U.S. would not have the ability to do so without Iraqi participation, and the request would have been coded, unilateral ability = 0 (no).

Therefore, two primary factors need to be considered when coding unilateral ability. First, does the foreign ally have the relevant resources, personnel, means, or institutions in place that can take over the roles being requested in the demand? If the

foreign power has independent institutions required to fulfill the demand, it is likely to be less dependent on the domestic ally. For example, in 2007, even though the U.S. could theoretically prosecute Iraqi government officials, it could not pass Iraqi law or make Iraqi political decisions about sectarian appointments.

Second, as with concepts of deterrence and compellence in international relations, the status quo is a critical component to coding potential unilateral ability. What is the situation at the given moment the demand is made that may impact whether or not the foreign state can fulfill the request without the participation of the domestic regime? There are times when the foreign power may be running relevant domestic affairs for its ally and may have unilateral ability to implement a request, whereas under other circumstances the domestic regime is more independent and not readily controlled by foreign institutions. Which ally is in control of the organizations involved and how does that effect which actors can have direct influence over the state of affairs? In 2004, under the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. did have control over Iraqi personnel decisions. However, by 2007, it had lost that ability and therefore was beholden to Iraqi sectarian decisions.

Noting whether the intervening force has the unilateral ability to implement a request provides one indication of the dependency of the intervening force on its domestic ally regarding a particular policy. If an ally does not have unilateral ability, it is more dependent on its partner to undertake the action, since it has no independent capacity to circumvent that partner. A related issue to this dependency was also tracked in the database. Coded as excludability, when the intervening force had unilateral ability to implement a request independently (unilateral ability = yes (1)), the request was then also coded according to whether or not the domestic ally could be excluded from benefiting from the results of the policy if implemented independently by its foreign ally.
Inspired by the literature on alliance burden sharing and the issue of private vs. public goods, this variable attempted to isolate situations in which domestic allies might be prone to free-ride. If, for example, the foreign ally can implement a policy without the participation of its domestic allies, and the domestic allies cannot be excluded from benefiting from its efforts, domestic regimes might be more prone to free-riding since they cannot be excluded from the public good. Military activity against the enemy is a general example. If the foreign force requests assistance from its domestic ally yet the foreign force has an independent capacity to conduct military operations against enemy forces, the foreign force cannot exclude the domestic ally from benefitting from their military operations that weaken their collective enemy. In this case the variable would be coded as excludability = no (0).

An example of a request where excludability is possible (excludability = yes (1)) can be observed in the 2003 U.S. request to its Afghan partners that Kabul establish anti-corruption narcotics-related programs across the government that would work to inculcate a more cohesive anti-corruption culture across all levels of government. Although it couldn’t set Afghan government policy or set rules for Afghan institutions, in 2003, the U.S. had the unilateral ability to fund and run a separate anti-corruption training program that could aim at Afghan government employees. American (not Afghan) decision makers therefore determined the anti-corruption curriculum, which could, if the U.S. so chose, exclude the regime in Kabul. Instead of benefiting the critical decision makers in the Afghan regime, such anti-corruption programs could potentially target Afghan elites. It depends on who sets the agenda, but exclusion was possible and therefore was coded as such in the database.

In addition to unilateral ability, interests were also accounted for as an independent variable potentially affecting the likelihood of domestic allies complying
with the demands of a foreign intervening force. Each demand was coded for whether it could potentially create *short-term political and/or economic benefits* for the domestic regime. For example, in 2008, the U.S. requested that Kabul pursue aggressive policies to register *hawalas*, the informal bankers that conduct the majority of financial transactions in Afghanistan and other parts of Asia and the Middle East. Kabul could potentially gain a short-term benefit from complying with this request because requiring *hawalas* to be licensed opens up new sources of revenue for the government, increased information, and even generated new opportunities to ask for kick-backs. Requests that have such potential short-term benefits were coded as short-term benefits = 1 (yes).

For other requests there was no potential short-term benefit. Consider U.S. demands for increased reporting on human rights abuses in Afghanistan. Human rights reporting might provide long-term positive consequences for Kabul, but under the given conditions of instability, the request offered few short-run benefits. Even reports of human rights abuses perpetuated by enemy forces highlight the lack of governance in Afghanistan, which reflects poorly on the regime in Kabul. Questions of longer-term benefits were excluded because almost all requests have the goal of long-term benefits for the domestic regime. These policies, after all, are designed to strengthen the regime so that it can secure its position and defeat the insurgency. Questions of potential long-term benefits therefore are not terribly helpful in explaining variation in outcome; almost all requests have some potential long-term benefit, but may or may not impose different costs in the short run.

In addition to potential short-term benefits, *potential short-term political or economic costs* were also coded to track their potential influence on compliance outcomes. Requests that have such potential short-term costs were coded as short-term costs = 1 (yes). An example of a request imposing short-term costs on the domestic ally can be
observed in the November 2002 request from Washington that Kabul internally budget adequate funding for the ministries of Justice and Interior instead of relying on supplementary funding.\(^93\) Although these costs were negligible in the long term, this request posed high short-term financial costs as monies had to be budgeted, which would sacrifice other projects currently receiving government funds.

Requests can, of course, provide both costs and benefits, including for example the 2006 U.S. request that the Afghans ratify the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Kabul could have potentially benefited politically in the short-term by taking such a step against the unpopular endemic corruption plaguing Afghanistan, but would also endure short-term costs from anti-corruption measures that would hold policymakers accountable for less-reputable practices.

The potential short-term costs and benefits of a request were coded in simple terms as yes (1) or no (0) despite the fact that not all costs and benefits are equal. Some requests may pose very high costs or very low benefits. But quantifying varying levels of benefits would be exceedingly difficult and likely unreliable for several reasons. First, although economic costs can be quantified in terms of money, they are not easily measured in this case because these are potential costs (or benefits). How much they actually may potentially cost or profit the domestic ally is at best a rough estimate and may never be stated in terms of an actual figure in the documentary evidence. Second, political costs or benefits are not easily quantified. Third, costs and benefits are dynamic. They shift based on changes in circumstances, which is a characteristic that is exacerbated in this study by existing in a complex war-time environment that shifts political and economics environments.

Nevertheless, in order to gather more information about potential costs and benefits of requests and to analyze if these potential affects have an influence on the likelihood of compliance, a composite variable was created that takes both potential short-term costs and short-term benefits into consideration. Both costs and benefits after all are balanced in the decision-making process of policymakers, and therefore should also be considered in balance with one another in estimating interests. This composite potential costs and benefits variable was termed “allied interest convergence/divergence” because it approximates whether allied interests match or deviate over a given request. The variable assumes the foreign ally has an interest in the request in question since this ally is the actor making the request. The interests of the domestic ally are then estimated by considering what the evidence indicates about costs and benefits. If the record indicates that, for the most part, the domestic regime felt short-term benefits outweigh costs, the variable was coded as allied interests = converge (1). If the evidence regarding the request indicated domestic policymakers felt that potential costs outweighed benefits, the request was coded as allied interests = diverge (0). This is a highly useful variable because it estimates how costs and benefits were both considered by the domestic ally. Of course many calculations of costs and benefits are done outside the official record and are difficult to fully document. Additionally political calculations can be very complex and can shift depending on changes in circumstances. However, this variable relies on the existing evidence, including media reports, public statements by domestic actors, and political analysis of the intervening force. It focuses on the critical domestic policymaker in question in the decision-making process. The variable is a general estimate of interests. It is designed to paint a broad picture through quantitative analysis. The variable is not supposed to provide a full accounting for
political interests in a complex wartime environment, which would not be a task appropriate for statistical analysis.

An example of coding may help describe both the purpose and limits of the variable measuring allied interests convergence/divergence. In 2009, the U.S. asked Kabul to work on establishing longer and better-coordinated hours at certain critical Afghan-Pakistan border crossings to facilitate trade and ease the burden of transporting goods into Afghanistan. This request posed both potential costs and benefits to the regime in Kabul. On the one hand, extended hours would strain current bureaucratic practices as well as potentially disrupt profitable black-market practices by individuals connected to Afghan officials that take advantage of closed border crossings in order to smuggle goods. However, extended hours at border checkpoints would also create opportunities for increased import taxes and trade and transport volume. Weighing the potential short-term costs and benefits to powerbrokers in Kabul, the request was coded as allied interests converging because longer hours at official border crossings would immediately increase import tax revenue without necessarily creating obstacles that black markets could not easily shift to accommodate. This was observed at the Torkham Gate border crossing between Kabul and Peshawar for example, where province Governor Gul Agha Sherazi was accused of levying a second, unofficial tax at the official border crossing that profited the governor and his network. Taken in total, the regime

---

96 Hodge, “Afghans Probe Corruption at Borders”; Justin Mankin, “Rotten to the Core,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/10/rotten_to_the_core; Julius Cavendish, “In
in Kabul had more to gain than to lose in the short term by longer and better-coordinated hours at the Pakistani border.

In addition, the data is coded according to the general issue areas addressed in each request. This variable monitors if the domestic regime had distinctive interest in different kinds of requests or if certain topics were prone to compliance or non-compliance. There were six categories:

1. *Political Reform*, defined as actions intended to change government policies and institutions. These requests could include electoral issues, law enforcement, governance, protections for minorities, bureaucratic protocols, constitutional reforms, and reconciliation programs.

2. *Economic Reform*, defined as actions intended to change economic policies. These requests include changes to exchange rates, currency manipulation, banking sector reforms, and tax policy.

3. *Development*, defined as projects or activities intended to support economic growth and provide social services, including land reform, school construction, reconstruction of damaged urban areas, microfinance strategies, and assistance to refugees and veterans.

4. *Military Strategy*, defined as actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of the war effort, including policies regarding the distribution and buying back of weapons and strategic decisions about troop placements.

5. *Military Reform*, defined as actions intended to change military policies and institutions, including expanding/shrinking security forces, increasing authority for military commanders, and reforming command and control protocols.

6. *Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy*, defined as actions intended to implement counterinsurgency strategy. These include COIN projects, negotiated ceasefire agreements, and pacification activities.

As important as interests may be in influencing compliance outcomes, however, first it must be determined if the domestic ally even has the ability to comply with a given demand. By definition, states that have partnered with foreign militaries to control their own territories are lacking governance capabilities. If they were more capable, they would likely avoid large-scale foreign military interventions to secure their regimes. Therefore capacity to implement a given request is a critical variable in determining compliance outcomes.

This control variable, *capacity*, accounts for whether the compliance process has been affected by missing capabilities in the domestic regime. If there is a clear indication from the documentary evidence or reliable historical accounts that compliance with a request has been affected by a lack of resource (usually political, economic or bureaucratic) within the domestic ally, the capacity variable for that request was coded as capacity limitations = yes (1). If there was no indication or discussion of a lack of capabilities effecting compliance processes, the variable was coded as capacity limitations = no (0). Consider, for example, the March 1979 Soviet request to the Kabul that Afghanistan seal its border with Pakistan.97 Once the Soviets took over military activity in Afghanistan, they realized the impossibility of this task due to terrain and

---

97 “Special File Record of Conversation of L.I.Brezhnev with N.M.Taraki,” March 20, 1979, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP).
cross-border Pashtun traditions. 50,000 Soviet soldiers assigned to the task could not prevent arms and militants from infiltrating into Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{98} It was a task far beyond the reach of Afghan communist forces in 1979.\textsuperscript{99}

However, a discussion of potential capacity limitations regarding a request does not automatically indicate that the request will go unfulfilled by the domestic ally. Requests with capacity concerns can be fulfilled, in full or in part, even if there is a signal that the compliance process may be affected by capacity limitations. Consider for example, the U.S. request to Kabul that poppy elimination programs focus on Helmand province.\textsuperscript{100} As the request was made, violence in Helmand was on the rise, as well as popular protests against counter-narcotics programs. Helmand was titled “the most difficult province for ISAF,” and U.S. policymakers noted the situation was straining the capacity of poppy elimination teams.\textsuperscript{101} Nevertheless, the Afghan government pushed forward and enforced some eradication programs focusing on Helmand including pre-planting outreach programs, leading to partial compliance with the request.\textsuperscript{102}

A second control variable, \textit{domestic internal politics}, accounts for internal political conflict in domestic regimes. The domestic ally is not a unitary actor. As with any political organization, internal disputes can affect policy outcomes. This dynamic was coded separately from capacity because it addresses a different issue. In such cases,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{98} Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001} (Penguin, 2005), 158.


\end{flushright}
the necessary infrastructure may be in place to execute the action requested, but the collective political will is absent. When there was evidence of a specific domestic political issue influencing the compliance environment, the variable was coded as domestic internal politics = yes (1), and when such evidence was not apparent, the request was coded as domestic internal politics = no (0).

Of course internal divisions undoubtedly exist on the side of the intervening ally as well. However, because demands from intervening forces are drawn only from very high-level decision documents that have been passed along to international allies, the internal debate among organizations within the intervening power is largely immaterial. For the most part, the final product, the result of those policy debates, is where coding for this project begins, which excludes the debate in the organizations of the intervening force. If there are exceptions where internal politics in an intervening ally has influenced compliance outcomes, those are noted with examples in the substantive chapters on specific wars.

However, internal political turmoil for the domestic regime can be expected to influence the process of determining whether or not to comply with a demand from an ally. Legislatures can block executive efforts to comply with allied requests, while political rivals can employ nationalistic rhetoric to threaten decision makers to refuse a request from an ally, and bureaucratic organizations can work at cross-purposes in order to diminish the effectiveness of a rival bureaucracy. Consider for example, the request discussed in Chapter 8. In 1988, New Delhi demanded that Colombo prevent individuals settled in northeast Sri Lanka after 1983 from voting. However there was notable

---

103 "Points of Verbal Message of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Reaction of the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene Conveyed Through the Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit," Colombo,
Sinhalese pressure within Colombo not to give in to this demand, as not only would it work against Sinhalese representation, but would also exclude individuals who had turned 18 since 1983, therefore violating longstanding electoral laws.\textsuperscript{104} Colombo did not comply.

A third control variable, \textit{wartime environment}, tracked occasions when complications from the war impacted demands and the process of compliance. To put it in terms from Clausewitz, this variable is controlling for wartime “friction.” Because conflict is so dynamic and unpredictable, things do not go as planned. As Clausewitz wrote, “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction…”\textsuperscript{105} Simple demands can quickly become complicated by conditions of the war. This variable controls for these complications that may include violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and offenses by the enemy.

Initially, the issue of a wartime environment may seem constant, as every request in the sample is complied with or defied within a wartime context. However, even though each request was likely affected in some capacity by the conflict, this variable tracks instances where a specific consequence of military efforts fundamentally changed the compliance environment. Despite the fact that war is a constant, complications arising from war are not uniform. Friction is unpredictable; sometimes it paralyzes


\textsuperscript{105} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 119.
organizations, sometimes it leaves operations unscathed. Furthermore, understanding how conflict can impact certain requests but not others may help provide insight into patterns of compliance.

An example of the war influencing conditions relating to compliance can be observed in a demand previously referenced in this chapter: the 2009 U.S. request that Kabul extend service hours at certain important Afghan-Pakistan border crossings to facilitate trade and ease the burden of transporting goods into Afghanistan. In November 2011, U.S. aircraft attacked two Pakistani border posts, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. In response, Pakistan shut down entry points into Afghanistan, including the routes specified in the demand to have longer hours, only to reopen them months later in July 2012. Compliance with the American demand that Kabul work on better-coordinated schedules with the Pakistanis to facilitate trade was complicated by a U.S. military action in a way that could not have been foreseen. The request and indeed the whole border was a victim of wartime complications. For this request and ones with similar dynamics, this variable was coded as wartime environment (complications) = yes (1). For other requests where there was no evidence of a direct impact of military action on the compliance environment, the variable was coded as wartime environment (complications) = no (0).

The variables of domestic internal politics and wartime environment are monitoring separate phenomena and were coded as separate issues. However, because they can be observed somewhat infrequently when contrasted with other variables, and

---

both variables monitor occasions when outside factors complicate compliance, a composite control variable was created to combine them, *Conditions of War or Internal Politics Impacting Compliance Environment*. Various statistical models were employed throughout the study occasionally using the composite variable and, at other times, using the unique variables on domestic politics and wartime environment. The models always specify which data was used and the logic behind its usage.

In Chapter 4 there is an interesting corollary to the variable on wartime environment. As developed in that chapter, an existential threat to a domestic regime caused by conditions of the war is a separate phenomenon from routine friction of operating in a warzone as described in the previous variable. Because there is a difference between routine operations and emergency conditions, a separate variable was created to monitor *acute enemy threats* (immediate threat = yes (1) or no (0)). The Tet Offensive in Vietnam, for example, had a markedly different effect on compliance when contrasted with daily operations in a counterinsurgency war. Explanations and examples of this variable are provided in detail in Chapter 4 – Vietnam.

Lastly, the database gathers basic information to contextualize the dependent and independent variables previously described, including coding the year the request was made, based on the available evidence. Allies can ask for requests repeatedly if they are not complied with in a timely manner and if they are deemed important to the war effort. The earliest communication of that request to the domestic ally was coded as the initial year of the request. Additionally, the year of compliance was also coded and again was recorded as the earliest date based on the available evidence. These years of initial request and completion were tracked for both verbal compliance and substantive compliance. Notes were taken to provide background on each request, and if the history
was not evident regarding compliance, a folder for each request was built to collect
evidence, documents, and to construct a timeline of the history related to compliance.
For more details and specific discussion of documents and coding rules, please see
Appendix A, which provides a detailed account of coding by tracing requests from the
U.S. war in Vietnam. Furthermore each chapter has a unique methodology section to
discuss particular methodological questions related to information and data sources of
the particular war or wars discussed in that chapter.
Chapter 4:

VIETNAM

“The Vietnamese in the street is firmly convinced that the U.S. totally dominates the GVN [Government of Vietnam] and dictates exactly what course shall be followed. However, the bitter and tragic truth is that the U.S. has been kept at such a distance from GVN circles and power that in joint councils or plans our views may be heard, some portions of our logic may be endorsed but with confrontations or matters that represent any truly revolutionary departure from existing GVN practices etc, we are light weights and presently do not possess the leverage or power to carry the day.”

- The Pentagon Papers

This study examines counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, identifying conditions promoting compliance by the domestic regime with the demands of their foreign ally and conditions promoting non-compliance. Using hundreds of declassified national security documents on U.S.-Vietnamese relations, I analyzed 105 U.S. demands, tracking relevant causal variables and compliance outcomes.

There are two significant findings. First, there is an interaction effect between whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a request, and dependency on the domestic regime to implement the request. If the Americans could undertake the requested activity unilaterally and Vietnamese and American interests converged, there were higher levels of Vietnamese non-compliance due to incentives to free-ride. If on the other hand interests diverged and the U.S. could act unilaterally, Washington was able to coerce Saigon into complying. Second, the shock of the Tet Offensive led to an increase in compliance, suggesting a serious external threat will motivate cooperation. This is in contrast to the influence of working under non-emergency wartime conditions, which

---

complicates the environment, makes requests difficult to fulfill and is correlated with higher rates of non-compliance.

This chapter proceeds in several steps. First, using descriptive statistics it discusses the characteristics of the data uncovered on compliance in Vietnam. Second, four categories of independent variables are detailed and examples of their impact on Vietnamese compliance provided. Third, several statistical models are offered in order to provide an overview of the independent variables and their significance.

**Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Vietnamese Compliance**

Over 2,500 U.S. primary source documents (10,000+ pages) were analyzed to identify 105 policy demands from the U.S. government to their Vietnamese allies from 1964-1973. Each demand was found the primary source documents contained in the 12 volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) on Vietnam published by the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. The process of identifying the outcomes of each of these demands again relied on these FRUS volumes, as well as the Pentagon Papers, declassified U.S. documents in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) and the Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS) as well as online U.S. government document repositories including usaid.gov and dtic.gov. A step-by-step guide to the methods used to process the data presented in this chapter on the U.S. war in Vietnam is offered in Appendix A.

---

109 For more information about FRUS see [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus). Produced by the State Department Office of the Historian, contains "declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies. Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution."
Summary Findings

Working from the 105 demands from the U.S. to Saigon over the course of the war, I found more instances of compliance than non-compliance. (46/105) 43.8% of the time the GVN (Government of Vietnam) complied with American demands (25/105) 23.8% of the time they partially complied and (34/105) 32.4% they failed to adopt the policies demanded. Compliance was measured by researching the outcome of the demand and determining if there was mostly no implementation (non-compliance), some implementation (partial compliance) or mostly implementation (compliance) of the request.¹¹⁰

Table 4. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Full Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Compliance Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Non Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>46/105 (43.8%)</td>
<td>25/105 (23.8%)</td>
<td>71/105 (68%)</td>
<td>34/105 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>11/22 (50%)</td>
<td>3/22 (14%)</td>
<td>14/22 (64%)</td>
<td>8/22 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
<td>19/79 (24%)</td>
<td>49/79 (62%)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>35/106 (33%)</td>
<td>32/106 (30%)</td>
<td>67/106 (64%)</td>
<td>38/106 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>50/148 (33.8%)</td>
<td>42/148 (28.4%)</td>
<td>92/148 (62%)</td>
<td>56/148 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Verbal compliance was also interesting. Like all allies, Saigon made promises. Sometimes it kept them; sometimes it didn’t. Vietnamese officials agreed to undertake the action being requested 72% of the time (76/105). This means they effectively agreed to implement almost ¾ proposals put forward by the U.S. Of these guarantees, 55% (42/76) were ultimately fully completed, 24% (18/76) partially adopted, and 21% (16/76) were not undertaken at all. This is interesting because it illustrates how verbal contracts are meaningful for the most part, but there is nevertheless a substantial amount of agreement without action.

¹¹⁰ For information regarding coding see Chapter 3 and Appendix A - Vietnam Methodology.
Table 5. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Verbal Agreement Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Refusal</th>
<th>No Data Available on Verbal Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>0/87 (0%)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>11/87 (13%)</td>
<td>18/105 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>20/20 (100%)</td>
<td>0/20 (0%)</td>
<td>20/20 (91%)</td>
<td>0/22 (0%)</td>
<td>2/22 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>51/70 (73%)</td>
<td>10/70 (14%)</td>
<td>61/70 (87%)</td>
<td>9/70 (13%)</td>
<td>9/79 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>75/83 (90%)</td>
<td>2/83 (2.4%)</td>
<td>77/83 (93%)</td>
<td>6/83 (7.2%)</td>
<td>23/106 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>0/99 (0%)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>8/99 (8%)</td>
<td>49/148 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 illustrates trends in the frequency of U.S. requests alongside rates of GVN compliance over the course of the Vietnam War. Explanations for trends in the graph based on developments in the war are found below the graph. Note that the number of requests complied with in 1968 rises above the number of new requests made by the U.S. in 1968 as Saigon catches up with U.S. requests made in previous years.

Figure 8. Foreign Allied Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance
Patterns in the direction, intersection and slope of the data show five discreet sections of the graph, 1964-66, 1967, 1968, 1969-70 and 1971-73. Each is a distinctive segment of the war where changing dynamics impacted the number of new U.S. demands and GVN rates of compliance. Details regarding these dynamics are provided below. Note that two trends are particularly significant. First, the shock of the Tet Offensive motivates Saigon to cooperate to an unprecedented level in 1968. Second, the drop off in both requests and compliance after 1969 as the Nixon administration, weary of the war, largely gives up on asking the GVN to reform.

1964-1966

At the start of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam there is an upward trend in both the number of requests made by the U.S. and requests complied with by the GVN. Washington has sharply increased aid to Saigon, and is asking for specific reforms in return. This funding combined with the American takeover of military operations frees the GVN to comply with relatively simple U.S. demands, including requests that call for a larger customs force, higher exchange rates, and the creation of secured stockpiles of weapons and rice to insulate Saigon against attack. Throughout this period the GVN is initiating more intensive projects that will take time to implement, such as land reform policies.

1967

There is a sharp decrease in requests made and an even more dramatic drop in compliance. After a few years of U.S. military intervention, the GVN has already completed simple reforms requested, as well as made decisions regarding which U.S. requests to undertake and which to put off. Complex projects in progress will take additional time to complete.
1968

The Tet Offensive of January 1968 is often cited as a turning point in Vietnam, and as illustrated by Figure 8 patterns in GVN compliance were also strongly affected by Tet. As I discuss later in the chapter, this spike in compliance in 1968 is a response to the NLF attacks on Saigon and other GVN urban strongholds, which shocked the GVN into recognizing the external threat posed by the enemy to their regime. There are multiple examples of this heightened sense of emergency inspiring compliance with U.S. demands. From the data in the graph a dramatic shift is evident between 1967 and 1968, where post-Tet the GVN is complying with more requests than the U.S. is making as it catches up on long-standing demands made between 1964 and 1967 in an effort to improve war-fighting capacity and solidify its position against the enemy.

1969-1970

Following the Tet Offensive and the initiation of numerous reforms which had been stalled prior to 1968, this period contains more requests complied with than new requests made by U.S. officials. This level of compliance is in part due to the completion of several reforms initiated in earlier years that took time to implement, as well as the immediate adoption of multiple new requests made by the U.S. during this period including offering concessions to North Vietnam in order to initiate peace negotiations.

1971-1973

A drop off in both the rate of new requests made and the rate of requests complied with illustrate the stalemate of the last years of direct American military involvement in Vietnam. The vast majority of new demands pertain to compromises offered during peace talks. U.S. officials have largely stopped asking for new substantive domestic reforms, and old requests, such as specific anti-corruption measures continue to be unfulfilled by Saigon.
The trends observed in Figure 8 also indicate that compliance and the frequency of new requests drop off significantly over time in Vietnam. There are several factors contributing to this trend. First, easy reforms are adopted early on, causing a spike in compliance near the beginning of intervention. Second, Washington makes a large number of requests early in the war as expectations for reform are high. Third, institutions, including Saigon’s bureaucratic policies and U.S. expectations for Saigon, eventually reach an equilibrium over time as certain reforms are neither enacted, nor expected, even if Washington believes reform would help the war effort. As Saigon grew increasingly accustomed to U.S. funding, support, and military efforts, it became harder for Washington to use those factors to compel change.

These observations tap into an extensive literature in comparative politics on political change, path dependence and historical institutionalism. Political and social institutions are often described as “sticky,” reflecting how laws, policies, procedures, offices, and bureaucracies become self-enforcing organizations. They reinforce the status quo in order to avoiding investing in new approaches, risking personal costs, and avoid uncertainly and change.\(^{111}\) Change can be observed early in the U.S. intervention in Vietnam as American funding pays for the creation of new bureaucratic structures, followed by a hardening of those organizations and institutional interests that seek to avoid change.

Table 6 presents the statistical findings using the data from the primary source documents. Although any student of the war in Vietnam should be wary of quantitative tools for estimating political and social aspects of the war, when used properly these

methods still provide great tools for understanding trends in the war. As the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted,

quantitative analysis of the hundreds, even thousands, of “countless” events occurring in many parts of Vietnam every day... [was one of the only ways for commanders] to understand the war and how it was going... Any given action was seldom important by itself, and at first glance no patterns were seen. Analysis however, revealed persistent patterns and cycles.

Substantive compliance, the dependent variable, was coded along a continuum as non-compliance, partial compliance and compliance. Multiple models were created to simulate varying conditions of the war in Vietnam and to test the effect and significance of various independent variables on compliance. These variables are grouped into four categories: warfare and external threats, state capacity, dependency and interest.

---

### Table 6. Compliance & Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependency</th>
<th>Interest Type:</th>
<th>Ordered Probit – Saigon’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 1964 - 1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Unilateral Action Possible</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.200 (0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Can Be Excluded</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.519 (0.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term:</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.024* (0.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Benefit and U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.251* (0.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. &amp; GVN Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence-Divergence and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Benefit</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.621</strong> (0.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.423 (0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Type:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.117 (0.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.244 (0.458)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.695 (0.535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.450 (0.450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.185 (0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.489 (0.673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-1.333</strong> (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or Internal Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.322 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.195 (0.420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Observations)</td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P < 0.05, ** Indicates P < 0.01

113 Interest is estimated by using Domestic Regime Potential Benefit, a dummy variable measuring if Saigon can turn what is being requested by the U.S. into a way to bolster its short-term interests such as profit making position or electoral benefit. A more specific variable, interest convergence/divergence is included in model 7, and in the section on the interaction term between interests and unilateral ability.

114 Interest in this model is estimated by a composite variable, “Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence,” which relies on the available documentary evidence to account for both private costs (threats) and benefits of the request for the domestic regime. The variable estimates in general if allied interests over the request in question converge or diverge.
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance

Each independent variable was researched and coded in an original database on compliance in the Vietnam War. I find they have varying levels of influence on compliance and interact in interesting ways to determine what factors were influencing Saigon’s behavior.

Capacity

Studying compliance first requires accounting for capacity. Capacity is defined as the possession of adequate resources and sufficient institutional ability to translate resources into action. Note that capacity was measured by triangulating reporting on each task by the U.S. Embassy and military mission officials as well as secondary historical investigations. This is a threshold issue for compliance. A given actor would be fundamentally unable to accomplish a demand if they lack the attributes necessary to take on the activity in the first place.

As expected, the data indicates capacity is strongly correlated with non-compliance. When capacity is lacking, compliance is unlikely. Despite this predictable result, the relative low frequency that capacity was cited as an issue determining compliance is surprising. Less than 27% percent of all cases indicated South Vietnamese state capacity impacted performance. 27% is not necessarily a small figure, but for a struggling regime with faltering capabilities, capacity might be expected to play an even more prominent role. Yet the data shows that more often than not, capacity was not

\[\text{\(^{115}\) Capacity coded as a “dummy variable” 0/1. 1 if it was an issue determining compliance, 0 if not. For more information see Chapter 3 – Methodology. A dummy variable was created tracking whether or not U.S. officials, intelligence reports or historical accounts discuss a lack of capacity within discussions of the given policy. This includes insufficient government institutions to implement the policy, disunity within the GVN administration, organizational failure to properly distribute funds, or failure to provide services due to expanding demand among others.}\]
decisive in South Vietnam’s lack of compliance with American demands. As detailed in Chapter 3 this may be due in part to U.S. officials recognizing the limits of the government in Saigon and tailoring their requests to actions they felt were in the grasp of their Vietnamese allies. This tendency influences the population of requests analyzed in this study since there is a self-selection against requests with capacity issues. However, as detailed in the methods chapter there are a couple of reasons why this is not problematic for the findings of this study. First, in Vietnam the U.S. had no choice but to ask for difficult reforms if those actions were critical for the war effort or if the U.S. was dependent on the GVN to adopt the given policy. Therefore some requests were made regardless of likely capacity issues. Second, U.S. policymakers were somewhat naïve in the early years of the war, underestimating the difficulty of certain tasks and overestimating Saigon’s interest in reform. Third, and most important, the bias in the sample towards requests the foreign power feels the domestic ally has the ability to implement is not unique to any particular war. In Vietnam and elsewhere it is reasonable to expect such a phenomenon across the population of counterinsurgency wars and to exist in similar future alliances. Such a bias does not impact the finding that lacking capacity tends to lead towards non-compliance.

The most common capacity issue afflicting South Vietnam’s ability to implement demands came from deficient GVN bureaucratic institutions. American dollars were readily available to invest in reforms, but GVN officials nevertheless still had to cope with bureaucratic machinery that was at best underdeveloped and at worst inept. According to American documents, GVN administrators ultimately encouraged

\footnote{In 59% of cases of non-compliance, capacity was not an issue. 41% of cases of non-compliance cited capacity limitations.}
ineptitude in the bureaucratic state structure by basing promotions on loyalty instead of effectiveness.

There are multiple examples of faltering South Vietnamese state structures impacting compliance. In anticipation of greater military efforts and U.S. involvement in 1964 Washington demanded that the GVN “increase the armed forces [RVNAF] (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.” The GVN ultimately complied by raising force levels, but not until late 1965 when American military forces had already arrived in large numbers and could actively participate in reorganization efforts. Until that point force numbers were dropping, even as they were supposedly being augmented. Saigon’s “failure to provide funds was blamed as a major reason for these military manpower deficiencies,” despite the fact that, as Secretary of Defense McNamara informed U.S. officials, “there is an unlimited appropriation available for the financing of aid to Vietnam. Under no circumstances is a lack of money to stand in the way of aid to that nation.” According to Ambassador Taylor, the problem was U.S. funds for South Vietnamese force expansion were not being distributed to local recruiters who could enlist troops. The bureaucratic hold up from transferring funds from Saigon to local officials in the provinces was the primary roadblock to force expansion.

Washington also felt the general treatment of the ARVN was problematic. By 1968 the average desertion rate in the ARVN was 17.7 per 1,000 soldiers, one of the

---


118 Gravel, The pentagon papers. Volume 3. Chapter 1, “U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965.” There had been a steady decline in the strength of RVNAF since October 1963, notably including a decrease of 4,000 in March alone; and the current strength was almost 20,000 below the authorized figure agreed necessary by both governments.

119 Gravel, The pentagon papers. Volume 3. Chapter 1
highest in modern history.\textsuperscript{120} But high desertion could not entirely be attributed to low morale among troops, as organizational and bureaucratic failures of ARVN administration also contributed to the trend. Inadequate housing and insufficient leave allowances motivated desertions while inaccurate reporting that did not account for soldiers who left their units to join others closer to home or soldiers that went AWOL, but later returned, led to inflated rates. These organizational issues had a serious impact on the joint U.S.-GVN war effort.

Faltering bureaucratic capacity also contributed to the inability of the GVN to provide services for its veterans. In November 1967 Saigon announced an “Action Program” attempting to address a range of social issues including “improved benefits for servicemen, veterans and dependents.”\textsuperscript{121} However, providing such benefits required institutions such as hospitals and vocational training facilities. Even with American funding, the development of such complex institutions at best takes years to accomplish. In order to improve treatment afforded Saigon’s veterans, President Thieu merged the Ministry of Veterans Affairs with the Ministry of Defense in order to transfer administrative know-how to the effort. Nevertheless, in the context of an ever-expanding war, resources from the Ministry of Defense and War Veterans were funneled towards military operations and away from veterans.\textsuperscript{122} It became common practice for Vietnamese commanders to report wounded veterans at home with their families as active service members in the field in order to continue to provide them a paycheck. This


practice inflated estimates of active ARVN personnel, leading to unrealistic force projections and understaffed units.

**Dependency and Unilateral Action**

At times only one ally can fulfill a particular role or undertake a given action. This causes the other partner to be “dependent” on its ally for executing the policy on behalf of the alliance. Such dynamics were evident in the U.S.-GVN alliance. Sometimes the U.S. could act unilaterally and take over tasks if Saigon failed to perform. American military planners did so on multiple occasions, including assuming control of efforts to expand the Port of Saigon, upgrading coastal transportation systems or funding youth programs. Other times the U.S. could not independently tackle the issue, leaving it reliant on Saigon to move forward. To its frustration, Washington found itself entirely beholden on the GVN to dismiss inept or corrupt officials, amend the national constitution or lower the draft age. In order to understand whether or not U.S. ability to independently undertake the actions requested impacted compliance I coded requests according to whether or not the U.S. could potentially adopt the activity on its own, or if it would fundamentally require GVN participation.\(^{123}\) Note that this variable tracks the *ability* to take independent action, according to the characteristics of the request, and does not monitor whether or not the U.S. actually chose to act on its own. Due to a counterinsurgency strategy emphasizing actions to strengthen the GVN, in order to prepare them for an U.S. withdrawal, Washington usually tried to work through Saigon.\(^{124}\) This was the case even if it meant the given task suffered, because the frequently arduous process of working through GVN institutions was expected to expand

\(^{123}\) For more information on coding and this variable, see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix A
\(^{124}\) There were 55 requests the U.S. could undertake unilaterally. 37/55 the U.S. chose not to override Saigon and take over responsibility for the task, leaving 18/55 times the U.S. chose to sacrifice the slow process of state building in order to get a specific task accomplished.
their independence, capacity and legitimacy. This was usually a higher priority than any particular activity requested of the GVN.

The statistical model presented in Table 6 indicates that there is no linear relationship between American unilateral capability to undertake the task requested of Saigon and GVN compliance. On the one hand, under certain circumstances U.S. unilateral capability provided incentives working against cooperation, as the GVN could wait for the U.S. to undertake the activity, in effect getting the benefit without the cost. One example of free riding and non-compliance is a 1966 American request that the GVN make an effort to train more health personnel in order to provide better care for soldiers and civilians. For reasons of legitimacy, Washington thought it was best if Saigon participated as a public demonstration of GVN provision of government goods and services. Regardless of this goal, a year later U.S. personnel had taken over the task. Because the U.S. could accomplish the task without their assistance, the GVN could choose to opt out and yet still benefit from the service.

On the other hand, as the analysis indicates, U.S. capabilities to undertake the activity without the GVN did not always inspire free-riding and non-compliance. If the U.S. is able to undertake the action independently, there is a motivation for Saigon to comply in order to gain favor with the Americans and better protect their interests. If Washington is likely to undertake the action regardless of Saigon, under certain conditions South Vietnamese leaders seem to have rationalized that they might as well take the lead and get what they can out of the policy.

---

This type of behavior is apparent in peace negotiations with North Vietnam. With American domestic support for the war plummeting, Washington was under increasing pressure to end the war. American officials were pushing the GVN to agree to concessions facilitating a negotiated solution. President Thieu was appalled by U.S. demands that his government accept the NLF as a political party in peace negotiations. His position on the NLF frustrated U.S. policymakers, who did not want their Vietnamese ally to stand in the way of a negotiated solution. North Vietnam was insisting on “four-party talks,” while the GVN advocated “two sided” negotiations to avoid recognizing the NLF. Saigon officials effectively stalled negotiations for two months by refusing to sit at a “square” table during negotiations, as the four sides would represent four parties. The issue was ultimately solved by all parties agreeing to call negotiations whatever they wanted (four-party or two-sided) and by adopting a Soviet-proposed compromise which included one large round table and two rectangular ones.\footnote{Pierre Asselin, \emph{A bitter peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the making of the Paris agreement} (UNC Press Books, 2002), 14-15.} Regardless, the GVN reluctantly accepted the NLF as a party in negotiations, and even later acquiesced to U.S. demands that it offer to have direct talks with the NLF. America’s ability to negotiate with communist forces with or without the GVN and to potentially sign an agreement that excluded Saigon convinced GVN officials to acquiesce to American demands. Refusing to participate would only cost the regime more.

Similarly, when the U.S. is unable to implement the requested policy independently varying degrees of both compliance and non-compliance are observed. This is apparent in the outcome of two tax reforms the U.S. requested in 1968. The first was for a substantial increase in GVN consumer taxes on oil and petroleum, designed to
increase GVN revenues by 3-4 billion piasters.\textsuperscript{127} Even though the GVN made a good deal of revenue from taxing the extraction and distribution of petroleum\textsuperscript{128} they nevertheless continued to provide tax exemptions for public consumption. As the U.S. Department of Defense summarized, “Ostensibly, the GVN has failed to act on raising petroleum taxes for the following reasons: Petroleum is thought to be a price leader; thus all prices will be raised if the price of petroleum is increased; it would be unpopular with the people; and it would be unpopular with the legislature which would have to approve a rise in petroleum taxes. In short, it is frequently claimed that in the interest of political stability the price of petroleum must not be allowed to rise.”\textsuperscript{129} Saigon never raised the petroleum taxes requested by the U.S.

On the other hand Saigon complied with U.S. demands to place more taxes on an \textit{ad valorem} basis, in order to allow revenues to “expand automatically with price increases.”\textsuperscript{130} This reform was important since inflation was causing a substantial decrease in revenue among taxes collected by a set fee per item. Although reforms were slow, the GVN promulgated a series of updated income and excise taxes from 1972-1974, “basing most of the new taxes on an ad valorem basis.”\textsuperscript{131} Note that these laws were passed when the U.S. was withdrawing forces and the GVN was faced with independence.

\textsuperscript{127} Approx 33 million U.S. dollars using the official piaster exchange rate 118 to $1. However note that due to inflation, the amount may be considered significantly less. Request for increases in taxes on oil referenced in "Ambassador Bunker’s Seventy-Second Weekly Message from Saigon Briefing President Johnson on the Present Situation in Vietnam," Cable. U.S. Department of State. Secret. October 30, 1968. Declassified October 27, 1994.

\textsuperscript{128} David Brown, “The Development of Vietnam’s Petroleum Resources,” \textit{Asian Survey} 16, no. 6 (June 1976): 553–570.


107
The U.S. could not implement any such reforms unilaterally because only the GVN could create and enforce a new tax code for itself. Yet Washington was directly impacted by how much revenue the government collected because it not only would have to supplement cash shortages, but was acutely interested in fostering a sustainable South Vietnamese regime that had independent and renewable sources of income. Despite this interest, because the U.S. could not adopt the reforms unilaterally, the GVN could pass the tax law it determined would best serve its interests and ignore the other. Ultimately U.S. policy makers could do nothing about it.

These examples illustrate how unilateral ability impacts compliance in varying ways, sometimes creating incentives for compliance, sometimes motivating non-compliance. The statistical model confirms the hypothesis that foreign unilateral ability and the interests of the domestic ally interact to affect compliance outcomes. If the U.S. can act unilaterally and GVN-U.S. interests converge, the GVN is more likely to fail to comply because there is incentive to free-ride. If the U.S. can act unilaterally and allied interests diverge, there is a higher probability of compliance as the GVN will agree in order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented without them anyway. The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible, as observed in the given tax examples above. If independent action is not possible, and interests converge there is a higher likelihood of compliance. If alliance interests diverge and independent action by the foreign ally is not possible higher rates of non-compliance are expected.
Figure 9. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity [Control Variable]</th>
<th>Unilateral Potential</th>
<th>Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence</th>
<th>Interaction with Unilateral Ability &amp; Allied Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1.167*</td>
<td>0.539 (0.285)</td>
<td>1.161* (0.367)</td>
<td>-1.117* (0.491)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This finding implies one set of circumstances in which coercion is possible for the foreign power. If interests diverge between allies, but the foreign power has the ability to independently implement the requested policy, it can coerce compliance by threatening to execute the policy and leave the domestic partner out altogether. Somewhat counter

\(^{132}\) Regardless of approximation for interest, the interaction effect between unilateral capacity and interest outlined in Graph 2 (above) remains statistically significant with compliance when the same regression is run substituting Benefit for Domestic Regime. The variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime.” The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Saigon’s interests based on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. Since the foreign power (U.S.) is making the request, I assume they are interested in the request. Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime (Saigon). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary evidence. For more on coding see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix A. For more on the interest variables see the section on interest as an independent variable and Chapter 3.
intuitively, such coercion is only possible if the domestic regime is opposed to the request. If the regime is interested in the policy, it has little incentive to participate. It benefits most by waiting for the foreign power to carry out the policy, effectively free riding without paying the costs for implementation.

This observation also has implications for trends in verbal compliance. Perhaps unsurprisingly there are more instances of promises given by Saigon lacking substantive follow-through when interests diverge and the U.S. is unable to act independently. In such a scenario, verbal compliance is used as a way of biding time and avoiding inter-alliance conflict, without actually adopting the requested reform. Washington has no direct way to coerce compliance, punish the GVN for agreeing to undertake reforms without actually doing so, or implementing the policy independently. Under such circumstances Saigon has the incentive to make promises and then not keep them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allied Interests</th>
<th>Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Converge</td>
<td>(Non-Compliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17% (4/23) Verbal Compliance and no Actual Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7% (1/14) Verbal Compliance and no Actual Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverge</td>
<td>(Compliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19% (3/16) Verbal Compliance and no Actual Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35% (8/23) Verbal Compliance and no Actual Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Rates of Verbal Compliance Without Substantive Compliance
An additional variable related to dependency included in the statistical analysis (Table 6) was excludability. This measured whether or not the U.S. could exclude Saigon from benefiting from a request if they failed to comply.¹³³ To illustrate with examples, the U.S. would be unable to exclude Saigon from benefiting from American military operations against North Vietnam as combating Saigon’s enemies inevitably helps Saigon. However, Washington might be able to exclude the GVN from benefiting from American efforts to build an anti-communist labor party. Such an organization could create political rivals that would challenge, not bolster, GVN control. However, this variable proved to have no notable impact on compliance, in part because the GVN did not necessarily believe the U.S. would exclude it from benefits of American efforts. Due to Washington’s interests in the survival and success of the GVN, it went against American interests to weaken the regime by withholding potential benefits. Actions undertaken to weaken the GVN would benefit the enemy more than the Americans. The GVN were aware of the dynamics of U.S. interests and did not seem concerned that the U.S. would exclude them, even if they had the ability to do so.

**Interests**

Having addressed the impact on compliance of 1) GVN capacity and 2) U.S. ability to implement reforms without Saigon, it is now appropriate to account for interests, a critical variable determining compliance. Interests are important. Whether or not you do what a partner asks largely depends on what they are asking for. How much does it cost? How do you benefit? Therefore it is not surprising that whether or not Saigon complied with U.S. demands in part hinged on what Washington had in mind.

¹³³ For more on this variable see Vietnam Methodology - Appendix
Issue Types

In order to observe trends in compliance correlated with different issues, six categories were created to classify requests by their subject.

1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and provide social services. Including land reform, school construction and assistance to refugees and veterans. 27/105, 26% of U.S. requests.

2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including raising exchange rates and increased taxes. 12/105, 11% of U.S. requests.

3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and institutions. Including policies towards opposition parties, protocol for administering funds, and legal and constitutional issues. 43/105, 41% of U.S. requests.

4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Effort intended to implement U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects (Project Take-Off, Operation Hop Tac), public sacrifice campaigns and pacification activities. 9/105, 9% of U.S. requests.

5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. Including military promotion policies, enemy POW treatment, reducing the draft age, and compensation levels. 9/105, 9% of U.S. requests.

6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of the war effort. Including putting forces into Laos, invading Cambodia, and striking North Vietnam. 5/105, 5% of U.S. requests.
Several trends emerge when comparing compliance among different subjects, including varying probabilities in compliance. From highest to lowest rates of compliance:

1. Military Strategy
2. Military Reform
3. Economic Reform
4. Development
5. Political Reform
6. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy
Military Strategy. There are several factors producing the trends observed in the above graph. First, there is a higher probability of compliance with requests pertaining to military strategy ahead of other subjects. This may be because the South Vietnamese were more willing to take U.S. advice on military actions out of deference to U.S. military leadership. Additionally, Saigon was less likely to see such requests as threats to their regime as military actions target the enemy and usually do not require internal reform. Lastly, it is improbable that limited capacity would impact these requests, and increase the likelihood for non-compliance, as the U.S. would only ask the South Vietnamese to undertake strategic military operations Washington felt they could handle. U.S. military planners would have used U.S. forces if they thought its allies lacked sufficient capacity for the task at hand. There is less of a probability for bias based on perceived capabilities to arise among other issues, such as political reform, which the U.S. cannot undertake on behalf of the GVN. It is therefore important to consider this kind of selection effect.
before making claims that requests regarding particular subjects are more likely to be complied with than others.

