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Leviathan Lost: The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

Sarah Simon
sarsimon@sas.upenn.edu

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Leviathan Lost: The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

Abstract
While wars between nations have declined over the past twenty years, intrastate conflicts are on the rise. Scholars are now examining the conditions under which civil war is likely to break out, to last longer, and to intensify, and the strength of the local government has emerged as a critical factor that could potentially mitigate the harms posed by civil wars. This thesis addresses two research questions: what is the impact of state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2) conflict intensity? To answer these research questions, I conduct several quantitative analyses of all internal conflicts occurring in the years 1960-2015, examining the relationship between state strength and conflict duration and battle deaths per year. This thesis ultimately finds that state strength, as proxied by military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is negatively correlated with conflict intensity but is positively correlated with conflict duration. This thesis concludes with the presentation of two case studies – the First Congo War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland – to illustrate how strong states may experience longer, but less bloody, civil wars.

Keywords
political science, civil wars, internal conflict, mixed methods, war, northern ireland, congo, Social Sciences, Political Science, Jessica Stanton, Stanton, Jessica

Disciplines
International Relations | Other Political Science

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“For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended … [without the State] there is continual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

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Leviathan Lost

The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

Sarah Simon
University of Pennsylvania

"For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended … [without the State] there is continual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

– Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)

Abstract

While wars between nations have declined over the past twenty years, intrastate conflicts are on the rise, leading scholars to examine the conditions under which civil war is likely to break out, to last longer, and to intensify. The strength of the local government has emerged as a critical factor that could potentially mitigate the harms posed by civil wars. This thesis addresses two research questions: what is the impact of state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2) conflict intensity? To answer these research questions, I conduct several quantitative analyses of all internal conflicts occurring in the years 1960-2015, examining the relationship between state strength and conflict duration and battle deaths per year. This thesis ultimately finds that state strength, as proxied by military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is negatively correlated with conflict intensity but is positively correlated with conflict duration. This thesis concludes with the presentation of two case studies – the First Congo War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland – to illustrate how strong states may experience longer, but less bloody, civil wars.

No one is in control. It is very frightening. Power is in the streets, and it belongs to those with a gun,” said a businessman to a journalist from the Associated Press in 1997. In his country, an ongoing civil war had spurred travel bans from the capital, leading many to book plane tickets under false names, and a sense of dread had fallen over the city. Another citizen echoed his sentiments, telling another journalist how the gunmen had killed his brother: “My mother Florence heard the shots from the house, and she always remembered how she saw two men running away cheering” (O’Boyle, 2017). He went on to describe how the targeting of his brother in the civil war later destroyed their mother, remarking, “There’s no doubt in my mind it was brought on the stress of what happened.”

Despite the similarity of their situations, these two citizens were describing lawlessness and violence in two separate civil wars on two different continents. The businessman, Robert Mulamba, spoke to reporters in what was then known as Zaire, known today as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As Mulamba grimly awaited gunmen in the anarchic streets of Kinshasa, the civil war in which Ken Funston’s brother was gunned down was drawing to a close after decades of violence. Funston lived in County Fermanagh in Northern Ireland, which since 1969 had been rocked
by sectarian violence in which over 3,000 people, Funston’s brother among them, would ultimately die. Despite their dramatically different life circumstances, both Mulamba and Funston found themselves subjected to and terrorized by capricious and random violence. Despite their dramatically different countries, both Mulamba and Funston regarded the rebels with a mixture of hostility and fear. And despite the dramatically different levels of political development in their countries, both Mulamba and Funston found themselves in the middle of a conflict spurred by massive grievances against the state. Grievances against governments are pervasive and eternal. But what makes Mulamba and Funston’s circumstances unique is these grievances boiled over in the form of civil war.

As Mulamba’s and Funston’s stories should illustrate, civil wars demonstrate remarkable variation in their outbreak, violence, combatants, length, and intensity. The shortest civil wars end within minutes after the staging of a bloody coup d’état, while some internal conflicts last decades – the Sudanese Civil War began in August 1955 and is still being fought to this day, sixty-one years later. Meanwhile, some civil wars have seen the death of millions, while some civil wars kill two dozen people per year and are punctuated by long lulls in the violence. Some civil wars are fought between two clearly-defined armies in pitched battles with clear frontlines, while other civil wars entail years of guerilla warfare between a strong state and a rebel group barely clinging to survival. But Mulamba’s and Funston’s stories also show that, regardless of their intensity or length, one thing is certain about civil wars, and that is the tremendous toll they take on local populations and economies. Civil wars victimize soldiers and civilians alike, and those that do not die directly from violence are often harmed by the subsequent failure of institutions, threats to public health, and collapse of the local economy (Imai & Weinstein, 2000). Moreover, civil wars are on the rise: a third of all nations since 1960 have experienced internal conflict of some sort, and intrastate wars have occurred far more frequently than have interstate wars over the past seventy years (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Dosse, 2010).

In recent years, the civil war literature has turned away from analyzing the desire to engage in civil war (namely a focus on economic greed or political grievance) towards an opportunity-based model of civil war outbreak. This model focuses on the political opportunity structure in place that informs potential rebels’ decision to wage civil war, and at its center is a discussion of state capacity (Tilly, 1978). Scholars are now examining the conditions under which civil war is likely to break out, to last longer, and to intensify, and the strength of the local government has emerged as a critical factor that could potentially mitigate the harms posed by civil wars. Underlying this scholarship is the hope that states can protect their citizens from violence within their own borders, and the ability of the state to ameliorate the natural conditions of anarchy has been a centerpiece of political theory from the 1600s onwards. While much attention has been paid to the ability of states to forestall civil war onset, more research is needed regarding how state strength and legitimacy can change the character and dynamics of civil wars once they occur. This thesis hopes to fill this gap in the literature by addressing the two following research questions: why are some civil wars more intense than others, and why do some civil wars last longer than
the existing literature regarding state strength, intensity of conflict, and length of conflict, using the existing scholarship to later inform my decisions of how to operationalize state capacity. Following this, I advance a theory of how three major components of state capacity (military strength, government revenues, and bureaucratic quality) influence duration and intensity of conflict. After this, I outline my data and methodology for my quantitative and qualitative analyses. I then present the findings of my quantitative analyses of all internal conflicts occurring in the years 1960 – 2015. This thesis finds that state strength is positively correlated with duration of civil war; that is, the stronger a state, the longer civil war within its borders is likely to endure. In addition, this thesis finds that state capacity is statistically significantly and negatively correlated with battle deaths occurring in a civil war, meaning that stronger states tend to experience lower-intensity conflicts. To illustrate the potential mechanisms leading to these relationships, I then provide the two case studies of the First Congo War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland. The final section concludes with implications of the findings and questions for further research.

**Literature Review**

Intrastate wars have occurred far more frequently in recent years than inter-state wars and tend to endure longer, and their effects range from extreme loss of human life to economic damage (Fearon, 2004; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013). Because of the massive harms posed by civil wars, scholars have sought to identify specific ways in which the effects of civil wars persist and impact the population. To begin with, civil wars kill both others? These questions have importance because they examine the qualities and characteristics of civil wars under various conditions of state strength, leading to a greater understanding of the opportunity structures rebels face when fighting against a government. These questions also have significance for peacekeepers in generating policy prescriptions for predicting, forestalling, and resolving intrastate conflict.

This thesis will advance hypotheses regarding the extent to which state capacity impacts the intensity and length of civil war and ultimately argues that military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity are essential components of state capacity. Using these proxies for state capacity, I will show that state strength is negatively correlated with conflict intensity but positively associated with civil war intensity. In addition to my statistical analyses, this thesis provides two case studies to illustrate how state capacity may lengthen civil wars but attenuate their intensity: first, Robert Mulamba’s war of First Congo War, and second, Ken Funston’s war of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. In the First Congo War, the dissolution of the Zairian state, coupled with fallout from the Rwandan genocide, allowed rebels to quickly unseat the Mobutu regime, with thousands of battle deaths and tens of thousands of civilian deaths occurring in only a few months of conflict. On the other hand, in the Troubles in Northern Ireland, one of the strongest states in the world underestimated the severity of grievances held by citizens of one of its peripheral provinces and struggled to strike an appropriate balance between the use of military and political strategies, leading to a low-intensity conflict of nearly thirty years.

In the following section, I outline...
on and off the battlefield: nearly as many people are indirectly killed by civil wars through damaged infrastructure and increased spread of disease as are killed in battle (Ghobarah, 2003). Moreover, civil wars destroy national education systems, inflicting damage that persists for generations, and also cause flight of human and physical capital (Chamarbagwala & Moran, 2011; Collier, 1999; Lai & Thyne, 2007). Further, countries take years to recover and develop after civil wars, and civil war-torn states unsurprisingly experience reduced international trade (Bayer & Rupert, 2004; Flores & Nooruddin, 2009). Post-conflict countries tend to receive less foreign direct investment and development aid, and countries that border post-conflict countries see reduced economic growth (Garriga & Phillips, 2014; Murdoch & Sandler, 2004). While the literature regarding the impacts of civil wars is well-developed, not as much research has been conducted on factors impacting conflict duration and intensity. This is a critical area of research because when civil wars break out, external countries and multilateral organizations often attempt to reduce the harms posed by the war, and loss of life is a primary way that intrastate war threatens future stability. Thus, the scholarship should attempt to address factors that lead to higher losses of life, along with longer civil wars. This literature review will begin by analyzing the existing literature about state capacity and then turn to an examination of the literature regarding conflict duration and intensity.

**State Capacity**

At first blush, states avoid violent challenges to their authority through multiple methods, including three strategies that Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) identify as coercion, co-optation, and cooperation with potential internal adversaries. States can help keep the civil peace and stop civil war outbreak through high levels of government spending on political goods and the establishment of trustworthy institutions (Fjelde & De Soysa, 2009). But when states cannot keep control and descend into civil war, Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbon (2004) note that a state’s lack of economic and military capacity can lengthen the duration of a civil war. Moreover, escalation of civil war can lead to an increase in military spending in the warring country itself and in neighboring countries, requiring more demands on state fiscal capacity (Phillips, 2015). On the other hand, state capacity – as measured by military quality and gross domestic product – has been shown not to be associated with intensity of civil war conflict (Lacina, 2006). However, it is not immediately clear what impact other measures of state capacity have on conflict intensity. Much of the literature focuses on defining state capacity, state capacity’s impact on internal development, how state capacity can forestall civil war onset, and how state capacity can aid the resolution of civil wars.

State capacity is a crucial and difficult concept to define and operationalize. Kocher (2010) criticizes the use of the term “state capacity,” noting, “You might inquire about my capacity to solve equations or shoot jump-shots, but it would not make much sense to inquire about my capacity in general.” Kocher (2010) insists that first researchers must identify what type of capacity states must have and the objectives for which that capacity is useful. Some major theoretical measures of state capacity include military power and capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, fiscal capabilities, and quality and coherence of political institutions (Hendrix, 2010).
Various ways to operationalize military capacity abound, namely military personnel per capita (Diehl, 1983; Jones, Bremer & Singer, 1996; Mason & Fett, 1996; Wayman, Singer & Goertz, 1983), log military spending per capita (Henderson & Singer, 2000), and log GDP per capita (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In addition, two major ways to operationalize bureaucratic or administrative capacity include expert assessments of bureaucratic quality and rule of law, along with export profiles, natural resources, and extractive capacity (Hendrix, 2010). Further, the quality and coherence of political institutions is usually identified as a critical factor providing state capacity (Gurr, 1974; Hegre et al., 2001). However, Hanson and Sigman (2013) go further and identify other measures of state capacity, like control of tax evasion, implementation of government decisions, and maintaining the monopoly on violence as important elements of state capacity. Moreover, various theorized dimensions of state capacity can be difficult to disentangle from one another, making it tricky for researchers to identify which measures of state capacity are significant (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Cingolani, 2013).

Setting aside questions of how to define state capacity, the literature has examined the impact of state capacity on general economic development and national security. Besley and Persson (2010) contend that a lack of state capacity, as manifested in weak or failed states, is a major obstacle to development, and indicators of state weakness all have negative impact on fidelity to human rights, leading weak states to have worse human rights records on average than strong ones (Englehart, 2009). Lack of state capacity can lead to security concerns as well: a low legal capacity can contribute to the likelihood of internal violence, and failed states are similarly more prone to produce terrorists (Besley & Persson, 2010; Rotberg, 2002). In addition, state capacity may provide protection from regional contagion, as state capacity has been shown to decrease the likelihood that a state will become infected by civil conflict occurring in neighboring territories (Braithwaite, 2010).

As a result, a wealth of literature points to state capacity as a fundamental factor of civil war onset; in conditions of civil war, the internal security of the state is no longer assured, and the natural security dilemma that states exist to prevent is exacerbated (Posen, 1993). Hendrix (2011) identifies a negative and significant correlation between civil war onset and fiscal capacity as measured by tax revenue, and other research notes that controlling for measures of state capacity reveals a strong negative correlation between democratization of a country and likelihood of civil conflict (Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010). Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) argue that democratization, bureaucratic effectiveness, and size of government army should prevent the outbreak of civil war since the government is more capable of holding the state together. Democratization may prevent the outbreak of civil war because they produce fewer radicalized elements and provide less exclusionary outlets for the resolution of ethnic conflict (Gvosdev & Gurr, 2000). Relatedly, an effective bureaucracy is capable of policing rural areas and providing services that make citizens less inclined to rebel, which may decrease the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). However, scholars disagree on the extent to which strong state capacity decreases risk of war onset. Sobek (2010) argues that strong states have a decreased risk of experiencing civil war, while Thies (2010) claims that state capacity does not affect civil war onset. How-
ever, both Sobek (2010) and Thies (2010) note that civil war onset may reduce state capacity, implying a potential reverse causality. Besley and Persson (2008) back up this assertion, finding that the prospect of an external war spurs much more investment and development of fiscal capacity than does the prospect of a civil war.

Finally, state capacity may also be an important characteristic that can contribute to the resolution of civil wars. Capable states that experience civil violence might be more able to credibly commit to a treaty or negotiation, which increases the likelihood the violence can reach a bargained conclusion (McBride, Milante, & Skaperdas, 2011; Sobek, 2010). Other measures of state capacity, like bureaucratic effectiveness and quality of military, may be linked to the outcome of civil wars. An effective state bureaucracy represents the ability of a government to function even in times of regime stress, and correspondingly, bureaucratic quality should make it more likely the government wins a civil war (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989; Knack, 2001; Schock, 1996). Similarly, a strong government army may be able to forestall losses of territory to rebel groups, making it harder for rebels to win (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000). On the other hand, Lacina (2006) finds that quality of military is not strongly correlated with severity of civil war. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) also find that size of army alone might not necessarily increase the likelihood of victory, indicating that nonmilitary aspects of state capacity are important as well. However, DeRouen and Sobek note that, while state capacity is necessary for peace agreements, it might not be sufficient conditions for a sustainable civil peace.

Overall, while the impact of state capacity on civil war onset and resolution has been well-documented, the impact that state capacity can have while civil wars are ongoing is not as clear. This is a vital question; while state capacity can be an important bulwark against civil war outbreak, the literature generally fails to address what happens when “all else fails” and strong states do experience internal conflict. Moreover, the literature lacks agreement on how to define state capacity and how to operationalize it in the context of civil wars, and policymakers and peacekeepers may want answers to the question of “what tools or resources may be useful to states when fighting a civil war?” Later, this thesis will seek to address these gaps in the literature by proposing a theory of state capacity and how it impacts duration and intensity of conflict.

**Conflict Duration**

Another major question scholars have asked about civil wars centers around the determinants of the duration of civil conflict. Grievances and ethnic conflict may be linked to length of conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004). Collier et al. (2004) provide three key conceptualizations of civil war: rebellion-as-investment (in which the critical incentive for fighting is the payoff to rebels once war ends), rebellion-as-mistake (in which military optimism prevents the recognition of any mutually advantageous settlement), and rebellion-as-business (in which the rebellion pays off through income or satisfaction while fighting occurs). Collier et al. (2004) find that the key factors that lengthen conflict are low per capita income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division, indicating that rebellion-as-mistake and rebellion-as-business are better conceptualizations of civil war — that is, “rebellions will occur where and only where they are profitable” since the
opportunity costs of civil wars must be low in order for them to occur. Ethnic rebellions or rebellions motivated by grievance tend to be long in duration, especially “sons of the soil” wars that pit a peripheral ethnic minority against state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group (Fearon, 2004). Wucherpfennig, Mettermich, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2012) find that ethnicity per se does not matter as much as how government and nonstate leaders capitalize on it, finding that rebels’ ethnic linkage to an excluded makes conflict endure longer. On the other hand, other scholars find that ethnic fractionalization makes conflicts shorter (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009).

