European Disintegration: Anti-Greek Bias in the Eurozone Crisis

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Abstract
Between December 2009 and February 2012, Greece announced its immense sovereign debt crisis, received two EU/IMF bailout packages, and implemented a series of draconian austerity measures. The streets of Athens erupted in anti-austerity protests as Greeks directed their rage against the troika and the wealthier EU states, which were leading the bailout process; Greeks simultaneously faced resentment and negativity from the creditor states as the Eurozone crisis brought to the forefront the underlying tensions in the EU. This paper investigates and quantifies the backlash in Britain and Germany against Greece through a media content analysis to determine the extent of the bias. Three critical moments in the progression of the Greek crisis are examined from the perspective of British and German popular and elite news sources The Sun, The Financial Times, Bild, and Die Zeit, and their coverage is analyzed according to five core indicators of anti-Greek bias. The media analysis of the crisis combined with public opinion data illuminates deep cleavages in the EU between the British and German national publics and between elites and masses, raising concerns for the future of European integration.

Keywords
Eurozone, financial crisis, European integration, media, European Union, Social Sciences, Political Science, Brendan O’Leary, O’Leary, Breandan
European Disintegration: Anti-Greek Bias in the Eurozone Crisis
by
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Abstract

Between December 2009 and February 2012, Greece announced its immense sovereign debt crisis, received two EU/IMF bailout packages, and implemented a series of draconian austerity measures. The streets of Athens erupted in anti-austerity protests as Greeks directed their rage against the troika and the wealthier EU states, which were leading the bailout process; Greeks simultaneously faced resentment and negativity from the creditor states as the Eurozone crisis brought to the forefront the underlying tensions in the EU. This paper investigates and quantifies the backlash in Britain and Germany against Greece through a media content analysis to determine the extent of the bias. Three critical moments in the progression of the Greek crisis are examined from the perspective of British and German popular and elite news sources *The Sun*, *The Financial Times*, *Bild*, and *Die Zeit*, and their coverage is analyzed according to five core indicators of anti-Greek bias. The media analysis of the crisis combined with public opinion data illuminates deep cleavages in the EU between the British and German national publics and between elites and masses, raising concerns for the future of European integration.

I. Introduction

Background

“This is worse than the ’40s. This time the government is following the Germans’ orders. I would prefer to die with dignity than with my head bent down,” asserted Stella Papafagou, an elderly Greek anti-austerity protester on the streets of Athens.\(^1\) The strength of her language encapsulates the ire and historical baggage underlying the Greek financial crisis that began in 2009; it was not only European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund, or “troika”-resenting Greeks who directed rage outward, but also national publics across the European Union, as media sources closely followed the unfolding events that seemed to reveal underlying tensions between the debtor and creditor states.\(^2\) In May 2010, Athens erupted in prolonged riots and protests in opposition to the austerity measures beginning to be imposed by the government of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to combat the sovereign debt


crisis rocking Greece and eventually other Eurozone states.\textsuperscript{3} Protests continued through 2012 as the crisis carried on, maturing into a deep recession across the Eurozone. Portugal, Ireland, and Greece received bailout funds from the EU and the IMF, and it became clear that the new economic conditions in the Eurozone would have deep social and political costs for the countries adopting the EU/IMF plans, costs that led not only to riots and protests but also to significant changes in government, such as the election of SYRIZA, the coalition of the radical left, to the Greek Parliament in 2012.\textsuperscript{4} The continuing economic issues hold implications for EU public opinion as the discrepancies between debtor and creditor states draw distinctions within the Union. The EU now acts in part as the arbiter of bailout and austerity packages contested from all sides, and European leaders struggle both abroad to end the crisis and at home to appease their national publics.

At its core, the Eurozone financial crisis is a crisis of sovereign debt, but its roots lie in the United States’ financial crisis beginning in 2007, which precipitated the global financial crisis.\textsuperscript{5} With the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the beginning of the global recession, states in the Eurozone with high levels of public debt faced restricted access to international bond markets as banks facing a liquidity crisis reduced longer term lending in favor of short-term securities, leading to the possibility of insolvency for the debtor states. The threat of insolvency led to the EU/IMF bailouts and the austerity

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requirements that accompanied them.⁶ A combination of factors allowed Portugal, Greece, and Italy to acquire the high levels of public debt that ultimately caused their sovereign debt crises (Ireland and Spain’s crises were brought about through different means). Countries in the Eurozone are bound by the European Monetary Union and use the Euro as a common currency, but they do not have a fiscal union; therefore, states control their own taxation and spending.⁷ When the peripheral countries joined the Euro, they were able to borrow at much lower interest rates than they otherwise would have been allowed without the internationally perceived security of the Euro.⁸ Additionally, the global recession induced states to support the financial sector and acquire public debt in order to ensure the continued functioning of the stock market, a move that switched the brunt of the crisis to the public sector in its second phase. When states were no longer able to access international bond markets to the same extent, the insolvency threat followed.⁹

The Eurozone crisis was unprecedented in many ways. Its large scale and rapid spread were remarkable.¹⁰ The resolution of the crisis has relied heavily upon the deep involvement of the EU and the IMF in debtor states’ finances, resulting in the potential for resentment by debtor states and expanded EU authority over member states’ finances, seen in the austerity requirements accompanying Greece’s bailouts.¹¹ The primary crisis

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⁶ Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, ix, 54-6.
⁷ Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, 3.
⁹ Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, 54-6.
resolution mechanisms for economically failing states have been EU/IMF bailout packages and the requirements they entail. The immense spread and depth of the economic crisis across Europe has differentiated it from crises contained within individual states and has impacted the prerogatives of international institutions tasked with resolving it.

Austerity has become the cornerstone of debt reduction agreements as the most critical conditionality imposed upon the debtor states in an effort to curtail their increasing debts. It became the new buzzword of the year, and it was the main source of pain for the protesters on the streets of Athens. A program of increased taxes, decreased wages, and reductions in public spending, austerity began its rise to prominence in the Eurozone following the crisis as states made an effort to decrease their public debt obligations. Austerity has been adopted in some capacity by numerous states in the Eurozone in response to the financial crisis, with both core and peripheral states tightening their belts to weather the crisis. In Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, it has been imposed from above as a conditionality of EU and IMF bailout packages. States such as Greece are projected to remain under austerity conditions for years to come before their debt issues are resolved, adding to the protesters’ pain.

Despite the complexity of the crisis, discussions of its causes often divide into two camps, with dramatically different interpretations of the events articulated by the debtors and the creditors. Descriptions of the crisis encapsulate more than simple facts; they often reveal the underlying perceptions that EU states hold about one another. The

13 Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, 7.
14 Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, 59-60.
“Northern diagnosis” of the problem often rests on a morality tale of the crisis. This narrative claims that the profligacy and extravagance of Southern governments living beyond their means precipitated the sovereign debt crisis. Such a conception of the events creates a dichotomy between saints and sinners in the economic system, often relies on stereotypes, and implies that the indebted states must be punished in some way to avoid further episodes of moral hazard and irresponsibility; that punishment in practice is austerity.\textsuperscript{15} The debtors, on the other hand, often point to the systemic issues in the structure of the Eurozone that allowed the series of events to unfold, although their framing of the crisis is not always free of stereotypes either, specifically stereotypes about Germans and other Northern governments. Additionally, they critique austerity measures for punishing workers for their governments’ attempts to support the financial sector, whose speculation on the crisis worsened the situation.\textsuperscript{16} These two narratives of the crisis are critical to understanding the role of beliefs and rhetoric in the resolution process, as are the disagreements on the efficacy of austerity that have risen to prominence as a result of the crisis. The range of opinions on austerity and the troika’s crisis resolution tactics, as well as the tension in the public discourse on the topic, reveal underlying views on European identity and integration, and they are critical to understanding the status of the European project today.


\textsuperscript{16} Lapavitsas et al., \textit{Crisis}, 38-41.
Justification of Project and Case Study

Evidence of palpable anti-German anger in Greece is not difficult to uncover. Illustrations depicting German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble as Nazis circulated in the Greek media in early 2012, echoing Ms. Papafagou’s allusion to World War II and provoking uproar in Germany. An interesting question becomes, then, what caused Greece’s extreme response against Germany—was it simply the perception of too much German involvement in Greece’s debt crisis coupled with the historical memory of World War II, or were Greeks responding to negative sentiments coming from the creditor states? An advertisement for The Spectator, a conservative British magazine, displayed on trains and buses in the UK read: “Most Germans own a second property. It’s called Greece.” The anti-Greek sentiment captured by this advertisement drove my interest in exploring the perceptions of wealthier EU states about Greeks. My analysis presents an effort to investigate the roots of the Greek response and, through this response, the tensions between states in the EU.

The disagreement over the efficacy of austerity and the moralization over the crisis articulate the possibility that the framing of financial crisis narratives by wealthier states may point to underlying assumptions by actors in the Eurozone. Reactions to bailouts and austerity may be investigated to reveal the public sentiments in play in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Understanding the intentions of the various actors involved in the resolution of the crisis is critical; with countries such as Germany playing major roles in

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dictating the settlements offered to debtor states, it matters what EU states think of one another. Because democratically elected leaders have to remain popular with their publics, public opinion and the media spin on the crisis likely affect the options leaders are willing to consider in order to resolve the crisis.¹⁹ In a politically hostile world, both financial assistance through bailouts and draconian austerity have come to be seen as the cure, and it is important to investigate why.