**Counterinsurgency Projects.** Requests pertaining to counterinsurgency strategy on the other hand had the lowest rate of compliance. This may be because many such demands required the adoption of U.S.-designed programs in which Saigon had little invested and did not necessarily support. Operation Hop-Tac, an early project intended to pacify contested areas near Saigon is one example. As the Pentagon Papers summarized, “While pacification received a low emphasis during troubled 1964-1965, there was one important exception: the Hop Tac program, designed to put "whatever resources are required" into the area surrounding Saigon to pacify it... General Taylor and General Westmoreland began Hop Tac, setting up a new and additional headquarters in Saigon which was supposed to tie together the overlapping and quarrelsome commands in the Saigon area. The Vietnamese set up a parallel, "counterpart" organization, although critics of Hop Tac were to point out that the Vietnamese Hop Tac headquarters had virtually no authority or influence, and seemed primarily designed to satisfy the Americans. (Ironically, Hop Tac is the Vietnamese word for "cooperation," which turned out to be just what Hop Tac lacked.)134 The plan failed, in part due to strategic flaws, and in part because of the lack of cooperation from Saigon. “The GVN has never considered Hop Tac its own plan and its own number one priority. The staff planning for the plan was done almost entirely by the United States, and then translated into Vietnamese. It is, in the eyes of many Vietnamese, ‘the plan of the Americans.’”135

---

135 Pentagon Papers. Gravel Ed. Volume 2. 525
Furthermore, counterinsurgency programs tend to be time-consuming. Success comes slowly and may seem inglorious compared to large-scale conventional battles. Early in the war Saigon was reticent to commit troops to time-consuming population-centered strategies. Regardless, by 1967 the U.S. began to increasingly value pacification programs that focus on the population in addition to operations attacking enemy forces. Washington applied more pressure to the GVN to participate. In mid-June 1967 Robert Komer, known as “Blowtorch Bob” for his potent administrative style, designed “Project Take-Off,” a pacification effort which Komer would head as deputy commander of MACV’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker also backed Take-off, but felt “as is often the case... GVN performance remains the crucial factor,” and so focused efforts on pressuring the GVN to support Take-off.

The timing of Take-Off worked against U.S. officials. Focused on the upcoming elections, President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky were not interested in new initiatives. According to one scholar:

In the absence of an express top-level South Vietnamese direction, CORDS was forced to act on its own, bidding advisers and program managers in August to coordinate Takeoff programs with their counterparts. In other words, CORDS issued guidance to the South Vietnamese through its advisory network hoping its advisers would be able to get local officials committed to Takeoff. As an exercise in leverage, Takeoff was inauspicious since CORDS failed to convince the government to issue orders to its own officials. Without obvious, high-level South Vietnamese endorsement, Takeoff could be viewed only as an American effort.138

But not all counterinsurgency programs were sunk by a lack of cooperation from Saigon. Project Take-Off soon became better focused and reorganized under the Phuong Hoang or Phoenix program, a highly effective campaign against “VCI,” Viet Cong (NLF) infrastructure. It aimed to “neutralize,” via capturing, interrogating or killing communist NLF shadow government operators active in contested areas of South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{139} Recently shocked by the Tet Offensive and hoping that without supporting infrastructure, guerrillas would be uncoordinated, unfed, and ideally ineffective, President Thieu complied with U.S. requests to support the program, signing a decree in July 1968. The GVN provided operators, interrogators, intelligence officers and infiltrators. Despite widespread criticism of Saigon’s implementation efforts, after 1968 high-level GVN support for the program made a decisive difference to the program.\textsuperscript{140} Under persistent American tutelage, GVN intelligence processes made the Phoenix program devastatingly effective. After the war, a senior NVA officer, Colonel Bui Tin admitted the program neutralized thousands of communist cadres, while communist authorities later said Phoenix was “the single most effective program you used against them in the entire war.”\textsuperscript{141} Therefore, there are several reasons why the GVN might have had difficulty complying with COIN projects early in the war. Nevertheless they did eventually cooperate with certain plans and had notable results.

\textit{Economic Reform.} There was also higher than average levels of compliance with demands for economic reforms. This is in part because U.S. suggestions for economic reforms.

\textsuperscript{139} Phoenix remains a highly controversial program. It has been categorized as a CIA assassination campaign and received widespread criticism throughout the war as an example of human rights abuses in the execution of the war. In February 1972 George Jacobson, DepCORDS quipped “I sometimes think we would have gotten better publicity for molesting children.” Hunt, \textit{Pacification}, 236.

\textsuperscript{140} For example in May 1970 the prime minister moved the Phung Hoang central office to the Directorate General of the National Police in order to better centralize efforts and coordinate inter-agency intelligence collection after U.S. complaints that GVN agencies did not cooperate sufficiently and were not giving the program sufficient prioritization. Hunt, \textit{Pacification}, 237.

rehabilitation agreed with Saigon’s interest in economic stability. Additionally, because the U.S. was directly funding much of South Vietnam’s budget, it was able to put specific oversight mechanisms in place, providing Washington leverage dictating terms and conditions. USAID’s Commercial (Commodity) Import (CIP) Program is one such example. CIP was a complex aid program, but did a remarkable job balancing varying fiscal and economic pressures. From 1954 to 1975 under CIP the U.S. provided over $4 billion worth of goods and materials to Vietnamese importers, an amount that made up 70% of non-military aid. A U.S. Congressional investigation summarized CIP’s multiple stages: “AID issues procurement authorizations permitting the purchase of certain approved commodities and sets up dollar credits against these authorizations in U.S. banks. In Vietnam, importers registered with the GVN invite bids... The United States makes payment to the suppliers in these countries through letters of credit... The importer obtains a letter of credit from his bank and an import license from the GVN. He then forwards his order to the supplier. The U.S. bank where AID has set up the dollar credits makes payment... The Vietnamese importer pays his bank the piaster (local currency) equivalent of the dollar cost... and then sells it on the local market. The Vietnamese bank pays the piasters received from the importers into a GVN-owned counterpart fund which theoretically is jointly controlled by the United States and the GVN.” U.S. MACV budget officials conducted reviews of GVN military budgets, and recommended programs to be funding from the CIP counterpart fund. Payments made from this fund are verified and additional spending is approved on a monthly basis by


MACV officials. “On occasion, withholding of monthly releases for military budget support has been used to achieve broad political objectives.”\(^{144}\) Therefore high levels of compliance with economic reforms may be the product of U.S. oversight over economic programs, conditions for aid and a shared U.S.-GVN interest in Vietnam’s economic stability.

*Military Reform.* Oversight of the GVN’s military budget may have contributed to the higher than average compliance with U.S. demands for military reforms such as force increases and reorganization schemes. But despite the supervision, not every demand the U.S. asked of the military was amended to suit American interests. U.S. officials became increasingly frustrated with Saigon’s execution of communist prisoners of war and asked the military to consult American officials before shooting prisoners. American military officials feared Hanoi would retaliate against U.S. P.O.Ws and wanted the GVN to stop. Regardless of U.S. requests, GVN military courts nevertheless intermittently ordered executions.\(^{145}\)

*Development.* Requests pertaining to development had lower than average rates of compliance when compared to other demands. This may at first be surprising considering Saigon’s interest in development activities and the vast American funds available for projects. But there are several reasons why there isn’t a high likelihood of compliance with these requests. Large development projects require coordination, institutional know-how and time. As a result, partial compliance is almost twice as likely as non-compliance or full compliance, as projects are initiated, but get bogged down in

\(^{145}\) “A military court in Danang, South Vietnam, sentences a member of the Viet Cong to die before a firing squad for the murder of civilians in Hue during the Tet offensive.” Cable. Department of State. Secret. April 19, 1968.
the process. More than half of development requests were impacted by Saigon’s faltering capacity, 10% more than other requests. Additionally, almost 60% of development requests in the database were coded as being complicated by combat. Development is hard, but it is even more difficult in war. As an example, in 1966 U.S. asked the GVN to work with USAID providing schools for refugees. The task proved gradually more difficult as military activities throughout Vietnam produced more refugees. Greater demand raised the level required to sufficiently provide for this request. Therefore development projects are prone to non-compliance due to limited state capacity and difficulties operating in a warzone.

*Political Reform.* The majority of demands from the U.S. were for political reform. This is not surprising. As a foreign power the U.S. would be unable to undertake internal reforms for the GVN, and therefore is required to ask. Furthermore, unlike the military budgeting process, the U.S. did not have much oversight over the GVN civilian government. “The control exercised by the United States over expenditure of the 3 billion piasters attributed to the civil sector of the GVN budget is, however, virtually nonexistent.”

There are several reasons why the U.S. did not have supervision over the GVN civilian budget. First, the U.S. State Department did not want to undermine the autonomy of the South Vietnamese administration. An important component of U.S. efforts in Vietnam were the reinforcement of an effective independent non-communist state administration. American policymakers feared that if the majority of internal

---


decisions in Vietnam were made in Washington, the GVN would grow overly reliant and the U.S. would be unable to withdraw in the future. Secondly, the GVN was defended its independent decision making process. Recovering from a long colonial legacy they were reluctant to sacrifice any undue influence to the U.S. Overall political reforms comprised 41% of all requests, and although there was more compliance than non compliance among requests, there was less when compared to other issue types. This should not be surprising considering many of these requests, including adding legal provisions for run-off elections or dismissing specific officials U.S. military officials deemed corrupt run against strong interests held by regime officials.

These findings are helpful for understanding trends in compliance among various issues. However, according to the statistical models (Table 6), the results were not as significant as most other variables in the study. There are several reasons why this is the case, and why predicting compliance outcomes cannot be based on issue type alone. First, there are relatively few cases of requests for military strategy (5/105), military reform (9/105) and political-military counterinsurgency strategy (9/105) in the data. Second, there was no significant relationship between issue type and compliance when partial compliance and full compliance were incorporated into a single category. Issue type may help distinguish between compliance and partial compliance, but is not as useful helping to explain GVN compliance and non-compliance. Ultimately, the best approach is not to use issue type as a predictor of compliance or non-compliance, but to consider the findings within each type. Understanding, for example, that development requests are particularly prone to failing due to insufficient bureaucratic capacity and complications from combat may help explain the outcomes of those types of requests. This is useful even if it is inappropriate to aggregate those findings across all requests.
and issue types. Additionally, the U.S. budget oversight over economic and military areas of South Vietnam that was absent over GVN political affairs, illustrates that mechanisms for leverage can be built into aid packages and can make a difference in compliance. However, such mechanisms were a trade off for the U.S. They were useful in compelling reform, at least in the margins, but may have fostered dependencies that harmed GVN state building. Ultimately the fact that issue type may not be able to predict much about compliance on its own is itself an interesting finding. That the general subject of the request is secondary to other factors in determining compliance may help identify factors that make a sizable difference.

*Interests—Costs and Benefits*

Potential costs and benefits for each demand were coded by creating two dummy variables to help organize basic information about the demands. The first variable tracks whether or not the goal of the demand could potentially bring short-term benefits to the GVN. The second tracks whether or not the request could potentially impose short-term costs. These were coded separately, as they are not mutually exclusive. Some demands pose neither potential costs nor benefits, since the U.S. fully funded most requested projects, while some are one or the other and some are both. The 1966 U.S. request that the GVN collect larger amounts of revenue from domestic sources is one example of both potential benefits and political threats. In 1965 the U.S. estimated that domestic taxes only accounted for seven percent of South Vietnamese GNP. U.S. officials felt this was untenable and demanded higher tax revenue in order to minimize aid dependency. On

---

148 For more see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix. In short demands were coded for whether they promoted the creation a good that could be used by the domestic regime to consolidate its hold on power, profits or profit potential or if it promoted a public good that would not directly benefit the domestic regime in the short-term.

one hand, Saigon could potentially benefit from increased revenue and diverse sources of funding that would continue to exist after the American withdrawal. On the other hand, an increase in tax revenue could potentially diminish public support, as higher taxes are unpopular, and there might be less aid from the U.S., as Washington calculated how much Vietnam would be given by filling in whatever the GVN could not raise domestically. As Robert Keohane noted, needing assistance “does not entail only liabilities;” it can create assets.\textsuperscript{150}

The potential for short-term benefits for Saigon was one of the highest predictors of compliance.\textsuperscript{151} If the goal of the demand could potentially be made to serve the private interests of head policymakers in the GVN, it had a much higher likelihood of being adopted than if it could not.

One example of how potential short-term benefits can impact compliance decision is 1964 request that the GVN increase expand military forces “by at least 50,000.”\textsuperscript{152} Because the United States was largely funding the military expansion, GVN officials reacted positively. This increase would provide them greater forces and expanded reach into disputed parts of South Vietnam. Saigon agreed to implement the increase, but compliance did not come straight away. Due to enemy activity and high desertion rates in early 1965 U.S. officials determined that “not only was RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] strength considerably below the goals set and

\textsuperscript{150} Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies.”
\textsuperscript{151} See table 1 for models accounting for benefit. Simple regression on compliance controlling for capacity yields $P < 0.025$ for potential for private benefit. 0.5392, (2406).
agreed upon, it was in considerable danger of actually decreasing.”

General Westmoreland reported in June 1965 that the ARVN’s failure to expand and their lackluster performance left “no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional U.S. or Third Country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead.” This sequence of events worked for Saigon, because the U.S. military would combat the NLF, while Washington paid for a larger Army for South Vietnam. After U.S. troops arrived, the RVNAF got larger. “RVNAF strength had increased by 152% from 1960 to 1966, going up by over 100,000 in the 18 months preceding the beginning of 1967.” This is an interesting example of how the GVN tended to comply with U.S. demands in ways that served their interests. Requests that had the potential to be adopted in ways that serve short-term GVN interests were more likely to be implemented.

In accounting for interest, potential threats can be just as important as potential benefits. Interestingly, however, this was not the case in Vietnam as potential threats to the GVN were not as significant in determining compliance with U.S. demands as potential benefits. There are several interesting reasons why this was the case. In order to determine if prospective threats impact rates of compliance a variable was created to code requests according to whether or not they could develop into a threat to ruling elites in Saigon. Although the coefficient on this variable (Table 6) is consistently negative, indicating a correlation between potential threats and non-compliance, this factor is less statistically significant when compared to potential benefits. This lack of significance

---

156 For more information see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix. In brief this is a dummy variable coding if the objective sought by the demand has the potential to harm private goods, gains or the power base of the domestic regime.
may be surprising, as avoiding potential threats could be assumed as a major component of interest, but there are structural aspects of the U.S. alliance with Saigon that may have caused threats to factor less prominently in compliance decisions. Foremost of these structural factors is the impact of U.S. commitment to the alliance.

As discussed in the introductory chapters regarding the foundation for the study, alliance dynamics are broadly based on aspects of alliance commitment, dependence and interest. The form of alliance between a foreign power and domestic ally fighting a counterinsurgency war fosters a unique form of commitment, especially in cases analyzed in this study where the foreign actor has demonstrated a strong commitment by enduring over 1,000 combat deaths in the conflict. A high level of commitment from an ally may cause domestic threats to be less of an issue than would otherwise be the case. In this study, this means potential threats may not be very important in GVN compliance determinations.

The impact of potential threats is also contingent on the political situation. If the foreign power has few options for viable domestic allies, the regime in power may feel secure in focusing on benefits instead of threats. Since many requests are potential opportunities for both costs and benefits depending on the turn of events, the regime in question may prefer to act on benefits, especially if threats seem less acute without domestic challengers and a strong foreign commitment to their survival. According to the Pentagon Papers, “by May 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem had demonstrated to his satisfaction that the U.S. was sufficiently committed to South Vietnam that he could afford on occasion to resist American pressure, and even to ignore American advice. Diem knew, as surely as did the United States, that he himself represented the only alternative to a
communist South Vietnam.”

With American consent Diem was overthrown in 1963, but to its dismay Washington found itself in similar positions with subsequent leaders. As the National Security Council reported to President Johnson in 1965 regarding the reigning Vietnamese official, “Our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is that we see no one else in sight.” Without alternatives, U.S. interests in a stable, non-communist South Vietnam became inextricably tied to the successes of the generals in charge, in effect providing them with plenty of bargaining leverage in negotiations with Washington. U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker was reportedly convinced that to achieve [U.S. goals] he had to develop and maintain a close working relationship with Thieu. He saw no alternative leader whom the United States could trust to help it attain its objectives in Vietnam. Given this attitude, it is not surprising that he tried to avoid making Thieu look bad to the extent he could. Bunker’s warm and supportive relations with Thieu came under considerable strain after Lam Son 719, however. The problem was the conduct of the 1971 Vietnamese presidential election in which Thieu sought a second term. Its outcome—not the fact that Thieu won, but how he won—represented a serious setback to Bunker’s efforts to promote stronger political institutions in South Vietnam.

Thieu rigged the election, an event Bunker considered a major setback to his efforts developing political institutions in Vietnam. A less optimistic take on the trend of potential benefits having a greater impact on compliance than domestic threats may be that a regime such as Saigon’s has proactively undertaken sufficient actions to secure its position so it is not actually threatened by U.S. requests. Loyal institutions such as

---


patronage networks may have been so secure that Saigon felt it could risk sticking its neck out and adopting certain policies like forming groups with rival domestic political parties as such risks also posed potential political benefits. As Hilton Root wrote regarding the military establishment, “under Thieu the officer corps was packed with loyal generals, whose numbers increased from forty to seventy-three. The enlargement was intended to prevent the coordination of a coup by a few senior officers. Thieu often promoted officers to duties far beyond their abilities, and the new appointees gained shares of the state’s economic resources through sanctioned venues for corruption.”

Stacking institutions like the military with loyalists minimizes the threat of a coup, and therefore provides some breathing room for actions that may entail risk-taking behavior.

Overall high foreign commitment and few domestic challengers may mean a regime such as Saigon can focus on benefiting ahead of worrying about short-term political threats. This is good news for foreign powers fighting counterinsurgency wars because allies may be more willing to take short-term risks and endure costs if there is high commitment from allies and strong potential short-term benefits. Nevertheless there are important examples of Saigon avoiding requests made by the U.S. due to the inherent threat posed by the American proposal to the Saigon regime. The U.S. assertion that Saigon offer a comprehensive amnesty program to the NLF is one example. In 1964 the U.S. started insisting on a program of “national reconciliation” offering southern Vietnamese communists a role in the GVN in order to provide a legitimate route for political expression. However as the Pentagon Papers surmised:

Those Americans who hoped that National Reconciliation would become a major new appeal to VC at middle and higher levels were to be in for a disappointment in the year following Manila. The GVN did not agree with the philosophy behind total forgiveness to the enemy, and continually

hedged its statements and invitations to the VC so that they resembled surrender with amnesty rather than “national reconciliation.” In fact, the GVN did not make an internal announcement on the National Reconciliation program until Tet, 1967, almost four months after the Manila conference, and three months after the GVN had "promised" the U.S. that it would make the announcement. Then, when the Vietnamese finally did make the announcement, they used the phrase “Doan Ket,” which is accurately translated as “National Solidarity,” rather than ‘National Reconciliation.’

Ultimately, the GVN never enacted a meaningful reconciliation or amnesty plan, instead the efforts merely repeated surrender programs such as those run under the “Chieu Hoi” campaign which sought to turn NLF members to the non-communist side, which fell far short of offering a comprehensive inclusion plan to the NLF as a political identity such as the plan imagined by U.S. authorities.

Although requests that posed potential threats to Saigon are correlated with non-compliance, statistical analysis of the data collected indicates that this correlation is not particularly strong (Table 6). Therefore, it is better to embed this variable within the context of other factors, such as capacity and potential benefits, part of the larger story determining compliance.

**Conditions of War, Internal Politics and External Threats**

As the American military and diplomatic corps in Vietnam were acutely aware, coercion and inter-alliance bargaining with the GVN took place amidst a sizable insurgency, adding a layer of complexity to accomplishing tasks in Vietnam. In order to provide a reflective model of compliance and coercion in U.S.-GVN relations it is

---


128
important to account for significant aspects of the war that impacted alliance relations. In particular I will examine shifts in demands and changes in the war and external threats that influenced behaviors.

**War Impacting the Compliance Environment**

Because the environment of the war impacted U.S.-GVN relations, it is important to analyze how hostilities may have affected compliance. Statistical analysis showed that complications from war, including violence, combat, and refugees, actually increases the probability of compliance. However, I will argue the relationship is not as simple as it may appear and should be analyzed cautiously.

This variable tracks when complications from the war impacted circumstances surrounding compliance.footnote[163] One example that may illustrate the potential impact of military operations is Washington’s seemingly banal request in 1964 that the GVN “carry out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon.”footnote[164] This unexpectedly turned out to be one of the most interesting demands in the study, which illustrates how specific externalities from fighting a war impact alliance dynamics and compliance.

Washington was receiving regular reports from U.S. advisors describing mounds of uncollected garbage and unsanitary living conditions in Saigon. The GVN municipality did not have the infrastructure to handle demand, and the U.S. was set on expanding

---

footnote[163]{For more see Chapter 3 - Methodology}

footnote[164]{“Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” Saigon, November 9, 1964, 7 p.m. Department of State, Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S. Department of State. 1964-1968, Volume I, Vietnam 1964, Document 408. See also “Instructions From the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor),” Washington, December 3, 1964. Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President. Top Secret. The instructions were approved by the President on December 3 (see Document 434) and formally transmitted to Rusk, McNamara, and McCone as Tab 2 to Document 440. Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S. Department of State. 1964-1968, Volume I, Vietnam 1964, Document 435.}
sanitation capacity by providing increasing amounts of non-military aid providing trucks specifically converted for garbage collection.\textsuperscript{165}

Nevertheless Saigon’s trash removal system vanished with the influx of American troops. Even though American bases took care of their waste, the American arrival had unforeseen effects on the rest of the city. According to Neil Sheehan in 1965, “sanitation services collapsed in Vietnam, because the workers quit en masse and rushed away to labor at the base construction sites for much higher salaries than the municipality could pay.”\textsuperscript{166} The problem became worse as military operations intensified, causing the cities to flood with people escaping the war. Before the U.S. buildup in South Vietnam, 80-85% of the population was located in rural communities throughout the country, primarily focused on farming.\textsuperscript{167} But activities by the NLF, GVN and the U.S. pushed hundreds of thousands into urban centers. Between 1960 and 1970 Saigon reported a 45% increase in population.\textsuperscript{168} American officials reported on the migration into the cities.

Vietnam has become an urban society... Except for some efforts by AID in the area of public works (water, electricity and road building) and the Vietnamese government’s concentration on security measures, the cities of Vietnam have been residual claimants on the time, energy and resources of pacification officials. While such questions as poverty, pollution, sanitation, housing, traffic congestion, noise, and crime are not, strictly speaking, insurgency related, they do bear heavily on the government’s ability to enlist the positive support of the people in its capital.\textsuperscript{169}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} “Operational Report- Lessons Learned for period 1 November 1966 – 31 January 1967,” RCS CSFOR – 65 (U) Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam. 81.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Non-military aid from the United States topping $230.6 million per year by 1964. Carter, \textit{Inventing Vietnam}, 147.
\item \textsuperscript{167} By 1966 it had exceeded an annual sum of $793.9 million. Carter, \textit{Inventing Vietnam}, 176.
\end{itemize}
Sanitation conditions in Saigon were so dire that the bubonic plague resurfled, to “alarming proportions” in 1967, decades after the French made notable headway reducing its incidence throughout the region.170

Ultimately the GVN made an effort to expand sanitation projects in Saigon, but always seemed one step behind expanding urban demand. The GVN’s primary focus had to be security; everything else was secondary. American frustration with the garbage caused American military units to sporadically get involved, or military officials would hire U.S. contractors to organize Korean or Vietnamese workers to do the job. Nevertheless USAID and Department of State officials felt it was important that the GVN municipality provide services and so refocused projects around their participation.171

This example of sanitation in Saigon illustrates how complicated achieving “compliance” can be.172 Furthermore, it shows how this variable on war changing the compliance environment requires careful handling. Unintentional consequences of combat can suddenly increase what is expected of the domestic regime, making compliance more difficult to achieve. Under these conditions I would anticipate a negative impact on compliance. This assumption is supported by noting that the variable becomes statistically significant when partial compliance and compliance are counted.

172 Note this demand was coded as partial compliance, because effort was made by the GVN, workers hired back, trucks put on the street, however externalities of war created expanding demand and there were issues in capacity.
collectively as “compliance.” If the wartime environment creates obstacles for compliance, the war itself may be preventing full compliance and promoting partial compliance. Friction from military operations makes compliance more difficult.

Nevertheless, the coefficient in the statistical model is positive. The impact of war on the compliance environment is correlated with increased levels of compliance. This is an important observation discussed in depth in the next section, as there are conditions in which the war can actually provide strong motivations for cooperation with the demands of the foreign ally. Therefore, the general variable controlling for the complications of war should be handled cautiously, understood as an interesting warning of problematic situational factors involved in wartime, but it would be inappropriate to make further assumptions based on the statistical results due to variation within the cases.

*External Threats—The Tet Offensive*

Of the various potential impacts war can have on compliance measured in the previous variable, one was particularly effective in motivating cooperation from Saigon. As illustrated earlier in Figure 8 regarding compliance over time, the GVN became more prone to adopt U.S. demands in the years directly following the Tet Offensive. The proximity of the enemy seems to have driven allies closer. Although some instances of compliance can be attributed to progression, (complex requests take a few years to implement), however qualitative analysis shows that much of this upward trend in compliance is due to the shock of Tet in 1968.

For example, consider the shift of high-level GVN opinions on draft procedures for South Vietnam. Starting in 1964, the U.S. began to press the GVN to implement a comprehensive program of national mobilization, including a national service law that
would enforce a lower draft age. The Pentagon Papers describe how events related to this demand unfolded in 1964:

General Khanh signed a mobilization decree on April 4; at the time the decree satisfied the USG as meeting McNamara’s recommendation on the subject. However, Khanh delayed signing implementing decrees for the mobilization decree indefinitely; and it has never become clear what it would have meant, if implemented. In May, Khanh purportedly broadened the draft to include older and younger men, and announced formation of a new "Civil Defense Corps" but neither came to anything.173

With the national draft age effectively set at 20 the U.S. continued asking the GVN to adopt programs lowering the draft age to 18 or 17 in order to add to ARVN strength.174 Meanwhile, according to U.S. estimates, the National Liberation Front (NLF) South Vietnamese insurgents drafted all males from contested areas between 15 and 45.175 Saigon was concerned that lowering the draft age would impact public opinion and motivate an American drawdown. Their official reasons for avoiding enforcement focused on social stability. “Prior to Tet, the GVN had cited social and religious mores to resist American demands to lower the draft age from 21 to 18.”176

173 Gravel, The pentagon papers, Volume 2. 351.
174 “Transmittal Memorandum, Leonard Unger, Dep. Asst. Secy of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Chairman, Vietnam Coordinating Committee, to Chet [Chester Cooper],” U.S. Department of State. Secret, March 20, 1965. Declassified March 17, 1980. Sanitized. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Vietnam, Vol. 31. “In order to make maximum use of available manpower resources and deny rural youth to VC recruiters, reduce the draft age from present 20 years to 18 of 17.” The U.S. was still pressing for similar reforms in late 1967, “Improvement of the armed forces. This would include fairer and more effective dependent, survivor and disabled veterans' benefits, lower draft age improved merit promotion system, and more effective punitive measures for soldiers who mistreat the civilian populace.” Quoted from “Post-election priorities in South Vietnam detailed,” Cable. U.S. Department of State. Secret September 2, 1967. Declassified December 15, 1994. Unsanitized. Complete. 4 page(s). See also Pentagon Papers Volume 2. “By the end of December 1967, MACV was recommending a further increase of 366 advisors for the FY 1969 program, primarily for district level intelligence slots. Meanwhile, on September 28, the JCS had forwarded with their endorsement the MACV-CINCPAC recommendation on RVNAF force increases, of which the RF/PF component was the largest. Requested was an increase in FY 68 RVNAF authorized strength from 622,153 to 685,739, a net of 63,586. Of this number, 47,839 were RF/PF spaces, and only 15,747 were for the regular forces (of which ARVN’s share was 14,966). To achieve these higher levels, MACV proposed the reduction of the draft age from 20 to 18 and the extension of tours of duty for active RVNAF personnel.” Gravel, The pentagon papers, Volume 2. 573.
However, the immediacy of the threat brought home by the Tet Offensive seems to have provided sufficient motivation for Saigon to decide to go with the American recommendation and emphasize mobilization. According to General William Westmoreland,

In March [1968] 19-year olds became eligible for the draft, followed on 1 May by 18-year-olds. The false starts at mobilizing manpower in previous years were partly due to the weak and unstable nature of the central government. But in this critical time, the Tet offensive had further crystallized support for an already strengthened and stabilized government. This solidifying effect was, in my estimation, the single development which enabled the mobilization program to be successful.177

President Thieu was able to secure permanent parliamentary authorization on a general mobilization law in June 1968, which “authorized the Government to conscript all men between 18 and 38 into the regular forces, and those over 16 and between 39 and 50 into the Self-Defense Corps.”178 The conscription policies advocated by the U.S. since 1964 were effectively implemented as U.S. sources reported:

Under the mobilization decrees and later laws, the strength of the Vietnamese Armed Forces rapidly increased. In the first six months of 1968 total strength rose by 122,000 men. The upsurge in volunteers was mainly attributable to the mobilization; effective enforcement of the draft and in the wake of the Tet offensive, a noticeably greater allegiance to the central government on the part of the people was a whole. This kind of growth of the South Vietnamese Army had been our goal for years.179

In this case, Tet motivated compliance because it not only inspired high-level GVN officials to issue orders, but furthermore motivated the bureaucracy to work towards implementation. As Robert Komer noted in his influential 1972 RAND study,

Most experienced observers on the scene have noted a marked improvement in overall GVN administrative performance beginning with

Tet 1968. In part this is attributable to increased U.S. advisory influence and, occasionally pressure. In part it is simply that the earlier efforts, of 1965-1967, began to bear more fruit over time. But even greater influences on GVN behavior were the twin shocks of Hanoi’s Tet and post-Tet offensives and the resultant clear beginning of U.S. de-escalation. Thus in a way Tet 1968 marks a watershed for the GVN as well as for the U.S. effort in Vietnam, GVN realization that a far greater effort in its part would be required to survive finally led to actual national manpower mobilization, extensive training programs for local officials, a major acceleration of pacification efforts, several economic reforms and the like.\textsuperscript{180}

However, as influential as the external shock of the Tet offensive was on GVN compliance, not everything the American advisors asked for was adopted in 1968. In particular, specific bureaucratic reorganization measures the U.S. advocated for on the local and mid-level of the GVN went unfulfilled. In August 1967 U.S. Ambassador Bunker outlined two critical administrative reforms, 1) giving the province chief operational control in his province over military forces engaged in pacification in the province, resources for development programs, and control of technical cadre, including agricultural, engineering, education, public health and public works officials and 2) centralizing rural development planning and coordination efforts in non-Revolutionary Development hamlets.\textsuperscript{181}


\textsuperscript{181} Regarding rural development the document notes a two-tiered system that centralizes policy planning and decentralizes resources. “Centralized administrative authority at the Saigon level is necessary to accomplish these objectives in the countryside,” while under this primary policy control the GVN should work towards “decentralizing decision making and resources to that district and provincial chiefs can be quickly responsive to the desires of the people in the hamlets and villages.” “Blueprint for Vietnam,” National Archives Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–S Files: Lot 70 D 48, Misc. VN Rpts. & Briefing Books. Chapter IV – National Development. 10-11. Referenced in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume V, Vietnam 1967. Document 296. Referenced in Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Volume 2. “Chapter VI. Seven-Nation Conference, Legitimate Government, and High Hopes for the Future, October 1966- September.” 1967. P. Blueprint for Vietnam, August, 1967. In September 1967 Ambassador Bunker clarifies the restructuring priority for rural development and focuses U.S. pressure on centralization: “I believe we should use our influence immediately after the election to have [Thieu and Ky] do the following.... 4. Centralizing all rural development efforts in non-Revolutionary Development hamlets (education, agriculture, public works, public health, etc.) under one coordinated control in the same manner in which they are now centralized under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in Revolutionary Development hamlets; funding resources at the provincial level for non-Revolutionary Development hamlets in the same manner in which they are presently funded for Revolutionary Development hamlets, so that coordinated programs can be established in each village with flexibility and with resources quickly available.” “Ambassador Bunker
Regarding the first reform, province chiefs had difficulty coordinating pacification efforts including managing military forces and development cadre in part because they lacked the authority to issue orders across these organizations. Although most chiefs were ex-military commanders themselves, ARVN officers operating the region were reticent to surrender any authority to individuals outside the military chain of command. Similarly, the various development bureaucracies in Saigon refused to make their personnel accountable to outside organizations including local province authorities. The Tet Offensive did little to alter these calculations. As a comprehensive 1969 U.S. Department of Defense report on South Vietnam’s military and political organization summarized:

Province chiefs have had considerable difficulty at times in getting cooperation and action out of a regular forces supporting them. (sic) Thus obtaining the necessary forces to deal with local force battalion has been difficult. Relationships between RD cadre, village councils and central government agencies. Technical service officials are often apt to look to their ministries for direction and ignore the province chief.\textsuperscript{182}

The same report tracked marked failure in Bunker’s second reform, centralizing rural development efforts in the areas requiring better coordination,

province and district officials have had problems controlling ARVN and directing the PRU, Special Police Branch and National Police Field Forces. All of these attitudinal factors and other difficulties from Saigon to village and hamlet level combine to make it difficult to fully integrate and combine political/military operations which are required by the US/GVN methodology to provide adequate security.... In the past, there has been a constant balancing off of political and military forces by the various incumbent political powers in attempts to ensure the continuance in power. Previous American attempts to convince the GVN to centralize control over various internal security forces in accordance with our organizational principles often have gone astray because they ran counter to the realities of SVN political life.\textsuperscript{183}


“Several problems soon developed” when efforts were made to introduce new organizational structures.

There either was no follow-on government presence to continue the RD work, or there was an existing administrative structure in the hamlet village which resented RD Cadre interference and, further, which was often ignored by the cadre thus exacerbating the differences between the cadre and the existing structure.¹⁸⁴

Therefore a lack of interest as well as inadequate capacity on behalf of Saigon’s ruling policymakers to impose changes on entrenched GVN bureaucratic organizations at the provincial and district levels left these interests in power to maintain the status quo. Compliance in these areas was not impacted by the January 1968 Tet Offensive in the same way it had in other areas. This may be due to the strength of entrenched bureaucratic interests, as well the potential distance of these entities from the 1968 offensive. Tet was an effective psychological campaign because it shocked Vietnam’s urban areas and American public opinion of the war. It was the first battle of the U.S. war in Vietnam fought in urban settings and proved the enemy could coordinate a sizable offensive in South Vietnam. GVN officials operating in more rural areas, some of whom were already accustomed to bloodshed from communist assaults, were either not attacked during Tet, or not nearly as shocked by the violence as Saigon. Therefore the external threat exposed during the Tet Offensive was instrumental in motivating GVN compliance with U.S. demands, but it was not a cure-all for Saigon’s bureaucratic failings.

The End of the War and U.S. Withdrawal

Testing the impact of changes in America’s commitment to its alliance with Vietnam by noting GVN compliance throughout the American intervention (high U.S.

commitment), juxtaposed against behavior when the U.S. is preparing to withdraw (lower U.S. commitment) would be useful for noting the impact of commitment on compliance. However following the Nixon election in November 1968, the U.S. began to make significantly fewer demands on the GVN, making it difficult to draw comparisons across the war. After 1968 Washington lowered its demands on the GVN for several reasons; U.S. officials had been pushing for certain reforms for years. Towards the end of the conflict those demands are revisited, but there is nevertheless a trend among American policymakers to ask the GVN for less. U.S. officials were focused in this period on signing a peace agreement with North Vietnam. As American attention fixated on this task, issues related to the internal workings of the GVN were secondary.

According to the available data, there are only 16 new requests from the U.S. to South Vietnam between January 1969 and January 1973. Note that there were 18 new requests from Washington in 1965 alone. As mentioned earlier, there are revitalized U.S. campaigns to get the GVN to revisit old demands such as reforms to improve ARVN leadership, but those drop off as the U.S. settles into accepting that certain requests will simply not be carried out.¹⁸⁵ Because there is limited data (n=16), the study is limited in the inferences that can be made about this time period. Regardless it is interesting that there is a notably higher rate of full compliance (75%) among the 16 new requests made after 1969 when compared to the rate of full compliance made on average throughout the war (43.8%). Rates of partial compliance are lower (18.75%), compared to the 23.8% observed across the war, including the period in question (1969-1973) and the rate of non-compliance (6%) is much lower than the 32.4% average.

This higher rate of compliance at the end of the war is largely due to two factors. First, the kinds of requests being asked and second, the U.S. withdrawal, and threats made to exclude the GVN from agreements. At this late stage in the war, U.S. officials are only requesting new reforms they either believe are likely to be complied with by the GVN, or are critical for the process of finding an acceptable settlement agreement with communist forces. The U.S. has leverage over the GVN regarding compromises made in negotiations because the U.S. has the ability to sign agreements without GVN concurrence. As the primary military power opposing the NLF, the U.S. can agree to compromises at the negotiating table with or without Saigon. As discussed in the earlier section on unilateral action, independent action can be a critical factor in coercing an ally if there is divergence between allied interests.

This was evident at various times throughout 1969 and 1973 as the U.S. pressured the GVN to comply or lose even more by being shut out entirely. President Thieu had learned this the hard way. In July 1969 Henry Kissinger began holding secret meetings without Thieu.\(^\text{186}\) According to historian Larry Berman, these talks “would establish a pattern of exclusion for the next four years – Kissinger negotiating an American troop disengagement with the North Vietnamese while informing Thieu only after the fact.”\(^\text{187}\) The U.S. was under intense domestic pressure to bring an end American involvement in Vietnam. Kissinger was further motivated by the upcoming election, and in 1972 reluctantly concluded that the American-GVN delegation was going to have to make substantial concessions to the communists in order to get the U.S. out of the war. The GVN had little interest in U.S. withdrawal or in conceding to the North’s demands. Such allowances would only leave them more vulnerable when the Americans left. The GVN


did not like the way negotiations were going. In 1969 they held up talks for two months in 1969 with the “famously stupid” debate over the shape of the negotiating table previously discussed in the section on unilateral action. But such stalling techniques were in their best interest as they prolonged the American military commitment and held off concessions. Nevertheless it is important to note that both the GVN and the U.S. were frustrated by these difficulties. According to John Prados, Thieu did not appreciate being forced to compromise. “He did not want to be pushed from one position to another, ‘as was the case with the ‘shape-of-the-table’ issue.”

Due to these inter-alliance difficulties, Kissinger felt it would be best to hold secret negotiations without Saigon, and the U.S. was able to drop a key GVN demand for mutual U.S. and NVN withdrawal. President Thieu was informed of this concession later. Thieu could choose between accepting the compromise or walking out and risking future American aid. He reluctantly complied with Kissinger’s demand because Saigon did not have a better alternative. This happened repeatedly during this period of the war, as 7/16 (44%) of requests fully complied with after 1969 cite the impending U.S. withdrawal, and subsequent U.S. activities to push forward on a peace compromise as motivating compliance.

Instances of non-compliance during this period arise under one of two conditions. First, issues arise when the U.S. cannot substantively undertake the requested action unilaterally without Thieu. For example, the U.S. was also pressuring

---

191 Compliance indicated by full compliance, not partial compliance. Calculated by "count if Compliance_Num == 2 & DateCompliance >= 1969 & ExternalThreat_Num == 2" Yielding 7 requests. "count if Compliance_Num == 2 & DateCompliance >= 1969" yielding 16 requests.
Thieu to allow Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to run in the 1971 presidential elections.

Thieu refused and the U.S. was helpless to change the decision.¹⁹²

Second, when the GVN was opposed to the request and there is division within the American administration, which gives Saigon an opportunity to get out of compliance without sacrificing U.S. support. In October 1972, on the eve of the U.S. election, Kissinger attempted to force President Thieu into signing an agreement worked out in Paris that would effectively end the war right before the U.S. election. Historian George Herring notes, “

In his haste to get an agreement Kissinger badly miscalculated Thieu’s willingness to do what the United States told him and Nixon’s willingness to support Thieu. Kissinger spent five days in Saigon, going over the treaty item by item, explaining its advantages for South Vietnam and issuing only slightly veiled warnings that a refusal to go along could mean an end to American support. Thieu was not appeased. He was furious he had not been consulted in advance of the negotiations and that he had first learned of the terms through captured NLF documents.

Thieu demanded mutual withdrawal and the establishment of a DMZ, and rejected NLF sovereignty.

Outraged at this unexpected threat to his handiwork, Kissinger denounced Thieu’s demands as ‘preposterous,’ and urged Nixon to go ahead without Saigon’s approval... Nixon on the other hand was at best ambivalent. Increasingly suspicious of Kissinger’s ambitions, he suspected that his aide was rushing a peace agreement to be able to claim credit for the President’s reelection, and he feared that a peace settlement on the eve of the election might be dismissed as a political ploy... He seems to have shared some of Thieu’s reservations about the October draft, and although he had approved it on the condition of Thieu’s acquiescence, he seems to have sensed Saigon’s rejection as an opportunity to achieve what he had sought from the start... Nixon’s support of Thieu ensured the breakdown of the October agreement.¹⁹³


Therefore, although there are relatively few observations to draw from, I am nevertheless able to make several observations regarding the impact of a lower commitment on inter-alliance bargaining. The U.S. gained coercive leverage with a diminished commitment to the alliance from 1969-1973 by being able to credibly threaten to exclude its ally. Lower commitment, forced by U.S. public demand for withdrawal, allowed Washington to threaten to undertake activities that would harm Saigon, including, for example, Kissinger’s decision to drop the demand for mutual withdrawal. This effectively removed U.S. forces, but left Hanoi’s military in South Vietnam, a military situation that diminished Saigon’s chances of survival. If U.S. commitment had remained high in 1973, the GVN would not have believed that Washington would agree to such concessions because it would hurt the non-communist effort and in effect, the American mission. Lower commitment gave the U.S. the credibility to threaten actions that would hurt Saigon, in effect compelling the GVN to comply with American demands.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, four categories of variables (listed below) were tested in order to offer insight into Saigon’s compliance with U.S. demands in the Vietnam War from 1964-1973.

1. Capacity—Low government capacity is unsurprisingly correlated with non-compliance. When Saigon’s institutions were unable to implement the reforms requested, the GVN was unable to comply with American demands. However capacity was cited as an issue in less than 27% percent of all demands, indicating that other factors are critical in impacting GVN responses to U.S. demands.
2. Interest—Saigon was much more likely to comply with requests that could potentially provide it with short-term benefits; whereas the link between non-compliance and requests posing potential short-term threats was much more tenuous. This may in part be due to America’s high commitment to the regime, which weakened the potency of potential domestic threats. Interestingly, the general subject of request failed to have a significant impact on compliance, but patterns were observed as certain issues tended to have similar trajectories and outcomes.

3. Dependency—There was an interaction effect between America’s ability to independently undertake the request and whether or not interests between Washington and Saigon converged. If the U.S. could undertake the activity unilaterally and interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to incentives to free-ride. If interests diverged and the U.S. could act alone, Washington was able to coerce Saigon into complying by threatening to act independently and exclude the GVN from benefits.

4. War and External Threats—The consequences of military activities made it more difficult for Saigon to comply with U.S. demands; however the shock of an acute enemy threat exemplified by the 1968 Tet Offensive fostered high levels of compliance with U.S. demands.
Chapter 5:

IRAQ

“How can we get to self-sufficiency if we do not have control?”

- Dr. Saad Qindeel, Iraqi Transitional National Assembly

A good deal has been written about the U.S. war in Iraq. Most materials address one of three aspects of the conflict: the decision to go to war, the rise of the insurgency, or the various counterinsurgency approaches adopted by the U.S. military. Very little specifically examines the U.S.-Iraqi counterinsurgency alliance. This chapter aims to help fill this gap while testing the hypotheses proposed in this study.

Summary Findings

There are several notable findings from the U.S.-Iraqi alliance relevant to the question of coercion and compliance. First, the Government of Iraq (GOI) had very similar rates of compliance with U.S. demands when compared with other wars examined in this study. Interestingly, Iraq however, had the lowest rate of full compliance identified. 35/106 (33%) of requests were fully complied with, 32/106 (30%) partially complied, and 38/106 (36%) unfulfilled. A contributing factor to Iraq’s lower rate of full compliance was the GOI’s low level of cooperation with demands regarding economic reform. This resistance to foreign financial advice was partially due to deficient institutional capacity, but was also a symptom of divergent economic philosophies between Iraq and the U.S. Iraq’s proclivity for statist solutions clashed with the

---

195 For a chart comparing wars and allied rates of compliance please see Table 1. Note also that the 35/106 (Complied) + 32/106 (Partially Complied) + 38/106 (Not Complied With) = 105/106. One request, a proposal for a MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems) Reduction Program made on October 11, 2009 (See 09BAGHDAD2736) remains classified. Publicly sources do not make clear whether the Iraqi government adopted the program.
American promotion of free market reforms. In other conflicts, economic-related requests tended to have some of the highest rates of compliance when compared with other issues such as political reform or military strategy. This was true in Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan in particular. But in both of these conflicts allied economic ideologies matched more closely than was the case in Iraq.

Second, in Iraq Washington negotiated demands with two domestic political authorities; the Shi’a dominated Government of Iraq in Baghdad, and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil. This is unique among the wars examined. During the U.S. occupation the KRG was effectively independent of Baghdad, requiring a separate U.S. diplomatic envoy. Third, U.S. control of the Iraqi state from March 2003-June 2004 under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was similar to the Soviet takeover of the Afghan state (1980-1989), providing insight into the political and strategic consequences of this type of intense political intervention. This era in U.S-Iraqi politics stands in contrast to allied relations after the handover of sovereignty to Iraqis in June 2004. From this point until the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, America became progressively less influential in Iraq’s political decisions. Fourth, similar to other wars examined, compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence between allied interests interacting with America’s dependency on Iraq to implement reforms requested. If Washington could execute the actions requested of Iraq, and the goal of the request was in the interest of both allies, Baghdad was unlikely to comply due to incentives to free ride on American efforts.