Another proposed factor in the duration of civil wars are the presence of natural resources in the country experiencing conflict. Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2009) find that fighting in regions with valuable minerals – namely, petroleum, gemstones, and drugs – lasts substantially longer than fighting in regions without those natural resources present. Other scholars confirm this finding, possibly since it may make rebellion as a business more profitable (Fearon, 2004; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). On this note, alluvial diamonds and illegal drugs may be the most strongly linked to duration of civil war, since they are considered “lootable” and more easily capitalized on by rebels (Ross, 2003). Lootable resources like diamonds and drugs make non-separatist conflicts endure longer but pose little danger in separatist conflicts; on the other hand, unlootable resources like hydrocarbons tend to spur separatist conflicts (Ross, 2003). Other characteristics of a country, in addition to its abundance of natural resources, like its democratization and population size have been found to lengthen conflict (Cunningham et al., 2009).

Other characteristics of the civil war itself – such as its ultimate outcome and the goals and structure of its rebels – may influence its duration. Fearon (2004) finds that civil wars emerging from coup d’états or revolutions tend to be shorter, as do civil wars in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union states. Cunningham et al. (2009) confirm that civil wars resulting from coups are shorter on average. In addition, governments that face rebels motivated by secessionist goals take longer to prevail (Brandt, 2008). The duration of civil wars may also be a function of whether it ends in government victory, rebel victory, or a negotiated settlement, since the baseline hazard rates vary from outcome to outcome (Brandt, 2008). On the rebels’ side, Cunningham (2006) finds that the presence of multiple rebel organizations in the same conflict leads to narrower bargaining ranges, higher risk of info asymmetries, last mover advantages, and shifting alliances. Therefore, the number of active rebel organizations at the start of the conflict should cause wars to endure longer. Subsequent research has confirmed this “veto players” hypothesis (Cunningham et al., 2009).

Not only does the number of rebel groups impact the duration of civil war, but the strength of those groups may also matter. Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) propose three types of civil warfare: (1) conventional warfare, which consists of pitched battles and clear frontlines; (2) irregular warfare, which consists of a conventional state army versus lightly armed guerillas; and (3) symmetric nonconventional (SNC) warfare, which consists of a government and rebels matched at low levels of military sophistication. They find that irregular conflicts tend to last longer than other conflicts, meaning that the relative military capacities of states and
rebels matter for the duration of civil war. Absolute rebel and government strength may be a critical factor as well, since rebel strength – as measured by a high mobilization, arms-procurement, and fighting capacity and a legal political wing – have been found to make conflicts shorter (Cunningham et al., 2009). On the other side of the equation, some argue that, at minimum, state capacity should increase the length of time it takes for insurgents to win (Mason, Fett, & Weingarten, 1999). However, the literature on conflict duration has not fully examined the correlation between state capacity and length of civil war. When it has addressed this relationship, the measures of state capacity may be flawed. For example, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) proxy state capacity with how democratic the country is, which does not seem to be a fair assessment of a country’s strength. Severely authoritarian or repressive regimes may have high state capacity, insofar as they can accomplish and achieve the objectives they set, while some countries may be nominally democratic but lack solid institutions or bureaucracies.

**Conflict Intensity**

The research regarding conflict intensity proposes several variables that might lead to higher conflict intensity. Some studies show that intensity of conflict is significantly correlated with the degree of income inequality and wealth inequality, indicating that severity of grievance held by rebels might lead to more intense wars (Murshed & Gates, 2005). Lu and Thies (2011) corroborate this assertion, finding that the Gini index of a country is statistically significantly correlated with battle deaths in civil wars. Ethnic fractionalization, another main grievance cited by the literature, has been shown to be correlated with severity of conflict (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014; Lu & Thies, 2011; Lujala, 2009). Relatively, scholars have linked ethnic dominance and ethnic polarization to greater battle deaths in civil wars (Lacina, 2006; Lu & Thies, 2011).

Other characteristics of the country experiencing internal conflict may contribute to the intensity of civil wars. Lujala (2009) shows that natural resources, such as the presence of gemstones, hydrocarbons, and drugs within regions experiencing conflict, increase the number of battle deaths. Importantly, Lujala (2009) finds that nationwide aggregates of presence of natural resources do not retain this predictive power; hydrocarbons and gemstones must be present in the areas of fighting in order to correlate with battle deaths. Other scholars find that whether or not a nation is a major oil exporter is a strong predictor of how intense its civil war will be (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014). Another geographic factor increasing severity of civil war is how rough or mountainous the terrain is, which may allow rebels to find shelter and regroup (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014). In terms of state activities, Wellendorf (2013) shows that education spending and male secondary school enrollment have a pacifying effect on civil war intensity, while others contend that democratic institutions can also reduce fatalities during civil wars (Lacina, 2006). Lujala (2009) confirms the finding that countries that were considered to be democracies a year before the conflict started seem to experience conflicts with fewer battle-related deaths. Finally, countries with larger populations seem to experience more severe conflicts (Lujala, 2009).

In addition, some research shows that characteristics of the conflict itself, such as the method of warfare or foreign intervention, can affect how intense the conflict
have been shown to affect civil war intensity, but most of these characteristics of nation-states are immutable and not subject to change over a short period of time. State capacity, on the other hand, may be manipulable by foreign countries or peacekeeping organizations through grants or provision of arms. If state capacity is associated with more or fewer battle deaths in a conflict, it may be worth examining for policymakers seeking to reduce intensity of civil wars. With that in mind, this thesis will now advance a definition of state capacity and present a theory of how state capacity impacts conflict duration and intensity.

Theory

This thesis advances the following definition of state capacity: the ability of a state to set and achieve various policy objectives. This definition consists of two components: (1) the setting of policy and (2) the implementation of policy. The first component requires states to be able to coordinate and set policy goals and objectives; intrinsic in this requirement is the necessity that governments possess a leadership structure that can decide the policy objective. Second, this definition of state capacity necessitates that governments must be able to implement policies to achieve the selected objective; in order to do this, states must coordinate amongst various bureaucracies once the objectives are set and use available tools and resources to complete the objective. I contend that a state possesses state capacity when it can accomplish both aspects of this definition.

Because there are different objectives at different times for different governments, state capacity might not always refer to the same capabilities; put more specifical-
ly, different types of capacities will matter for the policy objective selected by the government. For example, the objective of protecting citizens from foreign invasion requires different tools, resources, and abilities than does the objective of providing housing to citizens. For the first objective, military capacity will be an important factor – how strong is the state’s military, and how able is it to stop invaders? But for the latter objective, fiscal capacity might be more important — how much money does the government have, and can it provide goods to its citizens? In these examples, we more clearly see the definition of state capacity because the policy objective is identified, along with the skills, resources, and tools a government needs to achieve the objective. The definition of state capacity that I advance in this thesis addresses Kocher’s (2010) concerns that “state capacity” does not hold water as a general concept. Kocher (2010) insists that researchers must identify what type of capacity states must have and the objectives for which that capacity is useful. I agree in part, contending that in order to talk about state capacity, researchers must specify the policy objective the government seeks to achieve and whether or not the state has the capability to achieve it. However, my proposed definition departs from Kocher’s by noting that state capacity can cut across policy areas and that we can conceptualize the notion of a “strong state” more broadly. Under this proposed definition, a strong state is one that can set policy goals and has a variety of effective tools, resources, and skills for achieving those goals. Strong states have a broad repertoire of abilities and can direct their resources to achieving their set objectives.

Turning to an examination of civil wars, let us briefly set aside the first component of the theory – that states must be able to determine and set their policy goals – and hypothesize what the objectives of states might be when engaged in civil war. To be sure, various states will set different goals, depending on the disposition of the top leadership, the history of the country, and the strength of the insurgency, but this thesis contends that governments are concerned with two primary objectives during civil war: (1) maintaining the stability of their regime, and (2) ending the civil war. These two objectives are necessary for governments to achieve but may not be sufficient in and of themselves; the leadership might set other goals, depending on the exact nature of the conflict, but they must achieve these two objectives at minimum in order to maintain control. This section now turns to an analysis of these two state objectives.

First, this thesis contends that states are concerned with the stability and safety of their own regime during a civil war. This is one of their primary objectives during a civil war because the leadership of the state may be harmed or killed if their regime’s stability is not assured. In the case of internal conflict, the leaders of the regime seek to ensure that violence is not used against them; thus, the leaders of states are concerned with the stability of their regime and with their own physical safety during periods of civil war. Second, this thesis contends that states are also concerned with winning the civil war when war breaks out within their borders. In many ways, winning the civil war is an ancillary goal that arises due to concerns of regime stability, and states might be content to allow civil wars to endure, if they don’t cause too much trouble or if it allows the government leaders to consolidate their regime. So perhaps some states do not prioritize winning the civil war. With that noted, there are unique reasons
that states are concerned with ending civil wars. For example, governments might fear losing natural resources or economic damage after a prolonged civil war; in addition, governments might fear interference or manipulation by foreign governments or multinational organizations like the United Nations if the conditions of anarchy persist for too long. Moreover, states focus on ending civil wars because they need to retain the sole legitimate use of violence within their borders. Weber (1968) proposes that governments become sovereign when they have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given territory. In the case of civil war, rebel groups intrinsically challenge this monopoly on violence within the nation’s borders, thus challenging the state’s sovereignty as well. Indeed, in many cases, governments are fighting rebel groups who seek to become the new government and to possess that monopoly on violence. Thus, because states seek to retain the legitimacy of their regimes, states are concerned with ending civil war when it breaks out in their borders.

Therefore, if we accept that these are the two primary objectives of states during civil wars, an analysis of state capacity must take into account what tools and resources are necessary for achieving these two objectives. For the first objective of maintaining the stability of the regime, a strong military can help maintain physical safety of leaders and ensure that the governmental structure remains safe and intact. Thus, an important measure of state capacity should be the military capacity a state possesses. For the second objective – ending the civil war – a variety of capabilities are useful. They include, but are not limited to, a military strong enough to defeat the insurgency, a bureaucracy capable of negotiation and coordination of action after a settlement has been reached, and fiscal resources to maintain its military and to provide material benefits to citizens to remove incentives to join the rebel group(s). A professional and autonomous bureaucracy, including military officer corps, can allow the state to act in more coordinated fashion and decrease the likelihood of fractionalization and neo-patrimonialism in the officer corps. Moreover, bureaucratic quality is a critical component of the first part of the proposed theory of state capacity; without a strong bureaucracy and leadership, states might not even be able to set policy objectives in the first place. Thus, the following capabilities emerge as critical elements of state capacity when considering the policy objectives of states during civil wars: (1) military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and (3) bureaucratic capacity.

Now that we have adequately defined the key components of state capacity for the identified policy objectives, I now seek to answer the research questions posed by advancing hypotheses of how these three key elements of state capacity influence the duration and intensity of conflict.

**State Capacity & Duration**

First, I hypothesize that state capacity should increase the duration of civil wars because it buffers the state from potential rebel victory. Brandt et al. (2008) find that rebels win early if they win at all, meaning that state capacity can protect the government in these early stages and allow them to hold onto control. Rebels tend to win early because weak states may be viewed as incompetent or predatory by the populace, and at the first sign of a viable alternative, the population abandons the incumbent government, causing it to lose as a function of its own weakness rather than as a result of rebels’ military com-
petence. Thus, stronger states should be shielded from this effect, preventing the rebels from winning quickly, consequently lengthening the duration of civil war.

State capacity, as earlier defined, entails the ability of a government to set and achieve its policy and military objectives. In the case of civil war, this thesis contends that states both want to maintain regime stability and win the civil war, but keeping the regime stable is a prerequisite for winning the civil war. Therefore, regime stability is the most important concern of a state in the case of civil wars. I contend that governments are concerned primarily with “just holding on” because winning the war is an ancillary goal, subservient to making sure the leaders of the regime stay alive. Therefore, in the instances where the government cannot win a decisive victory quickly, state capacity should enable the governments to “just hold on” and wait the rebels out. Specifically, a strong military means that attacks by rebels are less likely to cripple the state’s military and that the physical safety of the regime is more secure, both of which lengthen the amount of time it takes for the rebels to win. Therefore, I hypothesize that state capacity should lengthen civil wars.

The natural follow-up question is that, if a state is strong, shouldn’t that allow it to win faster, thus shortening conflicts? However, this thesis still considers cases only where the state is weak enough to allow a civil war to break out in the first place. Perhaps winning quickly is too challenging for these states, and state capacity allows them to hold out, since they can’t outright defeat the rebels immediately. Moreover, this thesis also constitutes a set of cases in which the rebel group is strong enough to amass enough resources to decide to challenge the government using violence, meaning these cases in which civil wars break out are already above some threshold of rebel group viability. This too makes rapid government victory more difficult. In addition, even very strong states may find it difficult to penetrate and govern effectively peripheral regions of their territories. If civil war breaks out in these regions, strong states may not be able to win quickly or may underestimate the threat posed. For these reasons, I argue that state capacity should increase the duration of civil wars. The following hypotheses follow from this theoretical argument:

\[ H_{1a}: \text{State military expenditures increase the duration of civil wars.} \]
\[ H_{1b}: \text{State revenues increase the duration of civil wars.} \]
\[ H_{1c}: \text{State bureaucratic quality increase the duration of civil wars.} \]

In line with this theory, external support for the government and external support for the rebels should increase the duration of civil wars. External support, be it through arms, food, or funds, should give either side more resources to maintain the status quo of war. On the other hand, rebel strength relative to the government should shorten the duration of civil wars, since a higher relative strength would allow the rebels to win fast against a relatively weak state. Below a certain threshold, increases in rebel group strength relative to the government might not necessarily have an effect on the duration of the war, since the government would still maintain an advantage over the rebels. However, over a certain threshold, increases in rebel group strength relative to the government might speed rebel victory or shorten the civil war. Finally, I hypothesize that rough terrain lengthens civil wars because it allows rebel groups to squirrel away in the moun-
tains, making it harder for the government to seek them out. Moreover, a mountainous terrain may make it harder for the rebels to access government strongholds, causing the war to drag on. Therefore, roughness of a country’s terrain should increase the duration of civil wars. The following hypotheses follow from this theoretical argument:

\[ \text{H1d: External support for the government and/or rebels increases the duration of civil wars.} \]
\[ \text{H1e: Rebel strength relative to the state decreases the duration of civil wars.} \]
\[ \text{H1f: Rough terrain increases the duration of civil wars.} \]

**State Capacity & Intensity**

Conflict intensity relates more strongly to the second objective of states when engaged in civil war: winning the war itself. While the preservation of regime stability necessitates violence, winning the war requires it more strongly. This thesis will contend that killing members of a rebel group is but one method of many for winning a civil war. Other strategies may include stifling recruitment, containing the spread of rebellion and violence, and depriving rebels of funding and arms, among others. In the second objective of winning civil wars, inflicting battle deaths will play an important role, but each strategy is associated with an opportunity cost. If a government kills rebels exclusively as its strategy for winning the war, it probably won’t be using other strategies, as it diverts resources away from other strategies toward its selected technique. Conversely, if a state uses techniques of non-violence like depriving rebels of new recruits and targeting supply chains, they will probably focus less on specifically inflicting battle deaths. Overall, states cannot have it all – they must pick and choose which strategies are most effective. Thus, regimes with high state capacity are more adept at using multiple strategies, leading to a decrease of battle deaths relative to conflicts with weaker governments, who may have to resort to brute force in the absence of more sophisticated techniques – or in the worst cases, cannot put up any credible defense.

Examining each aspect of state capacity separately confirms this theory. First, I predict military expenditures to be negatively associated with battle deaths per year. Although this is initially counterintuitive, states with high military expenditures can be choosier about which battles to fight, are more able to minimize their own casualties, have better intelligence, and can participate in targeted killings of rebels, all of which are associated with lower intensity conflicts. On the other hand, weak states may be attacked more frequently, have worse intelligence (which may lead to mass killings in the absence of better information), and may not possess the officer corps, financial resources, equipment, or training to protect their personnel when attacked. As opposed to having military engagements foisted upon them by the rebel group, strong states may be able to take the offensive and engage in operations more assured to succeed. While at first blush, this may appear to increase rebel battle deaths, the state often has more personnel than there are rebel fighters. If states can minimize loss of life in their own ranks, which strong states are more capable of doing, the intensity of the conflict is likely to diminish. Overall, states with stronger militaries may be more cautious about using them and possess the restraint not to use them inappropriately, leading to fewer battle deaths. In addition, I hypothesize that government revenues and bureaucratic quality are neg-
atively associated with civil war intensity, since these elements of state capacity provide flexible resources that can be used on a variety of governmental objectives beyond simply killing rebels. For example, higher government revenues can be used to provide aid to war-torn regions to minimize grievances and stall rebel recruitment; for example, higher revenues could allow the state to increase public sector employment, addressing hypothetical rebel concerns about high unemployment. Likewise, higher bureaucratic quality can keep government services functioning during civil strife, preventing the contagion of violence. A high-functioning bureaucracy can also help a strong state find political settlements to internal conflict and facilitate the mediation of differences between warring factions.

