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CLIO’S FANCY: DOCUMENTS TO PIQUE THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION.

Towards an Anthropology of Europe:
Francesco Antonio Grimaldi’s Reflections upon the Inequality among Men.

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Recent scholarship by historians of the human sciences has established an incontrovertible link between the eighteenth-century idea of civilization and the modern discipline of anthropology. In particular, scholars have underscored the developmental scheme of the process of civilization, often expressed in a stage theory of society, and its importance for a “comparative method” in the study of culture. (Duchet 1971; Landucci 1972; Meek 1976; Stocking 1987) As against some formulations of the stage theory, which emphasized a universal process of civilization in which the base point was provided by an extra-European “other,” eighteenth century Neapolitan philosophes used the stage theory to provide the conceptual framework for the study of the civilizing process within the nations of Europe itself, starting from a base point of intra-European otherness, rather than from the contrast between Europe and the other continents. Shifting the ground on which the process of civilization rested, leading Neapolitan proponents of the stage theory of society used this developmental scheme to account for socio-cultural differences observable among the members of any given European nation—and particularly of the Kingdom of Naples itself. In their novel interpretation of the stage theory of society, then, the Neapolitan philosophes engendered an ethnographic theory that would prove to be of enduring significance for the Italian tradition of anthropology (Naddeo n.d.).

It was in response to the idea of civilization espoused by French and Scottish philosophes that the Neapolitan Francesco Antonio Grimaldi penned his Reflections upon the Inequality among Men (1779—80). In polemic with the cosmopolitan optimism of the philosophes, Grimaldi viewed the process of civilization as a local phenomenon which yielded uneven development. Like Rousseau, he sought to explain the observable inequalities among men in civil society, which he, too, viewed as inherent in its origin and progress. But inequality was not merely a function of civilization for Grimaldi. On the one hand, the “science of man,” as Grimaldi called it, measured the moral inequality observable among men relative to their natural
talents. And on the other, it assumed that the process of civilization did not uniformly subsume, or enslave as Rousseau put it, the majority of any given nation, but did so relative to their socio-economic “situation” within the nation—that is to say, their means of economic subsistence. Grimaldi’s stage theory of society was thus at once diachronic and synchronic; it envisioned civilization as both the culmination and summation of those stages of society which had preceded it. Civilization did not simply develop out of savagery, it was at once savage, barbaric and civil; it contained within itself the characteristic epiphenomena of primitive, pastoral, agricultural and commercial societies. It was, in short, non-contemporaneous and, as such, an accretion of societal strata appropriate for study by the human scientist.

The idea that the process of civilization be exemplified within the contemporary nation was reflected elsewhere in the Neapolitan tradition of anthropology (Naddeo n.d). In the wake of the Reflections, other students of the “science of man” took the nation as their object of study. Setting out to map the cultural topography of the Kingdom of Naples, they sought to inventory and account for the diversity of societal organization and behavior internal to the confines of the national community, which they perceived as populated by “barbarians,” “savages” and “civilized men” alike. In the Neapolitan case then, the “other” was not defined in contrast to one’s own society as a whole, but in contrast to that society’s center, which was considered to be exemplary of European civilization. Subsequently, Italian anthropologists have repeatedly concerned themselves with the presumed persistence of domestic savagery (Baldi 1988; Puccini 1996), a preoccupation which was part of the legacy of the Neapolitan Enlightenment for the social sciences in modern Italy, and akin to the ideas of anthropologists like Edward B. Tylor in Great Britain, whose doctrine of survivals argued that contemporary peasants manifest the cultural traits of earlier societies (Stocking 1987).

