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Abstract
This paper explores the motivations for Russian voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council from 1995-2012. Specifically, why does Russia vote with the West in many situations, but not in others? What motivated Russia to veto three Western-backed resolutions in the ongoing Syrian conflict? These are not arbitrary votes—Russia invests considerable energy in both explaining and justifying its voting decisions in the Security Council. Thus, even if one believes that Security Council resolutions do not significantly affect state behavior (a claim that international relations research increasingly disputes), such voting decisions still matter because Russia deems them important.

I contend that Russia's concern for 1) international stability and 2) state sovereignty norms drives Russia's voting patterns in the Security Council. The evidence for the subsequent analysis comes from 1095 Security Council resolutions and vetoed draft resolutions as well as their accompanying United Nations press releases. Both the statistical analysis and the qualitative case analyses found that a consistently conservative interpretation of Security Council jurisdiction and the promotion of state sovereignty norms influenced Russian voting. I also find that Russia views the entirety of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) making up the former Soviet Union as part of Russia's sovereign sphere. I test these hypotheses against hypotheses predicting an expansion-motivated Russia and a status-seeking Russia, but neither alternative viewpoint receives the same empirical support that a defensive Russia receives. Finally, the findings in this paper have a number of implications. First, the paper finds that Russia has internalized a strict legalist approach to Security Council affairs. Therefore, the Western diplomatic approach for compromise should not focus on Russian interests, but should rather engage Russia through the compatibility of legal principles. Second, the paper emphasizes the lack of normative consensus and highlights the importance of further codification of legitimate international legal behavior.

Keywords
Security Council, United Nations, Russian, International Security, Foreign Policy, Voting, Social Sciences, Political Science, Weisiger, Alex, Alex Weisiger

Disciplines
Political Science

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IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY: AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (1995-2012)

By: Brian Mund

Dr. Alex Weisiger, Advisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Distinction

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April 1, 2013
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Having now completed my undergraduate honors thesis, I can now understand why the acknowledgements section comes first. Thesis writing is a grueling process, and I’m convinced that no undergrad truly knows what they’re getting themselves into. In this way, a thesis is not too different from the draft. Fortunately, the Political Science faculty provides its undergraduates with incredible support and the resources to succeed.

First, Dr. Jessica Stanton patiently explained the details and implications of international relations theory during my freshman year; taking the time to provide thoughtful responses to a constant supply of questions spanning the breadth of the international relations sub-field. Dr. Stanton also served as my preliminary research advisor, encouraging me to identify interesting puzzles that I could explore more deeply. However, I faced a challenge: my primary research interests were largely theoretical, and thus challenging to test empirically. Ever since the beginning of my introduction to the International Relations subfield, I wanted to ‘measure’ legitimacy and ‘analyze’ sovereignty norms. Unfortunately, both abstract ideas do not lend well to empirical testing. Here, Dr. Stanton played a critical role in helping me identify avenues for exploring these abstract concepts on a tangible level, including the idea of focusing on the UN Security Council. Finally, I owe Dr. Stanton a big thank you for connecting me with Dr. Alex Weisiger, who agreed to advise me, at the time a cheeky sophomore, on my thesis project.

I owe Dr. Weisiger an ineffable degree of gratitude for his guidance and forbearance with his constructivist-leaning advisee. First, Dr. Weisiger agreed to allow me to join his seminar on International Relations Theory, a survey course examining the International Relations subfield of Political Science. Not only was the opportunity to listen in on high-level academic discourse an invaluable experience, the breadth of scholarship provided me a strong theoretical foundation, much of which I have been able to incorporate in this essay. Second, Dr. Weisiger agreed to work with me despite the fact he was on academic leave for past semester and has been deeply enmeshed with his own academic projects. Third and most critically, Dr. Weisiger has truly performed his mentorship responsibility with distinction, consistently going above and beyond in directing my research project. Dr. Weisiger has been a voice of sound reason, providing a consistent flow of constructive criticism, constantly helping me strengthen my arguments and narrow my focus. Moreover, Dr. Weisiger has provided more than just abstract feedback—over the course of the past year, he has carefully reviewed over 100 pages of draft manuscript. Never was Dr. Weisiger too busy to meet with me, and encouraged me to explore statistical testing even though he knew it would require even more direct mentorship. Without Dr. Weisiger’s help, this thesis would not have come to be—I would still be muddling around somewhere in the literature review. While this paragraph cannot hope to sum up a year of mentorship, I would be remiss if I had not at least made an attempt.

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I owe two major thank-yous to two more of my peers. First, Julie Berez took the time to teach me how to navigate the STATA program, which I used to run the statistical tests. Second, Shiri Bogomolny helped me format my bibliography into a presentable form for which I will be eternally grateful. Lastly, for everyone else who gave me support, sympathy, and tough love during this writing process—thank you.
ABSTRACT

This paper explores the motivations for Russian voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council from 1995-2012. Specifically, why does Russia vote with the West in many situations, but not in others? What motivated Russia to veto three Western-backed resolutions in the ongoing Syrian conflict? These are not arbitrary votes—Russia invests considerable energy in both explaining and justifying its voting decisions in the Security Council. Thus, even if one believes that Security Council resolutions do not significantly affect state behavior (a claim that international relations research increasingly disputes), such voting decisions still matter because Russia deems them important.

I contend that Russia’s concern for 1) international stability and 2) state sovereignty norms drives Russia’s voting patterns in the Security Council. The evidence for the subsequent analysis comes from 1095 Security Council resolutions and vetoed draft resolutions as well as their accompanying United Nations press releases. Both the statistical analysis and the qualitative case analyses found that a consistently conservative interpretation of Security Council jurisdiction and the promotion of state sovereignty norms influenced Russian voting. I also find that Russia views the entirety of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) making up the former Soviet Union as part of Russia’s sovereign sphere. I test these hypotheses against hypotheses predicting an expansion-motivated Russia and a status-seeking Russia, but neither alternative viewpoint receives the same empirical support that a defensive Russia receives. Finally, the findings in this paper have a number of implications. First, the paper finds that Russia has internalized a strict legalist approach to Security Council affairs. Therefore, the Western diplomatic approach for compromise should not focus on Russian interests, but should rather engage Russia through the compatibility of legal principles. Second, the paper emphasizes the lack of normative consensus and highlights the importance of further codification of legitimate international legal behavior.

INTRODUCTION

By October 4, 2011, brutal violence in Syria had already taken the lives of an estimated 3,000 civilians.¹ Despite the high toll in human life, the international community had not taken any meaningful action through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the international organization assigned to maintain international peace and security.² Finally, an October 4th vote intended to authorize sanctions against Bashar al-Assad in response to his attacks against his own populace, was vetoed by two members of the Security Council: Russia and China. By January 2013, the estimated death toll has risen to 60,000 people, many of whom were civilians.³ By January 2013, the UN has still not authorized any action other

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than a non-violent observer mission aimed to monitor a temporary ceasefire, and Russia and China had vetoed two more Security Council resolutions authorizing more forceful measures against the Syrian regime.

Contrast this behavior to another Security Council vote taken six months prior. On February 28, 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted sanctions against Libya after the deaths of about 233 civilians. In Libya, Security Council action led to a military intervention. In Syria, Russia and China have given no inclination of changing their position to allow any Security Council intervention. These two high-profile cases reflect a broader puzzle posed by this seemingly inconsistent voting: what motivates this voting behavior in the Security Council? Russian behavior in these cases is particularly puzzling: as a major power on the world stage with a stated interest in promoting humanitarian rights, how can Russia justify its steadfast opposition to the protection of basic human rights abroad? This puzzle fit into a wider research question exploring: what motivated Russian voting behavior in the Security Council between 1995-2012?

The analysis of Russian voting motivations in the Security Council is not an isolated thought exercise, but rather has very important implications. First, scholars have increasingly found that Security Council activity affects state behavior. As Erik Voeten explains, Russia (and China’s) refusal to sanction military activity threatened the legitimacy of the Second

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4 UNSC Security Council Resolution 2059
5 UNSC draft resolutions S/2012/77 and S/2012/538.
7 Jones, Bruce D. “Libya and the Responsibilities of Power.” Survival 53.3 (2011)
8 See, for example, the UN Press Release for UNSC resolution 1672, where Russia states that “There was no doubt that violations of international norms, including international humanitarian law, should not go unpunished.”
9 Originally, I had suspected that I would have to narrow down the question to specifically focus on resolutions related to threats to international peace and security and use of force. However, since the authorization of the use of force is the one of the primary responsibilities of the UNSC, such a distinction proved unnecessary.
Iraq War and significantly increased costs to continuing with the operation. Thus, because the Security Council has the power to greatly influence state cost-benefit calculations, the UNSC also matters to policymakers. Moreover, the Security Council deals with matters very important to state leadership: questions of international stability and interstate aggression. As such, the failure to reach a compromise on Security Council resolutions results in major foreign policy repercussions. For example, some argue that the ongoing failure to find common ground on the conflict in Syria has led to an overall strained relationship between the United States and Russia, which has resulted in provocative legislation on issues ranging from bilateral trade to child adoption. Therefore, the salience of the voting content also makes the understanding of Security Council voting behavior an important endeavor.

However, even if the Security Council votes were not important by themselves, the fact that Russia cares about its voting behavior makes it important. Russia makes the effort to seriously engage in Security Council deliberations, and takes care to justify its voting decisions. Moreover, the weight that Russia places on abstentions that do not tangibly affect a resolution’s outcome, as well as the length to which other states will go to court Russian support both speak to the importance that states place on Security Council voting.


11 The Security Council specifically focuses on situations of threats to international peace and stability, which also draw the greatest amount of attention from political science scholarship (and the international media).


13 The voting deliberations that occur on record are published in UN Press releases accompanying Security Council resolutions, and are used extensively as empirical evidence within this paper’s research.

14 See for example, the strong emphasis placed on consensus in the UN Press Releases of Security Council resolutions 1086, 1284, and 2023.
Moreover, there is an ongoing debate amongst scholars and policymakers alike over whether the United States should expect a cooperative or combative Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15} Much of this debate stems from opaque Russian decision-making that generates numerous alleged motivations behind Russia’s foreign policy behavior. Therefore, an analysis of Russia’s Security Council voting behavior also offers an informed perspective into the greater decision-making mindset for Russia’s foreign policy leadership. Thus, the systematic study of motivations behind Russian voting provides valuable insights not just by enabling a greater understanding of an important area of international politics, but also provides a valuable medium for understanding the motivations and psyche of Russia’s greater foreign policy.

I take a multi-pronged approach in assessing the motivations behind Russian voting in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{16} First, I identify three distinct theoretical perspectives from which to approach Russian voting behavior: 1) a defensive Russia 2) an expansionist Russia 3) Russia as a status seeker. Next, I develop my general theory, which falls under the ‘defensive realist’ theoretical perspective. I argue that Russian voting behavior may be primarily explained as an attempt to maintain international stability and preserve state sovereignty. I also develop the rival theories of an offensive realist Russia and a prestige-seeking Russia. I generate ten testable hypotheses that fall under these three theoretical categories. Each hypothesis postulates motivations for Russian voting behavior.

Next, I analyze the range of 1095 Security Council resolutions from 1995-2012 from a quantitative standpoint, focusing on draft resolutions that produced negative votes, i.e.

\textsuperscript{15} The disagreement between Janusz Bugajski and Andrei Tsygankov over Russian foreign policy intentions epitomizes the scholarly divide, and the debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney over the U.S. foreign policy stance towards Russia during the 2012 elections highlighted the similar lack of consensus among politicians and policymakers. See Romney, Mitt. “Bowing to the Kremlin: Why Obama’s "hot mic" diplomacy is endangering America.” \textit{Foreign Policy}, 27 March 2012; Anishchuk, Alexei. “UPDATE 1-Medvedev says Romney’s anti-Russia comment smacks of Hollywood.” \textit{Reuters}, 27 March 2012.

\textsuperscript{16} I owe a special thank you to Dr. Deirdre Martinez for helping me design this research approach.
where there were vetoes and abstentions. The gathered empirical Security Council data was then subjected to holistic statistical analyses. Thereafter, I analyzed the relative merit of each hypothesis in light of the statistical results. Finally, I employed specific case studies for a number of those resolutions, for which the UN press statements and Russian voting justifications provided an additional layer of insight.

Taken holistically, the empirical data most strongly supports the thesis that Russia’s voting in the Security Council is motivated by its desire to retain a favorable status quo: rather than seeking conflict with the United States or searching for greater prestige abroad, Russia is fundamentally motivated by the desire to protect what it already has. Russia sees both the maintenance of a stable international environment and the protection of state sovereignty norms as in its interest, and has internalized both principles to construct a strict interpretation of the Security Council’s legal jurisdiction. These findings were robustly supported by both the qualitative and quantitative analyses. Moreover, the data also demonstrated a secondary finding that Russia considers the CIS states to fall under its sovereign sphere of influence, and votes accordingly. In contrast, the data did not provide strong support for either the notion of an expansionist Russia nor for a prestige-motivated Russia. Finally, I conclude with a recapitulation of the major findings and an exploration of some of the practical implications of these research outcomes.

**Literature Review**

Russia’s behavior in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union poses an intriguing puzzle, and it is of little surprise that many scholars have attempted to explain Russian behavior. However, I have yet to find a systematic study of Russian voting behavior in the Security Council and hope to fill that gap in the literature. Thus far, I have only seen Security Council voting mentioned as secondary comments while engaged with
more general questions of foreign policy. For example, both Tsyagankov and Monaghan identify the importance of the supremacy of the Security Council for maintaining norms against the use of force and retaining Russian leadership, but neither are directly engaged with Russian UNSC voting behavior. Moreover, many authors mention the importance of the Security Council to Russian foreign policy, but do not attempt to systematically explain Russian voting behavior within the Security Council. Therefore, because Russian behavior in the Security Council is also part of Russia’s general foreign policy approach, the essay reviews the extant work on Russian foreign policy.

Overall, scholars tend to agree on the general periodization of Russian foreign policy. In a nutshell, Russia’s behavior towards the international community and the West in particular has varied from extremely cooperative, as exemplified at the very outset of the beginning of modern Russia, (1991-1994) all the way across the scale to the more confrontational approach seen post-2008. While scholars disagree on the causal factors and the explanatory reasons for this phenomenon, there is a general consensus that, if one looks at Russia’s foreign policy in 1991 and 2008, in the latter period one finds a much more hostile and confrontational Russian leadership. While scholars and pundits make many arguments, both implicit and explicit, to explain Russian foreign policy, one does find

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patterns in these foreign policy explanations. While it is tempting to classify these arguments under the 4 primary schools of political science thought concerning state motivations and behavior (realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics), most arguments contain elements of multiple schools’ ideologies. Instead, I try to group these arguments around shared common elements.

**Balance of Power**

The first group of explanations claims that Russia’s behavior in the international arena is based off of geostrategic power-balancing calculations. Many of these explanations start with the structural assumption that the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in a unipolar environment with United States hegemony.\(^{20}\) Due to this power imbalance, Russia fears U.S.-led unilateralism and therefore actively works to balance against the United States, pushing for greater multipolarity.\(^{21}\) This balance of power argument emerges most directly from the neo-realist framework, first fully articulated in Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, *Theory of International Politics*.\(^{22}\) Such a geostrategic balancing approach expects to see Russia oppose state action primarily when they feel that such an action threatens Russian security or challenges Russian relative power.\(^{23}\) Craig Nation identifies such a balancing tactic in Russia’s alliance with China. Nation describes the Chinese-Russian relationship as “mutually beneficial, yet plagued with mistrust.”\(^{24}\) Therefore, while Russian foreign policy engages China as a current ally to offset American power, Russia similarly has an interest in

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20 See, for example, Monteiro, Nuno. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” International Security, 36.3(Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40; on how the international system became unipolar.


23 Other scholars such as Duncan Snidal who see relative power as less critical to state security concerns would instead expect to see states balancing based off of absolute power gains calculations. See Snidal, Duncan. “Relative Gains and The Pattern of International Cooperation.” *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* ed. David Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 170-209.

preventing China’s rise to power. As realists would predict, Russia has become increasingly fearful of becoming a junior partner in that relationship, and would sever their alliance if they concluded that such an alignment is not in their best interest.\footnote{For specific readings on the developing Chinese-Russian relationship, Ferguson, Chaka. “The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership.’” Journal of Strategic Studies 35.2 (2012): 197-222; Rozman (2010); Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Goh, Evelyn. “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies.” International Security, 32.3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 113–157.} In short, such an approach expects Russia to behave in a way to offset its most severe threats to the greatest extent possible.

**SPHERES OF INFLUENCE**

It is therefore unsurprising to see that this balance of power explanation bleeds into explanations focusing on Russia’s ‘spheres of influence.’ The spheres of influence explanations of foreign policy make the important distinction that country’s interests are not universal across the spectrum. Neil McFarlane succinctly explains this ‘spheres of influence’ approach: “Russia’s relations with the hegemonic power are complex, and appear to be based on a realistic understanding of the preponderance of American power and also the hierarchy of American policy interests.” According to McFarlane, Russian policy behavior can be understood under three spheres of influence, which in turn reflect varying levels of threat. The first sphere of influence is the Russian heartland, which Russia considers its ‘domestic security interests’ and which Russia considers non-negotiable. The third sphere of influence is those matters of vital interest to the United States, which Russia will concede without a fight. It is this second sphere, McFarlane argues, where neither the United States nor Russia has vital interests, that Russia competes for influence.\footnote{McFarlane (2006).} For example, McFarlane...
identifies Iran (prior to Iran’s dash to nuclear weapons) as one of the player in this ‘second sphere.’

Similarly, Christopher Layne does not expect Russia to expect any success in a direct challenge to United States structural hegemony. As such, Layne instead argues that one expects to see ‘leash-slipping’, as Russia tries to carve out an independent foreign policy within the greater hegemonic context. Andrew Hurrell builds on this idea of an independent sphere and postulates, “the need to maintain regional power and to prevent its further erosion has been a central feature of Russian foreign policy.” In Hurrell’s view, Russia’s greatest challenge is the maintenance of its projection of power, and its foreign policy is premised on the fact that foreign policy decisions must promote an expansion of Russian’s influence, particularly within its own regional sphere. Larson and Shevchenko point to Russia’s manipulation of oil and gas supply to in its region as a way to “exert influence over the post-Soviet space.”

CULTURAL CLASH

A third group of explanations for Russia’s non-cooperative foreign policy, particularly towards the West, is grounded in cultural explanations. One of the most commonly cited articles on cultural differences leading to international conflict is Samuel Huntington’s article on the ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington argues that the political predominance of Western liberal states has not translated into the internalization of Western cultural norms and values, and these normative dissonances will lead to conflict along the lines of cultural divide. Huntington explicitly identifies Russia as a state where this internal

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cultural clash continues to have a major impact on Russian foreign policy behavior. The question, as Huntington states, is how Russia constitutes itself in the “historical debate over Westernization versus Russification.” In Huntington’s words, the debate is between behaving like a liberal democracy (West) or similar to a traditional, authoritarian, nationalist state (Russia). Huntington’s article was written in 1992. However, if it were extrapolated to explain Russia’s behavior in the past few years, Huntington would argue that an increasingly ‘Russian’ cultural viewpoint has led to conflictual foreign policy vis-à-vis the West.

While Huntington’s theory predicts certain structural ramifications in international relations, the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory does not directly account for foreign policy behavior itself. Larson and Shevchenko help provide the link from foreign policy behavior to international conflict by identifying the threats that “outsiders…with differing values and interests” pose to cooperation with the liberal Western community. Specifically, different foundational assumptions about state behavior and the international structure could certainly lead to misunderstandings and cooperation problems. Moreover, a sense of difference also often breeds distrust, as demonstrated by a number of psychological studies examining ingroup dynamics. Gilbert Rozman highlights this point by examining the ways in which the United States and Russia stand to gain from bilateral agreements are however not reached due to “reflexive Russian demonization of the United States.” The only reason that cooperation did succeed in the early 1990s, Mary Sarote argues, was because of Gorbachev’s

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32 Huntington (1992), pg. 43
33 Huntington (1992) pg. 44.
34 See also Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.p. 354 for a more in-depth examination on the ways that cultural differences may lead to conflict.
35 Larson and Shevchenko (2010), p. 64.
37 Rozman (2010).
decision to make cooperative agreements that that ‘horrified’ other Russian leaders.\textsuperscript{38} The chief implication in this literature for the purposes of this essay concerns the culture dissonance on questions of the standards of democratic legitimacy. Specifically, Larson and Shevchenko discuss the difference between Western accusations of a “retreat from democracy” as opposed to Russia’s insistence upon the right to a “sovereign democracy.”\textsuperscript{39} While the ‘cultural clash’ does not play a central role in many of the major scholarly theories of Russian foreign policy, a significant proportion of scholarship does ground their theories in the assumption of a distinct Russian cultural construction.