Finally, as described before, strong states often face rebellions that emerge in peripheral regions of the country that are difficult to access and may not be a core interest for the government. This results in conflicts of long duration but with relatively few battle deaths, since few military confrontations occur in these internal conflicts. Perhaps these conflicts have long lulls between violence or consist of long periods of small-scale guerilla attacks on police stations and military installations, which don’t generate as many casualties as pitched battles. On the other hand, when the state is weaker, the military challenge to the state tends to be more serious and can challenge the government in both rural and urban areas. In these circumstances, military defections may occur, and the rebel groups may be relatively strong and well-mobilized. Consistent with my predictions about duration, these conflicts should be associated with shorter duration but higher intensity. From these theoretical arguments emerge the following hypotheses:

- $H_2a$: State military expenditures are negatively associated with battle deaths.
- $H_2b$: State revenues are negatively associated with battle deaths.
- $H_2c$: State bureaucratic quality is negatively associated with battle deaths.

Considering other factors on civil war intensity, I hypothesize that conventional wars should lead to higher battle deaths. Conventional wars – as defined by Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) – pit traditional armies against one another in pitched battles with clear frontlines. These wars should have higher battle deaths because more military personnel are involved in the fighting on both sides and because both sides possess more sophisticated technologies of war. In addition, democratization of a regime should suppress civil war intensity due to the public backlash against high battle deaths. In democracies, governments are more accountable to the populace, which is naturally adverse to violence. Thus, democracies have an interest in minimizing fatality in civil wars. The following hypotheses follow from these considerations:

- $H_2d$: Conventional civil wars should experience higher battle deaths.
- $H_2e$: Democracies should experience lower battle deaths.

This thesis will now present my evidence and approach for testing the advanced hypotheses. After the discussion of this study’s methodology, a presentation of the results of the statistical analyses and case studies follow.

**Methodology & Case Studies**

In order to answer the two research questions posed by this article, I will employ two different methods and sources of quantitative data. For my first
research question – why do some civil wars last longer than others? – I use Cox proportional hazard models to examine which factors are salient for impacting the length of a civil war conflict. For my second research question -- why are some civil wars more intense than others? – I employ a regression analysis to find the statistically significant predictors of intensity of conflict. Per the suggestions of Hendrix (2010) and Kocher (2010), and as described above, I intend to use three independent measures of state capacity: (1) military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and (3) bureaucratic capacity. After I detail my methodology and data sources for my quantitative analysis, I will explicate the selection of and research for my case studies.

Research Question 1 (Duration)

For my first research question, regarding the duration of civil wars, I constructed a dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 1-2016, which consists of all armed conflicts occurring from 1946-2015. In the UCDP dataset, an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.” Each observation in the dataset represents a conflict between a government and a rebel group, as opposed to the conflict-year version, where each observation represents a conflict between a government and all rebel groups opposing it. My dataset consists of 587 conflict dyads, and my dependent variable is the time, in years, each dyad lasts, which I calculated based on the start and end dates of each dyad. To test my hypotheses, I obtained data on military expenditures, size of army, government revenues, and bureaucratic quality. For military expenditures, I used data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. I then lagged the variable by one year to reflect the fact that the effect of an increase in military spending may take some time to reveal itself. For government revenues, I also relied on the World Development Indicators’ time series data on government revenues excluding grants as a percentage of that country’s GDP. Finally, for bureaucratic quality, I used data from the PRS Group’s (2017) International Country Risk Guide, which since 1984 has assigned each country a yearly score on a scale of 1-6 rating the quality of its bureaucracy.

Other control variables I included as suggested by the literature include (1) log total population, (2) log GDP per capita, (3) whether or not the civil war took place in the Cold War, (4) ethnic fractionalization, (5) roughness of the country’s terrain, (6) how democratic the country is, (7) relative strength of the rebel group, (8) external support for the government and rebels, and (9) “veto players,” or how many dyads are present in the conflict. I will discuss the sources and treatment of each of these variables in turn.

First and second, I obtained data on each country’s population and its per capita GDP from the World Development Indicators and then took the natural log of each observation. Third, I constructed a dummy variable for whether the civil war occurred after the Cold War (1 is yes, 0 is no). Fourth, I took a measure of ethnic fractionalization (the ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure) from Kalyvas and Balcells’ (2014) replication data, which measures the ethnic fractionalization of a country using the multitude of languages
spoke in the nation as a proxy. Fifth, I obtained a measure of how mountainous each country is from Kalyvas and Balcells (2014), since several studies point to rough terrain as a factor in the intensity of civil war. Sixth, I obtained each nation’s Polity score from the Polity IV dataset; higher values correspond to more democratic countries, while lower values refer to more autocratic countries. Seventh, I used a measure of relative rebel strength from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013)’s Nonstate Actor Dataset. This measure is coded on a scale of -2 to 2, with -2 meaning the rebels are much weaker than the government, -1 meaning they are merely weaker than the government, 0 meaning the government and rebels are at parity, 1 meaning the rebels are stronger than the government, and 2 meaning the rebels are much stronger than the government. Thus, positive scores indicate that the rebels have a military advantage over the government. Eighth, I obtained data for external support for the government and rebels from the UCDP External Support Dataset (Primary Warring Party Dataset), which states whether or not external support was provided to the government and rebel groups (Högbladh, Pettersson, & Themner, 2011). Ninth and finally, for the “veto players” variable, I summed the number of dyads active in each conflict at the time of the observation. I then created a set of Cox proportional hazard models, introducing more covariates each time. The results are presented in subsequent sections.

**Research Question 2 (Intensity)**

For my second research question, regarding the impact of state capacity on the intensity of civil wars, I also constructed a dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 1-2016. In this dataset, the intensity variable only codes conflicts as minor (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year) or full-scale war (1,000 or greater battle-related deaths in a given year), and many conflicts do not change between minor and full-scale over their duration. To remedy this, I rely on data from the UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset, version 5.0, which is compatible with the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and contains data on battle deaths (soldiers and civilians killed in combat) in state-based armed conflicts between the years 1989-2015 (Melander, Pettersson, & Themner, 2016). The Battle Deaths Dataset only counts deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat; it does not, for example, include civilians who die due to disease or starvation caused by the conflict. Therefore, this dataset only measures the intensity of military confrontations, not the war’s wider impact on loss of life. From this dataset, I used the best estimate of annual battle fatalities, of which I then took the natural log. To test my hypotheses, I use the same independent variables for state capacity as my first research question. In terms of control variables, I use these same independent variables from my first research question: log population, log GDP per capita, relative rebel strength, ethnic fractionalization, post-Cold War, Polity score, and roughness of the country’s terrain. I included three different variables based on the prior literature review of conflict intensity, in which I evaluated whether each civil war in my dataset was a conventional, irregular, or SNC war by using Kalyvas and Balcells’ (2014) measures.

After compiling this data, I treated the dataset as time-series cross-sectional data and created a panel dataset based on dyad-year observations. I then created a random effects linear model for panel data
and tested the introduction of covariates on the natural log of battle deaths in each dyad-year. I tested for heteroskedasticity in all of the models, and when present, I provide heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Case Selection**

This thesis presents two case studies: the First Congo War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland. These cases were chosen because they provide examples of an extremely weak and extremely strong state, respectively. On the one hand, in the First Congo War, the Zairian state had basically ceased to exist, allowing the outbreak of civil war. As will be discussed later, the tax collection system of the Zairian state was virtually nonexistent, and the military suffered from multiple problems of lack of professionalism, low pay, and terrorization of the population. Zaire’s incredible weakness allows this thesis to examine conflict duration and intensity under circumstances of low state capacity. On the other hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland was chosen as a case study because it represents the other end of the spectrum of state strength. Northern Ireland is ruled by the United Kingdom and, as such, is a province of one of the strongest states in the world. Despite this high level of state capacity, violent challenges to the state’s authority occurred. This case was selected because it may reveal how strong states behave when faced with internal conflict.

After the cases were selected, I began research into the First Congo War. To research and draw conclusions about the influence of state capacity on the development of the conflict, I first consulted primary source documents, namely African newspapers, to construct a timeline of the war. I also examined the aforementioned data on military expenditures and government revenues to understand the strength of the Zairian state as the war unfolded. After developing a timeline of the major events in the war, I referred to secondary sources for commentary regarding the influence of state capacity on the Zairian government strategy in the war. In the second case, due to the richness of the scholarship regarding the Troubles, I relied mainly on secondary sources in my consideration of this second case study. I again constructed a timeline of major events of the Troubles to understand the evolution of the conflict, after which I consulted secondary sources for their arguments regarding British policy at the time, namely Neumann (2003), Woodwell (2005), Edwards (2010), and Weitzer (1987). Throughout this process, I referred to primary sources of British policy, namely Cabinet papers and transcripts of debates in the House of Commons, along with British newspapers reporting on the development of the conflict. Following the presentation of the major events and shifts in British response, I analyzed how British state capacity may have aided or hindered its government in the search for solutions.

This thesis will now present the findings of its quantitative study, after which a presentation and discussion of the case studies follow.

**Statistical Findings**

**Duration**

Beginning with the effect of state capacity on civil war duration, the average length of the 587 dyads in the PRIO/UCDP dataset is 6.189 years. Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier survival function for all civil war dyads coded in my dataset. The graph shows that most conflicts between a government and a rebel group tend to be resolved quickly, while
a select few conflicts persist many years, even decades.

In order to test Hypotheses 1a through 1f, I run several Cox proportional hazard models, estimating the effect of state capacity on the hazard of a civil war ending. In model 1 of Table 1, I test for the impact of three measures of state capacity on the duration of civil wars. Negative coefficients mean a negative association with the hazard rate of termination; thus, negative coefficients indicate longer conflicts. In model 1 of Table 1, the only statistically significant variables are the log population of a country and whether or not the conflict occurred after the Cold War; the former makes conflicts longer, and the latter makes conflicts shorter. This second finding tentatively confirms H1d, that external support for the government or rebels should lengthen civil wars, as the post-Cold War era has been associated with a dramatic reduction in the amount of funding and arms contributed from the two warring superpowers.

Moving rightward on Table 1, in models 2 through 5, I add more covariates, including ethnic fractionalization, roughness of terrain, Polity score, and relative rebel strength. In these models, post-Cold War and log population retain their sign and statistical significance. In addition, lagged military expenditures achieves statistical significance with a negative sign, meaning that military capacity is associated with longer conflicts, as hypothesized. And finally, in models 6 and 7 of Table 1, I add external support for rebels/government and veto players respectively. In these models, fiscal capacity, as measured through government revenues, achieves statistical significance with a negative sign, indicating that fiscal capacity causes conflicts to endure longer. In addition, other variables like rough terrain and ethnic fractionalization become statistically significant at the p<0.1 level, both with negative signs, meaning that they increase the duration of civil wars. This confirms hypothesis 1f, that rough terrain is associated with increased civil war duration. In addition, in model 7 of Table 1, relative rebel strength is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level, indicating that rebel strength makes civil wars end sooner. This is as I hypothesized in 1e, given that a higher relative strength would allow rebels to win fast against a state that’s relatively weak compared to them. Finally, external support is negatively correlated with the hazard rate and is significant at the p<0.01 level – external support for both the rebels and the government seems to lengthen civil wars substantially, confirming hypothesis 1d.

In Tables 2, 3, and 4 (contained in the appendix), I test for robustness of my findings regarding state capacity. Each of these models contains the same control variables as Table 1 with only one
measure of state capacity included. Table 2 contains military capacity, Table 3 contains fiscal capacity, and Table 4 contains bureaucratic capacity. In each of these sets of models, each of my measure of state capacity retains the same statistical significance and sign of Table 1, confirming my findings that military expenditures and government revenues are strong predictors of how long a conflict will last, while bureaucratic quality fails to achieve statistical significance. In addition, variables such as relative rebel strength, external support, rough terrain, log population, and post-Cold War tend to maintain their statistical significance and sign of coefficient, which indicates that my findings are robust. To provide a visual, Figure 3, also contained in the appendix, presents the duration of civil war with each of the three measures of state capacity held at their 75th percentiles. As the results of the Cox proportional hazard models would indicate, the Kaplan-Meier curves show that holding military expenditures and government revenues at their 75th percentile moves the curve outward, meaning that military and fiscal capacity lengthens civil wars. Predictably, the survival curves for bureaucratic quality above and below the 75th percentile are quite similar.

The findings of Table 1 confirm my hypothesis that state capacity contributes to longer civil wars. States with higher military expenditures and greater fiscal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Duration of Civil War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures (Lagged)</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Revenue (Lagged)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>-0.150***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (Log)</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rough Terrain</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support for Government</td>
<td>-0.604***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support for Rebels</td>
<td>-0.511***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Players</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Impact of state capacity on conflict duration

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
resources are able to prolong conflicts, especially when they are unable to win outright. These strong states may also experience civil wars in far-off regions where they are unable to project power, making it difficult for them to win quickly. These states may have militaries strong enough to withstand rebel attacks and capable enough to protect the physical safety of the regime, lengthening the rebels’ time to victory as well. Surprisingly, bureaucratic quality does not follow this trend, as it has a positive coefficient, meaning that more effective bureaucracies end civil wars sooner. This might occur because stronger bureaucracies are more capable of credibly committing to a negotiated settlement, and they can negotiate faster. In addition, stronger bureaucracies can cripple recruitment efforts of rebels and more effectively control the press, both of which might prevent the rebels from winning or allow the government to win faster, thus shortening the civil war. Bureaucracies are also unlikely to “offend” or frighten citizens of the country in the way that displays of military strength might; in this sense, the exercise of government strength through the bureaucracy might not inflame the population against the state in the same way that flexing the military forces might. Finally, external support for the government and/or rebels causes wars to drag on because both sides have more resources available to them, which either prevents them from being defeated or disincentivizes them from negotiating. As a result, the post-Cold War era sees shorter conflicts since this external support is less available to governments and rebels alike. But as one predicted, when the rebels are stronger than the government, civil wars are shorter in duration – simply because rebels can win faster.

**Intensity**

To investigate the effect of state capacity on civil war intensity, I created a time series cross-sectional dataset with dyad-year as the unit of observation. Table 5 tests all three measures of state capacity on battle deaths per year. Beginning with models 1 and 2 in Table 5, nothing except the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant. Initially, military expenditures seems to be positively correlated with battle deaths per year, but in model 3, military expenditures becomes negatively associated with intensity of civil war and achieves statistical significance. When ethnic fractionalization is added, it seems to suppress battle deaths per year as well. Moving rightward, in model 4, I add the type of war (conventional, irregular, or SNC) to the model, and we see that conventional wars and irregular wars are statistically significant and positively correlated with battle deaths per year. Finally, in model 5 of Table 5, military expenditures retains its statistical significance, as do the dummy variables for conventional and irregular wars. In addition, a country’s Polity score is negatively correlated with intensity, meaning that more democratic countries experience less intense conflicts.

In Tables 6, 7, and 8 (found in the appendix), I test for robustness by including just one of the three measures of state capacity in the models. Table 6 contains models with military expenditures, Table 7 contains models with government revenues, and Table 8 contains models with bureaucratic quality. In each of these sets of models, the coefficients of the three measures of state capacity retain their negative signs, and only military expenditures is statistically significant, as in Table 5. This confirms hypothesis 2a, but we
cannot confirm H2b and H2c, although the signs of their coefficients are negative. Conventional and irregular wars continue to be strongly positively correlated with battle deaths, and a country’s Polity score continues to be negatively correlated with intensity, indicating that democracy can attenuate violence when civil war breaks out. Therefore, we can confirm both H2d and H2e – conventional civil wars appear to be more intense, and civil wars in democratic countries appear to experience fewer deaths. Thus, my findings appear to be robust to the inclusion of control variables and across different measures of state capacity.