The following selection is from the second volume of the Reflections, in which Grimaldi treats “moral man,” or the intellectual development of man in society. This selection has traditionally been considered the centerpiece of Grimaldi’s three-volume work, canonized as it were in the definitive anthology on the Neapolitan philosophes edited by Franco Venturi, in which it is republished in its entirety (Venturi, 1962) The Reflections has otherwise been somewhat neglected by the historiography on the Neapolitan Enlightenment. This is certainly due in part to the fact that the work has yet to be re-published and remains rare in Italian libraries. In my own translation of Grimaldi’s original publication, I have tried to make his often obscure prose as accessible to the modern Anglo-American reader as possible without sacrificing fidelity to his concepts. Consequently, I have taken the liberty of simplifying the syntax and eliminating redundancy where I have felt that it muddled the point, and in the case of some particular words whose meaning may not be clear (e.g. “situation”), I have qualified it in brackets. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the adjectival usage of “civilized” is Grimaldi’s own, and numbered among the earliest usages of the French neologism in the Italian language. The same holds true for Grimaldi’s usage of “class,” which he borrowed from vocabulary of his mentor Antonio Genovesi, whose sociological use of the word was innovative in the European context and is worthy of further study.

Chapter XIII. Of the Civil Nations.

I. It is quite difficult to determine precisely what one should understand by the term civil nation, and how such a nation distinguishes itself from barbarous ones. If one were to draw upon the common knowledge of men, the difficulty posed by the notion of the civil nation would not be clarified in the slightest. The Greeks called barbarous all other nations which did not speak their language correctly. Moved by the same pride, the Romans hardly made an exception of the
Greeks, who themselves referred to the Romans as barbarians. In sum, every nation, both ancient and modern, considers itself to be the most cultured and the most civilized, estimating its manners and its customs above those of the others. But the philosopher who would like to establish the limits of culture and barbarity must regard the question differently. Far from partial pride, the philosopher must weigh the true principles by which nations distinguish themselves and merit the title of cultured and civil.

2. In my opinion, there are two principal signs that distinguish the civil nation from the barbarous: the utter loss of natural independence under the veil of civil liberty and the complete replacement of the compassionate and natural sentiments with the masque of reflection. Some will probably find my thoughts strange, as it is usual to distinguish the civil nations from the barbarous on the basis of their more regular form of government, which does not depend upon the arbitrary will of men but the establishment of law, which in turn safekeeping the good order, tranquility and security of persons no less than the property of citizens. In the civil nations, all the arts and sciences are brought to their ultimate degree of perfection. In the civil nations, commerce and agriculture reign; war is not carried on, but in the case of self-defense; the law of the nations is respected and manners practiced which render society pleasurable. In the civil nations, finally, the system of citizens' actions is ordered, unlike that of the barbarians, who were so elegantly characterized by the Latins for their *animi impotentia*, or disorderly spirits. While I agree that these and other similar characteristics distinguish the civil nations from the barbarous, I dare to add that those characteristics particular to the civil nations can be reduced to the two I indicated above. And so I reason.

[...]

8. If we consider the condition of civilized men, we shall find that they are divided into infinite ranks, in so far as the societal relations that the civilized state requires are themselves infinite. As if enclosed in a circle, every man exists in the center of his social situation, and from man emanate many rays that are circumscribed by the limits of his condition. These rays are nothing but the needs relative to his condition. They have their source in the physical body of man, which forms the center of his social circle, but can only extend and multiply themselves to the limits of the circle's circumference.1 The condition of an ecclesiastical, of a soldier, of a plebe, of a noble, of a courtier, of a businessman, of a shopkeeper, of a minister, of a subaltern, of a rich man, of a poor man, of a well-to-do man, etc. form many different circles, in which their relative needs are enclosed. Those needs modify their physical sensibility, so that all the rays terminate diversely, whence the different characters of men. We call civil manners those different manners with which the natural and compassionate sentiments are covered. In substance, they are nothing other than the different colors of the masque we wear in society.

9. If we could see below the masque of civil men, what new spectacle would present itself before our eyes? Thousands of virtues, which we appreciate in some, would lose all their worth; and thousands of vices, which we are unable to bear, would be discerned as attached to the mask, the changing of which would make them largely vanish. We are surprised that men change character with changing condition, that some sincere and honest men become cowardly and feigning and yet other modest and agreeable ones become arrogant and ungrateful. But our surprise ceases when we reflect that all these various modifications are the offspring of the masque, and that the latter varies relative to the variations of the center of our social situation. We accuse barbarians of being hard, simple, coarse, vain, proud and self-centered, and thus little

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1 Two men situated in the same circumstances in society always develop in proportion to their temperament. See the example given by Mandeville in the *Fable of the Bees*, Dialogue IV.
adaptable to the manners of others. We do this, however, without reflecting that those properties are the effect of the independence they enjoy, just as our opposite qualities are the offspring of our dependence, that is, of the masque that we are forced to wear.