**EURASIAN IDENTITY**

The Eurasianist\textsuperscript{40} approach offers one example of a cultural clash that results in a specific foreign policy behavior. An Eurasianist approach assumes a constructed Russian identity which includes the attempt to organize all of the greater Eurasian bloc under direct Russian leadership.\textsuperscript{41} When referring to Eurasia as a geographic location, this essay approximates the loose definition of Eurasia as the ‘post-Soviet space’\textsuperscript{42} as specifically referring to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an association of 11 Eastern European, Caucasian, and Central Asian states interacting based on the principle of sovereign equality.\textsuperscript{43}

In effect, Russian Eurasianism attempts to distinguish the “unique Russian experience from the more narrow ‘European’ experience.”\textsuperscript{44} As Boris Yeltsin describes the

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\textsuperscript{39} Larson and Shevchenko (2010)

\textsuperscript{40} My own term.


\textsuperscript{42} Bugajski (2008)

\textsuperscript{43} At least nominally. Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Also see Tsygankov (2012A) pp. 177-188.

\textsuperscript{44} Bugajski (2008), p.9
cultural myth driving Russian Eurasianism; “Russia is a unique country with its own interests and its own logic of development. From the historical point of view, Russia is a successor of the Rus, Moscow’s Czarism, the Russian Empire and of the USSR. From the geopolitical perspective, Russia is in the unique position of being in Eurasia.” Such an approach has led Russia to define its unique Eurasian character as a combination of European and Eastern values. Practically, these combined values has led Russian Exceptionalists to view Russia as both a ‘civilized’ European country as well as a ‘rising’ Eastern state. According to Christian Thorun, Russian leadership formulated and internalized such an Eurasianist identity in the years between 1994 and 2000.

GREAT POWER IDENTITY

One of the greatest challenges for the Russian people at the end of the Cold War was coming to terms with the reality that their national status had plummeted from one of the world’s two greatest super-powers to a second-tier country with its economy in shambles. This grandiose historical context, many scholars argue, plays a critical role in explaining the construction of Russian national identity that informs Russian foreign policy decisions. This approach is steeply grounded in constructivist thought—it contends that Russian national identity-constructs leads it to consider international recognition as a world leader to be a top national priority. In short, proponents of ‘national pride’ explanations argue that Russia’s actions are largely motivated by its desire to regain what it perceives as its proper place on the world stage. While many authors ground their argument in similar prestige-based foundations, other scholars combine this identity constructive theory with other elements of

\[\text{References}\]

47 Thorun (2009) p.34
48 Thorun (2009) p.35
international relations theory to produce a wide variety of theoretical interpretations and conclusions.

Some scholars directly postulate that status recognition drives Russian foreign policy behavior. Larson and Shevchenko argue that in the early 1990s, when Russia took a cooperative approach towards the West, the Western states did not accord the Russian leadership the level of respect that Russia felt it deserved. Under the Larson/Shevchenko hypothesis, this lack of respect and greater humiliation led to Russian efforts to reconsider their cooperative policy towards the West and instead strive towards status recognition as a strong rival power. Wohlforth identifies this same drive for status recognition, but argues that relative power concerns motivate prestigious status aspirations. This quest for status recognition, Larson and Shevchenko argue, results in a Russian effort to establish its distinctiveness versus the West that encourages cultural independence. Significantly, Russia emphasizes the Westphalian notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ as a means to develop a path to democratic governance free of Western pressures. This ‘independence approach’ stresses Russia’s unique cultural and historical identity and allows the Russian state to develop as ‘separate but equal’ entity on par with the United States.

Andrei Tsygankov takes a slightly different spin on Russia’s drive for Great Power status by focusing on perceptions of ‘honor’ as the primary force explaining Western-Russian relations. Tsygankov consciously combines realism and constructivism in his honor-based approach;

49 Larson and Shevchenko (2010).
50 Wohlforth (2009).
51 Larson and Shevchenko (2010).
52 Tsygankov, (2012A)
approach. The approach retains the constructivist commitment to viewing the world as a social interaction, not a natural necessity, but it also argues against transcending power in international politics.”

In other words, recognizing that neither realism nor constructivism adequately explain Russian foreign policy behavior, Tsygankov chooses to follow an emerging trend combining both paradigms. In this theory, the definition of honor combines national pride and concern for international prestige. In this honor-based theory, the key to understanding Russia’s foreign policy behavior lies in Russia’s split identity between its self-construction as a European country and as a distinct great power. In this formulation, Russia cooperates with the West when it perceives the West to be according Russia with the great power respect that Russia deserves, a hypothesis which resonates strongly with constructivist theories. However, Tsygankov offers far more ‘realist’ determinants of Russian foreign policy behavior in situations where the West humiliates Russia through a failure to acknowledge Russian prestige. If Russia feels confident about its capabilities vis-à-vis the West, it will challenge the West and pursue an aggressive foreign policy behavior. If Russia does not feel internally confident in its ability to challenge the West, then it will resort to a defensive policy of isolationism. Therefore, Tsygankov’s theory explains cooperative foreign policy in the early 1990s as reflective of a Russian government that felt its status sufficiently recognized by the West and an increasingly expansionist Russian state that comes from augmented power capabilities as the first decade of the next millennium progressed.

53 Tsygankov (2012A) p. 268.
54 Tsygankov (2012A) p. 6.
55 Tsygankov (2012A) p. 44.
56 Two other similar Great Power Identity theories have recently gained prominence in the literature. Christian Thorun incorporates great power status in his theoretical analysis. For Thorun, Russia retained a ‘self-perception of its great-power status consistently from 1992 to 2007.’ Thorun postulates that the Russian leadership’s constantly evolving ideological worldview and vacillating levels of material capabilities has led Russian leaders to pursue differing strategic policies at different times.
In all, some of the most recent and comprehensive scholarship on Russian foreign policy behavior has tended to combine realist calculations set in an ideational context. Above, the theories have centered on constructed great power identities that inform Russian foreign policy interests. However, there is another strain of thought that focuses on the power of ideas in shaping the international community through the legal legitimacy mechanism. In the words of one prominent scholar, “Power and legitimacy are not antithetical, but complements.”

**INSTITUTIONALIST LEGALISM**

Another group of explanations focuses on Russian accordance with the laws in international institutions, particularly in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This approach expects Russian foreign policy to strictly adhere to Russia’s perception of legal guidelines dictating state behavior in the international community. Russian leadership itself often couches its behavior in language engaging with questions of legality in the international system. In particular, Russia focuses on the United Nations Charter as the foundation for international law, and looks to the UNSC as the world arbiter and guardian of international law. If one believes Russian rhetoric, then there is good reason to think that Russia has internalized the norms dictating acceptable international behavior in the international system and adjusts its policies accordingly. Other scholars, such as Andrew Monaghan, believe that

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Anne Clunan offers an explanation of an identitive foreign policy based on a pragmatic construction of national self-esteem. While Thorun sees Russia’s great-power identity as a driver behind foreign policy behavior, Clunan sees the strong national pride as a result of foreign policy behavior. Under Clunan’s ‘aspirational constructivist’ approach, political elites offer a wide variety of possible conceptualizations of Russian identity, and the Russian leadership only internalizes the self-image that best fits from both a pragmatic political and historical standpoint as the Russian national interest. Thus, both of these authors, like Tsygankov, identify Russia’s Great Power identity as highly influential in the formation of Russian foreign policy. Clunan, Clunan, Anne L. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009; and Thorun (2009)

Claude (1966)


Russia has latched on to the UNSC out of weakness. By fastening themselves to legal preeminence of the Security Council, Monaghan argues, Russia preserves one of its primary sources of international influence—its permanent veto-wielding seat on the Security Council.⁶⁰

This approach, however, has been met with significant cynicism and even flat-out rejection. Some scholars, such as Mary Elise Sarote, argue that there is no legal consistency in the UNSC. Such scholars would be much more inclined to take John Mearsheimer’s perspective that institutions simply reflect power relationships⁶¹ and agree with Michael Glennon’s observation that the Security Council serves as a forum for geopolitical forces.⁶² Russia’s behavior, these cynics contend, operates based on Russian geopolitical interests, and Russian legalist arguments are post-hoc claims intended as a justificatory veneer. Furthermore, other critics go even farther and deny Russian integration in international law. Maxmillian Terhalle, for example, contends that Russia has failed to socialize into international law completely.⁶³ In this vein, Russia’s different perspective on the international legal system would lead it to act with no regard to established international law. Finally, Russian challenges to what Russia perceives as Western attempts to conform international law to non-consensus ‘universalized norms’ bring other scholars to question the very assumption of any consensus on international rules of law.⁶⁴ Therefore, the strong claim holds that Russia’s behavior has no real reflection on its engagement with established international law and even questions whether a consensus on international law exists.

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⁶⁰ Monaghan (2006). Monaghan’s argument is similar to the argument that I develop to explain Russian voting behavior.
⁶⁴ Terhalle (2011); Larson and Shevchenko (2012); Rozman (2010).
NORMS AND IDEAS

Scholarly theories have emerged which consider norms and ideas to carry as much political clout as military and economic power. Because these approaches view accepted norms as directly influencing state behavior, theorists assume that states factor norms and ideas as vital elements of their security interests. Under this logic, because normative frameworks and value-systems compete on the world stage for international acceptance, states have critical security interests in embedding their normative interpretation into the internalized psyche of the international community.\(^65\)

This essay considers norms and ideas on par with power and security gains, following in the Wendtian school of thought that recognizes the role that human nature and ideational factors play in the constitution of state preferences and interests.\(^66\) One chief difference between this constructive-identity foundation and many of the traditional approaches\(^67\) is that the constructive-identity school does not assume preferences.\(^68\) Therefore, this identitive leeway enables a deeper perspective into state motivations and preferences. However, this perspective only makes no prior assumptions about state behavior prior to initial interaction. Practically, however, each state \textit{has} had formative interactions. Therefore, nearly all of the assumptions used in the realist and neoliberal institutionalist school are subsumed under this identitive formulation—both grand theories simply predict that all states construct their identities in similar ways and therefore have similar behavioral patterns.\(^69\) In other words, one should be able to reach the same conclusions taking a constructed world with realist-constructed states as one would in a


\(^{67}\) Such as neo-realist or neo-liberal institutionalism

\(^{68}\) Wendt (1999) Ch. 3, p. 96-108.

\(^{69}\) Wendt (1999) Ch. 3.
parallel world examined under a realist formula. As such, the Wendtian (or social constructivist) approach allows for the greatest inclusivity and allows this essay to test the greatest range of hypotheses. It was for these reasons of robust applicability that the following theories treat military power, economic might, and normative ideas as all potentially influential factors in determining state behavior. While one potential critique might argue that a normative approach provides significant theoretical baggage with little increased leverage (i.e. decreased parsimony), I believe that the expanded ability to test a range plausible idea-based theories justifies such an approach.

According to constructivist theory, the transference and internalization of norms and ideas take place through interactions.70 Therefore it logically follows that institutions, which are defined as “a set of principles, rules, or norms that define appropriate behavior in a given setting,” serve as an incubator for the development of norms and ideas.71 For states, these interactions take place through international institutions. Specifically, Inis Claude and others identify the United Nations as the international institution with the greatest normative impact, and serves a legitimization function for norms and ideas.72 Therefore, state actions accepted as legitimate by the United Nations strengthen the norms motivating that action. On the other hand, state actions that attract international condemnation challenge the acceptance and legitimacy of the norms and ideas motivating that action.73 When norms have been fully internalized, they are institutionalized as international law.74 As such, one can

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72 Claude (1966)
easily conceptualize the United Nations Security Council—charged as the final arbiter of international peace and security—as a battlefield where states fight for acceptance and legitimization of their cultural norms, values, and ideas as well as their material interests.\(^75\)

This normative-based approach conceptualizes the UNSC as a chief battleground in a war of ideas, with different world approaches vying for international consensus and crystallization into international customary law.\(^76\) Conflicts in norms and values often manifest themselves through the legal and justificatory discourse that surrounds UNSC member states’ explanations for their actions. These justifications establish international norms, which in turn dictate acceptable state behavior in the international system.\(^77\) Finally, it bears reiterating that this concern with norms is neither simply rhetorical nor pedantic. As Chaka Ferguson writes, “In a hegemonic system, norms can be as threatening to states as armies and navies and affect whether states attain their interests.”\(^78\)

**ADVANCING THE SCHOLARSHIP**

This essay hopes to advance the scholarship aimed at understanding Russian foreign policy behavior by examining Russia’s decisions through the lens of international institutions. Analyzing voting behavior from an institutional perspective has the merit of engaging with the Russian leadership’s pursuit of national interests while also accounting for the constraints that other states place on Russian behavior. Russia’s voting decisions do not

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\(^75\) See, for example, Michael Glennon’s conceptualization of the UN Security Council. Glennon (2003)


\(^78\) Ferguson (2012)
take place in a vacuum; rather, these decisions reflect a combination of both the construction of Russian interests as well as an engagement with Russia’s inter-state relationships at an international level. Moreover, Russian voting behavior in the UNSC should provide an ideal platform for understanding Russian motivations because of both the centrality of the UNSC to questions of state security and the special normative weight\(^79\) wielded by UN organizations. Specifically, states pay close attention to the UNSC because of the UNSC’s tangible impact on defining legitimate acts of aggression and galvanizing international military coalitions.\(^80\)

By taking a structured and rigorous examination of Russian voting behavior in the UNSC, the author hopes to identify robust theoretical explanations for Russian voting behavior that serve the dual purpose of providing a thorough understanding of the motivations behind Russian voting behavior in the UNSC as well as produce useful theoretical insights for interpreting Russian foreign policy behavior as a whole.

**GENERAL THEORY**

The above section discusses the extant literature on Russian foreign policy behavior and explains the value of an institutions-oriented approach. The section below turns theoretical, focusing on a number of potential motivations for Russian voting behavior within the UNSC. These potential incentives fall into three distinct theoretical conceptualizations of Russia’s foreign policy approach: 1) defensive realism 2) offensive realism 3) status seeking. These three theoretical perspectives translate into three rival theories attempting to explain Russian behavior within international institutions. Below, I

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\(^79\) In a legitimizing sense.

sketch these three approaches defining different Russian worldviews: 1) a defensive Russia 2) an expansionist Russia 3) Russia as a status seeker.

DEFENSIVE REALISM

The theoretical roots of a ‘defensive Russia’ stem from defensive realism. Defensive realists argue that states do not necessarily have any aggressive designs against other states, but are often forced into conflict with other states as a result of the anarchic system of international relations. Robert Jervis’s work examining the challenges to cooperation in international relations is representative of the defensive realist approach. Jervis argues that even well-meaning states may fall into conflict through uncertainty in international relations.

I argue that Russia’s voting behavior in the Security Council is primarily steeped in a defensive foreign policy outlook. Russia views the Security Council as a tool to help maintain a world of international relations that protects Russian interests. Thus, this paper’s central argument is grounded in defensive realism; that Russia has two overarching goals aimed at defending current Russian holdings: 1) promotion of international stability 2) protection of state sovereignty. Below, I develop the general thesis argument.

First, Russia genuinely seeks to promote international stability through the Security Council. The horrors of the First and Second World Wars convinced Russia that it is in their interest to avoid large-scale international conflict. Moreover, because Russia seeks to preserve the status quo, Russia has incentives to delegitimize all interstate violence. With the reduction in Russia’s relative capabilities following the Cold War, conflict becomes even less

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82 Jervis (1978). Jervis explains that uncertainty creates a prisoner’s dilemma where the Nash equilibrium results in non-cooperation despite the fact that both states would rather cooperate than not cooperate.
83 Such evidence comes from Russia’s willingness to help establish the United Nations after World War II, a decision that would cede power away from individual states and centralize it with the international community.
attractive, as a status quo Russia has disproportionately large assets relative to its capabilities. Specifically, legitimate interstate violence has the potential to alter the balance of power and also affect the nature of the international system.\(^84\) Russia’s desire to preserve the current international system leads to a vested interest in a Security Council organization dedicated to maintaining stability in the international system.\(^85\) Thus, Russia views the Security Council as a vitally important international organization to prevent widespread international conflict. Russia demonstrates its commitment to the Security Council’s mission through its willingness to authorize force in situations that it feels threaten international peace and security, such as in Burundi in 1996.\(^86\)

However, Russia believes in many cases international intervention can exacerbate the instability arising from violent conflicts.\(^87\) Therefore, Russia will be careful to avoid authorizing unnecessary interventions that jeopardize international stability. I argue that this dual recognition for the importance of international interventions in maintaining stability combined with the potential for unnecessary interventions to create unwarranted instability leads Russia to create a strict legal definition where intervention is only justified as a last resort. The clearest example of Russia’s explanation of its perspective on the instability wrought about by intervention comes from a UN press release on a Russian-introduced draft resolution condemning NATO military activity in Kosovo.\(^88\) Russia’s representative claimed, “The use of force not only destabilized the situation in the Balkans and the region as a whole, but undermined today's system of modern-day international relations.”\(^89\)

\(^{85}\) Lavrov, Sergey. "Russia has no intention or desire to decide the fate of NATO," *The Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO*, 2 October, 2010.
\(^{86}\) UNSC Security Council 1049
\(^{87}\) Baranovsky (2001)
\(^{88}\) UNSC Draft resolution S/1999/328
\(^{89}\) Press release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/1999/328
specific, the current international system operates under norm of states as the individual actors in the international system, as opposed to trends that seek to put individuals within states as the primary driver of international relations.\textsuperscript{90} In this case, one clearly sees Russia’s belief that external intervention, when used improperly on behalf of non-state individuals, severely threatens not only international stability, but also the foundational norms under which states currently operate. Therefore, Russia advocates strict legal adherence to the limited jurisdiction of the UN Charter doctrine in order to simultaneously allow for a strong UNSC that maintains international stability while also safeguarding against abuse of the international mandate. In short, this legal definition revolves over whether or not the crisis poses a threat to international peace and stability, and if it does not, whether or not the parties to the conflict have agreed to intervention.\textsuperscript{91}

Second, Russia also has another incentive to limit needless international intervention—concern for state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{92} By promoting state sovereignty norms, Russia also promotes its own place in the international arena. State sovereignty is an ultra-conservative idea—it cements the current state actors as the only legitimate players in the international arena.\textsuperscript{93} As such, it crystallizes the current distribution of powers and prevents territorial redistribution contrary to Russian interests. Even more importantly, the sovereign state-centric system delegitimizes non-state actors’ attempts for self-determination, an important role for a Russia facing the threat of several separatist groups.\textsuperscript{94} Therefore, state sovereignty ensures the retention of a state-centric international system that secures Russian interests.

\textsuperscript{90} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch}. 1795.
\textsuperscript{91} These legal definitions are more thoroughly developed in the empirical sections; particularly in the qualitative analysis.
\textsuperscript{92} Thorun (2009)
\textsuperscript{94} Westra (2010)
Besides its state-centric focus, state sovereignty also protects Russia’s interests through its normative emphasis on the sovereign inviolability of internal state affairs. In other words, state sovereignty allows for countries to conduct their governments free from external interference. Thus, the state sovereignty norm protects Russia from international critiques on its human rights standards, thus allowing Russia more options through which it may achieve its policy agenda at home and abroad. In fact, Putin promoted the notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ in an attempt to directly connect state sovereignty norms with Russia’s right to govern its domestic populace without international obstruction.

In particular, this norm places the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the state citizenry with the state’s government, rather than with the international community. From the standpoint of international stability, Russia does not see internal conflicts within sovereign borders as posing a threat to stability. For example, in the ongoing civil war in Syria, Russia has explicitly stated that, “Furthermore, events [in Syria] posed no threat to international peace and security.” Therefore, in the interests of international stability and retaining the status quo, Russia adopts the position that the best way to solve an international conflict is to stay out. If the international community is going to get involved in a conflict, then the intervention must increase international stability.

Given Russia’s separatist threats, Russia also uses the state sovereignty principle to crack down on ethnic minority groups without the fear of serious international repercussions, thus maintaining the territorial status quo. Not only does Russia promote

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96 Hurrell (2006)
97 Larson and Shevchenko (2010)
98 UNSC Resolution 1994
99 From the perspective of intervention leading to instability, see for example, Luttwak, Edward. “Give War a Chance. Foreign Affairs. 78.4(1999) 36-44.
100 Bugalski (2008)
the state sovereignty norm; it promotes sovereignty as supreme over newer norms such as humanitarian intervention, which would lead to state instability and potential changes to the international status quo. Therefore, this theory of Russia as a defensive power predicts a conservative Russia concerned with maintaining the status quo.

**OFFENSIVE REALISM**

Another theoretical approach to international relations would predict more aggressive, expansionist foreign policy behavior. This approach, known as offensive realism, views state actors as power-maximizers seeking to promote their own interests at the expense of other states. The seminal work of offensive realist thought is John Mearsheimer’s *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Mearsheimer argues that due to relative gains concerns, states will not only try to increase their own power, but they will also attempt to diminish the power of other states through any means available. Thus, such an approach would expect aggressive state behavior with the intent of maximizing its relative power.

