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The Dogs That Did Bark: White-Collar Unions and Protests in Moscow in the Eastern European Post-Communist Context

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Abstract
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Keywords
white-collar unions, Moscow, post-communist labor, Eastern European labor, Russian labor, Russian unions, Russia, labor activity, industrial relations, Political Science, Rudra Sil, Sil, Rudra

Disciplines
Comparative Politics

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The Dogs That Did Bark
White-Collar Unions and Protests in Moscow in the Eastern European Post-Communist Context

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Abstract

This study will examine whether Russian labor is truly “quiescent” by examining general activity in Moscow from 2000 to 2014 and then focusing on white-collar union activity. The results indicate that over this period, the unions representing healthcare workers, teachers, and academics were very active and often achieved concessions from the government such as higher wages or changes to proposed reforms. These findings are important in the context of other post-communist states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) as they indicate that institutional differences like method of unionization and unions’ political involvement led to different results for white-collar unions in these countries. Finally, this study makes clear that while institutional differences and the legacy of communism can lead to different outcomes, white-collar unions in Moscow have effectively used various forms of political pressure to press for concessions and policy changes.
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I. Introduction

When looking at the question of organized labor activity and its effectiveness in post-communist Russia, one encounters a consensus of “quiescence.”¹ This argument maintains that Russian unions have been coopted by the government and do not organize on issues contrary to government initiatives. However, this work will demonstrate that it is not so simple. When looking at the overall record of labor demonstrations in Moscow, one would be tempted to think that labor is simply coopted, yet a more nuanced portrait emerges once one delves deeper and analyzes white-collar labor’s effectiveness.

Russian blue- and white-collar unions, which tend to deal with the state, operate using different processes than unions in the West that mostly operate in enterprise-union settings. As indicated by Sil ², Russia’s largest trade union federation tends to operate using constitutional and political means such as lobbying to maintain its leading position. Additionally, by using the state-created Trilateral Commission on the Regulation of Social and Labor Relations involving enterprises, labor, and the state, blue-collar unions have been able to dampen the liberal economic policies the Russia government enacted over the past several decades, such as the new Russian labor code in 2002.³ This study

¹ As stated by Kubicek, “Postcommunist trade unions are indeed, in Sherlock Holmes’ phrase, ‘dogs that don’t bark.’ The point of course, is that by many measures they should, and thus labor quiescence is a mystery to be solved.” (Kubicek, Paul. J. Organized Labor in Postcommunist States, 3). For more insight on this, see Cook 2011 and Sil 2013.
² Sil, Rudra. “The Fluidity of Labor Politics in Postcommunist Transitions: Rethinking the Narrative of Russian Labor Quiescence”
³ The Russian Labor Code deals with the relationship between the state, enterprises, and labor, outlining privileges given to each party in this trilateral framework. Additionally, it outlines labor management practices, giving it a great deal of sway in determining the flexibility (or inflexibility) or hiring and employment in Russia.
will indicate that in contrast to blue-collar unions, white-collar unions, which are outside of formal labor commissions in the Russian Federation and are comprised primarily of workers paid by the state budget, tend to use political means outside of formal constitutional structures. This often entails demonstrations, marches, and pickets, which is a stark contrast to the processes used by blue-collar unions.

To analyze the effectiveness of these mixed methods and to yield robust comparisons to other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, this study will involve a case study of organized labor protests in Moscow from 2000-2014, which will capture different impetuses for organized labor action among white- and blue-collar unions. Additionally, this study will facilitate a serious examination of the general context of white-collar union activity in the Russian Federation and will allow for a comparison of the structural causes which lead to differences in both mobilization of labor resources and effectiveness of labor demonstrations between Russia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Further investigation of the phenomenon of militant white-collar unions will prove useful as a point of comparison to the role of white-collar unions in regions with longer histories of capitalism, such as Western Europe and the United States of America.

Russian labor is not quiescent and is shown to be quite effective at working in the present system. It seems to lie in an institutional middle ground between several of the countries considered in this study, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, due to a variety of factors, such as the establishment of a leading trade union and the political sensitivity of a hybrid regime.
The consequences of an active and effective labor movement are important for the stability of the Russian political system. As scholars have noted\(^4\), the agreement the Russian government entered into with labor guaranteed support of the government and allowed the main union to get numerous perquisites such as retaining Soviet-era trade union infrastructure and facilities. Given the blue-collar unions’ adeptness in navigating the constitutional system and the white-collar unions’ effectiveness in mandating policy change via extra-constitutional methods, the government may not be able to rely on relative union calm indefinitely, which may lead to a reevaluation of the relationship between the state and organized labor. This increased labor effectiveness may lead to drastic changes in the ability of the state to carry out its objectives\(^5\) and pushes us to turn to the comparative context for more insight on what the different outcomes of this revised state-labor relationship could be.


\(^5\) The question of labor in Russia expands upon the question of the government’s base of power. Outside of constitutionally granted powers to the executive, the executive has been able to utilize swaths of the Russian population to mobilize support and implement government initiatives. For example, this occurred when Boris Yeltsin dissolved parliament, even though he did not have the constitutional power to dissolve the legislature, hence leading to the standoff at the White House in 1993. This decree and confrontation with the parliament was premised on his popular mandate to rule, which was affirmed by the 1993 referendum.
II. Russian Labor “Quiescence”

At the founding of the Russian Federation, 72% of the Russian labor force belonged to the FNPR (Federatsiya Nezavisimykh Profsoyuzov Rossiyi)\(^6\), which was the direct successor to the Soviet Union’s national union, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS)\(^7\). While the number of members in the FNPR decreased drastically over the following two decades, from 54 million members in 1990 to 29.7 million in 2005,\(^8\) Russian labor across sectors has continued to utilize unions. For working class workers there is the FNPR, along with other blue-collar unions like the KTR.

Furthermore, there is also prominent union representation for the professional class in Russia. Indeed, as the data collected will show, unions representing workers paid by the state, such as teachers, healthcare workers, air dispatchers, and professors have been very active in demonstrating and have been effective in organizing people to join. Contrary to the Western norm of unions being more of a working class phenomenon, in Russia the professional classes are represented by their respective white-collar unions as well.

However, despite the pervasive presence of unions in Russia, they seem to be “quiescent.” This is odd when compared to the last years of the Soviet Union, when the government was rocked by miner strikes in the Kuzbass and Donbass coal basins,

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\(^6\) Clarke, Simon. “The State of Russian Unions”, 276
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid., 283
involving more than 400,000 workers, which contributed to the collapse of Soviet rule. Indeed, as Cook notes, strikes on this scale have not occurred in the Russian Federation.

In her work on the lack of action by Russian labor, Linda Cook notes four theories that might explain this. The first of these posits that as globalization took hold of the global economy, states simultaneously transitioned from communism. This global change weakened unions globally due to the increasing interconnectedness of labor markets, leading to, as she claims,

1) The erosion of manufacturing industries and jobs that are most conducive to unionization; 2) the attendant decline in the size of enterprises; 3) growth of the private service sector, which is less amenable to unionization, and 4) economic globalization, which privileges mobile capital over labor and increases pressures for competition and flexibility in labor markets.

Under this explanation, Russia’s economy and labor market were simply subject to market factors that affected the rest of the world at the time.

Additionally, she brings up an alternative explanation – that the legacy of Soviet communism on enterprise caused labor to be relatively quiet in the face of policies that might be against its interests, leading to the image of government cooption. In Cook’s interpretation, because the individual enterprise was responsible for “wages, housing, medical care, access to consumer goods, social services, [and] recreation” it created

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9 Cook, Linda. “Russian Labor: The Puzzle of Quiescence”, 1
10 Ibid., 4
11 Ibid., 5
12 Ibid., 6
“multiple strands of dependence”\textsuperscript{13} which made unions hesitant to stir confrontation with managers.