10. Given the characteristics of the civil nations, let us now examine the means by which the barbarians lose their independence and grow accustomed to replacing their compassionate and natural sentiments with those of reflection. The means are the greater number of needs of civil life. A barbarous nation slowly and coincidentally begins to acquire new ideas about those comforts and pleasures formerly unknown to them. Formerly shared among only a few, goods get divided among many by way of inheritances and with exchanges. The number of proprietors is larger than before. But they are not insured from the violence of small despots. Hence they unite and form a single body that has enough physical force to oppose oppressors and seek security, the *jus aequum* or civil laws, to which it is worth subjugating the powerful just as the weak. Anarchy slowly yields to order, because anarchy makes everyone equally feel the need to establish order. In this state, it is no longer in the power of man to turn back and live like a savage. For he has grown too used to the comforts of societal life to abandon them. The needs he feels weaken his spirit, and render him incapable of securing tranquility with his own forces. Thus he must necessarily look for tranquillity in the moral forces of government. Specifically, these are the laws and customs which clearly and determinately establish the relations between those who govern and those who obey, as well as public and private law. These moral forces distinguish the form of governments and characterize that inequality that we call political, of which we shall speak in the third part of this work, where we shall investigate its origin and progress. Here, let us content ourselves with considering those moral forces as already established and examine them relative to their effect. Above, we have already seen that once made barbarians, the savages subject themselves to a form of government similar in all times and places. We have also seen that once barbarian governments are established, so is the exclusive holding of property and goods and, consequently, the diversity of conditions. But at the same time, we have seen that these governments only admitted two sorts of conditions, one composed of a small number of oppressors and another of the oppressed, founded as these governments were upon physical force. That kind of society could not be either very large or varied. In fact, all the barbarous nations are divided in many small dominions, which live in a perpetual state of war.

11. If it is legitimate to look for the first node in the chain of causes which lead the original barbarous nations to the civil state, it seems that one of the more turbulent and needy barbarian nations must have extended its dominion by way of war and plunder, subjugating its neighboring nations and enlarging its confines in a piecemeal fashion. As a result, a vast state could not govern itself as if by a barbarian chief ruling his small community with his mere force, which is always insecure. Consequently, it was necessary to make use of those moral forces which we have discussed above and shall clarify in the third part of this work.2

12. These moral forces make man lose his independence, and obligate him to live a more regular and tranquil life, since they bring to a halt the state of war in which the barbarous nations

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2 Should we like to consult history, we shall find that all the civilizing barbarian nations began with the war to subjugate their neighbors and expand their confines. The Assyrians, Chaldeans, Egyptians, Chinese provide examples for us in the Orient; and in the Occident, the Romans provide unequivocal proof of this truth. In the Middle Ages, when Europe had relapsed into barbarism on account of the invasions of savages from the North, Europe did not begin to civilize, if not when small barbarian tyrants made themselves subjects of a monarch supported by the populace, and together formed an empire. Italy was the center of culture on account of the pontifical state, which first expanded the confines of its empire.
end to be. Where the moral forces dominate, private violence has no place. Civil bondage slowly mitigates the natural ferocity of the barbarian. He begins to enjoy the pleasures of domestic life. His wife is no longer his slave, and his children the subjects of his absolute power. The law pertains equally to all as the dependent subjects of its [just] empire. This new kind of domestic life develops his spirit in a way totally different from before. He commences within the confines of his very home to modify himself with the adoption of polished humane manners, which reconcile love and respect, and with this new masque he presents himself to society.

13. In the otium and tranquillity of civil life, those arts which one had just begun to learn as a barbarian perfect themselves and multiply. One first tries to satisfy needs of primary necessity and then of luxury, which with habit make necessary an infinity of needs previously unknown. Commerce and the new discoveries which happen by chance continuously multiply our knowledge and needs. The man who is born in civil society finds himself enveloped by the force of its knowledge and needs, which modify his spirit in thousand different ways relative to the form of government, to the religion, to the manners, to the arts and to the sciences introduced.