Coverage of the financial crisis reveals the way in which European national publics view one another, illuminating possible underlying tensions or doubts about the success of the integrative European project. This perspective on public opinion provides an interesting look into the narrative of the crisis. Using Greece’s sovereign debt crisis as a case study, I investigate the narratives of Greece’s financial woes presented by two non-debtor states, Germany and Britain, as covered in four key media sources. I chose Germany both because of my German language skills and the state’s role as the biggest economic power in the Eurozone; Germany has played a key role in the EU’s formation in the past and bailout negotiations in the present.²⁰ Britain provides another interesting perspective given its history of resistance to European integration—³¹—the country is a EU member but refused to take on the single currency, continuing to use the Pound instead of the Euro. As a result, despite its prominent international position and economic strength, the state has not shared Germany’s prominent role in bailout negotiations. Given their

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different positions in the financial crisis resolution process and in the EU as a whole, a study of British and German media provides access to a range of opinions on the EU/IMF bailouts and overall orientations towards European integration held by citizens in non-debtor states.

Greece is an ideal choice for a media case study on the sovereign debt crisis. Internationally, Greece has become synonymous with the Eurozone crisis\(^{22}\); media around the world have closely followed the events, likely a result of the extreme nature of the crisis, allowing national publics to form opinions and sustain interest on the topic. Greece is an outlier in terms of the extent of its crisis, the interest it has stimulated, and the degree of involvement of the international community in the response. Since it joined the Euro in 2001, Greece’s position in the Eurozone has changed significantly. Between December 2009 and May 2012, Greece announced its deep financial concerns, approved and received two EU/IMF-directed bailout packages, adopted draconian austerity measures, and suffered extensive riots and political opposition by those who disagreed with the handling of the crisis. German news sources *Bild* and *Die Zeit* and British news sources *The Sun* and the *Financial Times* covered these events extensively, and they provide evidence about their national publics’ attitudes towards Greece, with deep implications for the success and the future of the European project.

\(^{22}\) For more on Greece as a “trope,” see Daniel M. Knight, “The Desire to Blame Greece for the Eurocrisis Ensures that the Greek People Pay the Price, While the Elites Responsible Get Away Free,” *London School of Economics and Political Science EUROPP*, January 9, 2013, URL 9.
II. Research Question

The coverage of Greece’s financial crisis in widely circulated British and German news sources should provide an indicator of the leanings of each state’s national public. National opinion is important given the international power differential between states like Greece and more financially successful states, both in terms of international legitimacy and financial status. Have German and British elite-level and popular-level news sources indicated bias against Greece in media coverage of the financial crisis, indicated by the use of stereotypes, positions on austerity, morality tales, oppositional distinctions drawn, and fear mongering? Is there a difference of opinion between Britain and Germany? If so, what drives the difference in opinion between the two states? Since both popular and elite news sources will be investigated, is there a difference between the two types of news sources in terms of financial crisis coverage, and what would such differences indicate about alignments patterns within the EU—what types of cleavages exist? What do these results mean for European integration both past and present—has it been successful thus far, for whom has it been a success, and will it be in the future?
III. Literature Review

*Roots of the Crisis and the Morality Tale*

An important debate continues on the roots of the Greek debt crisis, with some sources blaming systemic factors, such as fiscal consolidation under the Euro and the structure of the EU, and others pointing to problems specific to Greece and the actions it took to bring about its own financial decline and ultimately the decline of others. Perspectives that view Greece as a symptom rather than the root of the crisis generally focus on the EU as the causal factor underlying the financial crisis. Costas Lapavitsas and his collaborators investigate the effects of German dominance of the Eurozone and EU structure, illuminating the systemic issues that precipitated the crisis from a Marxist perspective. Lapavitsas paints the crisis as a “detonator” for underlying issues rather than depicting the debt crisis itself as the ultimate cause for the problems in the Eurozone.23 Criticizing member states’ public policies, Jürgen Habermas’ view is in accord with Lapavitsas’, arguing that the downturn shows the EU’s flaw of incomplete integration. Habermas thus blames the dissonant foreign and economic policies of member states, mirroring the neoliberal Giandomenico Majone’s emphasis on collective responsibility for the crisis, which views Greece as part of a larger broken system.24 Approaching the Euro and integration from a historical, often elite-focused perspective, David Marsh’s work provides important insight into the issues that conditioned the development of

23 Lapavitsas et al., *Crisis*, x, xi.
Giandomenico Majone, “Rethinking European Integration after the Debt Crisis,” *UCL* no. 3 (June 2012): 3, URL 10.
today’s Europe, furthering the macro-level analysis of the flawed EU system. EU-centric narratives of what went wrong tend to absolve Greece of the ultimate blame, examining the crisis through a supranational institutional lens rather than a state-level one.

Others take a less forgiving approach towards the debtor states, focusing on their misdeeds instead of systemic flaws in the structure of the Union; such perspectives tend to be more critical of Greece specifically. Some scholars have presented longer-term perspectives on the development of Greece’s problems (Gibson, et al, 2012; Bitros, 2013). Tracking the issues in Greece over time and providing a longer-term perspective, Heather D. Gibson et al. and George C. Bitros analyze the buildup to the Greek crisis from 1950 onwards and since its entry into the Eurozone, respectively, furthering the understanding of Greece’s specific context. Others have focused more on the proximate causes of the crisis (Ortiz, 2012; De Grauwe, 2010). Guillermo Ortiz and Paul De Grauwe exemplify the debtor-focused perspective, emphasizing the structural issues within the debtor states as the primary cause of the crisis and addressing the need for reform from within to resolve the current issues. Such approaches often inherently attribute more blame to Greece in the crisis.

I will not attempt to evaluate which narrative of the overarching crisis is more accurate, save for the assumption that the global financial crisis had many plausible causes and underlying factors, and the two perspectives often complement one another.

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De Grauwe, “How to Deal with It,” 1.
when both are provided. Thus, when one narrative is selected over the other and blame is assigned, media sources make a deliberate choice; the perceived roots of the financial crisis in media coverage and how these issues are framed are critical aspects of my analysis because the prevailing narrative within the more powerful states can be taken as an indicator of their perceptions of the debtor states, regardless of the degree of truthfulness of a certain characterization.

More pertinent to my project than perspectives on who should take the blame for the crisis are the effects of blame-assigning views on the framing of crisis narratives—in other words: who is being blamed? One logical development of theories that focus on the responsibility that Greece bears due to its governmental misconduct is the morality tale, a critical concept in discussions of EU states’ perceptions of one another in the financial crisis. De Grauwe has discussed the influence of economic morality on the response to the crisis, arguing that news source depictions of the crisis are crucial to the development of policy solutions due to their influence on public sentiment in states such as Germany and the Netherlands. He asserts that the “moralistic attitude” developed by the Northern states is in fact hampering crisis resolution efforts since the focus is on punishment rather than assistance of other Eurozone states. One can see in his description how a focus on Greek government misconduct can turn into a discussion of government profligacy that requires punishment for sins rather than a dialogue on the best economic solutions. Similarly, Wonhyuk Lim has criticized the prevalence of the

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28 It is important to note that not all narratives that focus on Greece’s misconduct result in morality tale narratives; the morality tale is just one possible development.
morality tale and its alleged ignorance of critical underlying economic factors, arguing that such depictions of the crisis do not fully encompass the truth, ultimately damaging recovery efforts.\textsuperscript{32} Beliefs play a major role in Eurozone crisis resolution efforts; Abraham Newman’s work focuses on Germany’s ideological background and examines how its beliefs have been influential in the crisis, realizing that ideologies condition perceptions of interests and therefore preferred policy outcomes\textsuperscript{33}; a belief in the morality tale could have a dramatic impact on Germany’s desired financial crisis resolution mechanisms. Again, for the project at hand, the critical aspect of the morality tale is not its accuracy in encompassing the true facts of the crisis, but rather whether and how it has been employed in depictions of the crisis in the wealthier EU states.

\textit{The Importance and Efficacy of Austerity}

Accompanying discussions of what precipitated the financial crisis comes a debate on the efficacy of austerity in alleviating the pain of financial downturns as well as commentary on the hidden costs it may have in the specific case of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. As more time passes since the onset of the crisis, more nuanced research on the effects of austerity in the specific case of the Eurozone has begun to emerge. While it appears to be the accepted course of action by the troika, critics of Greek austerity abound (Krugman, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013). Some economists disagree


with the notion that there is a tradeoff between GDP growth and reigning in spending, but others question the motivation behind the imposition of austerity, debating the moral overtones of the discussion and casting doubt on austerity’s ability to help at all.\textsuperscript{34} Neo-Keynesian Paul Krugman has been a prominent doubter of the austerity efforts, arguing that they will do more harm than good in the end and that government spending is a critical aspect of states avoiding deeper recessions.\textsuperscript{35} Similarly criticizing the dangers of austerity, Giancarlo Corsetti’s Centre for Economic Policy report and De Grauwe’s work explore the potentially harmful side effects of too much austerity on recovering states.\textsuperscript{36} Even the IMF’s groundbreaking October 2012 World Economic Outlook calls for a reevaluation of austerity as the knee-jerk reaction to debt crisis, as it posits that the fiscal multiplier was underestimated and that the effect of austerity may be even deeper recession; the IMF report includes an economic analysis of austerity measures, but it does not explore the social implications of austerity, another critical aspect of the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis.\textsuperscript{37} Others have examined the dangers and failures of Eurozone austerity measures in adequately addressing the social impact of the crisis (Lapavitsas, et al, 2012; Monastiriotis, 2011). The far-reaching effects of economic underperformance

\textsuperscript{34} Ortiz, “The False Dilemma,” 63.
\textsuperscript{37} International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook: Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth,” (October 2012): 40.
on vulnerable groups range from high unemployment to the creation of deep social divisions.\textsuperscript{38}

The adoption of austerity packages can also be examined in light of the political process of the EU. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein’s assessment of European identity as a politicized concept can be adapted to fit the bailout process—it is possible that austerity has become a similarly politicized phenomenon.\textsuperscript{39} Consent is an important aspect of the political process; the Greek financial crisis resolution process required the agreement of the EU and the IMF, in addition to member states and Greece, leading to contentious debates on the bailouts (Clarke and Newman, 2012). Given the nature of democratic political systems, politicians were in the position of having to convince the general population of the acceptability of bailout funds, adding further conflict to the process.\textsuperscript{40} An understanding of the debates surrounding austerity and the incentives for its use are important in an assessment of its level of support by national publics and leaders, offering a possible perspective on states’ perceptions of one another. I do not seek to evaluate whether or not the adoption of austerity packages by Greece was in fact advisable or the best possible solution, but rather what the importance of the narrative surrounding their adoption in non-debtor states was given the reliance on austerity as a cornerstone of the bailout packages in Greece.