---

196 U.S. requests for economic reform in Afghanistan were slightly lower than average when compared with rates of compliance across all subjects in Afghanistan, but was not nearly as low as the rate observed in Iraq.

197 Although only 5/106 requests were made to the KRG, two of which were also made to Baghdad. This means in the data only 3/106 demands were made to the KRG alone, while the vast majority (103/106) of requests analyzed were for Baghdad.

But before providing more detail about the data, it is worthwhile to discuss the war and the evolution of the GOI-U.S. alliance. Changes in the institutions established between Baghdad and Washington to contain the insurgency and govern the country affected what sorts of requests were made by Americans, how much autonomy Iraqis had in decision making and consequently, how much the U.S. had to rely on Baghdad to implement policy in Iraq.

The U.S., Coalition Provisional Authority and
the Government of Iraq

“The operating decisions were all being made by the [U.S.] military and the CPA.”

- Charles Costello
Deputy Chief, Local Governance Support Project
Iraq May 2003-2004

The U.S.-Iraqi partnership varied widely over the eight years of U.S. occupation. American involvement evolved from a complete takeover of Iraqi political institutions during the initial years of the war under the Coalition Provisional Authority to a more traditional inter-state counterinsurgency partnership, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of American forces in late 2011. In virtually all aspects of the conflict aside from initial military operations, the war did not go as the U.S. planned. This was certainly the case in terms of developing a post-Saddam political partnership. A task Washington did not expect to be expensive or complex turned out to be exceedingly complicated, time consuming and problematic.

---

The Coalition Provisional Authority

“Bremer exercised supreme executive, legislative and judicial powers.”

On January 20, 2003, roughly two months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) for Iraq. ORHA was intended to serve as a catchall organization addressing a wide variety of potential post-invasion developments. The Pentagon “assumed no more than a 2 or 3 month period” would be required to transfer sovereignty to friendly Iraqis. ORHA would handle this transition, and generally “deal with the post-Saddam conditions in Iraq.” This proved to be an overwhelming mission. During the run-up to the invasion, policymakers in Washington assumed Iraq would be more or less stable following the initial U.S. offensive. Iraq, U.S. policymakers assumed, was not only potentially rich from oil revenues, but also had relatively modern and well-developed bureaucracies. Pentagon and White House officials expected to be able to remove high-level Saddam loyalists without having to engage in “nation building.”

In retrospect these assumptions were misguided. A much more costly and complicated reality emerged after U.S. troops captured Baghdad. Years of sanctions, resource misallocation and mismanagement had gutted Iraq’s once reasonably well-functioning bureaucracies. The assumption that Iraq’s ministries could readily function without high-ranking officials also failed to appreciate the nature of government

203 Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 60; Cordesman, Davies, etc., Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 740–741; Rathmell, “Planning Post-conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?,” International Affairs, 81, 5, 1023–1024.
administration under Saddam Hussein. Baathist loyalists were promoted to positions of power while subordinates were kept ineffective. As Andrew Rathmell of the RAND Corporation articulated, “The nature of the bureaucratic authority structures in the Saddamite state meant that the removal of the ministers did not simply allow their subordinates to take over and carry on. Power and authority in the Saddamite system had been too centralized to allow competent subordinates to emerge... The real instruments of social control in Iraq had been Saddam’s extended family and patronage network, the internal security services and the institutions of the Ba’ath party.”204 The removal of those figures created chaos, looting and of course, the rise of an anti-American insurgency.

In early April 2003, immediately following the invasion, decision makers in Washington implemented a political plan opting out of a U.S. political takeover of Iraq. The Bush Administration was seeking an almost immediate transition to Iraqi control. On April 1, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote to the President, “The new regime is going to be a free Iraqi government, not a U.S. military government.”205 But this plan quickly became untenable. As military personnel reviewing America’s performance in Iraq summarized, “chaos on the ground threw the plan for a rapid political transfer to an interim Iraqi authority into confusion.”206 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

---

(ORHA) was scrapped for a more aggressive, U.S. political entity for Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.207

By May 12, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority, back by the U.S. military, reigned as the political authority in Iraq. Although U.S. policymakers were uncomfortable discussing the CPA in plain terms, during their 14-month reign Bremer and the Americans staffing the CPA were the government of Iraq. “As administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, [Bremer] was charged with governing Iraq... [He] could dispose of all Iraqi state assets and direct all Iraqi government officials. He possessed full executive, legislative, and judicial authority.”208

What kind of office the CPA was, and where it fit in the U.S. government was unclear. Ambassador Bremer was a Presidential envoy that communicated directly with the White House, while also part of the Department of Defense, supposedly operating under Secretary Rumsfeld. “The CPA’s relationship with Washington was also improvised and unclear, as was Bremer’s with his bosses. The CPA was, at one and the same time, an element of the Defense Department, a multi-national organization, and a foreign government.” 209

In Bremer’s opinion it was “not entirely clear that the CPA was a U.S. government entity.”210 The U.S. Office of Management and Budget wanted to monitor CPA spending, like any U.S. executive branch agency. The CPA however was operating on Iraqi public accounts. U.S. Army Legal Services Agency defended the CPA’s status as a legal entity

208 Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, xiii.
209 Ibid., xvii.
210 Ibid., 14.

149
outside the U.S. administration. “The CPA is not a Federal agency. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is a multi-national coalition that exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration.”\footnote{L. Elaine Halchin, “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities,” Text, \textit{UNT Digital Library}, September 21, 2006, 8, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10420/} Clayton McManaway a close aide to Bremer claimed the “CPA was the Iraqi government; it was not an American entity. [Even though] many American policymakers, including the Pentagon and Office of Management and Budget, didn’t see it that way.”\footnote{Dobbins et al., \textit{Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority}, 14.}

The Coalition Provisional Authority was tasked with improving Iraqi government institutions. Following the invasion, some Iraqi bureaucracies were severely handicapped, while others were gutted entirely. Seventeen of the 20 Iraqi ministries ORHA planned to run had been utterly destroyed in the extensive looting of Baghdad immediately following the U.S. invasion.\footnote{PBS Frontline, \textit{The Lost Year in Iraq}, Interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (Ret.).} Most senior Iraqi ministers had abandoned their posts, destroying files, records and data before fleeing.\footnote{Nir Rosen, “The Flight From Iraq,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 13, 2007, sec. Magazine, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/magazine/13refugees-t.html; L. Paul Bremer III and Malcolm McConnell, \textit{My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope}, First Edition, First Printing (Simon & Schuster, 2006), 45; Dobbins et al., \textit{Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority}, 111; (U.S.), \textit{Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience}, 115.} By some accounts by “mid-May no Iraqi ministry was working at more than 40 percent.”\footnote{Memo from Colonel Warner Anderson to ORHR Health Advisor, “Citizen Payment for Health Care,” May 17, 2003, Cited in Dobbins et al., \textit{Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority}. 111.} To physically reconstruct destroyed ministries, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), issued a contract to Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), to implement
“Ministry in a Box.” Costing $122,000 per unit, this program supplied materials for a hundred public officials in order to jump start bureaucracies.216

In the post-invasion chaos Bremer attempted to create and enforce law, building a new Iraqi government, with an American staff and acting under American authority. He was eager to create an Iraqi advisory body to weigh in on decisions and help legitimize CPA orders. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed on July 13, 2003 was given no official legislative or executive authority, but nevertheless became increasingly influential in governing decisions.217 Governing Council (IGC) representatives were appointed by the CPA, acting under the guidance of UN personnel and prominent Iraqi exiles.218 In order to coordinate Iraqi ministries the CPA created the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). The group was intended to play a role similar to the U.S. National Security Council. Bremer chaired the group from 2003-2004. Throughout this period Iraqi “ministers slowly assumed the role of decisionmakers and began to interact and communicate their needs within a legitimate governmental structure months before the transfer of authority actually took place in June 2004. In that month, the Iraqi prime minister took the reigns of the committee.”219

The CPA’s first order (intended to have the weight of Iraqi law) “de-Ba’athified Iraqi society.” It banned senior Ba’athist party members from all leadership positions in the new government.220 When Bremer turned administration of the de-Ba’athification order over the Iraqi Governing Council, headed at the time by Ahmed Chalabi, the

---

216 Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 118.
217 Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, xx.
219 Wright and Reese, On Point II, 433.
Council announced “new rules,” that would have “more depth and [affect] more people.”²²¹ Bremer was not pleased. Washington feared this was a sign that influential Shi’a Iraqi exiles like Chalabi might be inclined to use their new-found positions of power in post-Saddam Iraqi politics for retaliation. For the Bremer and the Bush Administration, this action confirmed the necessity of America’s “extended occupation.” The CPA had to “walk the cat back in the spring of 2004”²²² reinstating thousands of professionals that had been fired under the extended de-B’aathification order, including hundreds of teachers.²²³

Much like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq under the CPA ran Iraqi ministries through “advisors.” These were Americans who acted as operating chief administrators issuing agency policies and directing subordinate Iraqi officials.²²⁴ The CPA had seven “line offices,” of varying specialties including security, oil, civil affairs, economic development, regional operations and communications. These offices assigned CPA authorities to Iraqi ministries. CPA “individuals were charged with actually running their respective [Iraqi] ministries.” By August 2003 the Iraqi Governing Council was appointing 25 interim ministers, which lessened the profile of CPA administers, but CPA officials maintained control of ministerial budgets and had veto authorization over agency decisions.²²⁵

However unlike the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq under the CPA did not stay, nor did they systematically purge lower-levels of the Iraqi bureaucracy. In fact, once the CPA announced that it was handing over government administration to

²²² PBS Frontline, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Interview with L. Paul Bremer III.
²²³ Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, xxvi.
²²⁴ Ibid., xxi.
Iraqi officials, enforcement of CPA orders became a problem for Washington. “Iraqi lawyers and judges began to procrastinate in implementing or interpreting [CPA] law, preferring the established Iraqi version, even if it contracted the Bremer Orders.”

Similar to James Scott’s discussions in *Weapons of the Weak*, Iraqi subordinates engaged in repeated small acts of defiance against American authorities, incrementally imposing boundaries on American power brokers, drawing lines defining what could and could not be reasonably accomplished in Iraq.

**The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)**

In 2004 as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated the U.S. pushed to transfer governance to the Iraqis. This action, it was hoped, would slow the insurgency, appease calls for Iraqi sovereignty and take some of the heat off Washington for the downward spiral in Iraq. U.S. policymakers feared the occupation was becoming politically untenable. As early as September 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld communicated “enthusiasm for the concept of granting sovereignty as soon as possible to the Council or some other group of Iraqis.”

On June 28, 2004, two days ahead of schedule, the Coalition Provisional Authority, which had promulgated 100+ orders over the course of 14 tumultuous months, formally transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. In a rushed and rather unceremonious public announcement, at 10:26am Bremer ended the era of U.S. administrative governance of the Iraqi state. Two hours later Bremer was on a flight and

---


227 (U.S.), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, 120. By March 2004, the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council developed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), a document intended to guide Iraq’s interim authority structures during the transition period between the CPA and a popularly elected government. The U.N. had determined Iraq was in too much chaos for immediate elections.
John Negroponte presented his credentials as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to the IIG on June 29, 2004.\footnote{228\textit{The Associated Press, “Roadside Bomb Kills 3 U.S. Soldiers in Iraq,” June 29, 2004.}}

The 26 Iraqi ministries operating at the time had “been shifting to full Iraqi control” since June 1, 2004.\footnote{229\textit{Otterman, \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}, “Backgrounder - Iraq: The June 28 Transfer of Power.”}} This meant the Iraqi ministers appointed by the Interim Government (IIG) were legally independent of American authority. However, after June 28, the same American advisers that had been running Iraqi ministries under the CPA largely stayed put. “Most of the CPA’s former senior advisors (now known as senior consultants)... would continue top provide technical and operational reconstruction assistance to the Iraqi ministries.”\footnote{230\textit{Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 157, 165.}} In addition, the Iraqi ministers in place had been nominated by the IGC, but vetted by Bremer. Speaking of the June 28 ceremony, former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “This is not a transfer of power, a handover to a sovereign government. We are transferring limited authority to a satellite government, a satellite government that is still to establish its legitimacy and the longer we stay, the more difficult it will be before it to gain legitimacy.”\footnote{231\textit{Iraq’s Transfer of Power \mid PBS NewsHour \mid June 28, 2004.”As it was always intended to be, the IIG was a temporary organization. It fulfilled its mandate by holding elections on January 30, 2005 for 1) the 275-seat transitional National Assembly, 2) provincial assemblies in Iraq’s 18 provinces and 3) a regional assembly in Kurdish region. This elected government, also know as the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) crafted and passed a new constitution on October 15, 2005, a critical step in Iraqi self-rule. Elections for a permanent government were held on December 15, 2005 for Iraq’s primary legislative body, the Council of Representatives (COR). And by May 2006 executive branch cabinet officials were appointed and approved by the COR. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq - U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” GAO-08-117, October 2007. 15. But as the Iraqi state was solidifying during this period, so was the insurgency that challenging it.}}
The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and Permanent Government of Iraq (GOI)

How much influence American officials had in Iraqi government institutions after the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004 varied by the Iraqi ministry in question, the U.S. agency in control (USAID, Defense and or State), U.S. interest in transferring control and what was happening in the war. The following section summarizes U.S. approaches to influencing the actions of the Iraqi government after the CPA recused itself as the guardian of the Iraqi state in June 2004. Understanding how the U.S. was involved in the Iraqi state is critical to understanding inter-alliance relations and the political conditions potentially influencing Iraqi decisions to comply with, or refute U.S. demands.

The U.S. was eager to get friendly Iraqis to take responsibility for governing Iraq. But with security and governing capacity tenuous at best, compromises were made. Until 2010, for example the U.S. maintained authority over Iraqi detainee facilities, detention centers and inmates, due primarily to the lack of capability of Iraqi security forces to cope with the problem and American concerns about the threat that released prisoners could pose to American forces. American policymakers were also wary of handing over control of Iraqi intelligence services to Iraqi authorities for fear intelligence would be used for sectarian vendettas. The U.S. also maintained direct military command and control over Iraqi military forces for more than four years. U.S. Secretary of Defense


\footnote{233 Embassy Baghdad, “CODEL Inhofe Meets With TNA Members,” 05BAGHDAD5051. U.S. intelligence agencies were clamoring for real-time information that could protect U.S. personnel, while Washington undoubtedly sought to prevent Iraqi government intelligence assets from being utilized for further for sectarian feuding from within the Government of Iraq. Washington was likely concerned that handing over a national intelligence apparatus might provide another sectarian weapon for certain high-ranking Shi’a officials, while perhaps also denying U.S. military intelligence critical information on emerging threats.}
Donald Rumsfeld found this troublesome. It brought up obvious questions about Iraqi sovereignty. Rumsfeld promised the President “The GOI will assume command and control of the Iraqi Army not later than June 2007.” Due to the deteriorating security situation, however the last Iraqi division was not transferred until November 3, 2007.

While Office of the Secretary of Defense implemented policies designed to promote Iraqi self-sufficiency in the long-term, such as handing over control of Iraqi troops, U.S. forces were facing mounting security problems, which prompted the Department to promote U.S. involvement in the GOI to boost GOI performance. In November 2006 the Secretary felt the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) needed to “aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] – the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. – by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers.” DOD sought to strengthen Iraqi ministries by embedding increasing numbers of American personnel while also recognizing the importance of transferring power to Iraqi authority. At times these were contradictory goals.

The number of U.S. officials assigned to Iraq ministries varied. The U.S. Department of State was tasked with guiding efforts at ten civilian ministries: Oil,


235 American Forces Press Service, “7th Iraqi Army Division Now Controlled by Iraqi Government”; American Forces Press Service, “Iraqi Ground Forces Command Assumes Command and Control of 8th Iraqi Army Division.” The Division was handed over to Iraqi Ground Forces Command, under the control of the Office of the Prime Minister

Electricity, Planning, Water, Health, Finance, Justice, Municipalities and Public Works, Agriculture, and Education. In 2007 U.S. State Department advisory teams varied in size from 20 officials in the Ministry of Oil and 18 in Finance to three in Agriculture. These teams “typically interact with the minister, deputy minister, or department director levels.” U.S. advisers would present “options” to the Iraqi ministry indicating the decision stood with the Iraqis, but under American guidance.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) took the lead in advisory relationships with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior which controlled the Army and Police respectively. DOD, under the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was more aggressive than the Department of State and USAID in its advisory role. In 2007, for example, it had placed 215 American officials in the two Iraqi security Ministries (Interior and Defense). According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on U.S efforts to augment Iraqi ministerial development, these officials “advise Iraqi staff about establishing plans and policies, budgeting, and managing personnel and logistics, among other things. According to MNSTC-I advisors, they work

238 Ibid. For an example of U.S. influence within Iraqi ministries consider the following summary of progress in Iraqi banking reform from October 2005: “Banking Sector Reform: The Embassy (USAID and IRMO [Iraq Reconstruction Management Office]) are two months ahead of schedule in preparing the balance sheets of Iraqi state-owned banks as well as their executive summary assessment. Reform options for the banking sector will be presented to the Ministry of Finance by mid-November. USAID and Treasury are gathering financial information requested by the Minister of Finance to support the development of a state-bank reform program. We have begun to provide direction for the work of the Minister of Finance via a new Joint Task Force on Budget and Finance, led by the Treasury Attache Taecker and the Minister of Finance Allawi. The first meeting on September 13 focused on expenditures in the 2006 budget. Treasury’s interagency meeting with Iraqi officials on September 22 on the margins of the World Bank/IMF Meeting also helped to set the agenda and activities for the next task force meeting in Baghdad” Embassy Baghdad, “JCREd - Progress Report,” 05BAGHDAD4084, Sensitive, October 5, 2005.
with their Iraqi counterparts on a daily basis to develop policies, plans, and procedures.”

U.S. advisors also had varying influence across ministries depending on the relationships that developed. The 20 or so Americans advising the Ministry of Oil reportedly “played an integral part in drawing up contracts between the Iraqi government and five major Western oil companies to develop some of the largest fields in Iraq.” The State Department denied its officials chose which companies received development contracts in Iraq, yet admitted they regularly “provided template contracts and detailed suggestions on drafting the contracts.” State Department records appear to verify this claim. Despite this, multiple international oil companies have voiced skepticism over the “sovereign” process in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. The biggest development contracts have thus far been awarded to western companies.

U.S. control over aspects of Iraqi ministerial budgets in earliest years of the war, including the intelligence budget as well as the U.S. military occupation also undoubtedly influenced Iraqi political decision making processes. Until 2007 the U.S.

---

241 According to an internal Department of State memo, total U.S. personnel (State and other agencies) at the Iraqi Ministry of Oil was closer to 30. “MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENT AT THE MINISTRY OF OIL, A wide range of Mission elements provide training and advice in a variety of technical and policy fields. The core on-board Embassy/MNF-I Ministry of Oil engagement team consists of an oil section chief and three specialists in the Economic Section; the DoE section (2); USAID (5); ITAO (3); Energy Fusion Cell (5 with more enroute); Army Corps of Engineers (GRD) (4); MND-N (2); MNF-I (4). This core staff meets weekly to compare notes and to plan trips to Ministry facilities, U.S. Department of State, "BUILDING CAPACITY AT THE MINISTRY OF OIL" 07BAGHDAD3837, Unclassified, November 25, 2007.
243 Ibid.
245 Kramer, “U.S. Advised Iraqi Ministry on Oil Deals.”
246 The 2006 Iraqi national budget made no mention of any costs for national intelligence services. This is highly unusual for a government in the midst of fighting an intense counterinsurgency war, highly dependent on actionable intelligence. Payment for Iraqi agents was not being funneled through Baghdad. Embassy Baghdad, “CODEL Inhofe Meets With TNA Members,” 05BAGHDAD5051.
had final authority over the majority of state security apparatuses combatting the insurgency and protecting Iraqi ministers and ministries, including Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) various Iraqi Army units and private security details. Many if not most activities for GOI officials required coping with serious security concerns. With rates of violence skyrocketing from 2004-2007, American control of security organizations likely created a bargaining chip for Washington. Just weeks after the transfer of authority, for example U.S. officials wrote “The IIG knows that it has to consult with us on constructing a state of emergency law since its enforcement could involve coalition forces.”\(^{247}\)

From 2004-2008 the U.S. incrementally handed over authority to Iraqi officials making U.S. advisors less influential. In early 2008, the White House ordered a “surge” of U.S. development-oriented advisors, aiming to place at least 75 additional Americans in advisory roles within the government of Iraq, focusing on health, finance, electricity, oil and justice.\(^{248}\) However, American accounts of this “surge” indicate that these U.S. advisors were not directing day-to-day GOI activities. In fact, by 2008 many U.S. officials assigned to Iraqi ministries were having a difficult time regularly meeting with their GOI partners due to security constraints and the attitude of various ministers towards American agendas.\(^{249}\) In September 2007 Americans wee reporting “The Joint Planning Commission (JPC) and the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) in


\(^{248}\) U.S. Department of State, “Ministerial Capacity Surge Assessment,” 08BAGHDAD1008, Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU), April 1, 2008.

\(^{249}\) Ibid.
Baghdad are fast becoming Iraqi-driven institutions... The JPC and JROC will go from being largely USG-led to completely Iraqi-led by early 2008.”

Unsurprisingly at this time the U.S. was reporting difficulty negotiating certain issues with GOI partners. A cable on the Iraqi constitutional review noted U.S. Commanding General David Petraeus commented “It has proven difficult to urge movement from the GOI on practical concerns, let alone politically charged issues like new legislation.” Iraqi bureaucracies were no longer instruments of U.S. foreign policy. By now the GOI had consolidated itself into a political entity capable of acting independently of the U.S. and opposing American interests.

In summary Iraqi ministers had authority over the activities of their ministries after the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty, but embedded American advisors remained influential for several years after this transfer. U.S. influence in the GOI varied widely, depending on the ministry in question, but generally decreased over time. The ministries of defense and oil were seemingly most influenced by U.S. advisors. By late 2007 when important institutions such as the Iraqi military have been transferred to Iraqi control, U.S. advisors are “visitors” to the GOI, rather than authorities. As the U.S. Embassy summarized in 2008:

We have less influence than in 2004 - 2006, and will have even less influence as Iraqi politicians more and more can work together without our hovering over them...Our views on desired outcomes influence and shape Iraqi debates, but we can no longer dictate the exact shape of the outcomes.

The post-CPA U.S. advisory role in Iraqi civilian ministries was more intense than what the U.S. had pursued in Vietnam, but less than the aggressive Soviet approach in Afghanistan and certainly less than the U.S. in Iraq from 2003-2004. In Vietnam the U.S. boosted the pre-existing anti-communist regime. In Iraq, it largely scrapped the Saddam-era government and constructed a new government. This tactic initially required extensive U.S. involvement, as evidenced by the CPA, a group of Americans that ran the Government of Iraq. This legacy later allowed for additional American influence in the internal affairs of the Iraqi government until finally expiring when Iraqis gained full authority over state institutions.

**Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Iraqi Compliance**

Over 1,000 U.S. primary source documents (2,500+ pages) were analyzed to identify 106 unique demands from the U.S. government to their Iraqi allies from 2003-2011. These documents were found in three locations. First, I examined declassified documents located online through U.S. government agency websites, including The Office of the Secretary and Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act Library. Secretary Rumsfeld’s documents in the Special Collections Library were particularly useful for this project. A second source of material came from declassified documents released to the National Security Archive Iraq project. Third, the largest source of data for this chapter was U.S. State Department documents published by Wikileaks. In November 2010 Wikileaks, a non-profit organization dedicated to publishing classified information began releasing 251,287 U.S. Department of State cables, most created between 2002-

---

2010, including 6,677 from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. This provided extraordinary access to correspondence between the U.S. and its Iraqi allies.

In addition to public statements, declassified materials, and documents released by Wikileaks, there were two unique resources regularly clarifying the outcome of U.S. demands independent of what was in SIPRNET. One was the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), an independent U.S. agency established by Congress in October 2004 to monitor the use of U.S. reconstruction funds in Iraq. Since the U.S. would regularly provide funding for programs it asked the GOI to adopt, SIGIR reports provided reliable accounts of Iraqi performance. Another helpful resource for finding information on compliance outcomes was a set of reports the U.S. Department of Defense was required to produce according to House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Produced quarterly from July 2005-July 2010, these lengthy reports monitored progress, growth and developments in Iraqi governance, frequently addressing on the ground Iraqi advancement on U.S. demands.

Documents analyzed date from March 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011 (The U.S. intervention in Iraq lasted from March 20, 2003 – December 15, 2011). The 106 demands identified date from July 14, 2004 to February 23, 2010, providing relatively good coverage of demands made throughout the war. Note that the U.S. governed Iraq from March 2003- June 28, 2004 under the Coalition Provisional Authority. Therefore, as expected there were no demands from the U.S. to the “Iraqi Government,” as the U.S. had full governing authority. As discussed previously, this arrangement was similar to

---

the approach of several authoritarian states including the Soviets in Afghanistan after 1980 and the Vietnamese in the initial phases of the occupation of Cambodia.

The last request analyzed in this study predates American withdrawal from Iraq by 22 months for two primary reasons. One, the last document in the Wikileaks database is from February 28, 2010. Primary source documents currently available to the public for the last two years of the war are limited at best. Due to the recent nature of the Iraq conflict, this information is usually classified. Secondly, at least in other conflicts including Vietnam and Sri Lanka, the later years of the war bring fewer demands as the foreign state prepares to leave. It would be reasonable to expect the same in Iraq. It is likely the U.S. made fewer new requests from 2010-2011 compared to other years of the occupation.

It is also important to note that the “domestic regime” the U.S. negotiated with throughout the Iraq War was different than other domestic partners examined in this study in one notable aspect. There were two autonomous Iraqi political regimes. One, the GOI, was the national government of Iraq based in Baghdad. The Shi’a-dominated GOI is what most people imagine as America’s partner in Iraq. There was a second entity however, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the governing body of the “semi-autonomous,” predominantly Kurdish northern region of Iraq. Officially the KRG remains a regional government operating under the GOI. In practice, however, de facto regional autonomy after the Persian Gulf War meant that the Kurds exercised an unusually high level of independence, while the history of ethnic antagonism – most notably genocidal offensives against the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War - meant that the KRG had little interest in closer relations with Baghdad. If the U.S. sought to get anything accomplished in northern Iraq it had to deal directly with the KRG, as higher-
ups in the GOI did not control day-to-day activities in the Kurdish region. This study treats requests made to the heads of state in the KRG and those made to the GOI, equally as requests made to the “domestic regime” because this is the approach Washington took in its dealings with the Iraqi state. The U.S. sent high-level delegations to negotiate with both governmental entities.

Examples on this point may be useful although keep in mind the vast majority of requests (103/106) in the database were directed at the GOI. Only 5/105 of U.S. requests to Iraq located in the documents were for the KRG. Two requests were made to both the GOI and KRG. For example on July 25, 2007 U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker and MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus agreed in the “New Joint Campaign for Iraq” that it would be best to ask the GOI to agree to a delay a constitutional referendum on the status of Kirkuk.”\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “The New Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq,” 07BAGHDAD2464, Secret, July 25, 2007. See also 08BAGHDAD3031 for U.S. communications on Article 140 with GOI.} However, in a cable to the U.S. Department of State from the Embassy, dated the same day, July 25, 2007 U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker discussed a meeting with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani on July 19, in which the Ambassador asked the KRG President to work towards “transparent implementation” of referendum.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “Barzani Agrees To Push For New Goi Article 140 Committee Chair, Invigorate Committee,” 07BAGHDAD2466, Confidential, July 25, 2007.} Kurdish officials were frustrated with continual delays regarding the status of Kirkuk.\footnote{Ibid.} In other words, with the KRG the U.S. Ambassador emphasized communications between the KRG and GOI, sidestepping the delicate issue of delaying the Kirkuk referendum. However with the GOI, he is more direct asking to postpone the referendum. As of 2012 the status of Kirkuk has still not been resolved.
Data on Iraqi Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary

For 35/106 (33%) of U.S. demands the Iraqis were fully compliant, 32/106 (30%) there was partial compliance and 38/106 (36%) of requests concluded with non-compliance. If partial compliance and full compliance are combined, Iraqis were compliant for 67/106 (64%) of U.S. demands—a very similar percentage to the rates observed in other conflicts analyzed in the study (see below).

Table 8. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Full Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Compliance Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Non Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>35/106 (33%)</td>
<td>32/106 (30%)</td>
<td>67/106 (64%)</td>
<td>38/106 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>46/105 (43.8%)</td>
<td>25/105 (23.8%)</td>
<td>71/105 (68%)</td>
<td>34/105 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>11/22 (50%)</td>
<td>3/22 (14%)</td>
<td>14/22 (64%)</td>
<td>8/22 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
<td>19/79 (24%)</td>
<td>49/79 (62%)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>50/148 (33.8%)</td>
<td>42/148 (28.4%)</td>
<td>92/148 (62%)</td>
<td>56/148 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of verbal compliance for 23/106 (22%) of requests there was no available evidence regarding whether or not the Iraqis provided verbal assurances that they would or would not fulfill the request. Of the remaining requests there was 75/83

---

260 The 35/106 (Complied) + 32/106 (Partially Complied) + 38/106 (Not Complied With) = 105/106. One request, a proposal for a MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems) Reduction Program made on October 11, 2009 (See 09BAGHDAD2736) remains classified. Unclear using publicly available sources if the Iraqi government adopted the program.

261 The number of missing data points is primarily due small number of available data sources. Much of the relevant U.S. documentation remains classified and Iraqi discussion of the period is mostly unavailable. With older conflicts such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka, sizable collections of materials have been released, allowing for greater available evidence regarding communications between allies. Whereas 23/106 demands had no available evidence regarding Iraqi agreement (verbal compliance), only 1/106 had no available evidence available regarding whether or not the request was executed (substantive compliance). This difference in evidence can be attributed to verbal compliance largely being contained to a specific subset of diplomatic correspondence files. If the particular file regarding the particular demand is not saved or has not yet been released, it is difficult to know what was said between officials. However substantive compliance (or lack thereof) can be discussed in a variety of public documents and sources, including media reports, budgetary documents and military histories. The tangible evidence of a specific action undertaken is easier.
(90%) of Iraqi verbal compliance with American demands, 2/83 (2.4%) partial verbal compliance (GOI agreed to only part of the request), and 6/83 (7.2%) refusals of demands.

Table 9. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Verbal Agreement Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Refusal</th>
<th>No Data Available on Verbal Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>75/83 (90%)</td>
<td>2/83 (2.4%)</td>
<td>77/83 (93%)</td>
<td>6/83 (7.2%)</td>
<td>23/106 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>0/87 (0%)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>11/87 (13%)</td>
<td>18/105 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>20/20 (100%)</td>
<td>0/20 (0%)</td>
<td>20/20 (91%)</td>
<td>0/22 (0%)</td>
<td>2/22 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>51/70 (73%)</td>
<td>10/70 (14%)</td>
<td>61/70 (87%)</td>
<td>9/70 (13%)</td>
<td>9/79 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>0/99 (0%)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>8/99 (8%)</td>
<td>49/148 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Washington’s grew frustrated with Iraq’s pattern of passing legislation but not implementing the law. U.S. policymakers requesting policy reform in Iraq might receive verbal confirmation, the Council of Representatives (COR) along with the Prime Minister would write and pass new legislation, but then nothing would then materialize to implement the law. The U.S. promotion of the U.N. Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is one example. Iraq signed the UNCAC in March 2008, yet by December 2008 had not implemented the provisions. The U.S. Embassy was reporting GOI Deputy Prime Minister “Salih’s chief of staff told us in November he believed that by signing the agreement Iraq had fully met its provisions. There are 166 provisions in the UN-CAC to track than words exchanged between authorities. If for example the U.S. asked the Iraqi national government to build a school, there would be physical evidence whether or not that school materialized. But locating reliable evidence of the specific words exchanged regarding that building can be much more difficult.
which require Iraqi action in order to be fully compliant with the convention, of which ACCO estimates Iraq has completed about a third.”

Figure 13 charts the number of requests made by the U.S. by year juxtaposed with the Iraqi government rate of compliance with those demands. Some years have more requests complied than new requests made as Baghdad fulfills requests made in previous years later in the war. Complicated requests can take several years to complete. The number of requests made by Washington peaks in 2007, with compliance with demands made from 2003-2009 reaching a high in 2008-2009. This highpoint in the number of

---


263 Compliance in the chart includes partial compliance and full compliance.
requests complied with in 2008-2009 can be attributed to 1) numerous requests made in 2007 for the GOI to contend with, 2) an expansion in GOI capacity to comply with various U.S. demands, 3) the fulfillment of multiple complex requests that took time to implement, and 4) a marked decrease in violence from 2008-2011 compared to 2007, allowing for greater GOI freedom of movement.

The absence of requests from 2003-2004 is unsurprising. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), an American entity, was governing Iraq during this period. After the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government there is a steady rise in U.S. demands on its Iraqi partners each year until 2007. This continual increase from 2004-2007 reflects the gradual nature of the transfer of authority from American caretaker organizations to Iraqi bureaucracies over the course of several years. If the June 28, 2004 transfer heralded an immediate Iraqi assumption of responsibility across the board, it would be reasonable to expect a spike in demands in 2004-2005 (followed by a slow decline), similar to what was observed in Vietnam from 1964-66.

Furthermore, before leaving office in June 2004 L. Paul Bremer’s CPA promulgated orders at a frenzied pace assuming it was easier to unilaterally implement policies under American authority in 2004, as opposed to negotiating policies through the GOI once they were sovereign. U.S. decision makers may also have made fewer demands in the years immediately following CPA activity because they had largely pursued their agenda while in command in 2004. Later in the war, more demands to Iraqis had to be issued in order to respond to developments in the war.

---

264 Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 155.
Furthermore, the decision-making capacity of the Government of Iraq was intimately tied to the violence. As sectarian conflict and U.S. demands both rise in 2006-2007, a corresponding increase in GOI rates of compliance (Figure 13) fails to materialize because Iraqi political leaders are frequently pressured to avenge violence against their supporters. The increase in attacks 2006-2008 made opportunities for compromise within the GOI increasingly scarce, against many of Washington’s demands during this period.265

For example, in August 2006, the U.S. asked Baghdad to “take measures to promote ‘even handed’ [non-sectarian] law enforcement.” According a GAO report in May 2007,

Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in sectarian-based human rights violations... death squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs, largely with impunity... the Iraqi government and many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a sectarian basis.266

The American Embassy’s 2008 assessment of the Iraqi parliament discussed similar concerns. The Council of Representatives’ “problems are Iraq's problems: deep-seated sectarian, ethnic and personal animosities that inhibit and frequently prevent compromise, cooperation and agreement.”267

Various summary statistical models are provided in Table 10, accounting for variables that potentially influence compliance. Each of the 106 demands identified from

265 For example, U.S. demands such as, “take measures to reduce sectarian violence” and “ensure the Baghdad Security Plan does not protect sectarianism,” July 25, 2007, “GOI to cease sectarian appointments and politically motivated prosecutions,” and seek the “prosecution of government and security officials who break the law” (ending protections based on sectarian affiliation) See 07BAGHDAD2464 and Section 1314 Public Law 110-28. See also U.S. Department of State, “Allawi Back in Iraq; Seeks to Build Centrist Coalition,” 07BAGHDAD612, February 20, 2007, Secret.

169
the U.S. to its partners in the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government was coded to account for each of these potential independent variables.

**Table 10.** Compliance and Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordered Probit –Baghdad &amp; Erbil’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2004-2011</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Unilateral Action Possible</td>
<td>-0.437 (0.253)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.393)</td>
<td>0.088 (0.394)</td>
<td>-0.189 (0.399)</td>
<td>-0.130 (0.420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI Can be Excluded</td>
<td>0.282 (0.286)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term: GOI Benefit and U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.383 (0.497)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term: U.S. &amp; GOI Interest Convergence-Divergence and U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.039* (0.514)</td>
<td>-1.039* (0.514)</td>
<td>-1.040* (0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Benefit</td>
<td>0.659** (0.245)</td>
<td>0.526* (0.257)</td>
<td>0.528* (0.257)</td>
<td>0.819* (0.313)</td>
<td>0.565* (0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Threat</td>
<td>-0.453 (0.268)</td>
<td>-0.318 (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.316 (0.282)</td>
<td>-0.390 (0.263)</td>
<td>-0.314 (0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Issue Type: Political Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.039 (0.256)</td>
<td>-1.000 (0.256)</td>
<td>-1.150 (0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.324 (0.380)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.512 (0.612)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.278 (0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategy &amp; Military Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.466 (0.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>-0.911** (0.240)</td>
<td>-0.964** (0.252)</td>
<td>-0.938** (0.285)</td>
<td>-1.006** (0.249)</td>
<td>-0.941** (0.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or Internal Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.524 (0.272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Observations)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01

---

268 Interest in this model is estimated by using domestic regime benefit, a dummy variable measuring if Iraq can turn what is being requested by the U.S. into a way to bolster its short-term interests such as profit making position or electoral benefit.

269 Interest in this model is estimated by a composite variable, “Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence,” which relies on the available documentary evidence to account for both private costs (threats) and benefits of the request for the domestic regime. The variable estimates in general if allied interests over the request in question converge or diverge.

170
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance

Capacity

Consistent with initial hypotheses and findings in other wars, the data indicates lacking government capacity is strongly correlated with non-compliance. Unsurprisingly, when the ability to execute a demand is lacking, compliance is unlikely. Low capacity was cited as a serious issue throughout the Iraq conflict. Nearly half of all requests (52/106, 49%) made some mention of failing Iraqi ability contributing to compliance outcomes. This is a higher rate than what was found in other conflicts. In Vietnam and Afghanistan (U.S) just over 25% of requests included indications in American assessments that state capacity in Saigon or Kabul was impacting performance. Capacity was even less of an issue in Sri Lanka. Only 16.5% of requests made by the Indians had indications that a lack of capability contributed to compliance outcomes. Although these figures on capacity are not as straightforward as they might initially appear. Capacity failings being cited more frequently in Iraq than in Afghanistan does not mean Kabul had greater capabilities than Baghdad to cope with the counterinsurgency threat.270

As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology) and Chapter 10 (Conclusion), in terms of capacity there is bias in the universe of demands that are made, as the foreign government is less likely to ask partners for concessions it does not believe can be delivered due to a lack of capacity. For the reasons discussed in those chapters, including the consistency of this bias across these types of wars, and the fact that selecting requests

---

270 See Chapter 10: Conclusion. It is likely that Vietnam and Afghanistan (U.S.) have relatively lower rates of capacity cited as issues in compliance processes because Americans aren’t asking those regimes for reforms they feel are beyond the abilities of the Vietnamese and Afghans. Whereas in Sri Lanka, it is very likely that Colombo had fewer capability constraints.
based on capacity calculations doesn’t change the finding that low capacity is correlated with non-compliance, this selection effect does not change the findings of the study.

Similar to Vietnam and Afghanistan (U.S.), the most common capacity issue affecting Baghdad’s ability to implement demands came from deficient GOI bureaucratic institutions. American dollars were readily available to pay for reforms, but Iraqi officials nevertheless had to cope with bureaucratic machinery that was sorely lacking in institutional capacity. There are multiple examples of faltering Iraqi state structures affecting compliance outcomes. Consider the U.S. concern regarding Iraq’s failure to effectively spend allocated money. By 2007 Washington requested that Iraq execute its budgeted expenses. But GOI ministries spending their allowances was complicated by limited capacity to execute the projects specified. According to the GAO there were staff shortages, weak accounting institutions, and security complications:

U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a number of factors affecting the Iraqi government’s ability to spend more of its revenues on capital investments intended to rebuild its infrastructure. These factors include Iraq's shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife.

But this does not answer the question why capacity failures were cited twice as frequently in Iraq when compared to Afghanistan and Vietnam. All three domestic regimes had notable bureaucratic capacity failures. Furthermore, the rates of substantive compliance between these three wars are strikingly similar (roughly 1/3 full compliance, 1/3 partial compliance, and 1/3 non-compliance). If Baghdad were significantly less capable than Saigon and Kabul, there would likely be a corresponding drop in rates of

272 Cordesman and Mausner, “How Soon is Safe?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 5, 2009. 78.
compliance with U.S. demands since there is such a significant correlation between low capacity and non-compliance. But this is not the case.

For Baghdad it seems capacity was cited twice was often as was observed in Vietnam and Afghanistan for reasons other than Baghdad being half as capable as these counterinsurgency partners, which is not the case. First, the U.S. directly governed Iraqi institutions through the CPA and became particularly well versed in Baghdad’s bureaucracy. This heightened sense of institutional awareness may have made U.S. officials more prone to recognizing specific capacity failures in Iraq and discussing them in diplomatic correspondence more frequently than was observed in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Secondly, violence in Iraq quickly intensified between 2004-2007. The intensity of the rising insurgency largely caught U.S. policymakers by surprise. This may have influenced the frequency of capacity being cited as an issue in Iraqi compliance with U.S. demands for a couple of reasons. Washington was desperate to get the situation under control and was making demands on Baghdad; even asking for reforms American policymakers likely understood would be complicated by capacity limitations. While at the same time, the increased violence strained Iraqi government capacity. A regime that would be able to handle certain challenges under normal circumstances may find itself incapacitated by a state of war. Perhaps limited in its capabilities within the violence, once the insurgency became more subdued in 2008, Baghdad was able to comply with American requests, as evidenced by the rise in compliance between 2008-2009 illustrated in Figure 13.

**Dependency and Unilateral Action**

Similar to Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.) and Sri Lanka, the likelihood of Iraqi compliance with U.S. demands was affected by an interaction between the unilateral
ability of the foreign ally to implement the task at hand, and agreement or disagreement between allied interests. The statistical model in Table 10 illustrates the interaction effect within the context of other data from the war, while Table 12 (below) isolates the effect. It indicates that if the U.S. could act unilaterally and Iraqi and U.S. interests converged, Baghdad was more likely not to comply due to incentives to free ride. If the U.S. could act unilaterally and allied interests diverge, there was a higher probability of compliance as Baghdad was more willing to agree in order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented without them anyway. They might as well go along with the request and protect their interests in the process of implementation.

The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible. If independent action was not possible and interests converged, there was a higher likelihood of compliance, as Baghdad was likely to adopt the requested actions for the sake of its own interests. If allied interests diverged and the U.S. could not implement the reform without Iraqi assistance, there were higher rates of non-compliance. The GOI had no interest motivating compliance and likely no immediate consequences for failing to comply.

**Table 11. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allied Interests Converge</td>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Interests Diverge</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12. Ordered Probit—Baghdad’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2003-2010
Interaction Effect With U.S. Unilateral Capabilities and Allied Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.957** (0.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.905** (0.236)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01

Examples of the dynamics described above may be useful for gaining perspective on the interaction between interests and unilateral ability.

*Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance Due to Free Riding*

In 2006 the U.S. urged the GOI to invest in the reconstruction of Fallujah, a city that had been devastated by U.S. military operations. American policymakers felt it was important to have the GOI invested in this type of rebuilding effort in order to...

---

273 The variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime.” The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Baghdad’s interests based on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. Since the foreign power (U.S.) is making the request, the model assumes Washington is interested in the request. Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime (Iraq). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary evidence. For more on coding see Chapter 3 - Methodology. For more on interest variables see the section on interest as an independent variable.

274 U.S. Department of State, “Fallujans Mobilized for Election Amid Increased Tension in City,” 05BAGHDAD4971, December 13, 2005, Confidential. Note that not all U.S. policymakers backed the reconstruction of Fallujah. Two days before his November 2006 resignation U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a classified memo, “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:... Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, ‘If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.’ No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.” “Rumsfeld’s Memo of Options for Iraq War,” The New York Times, December 3, 2006.
increase the likelihood of success, and to better ensure lasting domestic investment in reconstruction projects for Fallujah.\footnote{Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), \textit{Information on Government of Iraq Contributions to Reconstruction Costs}, SIGIR 09-018, April 29, 2009.}

Under U.S. pressure the GOI pledged a few hundred million dollars to the effort, an amount described by some analysts as “meager” at best in light of costs. Additionally there were large discrepancies between what was promised and what was delivered by Baghdad, as at least 25-30\% of what was eventually paid by the GOI was funneled into security operations instead of reconstruction.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “The 2006 Iraq Budget,” 06BAGHDAD955, March 23, 2006, Confidential.} By 2008 the U.S. had taken primary responsibility for rebuilding the city. Entry into the city required a U.S.-issued residency card while the U.S. executed the majority of reconstruction projects. As one Marine said, “We were here, the battle part, last time. Now I’m back here fixing it, which is kind of ironic.”\footnote{Schwartz, \textit{War Without End}, 115-117.} According to U.S. National Public Radio, “Americans are widely seen as the engine behind the rebuilding. Asked if he felt he was still being neglected by the Iraqi government, Sheikh Hamid al-Alwani, the head of the city council, didn’t miss a beat. He says ‘naam’ or ‘yes.’ The Iraqi government has spent far less on rebuilding than the U.S. predicted.”\footnote{Garrels, Anne. “Long-Awaited Fallujah Rebuilding Shows Promise,” \textit{National Public Radio}, January 23, 2008.}

The GOI failed to meet U.S. expectations for investment in reconstruction for Fallujah because the U.S. had the resources to fund the projects unilaterally, and was just as interested as Baghdad in rebuilding the city for the sake of security. Iraqis could free ride on U.S. reconstruction efforts, benefiting with minimal investment. As illustrated by a project to build a wastewater treatment system for Fallujah, Baghdad took advantage of

\footnote{Ibid.}
opportunities to stall issuing payments to contractors for years, and neglected to deal with critical components of a project. For the treatment system there was no plan to link houses to drainage, a significant component to making the project worthwhile. Without a link to homes, there would be no municipal sewage to treat. In 2008 representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reported that although the Iraqi Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works had ‘verbally committed’ to ensuring home connections installed, U.S. Engineers were ‘extremely concerned’ that the Ministry would not provide any services, instead insisting homeowners install their own connections. This ad-hoc solution would risk harming the system, undermining the whole effort. The Army Corp of Engineers “stated that if the Ministry cannot fund the house connections, the ‘back up plan’ is for the U.S. government to use Economic Support Funds.”

*Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Compliance*

In 2007 the U.S. asked Baghdad to issue an official letter requesting U.S. assistance to remove 550 metric tons of natural uranium “yellowcake,” a starter material for high-grade nuclear material from Tuwaitha. Having significant military presence in the country, the U.S. had unilateral ability to remove the material, but not to issue an official letter from the Government of Iraq requesting U.S. assistance in the process. Since the U.S. issued two separate requests to Baghdad regarding the Tuwaitha yellowcake, one for an official letter regarding removal, one for Iraqi participation in the sale of substance, this study similarly coded two requests, one (removal) the U.S. had unilateral ability to enforce, the other (letter) required GOI action.

---

It was in Baghdad’s interest to have the yellowcake removed. During this time Iraq was occupied by a military sent to overthrow Saddam Hussein, in part to ensure that regime did not achieve nuclear weapons. The GOI was acutely aware of the potential consequences for nuclear ambitions. Second, they did not have full control over their territory. There was a possibility that insurgents could get a hold of the material and do harm to Baghdad and others. Additionally, the U.S. offered Iraq a good deal. The U.S. Department of Defense would handle the difficult job of transporting this material, while the GOI could profit from the sale. Lastly, by issuing the letter Baghdad could better influence the terms of the process. It could lobby for a better price and legitimize itself as the sovereign authority over such matters and property. After some negotiation over the terms and joking with the U.S. that maybe Iraq could sell the yellowcake to Iran, Baghdad complied and issued the letter. The end result of the request was in Baghdad’s interest and the task could not be accomplished without their participation.

**Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Compliance**

The controversial U.S. strategic decision to fund the Sons of Iraq—SOI, (or Concerned Local Citizens—CLCs), an ad-hoc group of Sunnis that had turned against the insurgency has been lauded by many as a critical strategic victory. It was nevertheless not particularly welcomed by the Shi’a-dominated GOI. Some officials in Baghdad saw the program as a unilateral American decision to arm a non-government Sunni militia that might compete for power in Iraq. After 2008 what to do with the Sons of Iraq

---


program became a tricky question. In late 2007 the U.S. asked the GOI to match funds for the program to move towards incorporating SOI elements into the government.\textsuperscript{283}

In January 2008, Baghdad agreed to match U.S. funds for the program.\textsuperscript{284} Although uncomfortable with the program as an armed, Sunni, non-government group controlling territory, the GOI recognized that if the U.S. continued to run the program without their input, the Sons of Iraq program would not only continue to exist on U.S. funding, but would continue to operate outside their influence. Matching funds and running programs to incorporate SOI elements into GOI institutions would give Baghdad more influence over the fate of the group.

Initially Baghdad’s cooperation on SOI funding was tenuous. The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that in practice, GOI payments to the SOI were “consistently late.” “Between October 2008 and December 2010, the GOI paid SOI salaries on time only about 42% of the time.” The U.S. had to provide additional payments to SOI entities due to Baghdad’s tardiness or failure to pay.\textsuperscript{285} Although the U.S. remained skeptical, Prime Minister Maliki expressed support for SOI integration into the government, earmarking $300 million in matching U.S.-GOI funds for the SOI.\textsuperscript{286} As the GOI gained authority over the Sons of Iraq program, reports emerged of Shi’a elements in the GOI targeting SOI figures.\textsuperscript{287} According to NPR “In 2009, the fate of the Sons of Iraq was left in the hands of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated

\textsuperscript{283} U.S. Department of State, “CG and CDA Discuss Foreign Fighters and Syria, Turkey and the PKK, and UNSCR with PM,” 07BAGHDAD3911, December 2, 2007, Secret.
\textsuperscript{284} U.S. Department of State, “Concerned Local Citizens Program: Securing Communities,” 08BAGHDAD164, January 22, 2008, Confidential.
\textsuperscript{285} Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), \textit{Sons of Iraq Program” Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak}, SIGIR 11-010, January 28, 2011.
\textsuperscript{286} U.S. Department of State, “Maliki On Cabinet Shake-up, Return Of Tawafaq, And Major Legislative Challenges,” 08BAGHDAD166, January 22, 2008, Secret.
coalition government, which agreed to pay the men and eventually either integrate them into the armed forces or give them civilian jobs. But scores have been arrested over the past year by the government.”  

Nevertheless Baghdad complied with parts of American demands regarding the SOI. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the GOI was providing $196 million for reintegration programs and according to the U.S. military by July 2008 more than 14,000 SOI had been incorporated into the Iraq Security Forces, adding however, “developing broad support of the program has been a challenge.” Baghdad agreed to U.S. demands that it provide matching funds to the SOI program in order to placate American policy makers, but perhaps more importantly to gain influence over the program, since the U.S. had been running the project unilaterally, without their input. U.S. and GOI interests diverged in terms of the SOI program, but U.S. ability to run the program with or without Baghdad convinced GOI policymakers to participate in order to gain more influence over the program, even if they felt threatened by it.

*Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance*

Understandably, if allied interests diverge and the foreign power is dependent on its domestic ally to implement the request, the end result is usually non-compliance. In Iraq this was observed in the November 2007 request from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and U.S. Commanding General David Petraeus to Iraqi Prime Minister

---

289 U.S. request that Baghdad match SOI/CLC funds coded as compliance based on SIGIR Reports, integration into security forces coded as partial compliance.
Maliki asking that the GOI continue to offer legal immunity to U.S. contractors in Iraq.\textsuperscript{291} Public outcry against alleged abuses by U.S. contractors had hardened GOI positions against contractor immunity even though such legal exemption had been afforded to contactors since the CPA. There was nothing the U.S. could do to compel the GOI to offer continued protection of contract personnel. The 2008 U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement specified: “Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.”\textsuperscript{292,293} The U.S. was dependent on Baghdad to fulfill the request as it had no authority over Iraqi law in 2009. Allied interests diverged, and the U.S. dependent on Baghdad to implement the request found itself without any leverage to compel cooperation. Indeed in February 2011 a British contractor, Daniel Fitzsimons, was sentenced to 20 years in prison in Iraq for the murder of two other foreign workers in 2009.

**Interests—Costs and Benefits**

This chapter has addressed the impact of capacity, the wartime environment, and Washington’s unilateral ability to implement reforms without Baghdad’s participation on rates of Iraqi compliance with American demands. This section complements these findings by accounting for interests, a principal variable impacting compliance. Whether or not certain actions are adopted is naturally dependent on what is being asked, and what potential consequences those activities will have on the domestic ally.

**Subject Areas**

Requests were classified by general subject matter in order to observe if trends in compliance were based on subject areas. Issue areas were not found to be statistically significant, but there are nevertheless interesting findings regarding issues and rates of compliance.

1. **Development**—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and expand infrastructure. Includes projects to reconstruct damaged urban areas, microfinance strategies, and vocational training programs. 14/106, 13% of U.S. requests. There is some potential overlap with requests classified as economic reforms, such as pricing for electricity services which is an economic policy, with growth and development goals.

2. **Economic Reform**—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including reforms to state-run social services, banking and financial systems, WTO negotiations, pricing of public services and hydrocarbon profit distribution legislation. 26/106, 38% of U.S. requests. There is some overlap with requests classified as development requests and one that could also be considered military reform: the Iraqi Army protecting the central bank. This is a security protocol issue, but also one addressing physical banking security and messaging about financial security.

3. **Political Reform**—Actions intended to change government policies and institutions. Including electoral, law enforcement, governance, protections for minorities, bureaucratic protocols, constitutional reforms, sectarian issues and reconciliation programs. 48/106, 45% of U.S. requests.

4. **Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy**—Efforts intended to implement counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects, negotiated ceasefire agreements, the provision of non-security services in damaged areas and the Sons of Iraq program. There may be overlap with requests classified as political reform. 4/106, 3.8% of U.S. requests.

5. **Military Reform**—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. Including increasing Iraqi security forces, increased authority for Iraqi military commanders, and command and control protocols. 9/106, 8.5% of U.S. requests.
6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of the war effort. Including policies regarding the distribution and buying back of weapons, use and oversight of militias and sending three additional Iraqi brigades into Baghdad. 5/106, 4.7% of U.S. requests.

Figure 14. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S to Iraq
Figure 15. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types - Iraq

Military Strategy. In Iraq and Vietnam the subject area with the highest rate of compliance was military strategy. There is good reason why this may be the case. Saigon and Baghdad may have been more willing to take U.S. advice on military actions out of deference to U.S. military leadership. Additionally, these domestic partners may have been less likely to disagree with requests regarding military strategy in contrast to requests for political reforms. These actions focus on targeting the enemy and typically did not require difficult internal reform. Furthermore, it is less likely that low capacity would impact requests regarding military strategy (which would increase the likelihood for non-compliance), as the U.S. would likely only ask Saigon and Baghdad to undertake strategic military operations Washington felt they could handle. U.S. military planners would have likely used U.S. forces if they thought their allies lacked sufficient capacity
for the task at hand. This means fewer military requests involving Iraqi forces should have failed due to capacity constraints.

*Counterinsurgency Projects.* There were only a few requests pertaining to counterinsurgency strategy (4/106), the majority resulting in partial compliance. This number may be low because many other categories also incorporate aspects of counterinsurgency strategy, including development or political reform. Since “counterinsurgency” policies can encompass a range of political and military actions, many demands potentially overlap with other given issue categories. These requests include management of Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs), also known as the Sons of Iraq program, a controversial U.S.-designed COIN program to pay young Sunnis to oppose al-Qaeda.

*Political Reform.* Similar to other conflicts, the majority of demands from the U.S. were for political reform. This was expected. As a foreign power the U.S. would be unable to undertake internal reforms for Baghdad, and therefore is required to ask. This makes these types of request the most numerous in every conflict examined. Examples of political reforms requested include boycotting legislation to revoke immunities for American contractors, holding a constitutional referendum, accepting the transfer of inmates from Guantanamo Bay and passing de-Ba’athification legislation.

*Development.* As with other conflicts compliance with development requests were lower than average. This may be due to the complex, multi-stage process required for important development work. It often takes significant institutional capacity that domestic allied regimes rarely have at their disposal. Operating in a warzone complicates development progress even further. The insurgency in Iraq regularly targeted social service and infrastructure projects. As opposition grew against coalition forces in the
years following the U.S. invasion, development work became important to the goal of promoting the idea of an effective Iraqi state, but it also became increasingly difficult.

**Economic Reform.** Requests pertaining to economic reform had the lowest rate of Iraqi compliance, which is unique to Iraq. In other conflicts including Vietnam and Sri Lanka, economics-related requests had some of the highest rates of compliance. Such cooperation between allies might be expected since both allies have a strong interest in economic stability. Similarly seeking greater domestic economic strength, allies would be expected to agree on various policies. However in Iraq half of all U.S. requests related to economic reform ended with non-compliance. (13/26, 50% Non-Compliance, 6/26, 23% Partial Compliance 7/26, 27% Compliance). These results can be attributed to two major factors.

First, the rate of low government capacity influencing compliance was significantly higher in requests for economic reform in Iraq when compared to other conflicts, and to other issues in Iraq. 20/26, 77% of economic demands cite capacity issues intervening in compliance, whereas 52/106 (49%) of all requests to Iraq discussed deficient capacity influencing compliance. This means demands pertaining to economic policy had a 28% higher rate of capacity problems. This is not surprising in light of the status of the tenuous economic infrastructure the U.S. discovered in 2003. According to the extensive report on the CPA written by the RAND Corporation, before the American invasion “the information systems of the [Iraqi] Central Bank and commercial banks were antiquated and—in some cases—nonfunctioning. The Rafidain and Rasheed bank branches had no interbank voice and data communications, and records were provided only once a month from branches to headquarters in Baghdad. The World Bank also noted that the Central Bank’s supervisory capacity was largely nonexistent, and the bank
suffered from the absence of any supervisory legislation.”

The U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury John Taylor, tasked with expanding Iraqi financial sector capacity wrote that after the U.S. invasion “the [Iraqi] banking system was in shambles. Electronic transfer of funds, widely made to people in developed countries was virtually non-existent, making Iraq’s payment system the equivalent of a Model-T Ford.”

The second factor contributing to an unusually low rate of compliance with economic requests was a lack of interest by Iraqi officials to adopt the solutions promoted by Washington. Iraq historically had a high level of state intervention in the economy. American free-market solutions were unfamiliar. Americans in Iraq ran into cultural and institutional roadblocks opposing their promotion of market policies. This was the case even with seemingly straightforward development or economic programs. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Babil grew frustrated when six years after the invasion Americans were still unable to inspire GOI representatives to reform local statist economic agricultural policies:

As the owner of around 70 percent agricultural land in the province, the government micromanages what farmers produce, guarantees the purchase of key crops, and, to a lesser extent, subsidizes agricultural inputs. These statist policies and other factors, from inadequate credit to the distortionary Public Distribution System (PDS), have restricted private sector development in agriculture. Having come to rely on government largesse, it is little surprise that Babil farmers look to intervention and protection rather than open markets for their livelihoods. Taking heed of these deep-rooted structural impediments, Babil PRT has promoted the establishment of an Iraqi-led agricultural advisory committee comprised of public and private sector stakeholders invested in the long-term agricultural viability of the province, once the breadbasket of Iraq.

294 Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 207.
296 U.S. Department of State, “Taking Steps to Uproot the Statist Legacy in Babil’s Agriculture,” 09HILLAH24, April 5, 2009, Unclassified - For Official Use Only.
Furthermore, according to a Rand report, the Iraqi banking system was incapable of handling modern market financing. “Iraqi banks had been cut off from international technology, standards, and business practices for 30 years. After the fall of the Ba’athist regime, the Iraqi financial sector was dominated by two state-owned commercial banks—the Rafidain and the Rasheed—and four state-owned specialized banks.”

Interestingly, this division between allied economic philosophies has not been present in other wars examined. Allies in other conflicts, including the U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, share a common economic ideology. This was absent in Iraq. Iraqis did not agree with U.S. market approaches.

Low institutional capacity combined with a cultural tendency towards statist solutions affected compliance with U.S. economic-sector demands. One prominent example of both factors was observed in American attempts to compel the GOI to reform the Public Distribution System (PDS) mentioned in the previous paragraph from Babil. PDS was a ration system established in 1995 to provide Iraqis with staple household items. PDS was an attempt to mitigate the effects of food shortages produced by sanctions against the Saddam Hussein. The program was run by the Iraqi Ministry of Trade (MOT), and depended on food imports (up to 480 tons per month) even though Iraq had historically exported food.

U.S. officials commented that with sanctions and PDS Iraq went “from breadbasket to basket case.” The World Food Program (WFP) took over running the program after the disintegration of the Saddam-era Iraqi state.

---

297 Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq - A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 206.
299 U.S. Department of State, “Taking Steps to Uproot the Statist Legacy in Babil’s Agriculture,” 09HILLAH24, April 5, 2009, Unclassified - For Official Use Only.
Washington put pressure on the GOI to reform the system in order to fix efficiencies, market distortions and the PDS burden on GOI finances. However according to the U.S. Embassy,

despite almost universal acknowledgement of its failures -- its massive price tag, its distorting effects on domestic commodity markets, and its myriad opportunities for corruption -- there have been no significant reform efforts. In 2007, the COR passed legislation that would have rendered households of government officials at the rank of Director General or higher ineligible for PDS rations. The GOI has not implemented this reform, however, and even the wealthiest Iraqis remain eligible for rations.\textsuperscript{301}

The failure to reform PDS can be attributed to a lack of political will to modify the popular social program, capacity problems hindering better administration and GOI reticence to adopt market solutions.

\textit{Issue Type—Conclusion.} These findings are helpful for understanding general trends in compliance among various issues, in particular when contrasted against findings in other conflicts. However, similar to other counterinsurgency wars, in Iraq the correlation between issue type and compliance was not statistically significant (see Table 10). This may in part be due to certain types of requests including military reform, military strategy and counterinsurgency strategies having only few observations. Only tentative conclusions ought to be drawn from these few examples.

\textit{Interests—Costs and Benefits}

Similar to other wars including Vietnam, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, potential short-term benefits for Baghdad were one of the highest predictors of compliance.\textsuperscript{302} If the goal of the demand could potentially be made to directly serve the interests of the

\textsuperscript{301} U.S. Department of State, “Reforming the Public Distribution System -- Easier Said Than Done,” 09BAGHDAD2621, September 9, 2009, Unclassified, For Official Use Only.

\textsuperscript{302} See Table 1, Row 11 for models accounting for benefit. Simple regression on compliance controlling for capacity yields $P <0.005$ for potential for private benefit. 0.719, (0.243).
regime or Iraqi policymakers, it had a higher likelihood of being adopted than if it couldn’t immediately yield benefits for the regime.

For example, in August 2006 the U.S. was alarmed that the previously discussed food distribution program, the PDS (Public Distribution System), was running into new bureaucratic difficulties. The GOI had failed to issue the required letters of credit for contracts associated with the system for August. This, the U.S. feared, might lead to system failure and potential food shortages. The primary problem was a highly inefficient bureaucratic system, which required letters of credit for all PDS purchases, a “90 day process even under favorable conditions.” The U.S. Embassy “pressed” the Minister of Trade “and other leaders in the GOI” to move on issuing the letters in order to avoid disruption of service. It was in the best interests of officials in the GOI to issue the letters in order to avoid the massive potential political fallout that PDS failure could produce. Seeing the strong potential benefits for complying with the demand, for their own interests and benefit, the GOI successfully cobbled together the letters of credit and the PDS system was not interrupted.

In addition to potential benefits, compliance with requests from allies can also pose potential threats or impose potential costs on the domestic regime. Interestingly, similar to Vietnam and Sri Lanka the statistical analysis on Iraqi compliance (see Table 10) reveals that potential threats are associated with non-compliance, but are not as significant as potential benefits in predicting outcome. Below is a graph of the impact of potential threats on rates of compliance in Iraq.

---

Again, the Public Distribution System (PDS) provides a useful example. The American request that Baghdad comprehensively reform PDS posed a potential threat to short-term GOI political interests. Despite being “massive, inefficient, and expensive,” PDS continued to operate because GOI officials feared any alterations would threaten their political careers.\footnote{305 U.S. Department of State, “PDS Inefficient, But Potential Electoral And Confidence Building Tool,” 08BAGHDAD713, March 19, 2008, Confidential.} However, just as not all requests that pose potential benefits for the regime are complied with (other factors such as capacity may be paramount), not all requests that pose potential threats end in non-compliance. One example is the previously mentioned U.S. demand that the GOI support the Sons of Iraq (SOI), also called the Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs). Maintaining the program posed a potential threat to the Shi’a-dominated GOI as it reinforced local Sunni militias. However Baghdad complied with key aspects American demands to back the SOI because GOI officials felt it was better to take over the program than have it operate beyond their influence.

Potential benefits and costs are not mutually exclusive. Certain requests, such as the 2009 request that Iraq issue provisions for Out of Country voting for Iraqis abroad, could either help or hurt short-term GOI interests. The potential impact of out of country voting on the re-election bids for GOI officials was unclear at the time Washington made the request.\footnote{306 U.S. Department of State, “Embassy Delivers U.S. Proposal on Out of Country Voting DIP Note,” 09BAGHDAD3310, December 22, 2009, Confidential.}

**Conditions of War and Internal Politics**

The GOI and KRG are not unitary political entities. Like all governments, there was internal debate, conflict and internal maneuvering that had potential influence on compliance outcomes. For example, in 2006 the U.S. insisted the GOI hold members of
the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) accountable for “killings, disappearances, and human rights abuses,” committed by MOI officers.\textsuperscript{307} The Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights (MOHR) and the Human Rights Directorate at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) investigated accusations of MOI misconduct. This was not a model of interagency cooperation. The Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani complied in part with requests from MOD and MOHR by authorizing the arrest of multiple low-ranking MOI officials accused of human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{308} However high-ranking officials had also likely committed abuses. Commander of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} National Police Division for example was “believed to have directly ordered torture and other abuse.” He was spared by Minister Bulani and instead reassigned to the Ministry's intelligence division. The Commander's “punishment for his alleged crimes has been the loss of four days of pay.”\textsuperscript{309} Some elements of the GOI were working towards U.S. demands while others worked in opposition.

Similar to what was uncovered regarding capacity, domestic political conflict influencing the compliance environment was cited significantly more frequently in Iraq than in other conflicts. 38% of U.S. requests discuss domestic politics playing a role in the compliance process. This is in contrast to 11% in Sri Lanka. The high number of requests discussing domestic political strife in Iraq is likely a product of two factors. First, sectarian divisions made domestic political negotiations during this period in Iraq particularly rancorous. This spilled over into policy debates over U.S. demands. Second, materials available in the Wikileaks cable database provide more details than what is available for other conflicts such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka. Routine embassy cables on

\textsuperscript{307} U.S. Department of State, “Badr Leader Agrees the Militia Should Demobilize,” 06BAGHDAD930, March 21, 2006, Confidential.
\textsuperscript{308} U.S. Department of State, “Demarche to Iraqi Interior Minister on Site 4,” 06BAGHDAD2842, August 7, 2006, Confidential.
\textsuperscript{309} U.S. Department of State, “Human Rights in the Interior Ministry; Director Complains of Marginalization, Threats,” 07BAGHDAD1377, April 23, 2007, Confidential.
domestic political conditions can be disposed of instead of archived if they are considered historically unimportant. There are tens of thousands of such documents, and prior to the digitization of communication, archiving, indexing and publishing these materials was considered excessively time consuming for their minor historical value in the greater context of the war. However, in the Wikileaks database, such routine documents are readily located, searchable and available for Iraq and Afghanistan. This is supported by the fact that 24% of U.S. requests in Afghanistan (gathered largely using Wikileaks as well) also discuss domestic political issues involved in the compliance process. While less than Iraq, this is still twice as much as 11% in Sri Lanka and 9.5% in Vietnam.

Interestingly this greater or lesser availability of “routine” cables documenting details of domestic political issues does not affect the findings in this study. Consistent with other wars, including Vietnam, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, domestic political issues were statistically insignificant in explaining trends in compliance in Iraq. As was the case in other conflicts, domestic politics had varied effects on compliance outcomes. The U.S. demand that the GOI implement the 2006 National Investment Law (NIL) is an example of compliance in spite of domestic political infighting. Throughout 2008-2009 Dr. Sami al-Araji, Chairman of the National Investment Commission successfully lobbied members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass amendments to the NIL as well as other necessary financial regulations. There was internal opposition to the

---

310 Ordered Probit, Internal Political Issues (Iraq) -0.170 (0.271), Capacity -0.917** (0.262), Unilateral Potential 0.057 (0.398), Domestic Regime Private Benefit 0.510*(0.258), Interaction between Unilateral Ability and Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence -1.083* (0.519), Issue (Political Reform) -0.089 (0.257), Potential Threat to Domestic Regime Private Interest -0.318 (0.282).

revisions, but the GOI complied by passing the amendment to the NIL in part due to concessions made on other issues.\textsuperscript{312}

\textit{War and External Threats Impacting the Compliance Environment in Iraq}

Because the government of Iraq was making decisions regarding compliance while threatened by an insurgency, it is important to monitor how the wartime environment affected compliance. As with other wars examined the study, a variable tracking complications from the war was created to capture aspects of coping with an insurgency, including for example, violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and offenses by the enemy. One or more of these factors was cited as an issue affecting Iraqi compliance in 18/106 (17\%) of demands in Iraq, which is not a terribly high rate considering that insurgent attacks in Iraq peaked at 180 per day in June 2007, a state of affairs that paralyzed movement in major cities and hampered development efforts across the country.\textsuperscript{313}

One example of the war influencing a compliance outcome was observed in the 2007 U.S. demand to the GOI that it speed up the paperwork and processing of detainees, a task intended to move towards a U.S. withdrawal. But as violence spiked from 2006-2008, there were more insurgents in Iraq and coalition forces were holding increasing numbers of detainees due to security concerns. As the U.S. Embassy observed, “Case processing is not improving fast enough to keep pace with GOI detainee intakes and the transfer of detainees from coalition forces in the coming months... The GOI

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.  \\
\end{flushleft}
 detention system will, under this scenario, become more of a warehouse than a detainee processing center for the courts.”\textsuperscript{314}

However, unlike most conflicts examined in the study, in Iraq complications from operating in wartime environment was not found to have a significant impact on rates of compliance with American requests (see Table 10). However there were no incidences of full compliance if the war had an influence on the compliance environment.\textsuperscript{315} In other words the best Washington was going to get was partial compliance if violence from the war was influencing Iraqi activities regarding the demand in question.

In Vietnam an additional variable was created to measure the potential impact of a serious crisis on compliance patterns. However Iraq never experienced an acute enemy offensive, similar to the Tet Offensive, which posed a worrying threat to the continued operations of the domestic regime. Therefore, a study was not made of the impact of an acute enemy offensive for the Iraq war. The impact on continual violence and the increases and decreases of enemy activity have previously been discussed in the sections on the affect of violence on the compliance environment and earlier discussions of changes in compliance over time throughout the war.

**Conclusion**

Two dynamics in Iraqi politics regularly complicated compliance outcomes with U.S. demands: 1) Sectarian divisions between Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish blocs, and 2) tensions over the division of authority and resources between federal and regional


\textsuperscript{315} Requests in which the war was found to have a specific influence on the compliance environment resulted in 4 requests ending in non-compliance, 14 partial compliance and 0 full compliance. Requests that had no discussion of wartime influence, 34 ended in non-compliance, 18 partial compliance and 35 full compliance.
entities. These dynamics are worth a brief discussion because they stand at the heart of Iraq’s political future and were apparent throughout U.S.-Iraqi bargaining encounters.

In an effort to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, the U.S. promoted a strong agenda for reconciliation between sectarian groups. The 18 highly publicized August 2006 “benchmarks” the Bush Administration required Iraq to fulfill order to receive $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds, were actions designed to promote political reconciliation in Iraq.316 Some of these demands, such as establishing joint security stations in Baghdad, were fulfilled. Others, such as passing critical hydrocarbon legislation clarifying oil rights between competing groups and regional government entities, were not completed. Baghdad received the supplemental money from the U.S., but by many accounts, including the investigation carried out in this study, most of the benchmark requests ended with partial compliance at best. Several key requests went unfulfilled entirely.317

Sectarian divisions are an unfortunate hallmark of Iraqi politics. Despite U.S. demands for reconciliation, critical aspects of the American occupation unintentionally reinforced sectarian identities. The American reliance on Kurdish and Shi’a partners to contain the Sunni insurgency and promotion of national elections hardened political identities around sectarian representation.318 Recurrent sectarian frictions complicated GOI compliance with American demands. Washington promoted its vision of a unified Iraq, while sectarian groups fought to protect the future of their groups within the

emerging Iraqi political system. These tensions were partially captured by the variables on interests and domestic political dynamics.

Four categories of independent variables were tested to offer insight into Iraq’s compliance (or non-compliance) with U.S. demands:

1. Capacity—The inability of the Iraqi government (GOI) to implement certain reforms requested by Washington unsurprisingly led to a greater likelihood of non-compliance. Nearly half of all requests, 52/106, or 49% mentioned deficient ability (as opposed to will) contributed to compliance outcome.

2. Interest—Baghdad was more inclined to comply with requests that could potentially provide short-term benefits, and less likely to comply with requests that posed potential short-term threats. Interestingly, the general subject area of requests was not statistically significant in determining compliance outcomes, but Iraq was uniquely unlikely to adopt U.S. recommendations for economic reforms, in part due to a tradition of statist economic solutions that clashed with Washington’s call for market-based solutions.

3. Dependency—Similar to findings from other counterinsurgency alliances, there was an interaction effect between Washington’s ability to independently undertake the request and whether or not interests between the U.S. and Iraq converged. If the U.S. could undertake the activity unilaterally and U.S.-Iraqi interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to incentives for Baghdad to free ride. If interests diverged and the U.S. could act unilaterally, Washington was frequently able to coerce Baghdad into complying, by threatening to act independently and excluding Iraq from a position of influence.
This was observed with U.S. requests for Baghdad to support the Sons of Iraq program.

4. War and External Threats—The consequences of operating in a warzone made it more difficult for Iraq to comply with U.S. requests.
Chapter 6:
THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN

“A western diplomat said Karzai had given ‘two fingers’ to the western donors who had pumped millions of dollars into establishing democratic elections in the country.”

An element of tension is always present between foreign intervening forces and domestic allies. But the relationship between the Washington and Kabul was exceptionally antagonistic. Afghan President Karzai blamed the U.S. for a myriad of Afghanistan’s problems, harshly condemning the U.S. mission for Afghan civilian casualties and the slow pace of development. In exchange the U.S. has called Karzai paranoid and conspiratorial—an ally requiring “frank...(and perhaps at times, confrontational) dialogue.”

Peter Galbraith, the deputy chief of the UN mission to Afghanistan, insinuated that President Karzai had a drug problem.

U.S.-Afghan tensions permeated into routine cooperative activities. In 2011 U.S. Treasury advisers “described the working conditions at DAB [Afghanistan’s National Bank] as ‘hostile,” while U.S. service members grew suspicious of their Afghan partners as U.S. soldiers were being killed by their Afghan trainees.

This chapter investigates the U.S.-Afghan partnership, exploring the dynamics that lay at the heart of these tensions, in particular

---

investigating structures that fostered or inhibited American influence over Afghan behavior.

**Summary Findings**

The Government of Afghanistan (GOA or GIRoA) had similar rates of compliance with U.S. demands when compared with other wars examined in this study. 50/148 (33.8%) requests were complied with, 42/148 (28.4%) resulted in partial compliance, and 56/148 (38.8%) went unfulfilled. Most of the demands made across the conflicts investigated resulted in approximately 1/3 full compliance, 1/3 partial compliance and 1/3 non-compliance.

Also similar to other wars examined, compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence between allied interests interacting with America's dependency on Afghanistan to implement reforms requested. However, interestingly, as discussed throughout this chapter, one aspect of this interaction effect did not hold up in Afghanistan. There was a surprisingly low frequency of free-riding in Afghanistan when compared to other conflicts, including Iraq, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. The hypothesis that free-riding should be expected when 1) allies share interests in a request, and 2) the intervening ally is capable of implementing the request independently, was not robust in Afghanistan. In Iraq, for example, the rate of full compliance with this type of request was 12.5% (3/24 requests). This is significantly lower than Iraq's overall rate of full compliance (33.3%), following the prediction of less-than-average cooperation under these conditions due to incentives to free-ride. Afghanistan, on the other hand, under the same conditions conducive to free-riding, tripled Iraq's rate of compliance, 37.5%

---

323 See Appendix B for a chart comparing wars and allied rates of compliance.
This rate is in fact even higher than the average rate of compliance across all demands made in Afghanistan 33.8% (50/148), contradicting the predicted outcome of non-compliance due to free-riding under these conditions.

Why didn’t the Afghans free-ride off American efforts even when provided incentives to do so? Based on the available documents, I argue the answer is rooted in Afghanistan’s notorious problems with corruption. Kabul frequently chose to comply with American demands that the U.S. could implement independently, in part because these policy demands create opportunities to access American funds and to influence which Afghan actors gain and lose from these policies. Complying allowed Afghan administrators to access funding sources and hold decision-making positions. Detailed examples and more information are provided throughout the chapter.

Additionally, patterns of Afghan compliance during the U.S. intervention were unique when contrasted against other counterinsurgency conflicts investigated in one other fascinating way. The probability of Kabul complying with an American demand was significantly correlated with whether or not that demand posed a potential short-term threat or imposed costs on the GIRoA. In all the conflicts investigated there was unsurprisingly some degree of correlation between a demand posing a potential threat to the domestic regime, and an increased likelihood of non-compliance. But this finding was uniquely robust in Afghanistan. It was the only conflict in which a potential political threat or economic cost inherent in a demand was consistently statistically significant predicting a failure to comply. This finding, when taken in conjunction with the Afghan failure to free-ride due to an apparent GIRoA preference to tap into potential sources of revenue rather than risk unilateral American action, indicates the GIRoA was exceptionally focused on short-term gains rather than longer-term investments. Kabul
appears to be less willing than other counterinsurgency partners to accept short-term risks and to value actions, even those taken independently by their allies that would directly benefit their regime, above short-term sources of revenue and avoiding short-term costs. This finding has interesting implications for U.S. policymakers managing the Afghan alliance, and may, at least partially, have contributed to the exceptionally chilly partnership between Washington and Kabul.

First, however because the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan did not exist prior to the U.S. intervention, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the war and the evolution of Afghan decision making under American occupation.

**Hamid Karzai and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan**

“Ultimately, the Afghan Government must be a genuine partner for our assistance efforts to succeed. It cannot be held accountable for processes over which it has little or no control.”

As General David Petraeus once noted, the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, are enormous. The previous chapter on Iraq centered on control of the central government and the transition from U.S. domination of the Iraqi state to increasing Iraqi autonomy. The following section on Afghanistan will similarly discuss the role of U.S. advisors in Afghan bureaucracies and the context of U.S. demands on the GIRoA. However, in Afghanistan this discussion of governance requires a different context. In contrast to Iraq, which experienced a long tradition of centralized state

---


control, Afghanistan had no precedent of strong federal government to build on. Local
dynamics and traditional, non-state authorities dominate politics in Afghanistan. Therefore, the starting point of the Afghan state at the moment of U.S. intervention
should not be conceptualized as an entity with unencumbered territorial control over
Afghanistan. As Washington and Kabul worked out agreements in Kabul, Afghan
territory outside the capital was frequently controlled by entities outside their reach,
including warlords and reemerging elements of the Taliban. Afghanistan had never
existed as a state with a strong center. The disconnect between control of the Afghan
state and Afghan state control of Afghanistan made the job of post-Taliban
reconstruction that much more daunting for Washington and Kabul. Although U.S. and
NATO forces have made progress throughout 2012 and 2013 to promote a more visible
presence for the Afghan federal government in rural areas, Afghanistan is still not
traditionally politically oriented for centralized state control.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks
gave the U.S. more responsibility for Afghanistan that Washington wanted. The Bush
Administration was wary of getting bogged down in an Afghan quagmire, similar to the
Soviet experience. U.S. policymakers sought to use the Northern Alliance as a proxy force
to produce a quick Afghan political alternative to the Taliban. In 2001 and 2002
Washington imagined the United Nations would be the premier international ally for
post-Taliban operations, effectively freeing U.S. forces for other potential operations and
to avoid involved development processes for Afghanistan. As expressed by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 2001, “The USG should not agonize for post-
Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban.
The sooner the Taliban is pushed out of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and
other key cities, the better. However, without slowing down the Northern Alliance’s
advance, the USG should begin discussing international arrangements for the administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek) tribes.\textsuperscript{326}

The December 2001 Bonn Agreement brought together non-Taliban Afghan political groups and international representatives to select individuals to the Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA), the political body that would develop into a post-Taliban Afghan state.\textsuperscript{327} Hamid Karzai, a Kandahari Pashtun, was appointed chairman with relative consensus.\textsuperscript{328} According to the agreement, the AIA cabinet would act as both executive and legislature, with Karzai as head of state. The AIA convened an “Emergency Loya Jirga” (Emergency Grand Council) in June 2002 to select 1,500 representatives, who in turn then voted to extend Karzai’s term of office as chief executive for two more years. The Afghan government was now called the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA).\textsuperscript{329} In January 2004, a 500+ person Loya Jirga passed a constitution, and presidential elections held in October 2004. Unsurprisingly the winner was Hamid Karzai.

During, the long transitional period between 2001-2005 the Afghan government (such as it was) did not control much of Afghanistan. Furthermore, President Karzai did not necessarily control much. According to one expert, “Even within Kabul, Karzai had only limited control over his own government, many of whose top officials led militias that had fought or were still fighting against the Taliban with U.S. support.”\textsuperscript{330} The varied regional, ethnic and militia leaders that had been cobbled together to form the post-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Dobbins} James Dobbins, Conversation with the Author, May 2012.
\bibitem{Rubin2} Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” 9.
\end{thebibliography}
Taliban Afghan state vied to maintain control of their territories, resisting centralized state control. These tensions between regional commanders (also frequently termed “warlords”), and Kabul were dealt with on a piecemeal basis over the course of the American intervention, but never eliminated. In December 2012, Ismail Khan, a commander in western Afghanistan, called for a reorganization of forces to fight the Taliban, a direct challenge to Afghan national security forces that had been organized for this purpose. Since Kabul had only tenuous authority over anti-Taliban military forces, the U.S. frequently found itself negotiating directly with regional leaders, and bypassing the Karzai administration.

Both the nascent Afghan national government and U.S. strategy in Afghanistan were alarmingly uncoordinated in the initial years of the war. Internal divisions within political organizations planted the seeds for tension in the Washington-Kabul alliance. Furthermore, disarray in the greater counterinsurgency mission led to a good deal of distrust and confusion in the partnership. Six months after the U.S. sent forces into Afghanistan in April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote to his deputies: “I may be impatient. In fact I know I’m a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me.” This was not just Rumsfeld being sarcastic. According to Ambassador Peter Tomsen, there was a fundamental failure to coordinate U.S. strategy and approaches to the Afghan state. “Inside Afghanistan, the U.S. embassy, the U.S. military, and the CIA often operated in separate stovepipes and at

---


333 Donald Rumsfeld, “Subject: Afghanistan, Memorandum to Douglas Feith” (U.S. Department of Defense, April 17, 2002); See also Donald C. Bolduc, *Bureaucracies at War: Organizing for Strategic Success in Afghanistan* (U.S. Army War College, 2009).
cross purposes. There was no integrated U.S. policy enforced by the White House to coordinate all U.S. agency efforts. Sometimes one agency back Afghans to compete with Afghan rivals supported by other agencies.” 334

As Washington and Kabul struggled in Afghanistan, their lack of internal strategic and institutional coherence took a toll on the counterinsurgency alliance. Afghanistan’s 70% illiteracy rate and political inclinations against centralized state authority made it difficult for the U.S. to build bureaucracies or for Washington to expect those bureaucracies to perform. This extraordinary low institutional capacity motivated U.S. agents to circumvent Kabul and implement projects without Afghan government participation. According to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Most international donors, including the United States, channel much of their aid ‘off-budget,’ meaning it does not go through the Afghan Government... the U.S. Government is working to meet its Kabul Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid ‘on-budget’ by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009, 35 percent in FY 2010, and 37-45 percent in FY 2011.”335 This tendency to fund projects “off-budget” was also a response to endemic government corruption in Afghanistan. Consider, for example, USAID’s decision to use Catholic Relief Services instead of Afghan government agents to distribute funds for a cash-for-work program in Ghor province because “villagers reported that some officials involved with government-run programs... diverted commodities to their own pockets. It is unclear if this is blatant corruption or

334 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 632.
335 Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, 18–19.
whether officials felt food they took was an expected return for their involvement in the organizing the activities.\textsuperscript{336}

Although perhaps more efficient in the short-term, the practice of excluding Kabul from the aid process likely imposed long-term costs on the U.S. by delaying institutional growth of the Afghan state and reinforcing Kabul’s reputation as corrupt or incapable. From 2001-2009 less than 20% of aid was “on-budget,” or channeled through Afghan government institutions. This meant parallel governance institutions were competing with Kabul for political influence across Afghanistan.

While considered by many as strategic successes for localizing the coalition military presence in Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have also been critiqued for perpetuating reliance on governance programs run by non-Afghan government entities.

President Karzai criticized the PRTs as holding back Afghan capacity-building and called for their abolition as ‘parallel governing structures’... The Afghan government and some outside organizations have long argued that the PRTs have hampered Afghan government efforts to acquire the skills and resources to secure and develop Afghanistan on its own. USAID observers say there has been little Afghan input, either into development project decision making or as contractors for facility and other construction.\textsuperscript{337}

Furthermore, the chronic shortage of educated Afghans reportedly created “donor practices of hiring Afghans at inflated salaries, [drawing] otherwise qualified civil servants away from the Afghan Government.”\textsuperscript{338} These salaries could be “10 to 20 times the amount of base government salaries ... Moreover donors provide salary support

\textsuperscript{338} Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, 3.
outside the Afghan planning and budgeting process, thereby hindering the GIRoA’s ability to assume responsibility for managing its civil service. Many of the donor-supported positions are not even authorized in the government’s staffing charts.”

These dynamics have potential implications for the dynamics of the Washington-Kabul partnership and perhaps for the demands issued by the U.S. to the GIRoA. Did the U.S. tendency to use other Afghan political players initially in the war, including warlords and regional actors, change the numbers, or types of demands Americans made on the GIRoA? And did the U.S. proclivity to provide “off-budget” aid, excluding the GIRoA from aid processes to protect U.S. funds from waste influence the characteristics of the demands made by Washington? The data indicates that this is not the case. For the reasons outlined below, the length of the U.S. intervention in Afghan provided plenty of opportunities for the U.S. to make demands to both Kabul and other political actors. Almost 30% more demands were identified for the U.S. war in Afghanistan than any other war examined in this study, including Iraq, Vietnam and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Additionally, Afghanistan’s unprecedented lack of modern governing institutions meant that the U.S. as an intervening force had a lot to ask for from Afghans that may have been take for granted in other conflicts that had more developed partners.

Furthermore, the U.S. was well aware that long-term strategic success in Afghanistan hinged on the survivability of the GIRoA. Kabul’s development and inclusion was critical to the mission. As Ambassador Tomsen discussed, even though the U.S. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency readily engaged in relationships with warlords and other characters that may have ultimately undermined

the GIRoA, the U.S. Department of State was dedicated to GIRoA inclusion. Furthermore if these dynamics influenced the kinds of requests made by Washington to Kabul, it would be reasonable to assume the U.S. would be less likely to ask the GIRoA for activities the U.S. could implement unilaterally. But the data shows that in Afghanistan the U.S. did not limit tasks requested of the GIRoA to only those requiring GIRoA assistance. For 93/128 (62.8%) of requests the U.S. was dependent on the GIRoA for participation, a figure similar to the findings from Iraq 71/106 (67%) and Sri Lanka 51/79 (64.6%).

It may be the case that in Afghanistan there was so much to ask for, so much to develop, that the U.S. had plenty of requests for the GIRoA as well as other domestic and international actors.

**The U.S. Civilian Advisory Effort**

The primary U.S. official tasked with overseeing advisory programs (AKA “building the capacity”) of the Afghan government is the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), an office first held by Richard Holbrooke in 2009. Prior to the creation of that position the duty fell to the U.S. Ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representatives reporting to the UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). Part of the Obama administration’s 2009 strategic review of U.S. policy was a “civilian surge,” a marked increase in U.S. non-military personnel sent to Afghanistan to assist in advising and building Afghan government capacity. By 2012 there were

---

340 Note that the U.S. intervention in Vietnam is a bit more of an outlier. For 49/105 (46.7%) the U.S. was dependent on Saigon for assistance, roughly 15-20% less often than what was observed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. This indicates the U.S. was more likely in Vietnam to ask for tasks it could accomplish unilaterally than in the other wars.

1,300 U.S. officials serving in civilian advisory roles in Afghanistan, up from around 400 in 2009 prior to the “surge.”

The role of advisors varied widely depending on the development condition of the Afghan office. The advisor guide to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), which oversees the Afghan police, rated MoI offices according to competency. As of May 2011 the average office ranked on the level of “Ministry organization cannot accomplish the function without significant coalition assistance.” No MOI office was yet ranked “self-reliant.” By April 2012 that rating had not shifted. The Ministry of Defense was performing a little better. By April 2012 the MoD “was assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish its mission.”

After more than a decade, the United States maintains full responsibility for training and arming the Afghan military through administration of the NATO Training Mission and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). In short, the U.S. is largely embedded in GIRoA security agencies, but it does not control the high-level GIRoA policy process. U.S. personnel and leadership are integrated into to multiple Afghan government institutions, but unlike what existed in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, or in Afghanistan under Soviet control, U.S. counseling in Afghanistan is not tantamount to control from Washington. In fact, diplomatic documents are littered with examples of U.S. officials having good degree of difficulty coping with Afghan allies. Preparing for a February 2010 meeting on electoral reform,

344 Ibid., 2–5.
346 Ibid., 14.
U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry was growing weary of corruption and actions by Kabul that threatened electoral reform. The U.S. Ambassador wrote in a memo back to D.C. “Karzai’s willingness or unwillingness to consider our perspectives and serious efforts to build a sustainable system of representative governance will be a good indication of his willingness to partner with us in the year ahead.” The U.S. does not have the type of partner it would ideally want, nor the influence over that partner it would like, through the intervention in Afghanistan. The U.S. and Afghans have an unruly partnership.

Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Afghan Compliance

Over 1,000 U.S. primary source documents (2,500+ pages) were analyzed to identify 148 unique demands from the U.S. government to their Afghan allies from 2001-2010. These documents were found in three locations. First, declassified documents located online through U.S. government agency websites, including The Office of the Secretary and Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act Library were examined. Secretary Rumsfeld’s documents in the Special Collections Library were particularly useful for this project. A second source of material came from declassified documents released to the National Security Archive. Many are available online, while others are pending publication in a declassified document set. Third, the largest source of data for this chapter was U.S. State Department cables published by Wikileaks. 2,961 cables from the U.S. Embassy were contained in the Wikileaks database, providing access to

349 http://cablesearch.org/
correspondence between U.S. and Afghan allies.\textsuperscript{350} A more detailed analysis of the Wikileaks materials is contained in Chapter 3 – Methodology.

In addition to public statements, declassified materials, and documents pulled from Wikileaks, there were two unique resources regularly clarifying the outcome of U.S. demands independent of what was in SIPRNET. One was the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an independent U.S. agency established by Congress to monitor the use of U.S. reconstruction funds in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{351} Since the U.S. usually provided funding for programs it asked the GIRoA to adopt, SIGAR materials provide reliable accounts of Afghan performance. Another helpful resource was a set of reports the U.S. Department of Defense was congressionally mandated to produce, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” These lengthy reports monitored progress, growth and developments in Afghan governance.\textsuperscript{352}

Documents analyzed date from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2012 (The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan lasted from September 11, 2001 – (Expected) December 31, 2014). The 148 demands identified date from January 10, 2002 to February 26, 2010, providing coverage of the war from its beginning to early 2010. The last request analyzed predates American withdrawal by four years for two primary reasons. One, as of writing, the war was still ongoing. It would be impossible to collect data on events that have not yet taken place. Second, the last document in the Wikileaks database is from February 28, 2010. Primary source documents currently available to the public for the last years of

\textsuperscript{350} A discussion of the source and substance of the Wikileaks U.S. Department of State Cable database is contained in the preceding chapter, Chapter 5: Iraq, in the Methodology section. The documents used for analyzing the U.S. war in Iraq also relied on materials contained in the leaked database published by Wikileaks.