A surprising finding is that ethnic fractionalization is consistently negatively correlated with intensity level of a conflict. One might expect that ethnic fractionalization increases the intensity of conflict; greater levels of ethnic fractionalization may make the state more willing to kill rebels because combatants on both sides may be more likely to belong to different religions, making it easier to dehumanize and “otherize” the enemy. In addition, ethnic fractionalization may increase the strength and unity of rebel groups, leading to increased deaths due to the rebels successfully killing more government combatants. However, the results of my regression analyses require further examination of this hypothesis. Perhaps ethnic fractionalization is negatively correlated with civil war intensity levels due to the way conflict dyads were constructed for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Battle Deaths per Year (Log)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Revenues</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Quality</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (Log)</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conventional War | 0.540** | 0.540** | 0.540** | 0.540** | 0.540** |
|                  | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.221) | (0.221) |

Irregular War | 0.489*** | 0.489*** | 0.489*** | 0.489*** | 0.489*** |
|               | (0.186) | (0.186) | (0.186) | (0.186) | (0.186) |

Non-War | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.512 |
|         | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) |

Post-Cold War | 0.192 | 0.192 | 0.192 | 0.192 | 0.192 |
|              | (0.220) | (0.220) | (0.220) | (0.220) | (0.220) |

Polity Score | -0.050** | -0.050** | -0.050** | -0.050** | -0.050** |
|             | (0.084) | (0.084) | (0.084) | (0.084) | (0.084) |

Rough Terrain | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
|              | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |

Logged IV | 0.277*** | 0.277*** | 0.277*** | 0.277*** | 0.277*** |
|          | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.046) |

Constant | 2.665*** | 2.665*** | 2.665*** | 2.665*** | 2.665*** |
|          | (0.056) | (0.056) | (0.056) | (0.056) | (0.056) |

Observations | 795 | 795 | 795 | 795 | 795 |
R² | 0.409 | 0.409 | 0.409 | 0.409 | 0.409 |
Adjusted R² | 0.395 | 0.395 | 0.395 | 0.395 | 0.395 |
F Statistic | 57.500*** (df = 6, 788) | 35.700*** (df = 7, 787) | 25.700*** (df = 8, 646) | 22.700*** (df = 11, 643) | 20.800*** (df = 14, 640) 

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5. Impact of state capacity on conflict intensity.
the purposes of this research. As described above, this study treats one state paired with one rebel group as a conflict dyad, as opposed to one state paired with all rebel groups fighting at once. This might lead to lower battle deaths in each conflict dyad measured but possibly high overall battle-deaths across all rebel groups. States with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization might theoretically have more rebel groups and sides involved in the conflict; thus, there might be low battle-deaths in a conflict against a government and one rebel group but high total battle-deaths when accounting for the entire war with all rebel groups. Therefore, the total number of deaths in a conflict might be positively correlated with ethnic fractionalization, raising a possible question for future research of ethnic fractionalization’s impact on conflict-wide intensity.

To summarize, the picture that emerges from these findings is one of strong states that can contain conflicts, protect civilians and their own troops, kill rebels with more precision and intelligence, and pick their battles. States with high military expenditures may be able to procure more sophisticated technologies of warfare and be choosier in the battles they fight, minimizing casualties on their own side and killing only the rebels that are necessary for victory. And while government revenues and bureaucratic quality were not statistically significant, their coefficient was negative, indicating that these measures of state strength likely provide governments with flexible resources to fight civil wars in non-violent ways, such as the provision of aid to war-torn regions or the search for political solutions to internal conflicts. Weak states must either resort to tremendous violence in the absence of other coercive tools to seek victory, or they do not possess the tools to inflict violence in the first place. In this latter case, weak states cannot protect their own troops or shield civilians from collateral damage. In both cases, weak states experience more intense conflicts. As expected, conventional civil wars experience greater amounts of casualties, given that these wars pit two strong armies against one another in conventional warfare, causing high amounts of battlefield fatalities. Finally, democratic countries must be more careful when fighting a civil war, because high casualties threaten the stability and electability of the current government. As a result, democracies experience less intense civil wars.

The next section provides two case studies to illustrate how stronger states may experience internal conflict that is longer but less intense than average. The first case study, the First Congo War, provides an example of a weak state that experienced a short but bloody civil war. In this example, an unprofessional military and a limited government revenue base prevented the regime in Kinshasa from forestalling the end of the civil war and protecting its own personnel and citizens from violence.

Case Studies

First Congo War

Ever since its independence from Belgium, Congo has exhibited many of the hallmarks of a weak state. When it achieved independence in 1960, a lack of central authority and regional fragmentation enabled high levels
of political violence and division, especially along ethnic lines (Young & Turner, 1985). Political mobilization in Congo occurred on ethnic lines not due to rigid ethnic identities – and in fact, many scholars describe the considerable fluidity of Congolese ethnic identities at the time – but rather due to the lack of state legitimacy and institutions (Breuilly, 1994). In the absence of this central power, Chief of the Army Mobutu Sese Seko staged a coup in 1965 and established his regime in the state he renamed Zaire (Young & Turner, 1985). While the relative weakness of the government is not unusual for a state emerging from colonial rule, what is unusual about Congo is just how weak it remained for decades. As the post-coup decades went on, the Zairian state weakened in the three key measures of state strength advanced by this thesis: (1) military strength, (2) revenue collection and government spending, and (3) bureaucratic quality. This thesis will first illustrate this decline in state strength, after which it presents the evolution of Zairian conflict. This section will end by arguing that the quick but intense victory of the rebels in the first Congo War was related to the lack of Zairian state capacity.

**State Decline**

First, due to a lack of serious internal or external challenges to its authority, Mobutu’s regime could afford to have a corrupt, ineffective, and weak military. The main role of the Zairian national army (FAZ) was to promote internal security with little consideration of national defense (O’Ballance, 2000). Mobutu understood well the risk that a strong military could pose to a ruler, having himself seized power in a coup. Thus, the Mobutu regime had a vested interest in maintaining a weak military (Atzili, 2007). With this in mind, Mobutu systematically rechanneled resources earmarked for the military towards his Presidential Guard (Shearer, 1999). This lack of investment eventually came back to haunt Mobutu in the 1970s, when the regime faced internal rebellion in the two Katanga rebellions. When faced with this internal conflict, Mobutu had to outsource the protection of the national defense to Moroccan and French troops to compensate for Zaire’s weak army (Callaghy, 1984). Even after this threat abated, Mobutu continued to neglect the military, refusing to pay Zaire’s military personnel with state funds. Instead, he encouraged them to seek payment through extortion of the citizenry, such as kidnapping for ransom or looting (Reno, 1998). Michael Shafer (1982) summarizes the importance of the military in Zairian politics as resulting in “Mobutu’s extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and de-professionalize it.” Overall, the Zairian military was ill-equipped to handle the coming civil war that would soon tear the region apart.

Second, a strong state needs taxation and revenues in order to survive, and the Zairian state struggled to obtain these revenues. The Zairian tax collection system was fraudulent and ineffectual. The World Development Indicators (2016) data show Zaire’s tax revenues in the 1970s and 1980s at a measly 6–11 percent of the country’s GDP, a number which dropped to 5 percent of GDP by 1995. For comparison, the WDI data show the United States at roughly 18 percent of GDP around the same time, which is considered a low level of tax collection by Western standards. Moreover, Callaghy (1984) notes that so many economic transactions were being conducted in the Zairian black market that the actual tax burden on Zaire’s citizens
was probably miniscule. In the absence of a robust tax collection system, Mobutu relied on external support, foreign debt, and short-term policies to sustain the network of patrimony he used to control the state (Atzili, 2007). Young and Turner (1985) describe how Mobutu seized vast swaths of land and commercial enterprises owned by foreign nationals in a movement he called “Zairianization.” This immense sequestration of economic resources allowed Mobutu to distribute even more goods to the political class, thus bolstering his patrimonial system. Therefore, the lack of consistent revenues greatly crippled the ability of the Zairian state to plan, budget, and deliver public services.

But even when there were revenues to spend, the Mobutu regime “spent little on public goods, and when it did, the focus was mostly on extravagant, highly visible, and often misguided projects” (Atzili, 2007, p. 159). For example, the government poured nearly a billion dollars into the construction of the Ingha-Shaba Dam and an associated high-power grid that transferred the dam’s energy to the nearby Shaba mines, projects which could have used much cheaper energy sources. While these lavish, high-profile infrastructure development continued, state spending on social services dwindled from 17.5 percent in 1972 to under 1 percent in 1992 (Lemarchand, 2001). Moreover, as the years went on, more and more money was diverted from the state’s budget to a discretionary fund for the president – by 1992, 95 percent of Zaire’s annual budget went either to Mobutu’s personal accounts or to the accounts of his beneficiaries (Atzili, 2007). Even when the government spent funds on investment projects, peripheral provinces were marginalized, while the capital and core regions received the lion’s share of investment. Young and Turner (1985) describe how Kinshasa was only home to 6 percent of Zaire’s population but was allocated 31 percent of the budget for government investments. On the other hand, Kasai Province held nearly 20 percent of the country’s population and received virtually no funds. Overall, the revenue collection of the Zairian regime was far from robust, and even when it managed to collect funds, the government rarely spent its revenues equitably or effectively.

Third and finally, an effective state must rely on bureaucracies and institutions to set and achieve governmental objectives. Zaire also lacked this quality of a strong state. As Young and Turner (1985) note, the state of Zaire did not exist in a meaningful sense outside of Mobutu’s personal authority. Although Mobutu originally paid lip service to building Zaire’s institutions – namely through his 1967 founding of the Popular Movement of the Revolution, Zaire’s sole political party – these institutions performed few services and often merely allowed Mobutu to further his personal control over the education system, the military, and regional authorities (Atzili, 2007). In the absence of meaningful reforms, Mobutu waged two public relations campaigns: “Authenticity” in 1971 and “Mobutism” in 1974. These public relations campaigns, coupled with milquetoast economic reforms like Zairianization and “Radicalization” in 1974, represented Mobutu’s attempts to curry favor with the populace and other African leaders through rhetoric (Callaghy, 1984). Much like he downsized the military, Mobutu preferred to shrink the size of the Zairian bureaucracy, fearful of the threat it could pose as an independent power base, and instead relied on a network of clients to provide state services (Reno, 1998). By 1975, faced with growing foreign debt and economic woes caused by the falling price
of copper, Mobutu abandoned even the pretense of nation building and chose to protect his own authority by monopolizing resources for himself and his patrimonial network (Weinstein, 2000). This shift away from institution building paved the way for state deterioration and, eventually, civil war. Overall, the Zairian state had a weak military, poor revenue extraction, ineffective government spending and distribution of public goods, and incompetent bureaucracies and institutions. All of these deficiencies contributed to its loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, leading to the onset of the First Congo War, as described in the next section.

**Onset of Civil War**

For centuries, tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire, and these tensions would eventually contribute to the onset of the First Congo War. Since the 1800s, members of the semi-nomadic Tutsi tribe had emigrated to eastern Zaire, some forcibly relocated to Congo to perform manual labor for Belgian colonialists and others later fleeing the 1950s social revolution that brought the Hutus to power in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009). Tutsis who emigrated from Rwanda before Congolese independence in 1960 are referred to as Banyamulenge and had the right to citizenship under Zairian law (Vlassenroot, 2002). After Zaire achieved independence, Tutsis continued to emigrate from Rwanda, and these latecomers were known as Banyarwanda. However, “native” locals – members of the Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga ethnic groups – often failed to distinguish between the two Tutsi groups, referring to them both as Banyamulenge and treating them as foreigners (Mollel, 2008). After solidifying his control of the country in the 1960s, Mobutu helped select members of Banyamulenge, along with other minority ethnic groups across the country, climb to top political positions in the eastern regions, hoping to prevent more populous ethnicities from coalescing into credible opposition (Autesserre, 2008). This move exacerbated existing ethnic grievances, as manifested in the Kanyarwandan War, in which members of the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups massacred Rwandan emigrants (Lemarchand, 2009). In 1981, in an attempt to improve his popularity in the region, Mobutu too eventually turned against the Banyamulenge, portraying them as “Rwandans” (Weinstein, 2000). Throughout the mid-1990s, the Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga regularly attacked the Banyamulenge, killing 14,000 Tutsis in the process (Lemarchand, 2009).

The definitive event that precipitated the First Congo War was the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide. During the 100-day genocide, nearly 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered by Hutu aggressors, which caused Tutsis to flee en masse from the country in an exodus that was called the Great Lakes refugee crisis (Straus, 2013). The Rwandan genocide was brought to an end in July 1994 by the overthrow of the Hutu government in Kigali by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front. Over the course of the crisis, 1.5 million refugees fled across the border to eastern Zaire, including Tutsis who fled the Hutu génocidaires but also those that feared reprisal from new Tutsi RPF regime. This latter group consisted of the génocidaires themselves, the former Rwandan army (FAR), and independent Hutu paramilitary groups known as the Interahamwe (Reyntjens, 2009). Many of these second group of refugees took up residence in refugee camps in the Kivu region of Zaire and established the camps as bases for rearming themselves (Weinstein, 2000).
the first half of 1996, nearly one hundred Tutsi – Rwandan and Zairian Banyamulenge – died per month in attacks launched over the Zaire-Rwanda border from residents of refugee camps (Gribbin, 2005). In response to the massive influx of refugees over its borders, the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent to be repatriated to their countries, including the Banyamulenge (Lemarchand, 2009). However, many refugees resisted repatriation, and the Hutu génocidaires grew bolder as Mobutu actively supported their training and supplied them for an invasion of Rwanda (Reyntjens, 2009). As attacks from Hutus harboring inside Zaire continued, the new RPF leadership in Kigali began to train and equip the Banyamulenge in order to protect themselves from cross-border attacks from Hutu refugees (Shearer, 1999).

The long-simmering ethnic tensions finally boiled over in an exchange of gunfire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian Green Berets on August 31st, 1996 (Reyntjens, 2009). This battle marked the beginning of the Banyamulenge Rebellion, the primary goal of which was to expel extremist Hutu forces from east Zaire and seize power in the Kivu provinces. The government in Kigali finally chose to deploy its Tutsi militias for operations in Zaire, and on October 7th, 1996, the Rwandan government supported Banyamulenge who began an uprising in the Kivu town of Bukavu, after the vice-governor based there proclaimed that Banyamulenge would have to leave (Solomon, 1997). The Banyamulenge managed to fend off an attack by the FAZ, causing tensions to rise between Rwanda and Zaire, which eventually culminated in an exchange of mortar fire over Lake Kivu between the two nations’ armed forces (Reyntjens, 2009). As the Banyamulenge Rebellion began to spiral out of control in late 1996, other enemies of Mobutu in multiple sectors joined forces with the Banyamulenge in what they named the Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL). The AFDL fought under the banner of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a former Marxist rebel who led one of the three major rebel groups that combined into the AFDL (Quinn, 2004). The violence in east Zaire in October 1996 is regarded by scholars as the beginnings of the First Congo War. The next section describes the progression of the conflict and its resolution through the toppling of Mobutu a bloody seven months later.

**Progression of the War.**

By late October, the AFDL had defeated the Zairian forces occupying Uvira and Bukavu, and the AFDL controlled the land between the two cities. See Figure 4 for a map of the AFDL offensive in the First Congo War. As an AfricaFocus bulletin reported on October 26th, 1996, “The FAZ are losing territory and retreating, sometimes even before engaging the rebels” (IRIN Briefing, 1996). In a response to this rapid territorial loss, on November 20th, 1996, Mobutu suspended the Zairian Army Chief of Staff, General Eluki Monga Aundu, and replaced him with Lieutenant-General Mahele Bokungo Lieko, who had a successful history of crushing armed rebellion. In addition, Mobutu transferred the Presidential Division and Civil Guard under Mahele’s direct command, providing the FAZ with superior quantities and quality of arms (“Mobutu Appoints,” 1996). However, Mobutu’s attempts to reform the military seemed to be in vain. The FAZ continued to backpedal into the end of the year, as the rebels controlled Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Bunia, Walikale, Butembo, and Lubero by De-
in the rebel advance, temporarily satisfying them and giving them buffer against the former génocidaires. This pause continued until late January 1997 (Reyntjens, 2009). During this time, the AFDL and Rwandan forces committed many atrocities against Hutu refugees, and Amnesty International (1998) estimates that as many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred in this time. While the AFDL and RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to the areas where these atrocities occurred, the United Na-

cember (Solomon, 1997). As a reporter from Business Day in Johannesburg noted in January 1997, “The rebel movement that was born in the hills of east Zaire effortlessly routed the army, seized towns, dismantled refugee camps and sent thousands of recalcitrant Rwandans home. Nothing, it seemed last year, could halt the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire” (Wrong, 1997a). This capture of nearly 800 x 100 km of territory along the border of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi caused a pause in the rebel advance, temporarily satisfying them and giving them buffer against the former génocidaires. This pause continued until late January 1997 (Reyntjens, 2009). During this time, the AFDL and Rwandan forces committed many atrocities against Hutu refugees, and Amnesty International (1998) estimates that as many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred in this time. While the AFDL and RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to the areas where these atrocities occurred, the United Na-
tions Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights later conducted a mapping exercise of atrocities in the First Congo War and documented the killing of tens of thousands of Hutu civilians (United Nations Office, 2009).