To investigate this fear of confrontation, Ashwin explores whether unions continued the Soviet practice of maintaining “social peace” by collaborating with enterprises, and finds that modern unions in Russia do, to a large extent, view this social partnership as key and tend not to be active. She indicates multiple examples of regional branches autonomously pursuing action because central FNPR leadership did not act in the face of labor violations. Indeed, even the president of the FNPR, Mikhail Shmakov, indicated in 2000 that ‘the trade unions consider a strike to be a “failure of social partnership. Either social partnership or class struggle!”’\textsuperscript{14}

This Soviet legacy continues not only in the central leadership’s refusal to pursue conflict but in the length of time necessary to resolve labor disputes. As Ashwin detailed, upon initiating a conflict, unions had to wait 13 months for government administrators to resolve the issue at hand, during which wages had not been paid.\textsuperscript{15} Given this difficult reality, labor is disincentivized from speaking out. While Ashwin and Cook’s cases involve labor working for enterprises, a similar analogy exists for state-employed workers, as the 1998 protests in Russia were mostly led by government-employed workers who were asking for their wages to be paid.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ashwin, Sarah. “Social Partnership or a ‘Complete Sellout’? Russian Trade Unions’ Responses to Conflict”, 35
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 36
\textsuperscript{16} Sil, Rudra. “The Fluidity of Labor Politics in Postcommunist Transitions”
While the Soviet legacy may have continued in the system of labor dispute arbitration and state-enterprise-labor dynamics, the relationship between the state and labor became much more combative, as labor attempted to assert autonomy. In her exploration of a third potential cause of labor quiescence in Russia, Cook indicates that labor may have kept quiet due to the state’s renewed vigor in suppressing labor concerns. As Yeltsin proceeded to guide Russia through shock therapy, unions were afraid that they were going to be harmed and did not support Yeltsin, going as far as supporting the parliament that attempted to impeach him in 1993.

Indeed, as Simon Clarke notes, after choosing to support parliament in Yeltsin’s confrontation with the Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament), the FNPR faced harassment by the government, as the administration “froze the FNPR’s bank accounts and cut off the telephones, banned the check-off of union dues, took away the unions’ responsibility for social insurance and health and safety, and threatened to confiscate their property.” 17 After this, the FNPR changed leadership and was much more conservative in its approach to government, never attempting the same kind of dissent as in 1993.

Additionally, the power dynamics in Russia’s federal structure may help explain labor inactivity. Robertson notes that labor may be quiet or noisy based on the intentions of the ruling elite. As seen in his analysis, the relationship between regional governors and the

Moscow ruling elite in Russia was significant in determining how many days were lost to strikes. Furthermore, the poorer or weaker a region also determined how often the governor would lend support to “noisy” strategies such as labor demonstrations.  

For example, Robertson notes that during the 1997 submarine worker strike, the governor of the Primorski Krai region, who had bad relations with Moscow, provided buses and police protection for the workers.  

Hence, while central government-labor dynamics play a role in explaining labor action, the relations between the regions and the center may be as important to consider.

These interwoven dynamics lend credence to Cook’s fourth possible explanation for labor quiescence, that labor simply didn’t know to whom to address their grievances.  

Due to the interplay of private business and government in the 90s and the chaos that followed due to the failed privatization, it was difficult to determine who was responsible for the unrest. Hence, without a target, protesting was in vain.

Labor seems to have mechanisms to effect change despite these difficulties. As Sil makes clear, the unions played a considerable role in helping temper some of the language in the 2002 Labor Code.  

Whereas the original version was going to be much more pro-management and introduce more employee flexibility, the FNPR managed to convince the Duma to give workers more legal protections and force employers to negotiate with

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18 Robertson, Graeme B. “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes." , 795
19 Ibid., 787
20 Cook, Linda. “Russian Labor: The Puzzle of Quiescence”, 8
unions.  

Despite this, Cook claims that the level of labor protests in recent years has remained low. One would expect this during Putin’s first two terms as wages grew and the economy expanded, satisfying labor. However, recent findings indicate that even during the recent financial crisis, during which Russian GDP fell 7.9%  

Gimpelson posits that labor was calm due to its flexibility in adverse circumstances. He notes that in the 90s, when the economic situation was dire, workers took furlough days and wage cuts, while overall unemployment was low. Hence, wages and working regularity were not sticky, but employment was. He also discusses the recent crisis, indicating that employers engaged in the same techniques, leaving layoffs as a last resort and preferring to reduce labor costs in other ways. He attributes this flexibility to the costly and conflict-prone nature of layoffs, as enterprises can suffer protests if there are lay-offs and government intervention in labor markets makes layoffs an unattractive choice.

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22 Ibid., 203
23 Gimpelson, Vladimir; Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav “2011 “Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different?”, 10
24 Ibid., 6-7
25 Ibid., 10-12
26 Ibid., 21
Considerable work has been conducted on post-communist labor activity and effectiveness in Central and Eastern Europe. By looking at the variations in the development of unions in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary one can see if Russian labor is unique or if this decreased labor activity and ability to affect government policy are par for the course in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe. All of these nations were members of the Warsaw Pact, heavily industrialized, and as comparative cases, are useful in showing how different institutional and political choices can yield considerably different outcomes, even given similar contexts.

Just like in the Soviet Union, trade unions in these countries were treated as “transmission belts” in providing benefits and managing industrial relations, being equipped with infrastructure and facilities such as spas and employee housing to incentivize workers and promote productivity. However, as these states began to transition from communism, they did not necessarily follow the Russian path of having a central labor union immediately upon liberalization.

One of the clearest examples of this is Poland, where the dissident trade union, Solidarity, gained power initially. Solidarity was formed as an alternative trade union to the one

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28 Sil, Rudra “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation in Postcommunist Europe: A Paired Comparison of Poland and the Czech Republic”
29 Ibid, 8
presented by the communist Polish state\textsuperscript{30} and presented a successful political challenge to the party apparatus, helping overthrow the party and usher in a new era for Poland. Upon seizing power, Solidarity proceeded on a path of pro-market reforms, contrary to what the alternative union, the OPZZ, preferred. Unlike the Russian FNPR, Solidarity operated in a divided context, with its supporters being more pro-right and reform-minded than the leftist OPZZ members who were discontent with the drastic reforms which led to severe inter-union tensions and conflict.\textsuperscript{31}

Hungary has an even more divided labor environment, which has been described as having as tranquil a system of labor relations as the Vatican due to the multiplicity of unions.\textsuperscript{32} Unlike Poland, whose main unions are Solidarity and the OPZZ, Hungary has a plethora of labor unions rather than an all-encompassing federation. This competition between the unions pushes them to be shut out of policy-making because of their inability to have a united voice. Hence, while Hungarian trade unions are considerably less influenced by the state, they are less powerful.\textsuperscript{33}

This is a stark contrast to the Czech labor situation in which ČMKOS is the most important union in the country. Out of the three nations, it is the closest parallel to the FNPR, as it also descended from its communist predecessor and is the largest union force

\textsuperscript{30} Kubicek. “Organized Labor in Postcommunist States”, 26
\textsuperscript{31} Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 20
\textsuperscript{32} Kubicek, “Organized Labor in Postcommunist States”, 136
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 157
in the country. \(^{34}\) This “unified, encompassing union confederation” \(^{35}\) has been able to exert significant economic and labor policy influence, pushing the government to constrain employer flexibility in favor of a low unemployment, low wage model. \(^{36}\)

Even though there are significant institutional differences, these states reacted similarly upon liberalization by switching the dispersion of social benefits from being the unions’ responsibility to the state’s \(^{37}\), leading to a decline in union membership. Similar to the FNPR’s record over the last several decades, unions in these countries experienced a fall from 90% union membership density before the fall of communism \(^{38}\) to the mid-teens by 2009 \(^{39}\).