Offensive realist theory has specific implications for Russian voting behavior. This theoretical approach is grounded in the idea that Russia is unsatisfied with its current share of power, and has designs on extending its sphere of influence through expansion. Moreover, such an approach imagines a Russia intensely concerned with the relative balance of power and in a zero sum world where Western gains translate into Russian losses. Therefore, this theoretical approach conceives of a Russia whose Security Council votes are an extension of its realpolitik. Such an approach would expect Russia to be consistently pushing for Soviet irredentism and beyond. Moreover, because offensive realism views the Security Council as simply another tool in Russia’s grand strategy, the Security Council as an

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101 Baranovsky (2001)
103 Mearsheimer (2001)
institution would not have independent significance for Russia, and Russia would only obey international law when it was expedient. The biggest constraint on Soviet expansion would be Russia’s relative power vis-à-vis the other members of the international community. This approach would also expect Russia to align itself strategically with other rising powers, regardless of concerns of international legitimacy.\footnote{Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” \textit{International Organization}, 44.2 (1990). pp.137–138; Rozman (2010).} Most critically for this essay, however, an offensive Russia will seek to hem in the U.S., and use whatever power it has at its disposal—including the use of the Security Council—in order to limit United States power expansion and avoid U.S. hegemony.\footnote{Pape (2005), Thompson (2006), Paul (2005), Voeten (2005) and Prantl, Jochen. "Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council," \textit{International Organization} 59.3 (2005): 559-92.} Therefore, this offensive realist theory of an aggressive, expansionist Russia predicts Security Council behavior that expands Russian power and influence, is willing to change the international status quo, and is indifferent to international legal norms—nearly opposite predictions to my primary theoretical argument of Russia as a defensive state.

\textbf{STATUS SEEKING}

The third approach expects Russia to use the Security Council to advance its Great Power status. This viewpoint places less emphasis on direct power concerns and more weight on questions of international prestige. Two authors who make prominent arguments about the role of prestige in state behavior are William Wohlforth and Robert Gilpin.\footnote{Wohlforth (2009) and Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.} Both authors argue that power is linked to prestige, and therefore states seek prestige and respect from the international community. Specifically, both Wohlforth and Gilpin argue that
international prestige leads to less conflict, as the international community recognizes
prestigious states as possessing significant levels of relative power.107

Russia’s powerful position as one of five permanent members of the Security
Council gives it a strong platform from which it can remind the international community of
its prestigious great power status. Here, one expects Russia to work more cooperatively with
states that respect its great power status, and will make an effort to highlight its national
prestige through Security Council behavior when Russia does not feel sufficiently respected.
Moreover, as a great power, Russia will seek diplomatic alliances with other great powers in a
desire to feel part of the international ‘in-group.’ A status-seeking Russia will also place great
weight on the level to which its own perspective is respected and taken into account.
Similarly, a status-seeking Russia will strive for the international community to respect
Russian cultural distinctiveness as distinct civilization with unique legitimacy. Therefore, this
third approach expects Russia to use the Security Council as tool for promoting its
international status. While the prestige-based motivation marks this theory as distinct, this
theory of Russia as a status seeker has elements that do not directly conflict with a defensive
Russia. The status seeker hypothesis predicts that a result of prestige would be a decrease in
conflict—one of the primary goals of a defensive Russia.108

HYPOTHESES

Below, I outline a number of hypotheses predicting Russian voting behavior. The
first three hypotheses result from the defensive realist school, and are consistent with my
primary theoretical argument. The next three hypotheses come from the offensive realist

107 Wohlfforth (2009) and Gilpin (1981). Therefore, in order to prevent challenges to Russian relative power as a
‘Great Power’ state, Russia aims to solidify and legitimize its Great Power status.
108 In other words, defensive realism would predict Russia to seek to minimize threats to stability, including
minimizing the chance of conflicts. Therefore, if prestige was a medium to decreasing conflict, then the two
theories are not opposed. However, other elements of the status seeker theory, such as the desire to increase
prestige in order to maximize power leverage, would fall much more closely in line with offensive realism and
an expansionist Russia.
viewpoint, and provide a direct challenge to my thesis argument. The last four hypotheses stem from the status seeker viewpoint, which—while foundational distinct—has elements compatible with both offensive and defensive realism.

**DEFENSIVE RUSSIA**

Three hypotheses fall under the perspective of a defensive Russia. First, H1 describes a legalist approach that allows Russia to develop a strictly conservative view of Security Council jurisdiction, hence enabling Russia to retain its influence and preserve the status quo. Second, H2 expects Russia to uphold state sovereignty norms. The state sovereignty principle maintains the current status quo, thus protecting harmful changes to Russian interests. Finally, H3 predicts that Russia will protect its influence in its self-proclaimed sovereign sphere among the post-Soviet CIS states. From Russia’s perspective, this protection of their sphere of influence is defensively motivated and targeted at preserving Russia’s traditional power influence. Each of these three hypotheses are more fully developed in the following section.

**STICKLERS FOR THE LAW**

This theoretical approach highlights Russia’s close engagement with the UNSC as the sole authority on questions relating to use of force and Russia’s strict interpretation of the UNSC legal mandate. By designating a strict legal mandate of jurisdiction for the UNSC, Russia has the ability to defend the international status quo on legal grounds. Specifically on questions of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and use of force, Russia bases its behavior around a classic ‘liberal’ interpretation of the UN Charter. Russia fully supports the Kantian interpretation that “interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of

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109 An example of such a defensive stance comes from UNSC resolution 1851 discussing Somalia, where Russia says, “It was important that Security Council resolutions be based on international law and not designed to change it.”
an independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence, it would itself be an
offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure.”\textsuperscript{110}\footnote{Kant (1795)} In other words, a “basic
postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from
advocates full universality of the generally recognized norms of international law both in
their understanding and application.”\textsuperscript{112}\footnote{President of Russia (2008)} In other words, Russia strictly pursues and condones
only foreign policy activities that fall strictly within the guidelines of international law.
Moreover, Russia takes the strict liberal Kantian perspective respecting state sovereignty and
protecting against external intervention, which Russia claims undergirds the foundation of
the United Nations Charter.

To bolster its point, Russia emphasizes that the UN Charter clearly outlines that the
UN “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,”\textsuperscript{113}\footnote{Text from the United Nations Charter, Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 2.} unless granted
direct authorization by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{114}\footnote{United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Articles 23-23. Welch Larson and Shevchenko (2010)} This legalist distinction plays a vital role in
understanding Russian motivations in the Security Council. Such an approach advocates that
Russia genuinely supports the role of the Security Council and believes in the UN Charter.
Specifically, Russia recognizes the critical role of maintaining a Security Council body
composed of the world’s most powerful nations in order to secure a stable world order.
However, from Russia’s perspective, the legal goal of the Security Council is to maintain
Russian perspective, is extremely limited. Unless a state actor poses a serious threat to
international peace and security, and a Security Council intervention would stabilize and not exacerbate that threat to international stability, then Russia does not believe that there are any legal grounds for the violation of state sovereignty. As such, the only legal recourse open to the Security Council is the pursuit of negotiated diplomacy on the basis of state consent.

Therefore, in situations of external intervention, one should expect Russia to proceed with extreme caution. According to Russia, in order to qualify as a justified situation for international intervention, either the conflicting parties must consent to external intervention forces or wage a conflict that poses a real threat to international peace and security. As Baranovsky articulates,

“In strictly legal terms, Russia continues to argue that the non-use of force, as formulated in the UN Charter, has an imperative character. The Charter stipulates directly and unambiguously that the only two exceptions concern the right of states to individual or collective self-defense (article 51) and to actions aimed at maintaining international peace, with the Security Council being the only body entitled to decide upon appropriate means, including the use of force (article 42).”

From this one may expect the following prediction:

\[ H1: \text{Russia will be more likely to oppose or abstain on a UNSC resolution when the resolution supports international intervention without the consent of the fighting parties or a threat to international peace and security.} \]

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117 From Russia’s perspective.

118 Under the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39, the Security Council has the right to take action in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” However, if a situation does not qualify as a threat to the peace, then state sovereignty, as outlined in the charter, takes precedence and the Security Council must obtain consent for any intervention violating state sovereignty.

119 Baranovsky (2001)
Here, one would expect resolutions concerning international intervention to prove a useful tool for assessing the strength of this hypothesis. Due to the primary requirement of the UN Security Council’s charter to necessitate scenarios threatening international peace, one should expect Chapter VII resolutions, which invoke the Security Council’s authorization, to play an important role in establishing a legal basis for activity. Moreover, because the legal framework requires negotiated consent to cases not threatening international peace as well as for provisional diplomatic measures for threats to peace,¹²⁰ one should also expect state consent to play an important role in the voting process. Therefore, due to legal concerns, one may expect Russia to oppose resolutions¹²¹ if they are adopted under Chapter VII but lack significant violent threats or if the parties to the conflict have not consented to UN intervention. On the other hand, a lack of these legalistic voting behaviors would seriously challenge the viability of H1.

Moreover, qualitative evidence providing justifications for voting behavior on legal terms in specific resolutions would also lend support for H1. However, such a qualitative assessment cannot stand on its own. The provided reasoning can only directly vouch for the consistency of Russia’s explanation for their voting motivation. However, without a more quantitative, holistic affirmation of Russia’s legal behavior, such explanations may prove to be more of a legal justificatory cover rather than a reflection of a sincere resolve to uphold international law. Finally, on the qualitative side, if the evidence provides examples of cases where Russia believes that a resolution violates international law, but is convinced to avoid casting a negative vote due to side-payments and political expediency, then this theory will be effectively falsified.

¹²¹ Here, as for the rest of the essay unless specifically noted, opposition is used to entail either a veto or an abstention.
DEFINING SOVEREIGNTY NORMS\textsuperscript{122}

Scholars overwhelmingly accept that Russia’s interpretation of international law and the UN Charter is not universally accepted by other states in the international system.\textsuperscript{123} In particular, Martha Finnemore points out that changing norms of intervention have led to a conflict between humanitarian intervention and respect for state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{124} However, this norm-shift has not been universal, and different states value the relative legal weight and significance of each norm to varying degrees.\textsuperscript{125} Moreover, each country vies to institutionalize its normative outlook on the international system and cement its own perspective into international law. In many ways, this battle for the relative legitimacy of these contradicting norms is fought among the permanent members of the UNSC, with the more conservative China and Russia pitted against the progressive U.S., U.K, and France. As Gilbert Rozman explains,

“Both states [China and Russia] oppose allowing U.S. power and Western values to gain a dominant global position. The two also share a firm commitment to leave the UN Security Council with the sole authority to address questions or the use of force beyond one’s national borders.”\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{122} The reason why this section is differentiated from the section above on Russian legalist behavior is because the basis of this section’s claim is less grounded in international law. In H1, the argument is that Russia votes consistently in a law-abiding fashion based on their interpretation of the UN Charter. This section, on the other hands, looks at state sovereignty not as an absolute fact, but rather as a mutable norm that Russia attempts to influence through its voting behavior in the UN Security Council.


\textsuperscript{124} Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 52 – 84. See also Risse, Thomas. “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54.1 (2000), 1-39; See also Jackson and Rosberg (1984) pp. 13. “The doctrine of States’ rights—that is Sovereignty—is a central principle of international society. It often comes into conflict with the doctrine of international human rights, but international society does not promote the welfare of individuals or private groups within a country or transnational groups across countries; nor does it protect individuals or private groups from their governments.”

\textsuperscript{125} Adam Roberts (2003)

\textsuperscript{126} Rozman (2010)
Therefore, Russia and China maintain steadfast opposition to any infringement upon the state sovereignty principle, arguing that the “right-to-protect” principle promoted by the West violates international law and is symptomatic of U.S. expansionism.\footnote{Hurrell (2006); Jones (2011); Roberts (2003). For more on the Western countries’ normative push as a whole, see De Nevers, Renee. “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era.” International Security, 31.4 (Spring 2007), pp. 34–66} Russia argues that the Western states have structured a hypocritical system that allows NATO to pursue its political interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention.\footnote{For more on questions of unevenly applied sovereignty principles, see Stephen D. Krasner (1999). Moreover, for more on the international community’s recognition of failed states, see Jackson and Rosberg, (1984)} Through a haphazard implementation of a humanitarian intervention principle that bypasses the UNSC, the West tries to expand its political reach and avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes, which exist in the UNSC as safeguards designed specifically to prevent such unilateral aggression. For example, Russia found the justification for NATO intervention in Kosovo as a unique case to be ‘a lie’ and was outraged by the ad hoc application of sovereignty rules.\footnote{Interfax. “Putin calls lies claims Kosovo case is unique,” Trend. 14, February, 2008. See also Terhalle, Maximillian. (2011); Coggins, Bridget. (2011)\footnote{Coggins (2011); Paul, T. V., “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, 30.1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46–71; Westra (2010)}

Moreover, one should also keep in mind that Russia has other less noble incentives for promoting the dominance of the state sovereignty principle and UNSC framework than simply because it is the legally agreed-upon international law. Russia has three politically motivated reasons for promoting sovereignty over humanitarian norms: 1) maintaining the state-centric status quo 2) shielding Russian treatment of own ethnic minorities 3) preventing expansion-driven humanitarian causes.

First, Russia, as with the other great powers, has incentive to promote the status quo.\footnote{Coggins (2011); Paul, T. V., “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, 30.1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46–71; Westra (2010)} Since the time of the establishment of the U.N. Charter, Russia’s relative power in the international power hierarchy has fallen precipitously. Therefore, it is unsurprising that
Russia favors institutional principles that reflect a previous, more favorable era of Russian dominance. The five permanent members of the UNSC reflected the most powerful states in the international system at the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{131} If the 5 most powerful states were recalculated today, it is unlikely that Russia would still retain a permanent membership on the UNSC and its critical veto power. For example, judging by contributions to the International Monetary Fund, a signal of prestige and influence in the international community, Russia ranks ninth in contributions and voting influence (Figure 1).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{countries_quotas_imf.png}
\caption{Countries’ quotas in IMF}
\end{figure}

Therefore, simply due to the fact that the Russians have undue influence in the Security Council, one would expect Russia to staunchly promote the sole utilization of the UNSC, an institution with a favorable (if outdated) power balance. Andrew Hurrell encapsulates this sentiment: “The need to maintain regional power and to prevent its further

\textsuperscript{131} With the notable exception of Germany and Japan.
erosion has been a central feature of Russian foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{133} The problem for Russia, however, is that as humanitarian intervention has become a more dominant norm, it has eroded power away from the state-based Security Council system, and has empowered states to ignore the United Nations Security Council on the grounds of answering to a higher calling—the protection of fundamental human rights.\textsuperscript{134}

As Thomas Risse puts it,

“The debate about humanitarian intervention, for example, concerns understandings of two conflicting and constitutive norms of international society: sovereignty as a state property and human rights as a property of individuals.” (22)\textsuperscript{135}

In other words, while sovereignty operates on a state level, where each state is considered as a unitary state actor, then the UN may operate smoothly through state representation.\textsuperscript{136} However, once rights are considered on the individual human level, then the state model is no longer sufficient, and issues must take into account the views of individuals citizens. As such, the state can no longer operate as a reliable representative; now, even if a state is content with the status quo, there still may be threats to peace and security if individuals within the state believe that their human rights are being compromised. It was this change in definition of threat to the peace that allowed NATO to ignore international law only authorizing such intervention in cases of interstate aggression and intervene in places like Kosovo.\textsuperscript{137} In a state-sovereignty based system, this intervention was illegal. However,

\textsuperscript{133} Hurrell (2006)  
\textsuperscript{135} Risse (2000)  
NATO “nevertheless declared that it felt bound to act by a higher law of morality”—the law of individual humanitarian rights.  

Second, the state sovereignty principle favors two types of states: a) states with questionable human rights practices and b) states facing separatist threats. Russia meets both qualifications. As Neil MacFarlane writes, “[Russia’s] internal difficulties and its vulnerability to criticism in terms of international human rights and governance norms push it towards profoundly conservative definition of sovereignty and the rights of states within their domestic jurisdiction.” By cloaking its behavior behind unassailable state sovereignty, Russia adopts a stance on human rights that allows it free reign to legally defend any treatment of its domestic population as cultural relativism. In particular, the ‘state sovereignty’ justification robs Muslim separatists in Chechnya and elsewhere of a legitimate claim to external support. By setting the precedent of giving no ground to self-determination efforts, Russia not only justifies its treatment of the Chechens, it also sends a message to the other ethnic minorities in the greater Russian federation. This in turn allows Russia to build its entire definition of the legitimate use of force around the differentiation of interstate and intrastate violence. For example, in Chechnya, “After three years of ‘hesitation’ with respect to the breakaway republic [Chechnya], Moscow decided to use force, exactly as NATO did in Yugoslavia, but with the convincing

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138 Ramakrishna (2000).
140 McFarlane (2006)
justification that it was applying such force to its own territory, that is, without violating the
international law."\textsuperscript{144}

State sovereignty turns gross human rights violations ‘unacceptable’ to ‘regrettable,’
and, as referenced above, and only authorizes intervention in interstate conflicts. Therefore,
Russian support of state sovereignty helps promote its political interests while “parading as
the standard-bearer for international law and the promoter of multilateralism.”\textsuperscript{145}

Third, Russia opposes violations of state sovereignty because of the potential for the
rise of humanitarian intervention norms to lead to an excuse to violate state sovereignty.

“In the Foreign Policy Concept this approach was elaborated further: ‘Concepts such as
humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty’ are promoted in order ‘to justify
unilateral forceful actions circumventing the UN Security Council’, which is why attempts to
make such concepts internationally acceptable should be rejected.”\textsuperscript{146}

This reason for opposing the dominance of humanitarian norms is reminiscent of Russian
fears under geostrategic realism.\textsuperscript{147} Even if the United States does not have an expansionist
myth or power-maximizing intentions, the rise of humanitarian intervention norms
provides an excuse for state aggression. For example, had Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had
territorial designs on the Kuwaiti government in 2013, all Saddam would have to do to
justify his invasion would be to ground it in language of individual rights and recast his
mission as a ‘humanitarian intervention.’ While this example offers some degree of
overstatement, Russia would argue that the core principle still stands—legitimizing
interventions on humanitarian grounds undermines the non-aggression principles of the UN
charter.

\textsuperscript{144} Baranovsky (2001)
\textsuperscript{146} Baranovsky (2001)
\textsuperscript{147} Explained further in H4.
Therefore, the UNSC provides Russia with an important means of contesting and even attempting to reestablish generally accepted interpretations of international law. Russia uses the discourse in the Security Council in order to construct a UNSC mandate in favor of reinforcing the state sovereignty principle and legitimizing intervention only through the UNSC authorization. This approach would expect to see Russia’s votes align most often with the Western countries’ votes when the normative implications under consideration are consistent with Russia’s interpretation of international law stressing state sovereignty norms. On the other hand, when Russia sees resolutions as threatening norms of sovereignty, they will veto those resolutions.

All of this background theory may be formally stated as a simple hypothesis,

\[ H2: \text{Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it marginalizes the norms promoting the state sovereignty principle.} \]

In order to test the validity of H2, one must allow for the symbolic significance of votes cast in the UNSC on international norms. Within those parameters, when resolutions support state sovereignty, one would expect Russia to support those resolutions. On the other hand, those resolutions that undermine sovereignty principles and norms should see a higher likelihood of Russian opposition. The measurement of H2 arise from a combination of examining cases when violations of sovereignty took place as well as

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149 Johnstone (2003)
150 One potential realist counterargument would suggest that the UNSC is simply a forum for the most powerful states to carry out their interests. Others would retort by pointing to the value of the UNSC as a forum for the exercise of diplomacy and soft power. Realists in turn would argue that ‘soft power’ does not actually exist as its proponents portray it. A more challenging realist response would point to the incentive for such behavior, namely, that Russia has a large stake in maintaining the status quo delineated in the UN Charter and incentive to resist any change to the international system.
152 Note that one key difference between H1 and H2 is that H1 would expect Russia to object to other types of legal violations besides just state sovereignty, while H2 would expect Russia reluctance to violations of sovereignty even in cases when such violations are legally warranted. This distinction is explicitly discussed in the qualitative discussion on the hypothesis concerning Chinese leadership in examining discrepancies between Russian and Chinese voting patterns over Kosovo.
whether or not Russia made an effort to justify their voting behavior. Such attempts to justify voting behavior offer a clear way of trying to influence the Security Council from a normative standpoint by setting guidelines for appropriate behavior. Nonetheless, one must also remember that Russia may not necessarily agree with the majority of the international community as to what constitutes a violation of sovereignty. Therefore, any measurement determining whether a violation of sovereignty took place should use a loose definition on the violation of sovereignty to account for the possibility of Russian definitional leniency. If the evidence does not show Russian attempts to defend their position on cases with a violation of sovereignty then such evidence would severely challenge this hypothesis. Moreover, if Russia proves in any way less likely to oppose votes that invoked a violation of sovereignty, then this hypothesis would be effectively falsified.