After a quiet start to 1997, the Mobutu regime announced a counter-offensive against the AFDL in the eastern provinces. Mobutu hired European and African mercenaries around January 20th, along with members of the Angolese UNITA and Rwanda’s exiled Hutu army (“Belgian leads,” 1997). Revealing the weakness of the state, government troops resorted to looting, banditry, and exactions as they fled in disarray from towns across the country (“14 Zairean Soldiers,” 1997). The Zairian counteroffensive placed the frontline at the central towns of Walikale and Tingi-Tingi, pinning 400,000 refugees between the advancing FAZ troops and the AFDL. However, with the rebels’ capture of the Lake Tanyanyika port of Kalemie around February 3rd, 1997, the government’s counter-offensive faltered, and the AFDL proceeded to handily seize Pinya, Moba, the Tingi-Tingi refugee camp, and Lubutu by mid-February (“Calls for Zairean premier,” 1997). By this point, blaming his neglect of the army for the rebels’ steady advance, opposition newspapers took to openly poking fun at Mobutu’s prostate cancer, and the rapid depreciation of the Zairian currency caused citizens to start referring to the zaire as “prostates” (“Mobutu cracks down,” 1997).

The AFDL then headed westward in two pincer movements, the north of which eventually took Isiro, putting it in control of 1000 km of territory along Zaire’s eastern border (Mills, 1997). The southern pincer movement began with Kalima and its refugee camp, which fell to the rebels on February 25th, and those present described the takeover as orderly and peaceful: “They were disciplined, so we knew they were not Zairian troops,” remarked an American procurer for the Catholic Church. The takeover of Kalima put the AFDL in charge of a 1450 km strip of territory (“Refugees flee camp,” 1997). Around this time, nine senior officers of the FAZ defected to join the rebels in late February. The officers cited “low morale, years of low wages, and dismal living conditions … but what demoralized them the most was a two-tiered army command – one from the armed forces and the other from a ground of underground commanders close to Mobutu” (“Reports of Zairean troops looting,” 1997). As Williams (1997) argues, “Armies founded on internal pacification are always better at bullying and terrorizing the local populace than fighting a well-disciplined force. The Zairian army rapidly disintegrated, exposing Mobutu’s soft underbelly.” With the FAZ in shambles, the southern AFDL forces captured Kindu with ease by mid-March, and the northern pincer traveled down from Isiro to capture Kisangani, the third-largest city in Zaire and also the site of the local headquarters of the FAZ (“While the relief basics pour in,” 1997).

Next, the AFDL set its sights on Lubumbashi in the south, the country’s second largest city and hub of copper and cobalt mining. On its march south, the AFDL took Pweto, and regional military sources remarked that “[t]he rebels took Pweto with little fighting because government troops were afraid of their advance and afraid of popular anger directed against them by residents” (“Zairean city is next target,” 1997). The AFDL next prepared a pincer movement on Lubumbashi from Kamina in the northwest and Kasenga in the northeast. In early April,
they captured the diamond capital Mbuji-Mayi, where “[t]raders said Zairian soldiers based in the town were nowhere to be seen” (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997). Over time, it became apparent that the FAZ’s counter-strategy appeared rooted in minimal resistance, when it chose to fight back at all. The rebels captured Lubumbashi in mid-April, where they were cheered by residents ready for regime change, and despite the rebels’ capture of these mineral-rich regions, mining companies expressed confidence that ratification of their existing deals could be concluded with rebel leaders (“Mobutu battles to regain,” 1997). Later that month, on April 17th, American Mineral Fields sealed a $1 billion deal to develop the Kolwezi copper tailings project in Zaire through a back-door agreement with the AFDL, giving Kabila a much-needed boost of revenue (“Zairean rebel leader Kabila,” 1997).

The AFDL captured three more towns by April 25th and routed the north and south pincer movements to advance steadily on Kinshasa from the Bandundu province in the north and from Kikwit in the east (“Seven years after,” 1997). While the AFDL troops marched inexorably onwards, Kabila paused to meet with international officials to discuss the fate of 85,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared south of Kisangani. This was not the first time the AFDL was accused of committing atrocities, as the UN refugee agency reported claims of three mass graves near the empty refugee camps of Kibumba, Katale, and Kilimanyako (“Hundreds of fleeing Hutus,” 1997). Kabila brushed off the concerns of international mediators, calling the disappearance of these refugees “a little problem”. The AFDL was also under international heat for the massacre of thousands of refugees in the Tingi-Tingi refugee camp in early March (“UN alarmed,” 1997). Given the conflict’s high levels of civilian victimization, the international community had attempted to negotiate a settlement throughout the war, but now, growing increasingly fearful of the instability of the country, South Africa finally succeeded, with Mobutu and Kabila agreeing to peace talks hosted by Nelson Mandela (Laufer, 1997). However, these peace talks were largely unsuccessful, with Mobutu only agreeing to step down after a long transition period, while Kabila demanded Mobutu’s immediate resignation (“Zaire: Mobutu said ‘willing to step down,’” 1997). Reyntjens (2009) contends that the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead participated only to appear willing to attempt a diplomatic solution, while still continuing to press steadily onwards.

After repeated international attempts to bring both parties to the table again, the AFDL eventually reached striking distance of Kinshasa’s airport around May 6th (“US presses Kabila,” 1997). Tensions ran high in Kinshasa for the next two weeks, as residents expected the rebels to attack from multiple directions, finally activating their long-promised western front by ordering in hundreds of Katangese fighters waiting across the Angolan border (Wrong, 1997c). Attempts to mount a more serious defense were undermined by Mobutu’s worsening cash crisis; since the rebels seized Zaire’s diamond and copper-producing regions, the oil industry was virtually the government’s only source of revenue. Businessmen reported Prime Minister Gen Likulia Bolongo “had gone cap in hand to leading companies, demanding contributions. At the central bank, the presses kept printing money, but with the highest denomination worth just $0.28, the procedure produced little in terms of money
supply” (Wrong, 1997b). In a desperate attempt to shore up the military in the final days of the war, the authorities also tried to launch a military recruitment drive at the university in Kinshasa. Traditionally, the student population supported the radical opposition. As one student remarked to the South African Business Day newspaper on May 8th, “Joining the losing side at this late stage did not seem a good idea” (Wrong, 1997b).

On May 12th, the AFDL resumed its march towards Kinshasa, abandoning its pledge to Mandela to wait for a second round of peace talks. And by May 17th, 1997, the rebels marched triumphantly through Kinshasa, cheered by onlookers and met with isolated resistance (“ANC congratulates,” 1997). The AFDL fanned throughout the city, captured Mobutu’s riverside palace and its nearby fortified military base, and ordered government troops to surrender their weapons by the end of the day. Zairian soldiers readily complied, eager to tie white cloths around their heads to show their support for Kabila. “Today, we finally feel free,” said former army captain William Mazaza to the South African Business Day as he handed in his weapons to the AFDL (“Rebels stamp their authority,” 1997). Nelson Mandela remarked, “As far as Kabila is concerned, he will enter Kinshasa without bloodshed. His troops have been acknowledged, even by his enemies, as being disciplined and courteous” (“Mandela: Kabila doing ‘excellent’ job,” 1997). In an address to the nation, Kabila proclaimed himself president on May 17 and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order to the country. He then reorganized the nation under the name it goes by today – the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Analysis

The First Congo War provides an example of a short but bloody civil war in which the state was weak, and the weakness of Zaire contributed both to the short duration of the war and also its high intensity. First, state weakness likely contributed to the short duration of the First Congo War due to the weakness of the Zairian military and the government’s limited revenue collection. Throughout the war, the FAZ failed to stop the AFDL advance and, on many occasions, chose not to fight back at all. Often, Zairian soldiers were nowhere to be seen, as the rebels took city after city (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997). As Solomon (1997) notes, “As the war continued, it became obvious that Mobutu’s generals did not have a military counter-strategy … even with a military plan, Kinshasa would not have the available soldiers to transport to the battlefield.” While it is impossible to say for certain, the war may have lasted longer if the Zairian army had posed more of a credible threat or won even a few battles.

Moreover, the FAZ often did the work of recruitment for the rebels through their looting and pillaging of towns, causing local citizens to celebrate when the AFDL finally arrived. A more professional military and higher military expenditures to pay personnel may have prevented the rapid disintegration of the Zairian forces when faced with the AFDL threat. Even if Mobutu still eventually lost, it is likely that he would have held on at least marginally longer if his military had been more able or willing to fight back. Similarly, a lack of government revenues severely crippled the Mobutu regime by the end of the war. As the AFDL seized region after region, Mobutu’s neo-patrimonial network began to collapse, giving the regime few sourc-
es of revenue. By the end, as the rebels approached Kinshasa, the meager oil industry was the only source of cash for the government, forcing the Prime Minister to beg for contributions from businesses (Wrong, 1997b). Higher government revenues may have prevented the war from ending so quickly, as Mobutu may have been able to divert funds to paying personnel, hiring more mercenaries, or buying more military equipment. To these ends, state weakness likely contributed to the short duration of the war.

Second, the intensity of the First Congo War is also likely related to the weakness of the Zairian state. Compared to other civil wars, Zaire saw relatively high battle deaths. The median number of annual battle deaths in the Battle Deaths 5.0 dataset is 189 deaths per year, while the First Congo War saw 5,761 casualties in just seven months of conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Figure 5 contains a histogram of average battle deaths per year for all conflicts noted in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Moreover, the Battle Deaths Dataset does not include civilian deaths, which occurred in startling amounts in the First Congo War. As stated earlier, some estimates of civilian victimization in the war number in the hundreds of thousands, indicating that weak states may not be able to protect civilians from the rebel group once civil war breaks out (Amnesty International, 1998).

Moreover, undisciplined government forces may turn to looting, pillaging, and inflicting violence upon the civilian population in the absence of formal remuneration. In the case of Zaire, Mobutu encouraged such behavior, reportedly asking his soldiers once why they needed salaries when they had guns instead (“Congo’s Curse,” 2010). Moreover, unsophisticated technologies, low military expenditures, and untrained personnel all contributed to high loss of life in the Zairian forces, indicating that weak states may be less able to protect themselves in battle. While weaker states may also be unable to inflict heavy casualties on rebel groups, their inability to minimize their own casualties might explain the negative correlation between state strength and intensity of civil wars. In the example of the First Congo War, a weak state was unable to protect itself from loss of civilian and military life, unable to raise the funds to mount a national defense, and unable to forestall the toppling of its own regime, even if only for a few months. Thus, the Zairian case exemplifies how state strength may be positively correlated with civil war duration and negatively correlated with intensity.

**The Troubles**

On the other hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland represent a case in which a strong state – in fact, one of the strongest states in the world, the United Kingdom – experienced internal conflict with low intensity and long duration. For nearly thirty years, between 1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland, a province of the United Kingdom, experienced ethnic conflict over the constitutional and political status of the province vis-à-vis Britain; over the course of the conflict, 3,532 people died, of whom 1,841 were civilians (Fay, Morrissey, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999). By virtue of the fact that this case is thirty years in length, while the Zaire’s civil war lasted only seven months, this study will devote considerably more time to outlining the developments in the internal conflict. This case study begins with a discussion of the geographic, political, and ethnic tensions that existed prior to the outbreak of internal
conflict, followed by an explanation of the evolution of the conflict.

**Background**

The root grievance held by participants in the Troubles centered around the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The majority of Northern Ireland’s population were unionists, who wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom, and many of whom were Protestant descendants of colonists from Great Britain. However, a significant minority were Catholic and nationalists, who wanted Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic of Ireland, creating a unified Ireland independent of Great Britain (Foster, 1989). Even to this day, public polling shows that unionists tend to see themselves as British, and nationalists tend to identify as Irish (Northern Ireland Life and Times, 2014). Thus, the conflict took place along political, religious, and ethnic lines, much of which was caused by Anglo-Irish history leading up to the Troubles.

Nationalists contend that Anglo-Irish history started in the year 1170, when Strongbow and other Normans invaded Ireland, but it is arguable whether the so-called Old English actually can be considered “English” (Kee, 1989). Regardless, only in the sixteenth century did the loose relationship between the island of Great Britain and the island of Ireland begin to shift. By the death of Elizabeth I in 1602, the monarchy “could properly claim to have conquered most of Ireland” (Adelman & Pearce, 2001, p. 3). Shortly thereafter, settlers from Scotland and England established a Protestant community in Ireland, and between the early seventeenth and late eighteenth century, the British government exercised only informal and loose control over Ireland, preferring to treat it as a ‘place apart.’ This marked the beginning of the British treatment of Ireland as a region on its periphery. Frustrated by this treatment, the Republican rebellion of the 1790s first articulated the principle of the unity of the Irish people, as well as their separation from England. Having previously granted legislative independence to an Irish parliament in 1782, the unrest caused by this insurrection ultimately caused London to resume the direct government of the island in the early 1800s (Foster, 1989). The Act of Union in 1801 abolished this Irish parliament in Dublin and formally annexed the island of Ireland to Great Britain, which laid the roots for a conflict between supporters of the United Kingdom and supporters of Irish Nationalism.

In 1845–49, the infamous Great Irish Famine occurred, when a potato blight destroyed two-thirds of Irish potatoes, leading to an estimated 1 million deaths. London’s response to this crisis was decidedly lackluster, marked by public relief schemes being abandoned in 1846 by the newly-elected Whig government and the continued selling of Irish potatoes abroad (Foster, 1989). Neumann (2003) characterizes London’s response to the famine as one of “initial disinterest, aloofness, and crisis management” (p. 12). Gradually over the nineteenth century, recognizing their failure in governance during the famine, British politicians developed the solution of “home rule,” which granted Dublin independence in a number of policy areas while maintaining constitutional linkages to the United Kingdom (Murphy, 1986). The introduction of a modest home rule bill in 1912 sufficiently alarmed Unionists in Northern Ireland, causing Unionists and Nationalists to form paramilitary organizations to defend their respective causes (Foster, 1989). In 1919, anger bubbled over as the Irish War of Independence
broke out. After the resolution of this war, an act of British parliament partitioned the island of Ireland into Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, the latter of which became the Irish Free State in 1922. 1921 represents the formal creation of the province of Northern Ireland as a separate entity, which before was merely a collection of six counties in Ireland.

However, the partition of Ireland into Northern Ireland and the southern Republic of Ireland exacerbated the ethnic conflict within the province. Northern Ireland consisted mainly of Protestants who wanted to remain in the United Kingdom, but a significant minority of Catholic Nationalists still wanted Northern Ireland to join the Republic of Ireland. Especially after the end of the Second World War, tensions continued to build and eventually came to a head in the late 1960s. Around this time, several Nationalist civil rights marches occurred, many of which were attacked by Unionists, and Unionist organizations began to organize counter-demonstrations (Neumann, 2003). The conflict finally boiled over in August 1969, when the British Army was deployed to the streets of Northern Ireland after riots and attacks in Belfast, marking the beginning of the Troubles. The Troubles pitted republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) against loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA). British state security forces, including the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), eventually became embroiled in the conflict.

As a brief note, this thesis will refer generally to Unionists and Nationalists as groups of individuals who wanted respectively to remain in or leave the United Kingdom. The more radical strains of each ideology will be referred to as Loyalism (for Unionism) and Republicanism (for Nationalism). In addition, because there were fewer Catholics in Northern Ireland, this thesis occasionally uses the terminology of majority/minority to refer respectively to Protestants and Catholics. Over the next sections, this thesis will detail the evolution of the conflict over five distinct periods: 1969-72, 1972-75, 1976-82, 1982-88, and 1989-98. Throughout the discussion of the conflict, this thesis will pay particular attention to the evolution of British military, economic, and political strategies. After each section, this thesis will consider how the case of the Troubles may be illustrative of some of the earlier arguments regarding state capacity: namely, that strong states tend to experience longer but less intense conflicts on average.