\textsuperscript{351} Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. www.sigar.mil/index.html

the war are limited at best. Finding public, high-level U.S.-Afghan correspondence is not possible under the given classification requirements.

**Data on Afghan Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary**

For 50/148 (33.8%) of U.S. demands the regime in Kabul was fully compliant, 42/148 (28.4%) partially compliant, and 56/148 (37.8%) non-compliant. If partial compliance and full compliance are combined, Afghans were compliant for 92/148 (62%) of U.S. demands. These are very similar percentages to the rates observed in other conflicts analyzed in the study.

**Table 13. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Full Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Compliance Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Non Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>50/148 (33.8%)</td>
<td>42/148 (28.4%)</td>
<td>92/148 (62%)</td>
<td>56/148 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>11/22 (50%)</td>
<td>3/22 (14%)</td>
<td>14/22 (64%)</td>
<td>8/22 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>46/105 (43.8%)</td>
<td>25/105 (23.8%)</td>
<td>71/105 (68%)</td>
<td>34/105 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
<td>19/79 (24%)</td>
<td>49/79 (62%)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>35/106 (33.3%)</td>
<td>32/106 (30.5%)</td>
<td>67/106 (63.8%)</td>
<td>38/106 (36.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of verbal compliance there were 91/148 (61.5%) instances of Afghan verbal compliance with American demands, no cases of partial verbal compliance, and 8/148 (5.4%) refusals of demands. For 49/148 (33.1%) there was no available evidence regarding whether or not the Afghans provided verbal assurances that they would or would not fulfill the request. This high number of missing data points is primarily a consequence the available data. Due to the relatively recent nature of the conflict, a large percentage of U.S. documents remain classified and Afghan discussion of the period is unavailable in print. With older conflicts such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka, sizable
collections of materials have been released, allowing for greater available evidence regarding verbal communications between allies. Note that in terms of methodology, there is significantly more evidence regarding substantive compliance when compared to verbal compliance. The tangible evidence of a specific action undertaken is easier to track than words exchanged between authorities. If for example the U.S. asked Kabul to pass a piece of legislation, there is a clear public record of statutory developments. But locating reliable evidence of the specific words exchanged regarding a piece of legislation can be much more difficult.

**Table 14.** Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Verbal Agreement Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Refusal</th>
<th>No Data Available on Verbal Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>0/99 (0%)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>8/99 (8%)</td>
<td>49/148 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>20/20 (100%)</td>
<td>0/20 (0%)</td>
<td>20/20 (100%)</td>
<td>0/22 (0%)</td>
<td>2/22 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>75/83 (90%)</td>
<td>2/83 (2.4%)</td>
<td>77/83 (93%)</td>
<td>6/83 (7.2%)</td>
<td>23/106 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>0/87 (0%)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>11/87 (13%)</td>
<td>18/105 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>51/70 (73%)</td>
<td>10/70 (14%)</td>
<td>61/70 (87%)</td>
<td>9/70 (13%)</td>
<td>9/79 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, due to the recent nature of the conflict, not every request currently designated as unfulfilled is certain to stay as such until the end of the U.S. intervention. Consider for example the 2009 request the GIRoA allow for legal lumber sales. In 2006 Kabul banned timber sales in order to protect what remained of Afghanistan’s forests. This unfortunately caused sales to be conducted illicitly, and enabled the Taliban to dominate Afghanistan’s timber sales. In response the U.S. government will “push for the rapid implementation of licit timber sales.”353 As of 2012 the ban on timber sales has yet

---

to be overturned however that status can easily change. For now it is coded as non-compliant for statistical analysis, but is flagged for review in 2014. Two other requests similarly fall into this category.

Figure 16. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – U.S. in Afghanistan

Figure 16 charts the number of requests made by the U.S. by year juxtaposed with GIRoA rates of compliance with those demands. Some years have more requests complied than new requests made as Kabul fulfills requests made in previous years later in the war. The choppy nature of the number of U.S. requests and level of Afghan compliance over the course of the war in Afghanistan compared with Iraq’s steady rise

354 Compliance in the chart includes partial compliance and full compliance.
and fall (See Chapter 5: Iraq) reflects differences in the nature of the two American interventions.

Afghanistan experiences a significant drop in the number of U.S. requests from 2004-2005. There are several potential reasons why this is the case. First, as Iraq grew increasingly violent during this period, Afghanistan may have been sidelined as a priority. Although U.S. military officials, including CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks, refute claims that Afghanistan was compromised because of Iraq, other officials argue Afghanistan languished in the shadow of Iraq.355 Representative Bill Delahunt stated in the 2006, “We became too focused on Iraq, and we forgot about Afghanistan.”356 Ambassador Peter Tomsen argued it was undeniable.

Air assets and sophisticated intelligence equipment were moved to the Iraq theater. Even the large U.S. Army generators at the Kandahar Airport were taken out of Afghanistan. A U.S. CENTCOM official explained why [to Tomsen]: ‘We’re simply in a world of limited resources, and those resources are in Iraq… Anyone who tells you differently is blowing smoke.357

Second, as previously discussed, the extraordinary low institutional capacity of Kabul motivated U.S. agents to circumvent President Karzai and implement projects without Afghan government participation.358

358 According to a report produced by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Most international donors, including the United States, channel much of their aid ‘off-budget,’ meaning it does not go through the Afghan Government… [Kabul] cannot be held accountable for processes over which it has little to no control. Thus, the U.S. Government is working to meet its Kabul Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid ‘on-budget’ by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009, 35 percent in FY 2010, and 37-45 percent in FY 2011.”358 Although perhaps more efficient, eliminating the Afghan government from decision making processes on development not only inhibits the growth of institutional capacity, it also likely limits the number of demands made on those partners. In the initial years following September 11, the U.S.
The spike in U.S. demands noted in 2006 is largely a product of “The Afghanistan Compact,” a document emerging from the January 31 London Conference which compelled Kabul to negotiate a long list of reforms, benchmarks and priorities. The 2006 increase in U.S. demands is also in part a response to the resurgence of the Taliban and an increase in ISAF troop deployments. Between 2005 to 2006 Taliban suicide attacks increased 400 percent and armed attacks in Afghanistan climbed from 1,558 to 4,542.\textsuperscript{359} As the Taliban insurgency grew, the U.S. submitted more proposals to its Afghan partners to compel them to reform in an effort to counteract losing ground in the war.

The decrease in U.S. demands to Afghanistan in 2008 may have been a symptom of the change in American administrations, while the spike in 2009 is likely a consequence of President Obama’s strategic review of the Afghan war, the start of the U.S. troop surge and an American reinvestment in the conflict. The approximately 30,000 American troops in Afghanistan at the end of 2008 more than doubled to 63,000 by 2010.\textsuperscript{360} As U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan rose, the number of demands Americans put on Afghan partners similarly increased in order to complement military operations with political and economic development.

Various summary statistical models are provided in Table 15 accounting for variables that potentially influence compliance. Each of the 148 demands identified from the U.S. to its partners in Kabul was coded to account for each of these independent variables.

---

\textsuperscript{359} Tom森, The Wars of Afghanistan, 624.
Table 15. Compliance and Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependency</th>
<th>Ordered Probit – Kabul’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2002-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Unilateral Action Possible</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA Can be Excluded</td>
<td><strong>0.469</strong> (0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term: GIRoA Benefit and U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term: U.S. &amp; GIRoA Interest Convergence-Divergence and U.S. Unilateral Action</td>
<td>-1.786 (0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Benefit</td>
<td><strong>0.423</strong> (0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Regime Potential Threat</td>
<td><strong>-1.077</strong> (0.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Issue Type: Political Reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategy &amp; Military Reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or Internal Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Observations)</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01

---

361 Interest in this model is estimated by using domestic regime benefit, a dummy variable measuring if Kabul can turn what is being requested by the U.S. into a way to bolster its short-term interests such as profit making position or electoral benefit.

362 Interest in this model is estimated by a composite variable, “Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence,” which relies on the available documentary evidence to account for both private costs (threats) and benefits of the request for the domestic regime. The variable estimates in general if allied interests over the request in question converge or diverge.
Independent Variables – Explaining Compliance

Capacity

As expected, a lack of government capacity is strongly correlated with non-compliance. When the ability to execute a demand is lacking, compliance is less likely. Afghanistan has traditionally had very little infrastructure and has experienced significant problems establishing competent bureaucratic protocols. Yet despite chronic shortcomings in government, only 26% of U.S. requests (39/148) discuss a specific lack of capacity influencing the compliance process. This is likely due to American officials limiting requests based on perceived Afghan capabilities. The 26% frequency of capacity being cited as an issue was consistent with Vietnam where 27% of requests discussed capacity shortcomings, but stands in contrast to Iraq where 49% of all requests made some mention of limited Iraqi ability contributing to compliance outcomes.

This selection in the requests that are made based on capacity calculations by the intervening state is not unique to Afghanistan. The Methodology chapter discusses this bias across the wars investigated as it a consistent phenomenon in the foreign policy decision-making process of intervening states. The foreign government is less likely to ask its partners to implement tasks it does not believe its ally is capable of implementing. However, as noted elsewhere in the study, in counterinsurgency wars, there is a strong motivation to ask partners to undertake tasks that extend beyond the capabilities of the domestic ally due to the political imperative for the intervening state to lessen the burden of intervention, or hasten withdrawal.

Baghdad having almost twice the number of requests cited for capacity limitations than Kabul does not mean that Baghdad had fewer capabilities than Kabul. This is not the case. The numbers on capacity are reflecting 1) Washington limiting what
is being asked of Kabul due to the limited reach of the Afghan state and 2) Washington’s intimate knowledge of capacity constraints in Iraq. By running the Iraqi government under the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. officials were more prone to discuss organizational limitations in Iraqi institutions. This is reflected in frequent discussions of capacity constraints in Baghdad.

Washington asked the Afghans to undertake tasks related to governance that are taken as a given by the Americans in Iraq, such as issuing a single identity document across Afghanistan instead of using widely varied regional documents, creating separate prison facilities for women and juveniles, or beginning to conduct rudimentary bookkeeping in government agencies. Due to the legacy of limited bureaucratic governance left by the Taliban, efforts to promote reforms had to confront fundamental challenges such as widespread illiteracy and the customary repression of women, who otherwise would have comprised 50% of the available workforce. The request, for example, that the GIRoA require anti-narcotics certification for new Afghan police recruits was complicated by the fact that 70% of new recruits were illiterate and could not meaningfully comprehend the anti-narcotics certifications presented to them.\textsuperscript{363} Presumably if Washington had asked Kabul for the exact same reforms presented to Baghdad, there would be an increased rate of non-compliance in Afghanistan due to capacity limitations. However because U.S. officials understood the challenges (such as high illiteracy) in Afghanistan, requests to Kabul were tailored around these limitations.

The most common capacity issue affecting Kabul’s ability to implement demands came from deficient Afghan bureaucratic institutions. This was also the case in Iraq and

Vietnam. U.S. soldiers were readily available for military operations and U.S. dollars funded projects, but U.S. and Afghan officials nevertheless still had to cope with Afghanistan’s dysfunctional bureaucratic machinery. As one high-level U.S. official summarized, “Governance is the most conceptually difficult area of the [U.S.-Afghan] strategic partnership.” Coping with issues in failing governance required tackling the worst of Afghanistan’s political problems.

As discussed earlier on U.S.-Afghan relations, upon its creation in December 2001, the GIRoA emerged as a weak political actor in Afghanistan. Washington frequently established programs unilaterally or worked with extra-governmental or pseudo-governmental Afghan political actors, excluding the Afghan government. The decade long U.S. intervention has not solved this problem. As a 2011 report by the Congressional Research Service noted, “Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled or governing functions are performed by unaccountable power brokers.”

Overall, there were significant governance issues in Afghanistan affecting the outcome of U.S. requests, and almost certainly the substance of U.S. requests to Kabul as well. As in other wars examined in this study, capacity makes a significant difference in rates of compliance as it defines the domestic ally’s ability to implement a given task. Low capacity led to lower rates of compliance.

---

Dependency and Unilateral Action

Similar to Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq, there was no reliable linear relationship between Washington’s unilateral ability to implement the tasks requested of Afghanistan, and Kabul’s decision to comply with the request or not. This is indicated statistically in Table 15. As in the other wars examined in this study, foreign unilateral ability to implement the task requested of its ally interacts with the convergence or divergence of interests between the allies related to the task, having a consistent, indirect influence on compliance outcomes. The statistical model in Table 15 illustrates the interaction effect within the context of other data from the war, while Table 17 (below) isolates the effect. It indicates that if the U.S. could act unilaterally and Afghan and U.S. interests diverged, there was a higher probability of compliance as Kabul was more willing to agree in order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented without them, effectively isolating them from the decision making process, further harming their interests.

The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible. If independent action was not possible and interests converged, there was a higher likelihood of compliance, as Kabul was likely to adopt the requested actions for the sake of its own interests. If allied interests diverged and the U.S. could not implement the reform without Afghan assistance, there were higher rates of non-compliance. The GIRoA had no interest motivating compliance and likely no immediate consequences for failing to comply.
Table 16. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converge</td>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverge</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Ordered Probit—Kabul’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2002–2010 Interaction Effect With U.S. Unilateral Capabilities and Allied Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.245** (0.348)</td>
<td>2.192** (0.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.092** (0.240)</td>
<td>-1.880* (0.441)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P < 0.05, ** Indicates P < 0.01

Examples of the dynamics described above are useful for gaining perspective on the interaction between interests and unilateral ability.

---

367 The variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime.” The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Kabul’s interests based on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. Since the foreign power (U.S.) is making the request, the model assumes Washington is interested in the request. Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime (Afghanistan). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary evidence. For more on coding see Methodology Chapter. For more on interest variables see the section on interest as an independent variable.
Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible – Predicted Non-Compliance

Due to Free Riding

When Afghan and American interests converge over a given request, and Afghan participation is not required to fulfill the task, Kabul can choose to fail to comply with the request and effectively reap the benefits of the task being implemented without paying the costs associated with fulfilling the request such as money, time or effort. There are multiple examples of Afghans free-riding off American efforts in Afghanistan. The outcome of U.S. demands that the Afghans invest more heavily in the development of their energy infrastructure and issue a single national identity card according to a reasonable timeline is one example. Noting that the Americans care as much, if not more about these issues, Kabul has largely preferred to have the U.S. make the investments in energy infrastructure and have relied on the U.S. to develop technological solutions such as iris scanning and biometric data protocol and storage to compile a national identity database.368 The Afghans can benefit from American efforts without making an investment.

The broad pattern of free-riding observed in the other cases in this project did not emerge in Afghanistan, however. There was surprisingly low frequency of free-riding in Afghanistan when compared to the other conflicts examined. For example, Vietnam and Iraq’s rate of full compliance with this type of request (interests converge, foreign unilateral ability) was 28.6% (10/35 requests) and 12.5% (3/24 requests) respectively. This is significantly lower than Vietnam and Iraq’s overall rate of full compliance 43.8% and 33.3% respectively. This correlates with the hypothesis of interaction effect, which predicts less-than-average cooperation under such conditions. By contrast, the Afghan

government complied with these demands 37.5% of the time, a rate that is actually higher than the overall rate of full compliance for all requests in the Afghan conflict, 50/148 (33.8%). This finding contradicts the prediction of the model for these conditions and the findings from other conflicts.

Why did the Afghans behave differently than the Vietnamese, Sri Lankans and Iraqis in failing to free-ride off foreign allied efforts when provided incentives to free-ride? Based on the available evidence I argue the answer is rooted in Afghanistan’s notorious corruption. Kabul frequently chose to comply with demands that the U.S. could implement independently in part because these policy demands created opportunities to access American funds and to influence which domestic populations would benefit from these policies. Complying (at least in part) with these requests allowed Afghan administrators to access funding sources and augment their influence over the decision-making process, which allowed them to make more money.

Take for example U.S. demands in 2002 that Kabul adopt a strong position against poppy cultivation. The Karzai administration made opium cultivation and trafficking illegal, published eradication goals, and created multiple counter-drug enforcement organizations.\(^{369}\) The creation of the Afghan-controlled Counternarcotics Directorate (CND) and Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) allowed Afghans to influence which organizations would be shut down and which could be left alone. According to the Congressional Research Service, “many Afghan government officials are believed to profit from the drug trade... Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to

benefiting from revenue streams that the drug trade produces.” If counternarcotics operations were left entirely to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Afghans connected to the GIRoA that profit from the drug trade would risk being caught by more impartial actors. However by taking greater influence over the law enforcement process, at the request of the Americans, Afghans in charge can decide who gets punished, and can also turn these positions of influence into new opportunities to profit.

This logic was evident across multiple other drug-related demands as well, including a request to enforce the poppy ban. Several Afghan officials appear to have taken an interest in this request because it allowed them to choose which opium operations could be shut down and which would thrive. This select enforcement of the ban and its potential profits for GIRoA officials was particularly well documented in Nangarhar province from 2005-2007. Chief Afghan officials in Nangarhar were not only able to solicit payments and shut down competitors, but limited opium production boosted prices (and profits), while putting Nangarhar on the U.S. list of “good performers.” This increased foreign aid, “which was all too easily siphoned off” by GIRoA officials. Similar situations emerged in other drug initiatives encouraged by the U.S, including requests that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development take

---

372 Mankin, “Rotten to the Core.”
374 Mankin, “Rotten to the Core.”
responsibilities for alternative livelihood projects, and the establishment of Drug Intelligence, Investigative and Interdiction Units.

Aside from drug policies, other issues also appear to have been complied with (at least in part) by Afghan officials preferring to tap into U.S. revenue streams than free-ride off American efforts. In October 2006 the U.S. sought to transfer responsibility for border management to the GIRoA. There were capacity limitations, but strong motivation for the GIRoA to control and profit from border customs revenues. In Herat, for example, the U.S. Embassy reported there is “tremendous leakage in imported cargo, much of which either bypasses the customs house via other transport routes or else is sold into the local market before reaching the customs house.” Afghan customs organizations were “rife with corruption,” with “almost 70 percent of potential border revenue lost because of corruption.” High-level officials from the Ministry of Finance (Customs) and Ministry of the Interior (Border Police) had strong motivation to be involved to augment sources of income, both licit and illicit, which led to bureaucratic issues fighting for control over border management. In 2009, border management was still dominated by Americans, however the Afghan Ministries of Finance and Interior were playing an increasing role, and profiting from their positions of partial compliance, as opposed to not participating and letting the Americans carry the entire load.

---

Customs collection and counternarcotics may be prone to corrupt practices. However, even issues that are not traditionally tied to corrupt networks became sources of illicit profits in Afghanistan. The theory proposed in this study predicting non-compliance due to incentives to free-ride off allied efforts was trumped in Afghanistan by incentives to comply in order to profit in these areas as well. Consider, for example, disaster relief.\textsuperscript{381} Kabul’s disaster management bureaucracies relied on “provincial governors and warlords” to distribute aid locally. This gave local officials “tremendous power to control allocations of aid and its disbursement.”\textsuperscript{382} GIRoA provincial administrators were documented as conducting “wholesale robbery “of humanitarian assistance intended for flood victims.\textsuperscript{383} Washington sought to channel disaster relief aid through the Afghan government in order to promote popular support for the regime, a strategic goal in the counterinsurgency campaign. However, analyzing the degree of corruption in GIRoA “compliance” with U.S. requests for participation in aid programs, the U.S. Ambassador commented that unless corrupt officials are removed, “efforts in the area of humanitarian assistance meant to gain the support of the local populace will more likely serve to underline local corruption and further erode local support for the GOA [Kabul].”\textsuperscript{384}

\textsuperscript{382} Kevin Savage et al., Corruption Perceptions and Risks in Humanitarian Assistance: An Afghanistan Case Study, HPG Working Paper (Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2007), 12.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid.
Afghan compliance under conditions other allies tended to fail to comply, due to free-riding, seems to be at least partially motivated by incentives to protect and augment corrupt sources of influence. According to the data, in Afghanistan the motivation for profit has been more influential than motivations to free-ride off American efforts. Free-riding risks U.S. unilateral action will cut off lucrative illicit sources of income and political power.

Of course Afghanistan is not alone in corrupt practices, but it may be exceptional in its severity. With the rapid influx of foreign cash that corresponds with foreign troop deployment, corruption is a serious, and recurrent issue in every domestic regime examined in this study. In Afghanistan however, it has reached unprecedented proportions. As one U.S. DEA agent noted, “The big problem in this country is criminality and corruption. It’s huge. It’s just rampant. It’s rife. It’s beyond anything we’ve seen in Colombia or Mexico or any place else...”385 According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2009 Afghans paid approximately $2.5 billion in bribes, the equivalent of 23% of GDP.386 According to the U.N. the two greatest sources of revenue in Afghanistan are drugs and bribes.387 When ranked, Afghanistan has continued to be found more corrupt than Iraq, and listed second only to states such as Somalia and North Korea.388 A pervasive phenomenon, corrupt practices are well

---

387 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims.
documented in reporting between the U.S. Embassy and policymakers in Washington. For an example, consider the December 2009 report on a U.S.-backed pilot program designed to pay the Afghan police using mobile-money, an electronic, cell phone-based fund dispersal method intended to prevent superiors from siphoning cash intended to pay subordinates. Superiors accustomed to skimming off a percentage of their subordinate's salaries were unhappy about the program. The Afghan National Police commander in Jalrez in Wardak Province called the company providing technical assistance for the mobile-money program, directly asking for “a cut of his subordinates' salaries. After his request was refused, he ordered his subordinates to give him their phones and PIN numbers. On November 22, the commander collected 45 phones and demanded payment of their salaries.”

What is striking about the activities of the commander in Wardak is the seeming lack of attempt to conceal corrupt behavior in Afghanistan. Even the most senior officials are guilty of blatant corruption. Consider for example the description by the U.S. Embassy regarding the “numerous occasions” in which the Attorney General and President Karzai have authorized the release of detainees based on personal connections and nepotism. “In April, President Karzai pardoned five border policemen who were caught with 124 kilograms of heroin in their border police vehicle. The policemen, who have come to be known as the Zahir Five, were tried, convicted and sentenced to terms of 16 to 18 years each at the Central Narcotics Tribunal. But President Karzai pardoned all five of them on the grounds that they were distantly related to two individuals who had been martyred during the civil war… Separately, President Karzai tampered with the narcotics case of Haji Amanullah, whose father is a wealthy businessman and one of his

---

supporters. Without any constitutional authority, Karzai ordered the police to conduct a second investigation which resulted in the conclusion that the defendant had been framed.”390

Although corruption was certainly rampant in Iraq and Vietnam, Afghanistan is even worse. This extra emphasis on opportunities to profit interestingly counteracted incentives to free-ride off foreign forces. The Afghans instead cooperated, at least in part, with U.S. requests that were in their interests that the Americans could implement without their participation, because they were hesitant to pass up any opportunity to tap into American funding.

Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Compliance

The interaction effect between allied interests and foreign unilateral ability predicts when allied interests converge and the foreign intervening state has an ability to implement a task unilaterally, compliance from the domestic ally is likely because the domestic state must participate in order to benefit. There is no option to free-ride off the efforts of the intervening forces due to the fact that their participation is required by nature of the task at hand. This relationship held in Afghanistan, as in the other cases in this study.

To use an example again relating to Afghanistan’s serious problems with corruption, in 2006 Kabul was asked by Washington to move forward to ratify the U.N. Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The GIRQA had signed the U.N. convention in

2004, but it had not yet been ratified by the legislature. By August 2008 both houses of parliament in Afghanistan completed the ratification process, effectively complying with the U.S. demand.\(^{391}\) There were several reasons why the GIRoA collectively held that there was more benefits than costs from signing and ratifying the convention, something that only they (not the Americans) could do in Afghanistan. First, with 140 signatories the UNCAC is a popular convention. States such as North Korea, Somalia and Chad that have refused to sign the agreement have risked deepening their international reputations regarding corruption. Second, for individual lawmakers in Afghanistan, taking a public stance against signing or ratifying the anti-corruption agreement would be tantamount to publicly endorsing Afghanistan’s systems of corruption, a highly prevalent and poorly-concealed system, but nevertheless a despised part of Afghan political life. Third, there are aspects of the convention that can potentially benefit Kabul, or the elites in office, including asset recovery where signatories are able to pursue government monies that have been hidden in private bank accounts in other countries. This could potentially be used as a tool to punish various individuals, while perhaps allowing others to act with impunity.

Fourth, the institutions tied to the convention, including the Afghan High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy (HOO or HOOAC) have been established under the guidance of Afghan President Karzai. In 2010, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction [SIGAR] stated that HOO “has not been able to do more because it suffers from significant gaps in capacity; It lacks sufficient independence... In contravention of generally accepted standards and ethical codes for oversight organizations, both the Director General and Deputy Director

General of the HOO are also employed as presidential advisors within the Office of the President.\footnote{Arnold Fields, \textit{Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR): Quarterly Report to the United States Congress} (SIGAR, 2010), 14–15.} The U.S. Inspector general found evidence for this creating a conflict of interest.

Lastly, policymakers in Afghanistan likely rationalized that they could ratify the convention, but could neglect to follow up on promised reforms. This is pattern across political life in Afghanistan. As the U.S. State Department summarized in an investment risk summary for Afghanistan in 2012:

Based on the Penal Code, corruption is a serious criminal act; articles 260 to 267 state that anyone accepting or giving a bribe can be charged with criminal acts. While these anti-corruption laws exist, enforcement has been very limited. President Karzai created the High Office of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy ("HOO") to coordinate anti-corruption measures for the government; this office, however, does not control penalties and fines and has been largely ineffective. Afghanistan acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in August 2008, but is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. The early 2011 establishment of the Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) for Anti-corruption should assist the Afghan Government in assessing its compliance with UNCAC. However, questionable Afghan Government commitment to supporting the MEC and early administrative challenges plague the new organization.\footnote{Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, “2012 Investment Climate Statement - Afghanistan,” Report, \textit{U.S. Department of State}, June 7, 2012, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191093.htm.}

In other words, according to the evidence there were more benefits than costs for the GIRoA to ratify the UN Convention Against Anti-Corruption, because there were sufficient pathways to avoid actual against corruption, while simultaneously placating international donors by doing “something” about Afghanistan’s rampant corruption. Since Afghan participation was required for the demand to be implemented, and since they had interest in seeing the convention ratified, Kabul complied.
Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Compliance

Similar to other conflicts, in its intervention in Afghanistan, Washington was able to coerce its Afghan partners by threatening to implement reforms that went against the immediate interests of the Afghans if the U.S. had unilateral capacity and there were greater potential short-term costs than benefits for the Afghans. Kabul after all would rather participate and protect their interests to the greatest extent possible, rather than have their American allies implement the request unilaterally at a potentially higher cost. For the sake of consistency I will illustrate this point with another example of U.S. requests relating to corruption reform.

By 2009, Washington had grown frustrated with faltering Afghan efforts to curb corruption. The Americans aimed to set up a new anti-corruption commission. This time Washington was insisting on an organization with direct international participation, instead of previous models that relied ultimately on Afghan policy makers. Afghans with strong ties to the Office of the President dominated organizations such as Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight (HOO or HOOAC). They did not have the necessary authority or motivation to promote painful anti-corruption reforms and the U.S. sought a new approach. By late 2010, Kabul complied and established the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), a board consisting of three Afghans and three international appointees. President Karzai was careful to appoint Mohammed Yasin Osmani, a Karzai loyalist and former chief of the High Office of Oversight (HOO or HOOAC) to the MEC, despite international resistance to Osmani. The Guardian

---

newspaper reported that under Osmani HOOAC “got nowhere.” According to one former official, Osmani’s inclusion in the MEC “was a real kick in the teeth for internationals and signaled Karzai had no intention of going after those who were corrupt.”

However, the Americans were able to get at a limited level of compliance out of Kabul regarding the MEC and international participation because the Chief of the Monitoring Group (MEC) was being established by the United Nations (with the international and Afghan committee designating the MEC chair), not the Afghan government. U.S. officials appear to have grown weary of anti-corruption organizations made meaningless by being funneled through Kabul. The international community signaled to President Karzai that they were determined to establish a group other than the HOO to investigate corruption in Afghanistan. Because the U.N. was taking a large role establishing the MEC, the U.S. could threaten, at least in part, to establish an anti-corruption organization in Afghanistan to publicize corruption in the GIRoA that would be outside the influence of elites in the GIRoA.

The GIRoA had more to lose from failing to participate, when compared to joining and having some influence over the MEC. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) has reported that the GIRoA has gone along with the MEC but has attempted to interfere with certain tasks. According to SIGAR, the Department of State lauded “the progress the MEC has made in a difficult environment and noted that its work is receiving proper attention from the Afghan government... [Nevertheless] the


235
HOO has also continued to interfere with the MEC’s work, although with diminishing effect. Although President Karzai had attempted to limit the scope of the MEC in February 2012, the Afghan government did not prevent the MEC from conducting its work this quarter.”397

Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance

Understandably, if allied interests diverge and the foreign power is dependent on its domestic ally to implement the request, non-compliance is likely. This finding was undeniably robust in Afghanistan. There are dozens of examples of the Afghans not complying with demands they determine are costly if the U.S. does not have an independent capacity to implement the policy. The 2002 request that U.S. personnel be exempted from Afghan income tax is one example. The U.S. status of forces agreement signed between the U.S. and the Afghans stipulates “The Government of the United States of America, its military and civilian personnel, contractor, and contractor personnel shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar charge assessed within Afghanistan.” However GIRoA officials held that this did not cover income gained through foreign or aid contracts and pursued U.S. personnel in Afghanistan for income tax. “The international community should be happy we are implementing the rule of law,” said Said Mubin Shah, deputy minister of finance for customs and revenue. “We should work together to solve this problem and impose the rule of law, because a lot of foreign contractors are evading their taxes.”398

Interests—Costs and Benefits

This chapter has thus far addressed the impact of capacity, the wartime environment, and Washington’s unilateral ability to implement reforms without Kabul’s participation on rates of Afghan compliance with American demands. This section complements these findings by accounting for interests, a principal variable impacting compliance. Whether or not certain actions are adopted depends on what is being asked, and what potential consequences those activities will have for the domestic ally.

Subject Areas

Requests were classified by general subject matter in order to observe if trends in compliance were based on subject areas. Issue areas were not found to be statistically significant, but there are nevertheless interesting findings regarding issues and rates of compliance.

1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and expand infrastructure. Includes projects to reduce areas contaminated by landmines and allow for the legal sale of lumber. 27/148, 18% of U.S. requests. There is some potential overlap with requests classified as economic reforms, such as pricing for electricity services which is an economic policy, with growth and development goals.

2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including reforms regarding currency conversion policies, import policies and customs reforms. 25/148, 27% of U.S. requests.

3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and institutions. Including law enforcement, governance, bureaucratic protocols, constitutional reforms, sectarian issues and reconciliation programs. 89/148, 60% of U.S. requests.

4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Efforts intended to implement counterinsurgency strategy. There were no requests determined to fall into this category for the war in Afghanistan from the available sources.
5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. Including increasing security forces, and command and control protocols. 3/148, 2% of U.S. requests.\textsuperscript{399}

6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of the war effort. Including policies regarding assisting U.S. forces and weapons employed in the field. 4/148, 3% of U.S. requests.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S. to Afghanistan, 2002-2010}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{399} There are likely more demands made by the U.S. regarding military reform and military strategy that are not yet captured in the dataset examined because the materials from the U.S. Department of Defense running Afghan military training programs remain classified and are unavailable to the public. After 2005 the majority of materials in the database were collected from Department of State materials in Wikileaks, which focuses on political matters more so than military issues.
Similar to other counterinsurgency wars, in Afghanistan the correlation between issue type and compliance was not statistically significant (see Table 15). This may in part be due to certain types of requests including military reform, military strategy and counterinsurgency strategies having only few observations. Only tentative conclusions ought to be drawn from these few examples.

**Interests - Costs and Benefits**

Similar to other wars including Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq, potential short-term benefits for Kabul were one of the highest predictors of compliance. If the goal of the demand could potentially be made to directly serve the interests of the regime or Afghan policymakers, it unsurprisingly had a higher likelihood of being adopted than if it couldn’t immediately yield benefits for the regime.
For example, in December 2005 the U.S. requested Kabul implement customs reforms and increase revenue from customs. Reform had been “lagging due to weak GoA [GIRoA] commitment and systemic corruption at all levels.”\textsuperscript{400} There were capacity issues, but also a strong motivation for Kabul to implement select reforms to increase revenue through customs duties. Although corruption through an “infrastructure of leakage” continued to thrive in Afghan customs institutions, many reforms have been adopted under U.S. and IMF guidance, with customs revenues increasing 700 percent in five years, jumping from $50 million in 2004 to $399 million in 2008.\textsuperscript{401}

Naturally, requests from allies can pose potential threats or impose costs on the domestic regime as well as benefits. An example of potential costs effecting compliance outcomes was evident in the 2006 U.S. demand for increased reporting and monitoring of human rights issues in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul on the whole was not interested in greater accountability for human rights issues. By 2007 the U.S. Department of Defense was reporting that journalists reporting on human rights faced an increased likelihood of detention and the government instituted additional controls over media coverage of human rights. In response the U.S. made attempts to independently implement programs, such as micro-loan programs, promoting gender equity and other rights.\textsuperscript{402} In this case the potential costs of implementing the request motivated the GIRoA to avoid complying with American plans.

\textsuperscript{400} U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Finance Ministry Deflects Customs Reform,” 05KABUL5052, December 14, 2005), Confidential.
Interestingly, in Afghanistan potential threats predicted compliance outcomes more reliably when contrasted to Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq. Kabul appeared to be more sensitive to potential costs of requests than these other regimes in decisions regarding compliance. In every conflict examined, benefits were consistently a significant predictor of positive compliance outcomes. Potential threats or costs on the other hand, were associated with non-compliance, although not as significantly as benefits predicted a positive compliance outcome.

In Afghanistan, potential costs of the request were highly reliable and statistically significant in predicting lower probabilities of compliance. The reasons for this finding may be related to Kabul’s surprising lack of free-riding off American efforts. As described earlier in the chapter, Kabul’s affinity towards participating in situations where other allies may have instead been free-riding, is likely the product of an exceptional penchant among Afghans to take advantage of opportunities to tap into American revenue streams. Although I want to avoid oversimplifying the dynamic at hand, the data suggests Afghan compliance decisions appear to be less based on the desire to capitalize on the actions of allies, and more motivated by getting at the money of allies, while avoiding short-term financial and political risks.

Afghan decision makers appear to be exceedingly reactive to threats or costs of demands when compared to other counterinsurgency allies. When compared to other wars, in Afghanistan short-term costs and benefits are more critical in decision-making processes than the longer-term benefits of reform that are at the heart of each demand. Afghan decision makers appear to value profit over the benefits from free-riding off allied efforts, and seem to similarly value avoiding costs above accepting risks to implement requests that propose longer-term benefits. Being ravaged by war and
plagued by invading forces, Afghan political life may have fostered a generation of leaders with exceptionally short horizons for decision-making when faced with weighting short-term costs and benefits against long-term costs and benefits. The volatile nature of Afghanistan’s modern history may have taught Afghans to prioritize the immediate over the long-term to such a degree that they are exceptionally reactive to potential short-term threats and potential opportunities to make money when compared to other counterinsurgency allies. President Hamid Karzai has successfully maintained office for over a decade not despite these pressures, but in part because of them. Karzai has shown exceptional skill managing the immediate demands of Afghanistan’s domestic political interests, including warlords, political rivals, as well as Pakistani, Indian, Iranian and American interests.403

This pattern in Afghan political life had an influence on compliance outcomes with American requests. If there was short-term benefit, there was a significantly higher likelihood of compliance. If there was a potential short-term cost to the request, there was a significantly greater likelihood of non-compliance (see Table 15)

**Conditions of War and Internal Politics**

As in any government, the characteristics of Kabul’s bureaucracies influenced whether or not the Afghan government complied with certain requests. Consider, for example, the 2006 U.S. strategy for increased Afghan private sector development and economic privatization of industries including Ariana Airlines. The plan failed in part due to competing domestic political forces including parliamentarian resistance against

---

proposed privatization reforms by the Ministry of Finance.\textsuperscript{404} Additionally, the influence of domestic bureaucratic tension became evident for American policymakers managing Afghanistan’s borders. The U.S Embassy reported in 2005 that “when the [Afghan] Border Police worked by themselves, they generated serious disagreements with the Ministry of Finance (that controls the Customs Service). This disagreement has blocked further progress of the unilateral border plan designed earlier.”\textsuperscript{405} Two years later the relevant Afghan interagency situation had only deteriorated and with it the border management reforms sought by Washington. The Americans reported in 2007, “At issue during this meeting were the roles of [Government of Afghanistan] ministries at the border and in part the lack of mutual support and misunderstandings between MoF and MoI [Ministries of Finance and Interior].”\textsuperscript{406}

In 24.5\% of U.S. requests American documents mention some level of Afghan domestic political squabbling in the compliance process. This was less than the record showed regarding Iraq, in which 38\% requests had a record of domestic political complications, but more than Vietnam and Sri Lanka (11\%). However as with these other conflicts, domestic political tensions was statistically insignificant in explaining trends in compliance in Afghanistan. As was the case in other conflicts, domestic political complications had varied effects on compliance outcomes. For example, against all American demands to the contrary, Afghan President Hamid Karzai “Afghanized” the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), a watchdog group intended to deal with fraud in Afghanistan’s shaky electoral process. The U.S. demanded the ECC contain at least two international members in order to prevent the watchdog organization from

\textsuperscript{404} U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Charge’s Initial Call on New Afghan Finance Minister, 09Kabul558,” March 12, 2009.
\textsuperscript{405} U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Urgent Resource Request to Support Afghan Border Management Initiative (BMI), 05KABUL5185.”
becoming a rubber stamp for pro-Karzai election fraud. In this instance however, President Karzai was thwarted by the Afghan upper house of Parliament, which rejected Karzai’s plan to “Afghanize” the institution and the GIRoA effectively complied with U.S. demands, despite the President’s efforts to the contrary.407

War and External Threats Impacting the Compliance Environment in Afghanistan

Because Kabul was making decisions regarding compliance while facing a serious military and political threat from the Taliban insurgency, it is important to monitor how this wartime environment potentially affected compliance outcomes. As with other wars examined, a variable tracking complications from the war was created to capture aspects of coping with an insurgency, including for example violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and enemy military activities. One or more such factors were cited as affecting Afghan compliance in 11/148 (7%) of demands. This group included for example, the 2006 demand for Kabul to organize a national census to provide much-needed information for aid distribution. However in 2008 due to security concerns the Afghans canceled the census plan.408

However when Afghanistan is compared to other wars, there is a notably lower frequency of the war disturbing compliance outcomes. Afghanistan is 7%, whereas Iraq experienced such instances in 17% of requests and Vietnam was 36%. There are several potential reasons why U.S. requests to the government in Kabul were less frequently affected by the conditions of the war when contrasted with other wars such as Vietnam, Iraq and Sri Lanka. The U.S. war in Afghanistan has been long, but has had a lower level

of overall violence than other counterinsurgencies investigated.\textsuperscript{409} The Taliban conducted fewer effective military operations to disturb the U.S. and GIRoA. Although casualty rates have lowered by advances in technology and battlefield medicine, it is still helpful to keep in mind the differences between the levels of violence between Vietnam in which over 58,000 U.S. troops were killed, compared to 4,487 in Iraq and currently just over 2,000 in Afghanistan. There has been less coordinated violence in Afghanistan to disturb the compliance process, although the Taliban can be quite disruptive when determined.

As would be expected, complications from operating in wartime environment were unsurprisingly found to have a significant impact on rates of compliance with American requests in Afghanistan. It is simply more difficult to get tasks accomplished in a more complex, violent environment than if those environmental factors did not exist.

**Conclusion**

There were several important findings regarding factors affecting Afghan compliance with American demands.

1. Capacity—The inability of the Afghan government (GIRoA) to implement certain reforms requested by Washington unsurprisingly led to a greater likelihood of non-compliance. 39/148 or 26\% of U.S. requests discuss mentioned deficient ability (as opposed to will) contributing to compliance outcome.

2. Interest—Kabul was unsurprisingly more inclined to comply with requests that could potentially provide short-term benefits to Afghan politicians. Additionally, Kabul was more sensitive to potential threats posed by various threats when

compared to domestic governments in other conflicts. Requests that posed potential short-term threats to GIRoA interests were significantly less likely to result in Afghan compliance. In other conflicts, including Iraq, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, the correlation between potential costs of the request to the domestic allu and non-compliance was much weaker.

3. Dependency—Similar to findings from other counterinsurgency alliances, there was an interaction effect between Washington’s ability to independently undertake the request and whether or not interests between the Americans and the Afghans converged over the given request. If the U.S. could undertake the activity unilaterally and U.S.-Afghan interests diverged, Washington was frequently able to coerce Kabul into complying, by threatening to act independently and excluding the Afghans from positions of influence. Interestingly, however, was a relatively low frequency of free-riding in Afghanistan when compared to Iraq, Vietnam or Sri Lanka. Due to Afghanistan’s endemic level of corruption requests from the United States were often viewed as opportunities to make money, which outweighed the motivation to free-ride. This resulted in a higher likelihood of compliance than my theory predicts.
Chapter 7:

THE U.S.S.R. IN AFGHANISTAN

“Soviet officials reportedly occupy the senior positions in every Afghan Ministry except the Foreign Ministry; where Afghans—because of the Ministry’s visibility and its dealings with foreigners—occupy Deputy Director positions... All decisions are Soviet, and most Afghan civil servants simply sit at their desks and collect their paychecks.”

U.S. Department of State
“Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan”

This chapter explores the Soviet-Afghan alliance, as well as discussions of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen and Cuba in Angola. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was so costly and difficult that it is frequently cited as a catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet empire.410

Summary Findings

The chapter has several notable findings. First, according to the available documents, the Afghans agreed to all Soviet demands. Second, despite this perfect record of verbal compliance, there was no increase in rate of compliance when compared to other conflicts. Partial and full Afghan compliance totaled 64%, which is strikingly similar to the other counterinsurgency interventions examined in this study including Iraq (63.8%), Vietnam (68%), Sri Lanka (62%) and Afghanistan under the U.S. (62%). The discrepancy between verbal and substantive compliance in the Soviet-Afghan case implies there was a failure to follow-through with promises made to Soviet officials.411


411 Substantive compliance are requests coded as “complied” or “partially complied” after analyzing the outcome of those demands and what actions were undertaken to put them into action.
The data collected for the Soviet-Afghan war is unfortunately limited to the first two years of the conflict, 1979 and 1980. Data was also collected for 1978, a year before meaningful Soviet military intervention.\textsuperscript{412} After 1980, the Soviet Politburo appears to have stopped directly asking its Afghan partners for new reforms, choosing instead to use internal Soviet agents embedded in Kabul to carry out requests.\textsuperscript{413} Because this takeover of Afghan governance structures is so critical to the Afghan-Soviet dynamic it is important to discuss the history of this relationship and the day-to-day functioning of the Afghan state under Soviet occupation before conducting analysis of the data collected regarding requests and compliance outcomes.

\textbf{Table 18. Timeline of Soviet Military and Political Takeover of Afghanistan}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1978</td>
<td>Nur Mohammad Taraki overthrows Mohammed Daoud Khan and establishes a communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), run by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Taraki reaches out the Soviet Union, asking for military and financial assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1979</td>
<td>President Taraki is assassinated by agents working for his deputy, Hafizullah Amin. Both Taraki and Amin belong to the Khalq faction of the PDPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1979</td>
<td>The U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan, Soviet KGB officials assassinate Amin and install Babrak Karmal as head of the PDPA. Karmal is a leader of the non-Khalq faction of the PDPA, Parcham.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1986</td>
<td>Mohammad Najibullah, head of Afghan Intelligence (KHAD), replaces Karmal as Secretary General of the PDPA. Najibullah is also in the Parcham faction of the PDPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1988</td>
<td>Geneva Peace Accords signal the end of Soviet involvement in the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1989</td>
<td>Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{412} If there is continuity in regimes before and during foreign intervention, this was done for all wars examined in order to be sure the study captures important demands made by the foreign ally, including in the immediate period leading up to the foreign troop presence. In conflicts such as the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where there is regime change with intervention, demands are collected at the time of intervention (not before) since those are separate political entities from the allies in the counterinsurgency conflict studied throughout this project.

\textsuperscript{413} This is discussed in detail in the next section “The Soviet Military and the Takeover of Afghanistan.”
After the December 1979 Soviet invasion Afghanistan, KBG agents assassinated President Hafizullah Amin.\textsuperscript{414} Installing Babrak Karmal as President, the Soviets inserted themselves in the Afghan government. As one U.S.S.R.-Afghan historian put it, “by the close of 1979 the PDPA (The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) no longer ruled Afghanistan, the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) did.”\textsuperscript{415} The number of Soviet counselors increased, and by early 1984 reportedly 10,000+ advisors were at work in various positions in Afghan military and civilian organizations.\textsuperscript{416} By 1987, 9,000 Soviets worked in the Afghan civilian bureaucracy alone.\textsuperscript{417} According to Dr. M. Hassan Kakar, a professor at the University of Kabul imprisoned by the Karmal regime in 1982, thousands of Soviets “worked not only as advisers but also as executives in all the military and civilian departments to which they were assigned. Bureaucrats of the regime found that even routine orders had to be approved and countersigned by the Soviets.”\textsuperscript{418} KGB documents confirmed Russian involvement in the Afghan government. “The KGB used one adviser as an example. N.K. Grechin said that he wanted “to be a shadow minister,” to run the economic and financial side together with the minister of planning, to be responsible for fulfilling the plans as well as drawing them up, in fact to be jointly responsible for everything.”\textsuperscript{419}

Due to the level of involvement, the Soviet takeover of the Afghan government was not secret for long. Writing in 1983 a U.S. intelligence official, described how

\textsuperscript{415} Anthony Arnold, \textit{Afghanistan’s Two-party Communism: Parcham and Khalq} (Hoover Press, 1983), 99.
\textsuperscript{417} Henry S. Bradsher and Henry St. Amant Bradsher, \textit{Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention} (Oxford University Press, 1999), 123.
\textsuperscript{418} Kakar, \textit{Afghanistan}, 70.
“Afghan bureaucrats, including those of ministerial rank, found that even the most routine of orders had to be approved and countersigned by the ubiquitous Soviets. In fact the roles of adviser and advisee had been reversed; in 1980 it was the Afghans who advised (if tolerated to do even that) and the Soviets who decide. Typical was the new role of Vassiliy Safronchuk, now assisted by eight subordinates: no cable could be sent from the Foreign Ministry without being approved (if not actually written) by one of this group. The situation was essentially the same in other ministries.”