Despite these obstacles, unions have persevered in effecting change. Given the differences in institutional arrangements, labor’s ability to form pro-worker policy is best understood as a spectrum in these three countries. The degree of cooption by the government differs greatly between these three countries, as demonstrated by the ability of trade unions to press for changes in government policy that are pro-labor more successfully in countries like the Czech Republic and less successfully in Poland. This context serves as an important guidepost to see how effective labor is in Russia, as Russia had to go through similar circumstances, and at times even utilized similar institutions.

\(^{34}\) Avdagic, Sabina. “State-labour relations in East Central Europe: explaining variations in union effectiveness”, 38

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 43

\(^{36}\) Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 3

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 9

\(^{38}\) Avdagic 27

\(^{39}\) Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 9
These three nations, like Russia, relied on the trilateral framework of enterprise, government, and labor, but had mixed results. Avdagic indicates that government-union interactions are the cause of varying union effectiveness. Given the plethora of state-owned enterprise and the minority-share of private enterprises in the larger economy until the 2000s in these countries, this power dynamic is the root of the ability of labor unions to effectively create policy. In effect, policy changes are caused by disparities in power between the state and organized labor. Hence, arrangements that lead to greater union power relative to the state will lead to better consequences for workers. Specifically, her model stresses union cohesiveness and relative independence from party politics as the variables which best predict union effectiveness and this framework leads to a fascinating examination of the relative labor quiescence in these three countries.

For example, in the Czech Republic, union unity pushed the government to recognize the union as a credible negotiating partner and led to pro-worker economic policy. This was quite different from the Polish case in which a bifurcated union structure split labor between OPZZ and Solidarity, which when combined with political cooption led to workers being sidelined. In contrast to these two cases, Hungary lies in the middle, as it has a fragmented union structure with “partial links with political parties,” which led to some successes and some failures in enacting pro-labor policy.

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40 Avdagic 41
41 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 18
42 Avdagic 44
43 Ibid., 43
While this dynamic framework is useful in gauging labor efficacy, Sil’s modification of this model, taking into account unions lobbying parties to support pro-labor causes, has significant ramifications for the Russian context. ČMKOS was able to exploit parties’ interests rather than use political platforms to further their agenda by supporting both the communist party (the KSČM) and the left-of-center Czech Social Democratic Party. While these two political parties would not pursue a coalition, they would vote together on issues relevant to Czech labor which led to the relatively more pro-labor climate in the Czech Republic compared to Poland. This is a stark contrast to the Polish situation where the initial leading union, Solidarity, took a stern right-of-center approach, promoting increasing employer flexibility.

This comparative context has important parallels with Russia. ČMKOS was successful in leading to more pro-labor legislation by lobbying other parties and relying on political processes, rather than taking to the streets or leading organized action. This is quite analogous to the aforementioned FNPR activities in response to the 2002 Labor Code. While avoiding the “failure” of striking on a massive scale, the FNPR was able to effect change and dilute the more liberal reforms.

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44 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 24
IV. Patterns in Labor Protests in Moscow

Further investigation was necessary to see whether labor really was quiescent, and this led to this chronological study of labor demonstrations in Moscow from 2001 to 2014. Moscow is the political, financial, and media capital of Russia, which, using Robertson’s term, makes it the ideal venue for “noisy” tactics which bring attention to a cause. In the initial case design, the time was limited to Moscow under Putin as the leader (be it President or Prime Minister) due to his focus on economic growth and his continuation of Yeltsin’s labor policies. This was important as it would help indicate whether labor demonstrations were less prevalent in times of high growth, indicating that government cooption was less the cause of quiescence, and that economic and wage growth were the actual causes of a peaceful “social partnership.”

Additionally, in the initial design of the study I turned to one of Russia’s leading business journals, the Kommersant, as it had been under multiple owners and tended to be considered an independent newspaper for most of its existence. The Kommersant has digitized all of its articles, making it a useful resource for researching instances of labor demonstrations in Moscow over the past 14 years. I used terms that were as broad as possible to make sure that I did not miss any demonstrations. Hence, I used the terms profsoyuz (trade union) and miting (demonstration).

Even in the initial design of the study, it was clear that given resource constraints, it would be difficult to obtain an exact estimate, as the only organization that would necessarily have an exact count of demonstrations would probably be the Ministry of
Internal Affairs or the Moscow local police, as they would provide protection for these events. As obtaining this record was not feasible given time and resource constraints, using a newspaper which had a record of impartiality proved effective.

Furthermore, to track how the protestors’ demand related to the state and government policy, the data were grouped as either pro-government or anti-government. Pro-government protests were protests in which the unions demonstrated with the United Russia party or in support of government initiatives (indicating a degree of cooption or manipulation of organized labor for political purposes), whereas the anti-government label indicated events in which the unions protested against a government decision or with parties that were opposed to United Russia.

The initial analysis yielded 44 instances of union demonstrations over a 14 year period. Out of those, 20 were pro-government, while the rest were nominally anti-government.

The pro-government demonstrations include yearly instances of May 1\textsuperscript{st} demonstrations, in which the unions and government always participated in together. With the exception of 2001 when the Communist Party took a more prominent role than United Russia, all of the May 1\textsuperscript{st} demonstrations were grouped as pro-government. The other instances of pro-government demonstrations are much more revealing.
Total Union Demonstrations in Moscow
2000 - 2014

Number of Demonstrations

Year

Union Demonstrations in Moscow
2000 - 2014

Pro-Government 43%
Anti-Government 57%
The first non-May 1st demonstration occurred in 2002, following the passage of the new Labor Code. The FNPR and the non-industrial unions both demonstrated to pressure employers to raise wages, hence to implement the new labor code. This may be viewed as a way for the union to provide political cover for the government, as the final legislation that was passed was not as pro-business as enterprises would have liked. This was the first pro-government action that was directly linked to supporting the presidential administration and existing government policy in this period.

In 2004, the Moscow unions demonstrated in support of government policy and against terrorism following the Beslan school crisis. This followed several years of tougher policy towards the Russian Caucasus, and set a precedent for labor protesting in support of government military policy, as was seen by protests later in the decade.

In 2008, following the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the FNPR demonstrated for higher wages and against Georgia. Given the description of the events of that day, including the multitudes that wore the colors of the Russian flag, it seems that this demonstration was more of a way to show support than to make concrete demands. This is heightened by the fact that the simultaneous demonstrations in other cities made concrete demands such as changes to tax policy, whereas the demonstrations in the two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, seemed to center on “solidarity with the South Ossetian nation.”

The remaining pro-government demonstrations were timed around the 2012 elections and following the 2011 demonstrations in Moscow. The December 2011 protest and February 2012 protests were explicitly aimed at supporting Vladimir Putin’s bid for reelection, lending credence to the theory that labor was dependent on the ruling elite’s will and did what was necessary to support those in power.