**SOVEREIGN Sphere OF Influence**

The final hypothesis falling under the defensive realist school concerns a sovereign Russian sphere of influence. This approach would predict that Russia will be more likely to oppose resolutions when the issue at hand pertains to an area in Russia’s geostrategic sphere of concern, rather than, for example, cases in sub-Saharan Africa. Geostrategic theory will assume that Russia will consider territories closer to their nation to be more of a security concern. As such, “Some [scholars] have posited a Russian Monroe Doctrine for these states, meaning that they are under Russia's sphere of influence.”

Moreover, while realist concerns may undergird Russia’s insistence on a security-maximizing approach within a Russian sphere of influence, it is Russia’s Eurasian identity...

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154 While the spheres of influence argument is clearly a realist argument, the interest construction assumed by the realists is more directly addressed by the Eurasian construction of Russian identity.

that has defined Russian preferences (and therefore the parameters of vital security interests) within that sphere. Allen Lynch directly draws the connection between Russian security interests and Russian identity: “The expansion of NATO threatens not so much Russia's material interests as Russia's fragile post-Soviet international identity.” 156 In other words, NATO expansion threatens Russian geostrategic security interests because Russia's identity includes the post-Soviet space as part of Russia’s international identity.

In particular, Russia’s conception of a greater Eurasia has led Russia to try to maintain a firm influence in the CIS states. Andrew Monaghan identifies the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union as “the dominant priority in Russian foreign policy since the early 1990s.” 157 Within this Russian sphere, scholars have emphasized a realist determination to maintain Russian sovereign integrity by whatever means necessary. This hypothesis lies at the border of offensive and defensive realism due to the fact that the international community does not agree on the status quo in the post-Soviet sphere.

Janusz Bugajski represents the Western perspective, which views the post Soviet states as fully sovereign and independent of Russian influence. As Bugajski writes, “Russia demonstrates authoritarian statism that employs the gamut of means to exert influence over its less powerful neighbors in the formation of a Eurasian state.” 158 In other words, under Bugajski’s interpretation of Russian Eurasianism, Russia takes an aggressive, offensive foreign policy approach to solidify the creation of greater Eurasia, an approach highly reminiscent of Huntington’s ‘traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist’ state. 159

156 Lynch (2001)
159 Huntington (1992). In Bugajski (2008), Bugajski characterizes Tsygankov as a “pro-Putin apologetic.”
Russia, however, would strongly disagree with Bugajski’s characterization. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sums up the Russian position quite well: “The CIS space has turned into a sphere for geopolitical ‘games,’…Stop trying to keep Russia inside its “regional shell.” Russia feels a historic connection to the post-Soviet CIS states, and does not agree that collapse of the Soviet Union has severed Moscow’s influence in the greater regional sphere. Thus, police action undertaken within the CIS body is Russia’s sovereign right, and Russia seeks to simply maintain their influence in the CIS region. Therefore, while Russia considers any expansion within Eurasia as legitimate pursuits of nationalist self-expression, its Western counterparts see such activity as expansionist and threatening behavior. However, this essay characterizes Russia’s activities in its self-designated sphere of influence, the CIS region, as a defensive action. This classification should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the Russian perspective. Rather, because the paper seeks to understand Russian voting motivations, it makes sense to adopt a Russian-colored lens when viewing its activity in the international community.

Nevertheless, if there are indeed conflicting viewpoints over the CIS region, one should find voting dissonance between Russia and the West on these issue areas. H3: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution concerning one of the Eurasian (CIS) states in Russia’s sphere of influence.

Russia’s Eurasian perspective will lead its leadership to consider the Eurasian area as a closely linked satellite to the Russian homeland and as partners in the greater Eurasian sphere, while the West will consider these states to have independent foreign policy doctrines and therefore view them as beleaguered states under attack by Russian

\[\text{Lavrov (2007). In an email correspondence with the author, Tsygankov defended his stance as ‘balanced’ and critiqued Bugajski as “one-sided.” Tsygankov, Andrei. "Russian Sovereignty Claims." E-mail to Brian Mund. 25 December 2012.}\]

\[\text{See Deng (2007).}\]
encroachment. Therefore, one would expect disagreement in UNSC resolutions. Resolutions concerning the Eurasian sphere would infringe upon Russian security interests, and should result in Russian opposition. On the other hand, when resolutions either reinforce Russian supremacy in the Eurasian sphere or do not concern the Eurasia at all, then they should not threaten Russian security interests and therefore one would expect less Russian opposition.

Nonetheless, not all Eurasianists believe that the Eurasian conceptualization of identity has led to a greater foreign policy. In fact, Natalia Morozova argues that while Russian Eurasianism has led to a strict protection of Eurasia’s territorial integrity, Russia has been unable to cohere this Eurasian identity into a workable foreign policy.162

**Expansionist Russia**

The next three hypotheses challenge the notion of a defensive Russia. H4 predicts that Russia will oppose the United States in order to block U.S. interests and promote a favorable balance of power.163 This concern with relative gains and active promotion of national interests falls in line with offensive realist thought. H5 expects Russia to more actively pursue its own interests (aggressive or otherwise) when Russia has a stronger military capacity. Such an approach views institutions as less constraining, so Russia would be more inclined to expect U.S. retaliation if Russia defies U.S. interests. Thus, if Russia expects a U.S. retaliatory response, Russia will only risk defying the more powerful state when it feels secure in its ability to defend itself. H6 postulates that Russia will make the strategic determination to ally with China and develop a more favorable balance of power. Such an

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162 Morozova, Natalia. “Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin.” Geopolitics 14.4 (2009): 667-686. However, for the purposes of this hypothesis, even Morozova would concede that Russia is motivated in the Security Council to protect its regional sphere of influence.

attempt to alter the balance of power in order to further Russia’s own influence falls solidly within the tent of offensive realism. Next, each hypothesis is explored in more detail

**Geostrategic Politicking**

One popular explanation for Russian voting behavior in the Security Council stems from the realist school of thought, and claims that Russia’s voting is based off of geostrategic calculations. In particular, Russia fears United States’ hegemonic unilateralism and therefore actively works to balance against the United States, pushing for greater multipolarity and expanding Russian influence. On a simple level, this theory predicts that the Russians would oppose Security Council action primarily when they feel that such actions challenge Russian power or threaten to tip the international balance of power farther towards the United States.\(^{164}\) From this statement, one may draw the testable conclusion that the greater Russia’s perception of UNSC votes reflecting United States hegemony, the more reluctant Russia would be to vote along with the United States. Specifically, Russia may perceive votes that grant authority to the United States and its allies to intervene in the internal affairs of another state as symptomatic of the United States’ hegemonic expansionism.\(^ {165}\) For example, Russia perceived the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 as expansionary and representative of greater U.S. strides towards hegemonic activity.\(^ {166}\) Therefore, Russia opposed U.N. Security Council resolutions that granted authority for U.S.-led forces to pursue perceived expansionary objectives in Iraq.

To state this hypothesis formally:

\(^{164}\) Christopher Layne argues that one would expect to see leash-sliping, as Russia tries to carve out an independent foreign policy within the greater hegemonic context. When taken outside of a hegemonic context, one expects Russia to oppose any resolution that tilts the relative balance of power away from Russia. (Layne 2006)


\(^{166}\) Layne (2006); Paul (2005)
H4: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it believes that the resolution would advance U.S. hegemony.\textsuperscript{167}

In order to assess whether a resolution seeks to advance Western hegemony, I use external interventions as a proxy. Namely, when resolutions would allow the international community to violate state sovereignty through intervention, I consider those cases of ‘perceived Western hegemony.’ Moreover, Russia should also be strongly opposed to resolutions allowing for United States-led intervention. When the U.S. leads an intervention force outside of direct U.N. supervision, this hypothesis would expect Russia to assume that the United States is undertaking power-maximizing behavior at its expense. An advocate of this hypothesis would expect Russian opposition, and that in cases of Russian support, Russia must be convinced that the intervention is somehow an exception and does not threaten its interests. Therefore, the presence of Russian opposition to both interventions in general as well as U.S.-led activity is critical to the validity of this hypothesis. The presence of Russian-initiated resolutions that actively promote Russian interests abroad would also strongly support this hypothesis.

Two other factors may support or challenge the hypothesis, but do not play a critical role. First, if the resolution is accepted under the binding Chapter VII of the Security Council, then the resolution empowers the UN Security Council members at the expense of the targeted states. Therefore, one might expect Russia to be more inclined to oppose resolutions that are adopted under Chapter VII of the Security Council Charter. Unless an intervention specifically promotes Russian interests, than one would expect Russia to avoid

\textsuperscript{167} One could also make the argument that voting against U.S. hegemony could be motivated be defensive concerns. However, this hypothesis includes cases where Russia has no tangible interest at stake, in which case Russia would only oppose if it were interested in actively balancing U.S. hegemony, regardless of whether or not the proposed action affects Russian interests. If so, then this would involve a concern with relative power and fall within an expansionist perspective. On the other hand, the spheres of influence hypothesis solely concerns areas in which Western expansion would threaten Russian interests, and is therefore classified as ‘defensive.’
authorizing Chapter VII that may allow other member states to legitimately pursue their national interests, thereby putting Russia at a relative disadvantage. Moreover, the presence of resolutions that reaffirm state sovereignty might serve as a counterweight to reassure Russia of U.S. good intent. However, given that geostrategic realists would put much more weight on the limited capacity that such a clause has on materially affecting state behavior, one would not expect the inclusion of sovereignty to significantly affect Russian voting behavior.

Of note, one limitation of this study is that if Russia truly felt that U.S. hegemonic expansionism posed an immediate and urgent threat to Russian security interests, then Russia would do more than just oppose a Security Council resolution—they would take military action! Indeed, this inability to track actual military responses could challenge this model in a serious way. However, in the given period of 1995-2012, Russia has not had any military confrontations with the West. In this regard, the West has been strategic in who it embraces under its EU and NATO umbrella. While countries like Georgia have wanted to receive full Western status, the lack of full Western acceptance has allowed the West to stay out of military confrontations with Russia over states like Georgia, and have allowed them to simply issue statements of disapproval instead. Therefore, while this concern is theoretically valid, it does not pose a challenge to the actually tested data. Moreover, such data may miss situations where Russia responds with military threats that do not escalate to war, such as the Russian naval installation in the Syrian port of Tartarus to deter

international intervention. However, in such scenarios that do not escalate to immediate conflict, one would expect Russia to couple its military activity with a rigorous diplomatic effort. Russia’s diplomatic effort would include voting activities through the UN, so these questions of military threat should not pose an additional empirical concern.

**Relative Power**

One may also derive a second hypothesis of Russian voting behavior in the Security Council from the ‘geostrategic politicking’ view of Russian foreign policy. This second hypothesis expects that the more powerful Russia is relative to the United States, the less concerned Russia will be about United States retaliation and the more likely Russia will be to publicly confront the United States. As mentioned above, both Tsyangakov and Thorun make realist-constructivist arguments suggesting that Russian foreign policy is largely constrained by their relative power vis-à-vis the Western powers. Similarly, ‘pure’ realists such as Glennon who see the UNSC as a mere reflection of geopolitics would also expect Russia to have a greater ability to reject resolutions reflecting Western foreign policy interests and to promote their own. Thus, the greater Russia’s relative power, the more likely that Russia will assert an independent voting behavior in the security council and veto UNSC resolutions that promote Western interests. Therefore, we may deduce the following hypothesis:

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171 Particularly if one agrees with Carl Von Clausewitz’s assessment that “war is an extension of politics by other means.” Von Clausewitz, *War as an Instrument of Policy*. (1832)

172 Tsyangakov (2012); Thorun (2009)

173 Glennon (2003). Bolton (2008) disagrees, arguing that the United Nations Security Council itself can be used to project power. “In New York, paralysed by the prospect of a Russian veto, the UN Security Council, that Temple of the High-Minded, was as useless as it was during the Cold War. In fairness to Russia, it at least still seems to understand how to exercise power in the Council, which some other Permanent Members often appear to have forgotten.”
H5: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it is relatively more secure vis-à-vis the U.S.

In terms of analyzing the data, one must establish the metrics for measuring Russian relative power and the implications of each type of vote at the Security Council. When Russia is strong relative to the West, one should expect to see them vote more often against resolutions. The reasoning here is that if Russia is materially strong, then they will have the confidence to pursue their own interests without being stopped by the overwhelming American strength that forces a weak Russia to vote in alignment with American geopolitical interests. On the other hand, if Russia is materially weak, then in the situations where Russia might like to oppose, Russia may be so weak that it dares not even symbolically oppose the West and United States’ interests.

This hypothesis differs from the others in terms of possible metrics. While the metrics for the other hypotheses came out of the resolutions themselves, in this case, the data for relative security did not come from the resolutions. Instead, this hypothesis used outside measurements such as widely accessible indices of military or economic strength in order to judge its empirical validity.

Finally, I note that the hypotheses above do not contain all possible conclusions of Russian voting behavior from a geostrategic realist perspective—in fact, the indeterminacy of the realist school of thought is one of the stronger critiques leveled against Waltzian realism. However, below I mention a few other arguments with realist undercurrents.

One might also argue that Russia would oppose resolutions that not only threaten its own interests, but also those that may allow NATO countries to expand Western spheres of

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174 McFarlane (2006). In particular, given Russia’s traditional position opposing the authorization of external interventions and the violation of state sovereignty, it is safe to expect that as a baseline, there will be some situations brought to the Security Council which Russia does not think necessitates UNSC action.

175 Waltz (1979), Thorun (2009)
influence in other regions by sparking relative gains concerns.\textsuperscript{176} Additionally, Russia’s fear of what it sees as U.S. expansionism may give Russian foreign policy a vested interest in quietly supporting rogue states that stand in opposition to American powers and interests as a balancing tactic.\textsuperscript{177} This relative gains challenge may spur Russia’s active engagement with more normalized non-Western powers, which would be indicative of a more active balancing. H8 addresses some of these questions by looking at the impact of the involvement of prestigious (including non-Western) states on Russian voting behavior.

RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE

Alternatively, one may also predict an expansionist Russia to forge strategic relationships with rising, non-Western powers. As such, one may use Russia’s relationship to the non-Western permanent member of the Security Council, China, as a metric for measuring Russia’s relationship with rising, non-Western countries. The United States and its Western allies have traditionally dominated the Security Council, and the preponderant power of the United States has ensured that the language of introduced resolutions nearly always reflects Western values and interests.\textsuperscript{178} When China vetoes or abstains on a resolution condemning state behavior, then China’s negative vote may be representative of rising non-Western countries’ opposition to the condemnation. If so, then Russia’s desire to maintain strong strategic relationships with non-Western states may lead Russia to follow China’s voting behavior. Therefore, tracking Russia’s votes on resolutions where China votes negatively will help signal the extent to which Russia desires to maintain strong relationships with rising non-Western states. Therefore, with regard to the non-Western states, one would


\textsuperscript{177} Rozman (2010); Gilpin (1981)

\textsuperscript{178} Prantl (2005). The major outliers are those resolutions surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the United States consistently vetoes.
expect Russia to vote all condemning resolutions along with China. Therefore, the policy implication would imply:

\[ H_6: \text{Russia will be most likely to abstain on UNSC resolutions where China abstains or vetoes.} \]

In situations where China breaks from the West, one expects Russia to do so as well. Such a theory has a particularly challenging time explaining situations where Russia breaks rank with the Security Council but China does not, or where China abstains or vetoes and Russia does not. A significant number of exceptions would lead one to suspect that Russia’s voting behavior in the UNSC is not in fact motivated by this desire to catch the rising tide of a shift to non-Western powers.

**RUSSIA AS A STATUS SEEKER**

Finally, the last four hypotheses fall under the category of prestige-oriented status seeking. First, H7 posits that Russia will place great weight on having its normative perspective taken into account during Security Council discussions. Such inclusion plays an important role in validating Russia’s identity as a prestigious, influential state. Next, H8 proposes that Russia seeks out relationships with prominent states in a search for the self-validation of its own identity. H9 argues that Russia will seek recognition in an attempt to promote a relational government order as a legitimate alternative to traditional liberal democracy. Finally, H10 provides the primary status seeker argument—that Russia will be more likely to cooperate with the West when it is given the respect and prestige that Russia feels it deserves.

**NORMATIVE COMPROMISE**

One must keep in mind that Russia’s campaign to affect international sovereignty norms occurs within a greater context of political discourse.\(^{179}\) As Edward Luck, Anne-Marie

\(^{179}\) Johnstone (2003)
Slaughter, and Ian Hurd argue, the UNSC acts primarily as a forum for political bargaining.\footnote{Luck, Slaughter and Hurd (2003)} As with other disagreements of interests and power, the states in the UNSC bargain and negotiate over the accepted norms in the international system. Because the great power states in the UNSC have strategic incentives to coordinate and maintain a unified front,\footnote{Coggins (2011)} one expects states to attempt to find an acceptable medium of normative compromise.\footnote{Weingast (1995), Prantl (2005)} As such, the level of normative compromise rather than the actual implication of the norm may more directly determine voting behavior. This leads to another hypothesis:

\[ H7: \text{Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when the West refuses to compromise on normative questions.} \]

In order to assess the strength of $H7$, I must gauge the level of normative cooperation taking place. While such metrics are difficult to quantify as more than an estimated approximation, I attempt to glean the relevant information based on the discussion reports in the Security Council and the accompanying press releases. Moreover, in terms of expected results, when the Security Council adopts resolutions with a negotiated consensus and normative implications acceptable to the Russian party, then one should expect Russian support. On the other hand, when West fails to satisfy the minimal Russian negotiating positions, one would expect Russia to feel disrespected, thereby resulting in increased Russian voting opposition.

Moreover, in such cases of normative opposition, one expects Russia to also justify its voting behavior to ensure that the international community understands Russia’s opposition to a specific resolution within a larger normative signaling framework lending
legitimacy to those justificatory arguments. Finally, Russian assent does not always correspond to Russian normative assent. In such situations, Russia should still want to provide its own counterweight through which they can promote their own normative viewpoints.\textsuperscript{183}

**Prestigious States**

Next, a Eurasian identity may lead Russia to pursue close diplomatic relationships with a wide array of prestigious states. Under this hypothesis, Eurasia’s unique position bridging the West and East encourages Russian leaders to not only seek normalization with Western states, but also leads those leaders to reach out more intensively to prestigious non-Western states.\textsuperscript{184} Russia’s ability to transcend the West and non-West cultural divide plays a critical part in the Eurasian construction. As such, an ingrained Eurasian cultural identity would result in the pursuit of strong relationships with significant non-Western states. In particular, the relationships with prominent states in the international community solidify the social conceptions critical to the maintenance of a Eurasian identity.\textsuperscript{185} By maintaining alliances with prestigious states of multiple cultures, Russia is able validate its own prestigious self-conception as a uniquely positioned state in the international community. Therefore, as a self-proclaimed guardian of both the East and West, Russia would want not to support resolutions condemning behavior of the states with which they hope to forge relationships.

\textit{H8: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it condemns a prestigious Western or non-Western government’s behavior.}

\textsuperscript{183} Of note, a satisfactory agreement might not include any change on the text or implications within the text itself, but might instead come as the result of linkage or side-payment.
\textsuperscript{184} Thorun (2009), p.38
\textsuperscript{185} Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.906
Therefore, this hypothesis would predict that Russia carefully considers how its voting behavior in the Security Council impacts its relationships with the ‘prominent countries.’ In particular, resolutions that condemn government behavior could prove informative for examining Russia’s concern with the relationship of the offending state in question. In such cases, one would expect that in resolutions condemning the behavior of a powerful state, Russia would not support the resolution. However, this metric may not directly assess Russia’s concerns for the various relationships because a number of external factors may influence whether Russia decides to vote against a friendly country. For example, such an assessment does not control for the severity of the offending country’s violations, and the level of threat posed to international peace and security. Nonetheless, one may respond by saying that few enough activities are so clear-cut to require an uncompromising response worth jeopardizing the diplomatic relationships and therefore this critique doesn’t hold weight. In all, due to the focus in H8 on level of prestige, it fits best with the status seeker viewpoint.

**LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOR**

Another culturally based status explanation stems from the argument that Russia has a differing perception of what constitutes legitimate state behavior. For the Russian government, legitimate democratic behavior must meet the primary requirement that the country’s populace must be provided with collective goods.\(^\text{186}\) Moreover, because Russia applies this standard of popular provision as the basis for legitimacy in its own country, one might reasonably expect for Russia to hold the greater international community to the same standards. If Russian culture does construe legitimate democratic regimes as those that successfully provide goods to their citizens, then Russia’s definition differs greatly from the

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Western definition. In his work on Afghanistan, Jan Angstrom identifies these two different perceptions of state legitimacy as liberal and relational legitimacy.\footnote{Also see Jan Angstrom (2008): Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state-building in Afghanistan, \textit{Small Wars \& Insurgencies}, 19.3, 374-396; for a larger discussion of relational versus liberal legitimacy.}

Most Western states define legitimate democratic behavior based off of a liberal understanding, which focuses on the state’s ability to protect individual rights. If a state can provide basic rights to each individual in society, then the state has accomplished its mission. On the other hand, Russia takes the perspective that state validity should be based upon relational legitimacy, or based on its successful implementation of societal order. Rudra Sil and Cheng Chen emphasize that Russia has a relational standard for government legitimacy—that the Russian people recognize the government as legitimate as long as it provides public goods and services to the population.\footnote{Sil, and Chen (2004)} In essence, this cultural-based hypothesis contends that Russian culture operates off of relational legitimacy. In contrast, a standard liberal perspective would argue such a state based on the implementation of order to be illegitimate. In a Western conceptualization of statehood, “states that coerce their citizens or foreign residents lack moral legitimacy.”\footnote{Doyle, Michael. (1996) p. 32.} Thus, due to the fact that Russia is trying to gain international acceptance of an alternate legitimate form of government, H9 fit best under Russia as a status seeker. After all, the more prestigious a state, the more likely other states will accept that state’s behavior as normatively acceptable.