Soviet involvement extended into the top echelons of Afghan government. President Karmal was surrounded by a staff appointed by the Kremlin and was under constant KGB surveillance. Having witnessed Moscow’s disposal of President Amin, Karmal seemed to be careful to agree to Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, according to Henry Bradsher, a historian on U.S.S.R.-Afghan relations, not everything was harmonious in the alliance. Late in his career Karmal lamented how “Soviet ‘advisers were everywhere... I was not a leader of a sovereign state. It was an occupied state where in fact [Moscow] rules.” Bradsher also perpectively points out how the extent of Soviet control is evident in a November 13, 1986 Moscow Politburo meeting. Members are discussing several minor issues they would let the Afghan leadership directly decide, implicitly indicating that Afghans were not expected to make any other independent decisions than those minor topics delegated to them.

Understanding the involvement of the Soviets in the Afghan state helps clarify the dynamic of the Moscow-Kabul alliance and elucidate how and if this relationship influenced rates of Afghan compliance with Soviet demands, at least in the period from 1978-1980 where data is available. First it is necessary to analyze the institutions at work

---

420 Arnold, Afghanistan’s Two-party Communism, 99–100.
421 Bradsher and Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, 123.
and then it is important to examine how the organization of governance institutions impacted the greater counterinsurgency alliance and trends in Afghan compliance with Moscow’s requests.

**The KGB Factor**

The KGB was the most prominent Soviet political organization in Afghanistan. KGB operatives comprised the bulk of Soviet advisers, while the KGB’s extraordinary powers enabled it to dominate other in-country Soviet institutions.\(^{422}\) Vasiliy Mitrokhin explained how KGB personnel organizationally fell into one of two groups. The “Residency” worked from the Soviet embassy while “Representatives” “were KGB officers sent to assist the Afghan government in various functions—generally, but not exclusively, connected with security, covert operations, sabotage, intelligence, and prisons. In addition came hundreds of KGB intelligence operatives, both Afghans and Soviets, whose identities were not known to the Communist Afghan government.”\(^{423}\) Over the years the KGB expanded their control within the Afghan government and worked to make sure loyal Afghans allied to the KGB moved up in government.\(^{424}\) Ultimately, KGB officials were either working in the embassy, embedded in the Afghan government, or spying on everyone else who did.

Moscow’s takeover of the Afghan state unsurprisingly had notable consequences on Afghan government institutions and the political conditions of the war. Shortly after the invasion and KGB infiltration of Kabul there was a massive desertion of Afghan civilian and military personnel. Furthermore, not only were these officials leaving their government posts, but they were frequently defecting to the enemy, exponentially

---

\(^{422}\) Ibid.


\(^{424}\) Ibid., 101.
strengthening the emerging mujahadeen opposition. Even those that stayed eventually
grew weary of the Soviet system. In 1985 it was being reported that “many party
members... have become disillusioned and deeply resent the way they are being treated
by the Soviets.” 425 This contributed to an acute shortage of Afghan personnel, a direct
result of “the exodus of qualified personnel and strife from within the communist party...
By the end of 1983, well over four-fifths of the county’s career diplomats had quit their
posts, been forced to retire or transferred to other ministry. ” This only led to increased
reliance on Soviet staff to fill in the gaps throughout the government. 426 Remaining
Afghan personnel were largely promoted for their loyalties. Since they were being shut
out, many Afghans in the PDPA eventually gave up on their duties. One Russian official
bitterly complained that the Afghan “leadership thinks that the U.S.S.R. will solve all the
economic and military problems. All they can think about is motorcars, positions and
amusements.” 427

To compound the problem of overreliance on the Soviets, the Afghan military
suffered staggeringly high losses in manpower. Entire divisions deserted and combat
casualties remained staggeringly high. The Afghan military shrunk “from an estimated
90,000 troops in 1978 to 30,000 in 1981.” 428 Soviet forces quickly grew frustrated with
their allies. The KGB reported that Afghan “officers openly disobeyed orders, cooperated
with the Dushmen [mujahadeen] and went over to their side. Over 17,000 men had
deserted from the army by 30 April 1980. There were also vast numbers of deserters in
subsequent years. In 1981 30,000 deserted from the army, and in 1982 from 2,500 to
3,000 each month. The number of deserters was six times greater than the number killed

425 Girardet, Afghanistan, 136.
426 Ibid., 138.
428 Douglas A. Borer, Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (Psychology Press,
1999), 175.
which was also very high.”\textsuperscript{429} What remained was a shell of a government and army that required increasing levels of Soviet support.

The Soviet Bureaucracy

The KGB reportedly falsified reports being sent up the chain of command and failed to implement requests from the Politburo for reforms in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances Afghan “non-compliance” would actually be partially or entirely KGB non-compliance. This phenomenon can be observed in demands from Moscow that the Afghan communists observe laws regarding arrest, trial and detention. Moscow feared kidnappings and extrajudicial executions were becoming harmful to public support for the faltering regime. Defector Mitrokhin discussed the extent of fraudulence from the KGB, including KGB Director Yuri Andropov’s presentations to other members of the Politburo. According to Mitrokhin, the “KGB compiled reports on the events in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] and the new leadership. A memorandum, No.2519-A, dated 31 December, ‘On the Events in Afghanistan on 27 and 28 December 1979’ for the CPSU Central Committee was signed by Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko and Ponomarev... The memorandum was written according to the rules of disinformation. Facts were distorted and rearranged, and a false interpretation of the situation was given. Andropov was the only signatory who knew the whole truth about the events. He had prepared and influenced them and had stage-managed what had happened. The rest knew only part of the truth and their role had been subsidiary as a form of insurance.”\textsuperscript{430}

This type of behavior was one of several notable dysfunctional trends in the Soviet bureaucracy impacting compliance with Politburo demands and the general administration of the counterinsurgency war. Corruption within Soviet institutions was

\textsuperscript{430} Ibid., 104.
on the rise throughout the 1980s,\textsuperscript{431} while there were notable growing rivalries between the Soviet embassy, military, KGB and party that caused agencies to “work at cross-purposes” in Afghanistan and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{432} The Soviet Army had by 1980 begun to behave in ways that alarmed the CPSU and Afghan officials, “D. Panjshiri, a member of the Politburo and chairman of the Party Control [Commission] of the PDPA CC, was very upset that the Soviet army was beginning to fight against the Afghan people, was displaying unheard of cruelty and ruthlessness and was acting on the principle of ‘the worse it is, the better.’ The soldiers and officers had no aversion to marauding and speculating with military property and fuel. They disregarded the traffic rules.”\textsuperscript{433}

Furthermore, because the Afghan state was staffed by Soviets, Afghan institutions quickly began to mirror their Soviet institutional counterparts – whether or not the form or operating procedures of that organization were appropriate for its designed mission containing the insurgency. In 1982 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported, “the Soviets are helping the Afghan Communists set up the same kind of party and government institutions that the U.S.S.R. uses to control its own population.”\textsuperscript{434} The Afghan intelligence and security agency, \textit{Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati}, better known as KHAD, directly resembled the KGB, taking up intimidation campaigns and extrajudicial killings, against what Soviet leaders were advocating for in Moscow regarding rule of law and due process for the Afghans to make the regime more popular. In effect, the institutions being established in Afghanistan by Soviet officials were fundamentally not set up to comply with several critical demands of the CPSU Politburo.


\textsuperscript{433} Ibid., 120.

\textsuperscript{434} “Afghanistan: The Revolution After Four Years” (Central Intelligence Agency, July 1982), NSEA 82-10341.
These organizations were replicas of Soviet institutions that were also failing to comply with the Politburo’s demands.

The face of KHAD was Mohammad Najibullah, an ambitious Afghan official who would take over as President for Babrak Karmal in 1987. Najibullah headed KHAD, but by most accounts the institution was fundamentally “controlled by the KGB. A Soviet journal said KHAD’s KGB advisors ‘used tools of Stalin’s great terror—secret denunciations, anonymous spies, ‘confessions’ extracted by torture, secret trials for tens of thousands and public show trials for a few, unannounced executions and long prison terms.” KHAD quickly became one of the most formidable political forces in Afghanistan. One of its more prominent victims later reported that KHAD “had the power and the means to torture men and women to the point of death with impunity. Although by law the execution of a prisoner after his trial in court was the prerogative of the head of state, KhAD determined the case one way or another.”

Structures within the KHAD bureaucracy modeled on KGB characteristics that would have been potentially effective maintaining an authoritarian state were potentially harmful in counterinsurgency conflict where control of the population is tentative at best, and public opinion is traditionally considered important in determining success or failure. Kidnappings were common and interrogation personnel were rewarded for confessions, whether such admissions were genuine or false. “The establishment of the truth, which was likely to lead to the acquittal of the detainee, would deprive the interrogator of the rewards (promotion cash, trips to the Soviet Union) that he was granted when he made the detainee confess to the crime of which he or she was

---

435 Bradsher and Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, 137.
accused... It was in his interest to make the detainee guilty."\textsuperscript{437} Counterinsurgency wars however require reliable intelligence enabling government forces to pinpoint insurgents without alienating the rest of the population, risking turning opinion towards the insurgency. False intelligence that led to false arrests and imprisonment of innocent Afghans was unlikely to have helped the war effort.

\textbf{Finding a Scapegoat}

KGB and KHAD interest in political consolidation reinforced Afghan communist party division, against the greater interests of the CPSU Politburo. In their official introduction to Mitrokhin’s KGB files Cold War historians Christian Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad comment “what is most striking (and most useful) about Mitrokhin’s text is the pervasive sense it gives of the distrust that the KGB fomented and spread among Afghan and Soviets alike. While it is clear that Moscow’s interest in the critical year 1979 lay in finding ways for the two main PDPA factions to cooperate against their increasingly efficient Islamist enemies, the KGB’s operations achieved exactly the opposite—by concocting rumors and slander, the KGB contributed significantly to the destruction of the PDPA (complete in most senses before the Soviet December invasion) and to the dysfunctionality of Soviet Afghan policies.”\textsuperscript{438} Afghan leaders made the same speeches regarding reform and unity over the course of the Soviet war (1979-89), but little, if anything was ever done differently.\textsuperscript{439} From 1978-1980 the CPSU Politburo would make a demand, the Afghans would agree to it, and the KGB in Kabul would either implement the request or ignore it depending on how the request fit with KGB standard operating procedures. After 1980 the Afghans were largely cut out altogether.

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{439} Bradsher and Bradsher, \textit{Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention}, 131.
The Soviet assumption of responsibilities largely deprived their Afghan allies of the ability to make decisions about the state, but it also allowed the Afghans to deny responsibility for the political or military state of affairs, focusing instead on aspects of policy that they could potentially influence. “No resolutions were passed unless they had been prepared beforehand by the Soviets. The Afghans paid an unreasonable amount of attention to internal party intrigues. They presumed that other matters would be settled by the Soviets. They behaved like dependants but, at the same time, were noticeably insincere with their Soviet comrades. Babrak held the view that an increase of Soviet influence and intervention in Afghanistan would increase his prestige and importance but not allow the Soviets to control him as they might wish.”

The Soviets similarly found it convenient to deflect blame to their Afghan counterparts. This became a particularly useful political tool later in the war once it was obvious to the Soviet leadership that the war effort was failing. According to M. Hassan Kakar, once “Karmal’s inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said, ‘The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help.’ Colonel Nikolai Invanov, a Soviet military writer, even wrote that ‘he [Karmal] was a nobody.’ Both statements reflect a failure of Soviet foreign policy. It was because of this policy that that Karmal was unable to achieve ‘national consolidation,’ that he had become ‘a nobody.’”

Karmal was initially chosen by the Soviets to front the Afghan state after the 1979 invasion precisely because he wasn’t “a nobody.” He was a founding member of the PDPA, was a high-profile member of parliament and a well-known moderate figure in Afghan political life.

441 Kakar, Afghanistan, 74.
in the 60s and 70s. His ineffectiveness and irrelevance was at least partially due to Soviet decisions.

The use of the Afghan political leadership as scapegoats for the failure of the Soviet agenda in Afghanistan only intensified after Mohammad Najibullah took over as President in 1987. “After Karmal was replaced by Najibullah, however, Soviet media began quoting the latter’s strictures. At first this just indicated a new leaf had been tuned. But as Moscow began to back out of its Afghan quagmire, it became a way of letting the Afghans damn themselves as not deserving continuing Soviet military support. Later Moscow media added their own harsh judgments to justify the withdrawal of the Soviet Army.”

Strategy and the Soviet Intervention in the Afghan Regime, 1979-89

What were the consequences for Moscow’s heavy-handed political approach towards its Afghan allies? Did Afghan compliance with Soviet demands have a positive impact on the Soviet-PDPA war? According to the available evidence, the answer is probably not. From the evolving political and military patterns, it seems more likely that the Soviet takeover of the decision making process harmed the U.S.S.R.’s military and political agendas in Afghanistan. The takeover took away what little sovereignty the PDPA enjoyed following Soviet military intervention, causing it to become increasingly reliant on Russian advisers, assistance, decisions, money, and military operations. It increasingly lost credibility among Afghans looking for a domestic national political force. Continued Soviet intervention in the internal processes of the Afghan state made it increasingly difficult for Moscow to withdraw and for the Afghans to take over mid/high-level leadership roles. Regardless of how much money they were given, every governance duty that was assumed by the Russians on their behalf effectively shrunk Afghan

---

442 Bradsher and Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, 132–133.
bureaucratic institutional capacity. The more the Afghan communists were shut out, the more indifferent they became. “As the conference goes on the debate gets higher and the advisers move closer to the table, while the Afghans move away, and finally the Soviets are left to quarrel among themselves...’ the ‘large number of advisers...caused...a spirit of stagnation, laziness, irresponsibility, and corruption inside the [PDPA] party.”

The Soviets promoted Afghans loyal to Russian institutions such as the KGB. Although this policy likely contributed to greater Afghan-Soviet inter-alliance cooperation, it raises questions regarding the complex impact of alliances on the counterinsurgency wars they are formed to fight. Can the Afghan-Soviet dynamic be called cooperation? There seems to be a significant difference between inter-alliance cooperation, and disguise through verbal agreement accompanied by the confiscation of sovereignty and surveillance of all allied parties. What does it mean if domestic actors are loyal to the foreign power above other political and national associations? What impact could this have on the war effort and political dynamics inherent in counterinsurgent conflicts? KGB archivist Mitrokhin touched on this issue while discussing one of the KGB’a favorite Afghans, Abdul Kadyr. He noted that Kadyr “was completely trusted by the Soviet organs and military. The Residency had a high opinion of him and considered him to be a man of principle and devoted to the U.S.S.R.... Babrak was aware of his strong personality and secretly disliked and mistrusted him... A. Kadyr is loyal to the Soviet Union and will not make any important military or political moves without orders from the Soviets or their agreement.” The Soviets assumed that Kadyr’s loyalty to the KGB above Karmal and the Afghan ruling leadership benefited them and the war effort. But having glimpsed into the potential effects of the Soviet takeover of the

---

443 Ibid., 123.
Afghan state on the political dynamics of the counterinsurgency war effort in this study, it is questionable whether domestic figures placing the interests of the foreign ally above the ruling domestic regime helps the war effort, or hurts the mission of building an independent domestic state.

Additionally the Soviet-Afghan alliance is interesting for illustrating that the foreign ally does not necessarily have superior strategic plans than its domestic ally, and compliance with those demands may not lead to greater rates of success in war. There were substantial reports that Soviet strategies to combat the insurgency were poorly designed for Afghan social and political life. In 1982 the CIA wrote:

In our view, Babrak’s policies have generally failed because they have the conflicting goals of winning popular support and turning Afghanistan into a socialist state on the Soviet model. The land reform program illustrates most of the problems government efforts have encountered. The Taraki government intended the program to win peasant support and destroy the power of the “feudal” landowning elite through redistribution of land, to increase production, and to lay the basis for organizing Afghan agriculture on the Soviet model. Like many other government programs, it reflected doctrinaire Marxist misconceptions about Afghan society. Most peasants had little reason to support the program. Fragmentation of holdings was a more serious problem than large estates. Land reform threatened mutually beneficial relationships between the large landlords and the tenants or small landholders... Notwithstanding earlier failures, the Marxists still seem to regard the program as both a means of restructuring Afghan society and – despite widespread opposition – winning rural support. Babrak announced that land reform would be one of his immediate goals. His government did little about the program until the summer of 1981, when it announced a revised program that virtually abandoned the original Marxist goals in favor of winning popular support. Almost anyone who agreed to support the government would have his holdings restored... still, the government kept grievances alone by discussing such unpopular institutions as “cooperative” farms and in January it issued a probably fictitious survey of land reform that both promised that reform would follow Afghan traditions and proposed measures hat violated those traditions.445

---


260
Try as Moscow and Kabul did to implement the political and military plans designed by Russian strategists, the counterinsurgency coalition saw multiple devastating policy failures. As Kakar explained, “on 15 January 1987, while inaugurating the policy of “national reconciliation,” [a Soviet demand] Najibullah invited political groups for a dialogue about the formation of a coalition government. He also invited leaders of the Islamic groups, but in reply they reiterated their view: “the continuation of armed jihad until the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, the overthrow of the atheistic regime, and the establishment of an independent, free and Islamic Afghanistan. The former king Mohammad Zahir also rejected the call. Even within the PDPA the opposition was felt. The followers of Karmal, who numbered more than he followers of Najibullah, set up a separate faction, the SNMA.”

When the Soviets made concurrent efforts to negotiate with the Afghan resistance in order to find a way to withdraw, they too witnessed their policy proposals fail due to the decisions of enemy commanders. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the famed mujahedeen commander who later lead the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance until his assassination on September 9, 2001, was contacted later in the war by Soviets seeking to negotiate a compromise. His sent the following response:

Mister Adviser!

I already wanted to go to the place to meet the Soviet representatives when I received your latest letter. I should say for the sake of clarity: we have endured war and your presence of 10 years. God willing, we will endure it a few more days. But if you begin combat operations then we will give you a fitting rebuff. That’s all. From this day we will assign our detachments and groups the mission of being in full combat readiness.

446 Kakar, Afghanistan, 261.
With respect, Ahmad Shah Masoud, 26 December 1988

The failure of Soviet policy despite compliance of the domestic Afghan regime is of course not unique to the Soviets. There were numerous devastating strategic failures for the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Indians in Sri Lanka. But the Soviets in particular chose an extraordinarily harsh military approach to Afghanistan, were working with an extraordinary unpopular Afghan regime and had a particularly difficult time getting any of their political initiatives to succeed. The fact that they effectively took over the Afghan state, taking intervention to the point of depriving the Afghans of their sovereignty, seems to have reinforced strategic failure as it bred deepening dependency and a lack of legitimacy.

**Methodology**

One important reason for investigating counterinsurgency alliances across various wars is to capture variation in the political-military strategies employed by both allies. A product of such varying strategic approaches is deviation in the degree of foreign interference in the internal domestic state bureaucracy. American strategists in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan were reluctant to take over political functions for their allies in fear that such activities would undermine the mission to create an indigenous independent government capable of resisting the insurgency without American aid. As the U.S. Department of Defense summarized for Vietnam in a 1972 lessons learned study, “Americans should help, not substitute for, the government of our ally. To the extent that we Americans “take charge,” we postpone (and may even jeopardize) the achievement of our ultimate objectives. The application of this lesson in practice, as we have discovered in Vietnam, is difficult and calls for a careful selection and training of

448 Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain.
advisers. If we could turn back history, the process of “Vietnami-
zation” would have been
started in 1962, not 1969.”

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was guided by a
very different philosophy. According to KGB records, by the end of the invasion, Soviet
advisers “delved into all the crevices of the [Afghan] ministries.”

This contrast in
approaches to counterinsurgency alliances provides an important opportunity to
investigate compliance in different environments.

In accordance with the methodology utilized across this study, high-level primary
source decision documents were identified from relevant archives and analyzed to
identify specific demands from the foreign power on the domestic ally. The fall of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 led to an unexpected opening of archives containing files
from the CPSU Politburo (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). This allowed scholars
in the 1990s to collect and translate critical decision documents on the Afghan war. Over
200 high-level Soviet documents have been organized and made publicly available
through the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars as well as through electronic briefing books by the
Russia project at the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

These documents were used in this study to compile a list of 22 demands placed on the

---

Overview of Pacification (Unclassified)” (Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), March 1972), 33, ISA Log No.


451 Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409
with document archives indexed at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection and over
150 Soviet documents on Afghanistan, project directed by Christian Ostermann available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan
From the National Security Archive, please see: “The Diary of
Anatoly Chernyaev: Former Top Soviet Adviser’s Journal Chronicles Final Years of the Cold War,
“Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989: 20 Years Later: Tribute to Alexander Lyakhovsky Includes
Afghan communist regime, the PDPA (The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) by the CPSU Politburo.  

Analyzing individual requests for compliance outcomes and conditions similarly relied on primary source documents as well as secondary sources, including statements from former KGB officials, former Afghan political prisoners, declassified U.S. government documents analyzing the war and historical accounts of the Afghan-U.S.S.R. alliance. Note that documents from the Afghan regime were not included because they were largely destroyed when the regime collapsed in 1994. Even if PDPA documents survived and were available, there would be good reason to doubt their validity. Former KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin defected to the UK with six cases of transcribed KGB documents commented, “For the sake of personal interests the [PDPA] history of the period before and after the coup was re-written and falsified. The role and place of the party and its leaders in the life of the country were deliberately distorted. Documents, articles and letters were rewritten and altered. Approval of a person was given for personal and subjective reasons rather than on a realistic basis.” Therefore, although such PDPA documents would be interesting to analyze, the inability to obtain such records does not affect the validity of this analysis.

The Soviets on the other hand, being accustomed to unwavering state control and absolute secrecy, could afford to be much more candid in their internal memos at the level of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo. After all, Soviet officials writing from 1979-89 would have had difficulty imagining a scenario where internal

---

452 Most documents in the Cold War International History Project’s (CWIHP) Afghanistan collection are translated into English. However the few CWIHP documents that remain only in Russian as well as other non-CWIHP sources for related Soviet documents that have not yet been translated were not used in this study.

policy documents would become public. This is reflected in released documents that include highly sensitive details including specific covert operational orders to intelligence agencies such as the 1979 order to send “a parachute battalion disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team. For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB U.S.S.R. (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel.”\textsuperscript{454} Equivalent information in U.S. documents would almost certainly continue to be classified even thirty years after the event for revealing details about intelligence methods.

All 22 demands from Moscow to Kabul were identified by examining hundreds of documents from CPSU Politburo meetings between 1978 and 1980, despite the fact that the documents examined extend from January 1, 1978 to December 31, 1989.\textsuperscript{455} After 1980 Soviet Politburo members were working directly with Soviet handlers in Afghanistan and not discussing specific policy demands during meetings with Afghans, were repeating demands already made, or were concerned about Soviet military strategy over policies of the Afghan government.

Of course, because not all documents from CPSU Politburo meetings throughout the war are available, it is possible that demands made on the Afghans from 1981-89 are simply not yet in the available records. It is impossible to know what materials continue to be withheld from public release, but there are several reasons why I do not think the document record is to blame for the lack of post-1980 CPSU Politburo demands. First, Soviet implantation in the Afghan state meant that high-level Soviet officials did not


\textsuperscript{455} For more information on document sources, see footnote 6.
have to negotiate directly with Afghan leaders on most issues as Soviet subordinates in Kabul had the ability to bypass Afghans and directly implement any sought-after reforms. Second, the record shows discussion throughout the war regarding reforms the Soviets first demanded from 1978-80. The Russians acting on behalf of the Afghans typically could not conduct these reforms without Afghan assistance. One example is the recurrent Soviet request for unity in the Afghan communist party. Regardless of the policy approach they adopted, the Soviets simply could not force the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA to unite in a meaningful fashion. Factionalism continued until the regime collapsed. Both Khalq and Parcham representatives repeatedly promised they'd cooperate, while some simultaneously undermined the other side at every opportunity possible.

**Afghan Compliance with Soviet Demands**

From the available Politburo documents 22 requests from Moscow to Kabul were identified including requests to strengthen the border patrol, implement land reform and negotiate with trial leaders. For 11/22 (50%) of Soviet demands the Afghans were fully compliant, 3/22 (14%) partially compliant and in 8/22 (37%) there was non-compliance. This is not necessarily as high of a rate of compliance as one might expect considering Soviet intimidation techniques and their infiltration of Afghan government even in the early period of the war from which these requests date. However these numbers are largely consistent with rates of compliance across the types of wars investigated in this study including Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. This section of the chapter will discuss the factors that influenced these compliance outcomes in the Soviet-Afghan alliance.
There was evidence of verbal compliance for 20/22 requests, and no evidence of instances where the PDPA said “no” to requests from the Soviet CPSU.\(^{456}\) Soviet domination over Afghan bureaucracies and pervasive KGB intimidation techniques gave Afghan officials incentives to agree to Soviet demands, regardless of their intention to follow through or not. Full verbal agreement with Soviet policies came from the very top of the Soviet and Afghan leadership as the KGB reported that President “Babak [Karmal] asked the KGB representatives to assure [KGB head] Andropov that he would unswervingly carry out all Andropov’s suggestions and advice.”\(^{457}\) This was also said in public. In 1982 a reporter asked Karmal if he “disagree[d] with the Soviet Union on any matter of policy or principle?’ ‘Not at all,’ he replied. And in 1987 President Najibullah was asked ‘Are there any differences between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan on how to resolve the afghan problem?’ ‘No, none whatsoever.’ He said. ‘There is complete unanimity of views between us.’”\(^{458}\)

There were also ritual acts of agreement from lower levels of the Afghan bureaucracy towards their Soviet advisers. “Niyaz Muhamad, the head of the economic department of the PDPA Central Committee, who was in Moscow for medical treatment, said, in confidence, in December 1980 that the Afghans had been instructed to tell Soviet officials they met that there was unity in the party, the safety of the population of the whole country had been secured and good conditions for economic activity had been established. The Khalq supporters were being punished for giving Soviet specialists true information.”\(^{459}\) Moscow was demanding unity in the PDPA, Afghanistan’s communist

\(^{456}\) Two demands did not have an available translated record of whether or not there was correspondence from the Afghans agreeing or disagreeing to the policy requested.  
\(^{458}\) \textit{Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention}, 124.  
party, which nevertheless remained perpetually divided between two groups, the Parcham and Khalq. However due to their policies, the Soviet leadership unwittingly deepened this divide by overthrowing Amin, a Khalqi, and replacing him with Babrak Karmal, a Parchami. This did not unite the PDPA under Parcham domination, as the U.S.S.R. intended. Instead, because Afghan military leadership contained a sizable Khalq presence, a consequence of Taraki and Amin's pre-Soviet invasion anti-Parcham military purges, there was perpetual in-group conflict. Furthermore, Karmal was quick to undermine Khalq forces in an effort to promote Parcham agendas and to neutralize what Taraki and Amin had done to promote the Khalqis. The anti-Amin Soviet move intended to minimize division ultimately reinforced it.

Capacity was another variable impacting rates of compliance. The Afghan state failing to have the capacity to carry out the requested reform was cited in the historical record for 6/22 (27%) of requests, while the other 73% of requests did not have reported capacity issues. Of demands that did not cite capacity as an issue, 5/22 (23%) ended in non-compliance despite the PDPA reportedly having sufficient ability to undertake the request. 11/22 or (50%) of requests that did not have lacking capacity as a limiting factor concluded in either full or partial Afghan compliance. Some of the requests in which a lack of capacity was an issue illustrate the possible naïveté of Soviet planners as they first entered the war. In March 1979 Soviet officials asked the Afghans to seal its border with Pakistan. After the invasion the U.S.S.R. took over this duty and found it impossible due to terrain, cross-border culture. This, as an example, was an extraordinarily difficult task and was beyond the reach of Afghan communist forces in 1979.

Figure 19 illustrates the number of requests made by the Soviet Politburo in Moscow to their Afghan allies in the war. Again there are no new requests made from high-level Soviet leadership to the Afghans from 1981-1989 because Soviet forces were directly entrenched in the Afghan bureaucracy, enabling the CPSU Politburo to circumvent negotiating with Afghan leaders. Certain requests including promoting a comprehensive program of national reconciliation to insurgent forces, publicizing political settlement opportunities or implementing propaganda political programs for the Afghan Army were requested from Soviet leaders early in the conflict (1979-80), but nevertheless not complied with until later in the war as the strategic focus moved away from military operations towards Soviet withdrawal.
For 12/22 (55%) of demands the Soviets had the ability to unilaterally accomplish the task on their own without the Afghans; the rest of the time (45.5%), they were unable to do so. Usually this incapacity to act without the Afghans was due to political considerations. Despite their deep involvement in the Afghan state after 1979, there were several activities the Soviets did not want to unilaterally carry out without Afghan participation as such action risked public admission of their annexation of the Afghan state. The U.S.S.R. wanted to be careful not to fall into U.S. or mujahadeen propaganda chastising Moscow as an aggressive foreign invader. The Soviets decided they needed the Afghans to participate in stopping repressive techniques against other Afghan communist or politically sympathetic groups in Afghanistan, to follow rule of law procedures instead of extrajudicial proceedings, and to enact a constitution. Theoretically, for example, the Soviets could have drafted the constitution for the Afghans, although this was deemed unnecessary since the version of the constitution passed in April 1980 was based on a draft written under Amin in 1979. \(^{462}\) Regardless the Soviets were still dependent on the Afghans to go through the motions of enacting it, passing it into law, including presenting, voting on and signing the constitutional proposal. This they could not do without Afghan participation unless they wanted to admit they had commandeered the Afghan state.

Analysis of the data from the demands identified reveals that if the U.S.S.R. had the ability to unilaterally take over a task, there was a higher probability that the Afghans would comply with the request (see Table 19). This is different from what was observed in the U.S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq for example. In those conflicts, Saigon or Baghdad was not more or less likely to undertake the activity demanded by Washington based on the American’s ability to implement the request without their participation. Instead, in

\(^{462}\) Kakar, *Afghanistan*, 73.
the other war examined in depth in this study including Afghanistan (U.S.), Iraq, Vietnam and Sri Lanka, there was an interaction effect between allied interest and foreign allied unilateral capacity predicting compliance, not foreign allied unilateral ability alone.

The situation in the U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan war was quite different. Because Soviets officials became embedded in the Afghan state, taking shadow leadership positions and redesigning state policies, tasks that the U.S.S.R. could accomplish in Afghanistan without the necessary participation of their Afghan allies were either 1) complied with by the Afghans under the supervision of their Soviet advisors 2) complied with by the Afghans because resistance would fail to change the task (as U.S.S.R. personnel could carry it out any way) and such resistance could result in severe punishment.

The potential for foreign unilateral implementation of the requested action merits discussion for understanding instances of Afghan non-compliance. As discussed, despite their efforts, the Soviets were not able to unilaterally take over every duty requested, leaving the Afghans some room for the choice of non-compliance. The Soviet demand for PDPA party unity is one such example. Because it was strategically important to uphold the appearance of the PDPA government as a domestic communist revolutionary movement governing Afghanistan, Moscow could not completely destroy the Afghan communist political party, or its leaders. Furthermore, as early as 1980 the Russians wanted a way out of the conflict. Eliminating the Afghan communist leadership was seen as problematic because it would only embed them deeper in Kabul. This effectively gave the Afghans some influence over party politics. This fundamentally meant that although they agreed to Moscow’s demands that they meaningfully unite as a
single party as well as other demands such as refraining from purging potential rivals from the military, Afghans in power were frequently able to avoid substantively complying with such demands. To Moscow’s frustration, there was nothing they could do about it as long as they wanted the PDPA to continue to function. After only a year of Soviet intervention, in 1980 the KGB was reporting that Karmal was “adopting the tactics of positive inaction. He listened attentively to advice, but did little to put it into action. He often complained: “It was not my idea that I should sit at the same table as the Khalqists. What unity is this?...[Karmal’s] only concern was how to compromise the leaders of the Khalq faction. He was not concerned about consolidating the situation in the country as he considered that the Soviets must do this.”

Lastly, the PDPA was more likely to undertake the action requested by the Soviets if they could directly profit from the request or use the action to better solidify their hold on power. For example, consider the Soviet request that Kabul implement communist political programs within the Afghan army. The request provided Kabul with an opportunity to expand its political base of support and inculcate the military. Table 1 provides a model for compliance based on the 22 demands available, accounting for capacity limitations, short-term benefits and threats of the demand for Kabul and Soviet unilateral ability.

464 “SPECIAL FILE RECORD OF CONVERSATION of L.I.Brezhnev with N.M.Taraki.”
The data indicates the Afghans were less likely to comply with the demand if they did not have the capacity to implement the given request. However Soviet allies in Kabul were more likely to adopt the given demand if they had the potential to profit, or if the U.S.S.R. could undertake the given demand without their help. Overall, there is more compliance than non-compliance with Soviet requests, but nevertheless over 1/3 of requests are not fulfilled.

**Conclusion**

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan illustrates an important dynamic impacting compliance with allied demands in counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign interventions. The greater the foreign intrusion into the domestic state and the more violent the means used by the foreign power in coercing its domestic partners, the more verbal agreement the foreign ally will receive. According to the available record, Kabul never told Moscow it wouldn’t do what Moscow asked. Yet 37% of requests ended in non-compliance, a figure comparable to the percentages found in Afghanistan under U.S. occupation, Vietnam, Iraq and Sri Lanka. Comprehensive compliance with allied requests is stubborn, hovering around 1/3, regardless of the intimidation tactics adopted.
by the foreign intervening force and regardless of the rate of verbal compliance with demands.

As James C. Scott stated, “the more menacing the power, the thicker the mask.” The more heavy handed the intervening state is in its dealings with domestic allies, the more “yeses” it will hear regarding reform, but the less such statements will mean. The likelihood of non-compliance with demands is likely to stay the same regardless of promises made.

In light of these findings on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss how other authoritarian intervening states handled the political problems inherent in their counterinsurgency alliances to contrast these alliances with the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan.

Other Counterinsurgency Interventions by Non-Democratic States

Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, Syria in Lebanon

Vietnam in Cambodia

On December 25, 1978, 364 days before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 150,000 Vietnamese troops crossed into Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. On January 10, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) the new pro-Vietnamese regime was tasked with picking up the pieces of Cambodia left behind by the Khmer Rouge and genocide. In just four years, Pol Pot had killed nearly 2 million people, including eighty percent of schoolteachers and ninety-five percent of doctors. For the Vietnamese, solidifying the post-Khmer Rouge PRK regime and fighting a

466 Joel Brinkley, *Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land* (PublicAffairs, 2012), x.
counterinsurgency war against remaining Khmer would take more than decade, finally resulting in Vietnamese withdrawal in September 1989. 15,000 Vietnamese soldiers had been killed in the process, but in the end Hanoi was largely successful in the mission. By the end of the cold war Vietnam had essentially turned both Laos and Cambodia “into good neighbors. Indochina was tuned into a Vietnamese bloc, the next best thing to a Vietnamese empire.”

Following a similar model to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese dominated decision-making processes in the PRK. As stated by one scholar, “To ensure the survival of both the infant regime in Kampuchea and Vietnamese dominance in Indochina, Hanoi felt it necessary to hold Phnom Penh’s hand through all decisions big and small.” This effectively avoided managing an “alliance” between two political organizations and the messy process of inter-state negotiations examined throughout this study. Like the Soviets in Afghanistan after 1981, and the U.S. for the first 16 months of American involvement in Iraq, the Vietnamese dictated domestic policy in Cambodia by dictating high-level policies for Cambodian bureaucracies. “Long after Vietnamese advisors had set up the PRK, its Party structure, and its state bureaucracy, they continued to wield tight control over the regime. Deference to the advisors was a matter of official policy.” The Vietnamese advisers, similar to their KGB counterparts in Afghanistan, infiltrated various levels of the domestic bureaucracy during the occupation. There were three organizations charged with implementing Vietnamese policy in Cambodia. At the top was A-40. Led by Le Duc Tho, A-40 consisted of high-level political experts from Hanoi’s Central Committee tasked with controlling

---

468 Ibid.
469 Evan R. Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building (Yale University Press, 2004), 143.
the top level of the PRK. B-68 was a mid-level group tasked with overseeing everyday government functioning in the PRK. And lastly, A-50 was created to promote Vietnamese-friendly policies in the provinces.470 As one historian on the war summarized, there was “direct political control of the Phnom Penh administration – the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), later re-named the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989 – by the Vietnamese. According to the accounts of defectors from the regime, the PRK operated under the tutelage of Vietnamese advisers at all levels.”471

The Vietnamese drafted the PRK constitution and selected higher-ranking PRK officials, but turned to Cambodian nationals to staff fledgling bureaucracies.472 This led to a good deal of bureaucratic nepotism.473 The Vietnamese combatted this trend by instituting protocols for personnel authorization and inculcating top PRK personnel in Vietnam. According to one historian, the “maze of Vietnamese advisers making most decisions in Kampuchean public life was further augmented by Vietnamese selection and training of Kampuchean party and government personnel. Vietnamese advisers screened potential party members. Those selected would be sent to Vietnam for training.”474

The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is particularly interesting as the Vietnamese had themselves just previously perpetrated an insurgency in South Vietnam against American forces. Policymakers in Hanoi had a unique perspective on insurgents, which almost certainly influenced their policies in Cambodia. They invited reformed Khmer Rouge elements into political life to defuse the political basis of the insurgency,

470 Nguyen-Vo, Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict, 146; Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (Free Press, 1988), 373–374; Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 143–145.
472 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 4–5, 50, 53.
473 Ibid., 51.
474 Nguyen-Vo, Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict, 146.
adopted an outwardly inclusionary brand of Cambodian nationalistic communism, and were wary of PRK corruption and retaliatory violence that could foster sympathy for anti-government forces.\textsuperscript{475} In light of the unique experience of the Vietnamese from occupied to occupier, it is all the more disappointing that primary source documents from Vietnam on the issue cannot be accessed. The only documents that have been released are mid- and low-level records from the PRK.\textsuperscript{476}

**Egypt in Yemen**

The Egyptian military similarly took an authoritarian approach in Yemen, dominating the political decision making process in the early stages of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). With Cairo’s blessing, on September 26, 1962, a coup led by Abdullah al-Sallal overthrew Iman Muhammad al-Badr. Al-Badr had inherited north Yemen a week earlier from his deceased father, Imam Ahmed, a leader described as “the bulging-eyed tyrant of Yemen.”\textsuperscript{477} The newly established Republican regime led by al-Sallal was shortly thereafter propped up by a military intervention from Egypt. Those loyal to the overthrown Imam regrouped in the mountains to initiate an insurgency funded by Saudi Arabia. Saudi leaders were threatened by Egypt’s posturing, Cairo’s geostrategic interests in oil, and announcements that “soon after the deposition of the imam that they [Egypt] were also interested in creating a Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.”\textsuperscript{478} Disturbed by the counter-monarchial revolution orchestrated on its border by Cairo, the Saudis provided millions in cash and arms to the royalist insurgents.

Due to the weakness of the post-Imam regime in Sana’a, Egyptians quickly

\textsuperscript{475} Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, 13.
\textsuperscript{476} Ibid., xii.
\textsuperscript{477} Dana Adams Schmidt, *Yemen; the Unknown War* (Bodley Head, 1968), 20.
dominated the Yemeni republican government. As expressed by one scholar, “the Egyptians bore the major responsibility for the republic (from 1962 to 1968), all the functions of a modern state bureaucracy and administration were carried out essentially by (and even for) the Egyptians, and then only in those areas that were under the government’s control.”\textsuperscript{479} The Egyptians invested as many as 70,000 troops in Yemen at one time, losing as many as 15,000 soldiers in six years. Cairo was anxious about the success of the regime, and considered Yemen “to be a backward and medieval country.”\textsuperscript{480} Dana Adams Schmidt, an American New York Times reporter who documented the Yemeni experience under the Egyptian occupation once colorfully described the Egyptian presence in the following terms:

At all times the Egyptians were at once the [Yemen Arab] republic’s mainstay and its greatest handicap. The republic needed Egyptian help and protection, but the condescension of Egyptian teachers, experts, and officials infuriated the quick, intelligent Yemenis; the Egyptian soldiers, though well behaved and docile, were increasingly resented. In Sana the Egyptians entirely dominated the scene; on the outskirts stood acres and acres of tents surrounded by barbed wire; in the streets their fleshy bodies, clad in yellow-brown uniforms, forever bent over counters, broad buttocks facing the streets endlessly choosing rolls of cloth to send home to their wives...\textsuperscript{481}

Typical for foreign counterinsurgency interventions, the task for Egypt in Yemen became increasing protracted, complex and political.\textsuperscript{482} As one study based on Arabic-language accounts described, “with Egyptians holding key positions in every ministry and throughout the bureaucracy, and the YAR’s economy increasingly tied to Egypt’s, the military task force became an external prop for what was essentially an

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{479} Wenner, The Yemen Arab Republic, 140; See also Peterson, “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Politics of Balance,” 257; Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{480} A.I. Dawisha, “Intervention in the Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies,” Middle East Journal 29, no. 1 (Winter 1975): 48.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{481} Schmidt, Yemen; the Unknown War, 80.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{482} Dawisha, “Intervention in the Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies,” 48.}
Egyptian-sponsored experiment in republican politics."\textsuperscript{483} Only escalating costs, the British withdrawal from South Yemen, growing public distrust of censored reports, and a humiliating military defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967 convinced Cairo to withdraw. At the same time, the Saudis backed allowed the two sides to negotiate a political integration strategy known as the Compromise of 1970.\textsuperscript{484} North and South Yemen were then subsequently united in 1990.

Similar to the Vietnamese in Cambodia, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Egyptians left behind a functioning bureaucracy in Yemen, but during the military intervention dominated their Yemeni allies. For the period of occupation Egypt was institutionally embedded in decision-making processes of Yemen’s domestic political organizations.

**Cuba in Angola**

Unlike the Soviet Union, Vietnam in Cambodia and Egypt in Yemen, the evidence indicates that Cuba did not enjoy de facto control of the Angolan state during its period of intervention in Africa. In fact, due to reliance on the Soviet Union for arms, advisors and funding, it has been reported that Cuba had to make sacrifices in its authority in Angola in order to satisfy Soviet demands.

A Portuguese oil-rich colony for almost 500 years, Angola gained independence on November 11, 1975. During the period of Portuguese exodus, three Angolan nationalist groups vied for control of the new state, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), backed by Cuba and the U.S.S.R., the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) aided by Zaire (and at points the United States and


\textsuperscript{484} Wenner, *The Yemen Arab Republic*, 136.
China), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), supported by apartheid-era South Africa and the United States. By summer 1976 the Marxist-Leninist MPLA backed by Havana had successfully driven the other two groups out of the Angolan capital Luanda, and by October was holding 12 of 16 district capitals. Uprooted, the FNLA and UNITA tentatively allied together to contest the MPLA in an insurgency funded by outside powers including the United States.

At independence Angola was in pieces. Not only were competing paramilitary groups ripping it apart, the rapid withdrawal of the Portuguese governing class was creating massive political instability. 485 Cuba staged a large military intervention to support the Marxists and stabilize the country. Havana’s operation began in earnest the fall of 1975 and lasted 26 years. The Cuban force that intervened in Angola to support the MPLA counterinsurgency grew to include as many as 50,000 Cuban troops at once, complemented by 2,000 Soviet and Eastern bloc advisers. 486 How many military and civilian casualties the Cubans suffered in Angola is surprisingly difficult to estimate. In fact, tallying Cuban deaths has been called “the single most contentious issue of the Angolan operation.” 487 Accounts range from 2,200-15,000 Cuban deaths. 488

Only approximately 7% of Cubans in Angola were reportedly engaged in humanitarian or political projects although Cuban personnel regularly switched between civilian and military roles. 489 Cubans involved in civilian projects were credited for

---

485 Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties," 8.
laying the foundations for Angolan government services, but evidence of Cubans dominating the Angolan state during the intervention was not as strong as accounts regarding the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Egypt controlling the government agencies of their allies.\footnote{490} In 1977, the CIA claimed, “Cubans are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to take command of a given situation instead of acting as advisers.”\footnote{491} But this is not necessarily indicative of systematic policies to control Angolan government institutions. Unfortunately, evidence is so lacking on the war that the nature of the Cuban intervention is unclear.\footnote{492}

The Cuban intervention is interesting because it relied on Soviet financing and strategic guidance. Unfortunately, again, exactly how Moscow was involved in Angola and the effect of their role on the Cubans is relatively murky due to a lack of documentation. Accounts of the Russian role in Angola range from claims that Moscow masterminded operations and used Cubans as fodder for Soviet policy, to Moscow acting as a relatively disinterested source of money and weapons for Cuban policymakers. The reality of the Soviet role is likely to lie somewhere in between. The available evidence indicates the U.S.S.R. was a vital, long-standing supporter of the MPLA and the Cuban effort in Angola, but was seeking to avoid taking over the war. During this period Moscow was preoccupied in Afghanistan and likely did not want to inherit Angola as well. The Soviets supplied advisers (likely between 1,500-1,700), spent over $4.9 billion,

and by the mid-1980s held a small, but important number of command positions in the Angolan government army (FAPLA). The Soviets also focused on advising Angolan financial ministries, “particularly in the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank and have reportedly replaced Cubans in the Transportation, Fisheries and Trade ministries.”