This same nuance arises when analyzing the prevalence of anti-government demonstrations in Moscow. While the number of demonstrations against policies would understandably be more numerous than demonstrations in support of an initiative, not all of the observations are valid for this analysis. For example, while many demonstrations argued against specific government policies, they overlap with government policies that the presidential administration tried to implement or was moving towards. This indicated that the demonstrations were actually pro-government and were an effort to shore up support for up government policies. For example, the 2005 protest by the agricultural union protested against inadequate support for Russian agriculture, an effort that had been restarted under Vladimir Putin and was one of his major domestic policy goals. 46

This is indicative of the fact that many of the anti-government protests do not seem to be serious, as seen in the 2001 FNPR protest demanding that deputies fly more 47 or the

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2008 FNPR protest which protested against Georgia and for higher wages. When controlling for many of these less serious actions, a fascinating observation rises to the surface – white-collar workers and their respective unions lead the majority of anti-government street protests. Often these are unions of workers paid by the state, such as the teachers, secretaries, air dispatchers, and scientists’ unions.

V. The Dogs That Did Bark

All workers, including white-collar workers, were unionized in the Soviet Union. Hence, upon the creation of the Russian Federation, these workers were already subsumed in FNPR structures. While the majority of the unions that comprise the FNPR are blue-collar, the white collar unions, such as the Union of Teachers, Union of Non-Industrial Workers, the Air Dispatchers Union, and the various healthcare worker unions that played a prominent role in the first round of the study, are components of the FNPR’s array of unions. Additionally, unlike many of the industrial workers who work for private enterprises, these white-collar workers are biudzhetniki, or paid out of the state budget (biudzhet).

To further investigate their activity, the study was conducted again but with more sources, including Lenta.ru and Radio Svoboda, which are known for their relative impartiality. Like Kommersant, they had digitized all of their articles which was used as data for the period in question. Once again, using the same search terms as in the first study and focusing on activity in Moscow, the sources used yielded 24 instances of protest.

While there had been consideration of including St. Petersburg or other large Russian cities in the sample, the results from the search indicated that almost all of the labor activity in cities outside of Moscow was blue-collar labor activity. Searching for white-collar union protests in St. Petersburg only yielded 3 additional white-collar protests and 2 which had occurred at the same time as the ones happening in Moscow and for the
same cause. As this wouldn’t have made the findings considerably more robust, the study remained focused on Moscow.

The 24 results indicate a distribution clustered around 2001 – 2005 and 2010 -2014, with no significant white-collar union activity between 2006 and 2009. The two clusters of activity represent, for the most part, two different kinds of demands on the part of the protestors. From the demands listed, it appears that a desire for more funding fueled most of the demonstrations in the first half of the 2000s and a call for reform or changes to reform drove people to the streets in the early 2010s.
The first cluster begins with the teachers’ union calling for pay raises and more funding in 2001, a request they would make again in 2003 and twice in 2005. Additionally, the academics’ union at the Russian Academy of Sciences would make a demand for more funding four times over the course of this first cluster. Overall, out of the 10 events in this first cluster, all but 3 of the demonstrations called for more funding, suggesting a pattern.

This trend may suggest a disconnect between rising expectations and government expenditures. The 2000s were a period of significant Russian economic growth, and the acceleration of calls for increased government spending and wage raises may indicate that the unions realized this and were aware of the positive budgetary implications. These demonstrations seem to have been successful. The 2003 Russian budget planned for
414.1 billion rubles in spending on education whereas the budget two years later nearly doubled that amount to 801.8 billion rubles. The Federal Service of National Statistics indicates that education spending grew at roughly the same rate as the budget, however the composition of the budget being tilted towards primary education is what may have led to the relative calm from the teachers’ unions following the first concentration of labor protests.

Additionally, the five year interlude between protests by the academics at the Russian Academy of Sciences indicates that perhaps the composition of the budget may have only been skewed in their favor closer to the beginning of the second concentration of labor protests as demonstrations began again in 2010. This is logical as funds were diverted from education funding to other components of the state budget as oil prices declined and international financial markets suffered tremendous stress. Indeed as noted as late as 2013, the Russian government has for several years decreased healthcare and education spending and increased outlays on social obligations and military spending.

The other reason for protest—the call for reform in the first cluster of labor activity foreshadows the second cluster. However, in their pro-reform efforts, labor appears to be less successful in the first time period. The unified social tax in 2003, monetization

49 2003 was the earliest year for which the Russian Statistical Service’s annual publication, “Russia by the Numbers” had data. Information on the state’s budget for the year is in the “Finances” chapter of the guide (Chapter 21).

50 Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation for the years 2005-2009

reforms in 2005, and Andrei Fursenko’s place as Minister of Education were firmly in place despite protests. In fact, as the Kommersant notes, in response to the newspaper’s questions about the protests, Minister Fursenko replied, “Let them protest, I’ll still be on my trip abroad.”

In the second period though, only four of the demonstrations call for more funding, two of which are held by the academics’ union. Almost all of the other events focus on rallying against proposed reforms, beginning with reforms which would have changed the state’s role in the pension system. This was followed by protests by the academics against the reorganization of the Russian Academy of Sciences which would have made it more fiscally responsible, and most recently Moscow was shaken by healthcare workers taking to the streets rallying against healthcare reforms which included cuts in government healthcare spending. The thread tying all of these proposed reforms is a move towards fiscal austerity and spending efficiency. While the Russian economy had recovered somewhat following the 2008 crisis, the curtailment in these spending items may be an attempt to sustain the sovereign wealth fund in case of further crisis or as a move to allocate funds to other budget items.

52 “Nauka ne uchitsya” [Science doesn’t learn] Kommersant. 25 May 2005
VI. What Drove the Unions to the Streets?

While the recent reforms affecting biudzhetniki that the Russian government proposed were quite drastic, the state pushed through similar measures in regards to other segments of the labor market without facing such backlash, indicating that white collar unions’ response was quite extraordinary. For example, the Labor Code of 2002 forced a certain element of employee flexibility unto the Russian labor market. Additionally, when in 2011, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov proposed a radical rethinking of the Labor Code during his time as Chairman of the Labor Market committee at the Union of Entrepreneurs, no massive protests occurred. When similar labor proposals were proposed even outside of official Duma hearings, the FNPR took to the streets, as was seen in the early 2000s when the FNPR protested the new labor code.

In spite of these liberalizing measures, Russian labor has experienced massive wage increases with wage increases from 2005 – 2013 keeping a compound annual growth rate in the low- to high-teens, depending on the occupation. For industrial and blue-collar workers, this meant moving from poverty into a comfortable working-class level. Given Russia’s expanding social safety net, fixed capital investments, and infrastructure

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53 Prokhorov proposed changes to align the Russian system with more liberal standards, to orient the economy towards a focus on services, stating, “Our labor legislation follows the Soviet-era labor code, which was developed and approved about 40 years ago. Whether it is good or bad, this legislation no longer performs its functions. Obviously, regulations that were created to protect the values of an industrial society impede the development of a post-industrial society.” (Kononova, Svetlana. “Labored Regulation” Russia Profile. 04.12.2011)

54 “Srednyaya nachislyunnaya zarabotnaya plata rabotnikov organizatsii po gruppam zanyatii” [Average employee salary based on occupational category] 06.11.2014. Federal Statistical Services
investments, this bulk of labor has been able to become wealthier throughout the period studied in this case.

In this same period, the data indicate that white-collar workers also became wealthier, including the *biudzhetniki*, such as healthcare workers and professors, whose incomes often grew at the same rates as those in other occupations. For example, between 2005 and 2013, healthcare workers’ (except nurses) monthly salaries grew at a CAGR of 19% from 8,664 rubles to 35,975 rubles. Similarly, textile workers’ salaries grew at a CAGR of 17% from 6,262 rubles to 21,678 rubles.