14. We have observed above that the moral development of all barbarians is about the same, and that the diversity among them solely depends upon the circumstances of climate, since their form of government is the same in all places and excites a relatively small number of needs, leaving the primitive impressions of nature in the barbarian. But we cannot say the same for the moral development of civilized men, since the state of civil society, which determines their moral development, [itself] varies to the tenor of the numerous forces which modify it. Consequently, the needs of this state are larger in number; and since they depend upon various moral forces, which do not act upon individuals equally but relatively to the social situation in which they find themselves, it comes to pass that the moral development of the individuals of a civil nation is more varied than that of a barbarian one and causes an immense inequality among those same individuals. If we examine a population of savages, we can hardly distinguish among them who is the most active, who stupid, and who more or less capable of understanding. All would have about the same degree of limited intelligence; all would be more or less able to exercise the arts and crafts known to their tribe. If we then examine a nation of barbarians, we would find their development relative to their state, which distinguishes their character a bit from that of the savages. Courage, ferocity and industry indicates the greater activity of their spirit. If this greater activity can be unequal among individuals, it is always so to a limited degree and relative to the physical rather than moral constraints on man. But in civil nations, moral inequality has a different aspect, and it is here that we must examine it in order to understand it. The arts, sciences and passions of various sorts, produced by needs unknown in the states first considered, become the standards by which we need compare the moral development of men in order to understand this kind of inequality. Relative to the diverse social situations of individuals, we shall see in the same nation: stupid savages; barbarians governed by the passions and men who act in accordance with the most refined reason. We shall see in the same nation the maximum degree of the spirit linked to the basest by way of a long and varied chain of intermediate degrees. There, our theory that the moral development of men is a result of both the ability of the individual to feel and of circumstance shall be further confirmed.

Chapter XIV. Of the Development of the Intellectual Faculties of the Civil Nations relative to the Arts and Sciences.

I. The same arts and sciences are not in use and cultivated by all the civil nations. Yet, there is no nation meriting the name, where certain arts and sciences are unknown and uncultivated. I need not speak of either the origin of the arts and sciences or the state in which they find themselves in the civil nations which presently exist. That would be an enterprise foreign to my own. It is
enough for me to examine this material from the point of view of the inequality of the development of intellectual faculties that we observe among the individuals of a civil nation. The causes that I will examine in the abstract are applicable to every particular case.

2. Generally considered, the civil nation presents us with a theater of infinite diverse scenes in which man represents a character relative to his social situation. This situation principally derives from the circumstances which chance, as the ignorant puts it, or Providence, as the philosopher must conclude, provide, that is to say, from one's place of birth, from the station of one's family, from the education that one receives as a child, and from the combination of infinite circumstances of diverse kinds in which we can find ourselves in the course of life. Given that the forces of our temperament, which are the principal basis upon which circumstances rest, are not an obstacle, all these things taken together, which are absolutely independent of our will, must contribute to our moral development relative to the arts and sciences.

3. In order to clearly understand such a truth, let us examine one of the civil European nations as they are today. Let us look at that nation's individuals situated in the countryside, small provincial towns and the capital, who are employed in various occupations and distinguished in various classes formed by the distinction of conditions and by the unequal distribution of goods. We shall see that the development of the spirit relative to the arts and sciences is always proportionate to the social situation and circumstances in which each individual finds oneself.

4. The first class which presents itself for our reflection is that of men who live in the countryside to tend herds and cultivate the land [i.e., peasants; cfr. paragraph number 8 below]. For the most, these men live divorced from civil society. Their home consists in a small hovel made of boards or branches. A coarse woolen or cotton cloth serves for their dress. And their food consists of a piece of bread, or some oats, corn, chestnuts or millet with a few roots. From time to time they consume a plate of legumes seasoned with putrid oil, and a few times a year a bit of badly prepared meat. Their primary commerce is with the beasts they tend and the trees they cultivate; and a few times each year they see the city closest to them. These men are strong, robust and insensitive in comparison with the other individuals of the nation. Their needs are few. In sum, they are almost similar to savages, who know neither the arts nor the sciences. The only difference one can note is that the former enjoy the advantage of security the forces of the nation procure, and note the vigor of the superior orders of society. They feel them, however, in such a rough way that they lose little of their natural independence. The savages, on the other hand, have no security and must be continually armed, but enjoy absolute independence.