In response to Western criticism, Russian has reframed its relational perspective through claims of ‘sovereign democracy,” which it contrasts to “rampant democracy.”\footnote{Monaghan (2006)} As explained by Larson and Shevchenko,
“Sovereign democracy maintains that Russia will determine its own path to democracy, free from foreign interference or normative pressures. In other words, there is more than one definition of democracy, and Russia is following the way best suited to its history and culture.”

From the Russian perspective, a forceful implementation of democracy as exemplified by the United States in countries like Iraq is extraordinarily counterproductive for both the advancement of democracy as well as the advancement of international stability. From this perspective, it is easy to see how such fundamental differences in perspectives on legitimacy could lead to a clash with the foreign policies of Western countries. Such a clash in perspective of acceptable state behavior may result in insoluble disagreements resulting in UNSC negative votes.

H9: Russia will be more likely to vote against UNSC resolutions that deny the legitimacy of a relational state perspective.

Practically, this denial of relational legitimacy mirrors an earlier hypothesis expecting a defense of sovereignty norms. H2 expected Russia to promote the state sovereignty principle. Essentially, the sovereignty principle protects states operating through relational legitimacy from international criticism. The sovereignty principle implements the liberal philosophy at the international level—that each state in the international system has the right as individual to structure its state as it wants without external intervention. Therefore, in an international community with strong sovereignty norms society, internal state behavior is

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191 Larson, and Shevchenko (2010)
193 One potential counterpoint here may be the argument that such a fundamental disagreement over the role of states would result in military confrontations, not just through ‘soft balancing’ actions at the UN.
194 Alternatively, one may view the international community as operating based on a relational perspective, where the drive for order has primacy, and the institutional power-sharing simply reflects the best way to maintain an orderly status quo. However, the principles of the U.N. charter do seem to imply that the sovereignty principle derives more from a liberal perspective. However, scholars like Stephen Krasner would disagree. Krasner (1999).
legitimate whether or not it is based on a liberal or relational structured society. As such, if Russia acts to maintain the state sovereignty norm, Russia also simultaneously defends its right to operate a ‘sovereign democracy’ based on relational principles within its borders. If so, this hypothesis must manage to separate Russia’s desire to promote state sovereignty norms and its desire to promote norms of relational legitimacy. Therefore, the challenge will be to identify resolutions that address questions of relational versus liberal legitimacy without directly involving questions of sovereignty. The resolutions that should prove most insightful are those that discuss questions of the universality of individual rights. From a relational perspective, the application of rights should come on a state level, and therefore not be subject to the mandate of the international community. As such, one would expect Russia to oppose resolutions that promote the international accountability of government behavior to individual citizens.

A RESPECTED POWER

Finally, ‘national pride’ explanations explain Russian behavior in the UNSC by exploring the construction of Russian identity. Proponents of ‘national pride’ explanations argue that Russia’s actions are largely motivated by its desire to regain what it considers to be its proper place on the world stage.\(^{195}\) This approach is deeply grounded in constructivist thought—it contends that Russian national identity-constructs lead it to consider international recognition as a world leader to be a top national priority.\(^ {196}\)

However, realist thinkers such as William Wohlforth have also promoted a similar theory, arguing that Russia strives to regain international prestige due to its impact on

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\(^{195}\) Larson and Shevchenko (2010)
\(^{196}\) Thorun (2009)
relative power concerns.\textsuperscript{197} Robert Gilpin explains the connection between prestige and power more clearly,

“In international relations, prestige is the functional equivalent of the role of authority in domestic politics…Authority (or prestige) is ‘the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.’ Thus, both power and prestige function to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant state or states…in short, numerous factors, including respect and common interest, underlie the prestige of a state and the legitimacy of its rule.”\textsuperscript{198}

In other words, prestige translates into state power critical for international credibility and negotiating leverage.\textsuperscript{199} Russian behavior that seems to reinforce this drive for prestige includes Russia’s attempt to revive its political standing by engaging with the West—trying to incorporate itself as part of greater Europe—and also by its alignment with the rising BIC (Brazil, India, and China) powers.\textsuperscript{200} In particular, Russia leadership has felt slighted at its treatment by the United States since the end of the Cold War and sees the NATO alliance's creep eastwards as a direct threat to Russian national security interests and a violation of past good faith agreements.\textsuperscript{201} Therefore, one would expect Russia to behave in a fashion that draws attention to its power status. In the UNSC, this would manifest itself through opposition to draft resolutions, where Russia’s dissent forces other countries to ‘take it seriously.’

Ian Johnstone’s insight regarding international consensus helps clarify why a disrespected Russia would result in less cooperative environment within the Security Council:

\textsuperscript{197} Wohlforth (2009)
\textsuperscript{199} Thomas Schelling. \textit{Arms and Influence}. Yale University Press. 1969. See Dahl's definition of state power.
\textsuperscript{200} McFarlane (2006)
\textsuperscript{201} For a direct analysis of NATO's eastward expansion, see Sarote (2010)
“Legal interpretation—especially at the international level where the lines between nonlaw, soft law, and hard law are blurry—is fundamentally a search for intersubjective meaning rather than a quest for single right answers.”

In other words, the international community has to work together to agree on how to interpret certain events. On a basic level, in order to take action, the members of the Security Council have to come to a consensus that a particular situation poses a threat to international peace. When Russia is less respected, then Russia’s views will less likely be taken into account. Therefore, the final product of these resolutions will likely be unsatisfying to Russian interpretations. In such situations, it is unsurprising that Russia breaks rank with the other members in order to demonstrate its relevance.

Therefore, 

H10: Russia will be more likely to veto resolutions when they feel that the Western states fail to acknowledge Russia’s great power status and treat Russia in a matter that ignores Russian power.

Moreover, evidence for this hypothesis could also include the clear identification of voting situations where Russia casts a negative vote to ‘make a statement of relevance.’ On the other hand, when Russia is considered an equal player and feels genuinely respected by its Western counterparts, then one would expect Russia to vote in favor of the resolution. However, such information is very challenging to find empirically. Instead, the assessment of Russian prestige is more easily categorized on a larger scale. Therefore, levels of respect can be extrapolated as a general periodizations within the given time period.

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202 Johnstone (2008)
203 Terhalle (2011) notes that “China and Russia have not accepted the Western interpretation for a considerable amount of time (in public international law terminology they are ‘persistent objectors.’” The problem with Terhalle’s assessment, however, is that Russia and China do vote in favor of a vast majority of Security Council resolutions.
204 Because of the strong incentives for great power consensus in support of the status quo, such statements of relevance force the other Great Power states to engage with Russian concerns more seriously, thereby treating Russia with greater respect.
205 The latter will be tested in the qualitative analysis.
Finally, while Clunan’s aspirational constructivism offers another potential theoretical framework, (state leaders choose the best fit from a series of floating identities)\textsuperscript{206} in practice, testing such an approach would border on tautology, and therefore, I refrain from examining her argument in greater detail.

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**RESEARCH DESIGN**

**OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY**

In order to assess the relative strength of the various hypotheses, I focused on the source of the question at hand—Russian votes in the Security Council. Using data from the United Nations,\textsuperscript{207} I examined the 1095 draft resolutions discussed by the United Nations Security Council between September 22, 1995 to December 20, 2012. [Appendix I] This time period serves to provide strong analytical leverage for understanding the voting behavior of the modern Russian Federation. I then coded these resolutions for a number of variables based off of the hypotheses generated from the theoretical discussion. Next, I used the STATA statistical package to run a number of preliminary cross-tabulations tests to identify

\textsuperscript{206} Clunan (2009)

which hypotheses generated positive association.\textsuperscript{208} Afterwards, I ran probit regression tests to further parse out the information. Finally, after I explain the quantitative results, I include a qualitative section synthesizing the statistical findings with evidence based from specific noteworthy resolutions.

Furthermore, before developing the methodology, it is important to clarify one more theoretical point. The tested hypotheses discuss ‘negative votes’, which refer to either an abstention or a veto. Such an approach is justified by the fact that Russian voting justifications demonstrate that Russia considers its abstentions to be negative votes. For example, on resolution 1284 discussing a weapons monitoring mission for Iraq, Russia abstained on the resolution. However, their voting justification made it clear that they considered their vote a ‘no’: “The fact that the Russian Federation was not blocking the imperfect resolution should not be taken to mean that it was obliged to go along with a forceful implementation of it.”\textsuperscript{209} Hence, one sees that Russia does not consider an abstention vote supportive of the resolution. Moreover, due to the fact that many potential veto-type situations are handled outside of the Security Council,\textsuperscript{210} any veto or abstention cast in the Security Council has some symbolic significance, and thus may be considered under a similar voting logic.\textsuperscript{211} Moreover, both Russia and China, the two permanent member states with the highest numbers of abstentions and vetoes, vote in favor of resolutions over 95% of the time. Therefore, because both vetoes and abstention as so rare in the Security Council, both votes and abstentions take on a similar demonstration of

\begin{itemize}
\item[I'd like to give a special thank you to Professor Weisiger and Julie Berez for introducing me to a crash course in STATA 101 and helping me develop the STATA script for the more advanced statistical coding.]
\item[Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1284.]
\item[To cite just three examples, the counterfactual cases of Russian vetoes in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Iraq will be discussed later throughout the course of this paper.]
\end{itemize}
opposition to introduced resolutions, and the hypotheses treat the states’ voting behavior as such.  

Additionally, in order to address the concern that abstentions and not vetoes were driving the findings, one should note that many of the salient examples used in the qualitative section were vetoes. In fact, every major hypothesis used examples of vetoed draft resolutions or threatened vetoes as primary sources of evidence. For example, a 1999 veto on Kosovo proved plays a significant role in the discussion of NATO aggression in H4, and a 2000 veto on Myanmar plays an important role in establishing the importance of state sovereignty over humanitarian norms, as argued in H2.

There were also practical reasons for the grouped classification of vetoes and abstentions. Of the 1095 coded resolutions, only eight were Russian vetoes, and only another 36 were abstentions. In other words, only 4% of the total coded resolutions included any type of negative Russian vote. Therefore, when working with the data, it made sense to work with Russian negative votes (vetoes and abstentions) as opposed to just Russian vetoes—otherwise the sample size was just too small. I thus generated a dichotomous dependent variable, which took a value of 0 when Russia voted in favor of a resolution and 1 when it abstained or voted against.

I chose the data range of September 22, 1995 to December 20, 2012 for practical reasons. From a research perspective, the UN voting data, specifically the UN press releases,

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212 This decision will be discussed in further detail in the data collection section and evidence for this theoretical decision will be reinforced in the section discussing qualitative empirical evidence.

213 i.e. cases in which the resolution was withdrawn to a threat of a Security Council veto.

214 H1, H2, H4, H8, H9 and H10 all included vetoes or threats of vetoes in the qualitative evidence piece. The ‘major’ hypothesis driving the logic of the three theoretical perspectives were H4 (expansionist Russia), H1& H2 (defensive Russia) and H10 (Russia as a status seeker).

215 Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/1999/328 (Kosovo) and S/2000/14 (Myanmar).

216 Including two abstentions from earlier in 1995 that were coded from the period prior to September 22.

217 Nonetheless, due to the fact that there may be different logics behind vetoes and abstentions, I also examine the vetoes from a qualitative standpoint to ensure that the causal voting logics are not being solely driven by the abstention data.
on which my research relied did not extend before September 22, 1995, so that specific date provided a pragmatic cut-off point. Due to the fact that I have chosen to examine an ongoing phenomenon, I needed to draw an end date for my research material even though the Security Council has continued to cast votes in 2013. The end of 2012 offered a good cut-off option by incorporating all but two months of data and also coincides with the New Years recess in the Security Council. Because the Security Council does not meet in the last week of December or during the first week of January, the Security Council tries to squeeze all outstanding important resolutions in at the end of the calendar year, thereby ensuring that such a cut-off date will not miss any important resolutions under consideration.

These cutoff decisions also have grounded analytical foundations. The Russian Federation was not created until late 1991. From 1991-1994, the Russians were still reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union and desperately struggling to reorder the remains of the Soviet empire. As such, during the transition years of 1991-1994, modern Russia’s post-Cold War identity was still developing, and less relevant to understanding modern Russia’s voting behavior.\(^{218}\)

**DATA COLLECTION\(^{219}\)**

The coding process began by transcribing some basic information about the resolution onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. [Appendix II] First, I included the resolution number.\(^{220}\) Each Security Council resolution, when approved, gains a unique resolution number. However, vetoed draft resolutions do not receive a resolution number. Therefore, for the vetoes, I instead inputted the draft resolution number, maintaining the United

\(^{218}\) Tsygankov (2012A) and Thorun (2009) categorize Russian foreign policy behavior as ‘accommodating’ towards the United States during Gorbachev’s short-lived attempt at liberal normalization.

\(^{219}\) For more information about my coded dataset, please refer to Appendix III

\(^{220}\) Rather than inputting each number individually, I created an “x-1” function, where each box’s value was 1 less than the value of the box directly above.
Nations’ formatting (S/YEAR/SEQUENTIAL ITEM). Next, the year and date of the resolution was inputted under the ‘Year’ and ‘Date’ columns, respectively. Next, a topic title was inserted for each resolution. As a general rule, the topic title was taken as presented on the UN webpage. However, consistency took precedence over direct translation. For example, the United Nations page would alternate between labeling resolutions on Iraq as “Iraq”, “Iraq-Kuwait”, and “the situation in Iraq-Kuwait.” I grouped all these resolutions under the same heading of “Iraq.” The one exception to this rule regarded cases of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, which I all coded as Middle East. These cases consisted of three topics: 1) Israel-Palestine 2) The UNDOF observer force situated on the Israel-Syria border 3) UNIFIL peacekeeping force on the Israel-Lebanon border. While the rest of the variables were coded distinctively, the all three cases fell under the same topic heading. The reasoning for this methodological decision was that all three issues remained unchanged throughout the examined time period. However, a separate topic heading existed for ‘Lebanon,’ which did not include the UNIFIL peacekeeping force, but rather exclusively focused on the UN investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Next, I looked at the given press release for the resolution in question. If there were a veto or abstention by Russia or China, I would code a ‘1’ in the relevant column, else I would code ‘0’. I coded the votes for China as well as for Russia because of H6, which predicted a correlation between both countries’ voting behavior. The ‘Notes’ column was used to convey a qualitative sense of the resolution’s intent and implications and was not used in the statistical analysis. The justification column, on the other hand, played an important role in providing qualitative evidence towards the various hypotheses. In any situation where Russia made a public statement to justify or explain their voting behavior,

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these justifications were recorded in this column. The justifications were also incorporated on a quantitative level by providing insight as to whether or not Russia felt the need to voice their opinions on a given set of issues.

Next, the research evaluated variables valuable in assessing substantive elements of the individual resolutions. First, in line with H4, which postulates the importance of perceived hegemonic activity by the United States, I assessed whether the resolution supported or authorized intervention. (Titled ‘Intervention or No’) If there was intervention present, the resolution was coded as a ‘1’, otherwise, it was coded as a ‘0’. For some resolutions, it was not immediately obvious whether or not they constituted cases of intervention. As a general rule, the classification depended on the presence of an armed external military force in the country. Therefore, observer missions such as those in Syria and in Croatia were not coded as interventions and therefore received a ‘0’. On the other hand, peacekeeping missions with a military component, such as in Lebanon or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were counted as cases of intervention and were coded with a ‘1’. Non-military actions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, were not considered acts of intervention. The exception to this general coding rule was those cases that authorized international tribunals under binding resolutions. These few exceptions did directly constitute a significant intervention despite the lack of a military component, and were therefore coded as such.

Next, I checked for the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Variable=‘Chapter VII’) Chapter VII grants the UN Security Council with the responsibility to determine whether international activities pose a threat to international peace and security, and even more importantly, authorizes the Security Council to take measures “to maintain or
restore international peace and security.\textsuperscript{222} With Russia’s concern for international stability and state sovereignty,\textsuperscript{223} whether or not Security Council resolutions are adopted under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII might matter a lot to Russian leadership. Similarly, I searched for a reference to the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII, which authorizes regional security arrangements with the Security Council’s sanction.\textsuperscript{224} In both cases, if there was a reference, the variable was coded as ‘1’; else, the variable was coded as ‘0’. Because references to Chapter VII and Chapter VIII might serve as indicators for U.S. hegemonic ambitions, these two variables were included in response to H4.

In order to control for symbolic resolutions, a column detailing ‘Specific Policy Implications’ established whether the resolution promoted resulted in some actionable change, (coded as ‘3’) or whether the action had no direct policy implication (coded as ‘0’).\textsuperscript{225} For example, a resolution solely condemning terrorist violence would not have specific policy implications. If Russia was motivated by fear of U.S. hegemony, then Russia would be less likely to oppose resolutions without a tangible policy implication. Another column looked specifically at whether the resolution had policy implications for U.S. action beyond the framework of the Security Council, (called ‘Alternately specifically US outside of UN’) such as the U.S.-led multinational forces in Afghanistan. More specifically, policy implications meant that the US may take actionable interventive measures outside of a UN-led mission. Therefore, the difference would be between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was U.S. led, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in

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\textsuperscript{223} For example, see (Coggins 2011), Westra (2010)

\textsuperscript{224} United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53.

\textsuperscript{225} This variable was coded as ‘3’ instead of as ‘1’ because initially there were four possible coding options. However, as the coding developed, I realized that the best way to code this variable was through a binary coding of yes/no to policy implication, and I eliminated the middle two options.
Afghanistan (UNAMA) that was U.N. led. While the leadership differed, it is important to note that the UN Security Council sanctioned both missions. The purpose of this “action outside the UN” variable also looked at H4, but from the other direction: rather than looking at cases without specific actionable policy implications, this variable assessed whether Russia was more likely to veto resolutions that authorized the United States free reign outside of UN control.

H5 predicts that Russia will oppose more resolutions when they feel more secure vis-à-vis the United States. To test this hypothesis, I needed a measure of Russia’s perceived sense of security. In terms of H5, I did not code anything directly from the UN resolutions themselves other than to count the number of negative Russian votes in a given year. H5 looks holistically at whether a Russian sense of security translated to bolder (more negative voting) in the Security Council. In order to get a measurable standard of this perceived sense of security, I drew from two primary sources. First, I drew from indices measuring Russian military strength compiled by the Correlates of War (CoW) project, with a particular utilization of their ‘CINC’ variable, which provides a holistic score of general state strength from 1995 to 2007. In order to assess relative Russian strength versus the United States, I also included the United Staets ‘CINC’ scores, and calculated the relative score from the quotient of the Russian CINC score divided by the sum of the Russian and US score in a given year. Second, I also used data from the World Bank recording Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1995 to 2011 as a means of measuring Russia’s economic strength. I then merged both the CoW data and the World Bank data onto my

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spreadsheet, applying the appropriate value for each variable based on each resolution’s given year.

Next, in order to assess the plausibility of voting as law-abiding behavior, I examined the effects of state consent and the presence of significant violence (hypothesized as critical factors in H1), I coded each resolution for both factors. Because Russia (at least officially) cares strongly for the legal requirements of consent in cases that do not pose a threat to international peace and security, Russia will need a case for which there is either consent or a threat to international peace and security, in order to vote for a resolution. For the state ‘consent?’ column, each variable received ‘0’ if there was no consent, ‘1’ if the state consented, and in the few cases where the consent was unclear, the resolution was coded as ‘2’. (2’s were recoded as 0 for the purposes of statistical analysis.)

However, an important note here is that I didn’t distinguish between those situations where the states readily gave consent and where states gave ‘forced’ consent. My reasoning behind not making such a distinction was two-fold. 1) Discerning the exact level of diplomatic ‘arm-twisting’ that occurred in each case would have been extremely difficult and would have resulted in a high degree of arbitrary assignment 2) From the Russian perspective, the question at hand is whether or not the state gave official consent. Because the theoretical background here draws from theories stressing Russian legalist concerns, the manner by which state consent is derived becomes substantially less important. Therefore, all cases of authorized peacekeeping and observer missions operated under the basis of state consent, even if the consent was begrudgingly given at times.

One other special case worth noting was those resolutions concerning the oil-for-food programme in Iraq. While technically, this resolution extended the amount of

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228 The third important factor, intervention, had already been coded for in H4.
humanitarian aid given to Iraqi civilians, something which the Iraqi government was in favor of, this program operated under the greater framework of international sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Therefore, given the greater context under which these oil-for-food resolutions were passed, I coded these resolutions as passing without Iraqi consent.