\textsuperscript{38} Lapavitsas et al., \textit{Crisis}, 182.


\textsuperscript{39} Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, \textit{European Identity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Debates on the level of European integration existed before the financial crisis and continue in light of it, questioning who is being integrated and by whom, as well as what the effect of the crisis on future integration will be. The success of integration is often divided into an elite perspective and a mass perspective, and some scholars argue that European integration is an elite-driven process (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Haas, 1968; Habermas, 2009). Checkel and Katzenstein differentiate between the shaping of cosmopolitan and populist conceptions of European identity and trace the opposite directions in which elite and mass politics have traveled with regard to European identity. Ernst B. Haas focuses his top-down approach on the theory of neofunctionalism, a branch of integration theory that argues that sectors integrate as it becomes advantageous to do so. Habermas laments the state of the EU and its elite-driven progress, calling it an “elitist and bureaucratic” institution with a serious democratic deficit; in Perry Anderson’s words, “The elites do not persuade the masses; but, to all appearances, they have little to fear from them.”

For the scholars who view European integration as an elite-driven process, a hallmark of successful European integration would be a sense of European solidarity between national publics, a popular-level phenomenon, as opposed to negative perceptions of one another and stereotyping. Thus, national publics’ beliefs about one

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another are important in evaluating the level of integration, as well as the impact that the financial crisis has had on the European project.\textsuperscript{46} The existence of stereotypes held by national publics in member states about one another would indicate a problem in integration at the popular level; a lack of solidarity between German, British, and Greek national publics during the financial crisis, exemplified by stereotypical and negative views about Greeks and certain characterizations of the roots of the financial crisis, would provide evidence that integration has not succeeded at the popular level. A survey of common stereotypes about Greece would be useful in establishing what aspects of news coverage would indicate bias against Greeks, but the literature on Greek stereotypes specifically is not extensive. Southern Mediterranean cultures in general are characterized as warm and “excitement-seeking,” with additional helpful stereotypes coming from common knowledge\textsuperscript{47}; in popular conceptions, Greeks, Spaniards, and Italians are often depicted as happy-go-lucky, carefree, and lazy. Evidence of such stereotypes about Greeks would indicate significant bias against Greeks in news coverage, and it is thus important to look for indications of such views. Conceptions of Greek stereotypes and European identity are critical to my project due to the necessity of states helping one another to resolve the crisis—if they identify with and respect one another, they will be more likely to agree to assist each other than if they view fellow member states negatively or as “others.”\textsuperscript{48}

The financial crisis may have various implications for the future of European integration and for the EU as a whole. Even before the full scope of the effects of the global financial crisis became clear, Perry Anderson described the EU in its current state as built on “political quicksands” because of the degree of uncertainty regarding its future.\textsuperscript{49} Some argue that the crisis has resulted in an institutional deepening of integration; common examples include the Outright Monetary Transactions, the bailout fund, and the new precedent set despite the “no bailout clause,” Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.\textsuperscript{50} Others argue that the result has been a movement away from further integration (Newman, 2012; Majone, 2012); Newman cites Germany’s caution and conservatism in agreeing to assist member states financially in contrast with its previously more cooperative stance on EU integration efforts, and Majone points to polling data indicating EU citizens’ lack of desire for further integration.\textsuperscript{51} While some pin the blame for the crisis on too much integration, seen in some Germans’ longing for a return to the D-Mark, others argue that the problem was that the EU is not integrated enough.\textsuperscript{52} The EU is economically halfway integrated as a monetary and not a fiscal union, which some argue prevented effective crisis resolution

\textsuperscript{49} Anderson, \textit{The New Old World}, 46.
\textsuperscript{51} Newman, “Flight from Risk,” 156.
\textsuperscript{52} Majone, “Rethinking European Integration,” 1.
Majone “Rethinking European Integration,” 13.
and threatens further economic development in the Eurozone. Perspectives on the future of European integration are important as a measure of the backlash or reaction to the financial crisis with regard to how much EU states want to be involved with one another; it is possible that the crisis demonstrates the inefficacy of the concept of European solidarity as a whole when it comes to resolving high-stakes issues and that the systemic integration of the past in fact accelerated the breakdown of solidarity by making a large-scale Eurozone crisis possible.

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IV. Hypothesis

I posit that the British and German popular and elite coverage of the Greek sovereign debt crisis presents an accurate picture of the leanings of each state’s national public. I hypothesize that both British and German news sources will indicate bias against Greece in financial crisis coverage, although likely with important differences; both will, however, include stereotypes, the recommendation of austerity as a punishment, morality tales, an absence of solidarity, and fear mongering. I predict a difference between the two given Germany’s status as a member of the Eurozone, while Britain is an EU member that does not participate in the single currency; I also predict distinctions between elite and popular coverage given the different relationships elites and masses have to the project of European integration. Media depictions of the financial crisis in Greece have become loaded with language that holds significant implications for the underlying political attitudes of each source’s readership, and they are a crucial link in understanding the alignment of national publics in the EU in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
V. Sources of Evidence

The bulk of my evidence comes from British and German elite and popular news sources *The Sun*, the *Financial Times*, *Bild*, and *Die Zeit*. The sort of language and rhetoric employed will indicate the type of relationship that the people of each state perceive themselves to have with their Greek counterparts. I selected *The Sun* and the *Financial Times* as my British sources because of their extensive circulation. The *Financial Times* is regarded as the world’s preeminent economics-focused newspaper published in English; its reputation precedes it as the relied-upon news source for English-speaking financial elites, especially in Europe. As the most widely circulated British tabloid, *The Sun* is a relied-upon news source for a very different demographic, and the quintessential tabloid encapsulates popular coverage in Britain. *Die Zeit* and *Bild* were selected for similar reasons. While the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*’s readership in Germany exceeds that of *Die Zeit*, online resource constraints precluded my use of the *FAZ* as my German elite news source; however, *Die Zeit* is also widely circulated and highly respected, and its readership parallels *FAZ* in terms of its elite status. *Bild* is Germany’s most popular tabloid and thus offers a glimpse into the popular coverage of the financial crisis in Germany.

Since I argue that perceptions of one another are critical to an understanding of the impact of the morality narrative on proposed solutions, public opinion polling data such as the Eurobarometer and the Pew Global Attitudes Project will be an important facet of my analysis. The Eurobarometer data, with its frequent qualitative and quantitative studies of EU citizens, allows public opinion to be tracked over the course of the financial crisis, providing insights into the effects it has had across several time periods on
European identity and other factors that may indicate the degree of opposition and competition citizens within the Eurozone may feel toward one another. The Pew Global Attitudes Project similarly tracks EU citizens and their perceptions of one another, focusing more on the attitudes that the publics of different states have of one another rather than on their perceptions of the EU and its institutions, illuminating many of the stereotypes and assumptions that citizens of different countries hold about one another, an important factor in the crisis’ aftermath. Public opinion polling links the evidence offered by news sources and the professed beliefs of EU citizens. The relationship between the two will reinforce my analysis of media sources.

VI. Public Opinion: Media Content Analysis

Methodology

In order to investigate how the financial crisis in Greece was reported in the wealthier EU states, I searched for the presence of five core indicators of negative Greek perceptions in German and British coverage in the weeklong period both preceding and following three crucial moments in Greece’s financial crisis. My search terms were “Greek” and “Greece” (in German, “Griechen” and “Griechenland”). The first moment, December 3, 2009 to December 17, 2009, is indicative of the time that the Greek government officially announced that it was in dire fiscal straits. The second moment used, April 25, 2010 to May 9, 2010, is the period around the date the first Greek EU/IMF bailout package was announced. The third moment, February 14, 2012 to February 28, 2012, comprises the weeks around the second Greek bailout. A total of 561 articles were considered in my analysis. While a more exhaustive study would cover the entire duration of the financial crisis, this study was limited by time and resource constraints and thus is restricted to the one-week periods immediately before and after three key events; it does not, however, include all of the important moments in the crisis, including various austerity packages, turning points for other Eurozone states, and the aftermath and lingering effects of important events, as well as moments that, while perhaps less critical than bailout packages, would provide insight into the psychology behind the voting publics. All such moments would contribute to a more complete picture of the perceptions present in German and British news sources. The news sources used were deliberately from both popular and elite press. For German elite coverage, the center-left publication Die Zeit was used, and popular coverage came from the right-
leaning *Bild*, the widely circulated tabloid-style publication. British elite coverage comes from the prominent centrist economics-oriented *Financial Times*, while popular coverage comes from the widely read conservative tabloid *The Sun*.