5. From this first node in the chain of the development of civil society, let us now consider in second place the class of farmers and shepherds who live united in a small village or close to capital cities. This second class of men is far more developed than the first. Their frequent commerce with the city folk whose land they cultivate places them in circumstances where they feel the weight of the civil forces and enjoy those comforts which awaken many needs in them. Among them, there is a sort of luxury of dress and adornment correlative to their vicinity to the capitals. In order to satisfy these needs, activity and industry are required and, consequently, a development of spirit proportionate to their condition. In the villages, we do in fact find elders so sensible and adorned with natural virtues that they can be compared to the Catos and Cincinnatis of Antiquity. They demand the respect not only of their families but of their village. Young people turn to them as depositories of experience and respect their advice, which is for the most part based upon a few maxims passed down to them by their fathers, which are the mechanical foundation of all their reasonings.
6. This class of men feels little the weight of moral and political inequality, because there is no other distinction among men but that of age. And although it could procure riches for them, the superiority of a few proves intangible, enjoying as these men all do a kind of independence ensured by the few needs to which they are subject. In sum, if they had not a justice of the peace, who makes them feel the burden of civil bondage, and a parish priest, who keeps them practiced in religion, they could pride themselves upon living in the most simple and tranquil state of civil society. A philosopher does not recognize in these men anything but a purely physical sort of development. The philosopher always finds their natural and compassionate sentiments to be lively; he encounters in them only the shadow of the sentiments of reflection. The roughness and obstinacy which one attributes to peasants are the offspring of their simplicity. The independence they enjoy renders them incivil; and the authority of superior forces, which they experience without encountering them, makes them timid, suspicious, ferocious and mendacious with men of the superior classes.

7. Thirdly, the inhabitants of small provincial towns present themselves for our deliberation, inhabitants who are divided into the classes of the well-off, ecclesiastics, farmers, shepherds, fishermen and artisans. In these towns, political inequality begins to make itself felt. The well-off and the ecclesiastics wish to be distinguished from the other classes. In the small towns, one strongly apprehends the ambition for those honors so valued in the bigger cities. A mayor, a local official, a governor approved ad triginta focularia, a parish priest learned in the moral institutes of Bonacina and Bussembau make the weight of their authority felt. These men maintain a civil way of life, which is a bizarre mix of the rustic life, the old prejudices of barbarian times and the luxuries and customs current in the cities with which they often have contact. The sphere of their ideas is limited in proportion to the pettiness of the objects which form the basis of their needs. The arts are rude and in small number. The sciences do not penetrate, except by way of reverberation from the capitals; they neither take root nor can they grow, as the soil is encumbered by bushes planted by their old prejudices and sustained with the authority of those who dominate either in opinion or with force. In this class of towns, the philosopher still observes the residue of our ancient barbarians' character. Small offenses are often the causes of atrocious homicides. Enmities are lasting and pernicious. The code of [male] honor prevails over all other sentiments. Yet, one finds more hospitality and good faith than in the big towns, since men have fewer needs, experience less societal dependence and consequently bear a smaller mask. Furthermore, moral inequality must be much more marked in this sphere than among the inhabitants of small villages. In these towns, the way of life largely depends upon the diverse circumstances in which men find themselves. The passions cannot stimulate all individuals equally, since they are the offspring of the needs relative to each individual's circumstances and each individual is stationed diversely. The farmer, the shepherd, the artisan, the well-to-do, the ecclesiastic and, among these, those who often travel to the capital must each have a sphere of different ideas, which is progressively differentiated from the physical qualities particular to each person, which form, as we have seen above, the center from which the rays of development depart to approach the determinate circumference [of each person's condition].