Given the fact that salaries rapidly grew for all of the constituent parts of Russian labor, what explains the difference in demonstration frequency? The discussion on overall labor activity in Moscow made clear that for the most part, the FNPR did not participate in the same kind of massive or directed activities against government initiatives, whereas white-collar unions did. Given this disparity, it may not be co-option by the government or overall wage increases that are the explanatory variable behind labor activity, but rather expectations.

Indeed, when looking at the *biudzhetniki’s* activity, one encounters several contradictions needing further examination. First, recent data indicate that 37% of Russia’s population identifies as middle-class, entailing a salary range from 25,000 – 45,000 rubles per
However, when looking at Ibragimov’s work on Russian savings\textsuperscript{56}, only 22.3\% of the *biudzhetniki* consider themselves middle-class, indicating a deviation from the population average.

Additionally, when turning to the Federal Statistical Service’s data on those professions that have protested recently, one sees that their salaries are quite high and would place them solidly in the self-reported middle class. For example, university instructors\textsuperscript{57} earn approximately 30,000 rubles per month, which is consistent with the mean income of 33,000 rubles of those in the highly educated occupational category\textsuperscript{58}.

This disparity between the reported data and labor activity support two possible hypotheses which could support why unions demonstrated over this time period: mismatched wage expectations and mismatched employment expectations due uncertainties in government policy.

\textsuperscript{55}“Sredni klass v Rossii ne rastyet” [The Russian middle class is not growing] *Kommersant*. 16 May 2014

\textsuperscript{56}Ibragimova, Dilyara Hanifovna. “Sberech’ nel’zya potratit’: gde rossiiske srednie klassy stavili i postavyat zapyatuiu?” [Saving can’t be spent: where are the Russian middle classes placing the comma?] *X Mezhdunarodnaya nauchnaya konferentsiya po problemam razvitiya ekonomiki i obschestva [X International Scientific Conference regarding Problems in Economic and Societal Development]*

\textsuperscript{57}Classified in the Federal Statistical Service’s data as “Prepodavateli kolledzhei, universitetov i drugikh vuzov” [Instructors in colleges and other universities]

\textsuperscript{58}Classified in the Federal Statistical Service’s data as “Spetsialisty vyshego urovnya kvalifikatsii” [Specialists of the highest level of classification]
An Expectations Trap?

In 1992, a third of Russia’s working population was earning below the official living wage, leading to widespread poverty plaguing the country in the 1990s. By 2013, this figure had been reduced to approximately 11%, representing a dramatic shift. As mentioned, the late-1990s were filled with labor protests across the country as workers demanded higher pay and for the government to pay wage arrears. As the level of poverty decreased and people’s living standards increased, the overall frequency of labor activity decreased as well. Indeed, the intensity of the labor protests detailed in the findings above pale in comparison to the dramatic actions taken in 1998 when miners froze Russia’s rail network and barricaded legislators’ offices.

White-collar protests did not slow as dramatically as blue-collar union protests. While the Union of the Russian Academy of Sciences was quite active in the late-1990s and early-2000s, it continued its mobilizations of scientists throughout the period studied. If the variable causing this were just income, then there is a clear disparity as the scientists already earn relatively high wages. Looking at the mean earnings of those in the field of higher education, one sees that their incomes range in the upper half of the middle class range (25,000 – 45,000) of the overall population, with physicists and chemists earning the most at 46,000 rubles. This indicates that simply earning more does not placate these

59 “Chislennost’ naseleniya c denezhnymi dokhodami nizhe velichiny prozhitochnogo minimuma i defitsit denezhnogo dokhoda” [Number of people with incomes below subsistence level and the respective deficit] 01.21.2015 Federal Statistical Services
strata of society.  

This has peculiar consequences for the Russian developmental state. As noted by Sutela, under Vladimir Putin, “Russia used its financial resources for supporting what were regarded as strategic industries and companies...[and] chose defending incumbent jobs over economic destruction.” This investment-heavy model was capable of leading to a given level of wealth creation, consistent with the Solow growth model. Whereas those that were in depths of poverty are now able to afford a working-class lifestyle, the middle-class is having a hard time even recognizing itself as actually middle class because it relies on an external framework. These Moscow elite who comprise the biudzhetniki are well-educated and connected, meaning that their preferred salary

61 “Srednyaya nachislyunnaya zarabotnaya plata rabotnikov organizatsii po gruppam zanyatii” [Average employee salary based on occupational category] 06.11.2014. Federal Statistical Services
62 Sutela, Pekka.. Ed: Wegren, Stephen K; “Economic Policy.” Return to Putin’s Russia, 185
63 Stagnation may imply that Russia has reached steady-state long term growth given the existing institutional context, capital depth, and investment. In order to reach a higher steady state equilibrium, the capital-labor ratio must be modified to allow for greater factor productivity. To do so would require liberalizing measures such as facilitating investment and improved practices which would lead to greater productivity. For more elaboration, see Solow, Robert. “ A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 – 94.
64 As described by the Echo of Moscow – “Odnako printsipial’noe otliechie ot zapadnykh stran zakliuchaetsya v tom, shto rossiiskii srednii klass – v bol’shinstve svoym rabotniki gossektora, a ne chastnykh kompanii.” [“It seems that the main difference from Western countries is that the Russian middle class is mostly comprised of government workers, not workers in the private sector.”] (“Sredni klass – prikormlennaya loyal’nost’” [The middle class – bought off loyalty] Echo of Moscow. 08 July 2014.)
65 Given an approximation by the Russian Academy of Sciences (see “Sredni klass v sovremennoi Rossii: 10 let spustya” [The middle class in contemporary Russia: 10 years later] 2014. Institut sotsiologii rossiskoi akademii nauk [The Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences], it is fair to assume that the biudzhetniki are as well-
level may be attuned more to the income earned in more developed capitalist contexts, which would be unattainable given the present level of development in Russia.

Given these two frames of reference, one of an impoverished past and the other of what could be, there seem to be two “Russias,” one of which sets its frame of reference to the past, remembering how bad things were. This is the new working-class, lifted up on a wave of investment and government transfers. The second “Russia” however, the middle-class, may be using an international frame of reference, leading to a disconnect.

This hypothesis is supported by the differing frequency of protests and labor actions in Moscow and indicates that those with the frame of reference in the 1990s are less active now and tend to be the “quiescent” labor pool often noted in analyses of Russian unions. This group seems to be supportive of the state due to the government’s success in its main promise of economic growth—delivering the masses from poverty.

However, those with a forward-looking frame of reference are those in the white-collar unions, as they are well educated and tend to be politically active. If this group increases in size, the current developmental framework would be difficult to maintain. However to cause a widening of this group, the Solow model would call for endogenous developments such as productivity growth which would be difficult due to the Russian state’s focus on physical capital widening rather than intellectual capital over the past two connected as the other portions of the middle class, which are described in the report as very connected to the internet.
decades.\textsuperscript{66} Hence, the risk of their mobilization posing a political threat is somewhat minimized.

\textit{Breaking the Low Salary – High Employment Pledge}

While income expectations can propel the masses to the streets, a rapidly changing labor market may be another key factor. The Russian labor market has been historically flexible in that it often traded lower wages and fewer working hours to prevent layoffs.\textsuperscript{67} For the majority of the labor force (and for the FNPR’s main industrial and blue-collar components), this arrangement still holds. However for the white-collar biudzhetniki, it seems that this has begun to come undone.

The recent healthcare workers protests centered on the Moscow city government’s proposal to close hospitals and lay off doctors,\textsuperscript{68} foreshadowing a bill in the Duma which would mimic this proposal on a national level. While it still remains to be seen if this will happen, the fact that the government is considering trimming the size of its employee base seems to violate the norms of the Russian labor market.