1969 – 1972

Before August 15th, 1969, the primary British military strategy was to avoid the deployment of British troops (Neumann, 2003). But the Northern Ireland riots of August 1969, in which six Catholics and two Protestants were shot dead and 133 were treated for gunshot wounds, forced the British government to respond by deploying the British Army on the streets of Northern Ireland (Kelley, 1982). When the British government agreed to provide these troops “in aid of the civil power,” it had decided that its primary aim was the re-insulation of Great Britain from the conflict occurring in Northern Ireland – meaning, London sought to avoid contagion of the conflict to the mainland (Neumann, 2003). Immediately, then, the objective was to revitalize the Stormont system of Irish home rule, which would restore the constitutional status quo before the war. But this did not appear to be
a long term strategy: as early as August 19th, 1969, Home Secretary James Callaghan stated it was “urgent” to “press on with the reorganization of the regular police forces” (Public Record Office [PRO], 1969). It became clear that the government’s priority was to ensure the swift withdrawal of British troops and to protect the British mainland.

Moreover, British strategic thinking around this time seemed to center around two major principles: first, the principle of minimum force, and second, the maintenance of civilian government. In the first principle, the security forces’ role is regarded as obeying the duty to respond to force only with what is absolutely necessary to restore law and order (Mockaitis, 1995). To this end, British government officials believed there could be no “military solution” – to coerce the population through violence or put down any violent expression with military means alone would have violated the principle of minimum force. It was also regarded as counterproductive: a solution would have to be found “by proper parliamentary, constitutional, and electoral processes, [because] this is the British way of doing things”, said Arthur Young, the newly-appointed head of the RUC (“Military police take over,” 1969).

By late 1969, though, the British military strategy of minimum force had been interpreted as “minimum action,” and the newly appointed English head of the RUC even described his approach as “softly, softly” (“Military police take over,” 1969). In practice, this allowed Protestant marches to intensify, and “no go” areas in
Derry-City and West-Belfast were established, creating pockets where the IRA was free to organize (Kelley, 1982). Britain also initially failed to recognize the IRA as a credible threat, and by early 1970, riots became a part of everyday life (Neumann, 2003). By this point, the Provisional IRA had split from the Official IRA, and the Provisional IRA (henceforth referred to as the IRA) successfully baited the security forces into a repressive reaction, allowing them to skillfully escalate their campaign to the point they gained the confidence to launch an offensive against the British forces (Smith, 2002).

The conflict escalated in mid-1970 with intense riots erupting in parts of Derry and Belfast, leading to gun battles between unionists and nationalists in which seven people were killed (Bell, 1993). However, the British government characterized this renewed outbreak of violence as a combination of excessive drinking, long evenings, boredom, and a “taste of excitement” on behalf of Catholic teenagers (Wilsworth, 1970). Early in July 1970, a British Army raid in the Lower Falls district of Belfast sparked a riot and gun battles between soldiers and the Official IRA. Following this escalation of violence, the British Army imposed a 36-hour curfew and raided hundreds of homes after gassing the neighborhood with CS gas (Campbell & Connelly, 2003). Scholars have found the Falls Curfew created a negative backlash effect, where the British Army’s actions may have contributed to IRA recruitment (Duffy, 2009; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

It took until February 1971 for Lord Carrington, then Secretary of State for Defense, to acknowledge that “the recent riots represented a new phase in the campaign of violence. The disorder was no longer a merely intercommunal matter; and a situation approaching armed conflict was developing” (PRO, 1971). At this point, British policy shifted towards to “eliminating the hard core of terrorists” (Hansard, 1971a). However, the security forces’ campaign was always meant to be limited, and the British forces rejected the notion that any means would have justified the defeat of the IRA (“Progress in Ulster,” 1971). In line with this tentativeness, London attempted to accelerate the “swift exit” of British forces through heavy reliance on the locally-recruited UDR (Hansard, 1971b). London also devolved considerable decision-making authority to the Army; for example, London declared legality as the only guideline in relation to the level of force, which was vague and never translated into simple operating procedures (Neumann, 2003).

On August 9th, 1971, anger bubbled over when the British Army introduced internment. At dawn, armed soldiers launched raids and arrested 342 people suspected of involvement with the IRA, most of whom had no links to the Republican para-militaries (Spjut, 1986). This precipitated four days of violence in which twenty-four people died, and internment marked the complete alienation of the Catholic community from the existing structures of government (Neumann, 2003). In turn, this allowed the IRA to ratchet up its military campaign; in the six months prior to internment, there were twenty-five deaths, but the following six months saw 185 deaths (Hansard, 1972). Internment demonstrated that British reliance on purely repressive means of addressing the situation were counterproductive. Around this time, the failure of London’s political strategy became apparent as well. After British soldiers shot dead two Catholic civilians in Free Derry in July 1971, riots
erupted in the city, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – the major Nationalist political party – protested by withdrawing from the Parliament of Northern Ireland in Stormont (Bell, 1993).

The conflict continued to escalate into 1972, when, on January 30th, the British army shot twenty-six unarmed civilians, thirteen of whom were killed, during an anti-internment demonstration in Derry (Conway, 2003). The event became known as “Bloody Sunday” and was the highest death toll from a single shooting incident during the conflict in Northern Ireland. Subsequent violence, namely during the funerals of eleven of those killed on Bloody Sunday and the detonation of multiple car bombs throughout February and March, gradually led the British government realize that the IRA could not be defeated militarily (Neumann, 2003). Harry Tuzo, the commanding officer of the British Army in Northern Ireland at the time, described the IRA’s military campaign as “an activity that could be carried on until they choose to desist finally from what they are doing” (quoted in Kelly, 1976). This meant that defeating the IRA as a precondition for political progress was no longer viable, and Reginald Maudling, then Home Secretary of the British government, came to view the military as a tool for bringing about “an acceptable level of violence” (Chartes, 1971). Around the same time, London began to reconsider the viability of home rule, or devolving powers to a Northern Irish legislative body. Maudling began to advocate openly for power-sharing in which minority representation was guaranteed as early as March 1972 (PRO, 1972a). However, this memorandum was met with mixed reception by the Cabinet, and on March 30th, 1972, the British government dissolved Northern Ireland’s Government and Parliament, instituting direct rule from Westminster and taking over the governance of the province (Neumann, 2003).

These early years of 1969-72 exemplify three major themes of this case study as it relates to the correlation between state capacity and duration/intensity of conflict. First, the early years of the Troubles indicated that strong states like the United Kingdom may underestimate the severity of civil unrest in peripheral regions. Naturally, in London, the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force was taken for granted, but in Northern Ireland, no wide consensus existed about the role or responsibility of the security forces (Neumann, 2003). To put a finer point on it, in Northern Ireland, members of the community were actively resisting the execution of state authority. By this time, London was well-accustomed to its subjects rejecting British authority, given its recent experience with the decommissioning of its colonial empire, but for Northern Ireland citizens – who were represented in Parliament, were equal under British law, and could participate via normal channels of government – to resort to such violence was unthinkable to Westminster. Even when entering the conflict, the British government did not seem to grasp the severity of the grievances and the deeply
divided nature of the society: the principal objective of the intervention in August 1969 was simply, as Home Secretary Callaghan put it, not "to get sucked into the Irish bog" (Callaghan, 1973, p. 15). Indeed the British Army would fail in this endeavor, as twenty-six long years of conflict awaited it in 'the Irish bog.'

Second, the case of the Troubles indicates that strong states may fail to strike a balance on what constitutes an appropriate use of military force in responding to internal conflict – either being too timid or too repressive. The British Army oscillated between these two extremes over the first three years of the Troubles: on the one hand, the security forces were unwilling to take extreme military action to eliminate terrorists altogether, which lead to the establishment of "no go" areas where the IRA was free to organize. On the other hand, the British Army swung too far in the other direction with internment, which may have increased the duration of the conflict, as it handed proverbial ammunition to IRA for use in its recruitment campaigns. London learned through the internment that solely repressive ways of ending the conflict would fail. This lead to the third major theme exemplified by this case study: the idea that strong states may attempt other solutions, such as economic or political reforms, in the absence of a definitive military strategy. The British government tried many political reforms, such as altering laws regarding discrimination towards the minority community and changing the composition of the police force. It also attempted economic solutions through providing employment to Northern Irish citizens (Neumann, 2003). While these solutions may have eventually contributed to the solution of the conflict many years later, it is arguable that the oscillation between military and political/economic solutions lengthened the conflict. London’s vast array of policy options may have been an embarrassment of riches, and in this way, the number of resources possessed by strong states might cause indecision on the part of policymakers. Perhaps if London chose to respond with more military resoluteness or prevented IRA activity in the early years, the Troubles may have ended sooner.

1972 – 1975

The British government initially regarded the abolition of the Northern Irish Parliament in Stormont as a temporary measure (Neumann, 2003). It retained not only its vision of Northern Ireland as 'a place apart' but also its desire to insulate the British mainland from political conflict in the province. To achieve these ends, the British government gradually came to appreciate devolution as the best arrangement, but self-government had to be supplemented by a cross-community coalition to mitigate sectarian divisions. This would eventually lead to signing of the Sunningdale Agreement in late 1973, but prior to that, beginning in 1972, Britain began to recognize that its political and military aims were crucially intertwined (Neumann, 2003).

In the early stages of direct rule, Britain struggled to balance the competing imperatives placed on its military. Dual mandates existed for the British Army, including stopping paramilitary activity while simultaneously "regaining the trust" of the minority Catholic community (Neumann, 2003). As Lord Windlesham, a Minister of State under Home Secretary William Whitelaw, explained it, London’s policy at this time contained twin objectives: "British policy rests on the security forces in Northern Ireland countering effectively and impartially, the use of force..."
... by extremists of whatever kind. At the same time, the government is working towards a new form of administration in Northern Ireland" (“Ulster beyond,” 1972). Another concern of the British government emanated from its commitment to political and constitutional solutions: to this end, a lower level of violence was beneficial (Edwards, 2020). These conflicting objectives led to the scaling down of security forces in Catholic areas, and this failure to maintain military pressure on the IRA allowed them “to regroup and extend their influence” (Dewar, 1985, p. 64). It also resulted in the rise of Loyalist paramilitary activity, since the lax policing of Catholic communities raised Unionist suspicions about the commitment of the British forces to neutrality (Edwards, 2010).

In late May 1972, the IRA exploded twenty-two bombs in Belfast in what became known as "Bloody Friday." In response, two months later, on July 31st, the British Army launched Operation Motorman, in which they deployed 12,000 soldiers to re-take the "no-go areas" the IRA had been using for recruitment and operations (Sanders, 2013). Motorman was a limited military operation in the sense that it demonstrated overwhelming military strength in combination with explicit warnings about the character and timing of the operation. As such, it was done “to encourage the more responsible elements to keep the streets clear” (PRO, 1972b). Scholars credit the Motorman operation for its benefit to British intelligence, which contributed to a reduction of paramilitary activity: in the three weeks before Motorman, there were 2,595 shooting incidents across Northern Ireland, but in the three weeks after, only 380 shooting incidents occurred (Smith, 2002). In addition, Motorman strengthened the SDLP’s resolve to participate in constitutional politics, which paved the way for the signature of the Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973 (Smith & Neumann, 2005).

The Sunningdale Agreement attempted to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland. However, in its construction of the power-sharing agreement, Westminster assumed that Unionists cared much more about devolution and home rule, when they really were concerned with constitutional stability that would prevent a united Ireland (Neumann, 2003). Unionists began to feel that “new Stormont” would cause Britain to sell out Northern Ireland. Declarations from the Home Secretary Maudling that “[i]f, by agreement, the North and South should at some time to come together in a United Ireland … not only would we not obstruct that solution, but … the whole British people would warmly welcome it” surely didn’t help matters (quoted in Rees, 1985, p. 277). Structural imbalances towards the Nationalists and continuing violence contributed to this feeling of unease, and over the next months, Unionist opposition, violence, and a loyalist general strike caused the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in May 1974 (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996). After this, Britain re-introduced direct rule.

Despite the failure of Sunningdale, Neumann (2003) argues that the British government still did not understand that power-sharing would work only if the majority was assured of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status (p. 97). Failing to grasp the true source of Loyalist discontent, London developed a new strategy of “Ulster nationalism.” A major component of Ulster nationalism involved changes to British military strategy described as “Normalization,” which consisted of two
with the British government and Northern Ireland Office. The British government agreed to the ceasefire, eager to convert these “men of violence” to peaceful means and encourage all parties to commit to a settlement (Dixon, 2001). Incident centers were established to monitor the ceasefire, and the establishment of these centers was also seen as additional encouragement for Republicans to enter the political process (Dixon, 2008). O’Brien (1999) notes that the British government sponsored what would soon become Sinn Fein’s first offices and even offered to help with public relations if the Republicans would participate in the elections.

Despite all of London’s efforts, it soon became clear that the Republicans would not go political (McKittrick & McVea, 2002). Just as Westminster failed to appreciate the importance of constitutional stability to the Unionists, it overestimated the degree of compromise Republicans would be willing to make on their ultimate goal of a united Ireland (Neumann, 2003). The first major breach of the February truce occurred in July 1975, when four British soldiers were killed by an IRA bomb near Forkill, and the violence re-escalated shortly thereafter, with six more major attacks occurring before November (Kelley, 1982).

This period of the Troubles came to an end on December 5, 1975, when the British Army ended the policy of internment in accordance with its new Normalization policy (Spjut, 1986). In that time, 1,981 people were interned, and the interrogation techniques used on internees have been described by the European Commission on Human Rights in 1976 as torture (Sanders, 2012). 1975 drew to a close with many Unionists viewing the introduction of Normalization with unease: Neumann (2003) contends that, in practice, the introduction of the policy – with its reduc-
tion of British troops, release of detainees, and sustaining of the IRA ceasefire — indicated to many observers the beginning of a British withdrawal. The sharp deviation from previous military strategy led to political instability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The period of 1972-75 saw similar trends in the influence of the British government’s considerable state capacity on the duration and intensity of the internal conflict. First, the British government continued to misunderstand aspects of the conflict due to its location in a peripheral province. Specifically, London did not understand Unionist desires, thinking them to prize devolution more highly over a stable constitutional order that would guarantee Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom. Moreover, its lack of understanding of local politics manifested itself in Normalization, which devolved power to local police forces like the UDR and RUC, which were viewed as partisan in the conflict. Neumann (2003) argues that the British government undermined itself in this decision and notes that there was “little understanding amongst British ministers that, in a deeply divided society, the acceptance of law-enforcement was bound to be perceived in sectarian terms, and that impartiality was determined by the local security forces’ communal composition as much as by their objective professionalism” (p. 182). Arguably, the shift in reliance to local security forces, most of whom were Protestant, may have caused the conflict to endure longer.

Second, as before, the military policy of Britain was fraught with internal contradictions during this period. Dual mandates of “regaining the trust” of the Catholic community and fighting the paramilitaries led to a scaling down of the use of security forces in Catholic areas, which allowed the IRA to regroup. This, too, may have lengthened the conflict and serves as another example of a strong state struggling to strike a good balance with its use of military force. The British government seemed to reach that happy medium in Operation Motorman, which was applauded by scholars for its effectiveness despite its limited scope. Both Motorman and its warning of civilians before its implementation exemplify how strong states may experience internal conflict of a lower intensity; states with high capacity may be able to protect civilians and their own troops when employed in military operations. And while some scholars believe the IRA could have been defeated altogether in the mid-1970s, this is certainly up for debate. Instead of striking down more heavily against the IRA during this time, the British government focused on the third theme of strong states — political, economic, and constitutional solutions, like Sunningdale, Criminalization, and inducements for Republicans to participate in the political process. Although each of these policies would fail in turn, the British reliance on them illustrates how strong states may prefer to use other tools in their toolboxes in lieu of military force, thus decreasing the intensity of civil war — and possibly lengthening it.

1976 – 1982

This period was characterized by the longest continued period of undiminished British direct rule. Going into 1976, the British government decided that no new constitutional initiatives would be pursued before a stable constitutional, political, military, and economic order was established (Neumann, 2003). While devolution and power-sharing continued to be the primary British objective, its actualization
was believed to lie in the long term. In the meantime, direct rule would have to suffice. Throughout this period, violence dropped by nearly 75% from 1976 to 1978, and while scattered attacks still occurred, this period of the Troubles was considerably less intense that its predecessors (Neumann, 2003).