8. Finally, the inhabitants of the big city, or capital, present themselves for our examination. The rule by which to learn the moral inequality of such a place is no different from that which we have specified for peasants, villagers and provincial townspeople—that is to say, the moral development of man's mind in the city is proportionate to the particular social situation in which he is placed, his needs therein and his unique physical nature. Although distinguished in numerous classes, we must also consider that the city forms a single body, that it is always a

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3[ Martino Bonacina and Herman Busenbaum were noted early modern theologians.]
totality whose parts are connected to one another. The general force which results from the amalgam of a civil society's particular forces grows diffuse and, like the sun, gives with its rays a light proportionate to the bodies it illuminates. It forms the tenor of civil society, which makes itself felt among each class of persons, so that the moral development of the big cities distinguishes itself from that of the villages and small towns.

9. In the big cities, political inequality manifests itself most glaringly as a result of the diversity of [socio-]political conditions, which make certain men feel the needs [associated with the masque] of reflection greatly, others less, and yet others not at all. Of the different fortunes which citizens enjoy, some are rich proprietors and others worse off while the majority possess nothing at all. Some live from more or less lucrative or honorable professions; others live from the practice of the arts and others from useful or luxurious trades; others have neither property, profession, art nor trade, and hate work as if it were their greatest enemy. In order to survive in their ignorance and indolence, they must thus live off [the wealth] of others and have others either voluntarily or involuntarily provide for them. These various social situations, which are of an indefinite number in the big cities, awaken sentiments of reflection in proportion to the needs of each particular social situation. Whence it is the case that the moral development of the individuals who are placed in the big cities varies immensely over the broadest possible range. If moral development is proportionate to the force as well as the number of needs, then it is certain that man must feel more needs more strongly in the big cities than in villages or small towns. 4 Furthermore, imitation is more diffused and varied in the big cities. As we have said above, men render themselves unequal with the imitation one another. The particular temperament or circumstances of each man adds a little something of his own. Thus with imitation, moral development in man consequently varies and grows, in contrast, the animals never surpass the limits of development established for them by nature, so that the species never varies character with the passing of the years and is always and everywhere the same as it originally was.

10. To return to our topic: in the big opulent cities, where there are greater and varied needs, where men are forced into communion and imitation is necessarily more frequent, where governmental forces are more active in the education of the citizenry, there one must find the most distinct stratification of intellects fit for the culture of the arts and sciences. ...

4 Men nourished upon the chaos of the big cities have the mind and heart of tigers and leopards, who neither have their eyes at rest nor their appetite satisfied. And those who are born and live in the mountains and solitary villages appear to be a populace of beautiful simpletons, where hunger and war with neighbors likens them to wolves. Antonio Genovesi, Delle lezioni di commercio o sia d'economia civile, vol. ii (Naples: Stamperia Simoniana, 1770), ch. xiii, p. 288.


RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

Ralph Bolton (Anthropology, Pomona College: bynner@aol.com) is doing research on the life of Witten Bynner, poet, translator, and essayist, who lived in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the first half of the 20th century, and was a vocal supporter of Native American rights. He would appreciate hearing from readers who might know about contacts Bynner had with anthropologists.

Kevin Doak (History, U. of Illinois, Urbana: k-doak@uiuc.edu) is carrying on research on Japanese ethnology between 1920 and 1945, as part of a larger project on ethnic and national identity in Japan from 1868 to the present.

Pamela Jane Smith (Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge: pjs1011@cam.ac.uk) is doing research on the career of the archeologist Dorothy Garrod, the first woman professor at Cambridge University, as part of a dissertation project on the history of prehistory at the university.

Melburn D. Thurman (PO Box 391, Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, 63670) has for two years been interviewing archeologists and anthropologists for an ethnographic-sociological study of American archaeology (c.1945-80) and the emergence of the "New Archaeology."

BIBLIOGRAPHICA ARCANA

I. Recent Dissertations
(Ph.D. except where otherwise indicated)


Morse, Michael (University of Chicago, 1999) “Redefining the Celts: Rival disciplinary traditions and the peopling of the British Isles”

Wilcox, Clifford (University of Michigan, 1997) “Encounters with modernity: Robert Redfield and the problem of social change.”

II. Recent Work by Subscribers

[Except in the case of new subscribers, for whom we will include one or two orienting items, "recent" is taken to mean within the last two years. Please note that we do not list "forthcoming"