\textsuperscript{66} This is consistent with the state’s main budget line items of infrastructure and defense growing much more rapidly than education.
\textsuperscript{67} Gimpelson, Vladimir; “Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different?”,
\textsuperscript{68} “Vrachi vzyal’s za lechenie sistemy zdravookhraneniya” [The doctors have taken on treating the healthcare system] \textit{Kommersant}. 02 November 2014.
As Ovchareva notes⁶⁹, the government has done the opposite of what employers usually did in Russia. Rather than cut hours and keep employment stable in times of economic hardship, the government has now increased salaries and is cutting the number of workers it employs. However, in an effort to stem overall economic stagnation, the government’s pay raises for the biudzhentniki cannot be squared with other mandatory expenses such as social benefits and infrastructure investments.

This second hypothesis may become more applicable as the Russian government needs to make difficult fiscal choices. If it chooses to maintain wage growth while keeping physical capital investment constant, then it will need to spread the layoffs to other workers, which may be a rallying cry for the other white-collar unions.⁷⁰

*The Unions’ Effectiveness in Stymieing Reform*

Despite this move towards austerity in some areas of the budget, there seem to have been some concessions to unions. For example, when the government attempted to reform the Russian Academy of Sciences, the union created a wider support base and was able to extract major concessions. The scientists’ union collaborated with the Communist Party to get a petition against the reforms signed by 120,000 people and further protested in

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⁶⁹ “Бол’ше других стагнаций в России осознают бюджетники. Зарплаты им повышать не из чего, придется увольнять” [State workers will be more sensitive to stagnation in Russia. There will need to be layoffs] *TV Rain*. 07 July 2014.
⁷⁰ This fear may be one of the reasons that protests often involve multiple white-collar unions rather than just the directly affected union.
Moscow several times in 2013. 71 A year later, the reforms were considerably watered down, as the institutional changes that would increase fiscal austerity were directed by scientists from the Academy, rather than outsiders. To accomplish this, the academics’ union combined the institutional and party-based method the FNPR used in 2002 to amend the labor code with white-collar unions’ usual street-based strategy to soften the blow of any reforms. This hybrid strategy seems to be particularly effective, and may be a key factor in extracting concessions from the government.

The healthcare workers’ union employed similar tactics in late 2014 in response to the proposed medical system reforms. In early- and late-November, the union of medical workers, along with other professional unions held demonstrations protesting the proposed reforms 72 which would have cut the number of doctors in the country and decreased overall healthcare spending. While additional protests are planned for 2015, it will be interesting to see if they choose to use the same political mechanisms as the academics’ union and the FNPR before them.

Overall, protesting on the streets to effect serious policy change or reform is a relatively new occurrence that may be based on the concessions made during the 2005 protests against the monetization of benefits which would have replaced social benefits such as transportation and free meals into a state stipend. As Evans notes, the 2005 protests

71 “V tsentre Moskvy proshel miting protiv reform” [A protest against RAN reform took place in the center of Moscow] Lenta.ru 28 September 2013
72 “Aktsiya protesta medikov nachalas’ v Moskve” [The healthcare workers’ protest began in Moscow] Kommersant, 30 November 2014
caught the political parties by surprise 73 and eventually led to the government making several concessions to the proposed plan after the protests carried on for two months. 74 Additionally, following the 2011 protests involving hundreds of thousands protesting across the country, the government instituted major reforms intended to increase voter confidence 75. As Evans suggests, these gradual concessions may be leading to a “pattern of learned behavior”76 which successive demonstrations utilize to extract further concessions.

This group learning represents an evolution in organized labor tactics, particularly by the white-collar unions. While the FNPR tends to stick to formal mechanisms such as the trilateral framework, the white-collar unions are savvy at applying hybrid political pressure in a hybrid regime, in that they take to the streets while using formal constitutional mechanisms to press for concessions. While any legislation and reform proposed by the government will likely be in the same general framework as the original version (the 2005 monetization reforms and the 2013 Russian Academy of Sciences reforms were similar to the original proposals), the concessions have significant value. As seen in the 2013 reforms, the concessions cushioned most of the blow and left the reorganization process in the hands of academics rather than external supervisors 77

74 Ibid., 110
75 Monaghan, A.C “The End of the Putin Era” 12-13
76 Evans “Civil Society and Protest” 118
77 RAN was able to get a moratorium on reforms and based on the remarks of the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, it appears that the reforms will lower the burden for the academics in the academy. (Ne ostavit’ RAN” [Don’t leave the RAN Behind]. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 04 December 2014.)
which represents a major concession. The results of this study indicate the potential for this disconnect between formal and informal implementation of reforms, based on concessions, will continue if the process of learned political behavior continues as well.

*Changes in State-Union Relations and the Impact on State Power*

This brings us back to the larger question – what impact does this have on the state power? Upon the arrival of Putin, the government created a growth pact, limiting political participation, including labor involvement, in policy decisions in return for promising economic growth and stability. The hypotheses presented and the recent efficacy of labor in affecting government policy indicate that this “deal” may no longer hold.

The first hypothesis explored the notion that differing expectations between working-class and white-collar unions led to different levels of activism. As mentioned, it appears that the general growth pact holds for the working class because their economic frame of reference was shaped by prior hardships and the foundation of their wealth can still be targeted given the current investment- and capital-heavy system of economic development. However, the state will not be able to keep its pact with the white-collar unions who are increasingly growing disenchanted with the tradeoffs presented. As such, the state will not be able maintain the current institutional structure while appeasing the richer *biudzhetniki* unless it undertakes comprehensive economic reforms focusing on human capital and endogenous growth factors.
Undertaking this kind of development is difficult, as it would require trade-offs between investments that carry short- to medium-term payoffs (such as capital and infrastructure investments) and longer-term payoffs that would appease the middle class (such as investments in education). 78

This trade-off is akin to the wage-employment trade-off that was usually the norm in the Russian market. Given decreasing economic prospects under the current model, along with the current economic stagnation, the Russian government needs to make difficult choices. Indeed, the proposal under review that would result in thousands of layoffs would be a drastic revision of the prior understanding between labor and employers (public and private), indicating that the state is pursuing other priorities. Whether it tries to prevent stagnation by increasing white-collar workers salaries or refocuses the economy to allow for endogenous growth factors to be more prominent, sacrifices will need to be made.

While accomplishing these tasks is difficult enough, the success of Russian labor in effecting policy change has become a complicating factor in the historical tendencies of policy creation in Russia. As noted, unions have become adept at using parliamentary factions in coordination with street protests to pressure legislators to water down proposed reforms or to gain more favorable terms. Given the wide pattern of the

78 For a good discussion of the negligible long-run productivity advantages of stimulus spending on infrastructure see Hulten, Charles; Schwab, Robert. “Infrastructure Spending: Where Do We Go From Here?” National Tax Journal 1993. Indeed, short-term capital and infrastructure investment will simply increase the level of those employed, but will not change overall productivity, which is the determinant of long-term economic wealth per the Solow model.
mismatched expectations and increased volatility in state employment, one can expect white-collar unions to push further and to become more active in their activities. This will considerably limit the ability of the state to make necessary trade-offs in stagnating economic conditions or in making necessary long-term investments. To evaluate how the Russian state can cope with this increased difficulty in making trade-offs between labor groups, the comparative context is quite instructional.
The findings above raise the question of whether this approach to relations between white-collar unions and the state is replicated in other contexts. For example, in Central and Eastern Europe, as in Russia, white-collar labor is represented in larger unions. Additionally, most unionized white-collar labor, especially in healthcare and education, is on the state’s payroll which leads to a fascinating comparative opportunity between Russia and the European cases examined prior.