The five evaluative factors attempt to code systematically and organize any negative perceptions in Britain and Germany. The first coding decision is defined by the presence or absence of stereotypes about Greeks. Possible stereotypes commonly held about Greeks and residents of other Mediterranean states specifically relevant to the crisis include laziness, a propensity to lie and cheat, untrustworthiness, and a fun-loving nature, as well as a general broad-brush painting of Greeks as bankrupt or hopeless. The second coding decision confirms whether the news source claims that austerity specifically is in some way deserved as part of a punishment structure for perceived Greek misdeeds in the past. The third coding decision is a little more complex. I looked for the presence of an “us versus them” mentality (as opposed to a solidarity orientation) in the news sources, a direct mobilization of the relevant paper’s national public against the Greek public through various mechanisms, including negatively contrasting economic performance, stating that the crisis is a Greek problem that Greeks must solve, and drawing any xenophobic distinctions between the two groups. The fourth coding decision is the presence or absence of a moral narrative of the financial crisis, for example that the Greeks brought this upon themselves by spending too much, being dependent on the public sector, and other allegations of fraud, corruption, and waste. The fifth coding decision searched for is the presence of a palpable sense of fear or the inclusion of fear-mongering language in the publications, a factor that captured reluctance to pay for bailouts, the dread of an impending deeper crisis, as well as sensationalist language in
describing the protest movements. The analysis of these five moments in the
development of the Eurozone financial crisis provides evidence as to whether the British
and German newspapers display a sense of European solidarity or resort to historic or
customary “national character” analysis.

Some cross-sections of each state’s national public are missed by the
methodology of this study. By reading elite-oriented and mass-appeal publications, it is
possible that a significant middle ground may be overlooked; the wide-circulation of both
types of papers indicates that such a study gives a reasonably good overview of the
German and British public’s beliefs, but not all views are being included. In order to
focus on relevant coverage, only articles that specifically discuss the financial crisis in
Greece were read. While one-line mentions of Greece are often used insultingly or to
illustrate a worst-case scenario, they were excluded in order to focus on the goal of
understanding the biased nature of financial crisis coverage. A more general study would
search for anti-Greek perceptions in all British and German coverage, but this study
primarily concerns itself with the news’ narrative of the financial crisis specifically, an
orientation that may exclude an important angle on overall perceptions of Greece.

Moment 1: Greeks Bearing Debts\textsuperscript{56}, December 3-17, 2009

On December 10, 2009, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou admitted that
Greece’s debts were the highest that they had ever been in its history and that Greece
needed financial help, simultaneously promising large-scale restructuring of the Greek

\textsuperscript{56} The allusion to Sophocles’ warning has become prevalent; see Michael Mussa,
2010), URL 20.
economic and social system. Greece’s credit rating was downgraded first by Fitch with more to follow, and there was significant protesting across Greece. Initially, the riots were nominally in remembrance of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a young protester killed by a Greek police officer the year before, but they were inextricably linked to Greece’s financial decline and the general unrest of the population facing imminent crisis, turning violent as protestors clashed with police and discussions about austerity measures began. While murmurs of financial issues existed before the official announcement, December 10, 2009 marks the point at which even those not particularly interested in the financial goings-on of a small Mediterranean state in the periphery of the Eurozone had their interest peaked; thus, the period of December 3, 2009 to December 17, 2009 is used to analyze news coverage of this period.

Unifying themes that arose in the reading of the four sources in the first moment include an emphasis on Greek dishonesty in adopting the single currency, a deep interest in the rising social unrest in the state, questions about the efficacy of the Euro, and intense uncertainty about the future of the economic system as the Eurozone crisis began to unfold.
In the first moment, Bild published twelve articles relevant to the Greek financial crisis with some significant indicators of negativity towards Greece and its people. Most significantly, 42% of the articles placed Greece and Germany in opposition to one another, displaying an “us versus them” mentality, and two thirds of the articles made use of sensationalist language or fear. As details about Greece’s situation began to be known, Bild consistently described the debtor states (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Italy) as “time bombs,” implying that the worst had not yet come. The riots in Greece were covered in sensationalist language; rioters were described as “hoodlums,” “anarchists,” and “leftist extremists,” emphasizing “chaos” and “fear,” and the riots themselves were alleged to be reminiscent of a civil war. Bild contrasted Greece’s economic problems with Germany’s 2009 end-of-year economic performance, which it described as an “employment miracle,” apparently drawing an intentional distinction between the two states in terms of performance. What began as smaller hints of distinctions being drawn between debtor and creditor states evolved fully within days, peaking with an openly

hostile headline that asked, “Are Greeks and Spaniards Ruining the Euro?” Soon after the Greek government’s announcement, coverage became inundated with negative stereotypes, although only two articles in the period, or 17%, utilized stereotypes. Germany was described as the “purse” that might be financially responsible for their actions, and Bild showed an intense fear of financial obligations on the part of Germany. Greece was described as on the verge of collapse directly because of its unsound budgetary policy; it was also suggested that financially suffering states accepting bailout funds from the IMF would tarnish the image of the “proud Europeans” of the EU as a whole. Most prominently, Bild began to mention regularly that Greece lied to get into the Eurozone, asking, “But can the Greeks really be trusted? They hide, they trick, they cheat…” The deception used by Greece in order to enter the Eurozone was treated as a root cause of the financial crisis. Additionally, the emergence of the crisis was attributed to corruption in the country was specifically mentioned in discussions of how the crisis came to be, employing another negative characterization of Greek people in general—the conflation of the public and its politicians. Discussions about austerity were not yet prominent, and only one article indicated that austerity was deserved, stating that Greece must be tough now given its past deception, yet another allusion to Greece’s entry into the Eurozone. Bild in the beginning of December 2009 expressed an increasingly negative attitude towards Greece, and its escalating negative perspective over the two-week period indicated potential for a deepening of its attitude as the crisis progressed.

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During the first period, *Die Zeit* published eight articles relevant to the Greek financial crisis, and its articles were largely neutral or positive. In contrast with the coverage in *Bild*, the coverage in *Die Zeit* did not indicate significant underlying negativity towards Greece. It employed very little negative language regarding Greece, with only two articles displaying stereotypes, the idea that Greeks deserve austerity, or a sense of fear. While one article referred to the protesters as “Randalierer,” a word with negative implications that translates as “hooligan,” *Die Zeit* included the protesters’ perspective, refrained from sensationalizing the events, and was more content to discuss the management of the Euro and the possible effects of the crisis rather than the perceived personal failings of Greeks.\(^64\) It did, however, mention Greece’s “notorisch unzuverlässigen… Statistiken,” or “notoriously unreliable statistics,” an allusion to the Greek government’s dishonest presentation of its public finances when it entered the Eurozone.\(^65\) The implication that Greek data has a reputation for unreliability draws on stereotypical assumptions about Greece’s national character. However, instead of lingering on anti-Greek stereotypes in its coverage of the early December 2009 period,

Die Zeit feared the lack of spending on education and the creation of a lost generation in Greece. Overall, the paper in this period was largely sympathetic to Greece’s plight, even mentioning that Germany and other wealthy states have continued to benefit from Greece’s participation in the Euro. It also alleged that Robert Mundell, who spoke out in favor of a fiscal union coupled with a monetary union, was correct, a compassionate stance towards Greeks and an indication that the beginning of the Eurozone crisis did not instinctively cause Die Zeit to oppose further European integration; no mention was made about a fear of Germans ultimately being financially responsible for Greeks and their mistakes, for example. While Die Zeit was not completely free of statements that indicated bias against Greece, the paper’s tone remained objective and lacked the personal attacks and sensationalism found in Bild in the same period, a strong indication that Die Zeit’s readership would not be sympathetic to such an orientation towards Greece.

The Sun

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The Sun in the first moment had a small sample size of articles relevant to the Greek financial crisis, with only two covering the events, likely because of the peripheral

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nature of Greece at the time from the point of view of a large state in the EU but not in the Eurozone. The lack of coverage most probably stemmed from the corresponding lack of interest the British public had in events that were still so far away, especially given Britain’s non-membership in the Euro. The paper thus covered the events neutrally, even sympathetically to Greece, focusing on the Euro’s role in bringing about the crisis and displaying only fear at the potential for a widespread crisis that would affect the UK directly.68 The Sun entirely avoided the use of stereotypes, any commentary on austerity as a punishment for Greece, a moralizing attitude about the crisis, and it even alleged in a headline, “Euro prompts Greek economic tragedy,” overtly assigning blame for the crisis on the single currency, not the Greek state.69 The Sun showed the beginnings of anti-European sentiments in its knee-jerk blame of the Euro, but it refrained from directly contrasting the Greek and British national publics despite the slightly sensationalized fear of an approaching recession, the marker of an “us versus them” orientation70; while there was a lack of European solidarity, The Sun did not demonize Greeks. The paper’s lack of initial interest in the Greek financial crisis shows the preoccupation of its readership with other issues with the potential to affect them more directly, and The Sun thus remained neutral in its commentary on the events of December 2009.