By simultaneously accepting (or perhaps even insisting on) key leadership and advisory roles in Angola later in the war, but refusing to become entrenched, the Soviets likely influenced Cuban-Angolan relations, including how intimately Havana involved itself in the domestic regime in Luanda and the amount of leverage Cuba had over the Angolans. Consider, for example, the following account of Cuba dealing with the Angolan army (FAPLA): “Castro insisted that the FAPLA needed to be playing a more prominent role in [counterinsurgency operations], but when [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto suggested that the Cubans simply take over command of the FAPLA, Castro resisted, fearful of upsetting his Soviet patrons who were not only supporting the weaponry for the Cuban operation, but who were also involved in strategic planning at the FAPLA’s highest levels. As Castro saw it the Soviets would not take kindly to Cuba taking control of the army they were bankrolling, and he did little more than admonish

---

494 Ibid., 10; The shift in the war described by the CIA in the mid-1980s corresponded with Soviet ascendancy into select command positions in the Angolan army, likely a change in administration in response to military stalemate in the Cuban intervention. “A contingent of Soviet advisors (perhaps 100 officers) maintained a presence in the FAPLA High Command – overseeing the planning of operations and weapons deliveries.” However even in this era of select Soviet command, Moscow made it clear they would not stray from the “blueprint” where the Soviets funnel in cash and weapons, while the Cubans provided instruction and manpower. See George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 122, 192.
Neto to take the UNITA threat more seriously.” In other words, Castro held back on taking a controlling role over the Angolan military in order to avoid confrontation with Moscow.

The reliance on the Soviets highlights a unique dynamic in Cuba’s intervention. It was reported that the Cubans won over their Angolan allies by demanding little in terms of comfort. The Cubans reportedly accepted harsh conditions unlike their Eastern European allies. It is possible that Cuban personnel were more willing to accept difficult conditions and perhaps even demand less from their Angolan partners both in terms of their own circumstances, and in terms of development. Personnel coming from resource-rich, rational-legal bureaucracies such as those in the U.S. or U.S.S.R. may have elevated expectations compared to bureaucrats from developing states.

Lastly, another potentially unique dynamic in the Cuban intervention are reports that until 1984, Angolan authorities compensated the Cubans using profits from oil revenues. Most western accounts claim the Angolans covered room and board for Cuban nationals, but whether or not the Angolans also paid Cuban salaries, or how much the Cubans were given remains a contentious issue. Regardless of the amount, the fact that an initial assumption of the alliance included compensation for the foreign intervening force is unique to the Cuban intervention.

---

496 Ibid., 159.
498 Among large-scale foreign military interventions with a counterinsurgency mission, with over 1,000 foreign military deaths, such as the wars examined in this study.
**Syria in Lebanon**

Another counterinsurgency intervention perpetuated by an authoritarian regime that provides contrast to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the Syrian occupation of Lebanon that lasted almost 29 years.\(^\text{499}\) Restrained by Israel, Damascus did not enjoy uncontested control the Lebanese state, but it nevertheless strong-armed Lebanese policymakers and enjoyed a fair degree of control. Lebanese representatives regularly traveled to Damascus before making policy announcements and Lebanese President al-Hirawi reportedly quipped, “we now disagree on the appointment of a doorman and go to Damascus to submit the problem to the brothers [there].”\(^\text{500}\) Syria also allegedly directed Lebanese foreign policy decisions,\(^\text{501}\) and had notable influence over the Lebanese electoral process by picking candidates and building domestic political coalitions.\(^\text{502}\) But despite this influential role, Syria was limited in Lebanon by the Israelis and by the fractured nature of Lebanese politics.

Most accounts of Syrian influence in Lebanon describe Damascus dividing Lebanese groups to consolidate Syrian influence over Lebanon, yet trying to avoid provoking Israel. Syria maintained between 20,000 and 40,000 troops in Lebanon between 1976 and 2005.\(^\text{503}\) Through military and political pressure Damascus effectively

---


\(^\text{500}\) Daniel Pipes, *Syria Beyond the Peace Process* (Daniel Pipes, 1995), 47.


made itself “the godfather of Lebanese politics,” rigging elections and subverting Lebanese foreign policy.\footnote{Talbot, \textit{Syria/Lebanon: The Occupier and the Occupied}.} But due to the influence of Israel balancing Syrian domination of Lebanon as well as Iranian meddling through Hezbollah, Syria did not control Lebanese politics. Damascus fractured groups to create opportunities to mediate and maintained clients across Lebanon that allowed it bypass the Lebanese state whenever national politics became too messy.\footnote{Raymond Hinnebusch, “Pax-Syriana? The Origins, Causes and Consequences of Syria’s Role in Lebanon,” \textit{Mediterranean Politics} 3, no. 1 (1998): 152, doi:10.1080/13629399808414644.} These processes differ from other counterinsurgency interventions that more typically support one side and work to strengthen a regime against an insurgency. To assert its influence in Lebanon, Damascus, however, would frequently exploit “the rivalries of the various Lebanese factions while using the anarchy they created to make its peacekeeping indispensable and deter the involvement of rival external powers.”\footnote{Ibid., 145.}

Syria’s policies of historically supporting the insurgent group (factions associated Palestinian Liberation Organization), then instigating a large-scale military intervention in alliance with counterinsurgents to broker an agreement between groups that is favorable to their interests is an excellent introduction into the next chapter on India in Sri Lanka. As one historian writing on Syria summarized, “An invasion calculated to put a swift end to an embarrassing political situation thus served in fact to aggravate it.”\footnote{Rabinovich, \textit{The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985}, 55.} This statement is just as accurate for India in Sri Lanka as it was for Syria in Lebanon.
Chapter 8:

INDIA IN SRI LANKA

“India is engaged in threatening the future of Sri Lanka and perhaps the region. Unless India acts positively, the future of Sri Lanka will witness hard times but so will the future of India. You cannot play with fire without worrying about the spread of it to beyond what you can control.”

- Sri Lankan President Jayewardene, 1987

This dissertation examines counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, identifying conditions where the domestic partner regime complies with the demands of their foreign ally and when they are likely to dismiss such demands. This chapter is a case study of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, a war referred to as “India’s Vietnam.” The Indian mission in Sri Lanka lasted less than three years (July 1987 – March 1990), but escalated quickly within this brief period into a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign. 1555 Indian soldiers died (including 49 officers), 2987 were injured and New Delhi spent more than $1.25 billion on the effort. Despite these expenditures, the endeavor is largely considered to “have been a political and military failure.”

Summary Findings

This chapter has several notable findings regarding the India-Sri Lankan alliance and trends in coercion and compliance. First, Sri Lankan rates of compliance with Indian demands were remarkably similar to other conflicts examined in this study: 38% full

---


510 Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy* (Taylor & Francis US, 2009), 153. Cost of intervention has also been cited as 1000 Crore or more than ten billion Indian Rupees.

511 Sumit Ganguly et al., *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned* (Routledge, 2009), 155.
compliance, 24% partial compliance and 38% non-compliance.\footnote{U.S. in Vietnam [43.8% Full Compliance, 23.8% Partial Compliance, and 32.4% Non-Compliance.] U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan [50% Full Compliance, 14% Partial Compliance, 37% Non-Compliance]}

Second, due to the relative competency of the Sri Lankan state when compared to other domestic regimes examined, non-compliance due to insufficient capacity to implement requested reforms was significantly less frequent, allowing for better examination of other factors contributing to non-compliance outcomes. Third, despite India’s seemingly strong coercive leverage over Colombo, demands that failed to provide the opportunity for short-term benefits for Sri Lankans were less likely to be fulfilled. This implies that only under specific circumstances will a domestic regime regularly submit to requests that do not also serve to benefit them as well as the alliance effort. Forth, similar to the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan there is an interaction effect between interest and dependency. If India could undertake the requested activity unilaterally and Sri Lankan and Indian interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to incentives to free ride. If interests diverged and India could act unilaterally, New Delhi was able to coerce Sri Lanka into complying. Lastly, an increase in enemy activity made Colombo less likely to comply with New Delhi’s requests. Tamil offenses motivated Colombo to ignore its Indian partners and seek independent security solutions to the Tamil problem.

In order to understand the dynamics of the compliance environment in the Indian-Sri Lankan counterinsurgency effort from 1987-1990, it is first important to briefly summarize the conditions of the war and the dynamics of Indo-Sri Lankan alliance.
Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Insurgency (LTTE)—A Briefing

India’s shifting alliances between the insurgents and government counterinsurgents make this a fascinating and complex counterinsurgency intervention. From 1983-1990 New Delhi alternated between belligerents in the Sri Lankan conflict, switching from arming, funding and training Tamil independence groups to just years later sending Indian troops into Tamil regions of Sri Lanka in order to fight those same Tamil separatists. Hundreds of Indian soldiers were killed by Tamil militants Indian intelligence agents had trained and armed just years before. New Delhi sought to coerce the Sri Lankan government into compromising with Tamil leaders by funding the Tamil Tiger insurgents (LTTE), while coercing the LTTE by sending troops to uphold a primarily Indian-designed agreement signed by Colombo and New Delhi seeking to disarm the LTTE. This overestimation of its coercive influence over all parties in Sri Lanka cost India politically and militarily. After almost three years of fighting, New Delhi withdrew when the Tamil insurgents and the Sri Lankan government counterinsurgents covertly worked together to expel Indian forces from Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankans battled each other for another 20 years until the government finally triumphed in a notoriously bloody and drawn out campaign.

Understanding the dynamics of the Indian-Sri Lankan alliance requires a summary of the dynamics of the insurgency underpinning the war. Following its 1948 independence from British rule, Sri Lankan Sinhalese nationalists promoted Sinhalese social, cultural and political dominance of the multi-ethnic Sri Lankan state on behalf of the Sri Lankan Sinhalese majority. Measures such as making Sinhala and Buddhism the sole official language and religion of the state, as well as taking over education systems, restricting the Tamils admitted to universities and disenfranchising Tamil tea
plantations constituted specific discriminatory practices against Sri Lanka’s Muslim and Tamil minorities.\textsuperscript{513} Tamils were effectively excluded from government positions and benefits. The extent of such exclusion is evident later in this study in several demands made by India to the Sri Lankan government as part of the Indian counterinsurgency strategy. In 1989, for example, New Delhi requested that Colombo recruit more Tamils into the security forces. Indian military officials were alarmed to learn that Tamils, which make up approximately 20% of the population, had in the 1950s made up 40% of the Sri Lankan state military.\textsuperscript{514} However by the 80s, “of the total sanctioned strength of 72,665 Security Personnel, Tamils and Muslims do not constitute even 1 per cent.” India asked that “immediate steps... be taken to ensure that the Army, Navy and air Force reflect the ethnic composition of the country both among the Regulars and the Volunteers.”\textsuperscript{515} Sri Lankan officials agreed, but the percentage of Tamils included in government forces did not notably change.\textsuperscript{516}

In 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo were set off by increasing activity by the emerging preeminent Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, (LTTE). The violence precipitated an exodus of almost 300,000 Tamils refugees to India. The 60 million-strong sympathetic Indian Tamil population petitioned New Delhi to intervene to protect the Sri Lankan Tamils, an action signaling the start of India’s direct

\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. Indian officials concluded that this reform was “not implemented.” See also Rotberg, \textit{Creating peace in Sri Lanka}, 35.
involvement in the Sri Lanka’s Tamil problem.\textsuperscript{517} By March 1988 more than 100,000 Indian troops would be deployed in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{518}

Following the 1983 riots, India began covertly aiding Tamil separatists in order to pressure Colombo to embrace Tamil rights. New Delhi hoped this action would effectively push Colombo towards a political solution acceptable to the Indian Tamils and inspire Colombo to abandon its attempts to achieve a military victory over the LTTE. Furthermore, India was concerned Colombo was becoming dangerously close to Pakistan, Israel, China and the U.S. According to the strategic logic of Indira Gandhi, strengthening the LTTE would draw Sri Lanka away from those states as Pakistani and Israeli trainers would prove ineffective at guiding the Sinhalese to stifle the Tamil independence movement. A stronger LTTE would force Colombo to compromise with the Tamils and New Delhi. Addressing the Tamil militant safe haven growing in Tamil Nadu, the pro-LTTE region of India could not be accomplished without India. And Sri Lanka could not win decisively without addressing the Indian LTTE safe haven. India could corner Sri Lanka and demand it cut ties with Pakistan, Israel and the U.S. Simultaneously, the Gandhi dynasty would be in better position to win elections with Indian Tamil support, a reward for its efforts to promote the rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Although never officially acknowledged by the Indian government, it is open secret that by 1986 Indian intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was arming as many as 20,000 Tamil militants.\textsuperscript{519} These insurgent forces were reportedly given offices, weapons and training in Tamil Nadu in as many as 32 different camps.

\begin{itemize}
\item[517] Ganguly et al., \textit{India and Counterinsurgency}, 157.
\end{itemize}
During this period these militant groups were reportedly better armed and potentially better trained than the Sri Lankan government troops stationed in northern Sri Lanka tasked with putting down the Tamil uprising.\textsuperscript{520} The insurgents received assistance from the population and local political leaders, but according to unconfirmed sources, also had direct Indian state ties through RAW agents and other prominent Indian officials. Reportedly “some militant leaders were in fact living in the quarters provided by the State Government to Tamil Nadu politicians.”\textsuperscript{521} This sanctuary for Tamil militants in India meant that Sri Lankan forces could never militarily crush the insurgents, in effect creating notable bargaining leverage for New Delhi. Colombo would have to deal with India if it were to deal with the LTTE; much like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. quickly found they would have to deal with Pakistan to strike insurgents threatening Afghanistan.

Due to India’s support for the Tamil insurgents prior to 1987, significant tension grew between Colombo and New Delhi and relations came to a boiling point in spring of 1987. Sri Lankan forces launched an aggressive military campaign to clear LTTE operatives from the northern city of Jaffna. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi immediately condemned the strategy as well as Sri Lankan reliance on military measures for approaching the Tamil issue. New Delhi reportedly sent Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene a blunt message, “India will not allow Jaffna to be taken... India will arm the LTTE with Surface to Air Missiles (SAM-7 and 8)”\textsuperscript{522} In part due to Indian pressure, Sri Lankan forces stopped short of taking the town, but the Jaffna crisis was not over yet.

On June 1, 1987 Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit announced that due to suffering in Jaffna caused by recent Sri Lankan government offensives and Colombo’s

\textsuperscript{520} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 114.
\textsuperscript{522} Ibid., 178.
five month blockade of the Jaffna port, India was sending aid and relief supplies to the Tamils in Jaffna.\textsuperscript{523} In a public announcement Dixit asked Colombo to let Indian Red Cross ships through the Sri Lankan naval blockade in place to deny supplies to the LTTE. Sri Lankan officials were irate. Colombo issued a statement calling the allegations of suffering “unfounded. While pointing out that the tragic situation in Sri Lanka would not have become as acute as at present but for the patronage of separatist terrorism by the State of Tamil Nadu, a constituent of the Republic of India, the Government of Sri Lanka wishes to point out that neither has the Government of Sri Lanka solicited any humanitarian aid nor does the situation prevailing in the North require any assistance from any outside sources as the Government of Sri Lanka is in a position to meet all the requirements.”\textsuperscript{524}

On June 3, 1987, 19 Indian boats arrived with humanitarian supplies for the Tamil population of Sri Lanka. After a lengthy negotiation between navies, the Indian fleet was denied entry. Part of the Sri Lankan strategy to break the will of the Tamil separatists was to turn the public against the insurgents. Allowing Indian supplies into the region worked against that strategy by easing suffering and portraying Colombo as a regime that could not, or would not, provide for its citizens. New Delhi did not agree and was embarrassed by the denial. Despite its size and power, it failed to coerce Colombo to let its ships through. But Indian embarrassment did not last long. The next day Indian Air Force pilots entered Sri Lankan air space without approval and dropped 25 metric


tons of food and supplies over Jaffna. The message was clear. India could do what it wished in Sri Lankan territory, regardless of the resistance put forward by Colombo.\textsuperscript{525}

In light of this hostile interaction, as well as India’s size, regional domination, military superiority, and Tamil population three times the size of total population in Sri Lanka, it is not surprising that Colombo considered India its primary security threat.\textsuperscript{526} What is surprising then is how New Delhi and Colombo became military and political allies working to suppress the Tamil insurgency less than two months after the Jaffna airdrop.

After several years providing covert support for Sri Lankan militants, by 1987 New Delhi was losing influence over the LTTE. Prime Minister Gandhi was reportedly told by RAW intelligence officials, “India was losing control over the militants. The militants in general and the LTTE in particular, were not responsive to India and were charting their own plan of action...a settlement must be reached quickly.”\textsuperscript{527} Furthermore the presence of the LTTE was destabilizing Tamil Nadu, a sizable Indian state which has been referred to as “the Kashmir of the South.” Its strong Tamil identity, sympathy for the LTTE, and ethno-political fault lines made it a potential “problem for the unity of India.”\textsuperscript{528} Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted to diffuse the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka in order to avoid further destabilizing the Tamil-dominated parts of India. If successful, the LTTE’s goal of Sri Lankan Tamil independence could pose a threat to India, which perennially struggled to balance its powerful regional ethnic groups. Additionally caring for the 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu was getting expensive.\textsuperscript{529} For


\textsuperscript{526} Ghosh, \textit{Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)}, 48.


\textsuperscript{528} Ibid., 89.

\textsuperscript{529} Bandarage, \textit{The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka}, 112.
India, a political solution in Sri Lanka would also put an end to Colombo’s military relations with the Pakistani and Israeli contractors India found threatening. New Delhi wanted to promote a unified Sri Lanka that provided sufficient concessions to its Tamil minorities to pacify the insurgency and its supporters in Tamil Nadu.

The Indian and Sri Lankan governments held bilateral negotiations on the Tamil issues in the summer of 1987. India “represented” the Tamil groups, who were not directly present during the drafting process. On July 29, 1987 the two states signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene argued that the July 1987 accord, as well as the 10,000 Indian troops initially deployed to Sri Lanka to impose the ceasefire and LTTE weapons surrender posed no threat to Sri Lankan sovereignty. Nevertheless there was trepidation regarding India’s intrusion into a domestic Sri Lankan issue. As a prominent congressional member articulated, “These matters have caused a grave sense of fear that Sri Lanka has lost her independence and sovereignty – whatever the Government might say to the contrary... Our people are tired of being lectured to about the how independent we are and that our sovereignty has not been violated, when the events that are unfolding daily show proof to the contrary.”

The ambitious agreement intended to put an end Sri Lanka’s insurgency with India’s help delivering the Tamil militants. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene conceded a great deal in the accord, including agreeing to (temporarily) unify the Eastern and

---

530 The 54 Air Assault Division made up the core of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). By August all three of the Division’s Brigades were in Sri Lanka, but all at less than half strength. Two battalions of the 91st Infantry Brigade were near Jaffna, with an additional Battalion inside Jaffna city, 47th Infantry Brigade was in Vavuniya, south of Jaffna and the 76th Infantry Brdige at Batticaloa on tin the east. The 340 Independent Brigade was in Trincomalee, in eastern Sri Lanka. Rotberg, Creating peace in Sri Lanka, 21; Kenneth Conboy and Paul Hannon, Elite Forces of India and Pakistan (Osprey Publishing, 1992), 15. Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 21.

Northern provinces of Sri Lanka (effectively uniting Tamil areas), granting amnesty to militants, adding Tamil as an official language and withdrawing all Sri Lankan military forces from the Northern and Eastern regions. It was far more than Colombo had ever previously agreed to give the Tamils, in no small part because of pressure put on President Jayewardene from New Delhi. As Sri Lankan National Security Minister, R. Wijeratne lamented, “If we did not sign [the] Accord we would have had to fight with India. India would not have come forward [to help the Sri Lankan government], but would have given arms [to the Tamil separatists] to shoot down helicopters.”532 In exchange for the concessions given the Tamils, India promised to enforce a ceasefire, oversee a surrender of arms by Tamil militants and effectively ensure the unity of Sri Lanka by delivering the militants without giving into Tamil demands for independence.

The implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord did not go according to plan. All sides initially greeted Indian troops landing in Jaffna warmly: LTTE sympathizers, Tamil civilians and Sri Lankan government forces.533 Nevertheless, Tamil goodwill towards the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was short lived. By the end of August 1987 difficulties arose, and the LTTE began to turn against the IPKF. Among other issues, a mass suicide of LTTE commanders captured by the Sri Lankan Navy led remaining LTTE officials to distrust Indian mediation attempts. They rejected IPKF authority to enforce the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, and the Accord itself as an agreement they never explicitly approved. The IPKF became a direct LTTE target and as hardened, well-trained insurgents, the “peace-keeping” mission quickly became violent.

The ensuing Indian-led counterinsurgency effort to disarm the LTTE continued until the March 1990 withdrawal of Indian forces at the request of newly elected Sri Lankan President Premadasa. Elected in 1989 Premadasa had worked secretly with the LTTE to come to an agreement to drive Indian forces out of Sri Lanka. The LTTE did not cooperate with any government for long. Three years later Premadasa and former Sri Lankan National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali were both killed by attacks orchestrated by the LTTE. LTTE operatives also assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with a suicide attack in Tamil Nadu, India on May 21, 1991. In 1992 India declared the LTTE a terrorist organization.

**Methodology—Tracking Indian Demands and Sri Lankan Compliance**

Over 500 Indian and Sri Lankan primary source documents (900+ pages) were analyzed to identify 79 unique demands from Indian forces to their Sri Lankan allies from 1986-1990. The documents were available in English in a five volume document collection, “India-Sri Lanka: Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict Documents 1947-2000,” edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, the former Director of the Historical Division at the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA), published by India Research Press. The collection contains a wide variety of document types including press releases by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments, transcripts from parliamentary debates, formerly classified memos and “Top Secret” correspondence between the Sri Lankan President and Indian Prime Minister. In order to determine the outcome of requests I relied on documents in the previously referenced collection, collaborated with other sources such as Ministry of External Affairs Publications as well as media reports, accounts published by retired Sri Lankan and Indian military officials, reports by international organizations, and historical accounts of the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka. Lastly, I

---

534 Ganguly et al., *India and Counterinsurgency*, 167.
conducted interviews with former Indian officials and Indian counterinsurgency experts in New Delhi in February 2013, including Lieutenant General Amarjeet Singh Kalkat, former commander of the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

Documents analyzed dated from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1990 (The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka lasted from July 1987 to March 1990). The 79 demands identified date from December 19, 1986 to November 3, 1989, providing good coverage of demands made across the duration of the war. As found with other conflicts, fewer demands are made towards the end of the intervention as the foreign state prepares to leave, and reiterations of older demands have already been captured in the data collection process.

**Data on Sri Lankan Compliance with Indian Demands—Summary**

In 30/79 (38%) of Indian demands the Sri Lankans were fully compliant, 19/79 (24%) they were partial compliant and for 30/79 (38%) of requests Colombo was non-compliant. If partial compliance and full compliance are combined, the Sri Lankans were compliant for 49/79 (62%) of Indian demands - a very similar percentage to the rates observed in other conflicts analyzed in the study.
Table 20. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Full Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Compliance</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Compliance Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Non Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
<td>19/79 (24%)</td>
<td>49/79 (62%)</td>
<td>30/79 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>46/105 (43.8%)</td>
<td>25/105 (23.8%)</td>
<td>71/105 (68%)</td>
<td>34/105 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>11/22 (50%)</td>
<td>3/22 (14%)</td>
<td>14/22 (64%)</td>
<td>8/22 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>35/106 (33%)</td>
<td>32/106 (30%)</td>
<td>67/106 (64%)</td>
<td>38/106 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>50/148 (33.8%)</td>
<td>42/148 (28.4%)</td>
<td>92/148 (62%)</td>
<td>56/148 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding verbal compliance there were significantly more instances of bargaining, or partial verbal compliance between the Sri Lankans and the Indians than observed in other cases. Colombo was less willing to readily agree to a demand to the extent that South Vietnam or the PDPA/Afghan regimes appear to have been. Such instances of negotiation were coded as “partial verbal compliance,” as Sri Lanka openly amended requests from New Delhi. To clarify with an example, in January 1988 the Indians requested that President Jayewardene make a public announcement regarding the announcement of the “Sri Lankan Government’s decision to hold Provincial Council elections. President may also appoint Governors for each of the Provinces of Sri Lanka especially one Governor for the North-Eastern Province who should be a prominent Tamil figure acceptable to a wide cross section of Tamil opinion.”\(^{535}\) President Jayewardene replied that the request was “Approved, except the names of the individuals.”\(^{536}\) The President was under strong domestic political pressure not to give in to Indian and Tamil demands that Tamils govern the newly unified North-East Province.


\(^{536}\) Ibid.
It is also likely that he needed more time to compile a list of potential officials who would be acceptable to the Indians, Tamils, and Sinhalese nationalists who had disparate goals. This is a case of partial compliance as Colombo announced the decision to hold Provincial Council elections, but the President ultimately appointed Nalin Seneviratne, a Sinhalese Sri Lankan Army officer as governor of the North East Province in November 1988. This fell short of the “Tamil figure” the Indian government requested be given the position. The verbal component was similarly coded as “partial verbal compliance,” as Sri Lanka agreed to some aspects of the demand, but not all.

Overall in the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka there were 51/79 (65%) instances of Sri Lankan verbal compliance with Indian demands, 10/79 (13%) partial verbal compliance in which they agreed to only part of the request, 9/79 (11%) outright refusals of demands and in 9/79 (11%) of demands there was no available evidence regarding whether or not the Sri Lankans provided verbal assurances that they would or would not fulfill the request.

---

Table 21. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial Verbal Agreement</th>
<th>Rate of Partial and Full Verbal Agreement Combined</th>
<th>Rate of Verbal Refusal</th>
<th>No Data Available on Verbal Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Indian Demands)</td>
<td>51/70 (73%)</td>
<td>10/70 (14%)</td>
<td>61/70 (87%)</td>
<td>9/70 (13%)</td>
<td>9/79 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>75/83 (90%)</td>
<td>2/83 (2.4%)</td>
<td>77/83 (93%)</td>
<td>6/83 (7.2%)</td>
<td>23/106 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>0/87 (0%)</td>
<td>76/87 (87%)</td>
<td>11/87 (13%)</td>
<td>18/105 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (Soviet Demands)</td>
<td>20/20 (100%)</td>
<td>0/20 (0%)</td>
<td>20/20 (91%)</td>
<td>0/22 (0%)</td>
<td>2/22 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (U.S. Demands)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>0/99 (0%)</td>
<td>91/99 (92%)</td>
<td>8/99 (8%)</td>
<td>49/148(33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – Sri Lanka
Figure 20 charts the number of requests made by the Indians by year juxtaposed with the Sri Lankan rate of compliance with those demands. Both the number of requests made and the number of requests complied with follow the same trajectory. An increase in requests corresponds with an increase in the number of requests complied with. This result appears straightforward, but it is actually distinctive when compared to the other conflicts analyzed in this study, including the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. In other conflicts, compliance fluctuated, not necessarily with the number of demands made, but with developments in the conflict itself such as the Tet Offensive or inter-alliance dynamics such as the Soviet decision to replace Babrak Karmal as head of state. Were there factors inherent in the Indian-Sri Lankan alliance or the types of demands issued by New Delhi that can account for the above-illustrated symmetry between demands made and demands complied with? Why are trends in Sri Lankan compliance different than Vietnam and Afghanistan-USSR?

First, the U.S. and Soviet interventions in Vietnam and Afghanistan each lasted almost a decade. Indian military involvement in Sri Lanka, although costly for New Delhi, lasted from July 1987 to March 1990, which is less than 3 years, or less than 1/3 of the duration of Vietnam and Afghanistan. If Colombo had not worked with Tamil insurgents to expel Indian forces in 1990, a longer Indian intervention might have resulted, and may have shown different trends in rates of compliance over time. This is an interesting reminder why cross war comparison is important. In addition to its primary investigations, such comparisons provide potential insights into aspects of conflicts, such as duration, that may impact inter-alliance dynamics. That said, one important factor to keep in mind is that the leadership of all three intervening states, Compliance in the chart includes partial compliance and full compliance.
India, the United States and the U.S.S.R., believed their military deployment would be substantially shorter than they actually were. When the initial decision to deploy troops was made, Moscow and Washington never believed that they would be fighting those wars for ten years. Based on estimates provided by Indian intelligence (RAW), Rajiv Gandhi thought the LTTE disarmament process begun in July 1987 would be completed by the end of 1987 or early 1988. Each power became involved in significantly longer and bloodier interventions than anticipated.

Second, the Soviet and American missions in Vietnam and Afghanistan differed from the Indian mission in Sri Lanka in respect to what they were trying to accomplish. Washington and Moscow intended to rapidly build up allied domestic regimes that could defend themselves and the interests of their American or Soviet sponsors. India was not necessarily interested in bolstering the government of Sri Lanka. In fact India’s years of sponsoring the LTTE prior to their counterinsurgency commitment was an attempt to weaken the military position of Colombo to coerce them into a political compromise with Tamil interests. Although there is more similarity than dissimilarity in the types of demands made by India, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on their domestic allies, certain aspects of different demands reveal divergence in the foreign missions of these states. For example, New Delhi only made one request regarding Sri Lankan economic reform. It asked for a finance commission. This contrasts with 11% (12/105) of American requests to South Vietnam regarding state economic policies. Demands regarding development projects also have a similar trend. Indian demands regarding development made up 5% (4/79) of requests, whereas the American demands in Vietnam regarding

---

such types of projects made up 26% of total requests, (27/105). Appendix B attached to the study contains a chart comparing types of requests made in various wars.

**Table 22.** Compliance and Non-Compliance with Indian Demands—Sri Lanka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordered Probit – Sri Lanka’s Compliance with Indian Demands, 1986 - 1990</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indian Unilateral Action Possible</strong></td>
<td>-0.029 (0.292)</td>
<td><strong>0.854</strong> (0.390)</td>
<td>0.715 (0.401)</td>
<td><strong>1.079</strong> (0.465)</td>
<td><strong>0.960</strong> (0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka Can be Excluded</strong></td>
<td>0.175 (0.292)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lankan Benefit and Indian Unilateral Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lankan and Indian Interest Convergence-Divergence and U.S. Unilateral Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Regime Potential Benefit</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.026</strong> (0.280)</td>
<td>0.254 (0.362)</td>
<td>0.324 (0.370)</td>
<td><strong>1.568</strong> (0.379)</td>
<td>0.131 (0.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Regime Potential Threat</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.796</strong> (0.410)</td>
<td>-0.480 (0.473)</td>
<td>-0.166 (0.497)</td>
<td>-0.771 (0.441)</td>
<td>-0.200 (0.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand Issue Type:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Reform</strong></td>
<td>0.537 (0.303)</td>
<td>-0.316 (0.323)</td>
<td>0.446 (0.294)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.068 (0.660)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COIN Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.348 (0.419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Reform</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.046 (346.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Strategy &amp; Military Reform</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.764 (0.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td>-0.552 (0.350)</td>
<td>-0.776 (0.368)</td>
<td>-0.523 (0.388)</td>
<td>-0.581 (0.356)</td>
<td><strong>-0.878</strong> (0.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War or Internal Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-0.743</strong> (0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Observations)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01

---

541 Interest in this row is estimated by using Domestic Regime Potential Benefit; a dummy variable measuring if Sri Lanka can use what is being requested by India to bolster its short-term interests such as profit making position or electoral benefit.

542 Interest in this model is estimated by a composite variable, “Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence,” which relies on the available documentary evidence to account for both private costs (threats) and benefits of the request for the domestic regime. The variable estimates in general if allied interests over the request in question converge or diverge.
Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance

Capacity

Unlike the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency against Tamil militants was not motivated by impending failure of the Sri Lankan state. Colombo was not at risk of collapse in 1987. On the contrary, a notable motivation behind New Delhi’s decision to interfere was the fear in the mid-1980s that the Sri Lankan military would succeed against the Tamils, driving increasing refugees to India and leaving Indian politicians vulnerable to accusations that they did nothing to protect Tamil rights.

In light of the competence of the Sri Lankan state in comparison to other regimes analyzed in this study such as Saigon or Kabul, it is not surprising that capacity was not nearly as important of an issue limiting compliance as it was in other conflicts. Colombo’s military and political infrastructure was expansive enough to handle most of New Delhi’s demands. In only 13/79 or 16.5% of requests was a lack of capacity cited as a factor contributing to a lack of compliance, leaving 83.5% of requests unaffected by capacity limitations.

Again, although there were more similarities than differences in the types of requests made by India, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., differences in what was being asked for may also have contributed to capacity being less of a factor in the Indian intervention. New Delhi was generally not after broad institutional reforms. Its requests tended to focus on short-range issues such as the official recognition of the Tamil language or a specific election announcement made by a given date. This, in combination with Colombo’s relatively high level of competency, made capacity less of an influential issue influencing Sri Lanka’s rate of compliance.
Dependency & Unilateral Action

*Sri Lankan Free Riders?*

As indicated in model 1 in Table 22 (row 1), India’s ability to unilaterally implement a demand requested of Sri Lanka is insignificant, and slightly correlated with non-compliance. This finding differs from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s ability to unilaterally take over tasks was correlated with a higher likelihood of Afghan compliance with that task. However, as discussed in the U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan Chapter, this may be a byproduct of the Soviet philosophy of intervention in Afghanistan, where after a few months Russians had largely taken over Afghan government functions. This is a different model than one in which the foreign state works with the dependent state in an alliance. In the U.S.S.R.-Afghan experience, tasks Russians could undertake without the participation of their Afghan allies were either 1) complied with by the Afghans under the supervision of their Soviet advisors, or 2) complied with by the Afghans because resistance would fail to change the outcome, and resistance could carry a high price, as the KGB did not take kindly to dissent.

This linear relationship between compliance and unilateral ability did not exist in the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan, or the Indian offensive in Sri Lanka. In these conflicts unilateral ability impacts compliance in varying ways, as certain conditions create incentives for compliance, while others seem to motivate non-compliance. For instance, the July 1987 demand that Sri Lanka ports “not to be available for military use by any country against India,”[^543] is an example of a demand Colombo complied with that India, with its regional dominance, sizable navy, military

superiority and record of using force to protect its interests in Sri Lanka, had the physical ability to implement unilaterally if it so wished. The Indian Navy could block foreign vessels, or even go so far as unilaterally taking over Sri Lankan ports. Colombo was well aware of these capabilities, and in part complied with the Indian demand in order to avoid confrontation.

However, there are other cases where India had unilateral enforcement capability, such as the demand that Colombo act as an intermediary sending Indian funds to the LTTE in order to motivate LTTE cooperation, where Colombo did not comply despite Indian capabilities to act without Sri Lankan assistance. Similar variation exists where New Delhi did not have unilateral ability to enforce the request. Sri Lanka agreed to cancel existing contracts with multinational companies in order to contract a British-built WWII oil storage facility known as the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm only to Indian firms. India felt threatened by the multinational agreements due to U.S. corporate involvement. In this case, although it could potentially use force to take over the Oil Tank Farm, as a non-signatory to the existing agreements, it could not cancel the companies’ legal rights to existing contracts, which was the substance of the initial demand. India had to convince Colombo to cancel these agreements and sign new contacts with Indian companies, which Colombo did in 1987. On the other hand the Sri Lankan government disregarded other demands the Indians were powerless to change.


on their own, such as its demand that bilateral talks between Colombo and the LTTE stop.547

The data indicates a similar varying phenomenon in the U.S. war in Vietnam. In that war, as in Sri Lanka it turns out unilateral ability interacts with interest, which indirectly impacts compliance. The statistical model in Table 22 illustrates the interaction effect within the context of other data from the war, while Table 24 (below) isolates the effect. It indicates that if India could act unilaterally and Sri Lankan and Indian interests converged, Colombo was more likely not to comply due to incentives to free-ride. If India could act unilaterally and allied interests diverge, there was a higher probability of compliance as Colombo was more willing to agree in order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented without them anyway. The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible. If independent action is not possible and interests converge there is a higher likelihood of compliance, as Sri Lanka will undertake the action for the sake of its own interests. If alliance interests diverge and India cannot implement the reform without Sri Lankan assistance, we should expect to see higher rates of non-compliance as there is no interest motivating compliance and likely no consequences for non-compliance.

Table 23. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting Compliance Probability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24. Ordered Probit – Sri Lanka’s Compliance with Indian Demands, 1986-1990 Interaction Effect With Indian Unilateral Capabilities and Sri Lankan Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity [Control Variable]</th>
<th>Indian Unilateral Potential</th>
<th>Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence$^{548}$</th>
<th>Interaction with Unilateral Ability &amp; Allied Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.911**</td>
<td>0.901*</td>
<td>1.912**</td>
<td>-1.568**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01

$^{548}$ As discussed in previous chapters, the variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime.” The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Sri Lanka’s interests based on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. Since the foreign power (India) is making the request, we can assume they are interested in the request. Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime (Sri Lanka). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary evidence. For more on coding see Methodology Chapter. For more on interest variables see the section on interest as an independent variable. Regardless of approximation for interest, the interaction effect between unilateral capacity and interest outlined in the above graph remains statistically significant with compliance when the same regression is run substituting Benefit for Domestic Regime. Ordered Probit, Capacity - 0.690* (0.351), Unilateral Potential 1.174** (0.449), Domestic Regime Private Benefit 1.657** (0.371), Interaction between Unilateral Ability and Domestic Regime Benefit -1.656** (0.571). The Convergence/Divergence variable was produced in order to account for costs as well as benefits in the interaction in order to verify the effect is not based on perceived benefits alone.
Interests

Costs, Benefits and Colombo’s Rate of Compliance

This chapter has addressed the impact on compliance of capacity, the wartime counterinsurgency environment, increases in enemy threats, and Indian unilateral ability to implement reforms without Colombo. This section accounts complements these findings by accounting for interests, an important variable impacting compliance.

Subject Areas

Six category types were created to classify requests by general subject in order to observe if trends in compliance correlated with different types of issues.

1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and provide social services. Including provision of services for refugees and youth programs. 4/79, 5% of Indian requests.
2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including the establishment of a financial council. 1/79, 1.3% of Indian requests.
3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and institutions. Including electoral, law enforcement, governance and amnesty protocols. 45/79, 57% of Indian requests.
4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Effort intended to implement counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects, announcements recognizing Tamil grievances and pacification activities. Note, there may be certain overlaps with political reform. 10/79, 12.7% of Indian requests.
5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. Including organizing paramilitary groups and dissolving military institutions. 5/105, 6.3% of Indian requests.
6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of the war effort. Including withholding force and the position of Sri Lankan forces. 14/79, 17.7% of Indian requests.
Figure 21. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from India to Sri Lanka, 1986-1990

Figure 22. Rates of Compliance and Issue Type – India in Sri Lanka
Military Strategy and Military Reform. Interestingly the above results are notably different than what was observed in several other conflicts, in particular the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In that conflict, Saigon exhibited the highest rates of compliance with requests regarding military strategy and military reform. However, as illustrated above, in Sri Lanka these issue types had the lowest rates of compliance. There were five requests made regarding military reform, including, making the armed forces of Sri Lanka reflect ethnic make up of Sri Lankan society (instead of dominated by the Sinhalese), transferring paramilitary forces into regular security forces, inducting the Citizen Volunteer Force (CVF) into the reserve and regular police force, increasing arms available to the CVF and implementing policies that increase the strength of the CVF. Colombo did none of these things. The Sri Lankan government was distrustful of Indian advice regarding military organization. India had spent years undermining Sri Lankan efforts to suppress the Tamil insurgency through military means. Therefore its advice on how to organize and staff Sri Lankan security forces was not heeded.

Requests pertaining to military strategy had similar results. In Vietnam it was the number one issue most complied with. The South Vietnamese were less likely to see such requests as threats to their regime as military actions targeted the enemy and usually did not require internal reform. However, this was different in Sri Lanka due to the historical Indian alliance with the Tamil insurgency. Colombo was much more inclined to see requests regarding military strategy as potential threats to Sri Lanka’s security. Even though such requests targeted the Tamil threat instead of the Sri Lankan regime, Colombo was wary these requests would set back, instead of serving their struggle against the LTTE. Requests included reforms such as vacating and relocating the Sri Lankan Army following the arrival of the IPKF, the cessation of military activities in the
north, ordering the CVF to take action to evict the LTTE and to withdraw paramilitaries and “homeguard” troops.

**Political Reform and Counterinsurgency Projects.** As was the case in other conflicts investigated in this study, the vast majority of Indian requests related to political reforms New Delhi sought from Colombo. These included issues such as amending the 1956 Official Languages Act to make Tamil an official language, increasing provincial autonomy, make law enforcement protocol in the northeast the same as in the rest of Sri Lanka, passing legislation allowing displaced Tamil citizens a postal ballot, recognizing Tamil political parties and postponing election nomination deadlines. For 20/45 (44%) there was full compliance and 11/45 (24%) partial compliance, which meant for 31/45 (69%) of these requests there was notable effort on behalf of Colombo to comply. This rate of compliance made requests for political reform a better predictor of compliance when compared to other issue types. (See Table 22, Row 7.)

Other issue subject headings such as military reform, military strategy, counterinsurgency strategy and development were all associated with non-compliance when compared to requests pertaining to political reform (see Table 22, Rows 7-10). This high rate of compliance was partially caused by Colombo’s willingness to cede certain political concessions to the Indians in order to get New Delhi’s cooperation on solving the Tamil issue, since India had previously been working against Sri Lankan interests. This is in addition to India’s successful attempts to coerce Colombo into compromising with the LTTE. The September 1987 demand that Colombo agree to LTTE recommendations regarding the composition of the Interim Administrative Council, a new administrative body designed to provide policy guidance to the newly formed North-
East Province, is one example.\textsuperscript{549} The Sri Lankan government agreed to the LTTE suggestions regarding the Council.\textsuperscript{550} However the Council did not have any significant impact and Colombo became increasingly hesitant to provide such concessions, as it seemed “every concession led to more demands by the LTTE.”\textsuperscript{551}

Requests made under Indian counterinsurgency strategies such as Colombo acting as an intermediary sending Indian funds to the LTTE, announcing openings for Tamils in government and refraining from blaming the IPKF for postponing election nominations, were all coded as requests related to counterinsurgency strategy. Although several such requests can also pertain to political or military reforms, this sub-grouping is intended to capture requests specifically relating to a counterinsurgency protocol in order to track compliance trends within and across counterinsurgency strategies. Ultimately there was a mixed reaction to these requests in Sri Lanka, as Colombo complied with COIN-related demands less frequently than with other political reforms, but more frequently than with requests for military action.

\textit{Development and Economic Reform.} Lastly, as previously discussed, compared to other conflicts including the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, there were very few Indian requests for economic and development-related requests. The majority of such requests related to instructions on handling Tamil refugees. This lack of Indian interest in such topics may be at least partially attributable to the high capacity of the Sri Lankan state when compared to other domestic partner regimes. India perhaps did not feel it needed to pressure Colombo to implement

\textsuperscript{550} India. Parliament. Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Debates (Lok Sabha Secretariat., 1987), 457.
\textsuperscript{551} Silva, Regional Powers and Small State Security, 258.
economic reforms or development projects, because there were somewhat comprehensive policies already in place. Additionally, and likely even more critical in explaining to the lack of such requests, is that fact that New Delhi was not as invested as other intervening states in the long term development of the Sri Lankan government and therefore did not have similar plans regarding financial and developmental restructuring. The few requests that were made had a mixed record of compliance, and ultimately were correlated with higher levels of non-compliance when compared with requests for political reform.

These findings are helpful for understanding general trends in compliance among various issues, in particular when contrasted against the findings in other conflicts. However, as has been the case in other conflicts analyzed in this study the correlation between issue type and compliance are not as significant or reliable as other variables included in the study (see Table 22). There are several reasons why this is the case. Firstly, there are too few cases of certain types of requests, causing disproportionate distribution between issue areas being analyzed. As previously mentioned, in Sri Lanka there were very few cases of request regarding economic reform (1/79), development (4/79), or military reform (5/79), making compliance findings among these categories less reliable in comparison with other issues such as political reform, (45/79).

Due to the inequity in distribution the statistical models in Table 22 primarily rely on comparing requests relating to political reform against the other kinds of issue categories combined. From this analysis it is possible to conclude that in the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka there is a higher likelihood of that requests for political reform be complied with when compared with requests asking for other reforms. This is in part testament to Indian coercive influence in getting Colombo to provide political
concessions to Sri Lanka’s Tamils, especially earlier in the conflict before the Tamil insurgency turned against Indian soldiers, making it evident to Colombo that New Delhi could not sufficiently coerce the LTTE. 10/13 (77%) of demands related to political reform requested in 1987 were complied with (either partially or completely). In 1988 20/27 (74%), and in 1989 1/3 (33%) Indian requests for political reform were complied with. By the end of the intervention Sri Lanka was not nearly as willing to make concessions.

Costs, Benefits, and Compliance

As was the case in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.) the potential for short-term benefits for Colombo was one of the highest predictors of compliance.\textsuperscript{552} If the goal of the demand could potentially be made to serve the interests of the regime or head policymakers in Colombo, it had a much higher likelihood of being adopted than if it couldn’t immediately help the regime.

One example of a request from New Delhi that held the potential to benefit the regime in Colombo was the 1988 request that President Jayewardene issue directives to the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner “to set in motion preparations for elections to Provincial Councils, polling booths, list of officers, etc...”\textsuperscript{553} India pushed the President to include various election directives but also left several aspects of election protocol up to Colombo. This openness in the request provided an opportunity for Jayewardene to make choices that would serve his short-term interests, including decisions regarding the election that could appease various domestic interests or consolidate his authority. It was coded as providing an opportunity for Colombo’s short-term interests. Perhaps

\textsuperscript{552} See Table 22.
unsurprisingly it was complied with. In September 1988 the President issued specific orders to the Election Commissioner for mid-November elections.554

In addition to benefits, requests can also pose potential threats or impose potential costs on the domestic regime. Statistical analysis on Sri Lankan compliance (See Table 22) reveals potential threats are associated with non-compliance. Similar to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the correlation between threats and non-compliance is fairly strong in the Sri Lankan war when compared to other wars.555 There are several likely reasons why this is the case. In Vietnam, for example the strong American commitment to Saigon may have made South Vietnamese leaders more willing to implement policies that were potentially threatening to their regime, believing Washington wouldn’t leave Saigon vulnerable to the enemy or to domestic political opposition. The opposite may be true in Sri Lanka. Colombo was acutely aware of India’s tentative loyalties to their cause, and therefore may have been less willing to implement reforms that posed potential risks than allies with more durable foreign support.

One example of a potentially threatening Indian request was the August 1988 demand that the Sri Lankan government inform New Delhi about the outcome of discussions with various Tamil groups regarding elections.556 By this time Colombo had largely lost faith that New Delhi could deliver the Tamil insurgents. January 1989 brought the election of President Premadasa, who was regularly engaging in bilateral negotiations with Tamil groups, including the LTTE, purposefully excluding New Delhi

555 See Table 1, Row 12 for models accounting for the impact of potential threats on compliance in Sri Lanka. Simple regression on compliance controlling for capacity yields P <0.1 for potential threats -0.715, (0.398).
and with the expressed intent of working with the Tamils to expel the IPKF.\footnote{Nubin, \textit{Sri Lanka}, 93.} Needless to say the Sri Lankans did not comply.