Russia appears to lie in a space between Poland, with its coopted unions, and the Czech Republic, with its somewhat effective and consolidated union structure. Hence, to analyze white-collar unions, analyzing just the Polish and Czech context would be most instructive, as the multiplicity of Hungarian unions would not fit the organization of white-collar unions in Russia and would limit the comparative potential.

**Poland**

Despite similarities between Russian, Polish, and Czech labor, the institutional setting makes a tremendous difference in the efficacy of white-collar labor. In Poland especially, sectors of white-collar labor have been effective in subverting policies by using their position in the union as a whole. The clearest example of this was in 1993 when the nonindustrial public sector organized a protest of 1.1 million people. 79 Unhappy with the rightward shift on which Solidarity had begun to take the country, the Solidarity teachers’

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79 Ekiert, Grzegorz; Kubik, Jan *Rebellious Civil Society*. 142
union began a protest before students’ final exams and demanded decreasing fiscal austerity measures and further increasing wages. Over the course of its months-long protest, the teachers’ union had convinced other nonindustrial public sector workers to join, culminating in a vote of no confidence in the Sejm and an end to Solidarity’s period of rule in Poland.  

This is similar to Russian patterns of white-collar labor protest over the past decade. As the study indicates, nonindustrial state workers often protest together, putting additional pressure on the government. While Russia is a hybrid democracy and would not tolerate a general strike and government change like in Poland in 1993, the unions’ ability to effect tangible change is still potent, as seen by the Russian government’s policy concessions following the 2013 Russian Academy of Sciences protests.

Other than the nature of the state, competition may be another factor affecting the efficacy of white-collar unions. Whereas the teachers’ unions in Russia are generally part of the FNPR, there is the teachers’ union under Solidarity and an independent teachers’ union in Poland, the ZNP. The ZNP initiated strikes in schools in 1992 before the Solidarity teachers’ union initiated its protest in 1993. Hence, while the larger union structures such as the OPZZ and Solidarity are heavily influenced by the government, it seems that the smaller unions tends to be more radicalized, which differs from the Russian context. Participating in such protests may be a form of competition for

80 Ibid., 142 - 148
81 Ibid., 110
members, in line with Sil’s thesis that “inter-union competition within the same sector” 82 may raise visibility, heightening this contest. This increased drive for members may indicate union effectiveness, initiating a cycle of increased membership and leading to more power in the state-labor power dynamic which Avdagic discussed. 83

However, there are limitations to the Polish example when looking at the most recent source of tension between the Russian government and labor – healthcare. Healthcare workers tend to be in Solidarity or OPZZ 84 and due to the lack of coordination between the unions, they struggle to present a united front, leading to few policy changes in a nation where low pay for healthcare workers is a chronic problem 85. Considering that the other professional unions in Russia came out in support of the healthcare workers in the late-2014 protests 86, when looking at healthcare reforms, the Polish case may indicate what not to do.

This promotes Sil’s point that inter-union competition is good but only if directed at political parties in a coordinated way. Without a clear message, even strikes will not lead to significant results. Additionally, it is hard to use the Polish context as a “forecast” for the future of white-collar efficacy in Russia due to the differing institutional contexts. For example, while Russians mostly rely on the state for healthcare spending, Poland began

82 Sil. “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 29
83 Avdagic 45 - 47
84 Sitek, Michal. “Politics and Institutions in the Reforms of Health Care in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland”, 50
85 Ibid.
86 The teachers union joined in the protest on November 30th. (“Aktsiya protesta medikov nachalas’ v Moskve” [The healthcare workers’ protest began in Moscow] Kommersant, 30 November 2014)
to embark on privatization in the 2000s.

The Czech Republic

In contrast to the Polish example, the Czech Republic illustrates a very similar framework of labor activity akin to the methods currently used in Moscow. Like in Russia, the Czech Republic relies on a trilateral council, *Rada hospodářské a sociální dohod* (RHSD), to handle industrial relations with ČMKOS. When unions realized in the late-1990s that this format was not going to lead to any gains, they behaved like organized labor in Russia. Like the FNPR, ČMKOS lobbied legislators and relied on formal constitutional methods to promote their agenda. Additionally, to press legislators, ČMKOS organized mass protests to demonstrate its size and reach, similar to how Russian unions behaved.

Additionally, there is a great deal to be gained by analyzing the Czech context in the recent financial crisis. While according to Myant, “mobilization has consistently proven easiest over issues of employment law and that has protected much of the legislation passed in 1990,” it is still relevant to compare how the labor reacted when the state and main negotiating parties were facing the same resource constraints as Russia’s government was in the prior section’s analysis.

Unlike the Russian context, most Czech professional unions deal directly with

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87 Sitek 50
88 Myant, Martin. “Trade unions in the Czech Republic”, 22
89 Myant, Martin. “The impact of the economic crisis on collective bargaining in the Czech Republic” *European Review of Labour and Research*, 188
enterprises, involving the government as part of the wider trilateral framework. However, despite this, the same low wage-high employment trade-off existed, with unions successfully pushing to maintain employment levels in lieu of wage increases.

Likewise, Czech organized labor demonstrated the same inter-sector solidarity that characterized the Russian context. Indeed, as Glassner noted, “unions [preferred to pursue a strategy protecting [their] highly skilled core workforces.” During the economic downturn in the late 2000s, the Czechs fought to maintain the same institutional arrangement as had been present prior to the crisis, and because enterprises, rather than the state had to shoulder the burden of making a trade-off, labor demonstrations were not as persistent nor as targeted as recent demonstrations in Moscow.

However, a key difference between the Czech and Russian contexts is that ČMKOS relies on the persistence of narrow majorities in parliament to make themselves a very important political actor due to their ability to affect elections and push the government to make concessions. The FNPR and its constituent unions are not as powerful, as there are less marginal situations to exploit because United Russia currently has a majority and had a super-majority prior to the 2011 Duma elections. Additionally, Russia is a super-presidential system in which the President can dismiss parliament, propose legislation,

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90 Glassner, Vera. “Central and eastern European industrial relations in the crisis: national divergence and path-dependent change.” Transfer: European Review of Labour., 165
91 Ibid.
manage regional relations, and call for referenda\textsuperscript{93}, whereas the Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy, heightening the power of any actor that can make a marginal change between narrow majorities in parliament. Given this different political setting, it would be difficult to map the Czech experience of white-collar unions extracting concessions on to the Russian context.

Thus, it seems that directly comparing Poland and the Czech Republic’s experiences of political struggles between white-collar unions and the state to Russia’s may be flawed as Russia seems to occupy a middle ground between these two frameworks. Even though Russian white-collar unions have less power than their counterparts in the Czech Republic, they are able to use their hybrid strategy to extract concessions from the government, which has been more successful than the Polish unions’ record.

However, the institutional arrangement may yield insight on how the Russian government can avoid dealing with the employment-wage tradeoffs and the rising expectations. Rather than making unions institutional actors, the state could extricate itself from labor-enterprise relations, fragmenting the focus of union efforts. For example, due to the local nature of labor-enterprise negotiations in the Czech Republic, there was less political drama and both parties, the unions and enterprises, tended to come to an agreement.\textsuperscript{94} This union fragmentation and movement towards a more American or Western European notion of industrial relations may allow the Russian state to concentrate power further

\textsuperscript{93} Sheinis, Viktor; Ed. M. McFaul. “The Constitution” Between Democracy and Dictatorship 67 - 71
\textsuperscript{94} Myant, “The impact of the economic crisis on collective bargaining in the Czech Republic”
due to the relatively weaker unions that would result from the lack of coordination and cohesion.