The other hypothesized factor in H1 spurring voting opposition to intervention was the lack of significant ongoing conflict in that country (variable=’significant ongoing violence’). When coding significant ongoing violence, the goal was to discern whether or not the country was experiencing violence that threatened government stability. If there had been significant levels of violence at the time of the resolution, then the variable would be coded ‘1’, otherwise, the variable would be coded as ‘0’ for no significant violence. Moreover, the coding tended to follow the general trends of violence within the country rather than focus on the immediate date of the resolution. For example, if there was no violence reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo on March 30, but there had been incidents of violence in February and early March, then such a case would be coded as significant ongoing violence. The exception to such a rule would be if there had been a treaty or peace agreement recently negotiated that coincided with an immediate cessation to all violence—in which case, the clear break with the past would result in a unique variable coding.

However, for the few cases that experienced sporadic levels of violence during this study’s time period, such as Lebanon, the coding was largely based on an examination of the Security Council resolution. For those resolutions passed during a period of significant violence, the Security Council made a point of condemning the violence and encouraging a peaceful settlement to the dispute. Therefore, in such cases of uncertainty, a lack of a
reference to any violent activity was a robust way of confirming that there was no significant ongoing violence during the time of the given resolution.\textsuperscript{229}

Next, I established another variable in order to assess H2, which predicted that violations of the sovereignty norms would lead to negative Russian votes. Because the voting record did not easily lend itself to a direct assessment of sovereignty norms, I instead coded whether or not a violation of sovereignty (as understood by the Russians) had taken place. In order to more fully look at the normative aspect, the Russian justifications column provides a qualitative control on violations on sovereignty that are portrayed as unique exceptions. However, when approaching the violation of state sovereignty, one must understand that the set of actions that infringe on state sovereignty is not immediately obvious. Moreover, Russia’s general predilection towards supporting state sovereignty gives researchers greater reason to believe that Russia may have a broader definition of state sovereignty than the international norm. Therefore, the coding rules took into account this level of ambiguity as to murky Russian guidelines of what constitutes a violation of state sovereignty by sub-coding this ‘violate state sovereignty’ variable into seven possible value entries.

For each case, the first paragraph of the press release statement for each resolution had the policy thrust of that resolution. Based on that information, I determined which category the resolution best fell under. If no violation of sovereignty had taken place, then a value of ‘0’ was reported under the column. For example, a resolution lifting a ban on Liberian diamonds would be coded as a ‘0’. Furthermore, I code non-military observer missions as not constituting a violation of sovereignty because these monitoring missions did

\textsuperscript{229} Finally, I recognize that the Uppsala Conflict Database provides precise levels of violence in each country on an annual basis, given the time constraints and the duality of the variable, the Uppsala database was not employed. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University.
not have permission to affect the reality on the ground and infringe upon state activity.²³⁰

The decision to code these observer missions as a ‘0’ was also an attempt to maintain
consistency; these missions had already been coded as ‘0’ for intervention, indicating that no
intervention had taken place. Next, the variable received a value of ‘1’ if the resolution either
applied or continued sanctions against a state. While the imposition of sanctions has not
traditionally been considered a violation of sovereignty, Russia’s sensitivity in the field of
sovereign governance justified this categorization. In particular, sanctions impinge upon
sovereignty by constituting an attempt to modify a state’s behavior by the international
community. The next category, with a value of ‘2’, included the ‘standard’ violation of
sovereignty—military intervention. The authorization of a military force often came in
response to rising violence that posed a threat to international peace and security. For
example, the resolutions authorizing the NATO-led IFOR force in the Balkans, or
intervention in Libya, offer examples of sovereignty violation through external military
intervention. However, if that this intervention came with consent by state governments, and
operated as a peacekeeping mission, then the resolution was coded as ‘3’ for this category.

However, this peacekeeping umbrella encapsulates a wide range, spanning from Haiti’s pleas
for peacekeeping troops to begrudging Sudanese authorization for a peacekeeping force. The
UNSC general practice was to authorize peacekeeping mandates for no more than one year,
so the same peacekeeping resolutions would continually receive an authorization for an
extended mission. One extreme example is UNIFIL in Lebanon, which was continuously
extended throughout the dataset’s time period and continues to be reauthorized in 2013.²³¹

²³⁰ These observer missions could also only be established with state consent.
²³¹ While the UNIFIL mission continues into 2013, as of March 1, the UNSC has not yet passed any
resolutions extending the mandate during this year.
Next, if the resolution demanded specific policy action by a state government, this was classified as a type ‘4’ violation of sovereignty. While these resolutions do not directly infringe upon state activity, they do lay out an expectation of state behavior. Therefore, any resolution that dictated state policy fell under this category. However, there were a few cases where the dictation of policy behavior accompanied another type of sovereignty violation. For example, resolution 2048 authorized sanctions against Guinea-Bissau (1) and also called for both sides to stop fighting (4). In such situations, the violation of sovereignty was coded as ‘1’, because it was both the primary action in the resolution and also because it comprised the ‘stronger’ violation of sovereignty.

Next, I created a separate category for resolutions that authorized UN tribunals. Three tribunals fell under this classification: 1) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 3) The truth-seeking commission in Lebanon. In all of these cases, the tribunals violated state sovereignty by creating an extra-territorial judicial process. When these tribunals’ mandates were authorized or extended, then the “Violation of Sovereignty” column received a ‘5’. However, resolutions concerning the appointment or reappointment of tribunal judges, which did not affect the authorization of the tribunal, were coded as ‘0’ for no violation of sovereignty. Finally, in order to create binary variables, each value was redefined as viosovX, where X equaled the corresponding value.

In order to assess H7, which predicts a failure of normative compromise to result in negative Russian voting behavior, I created two variables. First, I created a variable examining whether the resolution reaffirms the state’s sovereignty (variable='does wording prevent intervention'). The reason for the importance of recognizing a state’s sovereignty within a resolution violating that sovereignty is that it proves from a normative standpoint
that this Security Council resolution is an exception to the rule.\footnote{232} As such, I searched every resolution for a reference to the relevant state’s sovereignty—if the resolution contained a reference to the state’s sovereignty, then I coded a ‘1’. Otherwise, the sovereignty reference column received ‘0’.

Second, I coded for ‘compromise.’ Admittedly, I found compromise to be a difficult variable to code, as the extant data reveals severe selection effects. Compromise can take place on a number of levels and have a number of different implications. For my dataset, I began by assuming that no compromise had taken place. I then read the voting justifications in the resolutions’ press releases and looked for references to Russian compromise. If the resolution had no reference to compromise, then I coded it as ‘0’. If the resolution did refer to Russian compromise attempts, I further subdivided these references into two categories: 1) successful compromise 2) inability to find a mutually agreeable solution. If the case demonstrated successful compromise, in that one side voted in a way other than it would have done otherwise,\footnote{233} then the variable received a value of ‘1’. Otherwise, if Russia and the other Security Council members were unable to find an agreeable middle ground, then I also coded the case as ‘0’.\footnote{234}

The next column created a binary variable to assess the validity of H8, which expects Russia to be more likely to vote against resolutions condemning prestigious countries (variable=’prestigious country’). The set of prestigious countries was defined as the G-20

\footnote{232} Alternatively, one counterargument might state that recognizing the states’ sovereignty and undermining it anyway through the Security Council actions may serve to deprive ‘state sovereignty’ of having any political substance. Such conscious violations of sovereignty, these opposers would argue, sets precedents for future undermining of state sovereignty among similar lines. Nonetheless, by looking at Russian justifications, it appears that Russia was primarily concerned with the reaffirmation of state sovereignty. For example, in the UN Press Release describing Security Council Resolution 1441, Russia emphasized that “it was of fundamental importance that there was clear confirmation in the resolution that all members respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.”

\footnote{233} I.e. A change from a veto to an abstention, abstention to a yes, etc.

\footnote{234} The author here would like to note that the challenges with this compromise research design will be addressed below in the Statistical Testing section.
countries, or the top 20 most influential countries. Therefore, every resolution focusing on a G-20 country received a value of ‘1’ and those that did not received a value of ‘0’. However, after reviewing 1095 resolutions, only three resolutions directly targeted the behavior of a G-20 state. This finding reinforces scholarly claims that the UNSC Council is a pragmatic institution focused on maintain stability, and makes no claims of fair or equal application of the law. Therefore, while such a finding does lend evidence to the fact that diplomacy regarding Great Power policy behavior takes place outside of the UNSC, such a hypothesis has minimal applicability for understanding Russian voting behavior within the Security Council. The Russian outlier, however, in S/2009/310, does provoke an interesting question of why this situation was brought to the Security Council’s attention. Part of this answer likely rests on two facts: 1) the high profile nature of the case put the international media spotlight on the UN, and the UNSC felt obliged to take action. 2) Even more importantly, the Russian invasion of Georgia the year prior was viewed as largely in retaliation for Georgian overtures towards NATO.

This clash of U.S.-Russian interests may have forced the U.S. to bring the issue to the Security Council in order to show symbolic support of the pro-Western Georgian government in Tbilisi and not be seen by the international community as abandoning Georgia.

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236 Resolution 1192, which condemned India and Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation efforts. The other was S/2009/310, and attempted to establish a peacekeeping force in Georgia to monitor against Russian aggression. Finally, one case, resolution 1067, condemned Cuba in a direct dispute with the United States, and therefore fell under this category as well.
239 This Russia-Georgia relationship will be explored further under the qualitative analysis.
I attempted to broaden the sample data by also including Security Council resolutions that affected every member state, including the prestigious states. However, even with the expanded dataset, the sample size still remained extremely limited at 24 resolutions.

H3 predicted that Russia would be more likely to vote against resolutions concerning the Russian sphere of influence. I coded H3 by determining whether the targeted state in question was a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States ('CIS State'). These CIS states make up the former Soviet Union and maintain close economic ties to Russia, creating a Eurasian Economic Union.\textsuperscript{240} Despite the fact that Georgia has now dropped out of the CIS, for coding purposes, Georgia was considered a CIS state. The reasoning for considering Georgia as a CIS state is three-fold: 1) Georgia was originally a member of the CIS 2) Russia still considers Georgia to be part of the Russian home front\textsuperscript{241} and therefore behaves as such 3) the theory behind H3 cares less about with titular delegation of CIS states vs. non-CIS states than about the geographic CIS location, within which Georgia falls.

Therefore, if the resolution discussed a CIS state (or Georgia), the resolution would be coded as ‘1’, otherwise, it would receive a ‘0’.

In order to strengthen the H3 test, I also examined whether the Russian sphere of influence encapsulated more than just the proximal CIS sphere. Evidence points to the fact that Russia has traditionally considered activity beyond the CIS states still within its sphere of vital security interests.\textsuperscript{242} For example, Russian leadership spent most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century devoting substantial time and resources to controlling the political environment in Afghanistan, which the Russians considered critical to their national security.\textsuperscript{243} Furthermore,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{240} INTERSTATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Tsygankov (2012B)
\item \textsuperscript{242} Tsygankov (2012A) pp. 31-33
\item \textsuperscript{243} Angstrom (2008), pp. 384-386
\end{itemize}
the conflicts throughout the 1990’s in the former Yugoslav republic, Russia demonstrated that it considered the Balkan region to be part of its near abroad and felt a deep affinity for the Slavic Serbians.244 Therefore, I coded a second variable titled ‘CIS States+Borders+Balkans’ (or CISBB), which included all states that were in the CIS space, bordered CIS countries, or were part of the former Yugoslavia. These cases were given a value of ‘1’; otherwise, the resolutions were coded as ‘0’ for this last category.

For H9, which discusses the differences between relational and liberal legitimacy, I was unable to find a simple way to code the resolutions for promoting relational or liberal legitimacy for statistical analysis. Thus, no distinct coding category was used to measure the strength of H9. However, the material gathered through the qualitative analysis of Russian voting justifications should provide greater insight into the strength of this hypothesis.

H10, which looks at the impact of reputation and great power status, required one additional coded variable for analysis: “respect.” For the coding of this variable, I relied on the temporal analysis provided by Christian Thorun.245 Thorun identifies three distinct time periods of Russian status perception within our data sample.246 From 1995-2000, Russia felt increasingly disrespected and alienated from the Western world.247 From 2001-2004, Russia felt more respected by the West as a legitimate security partner in the War on Terror.248 Finally, from 2005 onwards, Russia has once again felt disrespected by the West and disillusioned at prospects of cooperation.249 Admittedly, Thorun’s data ends in 2007, but Tsygankov, writing in 2012, provides a nearly identical temporal periodization.250 Thus, every resolution that fell within a time period where Russia was disrespected received a ‘0’,

245 Thorun (2009).
246 Thorun, (2009), Ch. 1.
247 Ibid
248 Ibid
249 Ibid
250 Tsygankov (2012A), Ch. 4.
and when Russia was respected (from 2001-2004) the “respect” variable was coded as a ‘1’. Therefore, by examining the proportion of Russian negative votes for each time period, the evidence should provide a general sense of whether the hypothesis is on target.

However, I do recognize the potential challenge posed by the issue of counterfactuals—if the West actually respects Russia’s status and national interests, then the West will not introduce resolutions they that they know Russia will counter. Therefore, Russian negative votes will not be diminished by a lessened need to make a symbolic statement, but rather because there are fewer draft resolutions introduced with which they disagree. While this critique correctly identifies a separate causal mechanism, both mechanisms are triggered by higher levels of Russian prestige and result in lower numbers of Russian negative votes. Therefore, while this critique rightly identifies the proportion of negative votes in a given period as an imperfect proxy for levels of Russian prestige, this proxy still does successfully measure the level of Western respect accorded to the Russian delegation.

Before moving on to the statistical methodology, I would like to recognize that during the coding process, I discovered avenues for improvement in future coding exercises. First, on the variable for compromise (H7), I would recode the section as to differentiate between the situations where there were no attempts at compromise and those situations where attempts at compromise were made but were unsuccessful. This recoding would improve the clarity of the variables and would allow for an additional test of the relative success of attempts at compromise. Second, the Uppsala conflict statistics on violence could be used to measure the number of casualties per year and further differentiate between different levels of violence taking place. For example, tracing onto each resolution the yearly casualty figures for the relevant country would enable the researcher to conduct more in-
depth tests as to whether there is a more specific numerical cutoff for the number of casualties to affect voting behavior, or whether, as Gilligan and Stedman argue, the critical level of violence depends upon the region. Next, I would have coded the extensions of peacekeeping missions differently. Due to the fact that peacekeeping missions have to be repeatedly reauthorized and extended, these missions take up a disproportionately large number of the UNSC resolutions. Moreover, because the extended resolutions are almost always identical to the earlier resolutions, the extended resolutions are simple formalities. As such, they don’t engender genuine debate over the proposed resolution—those arguments and negotiations already took place during the original agreement. While it’s not inherently problematic to code these extensions as normal resolutions (as done in this paper), differentiating these extensions from original resolutions would have the added benefit of clearing the clutter of useless resolutions and lowering the N-sample size, thereby more clearly drawing out the significant variables. Finally, further research on the topic may consider adding two additional variables: 1) Russian co-sponsorship. Looking at the resolutions that Russia cosponsored in the Security Council would be another useful measure in ascertaining levels of Russian prestige as well as levels of Russian cooperation. 2) Relational legitimacy. This variable, while initially dismissed as too difficult to code, might be possible to code by creating three categories: 0) Not applicable 1) Relational legitimacy 2) Liberal legitimacy. This would have to be coded from an analysis of the notes and justifications columns, just as is already being done. Nevertheless, an official coding would help add a level of formality and statistical clarity to the analysis of H9.

**STATISTICAL TESTING**

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251 Gilligan and Stedman (2003)
Statistical analyses were conducted through the statistical package, STATA. While 1095 total observations is clearly sufficient for statistical analysis, the relatively small number of Russian vetoes and abstentions presents challenges for statistical inference.

I began by running initial cross-tabulations. The goal here was to isolate the hypotheses that had a low p-value, or a low probability that the association between the compared variables would have arisen by sheer chance. For the initial run-through, I looked for the chi-squared tests that provided me with p-values of .1 or less. While a 10% standard error of the mean is twice the generally accepted level of 5%, the (Pr= 0.1) cut-off provided a close enough correlation to warrant further testing and analysis. Below, I outline the tests that I ran for the various hypotheses. The findings indicated strongest support for H1, H2, H6, and H3. As such, the statistical findings provided strong evidence that Russia takes a defensively motivated strategic outlook preserving the status quo through its voting behavior in the Security Council. Even more importantly, these findings confirm the thesis that Russian voting in the Security Council is motivated by a combined desire to maintain international stability and preserve state sovereignty norms.

H1: Following International Law

H1 hypothesizes a strict Russian adherence to international law. According to Russia’s interpretation of the United Nations Charter, two of the primary determinants for legal behavior in the Security Council are the consent of the actors, and the presence of a threat to international peace and security. Russia believes that only under Chapter VII, in cases threatening international peace and security, does the UNSC have the authorization to intervene and combat aggression without the consent of the parties involved. Therefore, if

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252 And therefore 10% is typically not considered statistically significant, although some studies have included data under a 10% Type I error.

Chapter VII is not invoked, then one would expect Russia to oppose unless there is consent of the parties involved. Moreover, due to Russia's predisposition to view violent intervention as the greatest threat to international peace and stability, Russia will not encourage the use of force or violation of sovereignty unless absolutely necessary. The statistical evidence lends strong support to H1 by finding both the Chapter VII and consent variables to be highly significant.

Initially, I used the ‘significant violence’ as a means to assess current threats to international security. Significant violence was coded with the intent to capture which resolutions discussed situations that posed a threat to international peace and security. However, acts of violence do not necessarily pose a threat to international stability. This suspicion of the inability of the significant violence variable to measure threats to international peace and security was compounded by the fact that while Chapter VII was highly significant (Pr=.001), significant ongoing violence was not significant (Pr=.613). However, when I ran a cross-tabulation with Chapter VII and Significant Ongoing Violence, the two results were very significantly related (Pr=.000), suggesting that both variables may play a role in determining whether a resolution poses a threat to international peace. (Figure 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
<th>Significant Ongoing Violence (H3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi²(1) = 57.1100 Pr = 0.000

Figure 2: Association between Chapter VII and Significant Ongoing Violence

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254 See, for example, Coggins (2011) and Weingast (1995).
255 For example, in resolution 1203, Russia did not agree that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to international peace and security, and would therefore not support the resolution.
In order to dispel any ambiguity between the causality and association of the significant violence variable, I ran a multivariate probit analysis. The test reinforced the ‘significant violence’ variable’s inability to explain negative Russian votes. When examining the driving factors behind explaining Russian vetoes, Chapter VII was highly significant ($P>|z| = .003$), while Significant Ongoing Violence was notably insignificant ($P>|z| = .761$). (Figure 3)

| rusreg | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | $P>|z| \ | 95\% \text{Conf. Interval} |
|--------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------------------------|
| chaptervii | 0.4443768 | 0.1480901 | 3.00  | 0.003 | 0.1541256, 0.734628 |
| significant-3 | 0.0446462 | 0.146852 | 0.30  | 0.761 | -2.431784, 0.3324708 |
| _cons | -2.021305 | 0.1278348 | -15.81 | 0.000 | -2.271857, -1.770754 |

Figure 3: Probit analysis of Chapter VII and Significant Violence on Russian Negative Voting

On the other hand, while Chapter VII was initially coded to help explain U.S. hegemony, its significance does strongly indicate that Russia takes notice when a resolution characterizes a conflict as a threat to peace and security. Thus, in order to further hone in on the legalistic aspect, the analysis must also further explore under what conditions Russia opposes characterizing situations as a ‘threat to international peace’ with Chapter VII. First, one might expect that Russia would be more inclined to object to the inclusion of Chapter VII in resolutions where there is no significant ongoing violence. However, such a test provides a statistically insignificant association ($Pr=.164$). (Figure 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\text{Pearson chi2(1) = 1.9402} \quad Pr = 0.164$

Figure 4: Association between Russian negative votes and Chapter VII when Ongoing Violence=0

On the other hand, when there is significant ongoing violence present, Russia’s likelihood to oppose a Chapter VII resolution is statistically significant ($Pr=.006$). (Figure 5)
Figure 5: Association between negative Russian votes and Chapter VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi²(1) = 7.7031, Pr = 0.006

Such a finding is initially counter-intuitive, since the results indicate that Russia is more likely to vote against a Chapter VII resolution detailing a threat to international peace and security when there is violence (and presumably threatening stability) than when there is no violence.