Because direct rule had been adopted on a basically permanent basis, cooperation between London and the Republic of Ireland had broken down (Ceallaigh, 1996). Desiring the eventual unification of the island of Ireland, the Irish government in Dublin wanted the British government to recommit to a regime of devolution and power-sharing that would incorporate cross-border cooperation between the Republic and Northern Ireland (Neumann, 2003). Thankfully for Dublin, its credibility with the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland allowed it pressure London by undermining Britain’s military and political strategies. Later in this period, Westminster expressed it was essential that “Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey should not support” the hunger strikes of Republican prisoners in 1980 and 1981 (Emery, 1980). Moreover, the land border between the Republic and Northern Ireland gave Dublin bargaining power. Callaghan, elected Prime Minister of the UK in April 1976, accused Dublin of not taking seriously “the vital need for close border cooperation if the IRA threat was to be contained” (Callaghan, 1987, p. 499). Later, after Margaret Thatcher unseated the Labour majority in 1979, she too echoed the sentiment that “the border … is of crucial significance to the security problem” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 385). It became clear that the Republic of Ireland was a crucial partner in resolving the Troubles, one whose preferences would have to be accommodated.

Although the British government noted the importance of the shared Irish border, it began to take the position of Dublin more seriously after August 1979, when the IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten in the Republic of Ireland and killed 18 British soldiers in Warrenpoint. This was a turning point for the new Thatcher Cabinet that underscored the importance of cooperation on border security (Thatcher, 1995). Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, invited members of both governments to participate in a Constitutional Conference in 1980. This conference, along with a series of inter-governmental meetings between 1976 and 1981, failed to achieve any significant change in British strategy, but finally, in 1981, London threw its weight behind another constitutional initiative aimed at an internal settlement and devolution (Joyce & Murtagh, 1983). But by this point, neither the Irish government nor the SDLP were appeased, both of which were frightened by the immense degree of Catholic support for the ongoing prison hunger strikes and the potential growth of Sinn Fein as a viable electoral force (Neumann, 2003).

These hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 were prompted by the withdrawal of Special Category status. Special Category had existed since 1972 and allowed paramilitary prisoners to claim they were “political prisoners.” Its removal was tantamount to claiming there was no difference between “convicted terrorists” and “run-of-the-mill criminals” (Neumann, 2003, p. 110). Thatcher defended the withdrawal of the status by confirming, “There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing, or political violence. There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing, and criminal violence” (“Mrs. Thatcher pledges no sellout,” 1981). What really was at
stake was Britain’s policy of Normalization. The second of the hunger strikes, occurring in 1981, saw ten Republican prisoners die in the Maze prison, including the notable Bobby Sands, who had won a by-election to be elected as a Member of Parliament at Westminster (English, 2005). After his death on hunger strike, his election agent, Owen Carron, held his seat after an increased vote (English, 2005).

International media coverage brought attention to the hunger strike and the Republican movement, causing the popularity of the hunger strikers to surge in the Catholic community (White, 1993). London could not understand the support for the hunger strikers, given that Criminalization led them to believe that those in the jails were criminals on the fringes of society (Neumann, 2003). The British government failed to grasp that even anti-Republican Catholics, like Mairéad Corrigan, noted peace-maker, saw them “as men from our community. We know how they have come to be there. And above all we don’t want them suffering within the prisons” (quoted in O’Malley, 1997). As a result, what had previously been a fringe element of Northern Irish politics then emerged as a potent electoral force: Sinn Fein, widely regarded the political wing of the IRA (Taylor, 2014). In 1982, another Northern Ireland Assembly was established at Stormont, but its attempt to “win back support for moderates” backfired when the SDLP decided not to take its seats, allowing Sinn Fein to gain five seats, even narrowly missing two more seats in Belfast North and Fermanagh (Neumann, 2003).

This dawn of Sinn Fein as a credible electoral force meant that constitutional Nationalists like the SDLP experienced difficulties in staying moderate (Taylor, 2014). As time went on, even the SDLP began to advocate strongly for British cooperation with Dublin. Their pivot, partly caused by electoral pressure caused by Sinn Fein, evidenced that direct rule from London was untenable for the minority and that Britain was no longer viewed as an impartial and honest broker (Neumann, 2003). SDLP eventually withdrew from the by-election for the seat of Fermanagh and South Tyrone to show support for Bobby Sands, a move London found inconceivable (Taylor, 2014). More importantly, though, Bobby Sands’ victory, as well as Sinn Fein’s relative success in the Assembly elections, refuted the idea that “men of violence” or supporters of the IRA were on the fringes of society, although a clear majority of Catholic still supported constitutional Nationalists like the SDLP. This clear refutation of British belief in the moderate middle contributed to a gradual growth of British distrust of the local political process. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, once set up a local economic council, and in so doing, he made it explicit that no politicians should be included: “If, in this province, you decide to bring politicians on … then your economic council, first of all, will be very quickly bloated; and secondly, I don’t want political squabbles to spill over” (“Roy Mason on the economic prospects,” 1977). In the absence of more permanent solutions, British politicians decided to wait it out until “existing leaders [were] replaced by abler successors more willing to reach a compromise across sectarian barriers” (Walker, 1977). Until then, direct rule would continue.

As all these political developments were unfolding, the military’s counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland remained limited. Citing familiar reasons, Mason declared, “A democracy functions by the will of the people and through the rule of
law. It cannot behave like a totalitarian state, nor is it right that it should” (Hansard, 1977a). Similarly, the British government still perceived that “tough” security measures would drive IRA recruitment by alienating moderate Catholics (Hansard, 1977b). The British Army’s activity also did not escalate due to the assumptions of Normalization, the overarching policy at the time – namely that the gradual return to local law enforcement would make the situation more stable (Neumann, 2003). However, Normalization failed to achieve its promise of completely stabilizing the situation for a few reasons. First, the RUC, the local authority to which the British Army was gradually ceding its responsibilities, was still essentially exclusively Protestant, which caused law enforcement to be regarded as a tool in the Catholic-Protestant power struggle (Brown & MacGinty, 2003). Moreover, government rhetoric about adherence to “law and order” failed to convince observers, given the Army’s heavy reliance on uncorroborated evidence, extended holding powers, and non-jury courts (Neumann, 2003). While they may have been strictly speaking “successful,” many of the operations that were carried out by the Army did not align with the British ideal of civilian policing (Weitzer, 1995).

Neumann (2003) argues that British policy during these years of 1976-82 made assumptions of “an almost ideal game situation, that is, one in which London was the only actor to determine the strategic environment” (p. 121). In reality, countless players and factors – including the government of the Republic of Ireland, a global recession, hunger strikers, Sinn Fein, and the IRA’s indefatigable disruption – all frustrated London’s attempts to implement strategy. The consequences of the second hunger strike in 1981, along with disadvantageous outcomes in the Assembly in 1982, forced Westminster to return to the drawing board once again.

As before, British policy during 1976-82 reflected the governments’ lack of understanding of the forces at its periphery. The British government could not grasp that even those who desired peace still saw hunger strikers as men from their communities, and its resoluteness on the revocation of Special Category status led to international and domestic sympathy for the hunger strikers. This in turn led to the rise of Sinn Fein, which pulled constitutional Nationalists in their direction as they battled for electoral power. Strong states, like the UK in the case of Northern Ireland, may underestimate actors or miscalculate decisions made in regions they do not view as vital, which may contribute to conflict duration. In addition, strong states might downplay military solutions in favor of political solutions. By this time, the British government settled into a fairly stable pattern of limited counterinsurgency, believing that tough security measures would drive IRA recruitment. The military gradually became viewed as a tool by which a political settlement could be reached. As Neumann (2003) notes, “[“The norm of minimum force” reinforced London’s conviction that there could be no ‘military solution,’ and that it was the security forces’ task to buy time for a political settlement in achieving an acceptable level of violence … in that sense, it was the British government rather than the IRA, which had first embarked on a ‘long war’” (p. 181). While this long war dragged on, London sought an accommodation with Dublin and downplayed local politics. During these years, deaths were among the lowest of all of the years of the conflict, indicating that a state’s reliance on solutions beyond military force may
 contribute to lower deaths, which may be in some way connected to state capacity.

1982 – 1988

The most significant event of the 1982-88 period was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Constraints and pressures had arisen from the direct rule experiment of 1976-82, and London came to believe Westminster governing the province would contribute little to the containment of the conflict, nor was there any realistic prospect of power-sharing at the time. Therefore, the only way to prevent the conflict from spiraling into the mainland was to seek an accommodation with Dublin, making direct rule logistically easier for the British government. Seeking to reduce the violence while negotiations between the Irish and British governments were underway, the British Army’s main goal was to gain efficiency at containing paramilitary activity, particularly through improvements in cross-border security cooperation. Despite her reputation as “Iron Lady,” in Northern Ireland, the Thatcher period was not associated with an increased use of military force, given that the existing political and constitutional objectives limited the military objectives that could be pursued (Thatcher, 1995). Indeed, the Home Secretary of Thatcher’s Cabinet, Douglas Hurd, deemed the three most popular options for escalating the use of force – internment, shoot-to-kill, and cross-border hot pursuit – as counterproductive and inadvisable (Neumann, 2003).

With that said, two new experiments in military strategy did emerge in these years: the systematic use of accomplice evidence, and shoot-to-kill (Hansard, 1984). First, the British Army began to rely heavily on intelligence from arrested members of the paramilitaries who divulged the identities of fellow paramilitary members (informants who became known as “supergrass”). The supergrass system was credited by 1983 as having ‘broken up the Ulster Volunteer Force command structure in Belfast and virtually eliminated the IRA in Northern Belfast” (Moloney, 1983). Second, on a few occasions, the security forces drastically exceeded the appropriate level of force; one particularly notable incident occurred in which six unarmed Catholic men were shot dead by a RUC undercover unit (Neumann, 2003). While no one in London wanted to make what became known as “shoot to kill” as official government policy, members of the government harbored a certain sympathy for the security forces, who had been thrust in a situation where “they were expected to play by rules which the IRA would have never dreamt about” (Neumann, 2003, p. 131). Despite the government’s sympathy for the difficulty of the Army’s position, though, shoot-to-kill did not make its way into official military policy.

In the absence of consequential shifts in British counterterrorism policy, Irish cross-border cooperation emerged as the primary security concern at the time (Thatcher, 1995). Several notable attacks occurred to spur this shift, such as the Harrods bombing in December 1983, where an IRA car bomb outside a department store in London killed six people, and the Brighton hotel bombing in October 1984, where five people died in a bomb attack on the site of Conservative Party conference (Buchan, 2011). These events underscored the fact the Northern Ireland conflict would spiral into the mainland, if left unchecked. Accordingly, London sought to make the Irish government a responsible stakeholder in the management of the situation in Northern Ireland. On the Irish side, Garret FitzGerald, then the Taoise-
The mid-1986 collapse of the recently-reinstated Northern Ireland Assembly exemplified the British government’s abandonment of devolution at this time. This new focus on the Irish dimension culminated in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) by Thatcher and FitzGerald on November 15, 1985 (Kenny & Kenny, 1986).

The AIA established the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which would be made up of officials from the British and Irish governments. The body sought to promote “cross-border cooperation” and had a consultative role only – that is, it had no power to make decisions or change laws (Cochrane, 1997). The UK also agreed that all British Army patrols in Northern Ireland would have a civilian RUC escort (Cox, 1987). Finally, the treaty confirmed that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people consented to a united Ireland (O’Leary, 1987). For the Irish government, the AIA...
supported and strengthened Constitutional Nationalism in the wake of fears of a nascent and radical Sinn Fein; it also perceived the AIA as indirectly providing an incentive for Unionists to agree to power-sharing (Neumann, 2003; FTN 68). The improved cooperation between the British and Irish government would later become key in the passage of the Good Friday Agreement thirteen years later (Ruane & Todd, 2003).

However, the AIA failed to improve cross-border security cooperation; the minority also became no more inclined to support the Northern Irish institutions, and Dublin’s public criticism of Britain intensified (Neumann, 2003). In addition, the accord was strongly rejected by Unionists (Cox, 1987). In response to strong Unionist opposition, Thatcher responded that “the people of Northern Ireland can get rid of the inter-governmental conference by agreeing to devolved government” (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996, p. 234). Despite this opposition, the AIA is credited with several political results: it did cause the Unionists to re-engage politically, and the AIA also contributed to the marginalization of Republicans, leading to a perception in the Republican camp of political and military stalemate. This forced the leadership to review the assumptions on which its strategies were based, and the 1988 broadcasting ban of twelve organizations, including Sinn Fein, also contributed a Republican sense of marginalization (“Whose oxygen,” 1988). All of these changes contributed to the parties’ increased willingness to come to the bargaining table in the 1990s, when the Troubles drew to a shaky close.

This penultimate period from 1982-88 saw a refinement of British strategy, as evidenced by the conflict’s later resolution through similar tactics. To this end, Britain began to understand the desires and fears of the players in its peripheral province, and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, while unpopular domestically, did cause local political parties to revisit their intransigence. As before, the British government chose to downplay the military element in favor of political strategies – the major goal of the military during this period was to contain paramilitary activity and become more efficient at this task. The British Army saw a slight hiccup in its gradual calibration of ‘appropriate use of force’ when several shoot-to-kill incidents occurred, but overall, in this case, a strong state chose to sideline military solutions for political or economic solutions. Namely, the British focus on obtaining an accommodation from Dublin and its use of intelligence through the supergrass structure both represented the state’s attempts to fight the war using less violent techniques. Arguably, strategies like these may have taken longer to work, lengthening the conflict’s duration, but they most likely resulted in the deaths of fewer people, lowering its intensity. As in previous years, the period of 1982-88 illustrated several major themes in how strong states choose to respond to civil wars.

1989 – 1998

The successful conclusion of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 represents the greatest achievement of British policy in Northern Ireland and the end of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. In marked contrast to the AIA, British policy shifted towards the promotion of an agreed settlement, and because there was no point imposing changes to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland (because either party would find it unacceptable), Britain was prepared to accept any outcome as long
as it had achieved sufficient agreement between the local parties. London began to refer to itself simply as “partisan for progress” (Neumann, 2003, p. 149).

At the beginning of this period, having achieved cooperation with the Republic of Ireland through the AIA, the British government returned to its traditional objective of facilitating agreement on devolution and a limited Irish dimension. To achieve this, it launched negotiations for a settlement amongst the various parties, focusing on the principle of consent and the integrity of the political process. However, a major question emerged of whether or not to include Sinn Fein in this political process. Earlier on, London’s aim of political stability meant that there was no point in including Sinn Fein if it destroyed the likelihood of securing a settlement (Major, 2013). However, if the IRA ended its campaign of violence, talks with Sinn Fein might become possible and make the peace more stable (McKittrick & Brown, 1989). London also knew that there was a perceived political and military stalemate in the Republican community at this time and took steps to maintain this perception.

The military strategy shifted at this time as well. The British Army remained involved only to the extent that it served as a tool to support the political process and maintain the Republican perception of military stalemate (Neumann, 2003). The then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, made it clear that the military presence was “made necessary by violence, [would] be maintained as long as there [was] violence, but [would] certainly be reduced when violence [came] to an end” (Hennessy, 2000, p. 68). In addition, the formulation of Westminster’s military strategy was guided, as it often was throughout the conflict, by its aforementioned political objectives. London’s goal of a devolved government on the basis of an agreed settlement necessitated a ceasefire from the IRA, which would allow Republicans to participate in the settlement (Hollywood, 1997).

Although paramilitary activity on the British mainland intensified in 1994 and 1995, the British government seemed convinced this rise in paramilitary activity represented the beginnings of a peace settlement: as John Major (2013), the Prime Minister of the UK at the time, described, “[A]n offer of peace needed to be accompanied by violence, to show their volunteers that they were not surrendering” (p. 433). In order to trigger a permanent IRA ceasefire that would enable Sinn Fein to participate in political talks, the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn Fein produced several drafts of a declaration of principles which would be announced by the British and Irish prime ministers. The final draft of their document referred to the collective right of the “Irish people” to self-determination and overturned the idea of consent by stating consent had to be achieved “over a period” wherein the two governments would legislate for Irish unity, regardless of opinion in Northern Ireland (Mallie & McKittrick, 1997). Had they been announced, these principles obviously would have triggered an end to the IRA’s military campaign, since it negated the principle of consent, abdicated the need for agreement from both sides, and rejected Westminster as a neutral arbiter (Major, 2013). Naturally, the British government thought that this document would have torched the political process, as the majority would have viewed it as selling out Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom (Neumann, 2003).