The *Financial Times* published more exhaustive coverage of the events for a British and wider European audience more interested and educated in the nuances of Eurozone economic developments; ninety-one articles were specifically relevant to the events in Greece, and they displayed interesting bias patterns at the elite level. The *Financial Times* in this period was entirely lacking in articles that juxtaposed the British public against the Greek one or that used sensational language to stir fears in its readership, with no articles registering in these two categories. Only one *Financial Times* article implied that “Spartan austerity” was a deserved or appropriate punishment for Greece’s past sins.\(^71\) However, 22% of its articles employed stereotypes and negative or biased language to characterize Greece, reverting to negativity to report on events with some regularity. Greeks were cast as lacking credibility, dishonest, “irresponsible,” rule-breakers, and “riddled with corruption.”\(^72\) Greeks were described as a people with a “hubris” problem “living beyond its means” in a corrupt state “cooking its books,” with disastrous results for the global financial system.\(^73\) A recurring theme was an emphasis

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on Greece’s dishonesty in its entry into the Eurozone, as many *Financial Times* articles returned to the faulty statistics that allowed Greece’s budgetary problems to go officially undetected for so long, leading to a narrative about Greece’s “credibility deficit,” which drew on similar stereotypes of dishonesty.\(^7^4\) While Greek Prime Minister Papandreou coined the “credibility deficit” language in a speech, the phrase took on a more negative implication in the international press when divorced from Papandreou’s accompanying hope for the future of Greece. Similarly, the allegation of “Greek profligacy” appeared prominently in the *Financial Times* in this period in discussing the roots of the crisis.\(^7^5\)

Closely tied to the profligacy narrative, ten percent of the *Financial Times*’ articles relating to Greece in this period presented a moral narrative of the crisis. Commentary on the “moral hazard,” including some by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, discussed the risk of “rewarding irresponsible behaviour” and pointed to the simplistic causal explanation sometimes favored by the *Financial Times*: Greeks spent too much money and, as a result, caused the financial crisis.\(^7^6\) Discussions on Greece’s need to “slash spending” also often resulted in a moralizing tone and explanation for the crisis.\(^7^7\) While the *Financial Times*’ reliance on stereotypes was higher than one might expect in high level, economics-oriented paper, the types of

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\(^7^4\)*Dubai World,* *Financial Times*, December 14, 2009.
\(^7^5\)*ECB Ratchets up Pressure on Greece,* *Financial Times*, December 9, 2009.
*European Farce Descends into Greek Tragedy,* *Financial Times*, December 13, 2009.
*Credibility is Most Pressing Issue,* *Financial Times*, December 17, 2009.
*Greece Faces Credit Ratings Downgrade,* *Financial Times*, December 9, 2009.
*‘Constructive Ambiguity’ Has Taken Effect,* *Financial Times*, December 16, 2009.
*Greek Downgrade,* *Financial Times*, December 9, 2009.
negative language it used were often intrinsically tied to the moral explanation for the crisis it sometimes employed, resulting in close links between the two categories. The Financial Times’ coverage of the December 2009 period, while not sensational or divisive regarding national publics, relied on underlying negative biases in its frequent characterizations of the Greek national character and its moralizing tone regarding the crisis, resulting in some indication of negativity towards Greece.

*Moment 2: A Herculean Labor*, April 25-May 9, 2010

Just five months after Greece’s initial announcement of the extent of its financial woes, a bailout package from the EU and the IMF was approved for Greece. On May 2, 2010, Eurozone ministers finalized Greece’s first bailout package, totaling €110 billion, a massive sum that caused significant unease in the international media. Both German and British news sources reacted to the unprecedented bailout, and the finance ministers’ agreement was an impressive feat in the face of the worsening situation in Greece and the diverse opinions within each state; for Greece, it began a process of Herculean labors as it attempted to resurface from the pile of debts under which it found itself, paying penance with stringent austerity measures and restructuring within its financial system. The second period covers articles published from April 25, 2010 to May 9, 2010. This period captures the final negotiations surrounding the size of the package and how much member states would contribute, as well as the aftermath of its approval by the Eurozone finance ministers and the beginning of the approval process in individual member states.

The first bailout raised many questions in the British and German media, and it brought to light concerns about the extent of European integration and solidarity, the costs and benefits of the single currency, and fears for the future given the rising concerns about other states’ finances, as well as intense scrutiny on Greece’s public sector system and the causal mechanisms behind the crisis.

Bild

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*Bild* in the second moment had a tenfold increase in the quantity of articles it published about the Greek debt crisis; because the 115 relevant articles surpassed the threshold of 100 articles per two-week period, every other article was read for a total of 58. An astonishing forty percent of the *Bild* articles in this period employed negative stereotypes and language about Greeks. *Bild* adopted “Pleite-Griechen,” or “bankrupt Greeks” as a constantly recurring epithet for Greeks⁷⁹; it is important to note that Greece has not declared bankruptcy. The paper raged against “Bankrotteure und Luxusrenten, Steuerhinterzieher und Abzocker,” “bankruptcies and luxury pensions, tax evaders and

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“Angst um unser Geld!” *Bild*, April 27, 2010, URL 34.
“cheaters” in a state that it alleged needed billions of Euros to stay afloat while its citizens kept partying—“Feierlaune ade!” “Goodbye, party mood!” Bild proclaimed in one article on Greece’s hardships. 80 Another phrase that the paper adopted into common use was “Fass ohne Boden,” or “bottomless pit,” an allegation about the perceived uselessness of helping Greece financially. 81 Bild also often reverted to discussions on Greece’s entry to the Eurozone, alleging that Greece “getrickst, getarnt, getäuscht,” or “tricked, disguised, and deceived” to acquire the single currency. 82 Bild was more vocal in this period about austerity as a punishment mechanism for Greece, and fourteen percent of its articles specifically mentioned austerity in this capacity. Greeks, it asserted, should be punished with “harte Strafen,” or “harsh penalties,” and pay the price for living beyond their means. 83 Twenty-four percent of the articles in this period unfavorably contrasted Greeks with Germans, and one article referred to Greece as the “Problemkind Nummer eins,” or “problem child number one.” 84 A moral explanation of the crisis was offered in 24% percent of Bild’s articles. The financial crisis was bluntly alleged to be their fault, not the fault of speculators who had been causing problems in the Eurozone; Greeks were referred to as “Euro-Sünden,” or “Euro-sinners,” combining direct language about sin and

“Harte Strafen für Schulden-Staaten!” Bild, May 1, 2010, URL 44.
punishment with a moral narrative.\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Bild} also often sensationalized events in order to drum up fear, a tactic it used in 28\% of its articles in this period. Prominently featured was a deep fear that Germans would ultimately have to pay for Greece and never getting their money back.\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Bild} also sensationally predicted a crash and end of the Euro and the EU.\textsuperscript{88} The paper in the late April to early May 2010 period revealed significant anti-Greek bias across all five indicators, and the negativity of its language and rhetoric were noteworthy.

\textbf{Die Zeit}

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\textit{Die Zeit} in the second moment published 113 articles on the Greek debt crisis; thus, 57 were read for the purposes of this analysis. The paper did reveal several of the core indicators of bias, especially the use of stereotypes and moral narratives in addition to some allegations of austerity as a punishment and an “us versus them” mentality, but a reading of the articles presents a more complicated picture of \textit{Die Zeit}’s orientation towards Greece. While many articles did contain bias against Greece, the paper did not hesitate to criticize Germany. The paper criticized Germany’s leadership for its

\textsuperscript{87} “Griechenland-Hilfen sind ‘Sehr Schmerzhaft’” \textit{Bild}, April 29, 2010, URL 49.
\textsuperscript{88} “Müssen wir Zehn Jahre Lang Zahlen?” \textit{Bild}, May 1, 2010, URL 35.
hesitation in bringing about a debt deal, calling its behavior irresponsible for reverting to “atavistische Vorurteile,” or “atavistic prejudices” in the negotiations.\(^\text{89}\) It also strongly fostered a pro-integration position with many calls to European solidarity, reminding its readers of the degree to which Germany profited from the Euro and the many reasons behind the Eurozone crisis.\(^\text{90}\) Most significantly, \textit{Die Zeit} indicated deep frustration with news coverage of the financial crisis by other German papers; it accused \textit{Bild}, the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, and \textit{Die Welt} of stoking anti-Greek resentment.\(^\text{91}\) Still, the German paper employed stereotyping and moralizing in its coverage of the first bailout process. The paper asserted that nobody wants to be responsible for Greece’s “Lügen und Maßlosigkeiten,” or “lies and excesses” and that money should only be given under strict controls and with painful austerity.\(^\text{92}\) Similarly, Greeks were accused of having a “verschwenderischen Lebensstil,” or a “wasteful lifestyle” with unnecessary comforts, and a Greek was quoted describing Greeks before the financial crisis as “feiernde, Teller werfende,” and “ungezügelte,” or “partying, plate-throwing, and untamed.”\(^\text{93}\) Distinctions were drawn between the core and the periphery, and the paper published articles asserting different philosophies as the cause of the divide and that


Greeks should be “schwedischer,” or “more Swedish” in order to weather the crisis.\textsuperscript{94} Despite \textit{Die Zeit}’s predisposition to defend European integration and solidarity, it still often relied on stereotypes biases against Greeks in its news coverage of the first bailout, discussing Greece in the same manner in which it criticized other German news sources.