However, upon further examination, one realizes that Russia’s narrower definition of ‘a threat to international peace and security’ causes voting friction within the Security Council. While other Security Council states may be willing to immediately categorize violence as a threat to global peace and security, Russia needs further confirmation that the violence does not simply entail internal violence beyond the legal purview of the Security Council and actually threatens regional or international peace. If the violence does not spill beyond a state’s sovereign borders, then that conflict remains internal and lies beyond the Security Council’s jurisdiction. The ongoing violence in Syria provides a classic case of such a disconnect between Russia and some of the other members over the distinction of state violence and threats to international peace and security.²⁵⁶ Despite the fact that limited violence has spilled into Turkey, Russia has steadfastly maintained that the conflict remains an internal Syrian conflict and does not threaten international peace.²⁵⁷ On the other hand, in cases where the UNSC invokes Chapter VII without the presence of significant ongoing violence, the international community faces less of a sense of urgency and has the time to negotiate and compromise. Moreover, because these non-violent threats to international

²⁵⁶ See Russia’s statement in UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1994. “Underscoring the technical nature of the text, he stressed that it did not address the political situation in Syria, which was not on the Council’s agenda. Furthermore, events there posed no threat to international peace and security.”

²⁵⁷ “UN Condemns Syrian Attack on Turkish Town.” BBC News. 5 October 2012.
peace usually develop in a more latent, slowly evolving phase (such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons), the other members of the Security Council are willing to pursue Russia’s preferred approach of negotiated diplomacy. In short, Russia’s narrowly specified legal definition of threats to international peace and the appropriate responses lead to problems in Security Council resolutions adopted under the Chapter VII clause. However, due to the variation in Security Council members’ legal interpretation of significant violence as a threat to international peace and security, Russia’s voting behavior tends to clash with other members in Chapter VII resolutions with significant ongoing violence.

The second element to Russia’s legalist approach in H1 is the role of consent from the parties in the conflict. According to the theoretical background, Russia should be more inclined to diplomatic or negotiated solutions to which each party gives their consent. To a large degree, this consent-driven focus stems from Russia’s belief that a lasting peace only results through a negotiated solution with the consent of both sides. Moreover, the bulk of Russian voting behavior on matters of consent derives from their position that UN forces may only be dispatched with the consent of the conflicting parties. Therefore, in cases where a Security Council resolution does not have state support, Russia will be wary of giving support. Unless Russia believes that the resolution at hand proves a dire threat to international peace and is beyond the point of constructive dialogue, Russia will pursue consensus-building measures. Thus, it should not be surprising that there is a strongly significant association between negative Russian voting and a lack of state consent to

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258 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 1977, which imposed “binding obligations on all States to establish controls preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery.” (Security Council Press Release accompanying Resolution 1977.)
resolution content (Pr=.000). (Figure 6)

Figure 6: Association between negative Russian voting and state consent

A combination of the consent and threats to international peace variables provides a strong association to negative Russian votes and therefore offers strong support to H1. However, this consent mechanism operates in two distinct ways. First, Russia will be likely to oppose Chapter VII resolutions adopted without consent. Russia’s insistence on constructive diplomacy requires a deep engagement with parties involved to defuse threats to international stability. The statistical evidence supports this point, by showing that a cross-tabulation of negative Russian voting patterns and state consent remains highly significant (Pr=.000) when only looking at the data sample where resolutions invoke Chapter VII. (Figure 7)

Also, Russia’s tendency to vote negatively on Chapter VII resolutions adopted without consent (found through a crosstab between Chapter VII and rusneg only when consent=0)

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259 See, for example, Russia’s position in UN press statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Security Council resolutions 1544 and Security Council draft resolution S/2000/1171.
260 See, for example, Security Council resolution 1706, in which Russia will not support a peacekeeping force in Sudan before getting Sudanese governmental approval.
261 See, for example, Russia’s response in the UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1127 on Angola. “UNITA had virtually challenged the United Nations and the Council. The international community, therefore, had no alternative but to adopt the measures outlined in the draft resolution.”
remains significant at a 95% confidence interval (Pr=.043). (Figure 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Chapter VII 0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 4.1144$  $Pr = 0.043$

Figure 8: Association between negative Russian voting and Chapter VII when state consent=0

Therefore, on issues threatening international peace and security, Russia seems to require a consensual engagement with the parties to the conflict.

However, in conflicts without significant violence, Russia also cares strongly about consent. Unlike cases adopted under Chapter VII, these situations do not necessarily pose an immediate threat to world peace. In resolutions where there is no significant ongoing violence, Russia’s negative voting is statistically significant when cross-tabulated with state consent (Pr=.032). (Figure 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Consent7 (H3) 0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 4.6107$  $Pr = 0.032$

Figure 9 Association between negative Russian voting and state consent if ongoing violence=0

Thus, the finding that a lack of ongoing violence leads Russia to place an even higher premium on consent seems to further corroborate the hypothesis that a lack of violence extends the negotiating timetable. As such, with the longer time span and no current ongoing violence, Russia will be even more insistent that international law demands that the Security Council may only approve a negotiated settlement with state consent.
Therefore, the consistent significance of the tested variables does lend strong support to H1’s hypothesis of Russia’s legal considerations. However, it appears that both designating a resolution under Chapter VII and failing to garner state consent both significantly affect Russian voting patterns. Moreover, the role of significant ongoing violence still remained unclear. In order to clarify each variables’ relative explanatory power, I conducted a probit test on Russian negative votes and assessed the impact of consent, Chapter VII, and ongoing violence on these votes. The probit test results reinforced the initial findings derived from the cross-tabulations: state consent and the inclusion of Chapter VII were both significant drivers behind the negative Russian votes ((P>|z|=.000) and (P>|z|=.044) respectively) while significant ongoing violence did not play a causal role (P>|z|=.889). (Figure 10) In sum, the statistical analysis of H1 strongly supports the hypothesis that Russian votes in the Security Council result based on its strict legal interpretation of UNSC jurisdiction.

| rusneg  | Coef. | Std. Err. | z   | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------|-------|-----------|-----|------|---------------------|
| consenth3 | -0.6336084 | .150142 | -4.22 | 0.000 | -.9278813 to -.3393354 |
| chapter7v | .3141759 | .1563292 | 2.01 | 0.044 | .0077762 to .6205755 |
| significant | .021323 | .1529499 | -0.14 | 0.889 | -.3210893 to .2784534 |
| cons | -1.527751 | .1673325 | -9.13 | 0.000 | -1.855716 to -1.199785 |

Figure 10: Probit analysis of state consent, Chapter VII, and Ongoing Violence on negative Russian voting

H2: PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTY

The primary interest in H2 is to examine whether resolutions threatened the norms surrounding the state sovereignty principle. However, as explained in the methodology section, the strength of norms is difficult to measure on a quantitative level, I instead used violations of sovereignty as a proxy. By voting for the authorization of a violation of state sovereignty, Russia undermines the non-intervention norms. After all, by definition, every violation of the state sovereignty principle undermines the inviolability of the sovereignty
norm. Therefore, Russia should have a strong incentive to oppose violations of sovereignty unless viewed as completely necessary for international peace. Finally, when Russia does not oppose violations, one should expect Russia to justify why this resolution fits into their conceptualized normative framework on sovereignty. The statistical evidence below indicates that Russia is more likely to vote against violations of sovereignty and also takes care to justify its votes in cases where there were violations of sovereignty. Both pieces of evidence strongly support H2.

The first statistical tests aimed to get a rough sense of whether or not violations of sovereignty had any associated effect on Russian voting behavior. I tested the effect by running a cross-tabulation of negative Russian votes and a dichotomous variable that captured all of the possible violations of sovereignty that I measured (excluding values 0 and 6, which did not entail any violations of sovereignty). The resulting test was highly significant (Pr=.005). (Figure 11) Of the 43 negative votes examined, 38 constituted some form of a violation of sovereignty. Therefore, this initial scan provided strong evidence for H2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>realsov12345</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(1) = 8.0586 Pr = 0.005

Figure 11: Association of negative Russian votes and violations of state sovereignty

Next, tests were run in order to distinguish the independent significance of the different values for the violation of sovereignty variable. For clarity’s purpose, each value was redefined as viosovX, where X equaled the corresponding value for the violation of sovereignty. Of the tests run, only viosov1 (sanctions) and viosov3 (peacekeeping) were statistically significant at conventional levels (Pr=.000 and Pr=.041; respectively).
Furthermore, the viosov0 (no violation of sovereignty) and viosov2 (military intervention) were marginally significant (Pr=.062 and Pr=.065, respectively). Finally, Viosov4 (dictating state behavior), Viosov5 (international tribunals) and Viosov6 (promoting state sovereignty) were all not statistically significant with a chi-squared over .2.262

The two cases of marginal significance (viosov0 and viosov2) bear further explanation. First, viosov0 (no violation of sovereignty) may be explained by a separate mechanism at work: if the resolution does not call for any type of violation of sovereignty, then the set of cases are less extreme. For such resolutions, Russia will oppose those resolutions not because of a threat to sovereignty, but, as articulated in H1, they do not believe that situations not posing a threat to international peace and security fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council.263

It is also surprising, however, that the viosov2 (military interventions) variable is not more significant. However, when looking at the numbers, the lack of significance may result from the low number of interventions. (Figure 12) Russia voted against viosov2 resolutions 8.7% of the time. In comparison, viosov1 was extremely significant with negative Russian voting 10.1% of the time, and viosov3 was statistically significant with only 2.2% negative votes. Nonetheless, despite the proportion of high negative voting percentage in viosov2, this comes out to only 4 negative votes! Therefore, the fact that viosov2 was marginally

\[262 \text{ Viosov 4: Pr=.311; Viosov5: Pr=.220; Viosov6: Pr=.390} \]
\[263 \text{ One might suspect that the association is statistically significant in the other direction for the value of 0. However, this is not the case, and the Pearson chi-squared values have the same direction as the other cases with violations of sovereignty (positive values).} \]
significant even with such a low ‘N’ lends overall credence to H2.

![Table: Association between negative Russian voting and military intervention](image)

Figure 12: Association between negative Russian voting and military intervention

The insignificance of dictating state actions, international tribunals, and promoting state sovereignty also make sense within the bounds of H2. UN resolutions that demand a specific state policy or institute international tribunals are not violations of sovereignty in the traditional sense, and therefore would not require the same normative opposition as would the other more blatant violations of sovereignty. Finally, because resolutions coded with a value of ‘6’ actually promote sovereignty, it is no surprise that Russia opposed none of those resolutions. While one might expect to see a significant association in the other direction (namely, that Russia tended to vote more positively on resolutions that promoted sovereignty), the lack of significance in either direction is best explained by the fact that only 19 resolutions were classified with a value of ‘6’.\(^{264}\)

One unexpected result was the insignificance of the variable measuring the mention of ‘sovereignty’. The expectation was that a reference to state sovereignty would make Russia less likely to veto the resolution. However, a reference to sovereignty was not significant as to whether or not the Russia would vote against the resolution (Pr=878). Nevertheless, a reference to state sovereignty was much more likely to be present in resolutions that violated state sovereignty through sanctions, peacekeeping, or intervention (Pr=.000). (Figure 13)

\(^{264}\) But Russia did not oppose any of the viosov6 resolutions promoting sovereignty.
Therefore, we may include that while the inclusion of state sovereignty did not affect Russian voting behavior, it does play a role in passing a resolution violating state sovereignty. This finding reinforces the idea that some Security Council states care strongly about the protecting sovereignty norms even when violating sovereignty.\textsuperscript{265}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabu}{c|cc|c}
& Does Wording Prevent Intervention (HS) & & \\
& 0 & 1 & Total \\
\hline
0 & 239 & 115 & 354 \\
1 & 309 & 432 & 741 \\
\hline
Total & 548 & 547 & 1,095 \\
\end{tabu}
\caption{Association between violations of sovereignty and voting justifications}
\end{table}

Moreover, when a violation of sovereignty takes place, one would expect Russia to make some effort to justify the violation of sovereignty. After all, Russia believes that the state sovereignty norm should serve as the baseline for international behavior. Therefore, any UN authorized violation of state sovereignty should only happen under extraordinary circumstances threatening international peace. In these extraordinary circumstances, Russia should seek to justify its voting behavior so as to fit its voting pattern into the general normative framework supporting state sovereignty. The statistical evidence strongly supports this theory. A cross-tabulation of negative Russian votes and Russian justifications, when only testing circumstances where violations of sovereignty took place, was highly significant (Pr=.000). (Figure 14) In other words, in cases where there was a violation of sovereignty, Russian negative votes were associated with voting justifications.

\textsuperscript{265} While this finding alone does not clearly state that Russia is the state concerned with sovereignty here, qualitative evidence from the voting justifications discussed below further supports this view. See, for example, UNSC Resolution 1199.
Figure 14: Association between negative Russian voting and voting justification if sovereignty violation = 1

However, such a phenomenon may just be a result of Russia’s predilection for justifying any negative votes in general. Therefore, I ran another test, a cross tabulation of Russia’s tendency to justify its votes when a violation of sovereignty took place. Surprisingly, this test provided a result that was not statistically significant (Pr=.206). However, I suspected that this result was misleading. I had included within the classified dataset of violations of sovereignty every resolution extending a peacekeeping mission. These extensions were often mere formalities, and the normative justifications had already been established with the initial consent to the mission. For example, although Russia had felt the need to justify their behavior on the Security Council resolution. For example, in the case of substantially broadening the mandate of a peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara, Russia felt the need to justify the Security Council’s activities. However, in the following twelve resolutions between 2004 to 2012, Russia did not feel the need to reinforce their position as the length of the peacekeeping mission was extended. Therefore, in order to control for these time-extension resolutions for peacekeeping missions, I ran a further test, which proved statistically significant (Pr=.000). In this highly significant test, I ran the same cross tabulation as before, but instead excluded viosov3 (peacekeeping missions) from the

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266 See UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1495. “GENNADY M. GATILOV (Russian Federation) said the resolution opened the way for the peace process and did not impose a final solution on the parties. It was important that, at this time, the Council had demonstrated the capacity to come to a consensus decision on a very difficult matter.”
Mund-90

dataset. The extremely high significance of this second test supports my instinct that the peacekeeping formalities were affecting the data results.

Thus, the conclusion drawn was that the norms of sovereignty did affect Russian voting behavior and encouraged the Russian delegation to justify violations of those norms. While H2 was strongly supported on a holistic level, not all violations of sovereignty evoked the same degree of Russian negative voting response. Russia’s tendency to oppose violations which involved sanctions or peacekeeping missions resulted in the two most significant values, which reinforces the view that Russia opposes violations to sovereignty (including the implementation of international sanctions) unless completely necessary. Furthermore, the two values of marginal significance may be explained by a separate causal mechanism and a low number of examined resolutions. In short: Russian leaders vote to oppose unnecessary violations of sovereignty and to maintain sovereignty norms.

H3: RUSSIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

The next hypothesis presumed that Russia would be most strongly opposed to Security Council resolutions that concern Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. As a first cut, I conducted simple cross-tabulations between Russian negative voting and whether or not the topic of the resolution was a CIS state. Shockingly, the Russia’s voting behavior is remarkably consistent with its general voting patterns, and did not produce a significant result (Pr=.808). (Figure 15) However, as mentioned above, such a result may derive from selection effects—that the other countries respect Russia’s influence in the CIS and do not bring those discussions to full-fledged votes in the UN Security Council.267 One recent

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example evincing this point was Kyrgyzstan’s internal conflict in 2010. While the bloody Kyrgyz conflict may have posed a threat to international peace and security, “on June 14, the U.N. Security Council discussed the unrest in Kyrgyzstan at a closed-door meeting.” This Kyrgyz conflict, however, never made its way into a Security Council resolution, and therefore eluded our data search.

![CIS State (H8) Table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>CIS State</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 15: Association between negative Russian voting and CIS state**

However, the presence of a second measure of activity in the Russian sphere (which included CIS states, their border states, and the Balkan region) allows for more insight by including areas that Russia considers within its sphere but where the rest of the Security Council feels less circumspect. The cross-tabulation between Russian negative voting and CISBB (+Balkans +Borders) was statistically significant (Pr=.034). Such a finding may result from the contested nature of these states—that Russia and the West do not agree whether they fall into the Eurasian sphere. Moreover, a further test demonstrated that Russian opposition to resolutions in the CISBB sphere was even more significant when by the resolution concerned a violation of sovereignty (Pr=.014), indicating that Russians strongly opposed resolutions violating sovereignty in their domestic sphere. Given Russian concerns with the sovereignty norm, this finding makes sense. After all, violations of

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270 Sovereignty was measured by realsolv12345
sovereignty in the Russian sphere of influence are far more impactful on the sovereignty norms in Eastern Europe than do violations of sovereignty in other regions. For example, because an overwhelming number of Security Council resolutions authorizing violations of sovereignty target African countries, those violations are far less influential in affecting norms and setting precedents in Eastern Europe. Similarly, a violation of sovereignty in the Middle East might only affect normative patterns limited to the Middle Eastern region.

When only looking at CIS states, cases with a violation of sovereignty were more likely to be opposed, but the findings were not statistically significant (Pr=.114). The small sample size of 15 resolutions (with 2 negative votes) also played a limiting role in generating productive results.

Moreover, Russia was also very concerned with justifying its voting behavior on resolutions concerning its sphere of influence. Russia was far more likely to issue a statement justifying its vote on resolutions concerning the CIS (Pr=.002). (Figure 16) This finding reiterates Russia’s concern for the normative treatment of these states’ sovereignty.

However, Russia had less of a clear association for justifications in the CIS cases alone (Pr=.057). Such a finding may result from the fact that of the 60 resolutions concerning the CIS states, only two resolutions were ‘hard’ violations of state sovereignty (sanctions, military intervention, or peacekeeping). Therefore, due to the fact that these resolutions were less substantive, the Russians may have felt less of a need to justify their voting behavior.

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271 In fact, an overwhelming number of all Security Council resolutions target African states.
Figure 16: Association between justifications and CISBB

If the resolution called for intervention in the Russian sphere, Russian opposition was highly significant. For the CIS states, Russia opposed 2 of 3 resolutions calling for intervention into the CIS (Pr=.000). For CISBB, Russia opposed 8 of 100 resolutions, a voting pattern that was also highly significant (Pr=.002). Such evidence lends additional support to the existence of a distinct Russian sphere of influence where Russia is more likely to oppose resolutions.

Finally, in order to confirm that this relationship did not arise because of omitted variable bias, I ran a probit test with consent and Chapter VII, two factors that have already been established as significant. (Figure 17) Indeed, the probit test does confirm CISBB as a significant causal factor (P>|z|=.013). In sum: the available data strongly supports H3’s postulate that a Russian sphere of influence affects Russian voting behavior. In all, CISBB proved to be a better indicator than did CIS because too few of the CIS issues are even brought before the Security Council.

272 Nonetheless, due to the fact that CISBB is not the only significant variable, we may conclude that the other variables’ effects on Russian voting behavior is not caused by Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.
**H4: LIMITING U.S. HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS**

If Russia’s voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemonic aspirations, then Russia will vote against resolutions which contain elements expanding U.S. intervention. The relevant coded factors tested for H4 were 1) the inclusion of Chapter VII 2) the authorization of intervention 3) a resolution with actionable policy implications 4) the authorization of U.S. intervention outside of a UN-controlled force 5) whether or not sovereignty was referenced in the resolution 6) the presence of state consent. Due to the fact that resolutions introduced under Chapter VII resolution designate the discussed issue as a threat to international peace, Chapter VII provides a critical first step for the authorization of U.S. unilateral activity. If not accepted under Chapter VII, then states have less of a legitimate excuse for intervention.273 Furthermore, if the resolution has no direct implications for actionable policy, then Russia should not view the resolution as a means for U.S. expansion. Further, if foreign intervention or a violation of sovereignty is authorized, then the U.S. may have an excuse to extend its influence into the given region through the guise of the UN. More specifically, if the resolution gives the U.S. authorization to act without centralized United Nations force, then Russia has even more reason to fear ignoble expansionist motivations. However, if the state has given consent for the operation, then this may help to assuage Russian concerns. Finally, a resolution with wording that specifically

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273 Take, for example, the case of Iraq, when the United States used resolution 1441 accepted under Chapter VII as a justification for their invasion of Iraq in 2003.
affirms a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity may serve as a normative buffer against foreign intervention. After conducting the statistical analyses, I found that the major driver tested in H4 was the invocation of Chapter VII, which other hypotheses also predict to play a significant role. However, the insignificance of the primary variables of whether an authorization of intervention occurred and whether the resolution permitted US activity outside of the UN largely invalidate H4. Below, I expound upon the various cross-tabulations and regression tests that led to this conclusion.

For H4, focusing on Russian fears of U.S. hegemonic ambitions, I ran chi-squared cross-tabulations to test the significance of authorized intervention on voting behavior. While about half of the resolutions were coded as interventions, only 40% of the selected sample resulted in negative votes, resulted in a standard error of the mean of 16% (Pr=.163), which is not statistically significant. (Figure 18)

Even more importantly, a cross-tabulation between negative Russian votes and the authorization of US activity outside of UN oversight proves insignificant (Pr=.554). This finding poses a strong challenge to H4. H4 would expect such examples of unregulated

274 Here again, resolution 1441 on Iraq provides a good example of Russia’s attempt to buffer against U.S. intervention. As Russia stated in the press release on the resolution, “He said it was of fundamental importance that there was clear confirmation in the resolution that all members respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.” However, in this case, the inclusion of the reaffirmation of Iraq’s sovereignty was unsuccessful in maintaining Iraqi sovereignty as the United States invaded anyway.