It may be interesting to note that costs and benefits are not mutually exclusive. Requests can fail to pose either potential costs or potential benefits, can primarily be either potentially costly or useful, or can pose both costs and benefits. For example, consider the January 1988 request that President Jayewardene ensure that prominent Tamil leaders participate in elections, provided they recognize the unity of Sri Lanka.\footnote{Points of Verbal Message of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Reaction of the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene Conveyed through the Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit,” Colombo, January 13, 1988, \textit{India Sri Lanka: Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict Documents – 1947-2000}, Ed. Avtar Singh Bhasin (Indian Research Press, 2001), Volume VI, Document 793, 2184-2185.} This request posed both potential costs and benefits to Colombo. It could bring meaningful compromise with Tamil leaders, prestige to the president, reduce hostilities, and gain Tamil recognition for the territorial integrity of a united Sri Lanka. However, allowing Tamil leaders to participate in elections would also undermine Sinhalese control over government institutions, inviting protest from domestic elements such as the JVP, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front), a separatist leftist Sinhalese insurgent group that was seeking harder lines be taken against the Tamil groups and Indian troops in Sri Lanka. This would make the president vulnerable to political and physical attack. President Jayewardene ultimately made efforts to encourage Tamil leaders to participate in elections, however many Tamil officials were being intimidated or assassinated by the LTTE, and Colombo found itself helpless in stopping their campaign.

\textbf{Conditions of War and Internal Politics}

Domestic political obstacles, such as parliament blocking the implementation of a demand from New Delhi, were captured by a control variable, “Conditions of War or
Internal Politics Impacting Compliance Environment.” This variable monitored times when the compliance environment was impacted by complications from the war itself, the internal political dynamics of the domestic regime or the internal political dynamics of the foreign intervening state. Each of these three potential influences was tracked separately to allow for independent analysis. However, because they describe somewhat similar circumstances, namely issues of the war and domestic politics influenced compliance, they were combined in the statistical models shown in Table 22 (bottom row). However, independently discussing each of these variables is worthwhile in order to show how they differ as well as illustrating the potential complexity of complying with a given demand. The context under which compliance decisions are made is dynamic, at times influenced by the actions of the enemy, competing political actors or internal disagreement within domestic or foreign political institutions. The decision whether or not to comply with an ally’s demand can be a complicated process involving multiple actors.

*Indian Institutions and Sri Lankan Domestic Politics Impacting Compliance*

No war fighting force exists without internal bureaucratic tensions and interagency rivalries. Chester Cooper’s 1972 Institute for Defense Analysis pacification summary report observed, “the American effort to advise and support the Vietnamese in their pacification program was significantly blunted by institutional rivalries and frictions among MACV, CIA, AID, and the embassy itself... there was little attempt to establish effective overall control, or even coordination, of the various far-flung American programs.”559 Similarly India’s force in Sri Lanka suffered internal divisions.

---

Indian intelligence services (RAW), the organization that led the effort to train Tamil militants prior to 1987, continued to work covertly to negotiate with LTTE leadership throughout 1987-1990. But Indian military leaders tasked with suppressing the LTTE were cut out of the loop. According to journalist Rohan Gunaratna the tension between Indian political, military and intelligence services created several serious problems for the Indian effort. For example, in March 1988, IPKF forces ambushed and killed two LTTE leaders who were in active negotiations with authorities from RAW, and were even reportedly carrying correspondence between LTTE founder and leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. When they were killed, “the IPKF was not aware of the RAW plan – even if they knew, it would not mattered as they had no mutual respect for each other”\textsuperscript{560} Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit who worked closely with representatives from Colombo was also largely excluded from ongoing RAW-LTTE negotiations, despite being the senior-most political officer in the Indian effort. \textsuperscript{561} In other words Indians were know to occasionally work at cross-purposes, which undoubtedly influenced relations with Colombo.

Although important to the internal problems to the dynamics of Indian forces, bureaucratic issues within Indian agencies were not frequently cited as impacting Sri Lankan compliance with Indian demands. They influenced only 4/79 or 5% of requests. However despite its rarity, there were occasions, such as the Indian demand that Sri Lanka maintain law through the Civil Volunteer Force (CVF),\textsuperscript{562} where internal institutions of the Indian intervention impacted compliance outcome. In this demand,

\textsuperscript{561} Ibid., 266.
New Delhi asked Sri Lanka to bolster the CVF, only to have Indian intelligence (RAW) take over training and arming, ultimately using the CVF as an instrument to implement Indian interests in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{563} Colombo initially attempted to follow through with support for the CVF, but when its ranks swelled with over 30,000 Indian-recruited and armed Tamil youths, Colombo was unable to control the organization, let alone use it as an instrument to maintain law and order.\textsuperscript{564}

Although more frequently cited as an issue, (9/79, 11% of requests), domestic political issues internal to Sri Lanka were also not statistically significant in determining whether or not leadership in Colombo implemented a given demand. Nevertheless such complications were known to occasionally impact compliance outcomes. This was the case with the 1988 demand that Colombo prevent individuals settled in northeast Sri Lanka after 1983 from voting in the 1988 election.\textsuperscript{565} New Delhi feared “if such persons are allowed to vote in the Provincial Council elections, Tamil opinion across the Board will say that Sinhala colonialization has been legitimized.”\textsuperscript{566} In other words if post-1983 registrants were allowed to vote, Tamils that had fled their homes would be excluded, while Sinhalese that had subsequently claimed those areas would have political voice. There was notable Sinhalese pressure not to give in to this demand, as not only would it

work against Sinhalese representation, but would also exclude individuals who had turned 18 since 1983, and therefore violated longstanding electoral laws. Colombo did not comply.

**War Impacting the Compliance Environment**

Because the Sri Lankan government was making decisions regarding compliance within the context of a violent insurgency, it is important to monitor how developments in the war affected compliance with Indian demands. In order to specify the potential impact of this wartime environment, a general variable on the impact of complications from the war was created, “War Impacting Compliance Environment.” This variable captures aspects of the wartime setting, including for example, violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and overtures or offenses by the enemy. One or more of these factors was cited as an issue affecting compliance in 34/79 (43%) of demands.

Consider for instance the Indian demand that Colombo “make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youths.” This seemingly simple request was complicated by the fact that security concerns were consuming an exorbitant amount of Sri Lanka’s resources. Sri Lanka is a small state with big security problems. Colombo’s deficits averaged 12.4% of GDP from 1985-1989, and defense spending escalated from 1.1% of GDP in 1982 to 4.8% in 1988, despite India taking over responsibility for disarming the

---


LTTE from 1987-1990.\textsuperscript{569} Such expenses left little room for rehabilitation programs such as those requested by New Delhi regarding militant youths and the diversion of funds to the military was part of the reason Colombo did not comply.

Furthermore in the Indian intervention, increased military pressure by the LTTE led to a decrease in the rate of compliance with Indian demands. For example in 1987 the Indians requested Colombo 1) withdraw its paramilitary personnel from the North and East and, 2) transfer paramilitaries into regular military services and disband its “homeguard” forces.\textsuperscript{570} The “homeguards” typically consisted of groups of locals ostensibly organized to protect Muslims and Sinhalese civilians in Tamil areas and border villages.\textsuperscript{571} In keeping with the agreements made in the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, Colombo began to disband these groups, but this “was suspended when Muslims and Sinhalese were attacked and retention of homeguards became essential to protect them.”\textsuperscript{572} Colombo furthermore did not comply with New Delhi’s requests that they dissolve the paramilitaries, in large part because increased violence from the war made it politically and in some cases, even physically untenable to do so.

The point that an increase in enemy action inspired Colombo to refuse Indian demands is interesting when contrasted to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which caused the opposite reaction. In Vietnam Tet inspired an increase in the rate of compliance with foreign allied demands. There are several reasons why enemy violence in these two cases

\textsuperscript{569} Robert I. Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 73.
\textsuperscript{571} S. H. Hasbullah and Barrie M. Morrison, Sri Lankan Society in an Era of Globalization: Struggling to Create a New Social Order (SAGE, 2004), 260.
had opposite effect on rates of compliance with allied demands. In Sri Lanka the Tamils threatened the cohesion of Sri Lanka as it fought for independence for Tamil areas, but the insurgency did not threaten the existence of the state itself. The NLF and North Vietnamese in Vietnam on the other hand were vying for state control in Saigon. The type of threat posed by the increased enemy activity was also substantially different. In Sri Lanka there was somewhat gradual increase in LTTE activity, while the military action of the Tet offensive created an unprecedented political shock in Vietnam.

Furthermore differences between India and the U.S. in their respective commitments in Sri Lanka and Vietnam may have contributed to variation in the influence of enemy action on rates of compliance. A domestic regime under threat coping with a less committed ally may experience the fear of abandonment, which would draw it towards immediate solutions that momentarily best protect its security interests. This makes the regime less willing to provide concessions or comply with allied demands, as it is unsure of the payoffs for those actions. Colombo, having witnessed Indian agencies undermine their interests for years, did not have faith requests coming from New Delhi would serve Sri Lanka’s interests. And LTTE offensives discredited Indian claims that it could disarm the LTTE if Colombo gave enough political concessions. The Sri Lankan government became less willing to provide concessions to Indian interests as Tamil violence expanded, because the Indian strategy was clearly not working. However in Vietnam because of the high level of American commitment, Saigon may have been more willing to go with U.S. demands, as Washington had always stood against the communist North.

Lastly there are differences in the types of requests being compared between Vietnam and Sri Lanka. The kinds of requests Colombo started to dismiss under
increased pressure from the LTTE were frequently requests such as reducing military pressure against the enemy and providing increased roles to the IPKF. In Vietnam the types of requests increasingly complied with after the Tet military offense were requests for increased South Vietnamese militarization and Vietnamese government expansion. Although more cases need to be examined, this may indicate that in addition to other dynamics taking place following an enemy offensive impacting compliance, there may be a tendency of domestic regimes to increase their military involvement, regardless of the demands of their foreign allies.

**Conclusion**

New Delhi had both overlapping and distinct interests with both sides of the conflict in Sri Lanka. India used commonalities to get concessions from insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, but was unsuccessful getting either to fully promote the Indian vision for Sri Lanka. India’s position on devolution, the transfer of power from the centralized state apparatus in Colombo to localized government institutions in Tamil areas is an example of one issue that ultimately alienated both Tamil and Sinhalese and made India’s attempts to force compromise fall short of meaningful conciliation. After pushing Colombo to transfer power to more local levels, in 1988 New Delhi asked President Jayewardene to ensure “that Pradeshiya Sabhas [Village Councils] and District Councils do not dilute role of Provincial Council and Provincial Government.”

But this request for middle-range concentration of Tamil areas failed to satisfy the Tamils, who sought greater localized control, and it failed to please Sri Lankan government officials, who sought as much centralized power as possible. The focus on

---

the provincial level was largely based on India’s own governance models. This solution effectively took power from Colombo without significantly strengthening the Tamils and it left both sides unsatisfied.

Furthermore, despite India’s seemingly strong coercive tools in its dealings with both Colombo and the LTTE, Colombo’s rate of compliance with Indian demands remains consistent with other conflicts (62%), and the LTTE were also somewhat effective at avoiding Indian petitions. New Delhi was best able to coerce Colombo when it could credibly negotiate with the insurgents. This is particularly evident in India’s initial demands that Colombo provide the Tamils with certain rights such as recognition of the Tamil language and acknowledging the North and East areas as traditional Tamil homelands. Meaningful dialogue with the enemy was similarly useful for the U.S. at the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger coerced South Vietnamese President Thieu to agree to uncomfortable aspects of the Paris Peace Accords because Kissinger was in direct contact with Hanoi and could potentially cut Saigon out of negotiations completely. This is similar to what the Indians were able to threaten in 1987 before the LTTE made it clear they were not interested in cooperating with the Indian Peacekeeping Force.

In summary four categories of variables (listed below) were tested to offer insight into Sri Lanka’s compliance with Indian demands:

1. Capacity—The inability of the Sri Lankan government to implement certain requests made by India is unsurprisingly correlated with non-compliance, however in part due to its infrequency (capacity was cited as an issue in less than 13/79 or 16.5% percent of all demands), it was not statistically significant in
determining compliance outcome. Other factors, such as those listed below were more influential in determining Colombo’s response to New Delhi’s demands.

2. Interest—Colombo was more inclined to comply with requests that could potentially provide short-term benefits and less likely to comply with requests that posed potential short-term threats. This finding held despite India’s history supporting the insurgents, a precedent which allowed New Delhi to issue credible threats against its Sri Lankan government allies. The issuing of such threats did not change Sri Lanka’s inclination to comply when it was in its interests, and to dismiss demands that posed potential threats. In fact, India’s history supporting Tamil separatists may have strengthened such inclinations as New Delhi’s relatively low commitment made Colombo more likely to protect its interests, even at the cost of the collective alliance.

3. Dependency—As in other conflicts such as Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.) and Iraq, there was an interaction effect between India’s ability to independently undertake the request and the interests of New Delhi and Colombo. If India could undertake the activity unilaterally and interests between allies converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to incentives to free ride. If interests diverged and India could act unilaterally, New Delhi was able to coerce Sri Lanka into complying by threatening to act independently and excluding Colombo from benefits. More details are provided in the section on dependency and unilateral ability.

4. Wartime Environment—The consequences of operating in a warzone made it more difficult for Colombo to comply with requests. Furthermore, an increase in military activity by the LTTE lowered levels of Sri Lankan compliance with Indian demands. Colombo became less likely to make concessions to Indian or Tamil
interests and more likely to look inwards to the Sri Lankan military to deal with security threats as violence increased.
Chapter 9:

CONCLUSION

This study was motivated by two questions: What affects how much influence an ally has over its counterinsurgency partner? And what effects do inter-alliance dynamics have on who wins and who loses counterinsurgency wars with foreign military interventions? After analyzing nine wars and 460 policy demands made from an intervening force on its ally, I offer several findings.

First, shared interests do not necessarily produce cooperation between allies. Mutual interests are vitally important in motivating cooperative behavior, but as shown in this study, interests and dependency interact to produce incentives for compliance or defiance of allied requests. Second, once a military is committed in a counterinsurgency intervention, there are relatively few opportunities for the intervening force to coerce its ally. As described in previous chapters, an intervening force possesses coercive leverage only under specific conditions, namely that allies disagree over the issues addressed in the request, and that the intervening force can implement the request independently should the domestic ally fail to participate. If allies agree on a request that can be implemented independently by the foreign force, the domestic regime is more likely to fail to comply, opting instead to free-ride off the efforts of its partner.

Counterinsurgency interventions are difficult foreign policy problems. The findings from this project and the diplomatic history of these wars should temper

---


575 This hypothesis on free-riding held in Iraq, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, but not Afghanistan (U.S.). Kabul appeared to comply (in part) with requests ignored by other allies (Iraq, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka) in order to tap into additional sources of revenue from Washington. Kabul appears to have preferred benefitting from access to funds for projects, instead of benefitting by free-riding off American efforts. See Chapter 6: Afghanistan – U.S.
expectations about what can be coerced from an ally in a counterinsurgency. The data suggests there are limited opportunities for policymakers to coerce allies and no intervening military has yet been able to achieve over 68% full or partial allied compliance with their requests.

Nevertheless, despite opportunities for a foreign force to coerce a counterinsurgency ally being surprisingly difficult to pin down, these moments can be noteworthy. The United States was able to coerce its Vietnamese allies into making painful concessions to the North Vietnamese during the Paris peace talks. The U.S. was able to pressure its allies due to the fact that American forces were withdrawing (therefore lessening the U.S. commitment to Saigon) while also having the ability to sign a peace agreement with communist forces with or without South Vietnam.

Similar conditions for coercion were evident in other counterinsurgency wars as well. Consider, for example, the experience of Mozambique fighting the RENAMO insurgents with the help of Zimbabwe. Although there is little documentation regarding the nature of the alliance between Mozambique and Zimbabwe during their counterinsurgency alliance, it is clear Zimbabwe successfully applied pressure to Mozambique to negotiate with RENAMO to come to settlement after 1990. According to one historian, the domestic “opposition to Robert Mugabe was beginning to use the issue of military involvement in Mozambique to castigate the Prime Minister.”

Mugabe pressured Mozambique to negotiate in order to end the insurgency. By October 1992, the war was over by reconciliation, with RENAMO accepted as a mainstream political

---

576 See Chapter 4: Vietnam.
Aside from specific circumstances of lowered commitment to allies withdrawing from the intervention and the ability to exclude the ally should they fail to cooperate, the study suggests the best way for an intervening force to coerce an ally is not to be more aggressive, but to either alter its dependency on the ally to implement reform (which can be difficult depending on the nature of the alliance and the request in question) or to restructure incentives to create short-term benefits for the domestic ally. In Iraq, for example, the U.S. unwittingly promoted anti-corruption reform by promoting free press initiatives. Despite Iraq being consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, Washington’s request that Baghdad comply with financial disclosure requirements for public officials was largely fulfilled by 2009, due in part to media attention. Iraqi officials were motivated to comply with the transparency initiative in order to foster politically useful reputations for being tough on corruption. Without the personal political benefit to politicians created by media attention, it is doubtful the U.S. could have done much to convince Baghdad to comply.

Regarding the influence of counterinsurgency alliance dynamics on war outcome, two things are clear from this study: 1) The character of the in-country counterinsurgency ally, the character of the intervening ally, and the existence of a large-

---

581 According to the State Department a number of “anti-corruption officials continue to bubble up in the media in Iraq, likely a manifestation of both intense political jockeying and real efforts to crack down on corruption, which polls show is an issue of increasing concern to Iraq’s citizens. The Commission on Integrity (COI) is scoring some success with skillful use of the media (possibly prompting financial disclosure submissions by provincial officials with some well-placed criticism) and some concrete demonstration of newly acquired skills imparted by U.S.-funded and U.S.-staffed programs.” U.S. Department of State, “Anti-Corruption Update,” 09BAGHDAD2454, Confidential, September 11, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Anti-Corruption Update for January 7,” 10BAGHDAD44, Confidential, January 7, 2010.
scale foreign intervention can all potentially influence war outcome; 2) However, based on the findings of this study, the ability of the foreign intervening force to coerce its allies to comply with demands and hostility between allies has little influence on winning or losing the war. The next section will explore the claims in greater detail.

First, it is evident that the in-country counterinsurgency ally is vitally important in winning or losing counterinsurgency conflicts. Reflecting on the U.S. war in Vietnam, retired intelligence analyst Chester Cooper wrote that despite losing 58,000 Americans to the cause, American analysts “have had to return again and again to the hard fact that it was basically our ally’s war.” 582 U.S. involvement in Saigon’s bureaucracy only served to undermine strategic goals of independent Vietnamese capabilities. Yet, despite this straightforward observation, subsequent U.S. counterinsurgency analyses on Iraq and Afghanistan have reportedly continued to overemphasize U.S. efforts while overlooking the role of the domestic ally in determining war outcome.583

The existence of a foreign intervention is itself also significant influencing war outcome, but it is not a straightforward issue. Only the grimmest of security situations attract large-scale foreign interventions, a selection bias that stacks the odds against success in this universe of cases. In basic terms, a foreign force contemplating military intervention on behalf of a counterinsurgency ally is faced with several options vis-à-vis political involvement with its ally. Each approach has unique costs and benefits. Policymakers can opt out of intervening, they can provide political advisors, or they can attempt to dominate the political decision-making processes of the allied state. This

study analyzed the later two forms of intervention. These include conflicts such as the U.S. war in Vietnam and the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, where the intervening state strongly advised an allied counterinsurgency regime but did not govern the state itself. These wars were contrasted with more aggressive political interventions such as the approach taken by the Soviets in Afghanistan and, to a certain extent, the Vietnamese in Cambodia and the Egyptians in Yemen, which controlled certain decision-making institutions within the allied state. This study provided some evidence regarding the trade-offs involved in these different interventionist approaches.

Opting not to intervene takes away opportunities for a foreign force to implement policies unilaterally, forfeiting immediate efforts to contain an insurgency. It also denies opportunities to convince allies to implement policies that might otherwise go unfulfilled without an in-country foreign military presence. However, a failure to intervene can also strengthen an ally’s bargaining position. A non-interventionist foreign commitment to an ally can enable the foreign force to make credible threats to the ally because the foreign force has not yet intertwined its security interests with the success of that ally. This lower commitment can provide leverage in negotiations with allies, as well as deny the domestic ally the ability to free-ride off the efforts of intervening forces.

A foreign state opting to intervene militarily in a counterinsurgency conflict has several options regarding the nature of its involvement with the allied government. With the exception of the U.S. in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, democracies such as the U.S. and India tend to take strong advisory positions with domestic allies, but stop short of directly taking over the domestic decision-making institutions of their allies. This advisory approach leads to messier inter-alliance relations, since allied
institutions can willfully contradict foreign forces. However this dynamic can also foster domestic political independence, an important factor facilitating foreign withdrawal.

Because this study relies on released primary source documents which are more readily available from democratic regimes such as the U.S. and India (and former Soviet files, released in a moment of post-Soviet Russian openness), less data is available about inter-alliance dynamics in interventions that directly control domestic counterinsurgency allies, an approach adopted more frequently by authoritarian states. This more aggressive approach to allies can undermine self-sufficiency in domestic allied institutions, but it solidifies the counterinsurgency unit. Although there were several other important dynamics influencing war outcome, it is interesting to note that the Vietnamese were successful using this strategy in their ten-year intervention in Cambodia (December 1978-September 1989) to overthrow the Pol Pot regime, while the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Egyptians in Yemen from 1962-1967 had less success with similar methods.

The counterinsurgency wars examined in this study provide examples of how alliance dynamics can affect war outcome, including, for example, the impact of the negotiation process between allies over counterinsurgency policies on performance, the affect of limited government capacity on policy, and the level of domination of the foreign ally over the domestic regime influencing alliance relations and performance. But like many critical political factors in counterinsurgency wars, the pathways between these important alliance-related variables and their influence on winning or losing the war are multifactorial and complex. While the study was able to systematically test specific claims about the likelihood of compliance with specific allied requests based on the characteristics of the request, such as the ability (or inability) of the foreign force to
independently implement the policy should its ally fail to participate, the project was not provided the opportunity to systematically test propositions regarding alliance dynamics and war outcomes. Nevertheless, the data gathered on compliance provides insights into the layered relationship between counterinsurgency alliances and war outcomes.

Consider for example, counterinsurgency interventions undertaken by cash-strapped states such as Cuba in Angola, contrasted against superpower interventions such as the U.S. in Afghanistan. Evidence from the study indicates that developing states may have different development expectations for domestic allies when contrasted with resource-rich intervening forces.584 Lower development expectations can influence the types of demands made by intervening forces, the reforms implemented by the domestic regime and ultimately the counterinsurgency strategy adopted to fight the war. Similarly, domestic allies have different aid expectations for interventions undertaken by less wealthy states. These alliance dynamics can also influence war outcome. Consider, for example, how managing popular expectations for development in Iraq and Afghanistan has been difficult for Washington.585 Many Afghans and Iraqis expected the American intervention to result in a rapid rise of living standards in Iraq and Afghanistan. When these expectations were not met, there was dissatisfaction with the U.S. In Mozambique, on the other hand, there is no evidence that Zimbabwean troops intervening to help Mozambique combat the insurgency were ever expected to undertake any development actions. Just by being wealthy, the U.S. inadvertently created high expectations for reform and an inter-alliance dynamic with potential strategic consequences.

Furthermore, basic characteristics of the intervening state can influence the character of the enemy insurgency and influence war outcome. A superpower intervening in a conflict may unintentionally provide huge fundraising opportunities for an insurgency, as enemy states take advantage of the opportunity to use an insurgency as a proxy through which they can challenge the superpower. This boost in support for the insurgency may not be as notable in interventions undertaken by smaller states. This was evident in the amount of aid provided by Washington to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan contrasted to Washington’s more-limited assistance to UNITA forces battling Cubans in Angola. As illustrated across the study, complex subtleties related to counterinsurgency alliances and the states forming those partnerships can easily develop into dynamics that affect war outcome.

Yet, despite the in-country regime and the nature of the counterinsurgency intervention being vital factors among many influencing who wins and who loses these conflicts, the findings from this study suggest that the ability of the intervening force to promote its agenda and coerce its ally may ultimately have little bearing on war outcome. The consistency of rates of compliance across different wars (with different outcomes) implies that compliance with allied requests might not indicate much about counterinsurgency success. This is striking because it debunks the assumption underpinning all counterinsurgency advisory missions, which hold that complying with the agenda of intervening forces should lead to a greater likelihood of success. However, the assumption that following the instructions of the foreign ally will increase the likelihood of victory was not supported by the findings in this study.

The proposed idea that successful coercion of counterinsurgency allies may not positively affect war outcomes calls into question several assumptions regarding
counterinsurgencies. First, it undermines the notion that the intervening force has consistently sound strategic policies. The prevalent assumption is if the ally (such as the Karzai regime in Afghanistan) follows the prescriptions of its foreign allies (the United States), there is an increased chance of winning the war. However, in a counterinsurgency context, the political effects of military and political policies can be difficult to estimate ahead of time. Policies often have unintended consequences that can harm the war effort. This may be especially true with programs designed by foreign forces that may not appreciate the political nuances of a particular area.

Consider, for example, the U.S. request that Afghans conduct year-round poppy elimination campaigns. Kabul did not fulfill the request, and non-compliance may have actually helped the American counterinsurgency effort. As the governor of Badakhshan discovered, destroying poppy crops as sprouts gave local farmers time to replant different crops, while destroying poppy crops late in the season put farmers at financial risk. Eliminating the crop only once a year in the spring caused a significant drop in poppy cultivation (75%), yet enabled the governor of Badakhshan to maintain public support. When asked about his successful policies he commented, “The reason I’m successful is because I’ve gained people’s trust... It certainly isn’t because of an effective police force or the central government’s efforts.” Local knowledge can be a critical asset when the targets are the political loyalties, or “hearts and minds,” of the local population. Domestic actors were sometimes able to take more nuanced positions and tailor foreign-designed policies to evolving local situations. This study showed that the

failure of in-country regimes to fully comply with foreign demands did not always create a strategic disadvantage for the counterinsurgency campaign.

This is not to argue that allied defiance typically helped the war effort. The study uncovered numerous occasions of disastrously corrupt domestic political actors whose habits produced strategic liabilities for the counterinsurgency campaign. Non-compliance with foreign demands more often than not was an indication of free-riding or incompetence on behalf of the domestic ally, both generally harmful to the war effort. But nevertheless defiance itself should not be taken as a sign of strategic loss or impending counterinsurgency failure. In fact, as illustrated by the Indian experience in Sri Lanka, defiance can be a sign of strength in the domestic ally, which is likely helpful to achieving counterinsurgency goals. The Sri Lankans defied several Indian demands not out of weakness, free-riding, or incompetence, but because Colombo sought independent control over the counterinsurgency campaign apart from Indian designs. It took Colombo twenty years after Indian withdrawal, but eventually it won its counterinsurgency war.

These observations suggest that hostility within counterinsurgency alliances may not be a negative indication about the likelihood of counterinsurgency success, and furthermore, that animosity between allies may not negatively influence the outcome of counterinsurgency wars. Inter-alliance tension, which is frequently taken as a sign of dysfunction and sub-optimal performance, may in fact be correlated with success. Because so little work has been done examining this class of alliances, intervening forces largely assume that smooth, cooperative relationships between allies are an indication of achievement. This may not be the case. The “ideal” relationship in a counterinsurgency alliance may actually be a tense partnership that pressures the domestic regime to
defend its interests and move toward independent operations, sometimes defying the demands of its allies. An acrimonious counterinsurgency alliance may benefit the larger political processes fostering allied independence and foreign military withdrawal.

This study on compliance with allied demands in counterinsurgency wars has created several new avenues for research in the fields of alliance politics and power analysis. At its heart, this study is a systematic analysis of power. Where does influence come from in counterinsurgency alliances? Why do intervening forces have such difficulty motivating compliance from seemingly dependent domestic allies? Debunking the persistent convention of conceptualizing power as a trait of wealthy states, the study shows how a preponderance of resources has shockingly little bearing on coercing allies in the counterinsurgency context. Following the advice of David Baldwin, the study analyzes power by defining particular actors in particular situations in order to conceive of power as causation (a change in behavior), not as a given characteristic of resource-rich actors. It is evident that in counterinsurgency alliances where there has been a sizable military commitment, intervening forces should not confuse a preponderance of resources for a preponderance of influence in inter-alliance negotiations. As illustrated throughout the project, there are more complex political variables creating and limiting influence in these alliances. From these lessons in the future I hope to provide better insights into how to conceptualize power and coercion in foreign policy.

Additionally, moving forward with related research, I intend to examine allied commitment as a variable in counterinsurgency alliances, specifically examining the period of military withdrawal in order to analyze how a decrease in foreign allied

---

commitment may influence the behavior of domestic actors. This was touched upon in this study, but merits an independent examination. Additionally, I intend to take the theories proposed in this study and test them in other wartime environments to identify what may or may not be unique about counterinsurgency alliances. Furthermore, I would like to examine coercion and compliance in alliances formed between insurgents and foreign allies, contrasting those findings with the outcomes uncovered in this study on counterinsurgencies. Interestingly, there would be overlap between case studies examined, including, for example, India’s one-time support of the Tamil insurgents, Syria’s policies arming factions of the PLO, and the U.S. funding the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Leverage in alliances with insurgents may or may not differ from alliances with counterinsurgents. It would be interesting to examine if states have different opportunities to coerce insurgent allies as opposed to counterinsurgent partners or if political actors behave in similar ways regardless of which side of the conflict they are associated with. At least in the case of counterinsurgency alliances, as examined by this study, there are surprisingly limited opportunities for foreign forces to coerce domestic allies. To the dismay of future intervening forces, this is a systematic dynamic that I would expect to hold true in future counterinsurgency partnerships as well.
APPENDICES

Appendix A:

METHODOLOGY—EXAMPLES

Step-By-Step Example of the Methods - U.S. War in Vietnam

A detailed example from data collected may be helpful in illustrating the methods processes utilized in the study. Below is an example from the U.S. war in Vietnam. The Vietnam chapter systematically uses primary source documents from the U.S. war to construct a unique compliance database tracking 1) demands made by the U.S. on the Government of Vietnam in Saigon (GVN), 2) the outcome of these requests and 3) structural issues and characteristics of demands that may impact compliance outcomes. Tracking these elements provides a better understanding of their potential importance and impact on coercion, compliance and inter-alliance bargaining dynamics.

Step 1 - Analyze Statements from the Foreign Executive Outlining Its Policy Goals for the Domestic Regime (Policy Documents)

The U.S. was involved in Vietnam from 1954-1975. But the American commitment to a non-communist South Vietnam went through varying stages, a phenomenon that led some to refer to the cold war U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia as “The Vietnam Wars.” Nevertheless the war most Americans know as “Vietnam,” lasted from 1965 to 1973. In this study we begin collecting data in January 1964, a year before the first sizable introduction of U.S. troops. There are several methodological reasons for choosing to start the analysis in 1964. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed in August 1964 signaling the start of the escalation that led to 184,300 U.S. troops

being deployed in 1965, a force which suffered 1,369 combat deaths that year alone.\textsuperscript{590} Starting the analysis a year ahead of substantial troop arrivals helps ensure thorough analysis that captures as much data as possible, including interactions that prepare for the 1965 offensive, without including demands made before the U.S. was fully committed to Vietnam, a form of intervention outside the scope of this study. Ultimately, beginning a year ahead of the troops helps gather a more complete picture of U.S.-GVN relations and inter-alliance bargaining space.\textsuperscript{591}

The first step in analysis entails identifying specific demands from the U.S. to the GVN required relying on the 12 volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) on Vietnam 1964-1973. FRUS is produced by the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, and contains “declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies. Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution.”\textsuperscript{592} Each volume contains the text of several hundred of the most important declassified policy documents for a given time period in order to provide a definitive documentary resource on an important history event for scholars.


\textsuperscript{591} Furthermore, would find that starting in 1964 or 1965 might not make much difference to the data, as many of the requests made by U.S. officials in 1964 are repeatedly demanded in subsequent years. This means each of these units would have been analyzed in the study in an identical fashion just under a different start date.

\textsuperscript{592} For more information see http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus.
and government officials to use for reference. FRUS is considered one of the foremost resources for U.S. national security policy materials.

Due to the size and importance of the war in Vietnam, there are 12 volumes of materials on the issue, organized chronologically, collectively containing roughly 11,000 pages of material. These volumes are all available online (see http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments) and keyword searches are available by volume. Using a combination of the bound volumes published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, online copies of these volumes as well as copies of original documents when material was only referenced (but not reproduced) by the FRUS collection, it was possible to identify 105 unique demands from the U.S. to the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) over the course of the war. For example, one set of requests from the U.S. to the GVN was located in Document 408, FRUS 1964-1986, Volume I, Vietnam.593 Available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d408

593 Original located at Department of State, Central Files, POL 1—1 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a U.S. Mission cable. Ref. A–337, October 30, 1964. It is apparent that the next few months will be critical to the success of the new government and to our efforts to bring about some degree of stabilization in the internal political situation of SVN. The members of this government are generally inexperienced in public life and have never worked together as a team. It is the consensus of the Mission Council that under favorable circumstances it will require three to four months to get this government to function with any degree of effectiveness. By that time an assembly may have been formed and unless its performance has been acceptable in SVN eyes the government will face the hazard of removal.

To avoid waste of effort in uncoordinated activity, it is essential for the government to establish a series of short-term objectives which are reasonably attainable and which, if attained, will provide a point of departure from which we can later undertake more ambitious projects, military and civilian, inside and outside SVN. Such subsequent projects would include combined and increased military political-economic pressure on DRV, intensification of the in-country anti-VC effort, expansion of force goals for military and police forces, and the initiation of medium-term economic, social and psychological programs.

For planning purposes, we are taking February 1, 1965 as the target date for the short-term objectives (Annex 1). However, we are in doubt as to the feasibility of even approaching these objectives without finding some means in the immediate future for sustaining morale and encouraging a despondent country grown tired of the strains of the counterinsurgency struggle. We have only one reasonably certain way to provide this stimulant—by military actions (we are thinking primarily of air strikes) against the DRV which will do damage to the sources of VC strength along the infiltration routes and to a limited degree in NVN itself. For maximum morale effect, the existence and results of these actions need to be known, at least in part, in SVN. Furthermore, some U.S. participation is required to impart sense of U.S. willingness in future to share in necessary action to stop DRV support and direction of VC. (This also important as corresponding signal to Hanoi.) It is a delicate matter, however, to execute such operations because of the danger of premature escalation at a time when the new government is inadequate to provide leadership to the country and to use its resources to contain the probable VC-DRV reaction which might result from any significant air campaign against DRV.

Our partial solution to this dilemma is to introduce into the short term military program an expansion of 34–A operations to include limited air strikes against North, an intensification of the actions against infiltration targets in the Laotian corridor, and reprisal strikes for major VC depredations as required. There are presently only 10 qualified VNAF pilots available for such covert air strikes so that their scope would necessarily be limited. Our thought is that the Laotian Air Force should continue to play the leading part in air attacks in the corridor but we would get agreement for increased U.S. participation from Souvanna in order to indicate the U.S. commitment needed to encourage the GVN, as well as perhaps the RLG. (Some thoughts on this were contained in Embtel 1415 33. Document 406, reporting on last SEACORD meeting.)
Annex 1

Program Objectives To Be Reached by February 1, 1965

I. Governmental

1. Establish effective articulation of GVN/US agencies for optimum cooperation; action in this field to include establishment of a war cabinet to meet weekly with the U.S. Mission Council; the organization of a Ministerial Council of Economic and Financial Affairs to mesh with USOM organization; joint programming at ministerial levels in the military, economic, social, administrative and information fields.

2. Review governmental organization with a view to streamlining. Consideration to be given to a reduction or regrouping of Ministries and to the establishment of a Bureau of the Budget reporting to the Prime Minister.

3. Develop and initiate a national information plan as a means of improving communication between the GVN and its people.

II. Military

1. Bring the armed forces to authorized strength.

2. Review performances of key commanders, replacing the incompetent and stabilizing the remainder.

3. Bring all units to full combat effectiveness.

III. Police

1. Fill up the police to targeted strength.

2. Clarify the police mission and elevate its prestige.

3. Give the police a strong commander.

4. Clarify police powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation.

IV. Pacification
This document was added in plain text to the FRUS collections in order to facilitate searching. However for the sake of validity and source accuracy it is important to note that each document was added verbatim from the original document. Here is a copy of the first page of the previous referenced document.
An issue that came up during this stage was a lack of specificity of some of the requests from U.S. officials to the GVN. This phenomenon was not unique to Vietnam, and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 on methodology. Several “demands” are not requests for the adoption of specific policies so much as they are general goals including stability, prosperity, or security. These aspirations are too general to effectively monitor in terms of compliance or coercion. Therefore goals such as the following were not included in the study: “(a)... reinforce and accelerate the progress already made; (b)... markedly improve the interdiction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies; (c)... upgrade, accelerate, and coordinate the pacification program in the countryside; and (d)... maintain political and economic stability and support the development of the constitutional process.”

Accelerating progress, improving interdiction, upgrading pacification, and developing constitutional processes sounds impressive, but they are ends, the results of reform, not means to reform. Only requests that specifically outlined policies for the GVN to adopt in order to achieve goals such as the ones above were included in the database, including demands such as adopt “Project Take-Off,” a specific pacification strategy that later became the “Phoenix” program, which was designed to upgrade pacification, and form an advisory council to draft a new constitution in 1966, intended to develop constitutional processes.

Step 2 - Determine the Compliance Outcome of the Given Demand, and the Relevant Conditions for the Demand

Once specific demands from the U.S. to Saigon have been identified it is possible to trace what happens to each of those demands. This requires carefully monitoring compliance as well as the critical factors that seem to influence compliance. This database tracked the outcome of compliance by searching though the following sources:

1. Foreign Relations of the United States (for follow up documents discussing what happened to requests made by the U.S. to the GVN)

2. The four volumes of the Pentagon Papers

3. Digital National Security Archive (DNSA)

4. Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS)

5. Online U.S government document repositories including usaid.gov and dtic.mil


Most of the time, evidence was found in primary source documents. For example, one of the requests given in the document reproduced above, “Initiate a program for the improvement of the port of Saigon and the Saizon River channel”595 is discussed in the document below, a memo from December 1966, declassified by the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library in 1994 and available online via the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Vietnam Round-Up. This is just to let you know that my silence doesn't mean supineness. We've been pushing hard on several fronts during the past few weeks. On most of them we're getting forward movement.

1. Anti-Inflation Program. We're pressing on the Mission a tough across-the-board anti-inflation agreement. Ky himself seems to have responded to the proposals I made on your behalf and told his Cabinet that its 1967 budget limit is the 75 billion piasters we suggest. McNamara has gotten our military to accept a lean P-21.5 billion limit for US military spending in the first six months of 1967 and to P-46 billion for RVNAF. If we can hold these levels we will reduce spending by about P-20 billion more in 1967 than anyone in Washington or Saigon thought possible six months ago. And we'll do it without cutting into any needed military muscle too.

2. Port Congestion. Saigon port gradually improves but there is still a large backlog of CIP cargo awaiting removal. We also have 750 loaded barges clogging the port. I got McNamara to task MACV with a contingency plan for a complete military takeover of the Saigon Port around 1 March unless this backlog is significantly reduced. We're also working on the GVN, because Ky has not come through yet.

This information is then coded and collected in a database, following the rules outlined in Chapter 3.
### Appendix B:

**CHART COMPARING TYPES OF DEMANDS MADE BY FOREIGN ALLIES ACROSS COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Request Made by Intervening Ally</th>
<th>War and Subject of Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Local Government</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Form elected village executive councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Institute local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Increase provincial autonomy (devolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Pass provincial powers legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Increase district governance in Spin Boldak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation with Militants</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Offer Amnesty/Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Offer Political Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Amnesty to militants who surrender arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detainees to be released if all groups enter negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Amnesty and National Reconciliation Plan and Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Jirgas on Peace and Integration Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include Opposition in Government</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Appoint opposition leaders to new Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Negotiate with tribal and religious leaders to “attract” them to “the side of the party”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Announce openings for Tamils in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prominent Tamil Leaders to participate in elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Cease sectarian appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urge prominent Sunnis to engage in the draft constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Retain Internationals from UNAMA and ISAF on the Candidate Vetting Board [Not quite the same]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Enact a Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Forming Constitutional Review Committee (CRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Preparation of New Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Route funds directly to province, make Province Chief the key figure in pacification efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Institute local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Increase provincial autonomy (devolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Pass provincial powers legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands – already highly decentralized]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit Clientelism</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Promotion Based on Merit and ARVN Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Stop Purging the Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Cease sectarian appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cease politically motivated prosecutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Merit-based Appointments of Key Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Talks with Enemies</td>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: Offer to Talk to the NLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Bilateral Talks with Pakistan and Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: No Bilateral Talks Between Sri Lanka and the Tamils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

349
| Redistribute Land | U.S. in Iraq: Increased negotiated cease-fires  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: [No demands on similar issues in database, but it has been widely reported that the U.S. encourages the Kabul to proactively negotiate]  
| |  
| Engage Youth | U.S. in Vietnam: Land Reform  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Land Reform  
| | India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Iraq: Agricultural reform / increased privatization  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Fair system for settlement of land disputes  
| |  
| Offer Vocational Training | U.S. in Vietnam: Increase funds for youth programs  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Organize youth programs – especially for students  
| | India in Sri Lanka: Rehabilitate Militant Youths  
| | U.S. in Iraq: Fund militia reintegration programs  
| | young militia members to receive training  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Programs to Employ Youth and Ex-Soldiers  
| |  
| Domestic Economic Expansion | U.S. in Vietnam: Vocational Training for Graduating Students  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands]  
| | India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Iraq: Support vocational training  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Services and Vocational Training for Former Child Laborers and Soldiers  
| |  
| Regulation of Domestic Economy | U.S. in Vietnam: Simplify Import Procedures  
| | Require Advanced Deposit by Importers  
| | India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Iraq: Expanding microfinance and SME lending  
| | Limit private sector subsidies  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Transit Trade with Pakistan  
| | Conclude APTTA Agreement  
| | Expand Mobile Money - MOI and other Ministries  
| |  
| Focus on Rural Populations | U.S. in Vietnam: Limit spending to prevent inflation  
| | Increase certain taxes  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands]  
| | India in Sri Lanka: Establish Finance Commission  
| | U.S. in Iraq: State banking reform program  
| | Increase certain taxes  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Registration and Oversight for Hawalas  
| | Anti-Money Laundering Law  
| |  
| Religious Leaders | U.S. in Vietnam: Expand Rural Electrification  
| | Credit to Farmers  
| | Distribute New Seed Varieties  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Organize Poverty Committees – Win Over Peasants  
| | India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Iraq: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Contribute to Electricity Development Projects  
| |  
| | U.S. in Vietnam: Revitalize Inter-Religious Council  
| | U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Fractionalize Mullahs - Divide Religious Leaders  
| | India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands]  
| | U.S. in Iraq: Protections for minority political and religious parties  
| | U.S. in Afghanistan: Engage Religious Figures in Public Messaging  
| | Increased Positions for Women and Minorities  
<p>| |
| |<br />
| 350 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Leadership</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Forces to Stay Confined to Barracks</td>
<td>Out of Conflict in NE Region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Paramilitary Organizations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. in Vietnam: [No similar demands]</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India in Sri Lanka: Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF) to be inducted into the Reserve and Regular Police Forces</td>
<td>U.S. in Iraq: Support Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), incorporating a percentage into ISF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. in Afghanistan: Fund, Expand the Community Defense Initiative (CDI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


359


Middle East Contemporary Survey. The Moshe Dayan Center, 1993.


Afghanistan Reconstruction.,” July 2012.

———.”Limited Interagency Coordination and Insufficient Controls over U.S. Funds in
Afghanistan Hamper U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan Financial Sector and


Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). Falluja Waste
Water Treatment System. Falluja, Iraq. SIGIR PA-08-144 - 08-148., October 27,
2008.

Agencies and Commissions, 2009.

———. Information on Government of Iraq Contributions to Reconstruction Costs,
SIGIR 09-018, April 29, 2009.

———. Sons of Iraq Program” Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak,
SIGIR 11-010, January 28, 2011.

October_2008.pdf

Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. “An Economic Theory of Alliances.” The


Otterman, Sharon. “Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder - IRAQ: Iraq’s
council/p7665.

———. “Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder - Iraq: The June 28 Transfer of

Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism.” Review Article, October 23, 2009.

Parker, Michelle. Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency.

PBS Frontline, The Lost Year in Iraq, Interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (Ret.), October
17, 2006.


—. “Next Steps in the Political Process, President Bush to President Karzai,” January 18, 2002.


—. “Taking Steps to Uproot the Statist Legacy in Babil’s Agriculture,” 09HILLAH24, April 5, 2009.


—. “Barzani Agrees To Push For New GOI Article 140 Committee Chair, Invigorate Committee,” 07BAGHDAD2466, July 25, 2007. www.wikileaks.org


—. “CODEL Inhofe Meets With TNA Members, 05BAGHDAD5051,” December 19, 2005. 05BAGHDAD5051.

—. “CG and CDA Discuss Foreign Fighters and Syria, Turkey and the PKK, and UNSCR with PM,” 07BAGHDAD3911, December 2, 2007. www.wikileaks.org

——. “Demarche to Iraqi Interior Minister on Site 4,” 06BAGHDAD2842, August 7, 2006. www.wikileaks.org


——. “Maliki On Cabinet Shake-up, Return Of Tawafaq, And Major Legislative Challenges,” 08BAGHDAD166, January 22, 2008. www.wikileaks.org


——. “Meeting with the Minister of Science and Technology Regarding the Tuwaitha,” 07BAGHDAD2028, June 20, 2007. www.wikileaks.org


——. “Ministerial Capacity Surge Assessment,” 08BAGHDAD1008, April 1, 2008. www.wikileaks.org


—–. ‘IMF And Afghanistan Agree On Terms For Completing The Fifth Review; Ball In Afghans’ Court,” 09KABUL317. February 11, 2009. www.wikileaks.org


375


———. “Telegram 10019 from Saigon,” June 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET S, Telegram 6169 from Saigon.