\textbf{The Sun}

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\textit{The Sun} in the second period published fourteen relevant articles to the Greek financial crisis, an increase from the previous period that indicated more interest on the part of its readership regarding the events in the peripheral Mediterranean state. A significant percentage of its articles in the second moment employed stereotypes or negative language (29\%) or sensationalism to aggravate fear in its readership (43\%). Greeks were described both as “angry” and living “enviably costly lives in the sunshine,” characterizations drawing on negative national stereotypes of Greeks as fiery-tempered but laid-back.\textsuperscript{95} Similarly alluding to perceived Greek laziness, \textit{The Sun} drew attention to Greece’s generous retirement policies for some public sector workers.\textsuperscript{96} As in the

\textsuperscript{95} “Greek Crisis Wipes £36bn Off Shares,” \textit{The Sun}, May 5, 2010, URL 64.
previous period, *The Sun* was hostile to the single currency, and the articles in late April and early May of 2010 included an often-stated distaste for the Euro: “Thank goodness we have still got pound coins rattling round in our pockets and purses—and not Euros,” read one self-congratulatory article discussing the financial problems in the Eurozone.\(^{97}\) While *The Sun*’s financial crisis coverage is illustrative of its perceptions of Greece, many excluded articles pointed to an interesting dynamic between the two states; some articles not including substantial discussion of the Greek financial crisis specifically, which resulted in their exclusion, often pointed to Greece as the worst-case scenario for Britain when the paper criticized the government’s financial policies. While such a characterization of Greece is most certainly negative and unforgiving, it also indicates a degree of perceived association between the two states; instead of painting Greece as an outlier facing a unique fate, its plight was taken as a cautionary tale, revealing the possibility that Greece and Britain are not entirely different from one another in *The Sun*’s perception, a nontraditional form of solidarity without sympathy. Increased interest in Greece and the Eurozone crisis on the part of the paper’s readership led to more of the biased language and sensationalism that made *The Sun* famous as a tabloid, resulting in coverage of the first Greek bailout that was significantly less neutral than its coverage of the beginning of Greece’s public financial woes.

Financial Times

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The second moment saw the *Financial Times* nearly triple its coverage of Greece’s financial crisis, with 268 relevant articles published in the late April to early May 2010 period; since more than 100 relevant articles were published in the period, every other article was read, leaving 134 for analysis. Compared to the previous period, the *Financial Times*’ coverage revealed similar scores on indicators of bias, with fifteen percent of its articles employing stereotypical language and ten percent revealing a moral narrative of the Greek financial crisis; the paper generally lacked an emphasis on austerity as a deserved punishment, a juxtaposition of the paper’s national public against Greece’s, or sensationalism or fear-mongering. A recurring tactic in *Financial Times* articles in this period was the juxtaposition of Greeks against other national publics, especially other debtor states. Portugal was often held up as an example of a “good” debtor state—Portugal is characterized as more credible than Greece, and the “Portuguese did not lie,” differentiating Portugal’s situation from Greece’s.98 A quote by Christine Lagarde, then France’s finance minister and the future Managing Director of the IMF, was reprinted several times, differentiating Greece from Portugal based on Greece’s

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incorrect statistical data. Greeks were also negatively contrasted with Koreans, who handed in their gold to help their country out of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the implication being that Greeks were not making similarly honorable personal sacrifices; Greeks conversely tried to delay the process and should have been made to accept harsh terms in order to show their commitment to “painful” reforms. Greeks who had “become used to relative wealth” were also compared negatively to the “hardily resourceful” Latvians. Stereotypical allusions were again made using the language of sin and punishment to Greek “profligacy,” “malfeasance,” Greece’s lies in entering the Eurozone, allegations of corruption, and a lack of “fiscal discipline.” The concept of a “credibility deficit” continued into this period. Moralizing explanations for the crisis abounded, with some articles condemning the “cultures of entitlement” in a nation of some of “the world’s leading spendthrifts” and others focusing more directly on Greece’s public debt. Finally, distinctions were also drawn between Greece and creditor states; the crisis is framed as a situation solved when “German voters agree to pay [Greeks’]

“America Has Good Reason to Worry About Greece,” Financial Times, May 9, 2010.
pensions” and the “problems of the periphery are reluctantly being absorbed by the core,” indicating underlying tension in the concept of European solidarity.\textsuperscript{106} The Financial Times in the second period maintained the edge of hostility and negativity displayed in the first period, relying on stereotypes and moral narratives of the crisis in its extensive coverage of the Greek financial crisis.

\textit{Moment 3: A Sisyphean Labor}\textsuperscript{107}, February 14-21, 2012

In the early hours of February 21, 2012, the second Greek bailout package was finalized, granting Greece €130 billion from the EU and the IMF in order to avoid imminent bankruptcy. The bailout contained further harsh austerity measures and provisions for significant monitoring of Greece’s finances by its international lenders. The period found Greece further downgraded by international ratings agencies and a worsening situation in the state both politically and economically, with concerns being raised in the international media about the future of its governance and its ability to stave off a default. The approval process for the second bailout did not go smoothly, with significant delays in discussions on the size and extent of the package and the accompanying cuts Greece would face. Greece’s penance and attempts at recovering from its financial woes began to seem less like Herculean labors and more like Sisyphean ones, with a palpable sense of futility in discussions of the crisis as more Greek data became available. News coverage from February 14, 2012 to February 28, 2012 encompasses the uncertainty leading up to the second bailout’s approval, the conflict


between German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and Greek President Karolos Papoulias, and the subsequent beginning of the approval processes in member states’ parliaments.

Recurring themes in the third moment include discussions on the deepening recession in Greece, the possibility of a refocusing from austerity to state building, and perspectives on a Greek default or exit from the Eurozone.

**Bild**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bild Moment 3</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austerity deserved</strong></td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Us vs. Them</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral narrative</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fear</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the third moment, *Bild* published thirty-nine articles on the Greek debt crisis, a dramatic decline from the quantity it produced in the second period, but more than in the first, indicating continued interest on the part of its readership in Greece’s financial woes. While discussions of austerity as a punishment and moral narratives of the crisis were largely absent in February 2012, *Bild* did employ significant stereotyping (33%), “us versus them” juxtapositions (11%), and fear mongering (15%) in its news coverage in the third period. A quote from Franz Fehrenbach, CEO of Bosch, reappeared several times in *Bild*; Fehrenbach commented on Greece’s ailing economy, calling it an “untragbare Belastung,” or “unsustainable burden” on the Eurozone, criticizing “Phantom-Rentner” and “reichen Nichtsteuerzahlern,” or “phantom pensioners” and “wealthy tax evaders,”
and calling for Greece to exit or be pushed out of the Eurozone.\textsuperscript{108} Further stereotyping occurred with the characterization of Greece as a “Fass ohne Boden,” or “bottomless pit,” and the continued use of the epithet “Pleite-Griechen,” or “bankrupt Greeks.”\textsuperscript{109} A conflict with which \textit{Bild} was preoccupied in this period was the use of Nazi imagery in Greece to criticize Germany, especially after Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s controversial remarks about his preferred composition of the Greek government; Schäuble and Chancellor Angela Merkel were depicted with swastikas and wearing Nazi uniforms, which \textit{Bild} regarded as especially offensive given Germany’s financial assistance to Greece.\textsuperscript{110} Fear-mongering tactics were also used in the February 2012 period to rile up anxiety about Greece; the paper predicted the end of the Euro, rampant political radicalism by “Kommunisten, Judenhasser,” and “Halb-Kriminelle,” or “communists, anti-Semites, and half-criminals,” and it even debated the possibility of a military coup in Greece based on the President’s exhortation to Greek politicians to defend the homeland like soldiers.\textsuperscript{111} While one article pointed out the dangers of reviving nationalist thinking in discussions of the financial crisis, \textit{Bild} opposed the

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
second bailout, and its overall negative attitude towards Greece was readily apparent in its coverage of the crisis.\textsuperscript{112}

**Die Zeit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zeit Moment 3</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austerity deserved</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Us vs. Them</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral narrative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the February 2012 period, *Die Zeit* employed relatively few core indicators of bias in the articles it published on the Greek debt crisis, with a reliance on stereotypes (19%), moral narratives (13%), and an “us versus them” mentality (9%) featuring most prominently. The paper published fifty-four articles relevant to Greece in the period, approximately half of the volume it published in its coverage of the first bailout, indicating a possible decline in interest in the details of Greece’s financial concerns on the part of its readership. *Die Zeit*’s stated attitude towards Greece remained the same: the paper was largely sympathetic to Greece, especially with regard to the recession and the social impact of austerity, and it supported the second bailout.\textsuperscript{113} The publication printed a piece by Herbert Schui of Die Linke, Germany’s Left Party, criticizing austerity

\textsuperscript{112} “Schluss mit ‘Weiter So!’” *Bild*, February 26, 2012, URL 80.
as a poor deficit reduction plan that ultimately serves to weaken labor rights.\textsuperscript{114} The paper also continued to favor further European integration and was sympathetic towards Greek anti-Schäuble anger after the Finance Minister put out a statement that gave the impression that he wanted to dictate the composition of Greece’s government.\textsuperscript{115} Die Zeit shifted its focus from austerity to “Staatsaufbau,” or “state building,” for Greece, supporting ideas for a new “Marshall plan” to help the state return to competitiveness and growth.\textsuperscript{116} The paper also heavily criticized German tabloid Bild for its anti-Greek biases and Chancellor Angela Merkel for reinforcing the “Klische des faulen Griechen,” or “the cliché of the lazy Greek.”\textsuperscript{117} Despite the lack of stated bias against Greece, Die Zeit still showed some indicators of negative perceptions: Greeks were again accused of living beyond their means and of being “Prasser and Schummler,” or “spendthrifts and cheaters,” among other stereotypes, despite such views not being in accord with the paper’s stated position.\textsuperscript{118} The paper also printed several articles that drew a distinction between debtor and creditor states, ranging from statements about Greece needing to prove it can stay in the Eurozone to the assertion that the North is being made to pay for

\textsuperscript{117}“Merkel Muss Nach Athen!” \textit{Die Zeit}, February 16, 2012, URL 91.
the South;\textsuperscript{119} one piece argued for a “North-Euro” that would exclude the Southern states facing financial crises.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, \textit{Die Zeit}, despite its stated position as Greek-friendly, still provided space for anti-Greek stereotypes, “us versus them” positions, and moral narratives of the crisis.