After several months of bilateral nego-
tations, the Joint Declaration for Peace (also known as the Downing Street Declaration, or DSD) was announced on December 15th, 1993, by the British Prime Minister Major and the Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds. It nominally resembled the draft written by the SDLP and Sinn Fein leaders, but its content was fundamentally different from the proposals of the original draft (Mallie & McKittrick, 1997). In fact, many thought it to represent the exact opposite: the DSD restored the constitutional status quo by stating that self-determination had to be exercised on the basis of consent and gave no timeline for a united Ireland (Cox, 1996). Neumann (2003) refers to the DSD as a “tactical masterstroke” that united the whole spectrum of constitutional Nationalism, along with the biggest Unionist party, behind its agenda of devolved government and the principle of consent (p. 152).

Shortly thereafter, on August 31st, 1994, the IRA issued a statement announcing the complete cessation of military activities. Throughout this ceasefire, the IRA machine was far from inactive; to the contrary, targeting, training, and acquisition continued as normal during this time (Sharrock, 1995). The Combined Loyalist Military Command followed suit not soon after, on October 13th, 1994, when they issued a statement announcing a ceasefire on behalf of all loyalist paramilitaries (McAuley, 2005). The temporary cessation of hostilities allowed a Sinn Fein delegation to meet with officials from the Northern Ireland Office in January 1995. A month later, the British and Irish governments released the Joint Framework document (O’Leary, 1995). The Joint Framework document proposed North-South institutions that would be established by an Act of Parliament; in the event that a future Northern Ireland assembly would break down, the responsibilities of these institutions would be transferred to a standing Inter-Government Conference (O’Leary, 1997). This Joint Framework was clearly overbalanced towards the Nationalist position, since the Irish side had made no new concessions to justify the Joint Declaration’s favoritism towards it. In fact, its default mechanism was an invitation for Nationalists to make the Northern Ireland assembly unworkable, thus torching the need for any Unionist cooperation (Neumann, 2003).

Accordingly, the peace talks backtracked in February 1996, when two civilians were killed in the London Docklands bombing, which represented the end of the seventeen-month IRA ceasefire (Joyce, 2016). IRA violence continued for the next two years, but despite widespread calls for an all-out security offensive, London resisted the urge to reintroduce internment (Hibbs, Harnden, & Savill, 1996). Prior to this, the reliance on locally recruited security forces had been met with intense criticism after it was revealed that members of the UDR had passed on sensitive files to Loyalist paramilitaries (Hansard, 1990). In the end, fifty-nine UDR officers were charged, and this event damaged what little remaining impartiality the security forces were perceived to have. Just as Britain was beginning to mediate an agreed settlement, it was extremely important that the military situation not escalate (Neumann, 2003). The peace talks continued at Stormont in June 1996 without Sinn Fein. But in May 1997, a general election was held across the UK, and Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote to 16%, making it the third largest party in the region, and winning two seats in Parliament (Taylor, 2014). Shortly after the election, the new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, endorsed the Framework
Documents and the criteria for inclusion in all-party talks and signaled his commitment to meet with Sinn Fein to clarify certain issues (Pruitt, 2007). On June 25th, 1997, the British and Irish governments gave the IRA five weeks to call an unequivocal ceasefire, and the heat on the IRA intensified on July 18th, when John Hume of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein called on the IRA to renew its ceasefire (Pruitt, 2007). The IRA finally acquiesced on July 19th, announcing the renewal of its 1994 ceasefire.

With the IRA agreeing to end its violence, this paved the way for Sinn Fein to sign the Mitchell Principles in September 1997, which was a list of six ground rules agreed to by the parties in Northern Ireland regarding participation in the talks. After Sinn Fein’s signature of the Principles, multi-party talks resumed (McKittrick, 1996). Throughout this final phase of negotiations, the British government maintained it was not committed to any particular outcome and would support any conclusions resulting from the discussions, provided sufficient consensus emerged (Neumann, 2003). Finally, on April 10th, 1998, the Belfast Agreement (commonly known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed at Stormont.

The Good Friday Agreement consisted of several components, including devolution, power-sharing, designation, and the Three Strands. Under the Agreement, Northern Ireland would have a devolved government, where the UK parliament would transfer legislative powers to the new Northern Ireland Assembly. This body would in turn devolve executive powers to the Northern Ireland Executive, which would consist of both unionists and nationalists, and special voting arrangements gave veto rights to the minority community (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 2006). Finally, the three “strands” referred to three sets of institutions: (1) the democratic institutions of Northern Ireland, described above, (2) the “north-south” institutions created between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and (3) the “east-west” institutions created between Ireland and Great Britain. O’Leary (1998) describes these institutions as making “Northern Ireland bi-national” and established “elements of co-sovereignty.” While many commentators have compared the Agreement to the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 (leading one Member of Parliament even to refer to it as “Sunningdale for slow learners”), scholars note major issues omitted by Sunningdale that were addressed by the Good Friday Agreement, including the principle of self-determination and the recognition of both national identities (Rasnic, 2003).

The Good Friday Agreement was set to be approved by voters across the Ireland in May 1998. In response, the Loyalist Volunteer Force declared a ceasefire in the hopes it would encourage voters to reject the Good Friday Agreement. But on May 22nd, the referendums were held on the Belfast Agreement, one in the Republic of Ireland and the other in Northern Ireland. They succeeded with 94% and 71% in favor respectively (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 2006). Neumann (2003) argues that the integration of Sinn Fein into the political process extracted a high price, since London failed to extract a definitive commitment to decommission arms. Due to spoty disarmament, violence continues to this day on a small-scale basis. Despite this continuing unrest, many consider 1998 to be the end of the Troubles (Aughey, 2005).

**Analysis**

The final years of the Troubles, along
with the entire course of the conflict, illustrate two key themes regarding the influence of state capacity on conflict duration and intensity: (1) the underestimation of states of conflicts occurring at their peripheries, and (2) the subordination of military strategies to political or economic strategies.

First, the case of the Troubles illustrates that states – strong and weak alike – may misunderstand or underestimate conflicts which occur in peripheral regions. For the first decade of the civil unrest, the British government underestimated the severity of grievances held by participants in the violence and misinterpreted their political objectives. As Neumann (2003) contends, “London’s initial reactions to the street marches, protests, and civil disturbances in the second half of the 1960s was a mixture of disbelief, uncertainty, and reluctance … the reforms the Westminster government pressed for after the violent clashes of October 1968 were too modest to have the effect of securing peace” (p. 16). The case of Zaire also illustrated this tendency of states to underestimate conflicts in their peripheries, as its rebellion began in the eastern provinces, as far from Kinshasa as possible. However, the case of the First Congo War indicates that it is much more dangerous for weak states to neglect the periphery, as they are more susceptible to toppling quickly when faced with rebellion in far-flung regions of their country. Strong states, like the United Kingdom, might be able to afford to neglect or misunderstand peripheral provinces, since their intrinsic strength buys them time to “figure it out.” In this regard, state capacity may be associated with increased duration of civil wars because the endogenous strength of these states insulates them from conflict for longer than in weak states.

Second, stronger states may equivocate on the use of military force and choose to rely on political or economic strategies instead. In continuation with policy that began in the 1980s, the military was downplayed during this final period, and the British Army remained involved in the province only to the extent it supported the political process and maintained the Republicans’ belief in a military stalemate. Instead, in the 1990s, the British government devoted its energies to facilitating agreement on devolution and power-sharing, and the Downing Street Declaration, the Joint Framework, and the Mitchell Principles all exemplify political strategies that contributed to the resolution of the war through the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement. Strong states, like the UK, may understand that the use of overwhelming force could inflame the population against them. Weak states may understand this too, but the key difference between weak and strong states in this regard is that strong states have alternatives. Strong states may try to use political, constitutional, or economic tools before reverting to the use of military force, and these policies may sometimes conflict or contradict each other (e.g. 1970s military strategy as it came to simultaneously winning over the Catholic community while putting down the IRA). One possible reason strong states experience longer civil wars is that it takes them a longer time to settle on a strategy, given the many tools and options from which they may choose. In the case of Northern Ireland, it took at least fifteen years for the British government to settle on the combination of military and political pressures it used to eventually seek a settlement. This hesitance to use military force from strong states might also explain my earlier statistical findings of a negative correlation
between military expenditures and battle deaths. Although initially surprising, this relationship may make more sense in the context of strong states possessing the restraint to make sure those military expenditures are used in a way that does not contribute to rebel recruitment.

Overall, the Troubles of Northern Ireland provide a case in which a strong state – one of the strongest in the world – experienced a long but less intense internal conflict. In this instance, the central government underestimated the severity of grievances held in one of its peripheral regions, and its lack of familiarity with the local political situation caused initial errors and miscalculations of policies. In addition, the state took time to strike a balance between military and political instruments of power, eventually favoring the latter, which may have contributed to a lower level of intensity but a longer duration. It is worth noting that this intrastate conflict had a favorable outcome for the government. In the case where a state is strong and it still eventually loses its civil war, the mechanisms contributing to my statistical findings of long duration and low intensity may be dramatically different – perhaps, in these circumstances, the resources allow governments to hang on longer, or the state vacillates and errs on the side of too little or too much military force. Moreover, it is possible to conceive of a strong state – perhaps an authoritarian regime like the current one fighting the Syrian civil war – that does not favor the British government’s strategy of restraint and instead uses its military superiority as its primary strategy. How would we explain the finding of low intensity and long duration in this instance? At first blush, it is possible that these circumstances simply do not occur as often as situations of British restraint do, which may explain the statistical relationship between low battle deaths and state capacity. However, if this is not the case, this opens up a potential avenue for future research. On that note, this thesis now concludes with a discussion of the implications of its findings for policymakers and researchers.

**Conclusion & Implications**

This thesis has shown that state capacity is a statistically significant predictor of the duration and intensity of civil wars, finding that both military capacity and fiscal capacity are associated with longer but less intense civil wars. States possessing these capabilities may face wars in peripheral regions, like Northern Ireland, in which they underestimate the severity of the threat faced and experience difficulty projecting power in the unfamiliar region. These strong states also possess resources that allow them to pick their battles, protect their own troops and civilians, target rebels more effectively, and forestall the rebels’ recruitment efforts through the reliance on political solutions and through the provision of aid and government services. Despite these apparent strengths, the set of cases examined in this thesis still deals with states weak enough to allow a civil war to break out in the first place and with rebels above the threshold of rebel group viability. The case of Northern Ireland also indicates that strong states’ use of non-military solutions to civil wars may increase their duration. As a result, these strong states experience protracted conflicts with fewer battle deaths per year.

On the other hand, weak states either must resort to tremendous violence in the absence of non-military strategies, or, as in the case of Zaire, they have no credible military or security presence in the first
place. Both of these governmental situations contribute to a shorter duration of civil wars. Weak states are also unable to protect civilians and control their own forces, as evidenced by the mass looting and desertion of Zairian forces, which may be associated with higher-intensity conflicts. These weak states allow conflicts in the periphery to blossom into threats in urban areas as well, as shown by the AFDL's quick capture of major cities like Lubumbashi and Kisangani in the early months of the First Congo War. Overall, weak states are less able to achieve their objectives of maintaining the stability of their regime and country, leading to short but bloody conflicts.

This thesis contributes significantly to the scholarship of civil wars and expands upon existing discussions described in its literature review. The proposed definition of state capacity addresses criticisms that state capacity is difficult to operationalize while providing a workable framework within which scholars can continue to address the influence of state strength on variables of interest. While the literature regarding the impact of state capacity on conflict onset is well-developed, this thesis has made an important contribution by analyzing how state strength might matter in cases where the state is weak enough to allow a violent challenge to its authority. State strength, it appears, matters even after civil wars break out. In addition, this thesis expands upon existing discussions within the literature regarding conflict duration and intensity. The former body of scholarship has not fully examined the relationship between state capacity and length of civil war, and when it has analyzed the correlation, it often relies on imperfect proxies of state capacity like democratization. Through its quantitative examination of the relationship between state strength and conflict duration, this thesis enters this important variable of state capacity into the scholarly conversation of the predictors of conflict duration. Similarly, the body of literature regarding conflict intensity has focused on largely immutable qualities of the nation-state, such as oil exportation, rough terrain, ethnic fractionalization, and democratization, with little attention paid to state capacity as a potential factor. This thesis makes a valuable contribution in its argument that the endogenous strength of one of the most important actors in any civil war – the state itself – must be considered in discussions of conflict intensity.

However, this study is limited in a few dimensions that open up opportunities for future research. In the quantitative analyses, chiefly, there are concerns of potential reverse causality in the connection between military spending and conflict intensity; it could be the case that states that have low military expenditures spend less on their military due to the low intensity of the conflict, which would weaken the assertion that military expenditures decreases civil war intensity. While lagging the military expenditures variable does partially solve this problem, it is worth noting as a possible limitation of this research. In addition, this study could be improved by larger amounts of data on military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity, as the World Development Indicators have about 360 missing observations, while the ICRG data only begins in the year 1984. On the qualitative side, examination of additional case studies would aid scholars' understanding of the mechanisms linking state capacity to conflict duration and intensity. Given their unique and qualitative nature, claiming generalizability from the cases of Zaire and Northern Ireland is difficult. In particular, as briefly discussed
in the conclusion of the Northern Ireland case study, an examination of case in which strong state does choose to employ overwhelming military force would contribute greatly to the findings of this thesis. Nevertheless, the two case studies presented in this thesis provide a real-world illustration of a few of the potential ways in which state capacity may influence conflict duration and intensity.

Despite their potential limitations, the findings presented in this thesis have important implications for peacekeepers and policymakers. Stronger states tend to experience lower intensity conflicts that linger for decades. This could raise a normative question for peacekeepers on whether they encourage more military spending – on the one hand, conflicts may become less bloody, but on the other hand, they may endure longer. Moreover, stronger states seem to possess the bureaucratic capability of committing to negotiated settlements and of maintaining the provision of government services, even in the depths of civil wars, meaning that peacekeepers may wish to strengthen state bureaucracies as a means of decreasing civil war intensity. Another question for further inquiry would be examine the iterative aspects of government capacity – how do rebel groups react to increases in government capacity, and how much does rebel group capacity matter for conflict duration and intensity? Setting these questions aside for the future, this thesis is nevertheless a first step towards understanding how strong states seek to maintain control of their populations, how state capacity can lessen the intensity of conflicts, and how states can mitigate conditions of anarchy when civil war breaks out within their borders, becoming Leviathans once again.
Figures & Tables

Figure 2. Duration of civil war by outcome.

Figure 3. Duration of civil war with measures of state capacity held at 75th percentiles
Figure 5. Histogram of annual battle deaths of the conflicts contained in the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Dependent variable:</th>
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<td>Veto Players</td>
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Table 2. Impact of military spending on duration of civil war.
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Table 3. Impact of government revenues on duration of civil war.

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Table 4. Impact of bureaucratic quality on duration of civil war.
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**Observations**: 1,055 1,058 898 899 655

**R²**: 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23

**Adjusted R²**: 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21

**F Statistic**: 181.248*** (df = 4, 1063) 199.562*** (df = 5, 1063) 83.512*** (df = 4, 899) 81.708*** (df = 9, 898) 20.264*** (df = 12, 662)

**Note**: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6. Impact of military expenditures on intensity of civil war.

<table>
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<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Battle Deaths per Year [Log]</th>
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<tr>
<td>CONV War</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRREG War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logged DV</td>
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**Observations**: 1,055 1,058 898 899 655

**R²**: 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20

**Adjusted R²**: 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18

**F Statistic**: 181.248*** (df = 4, 1063) 199.562*** (df = 5, 1063) 83.512*** (df = 4, 899) 81.708*** (df = 9, 898) 20.264*** (df = 12, 662)

**Note**: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7. Impact of government revenues on intensity of civil war.
Table 8. Impact of bureaucratic quality on intensity of civil war.

<table>
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<th>Dependent variable: Batttle Deaths per Year (Log)</th>
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<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
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<td>(5)</td>
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Observations: 795
R²: 0.609
Adjusted R²: 0.602
F-Statistic: 131.798*** (df = 796) 165.589*** (df = 5; 796) 52.378*** (df = 0; 658) 28.630*** (df = 9; 615) 28.774*** (df = 10; 612)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
References


Mobutu appoints General Mahele Chief of Staff (1996, December 20), *Panafrian News Agency*.


Mrs. Thatcher pledges no sellout on Ulster. (1981, March 6). *The Times*.


Acknowledgements

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