**Advanced Industrial Capitalist States**

Is this move towards Western industrial relations possible, and if so, what will it entail? Upon comparing white-collar unions’ activity in the East and Central European and developed capitalistic contexts it appears that a “convergence” with the West would be divorced from reality. Russia and its peers in this study entered the 1990s with most professionals in unions which is a contrast to the western norm of white-collar workers not being part of unions. Due to a different legacy of unionization and different institutional roles for white-collar unions in the post-communist and developed capitalist contexts, it is clear that post-communist countries cannot truly emulate Western industrial relation frameworks.

Unlike the union models seen in the prior sections, the West has certain white-collar workers in professional associations and others in unions. As seen in Lipset’s analysis of teacher unionization in the USA, 3.3 million teachers are in unions, split between the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which identifies as a union, and the National Education Association (NEA), which identifies as a professional association. 95 The latter did not collectively bargain at first, but now acts like a union, using all of the tools at its disposal.

95 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Unions among White-Collar Employees and Professionals” 15
This aversion to striking and collective bargaining seems to be a tendency found in Western unions that cater to professionals. As seen in the discussion of unionizing healthcare workers, doctors’ strong professional identification is found to negatively correlate with unionization⁹⁶ and the American Medical Association even goes as far as to discourage striking, removing the force of any potential union.⁹⁷

Even in new sectors filled with white-collar unions, there tends to be hesitance to engage in traditional union activities. As seen in Jaarsveld’s case of the WashTech/CWA union’s activities in Washington state involving workers from companies like Amazon and Microsoft, attempts at unionization resulted in lay-offs and outsourcing of IT and white-collar jobs.⁹⁸ In response, it seems that high-tech unions tend to resemble professional organizations more than unions as they cannot use collective action against enterprises and rely more on political action, such as lobbying⁹⁹, and mutual aid¹⁰⁰.

As seen in the Washington case, in areas with developed service sectors, including tech, the ability to outsource work functions considerably increases, presenting a new challenge to the feasibility of white-collar unionization. In a study on the outsourcing decision, Teng et. al indicate that if employers felt that their employees were not delivering desired quality for the cost, they were likely to outsource the jobs if this was

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⁹⁶ Ibid., 22
⁹⁷ Ibid., 21
⁹⁸ Van Jaarsveld, Danielle D. “Collective Representation Among High-Tech Workers at Microsoft and Beyond: Lessons from WashTech/CWA” 374
⁹⁹ Ibid., 376
¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 374
still consistent with overall strategic orientation. Given the ability of high-tech and white-collar employees to outsource functions and still focus on core services, this indicates that in Western Europe and in the United States, outsourcing is a significant threat to the ability of unions to pose a threat in the service sector, as employers may view this as a rise in labor costs.

However, the larger context of white-collar unions indicates that unlike the cases presented in prior sections, Western white-collar unions deal with enterprises rather than the state, raising the question of comparative value. While in certain contexts, like the healthcare unions in the Czech Republic, there is evidence of increased interaction between enterprises and labor, this is still not the norm. Additionally, as indicated by Kshetri, the countries in this case are beneficiaries of outsourcing efforts by more developed economies and have limited outsourcing themselves indicating that there is limited applicability of the experiences of Western white-collar unions.

While Russia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are trying to converge with the West in many spheres, their unique white-collar union structures, as a result of their communist history, make it difficult to learn much from their Western partners. As many

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102 Kshetri, Nir. “Institutional factors affecting offshore business sprocess and ifnromation technology outsourcing”, 49
103 Sitek 48
104 Kshetri 48
105 Kubicek 52-53. Here Kubicek discusses Central and East European ambitions to converge with the West.
of the white-collar unions explored in this work represent state workers, the dynamic promoted by Avdagic between the state and labor is more appropriate than the traditional worker-enterprise dynamics which are common in Western labor.

However, both the post-communist and the developed capitalistic contexts indicate that white-collar labor is not quiescent. While the methods employed differ by sector in the West and by country in Central and Eastern Europe, white-collar labor resilience and the ability to extract concessions by exploiting existing institutions is noticeable. Whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, successful unions attempt to strengthen their power relative to the state, in the Western context, successful white-collar unions do the same, as seen in the lobbying efforts of WashTech 106 or the teachers’ union use of strikes 107. By using this dynamic relationship, unions in both contexts have shown that they are not sclerotic institutions but are quite responsive to shifting power dynamics and capable of exhibiting institutional learned behavior.

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106 Jaarsveld 376
107 Lipset 14 – 15. Lipset discusses how the NEA overcame its reluctance and now embraces strikes and collective bargaining as political tools.
VIII. Conclusion

This study has shown that the dogs really did bark. When disaggregating white-collar labor demonstrations from overall union activity, one sees that workers on the state payroll such as academics, teachers, and doctors are quite vocal in their demands. More importantly, these groups have faced increasingly more success as the period under study progressed. Whereas the government seemed to ignore these workers’ demands at first, there is already evidence of modifications being made to reform proposals following white-collar unions using new tactics.

When protesting, these unions continued to take to the streets to indicate that they had power and were able to mobilize support, per Avdagic’s dynamic state-labor model. However, what led to concessions is the willingness to work within existing mechanisms to achieve success. Just like the FNPR lobbied and relied on deputies from different parties to support their changes to the labor code in 2002, the white-collar unions also relied on political means to lobby for change.

The larger comparative study indicates that this is quite similar to the Czech case, where a unified union structure was able to coalesce white-collar workers into one union, and using similar tactics, press for measures that were friendlier to labor. However, this investigation leaves many questions that require further investigation. First, further work is called for on the disconnect between formal and informal implementation. As seen in the reforms of the Russian Academy of Sciences, while there were few formal changes made to the reforms, the informal concessions completely changed the tenor of the
reforms and gave the academics more power.

Additionally, it will be important to note how union movements progress in the Russian Federation. If the argument of “learned behavior” is correct, then unions will continue to take to the streets and use political means to promote policy changes. However, if this remains effective as the government learns as well or if this remains the dominant state-labor dynamic will give the comparative context more relevance.

Currently the state of white-collar labor in Russia appears to be between Polish and Czech labor relations, in that it is able to make marginal changes and isn’t entirely coopted by the state. Seeing how the dynamic evolves over the coming years will be important, as it may have important consequences on the ability of the state to pass economic legislation and on labor’s ability to get favorable conditions. Indeed, the hypotheses on labor mobilization that were discussed in the Moscow context indicate that the Russian state will need to begin to change the terms of the state-labor dynamic in order to facilitate tough choices it faces.

Faced with stagnation and the need to promote productivity, the Russian government may choose to facilitate inter-union rivalry, as there appears to be one subset of labor that is aggrieved (the white-collar unions) and another which is content with the economic progress thus far. As it is difficult to change the former’s frame of reference, the government may attempt to further weaken unions and specifically the biudzhetniki’s unions in order to be able to effectively enact policy without needing to deal with the
political maneuvering of the white-collar unions.

Even in the West, where there was not a legacy of unionized white-collar labor, unions have found ways to effect change and strive for better conditions for their members, indicating that the Russian state will face difficulties if it attempts the strategy above. This study and the comparative analysis are indicative of the larger pattern of labor being active while adapting to institutional settings. While this adaptability is sure to lead to many more duels between the state and organized labor, it makes clear that unions are not “quiescent” and have some bite to their bark.
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