### The Sun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sun Moment 3</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austerity deserved</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Us vs. Them</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral narrative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{The Sun} in the third moment published only seven articles discussing the events in Greece, half as many as it featured in the previous period, another indicator of the relatively low level of interest the British public sustained on the topic of Greece at this point in the financial crisis. Perhaps as a result of the lack of interest, the paper covered Greece almost entirely neutrally, with only one article employing negative Greek stereotypes. While Greeks were described as “hapless” in one article, the rest of the articles criticized austerity, commented neutrally on Greece’s most recent downgrade, and blamed the Euro for the problems in Greece.\textsuperscript{121} \textit{The Sun} argued that the “ultra-tough” austerity was to blame for the lack of growth in Greece, with Brussels leading the

\textsuperscript{121} “We’re Not Mean – Blame the Greens,” \textit{The Sun}, February 24, 2012, URL 99.
country “up the Greek.” The bailout was criticized as being to save the Euro, not the people, continuing on the paper’s trend of disapproval of the single currency. The paper’s coverage was bland in comparison to its usually incendiary and lively style, an important sign for the place that Greece held in the mind of the British general public—Greece was not a priority, and by February 2012, its concerns and crises had faded into the background for The Sun and its readership.

Financial Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FT Moment 3</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austerity deserved</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Us vs. Them</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral narrative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Financial Times published 167 relevant articles in the third period, indicating sustained interest on the part of its readership on the topic of Greece; 84 articles were considered for the purposes of this analysis. The paper was almost entirely free of all the indicators of bias in this period with the exception of stereotypes, which were used in 15% of its articles. The quote from the CEO of Bosch, which described Greece as an “unacceptable burden” and was popular in German media, made its appearance in the Financial Times as well. The paper made use of the usual stereotypes, commenting on

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122 “After Weeks of Turmoil, 13 Hours of Talks and a £110BILLION Bailout, Experts Say We’re Still… Up the Greek,” The Sun, February 22, 2012, URL 100.
Greek incompetence and “largesse without commensurate taxation.”125 One exceptionally harsh letter to the editor criticized an image of a poverty-stricken Greek couple because, the writer alleged, their apartment appeared to have a view of the Acropolis, so they could easily economize by moving—“Problem solved!” declared the article, mocking their plight.126 The paper picked up on some of the shift towards discussions of how to improve the situation in Greece other than austerity (including the “Marshall plan” idea) and criticized the debt-reduction agreements for increasing Greece’s financial woes127; previous austerity measures have left “no more room to cut public spending,” argued one piece.128 The Financial Times was unafraid to criticize Germany in this period, including negative commentary on Bild’s coverage of the crisis and Germany’s apparent indifference to the pain of austerity.129 The paper in this period remained somewhat hostile to Greeks personally, but its commentary on the appeared to have taken a bigger-picture perspective on the crisis overall.

VII. Public Opinion: Polling Data

Polling data provides an opportunity to examine the professed views of EU member states’ national publics and assess the level of agreement with the media analysis offered above. German and British polling results offer another insight into mass opinions within the states and answer the question of whether the biases detected in my media analysis are observed when citizens are directly asked about their opinions. The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project conducts international public opinion research on a variety of issues, including Europeans’ opinions on the EU. The Eurobarometer, an effort of the European Commission, addresses issues relevant to European citizens specifically. Both Pew and Eurobarometer survey results are indispensable resources for observing the orientations of European citizens in response to the crisis and over time. The results from their studies further support the data found in my media analysis when examined from the perspective of the core indicators of bias.

Stereotypes and Negative Opinions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In What European Country Are People the Least Hardworking?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Italy/Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Don’t know” responses were excluded.

Evidence of stereotypes can be found in the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s poll on perceptions of which countries, according to other Europeans, are the least hardworking. When asked which European nation has the least hardworking people, both the British
and the German respondents named Greece as the laziest nation, as did the French and Spanish respondents. A common stereotype that arose in the British and German news sources was Greek laziness or irresponsibility as a factor in the financial crisis, and these poll results provide more evidence for the existence of the stereotype. Interestingly, Greeks accused Germans of laziness in the 2012 poll; this allegation likely stems from the anger directed at Germany’s handling of the Greek debt crisis, since Germans are more commonly characterized as ruthlessly hardworking than lazy. Other than Greece, debtor states Italy and Spain were also mentioned in the top three laziest states by many of the polled national publics, indicating that the Southern European debtor states as a whole are subject to negative opinions and allegations of laziness. British and German news sources’ views on Greeks’ alleged laziness match the views professed by British and German national publics, who appear to believe the stereotypical and negative language used to characterize Greeks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In What European Country Are People the Most Corrupt?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Don’t know” responses were excluded.

The Pew poll on which European countries are the most corrupt further reflects the stereotypes commonly held about Greeks. Greece was mentioned in the top three most corrupt by respondents from Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain—interestingly, of those, only Greeks ranked themselves as the most corrupt, with Italy more often claiming the top spot. Greeks appear to have internalized, either from
personal experience or from other sources, their own reputation for corruption, an attitude similarly reflected in the poll on the level of hard work, where Greeks ranked themselves the second laziest. The results from other respondents indicate that familiarity may breed contempt when it comes to allegations of corruption, with German, British, Italian, and Spanish respondents criticizing their own states as well. Despite the self-criticism, the polling data indicates that the views espoused in German and British news sources about Greek corruption are representative of their citizens’ professed views.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion of Greece</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Spring 2012</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 2010</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spring 2012</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 2010</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2010-12.
Note: “Very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” have been combined into “favorable”; “somewhat unfavorable” “very unfavorable” have been combined into “unfavorable.”

British and German citizens’ opinions of Greece in a Spring 2010 and Spring 2012 Pew poll indicate a similar negative opinion of Greece in both countries, this time more generally. In Britain, while a majority of polled citizens had a favorable view of Greece in 2010 towards the beginning of the crisis, the percentage reporting some degree of unfavorable views more than doubled by the same time two years later. Germans began the crisis with slightly more than half holding an unfavorable opinion of Greece, but they indicated a relatively even distribution between favorable and unfavorable views; two years later, nearly three quarters of Germans reported unfavorable views of Greece—an overwhelming majority of the German public. The general negativity directed towards Greece and observed in this poll reinforces the negative language used in the British and German news sources’ coverage of the financial crisis in Greece.
Integration, Separation, and Fear

A persistent fear that arose in readings of the German news sources was in response to the threat of having to pay for the debtor states. A Spring 2012 Pew poll indicates that both British and German citizens overwhelmingly agreed that the economic problems of the states involved in crises posed some degree of a threat to their own economic well-being, a perception reflected in the fear-mongering language employed in the tabloids analyzed. While such a view might be entirely logical in 2012, after the bailouts to debtor states, it appears less rational in 2001 and 2006, when both British and German respondents in large numbers feared that wealthier states would have to pay for less wealthy states as a result of EU integration—in 2006, over 70% of both states’ citizens felt the threat of payments to come. Such fears indicate that, while the financial crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fear of Payment</th>
<th>Survey</th>
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<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>April 2001</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Responses for “Major Threat” and “Minor Threat” have been combined for “Yes.”

may have aggravated and deepened their reluctance to integrate, it is possible that resentments and prejudices were always lingering just below the surface of the EU.

Note: “Don’t know” responses have been excluded.

With the exception of *Die Zeit*, the German elite-level news source, the papers analyzed indicated a significant backlash against the idea of European integration over the course of the financial crisis; polling data provides evidence that national publics in Britain and Germany similarly resisted the notion of further integration. A 2012 Pew poll asking whether respondents favored or opposed granting the EU further budgetary authority over its member states revealed resistance from both British and German citizens, with over half of the respondents in each state opposing more power for the EU on budgetary matters. However, Germans were more ambivalent than their British counterparts, revealing a much more even spread between those in favor and those opposed. This ambivalence is reflected in the elite-level German newspaper’s orientation, which was much less opposed to the concept of further integration than *Bild* was.
A critical component of evaluating integration is not only EU citizens’ desire for further integration, but also the extent to which they personally feel they have already been integrated. A 2012 Pew poll provides evidence that the majority of British and German citizens have not made the switch from national to supranational loyalties when it comes to selecting an identity; the majority continues to define itself first as a citizen of its own country, not as a European, and hardly any identify as both equally. This orientation is stronger in Britain than in Germany, a result in accord with Britain’s generally more hostile attitude towards integration when compared to Germany’s. The emphasis in The Sun on relief at not being members of the Euro matches the lack of European affinity indicated in this study. The 2009 and 2011 Eurobarometer reports on the UK and the EU provide further evidence for the British public’s opposition to integration: the reports found that the more highly educated and urban citizens were, the more likely they were to view the EU positively, a result which reproduces the gap found
between the British mass and elite exemplified by the different attitudes held by the

*Financial Times* and *The Sun*.\(^{130}\)

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![Bar chart: Do You Think Having the Euro as Our Currency Has Been a Good Thing, a Bad Thing, or Neither Good nor Bad for Germany?](chart1.png)

Note: “Don’t know” responses have been excluded.

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![Bar chart: Do You Think Not Having the Euro as Our Currency Has Been a Good Thing, a Bad Thing, or Neither Good nor Bad for Britain?](chart2.png)

Note: “Don’t know” responses have been excluded.

Another aspect of evaluating integration is whether citizens that have been subject to European integration desire a retreat from it; given the prevalence of discussions on the

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\(^{130}\) Eurobarometer, “Flash Eurobarometer: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom,” July 2009, URL 102.
Eurobarometer, “Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom,” March 2011, URL 103.
Euro in light of the financial crisis, the extent to which citizens approve or disapprove of the Euro can be seen as a proxy for their views on existing levels of integration. When German citizens were asked about the Euro’s effect on Germany, responses were split relatively evenly between believing it had a negative effect or a positive effect, with over 20% of respondents selecting “neither.” The relationship between Germans and integration is encapsulated in this poll; there is a divide between the masses and the elites, as well as significant middle ground in the German political sphere on the topic of what to do in response to the crisis. The British version, which asked about the effect of not having the Euro, yielded very different results: British respondents overwhelmingly agreed that not having the Euro was a good thing for Britain, indicating the greater degree of Euroskepticism in the state. These views and the cleavages among states and different levels of society were reflected in the media analysis as well.
VIII. Discussion

The analysis of British and German media sources yielded results that confirmed my hypotheses. Both British and German news sources revealed evidence of bias against Greece according to the five indicators I selected for evaluation, but there were differences across critical cleavages. The views expressed by the British and German tabloids and elite sources were in accord with the results from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project and the Eurobarometer. British and German elites had different orientations towards European integration as a whole, and nationality was one important cleavage revealed through my media analysis. Germans were more supportive of European solidarity compared to their British counterparts, who largely looked upon the situation as outsiders. The British and German general publics had more in common in terms of negative views against Greece, but there were differences in what conditioned their negative responses, with their relationship to the Euro playing an important role. There was a significant cleavage between elites and masses in general observed in the news sources that reflected the literature on European integration and holds implications for the future integration as a whole.

British Elite vs. German Elite Opinion

British elites and German elites revealed crucial differences between one another, and the differences are the first important cleavage illuminated by this study. While both the Financial Times and Die Zeit consistently indicated some degree of bias against Greece, especially in the categories of stereotypes and moral narratives, the attitudes revealed towards Greece differentiated the two elite groups. Die Zeit made efforts to
stem criticism of Greece, condemning other German news sources for their biased
coverage and investigating the social impact of austerity, while the Financial Times
generally remained focused on the economic facts. This difference reflects historical
attitudes of British and German elites. German elites have a historical legacy of
supporting integration; German leaders were instrumental in the formation of
incarnations of supranational institutions that eventually became the EU, and they have a
record of driving integration in the postwar period. This pro-Europe orientation is
clearly visible in Die Zeit’s insistence on remaining positive about integration and its
attempts at solidarity when discussing Greece. While the paper still reveals some anti-
Greek bias, it takes European integration as a good in and of itself. This may in part be
because of the paper’s belief that Germany has reaped benefits from integration;
however, the bailouts to Greece had an undeniable cost to the German state, and Die
Zeit’s continued support for integration and helping Greece indicate that something more
was at stake in discussions of the financial crisis than the bottom line. Conversely, the
British elite appeared to look at the financial system first; the Financial Times is an
economics-oriented publication that does not appear to be inherently pro-integration or
view integration as intrinsically good. The paper overall favored the use of stereotypical
or negative language and made use of morality tales, and it did not display the
endorsement of integration seen in Die Zeit, although it was not hostile to the concept in
the ways seen in the publications intended for non-elite consumption. The Financial
Times appears to have internalized the prevalent Euroskepticism in Britain, while Die

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131 Simon Bulmer and William E. Patterson, “Germany and the European Union: From
‘Tamed Power’ to Normalized Power?” International Affairs 85, no. 5 (2010): 1051,
1061, URL 8.
Zeit seems to respond to and embody the historical legacy of postwar German elites. History matters in the different orientations of British and German elites on the topic of European integration, orientations that condition their perceptions of Greece.

**British Mass vs. German Mass Opinion**

While the British and German popular sources indicated more agreement on Greece in that their views were remarkably negative, the national public of each state appeared to have different reasons for the anti-Greek bias revealed in the media analysis and poll results. While *The Sun* did engage in negative commentary on Greece, the small volume of articles published on Greece during the first and third moments selected for analysis indicates the overall lack of interest the British public had in Greece when compared to their German counterparts, for whom Greece appeared to be a main topic of discussion. The lack of interest likely stems from the different relationships the states have with one another, a difference that can be attributed to Germany’s status as a member of the Eurozone, while the UK retained the Pound. The sense of fear displayed in *Bild* across all three periods appears to be a response to the possibility of having a financial obligation to Greece; the British public, further removed as non-members of the Eurozone, perceived their financial relationship to Greece differently (and perhaps erroneously—the British contribution to the IMF also funded the Greek bailouts in part). The British Parliament did not have to vote to authorize the bailout, however, adding a degree of separation between the British public and the financial assistance to Greece through the IMF. Another difference appears to be the relationship between *Bild* and the German government and *The Sun* and the British government; *The Sun* appeared to be
more concerned with criticizing its own government, while *Bild* supported Chancellor Merkel and her conservative government. *Bild* did not celebrate the losses Merkel’s coalition faced in the 2010 North Rhine/Westphalia elections, captured in the second moment of analysis; she was criticized strongly for her support of the bailout, but *Bild* did not support alternative candidates. Overall, the Euro issue appears to have conditioned the different responses to the crisis at the mass level. *The Sun* often indicated relief at not being members of the Eurozone; conversely, German resentment and fear appeared to stem in part from the fear of the effect on their own currency. The British separation from the continent, both in terms of its currency and its lack identification with Europe, seen in both *The Sun*’s reporting and the polling results, contrasts with the German conception of ownership of the Euro. More common than calls to return to the D-Mark in *Bild* were requests for Greece to leave. Thus, while both *Bild* and *The Sun* indicated anti-Greek bias, the reasoning behind their similar responses appears to differ significantly.

*Elite vs. Mass Opinion*

The elite versus mass cleavage with regard to EU integration appears to be important in perceptions of Greece. As a whole, *Bild* and *The Sun* were much more wary of integration and critical of Greece than their elite-level counterparts, *Die Zeit* and the *Financial Times*. The popular opposition to EU integration is demonstrated most prominently by the fear mongering and sensationalism of the two tabloids; while this can be attributed in part to their journalistic style, the fears underlying the sensationalism are real and palpable in the general public. Their concerns are reflected in the public opinion
polls on EU integration issues, indicating that the anxiety felt in Bild and The Sun is more than just a technique for selling papers. EU elites appear to have been integrated to some degree in that they are comfortable with the idea of it, even if, as seen in the Financial Times’ positions, they do not always agree with it. My analysis reveals the tension between elites and the masses in the EU, providing evidence that they have not been integrated to the same extent.

**Moving Forward: Implications for Europe and Further Research**

This study raises concerns about the future of the EU—how cohesive can it hope to be in the future if national stereotypes and deep tensions continue to exist to this day? While there is a clear desire on the part of German elites to integrate further, it appears from my analysis of the British and German national publics that the people do not want the integration their leaders covet, and there exists significant variance in the perceived level of integration between elites and the masses. While the democratic deficit in the EU weakens the ability of national publics to express their reluctance to integrate, they continue to speak out through their characterization of the crisis and through their parliaments. If Europe is to have any hope of the less contentious integration envisioned by elites, the masses must be incorporated into the European project with their consent. Leaders must acknowledge the resistance to further integration and address the public’s concerns; the media analysis and polling data indicate that, if not, the hurdles along the path to Europe will only get higher as the masses turn against the European project.

My work has provided further evidence for the palpable tensions in the EU, and possibilities to expand on it abound. Future work should examine not just coverage of
the financial crisis, but the ways in which Greeks are characterized in general in the creditor states’ news sources. Additionally, a larger study could include more creditor states, such as Finland and the Netherlands, and more debtor states, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, to gather more evidence on the debtor vs. creditor and North vs. South dimension of the rhetoric. Additionally, an in-depth study of the Greek perspective is lacking in my analysis, and it would undoubtedly help tell a richer story of Greece’s interactions with other EU states. The causal mechanisms in my analysis remain unclear—I cannot be certain of the extent to which public opinion drives media coverage or the media shapes public opinion, although my analysis indicates that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. I hope the rhetoric of the crisis is explored further, whether from the perspective of creditors or debtors, and that our understanding of these relationships can be expanded in the future.
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Note: PDF files of all analyzed articles are available upon request. *Financial Times* articles were accessed through a database and URLs are thus not included.

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