275 Particularly H1, H2 and H9.
behavior to be the motivating factor behind Russian voting, and the evidence strongly suggests that this is not the case. Therefore, the fact that both ‘Intervention’ and ‘US outside activity’ did not significantly affect voting behavior implies that the H4 hypothesis is not unsupported.

I continued by testing the number of negative resolutions against whether or not Chapter VII had been invoked. This proved highly significant (Pr<0.001), implying that the invocation of Chapter VII was associated with Russian abstentions and vetoes. (Figure 19) Nonetheless, Chapter VII just delineates a case as a threat to international peace and security (and therefore justifies UNSC authorizations of force). However, this delineation does not directly assume that the Security Council will take any action that would allow the U.S. to expand its influence. When restricting the sample to only cases where the resolution was adopted under the binding Chapter VII, the authorization of intervention becomes significant (Pr=.023). This finding reinforces the lack of association of U.S. activity outside the United Nations, which, even with the restriction of resolutions where Chapter VII was invoked, still remains insignificant (Pr=.813).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>447</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson chi2(1) = 10.4662 Pr = 0.001

Figure 19: Association between negative Russian voting and Chapter VII

Further, a chi-squared test revealed that there was a weak association between negative Russian votes and the existence of a specific policy implication with a chi-squared of about 11% (Pr=.111). However, a multivariate probit test of the variables (A specific
actionable policy from the resolution, authorized intervention, and the inclusion of Chapter VII) demonstrated that the inclusion of Chapter VII ($P > |z| = .004$) and the authorization of intervention ($P > |z| = .059$) were the primary causal drivers. (Figure 20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>$P &gt; z$</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>chaptervii</td>
<td>0.4259076</td>
<td>0.1461716</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.1394166 0.7123986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specificpol</td>
<td>0.2020554</td>
<td>0.1348963</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>-0.0623364 0.4664473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention</td>
<td>-0.2736022</td>
<td>0.1449096</td>
<td>-1.89</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.5576197 0.0104153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>-2.433022</td>
<td>0.3935302</td>
<td>-6.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3.204327 -1.661717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Probit of Chapter VII, Specific Policy Implications, and the authorization of intervention on negative Russian voting

Finally, hypothesizing that the association might hidden by the fact that Russia only opposes hegemonic influence in cases without consent, I tested the strength of association for the consent variable under the presumption that binding Chapter VII resolutions authorizing intervention were less likely to be accepted when the state did not consent to the intervention. This proved marginally significant ($Pr = .071$). Furthermore, when conducting a similar analysis, testing the authorization of intervention variable for negative Russian votes and controlling for Chapter VII and US activity outside of the UN, the association remains only marginally significant ($Pr = .0652$). In sum, the statistical evidence implies that while the categorization of a conflict under Chapter VII does affect Russian voting behavior, Russia’s UNSC voting is not driven by fears of US hegemony.

H5: RELATIVE SECURITY VIS-À-VIS THE US

H5 expects that Russia will only be willing to oppose the United States in the Security Council when Russia feels strong enough to withstand United States disapproval. Therefore, one should expect high levels Russian negative votes when Russia is relatively strong against the United States.\textsuperscript{276} In terms of statistical methodology, for H5, I took

\textsuperscript{276} Paul (2005) argues that Russia does not feel the sense of urgency to oppose U.S. hegemony when it is weak because it does not believe that U.S. preponderance poses an existential threat to Russian sovereignty.
advantage of the merged spreadsheets and ran a script\textsuperscript{277} that counted the total number of resolutions per year, the number of negative votes in that year, and then calculated the percentage of negative votes in each given year. [Appendix III] Given this background setup, I was able to run probit regression analyses comparing the negative Russian votes (rusneg) to the imported measurements of Russian strength.

I used both the military capabilities (CINC) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) variables to measure Russian state strength. The CINC data comes from the Correlates of War dataset, and is specifically intended to measure military strength from a number of variables.\textsuperscript{278} On the other hand, GDP more directly measures the strength of the economy. As both military capability and economic prowess are commonly cited as sources of international power and security, these variables are appropriate for testing H5. Moreover, given the collapse of the Russian economy after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has placed economic development as a top priority.\textsuperscript{279} Therefore, because of Russia’s stress on economic development as a metric of recovery, economic strength should also signal a feeling of Russian security. However, both the GDP and CINC variables require a different approach in that both are continuous variables on a spectrum rather than the discrete binary variables used for most of the statistical analysis. I thus run probit regressions, rather than the cross-tabs used elsewhere.

If Russia feels that it can only oppose the U.S. in the Security Council when Russia is relatively more powerful, then we should expect to see increased voting behavior as its GDP increases. However, statistical testing did not find any evidence for H5.

\textsuperscript{277} Courtesy of Dr. Alex Weisiger.
\textsuperscript{278} Specifically, the CINC data is an index of military spending, total military personnel, total population, urban population, energy consumption, and iron/steel production.
\textsuperscript{279} Monaghan (2003). For example, see Monaghan (2003) p.995, “Moreover, an underlying element of Russian policy is its growing strength and independence. High energy prices have sustained growth in the Russian economy and significantly reduced its reliance on foreign support.”
On the other hand, the poor correlation between \( (P>|t| = .400) \) suggests that there is little connection between GDP and Russian voting behavior. Similarly, a regression test does not provide a significant relationship between Russian negative voting and the Russia’s cinc scores relative to the United States \( (P>|t| = .366) \). Therefore, there is little evidence to support H5’s hypothesis that voting behavior depends on Russian relative strength.\(^{280}\)

**H6: CHINESE VOTING BEHAVIOR**

After conducting the statistical work, there was no doubt of association between negative Russian votes and negative Chinese votes. The correlation between the two countries’ voting behavior was extremely significant \( (Pr = .000) \).\(^{280}\) (Figure 21) A number of follow-up cross-tabulation tests ascertained that the type of negative vote cast (either a veto or abstention) was not always identical, but were similarly patterned enough to be extremely significant (all tests resulted in \( Pr = .000 \)). Nonetheless, the reader should be wary about jumping to conclusions on the basis of these results. As with all tests of association, correlation does not necessarily mean causation. In this case, it is quite possible that the same factors driving Russian voting behavior in the Security Council are also driving Chinese behavior, which results in the analogous voting patterns. Moreover, Chinese votes may instead be following Russian voting behavior. Due to the small case sample size, the best way to understand the differences in voting behavior is through a qualitative analysis focusing on those cases where Russian and Chinese voting behavior did not match up.\(^{281}\)

However, from the statistical perspective, while an association between Russian and Chinese

\(^{280}\) Nonetheless, this finding does not obviate Tsygankov’s finding of the impact on Russian relative strength on Russian foreign policy behavior in general. Rather, this merely indicates that Russian relative strength does not dictate voting behavior in the Security Council. The lack of correlation between negative voting behavior and state strength should not come as an overwhelming surprise. During 2012, Azerbaijan, one of the least powerful members sitting on the UNSC, led all states in the Security Council with three negative votes.

\(^{281}\) Indeed, these differences are analyzed in the qualitative study.
voting is strongly supported by the chi-squared analyses of the data, these tests only confirm the plausibility of H6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rusneg</th>
<th>chneg</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\text{Pearson chi}^2(1) = 475.1733 \quad \text{Pr} = 0.000$

Figure 21: Association between negative Russian voting and negative Chinese voting

**H7: NORMATIVE COMPROMISE**

As mentioned above in the discussion on coding methodology, the data suffered greatly from a failure to distinguish between failed attempts at compromises and situations in which no attempt at compromise took place. This situation is compounded by the fact that an analysis of compromises is inherently incomplete due to the presence of counterfactual cases that were either not introduced or involved informal diplomatic compromises before being introduced as a draft resolution. Lastly, any compromise that took place but was not alluded to the press statement afterwards would have been missed by the coding. Such a scenario where a state might discreetly make important technical concessions is easy to conceive. Therefore, any statistical findings on the ‘compromise’ variable remain highly suspect. Nevertheless, the compromise variable was highly significant (Pr=.000), with 18.3 percent of all the 82 resolutions during which compromise took place resulting in a negative Russian vote. Unfortunately, these results also tell us little, because intuitively, the cases in which compromises are necessary are already a self-selected group of ‘hard cases’ where the Security Council members do not agree.

**H8: PRESTIGIOUS STATES**

The extremely small relevant sample size made drawing conclusive results about H8 from the statistical data very difficult. However, the dearth of data concerning prestigious
countries is extremely informative about the institutional behavior of the Security Council. While the cross-tabulation between negative Russian voting and prestigious countries was statistically significant when looking at cases violating sovereignty (Pr=.019), the tiny sample size of 15 resolutions that are targeted at prestigious states does little to inform the research about general Russian voting behavior. Moreover, 12 of those resolutions target the entire international community. In conclusion, while an engagement with H8 uncovers some important truths, those truths are not directly relevant to the research puzzle at hand.

**H9: RELATIONAL STATE PERSPECTIVE**

As discussed in the methodology section, there this question was not approached from a quantitative perspective. Rather, this question of the normative bedrock of legitimate state structure, and what constitutes a valid democracy, is best pursued through a qualitative analysis grounded in examples. However, H9 is more of an adjunct hypothesis that complements a number of the other hypotheses. While H9, if supported, helps provide some of the background context for Russian normative approaches; it is not comprised of the same level of specificity desired in a primary hypothesis.

**H10: RESPECTED POWER**

The backdrop to testing H10 was the assumption that Russia perceived respect from the West fell into three distinct periods during the scope of this essay’s analysis. This assumption is based on the scholarly writings examining Russian foreign policy presented in the literature review. The extant literature has come to a broad consensus that Russia felt unappreciated and less respected between 1995-2000 and between 2005-2012, and felt more

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282 Using the variable ‘realsov12345’
283 The chief scholars mentioned in the literature review who discuss this periodization most thoroughly are Christian Thorun and Andrei Tsygankov.
respected between 2001-2004. Therefore, I created a new variable, ‘respect,’ which took a value of ‘0’ for resolutions during a time period where Russia did not feel respected (1995-2000 and 2005-2012) and took a value of 1 for resolutions when Russia did feel respected (2001-2004).

The cross-tabulation of Russian negative votes and respect were significantly associated (Pr=.043). (Figure 22) Such a relationship implies that during periods when Russia feels less respected, one sees a higher level of negative voting in the Security Council. Such a result logically follows from Tsygankov’s finding that Russia is less cooperative with the West when it feels disrespected. This statistical evidence demonstrates that a disrespected Russia that is uncooperative with the West on general foreign policy matters is also uncooperative on Security Council affairs.

![Figure 22: Association between negative Russian voting and Respect](image)

Nonetheless, this ‘respect’ result may be associative rather than causal. In other words, the support for H10 may result as a consequence of another variable. For example, it could just be that the Security Council was less prone to discuss issues that Russia would object to.In order to address this concern, I ran a multivariate probit test with other variables that had proven significant in affecting Russian negative voting behavior, including

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284 Thorun (2009) p. 39
285 Tsygankov (2012A)
286 However, such a situation seems unlikely, given that the time period in question included a number of significant interventions and violations of state sovereignty, including the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq.
the presence of state consent, the inclusion of Chapter VII in the resolutions, and whether or not the resolution targeted the CISBB. The respect variable remained significant in the probit analysis ($P>|z|=.05$), thereby indicating that respect plays a significant causal role in affecting negative Russian votes. (Figure 23)

| rusneg     | Coef. | Std. Err. | z   | P>|z| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|------------|-------|-----------|-----|------|-------------------|
| consenth3  | -0.393286 | 0.1911525 | -2.06 | 0.039 | (-0.770022, -0.01655) |
| chaptervii | 0.0064888 | 0.0137644 | 0.46 | 0.647 | (-0.209013, 0.22201) |
| respect    | -0.9231592 | 0.2162404 | -4.25 | 0.000 | (-1.350612, -0.49570) |
| cisborderz=$\theta$ | 0.1849951 | 0.1076793 | 1.69 | 0.092 | (-0.029052, 0.399046) |
| _cons      | -1.5127886 | 0.1670707 | -9.11 | 0.000 | (-1.827769, -1.197807) |

Figure 23: Probit of State Consent, Chapter VII, Respect, and CISBB on negative Russian voting

Admittedly, this hypothesis takes the causal theoretical leap assuming that a lack of respect leads to a non-cooperative disposition, which in turn will lead to voting opposition. As such, the results of the statistical analysis cannot be as confidently applied as evidence as for H10 as can be applied for a number of other hypotheses. Therefore, qualitative evidence demonstrating that a lack of respect played a role in Russian voting behavior would be necessary for the validation of H10.

Nevertheless, even without the qualitative evidence, such a hypothesis provides three-fold value for the study of Russian voting behavior. First, H10 demonstrates the importance of the greater contextual trends in determining Russian voting patterns—Russia’s relationship to the other member states makes a difference. Second, the finding in H10 statistically demonstrates the accuracy of the periodization in the Russian foreign policy literature. The statistical analysis in H10 proves that the periods outlined by Thorun and others have analytically useful implications.\textsuperscript{287} Finally, the statistical information suggests that Russia’s motivation as a status seeker may play a role.

\textsuperscript{287} Thorun (2009).
However, while H10 did provide some statistical support for Russia as a status seeker, the other hypotheses did not supply as solid support for such a theoretical approach. Even more significantly, the expansionist Russia approaches did not fare well in the statistical tests. Neither H4 nor H5 showed significant correlation, and H6 showed only association. On the other hand, all three of the approaches conceptualizing Russia as the defender of the status quo received strong statistical support, thus providing empirical weight to a theory of Russia as primarily motivated in the Security Council by a desire to uphold the status quo through maintaining international stability and protecting state sovereignty.

The chart below provides a summary of the statistical results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Statistical Result</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Legal Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Inclusion of Chapter VII increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of State Consent increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of significant violence does not increase chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Protection of Sovereignty Norms</td>
<td>Violations of sovereignty increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of sovereignty violations increases chance of voting justification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctions violations increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping violations increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Sphere of Influence</td>
<td>CISBB state increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CISBB state when violations of sovereignty increases chance of negative Russia vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of CISBB increases chance of voting justification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIS state does not increase chance of negative Russian vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>U.S. Hegemony</td>
<td>US activity outside of the United Nations does not increase chances for negative Russian vote</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intervention does not increase chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of Chapter VII increases chance of negative Russian vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Y=Yes  N=No  M=Marginal Yes  N/A=Not applicable
This next section examines the evidence for the various hypotheses from a qualitative perspective. The qualitative evidence utilized was primarily derived from Russian statements in Security Council discussions that were subsequently included in the UN press releases accompanying the resolution under discussion. For each hypothesis below, I introduce resolutions that contained discussions relevant to the hypothesis at hand. I find that the qualitative evidence offers the strongest support for concerns of legal jurisdiction (H1), protecting state sovereignty norms (H2) and protecting a Russian sphere of influence (H3). Moreover, the resolutions most strongly discounted the influence of relative power (H5), normative compromise (H7), prestigious states (H8) and Chinese leadership (H6). Finally, the qualitative evidence found marginal support for fears of U.S. hegemony (H4), the protection of democratic legitimacy (H9), and Russia as a respected power (H10). In all, these findings strongly support the thesis that Russia takes a defensive approach to the Security Council, with Russia primarily motivated by a desire to minimize instability and promote a sovereign, state-centric system.

**Qualitative Evidence: Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Relative Power</td>
<td>Higher relative GDP values do not increase chance of negative Russian vote. Higher relative CINC values do not increase chance of negative Russian vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>Chinese Leadership</td>
<td>Chinese negative vote increases chance of Russian negative vote (questionable causality).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7</td>
<td>Normative Compromise</td>
<td>Compromise increases chance of Russian negative vote (questionable methodology).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Prestigious State</td>
<td>Prestigious states increases chance of Russian negative vote (insufficient sample size).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H9</td>
<td>Democratic Legitimacy</td>
<td>Not assessed from a quantitative standpoint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10</td>
<td>Respected Power</td>
<td>Respect decreases negative Russian votes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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H1: Legal Orthodoxy

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289 Due to this structural decision to divide the categories based on hypothesis rather than by types of press release statements or resolutions, the same resolution may be used more than once under different hypotheses. This duplication was judged to be worthwhile, as a hypothesis-based discussion structure allows for the reader to more easily assess the relative strengths of each hypothesis.
This hypothesis is quite simple—H1 expects Russia to strictly follow a legal code dictating Security Council activity. H1 predicts that Russia’s votes will consistently follow its interpretation of international law. Such a prediction found strong support in the quantitative analysis and the following qualitative case examples further reinforce the explanatory capacity for H1. Moreover, the qualitative discussion of H4 will further established support for H1 by demonstrating that Russian concerns of U.S. expansion stem more from legal concerns of the Security Council mandate rather than any fear of U.S. hegemony. Due to the fact that the Security Council Member States do not agree on a single definition of international law,²⁹⁰ the following paragraph serves to clarify Russia’s legal interpretation of legitimate Security Council behavior.

According to Russia’s interpretation of the UN Charter, the goal of the Security Council is not to eliminate world violence, but rather to maintain international stability by preventing and containing interstate wars and violations of state sovereignty. The way that the Security Council prevents these wars is through a credible threat of a Great Power coalition (the Security Council) intervening and forcing the aggressor to cease its violent behavior and return to the previous status quo. Therefore, Russia believes that the Charter only legally allows for Security Council intervention in cases of severe threats to international stability, and only then to restore that stability.

Specifically, Russia derives the Security Council mandate from the United Nations Charter, on which Russia takes a conservative interpretative stance. In order to understand whether Russia’s votes are motivated by compliance with the legal regulations of the UN Charter, one must first understand which regulations Russia attempts to follow. The quantitative analysis examined two legal regulatory determinants: (1) whether there was a

²⁹⁰ Terhalle (2011)
threat to international peace and security (and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Security Council) and (2) whether the Security Council had the relevant state’s consent for intervention (which Russia argues is necessary for all Security Council actions not immediately threatening international stability). The statistical tests run along these two parameters found that Russia was significantly more likely to vote in favor of resolutions that followed Russian legal guidelines. The qualitative analysis of voting uses the same standards of international legal behavior, analyzing the importance of whether the threat constitutes a threat to international security and whether state parties consented to intervention. Additionally, the qualitative analysis also examines cases reaffirming the Security Council as the supreme international organ for handling threats to international peace and stability.

Russia has a strict legal standard for cases that fall within the Security Council’s mandate. However, if Russia ascertains that the situation does in fact pose a threat to international peace and stability, it will agree that the situation at hand meets the criteria for the Security Council and thus agree to authorize Security Council intervention. For example, Russia voted in favor of Security Council resolution 1049, which established the need for a ‘rapid and widespread response’ to ethnic violence in Burundi. In Burundi, an army of ethnic Tutsis were massacring members of the ethnic Hutu group, the two ethnic groups involved in the Rwandan genocide just a year earlier. Moreover, many of the Hutu victims

291 According to Russia, even a follow-up peacemaking mission would require state consent.
292 This qualitative examination is an exhaustive exploration of the various parts of the Russian interpretation of the UN Charter’s legal prescriptions for the Security Council. For examples of Russia’s discussion on the legal necessity for constructive diplomacy, see UNSC resolution 1680 on Lebanon, UNSC resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 on Iran, and 1132 on Sierra Leone. For examples of Russia’s insistence upon precise legal terms, see the UNSC resolution on Eritrea in UNSC resolution 2043 and on Iraq in UNSC resolution 1483.
293 UNSC Resolution 1049
were refugees from Rwanda. Such a conflict had the potential to reignite violence throughout the Great Lakes region and thus threatened international stability. When Russia supported the resolution, Russian representative Vasily Sidorov made a point of emphasizing that “the situation in Burundi... posed a real threat to the region as a whole.”

Moreover, once Russia had established that the situation in Burundi fell under Security Council jurisdiction, Russia was willing to vote in favor of a subsequent resolution that allowed for the basis of international intervention. Due to the real threat to international security, Russia followed the legal protocols and agreed that the violence in Burundi required Security Council attention. Therefore, the case of Burundi demonstrates that Russia is willing to authorize violence when it considers a situation a threat to international peace.

Similarly, when the Security Council members agree with Russia that a case does not merit unilateral intervention, then Russia will support the resolution. For example, during the ongoing Syrian Civil War, Russia voted in favor of the Security Council Resolution 1994, which extended the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that monitors the ceasefire lines between Israel and Syria. Russia has no objections to this observer mission, authorized to verify ceasefire compliance, an arrangement supported by both Israel and Syria. More significantly, the resolution intentionally avoided discussing the simultaneous violence occurring in Syria between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Syrian rebel forces. When justifying its support for resolution 1994, Russia made a point of emphasizing the fact that the current political situation in Syria did not pose a threat to

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295 Delaney (1996)
296 Specifically, in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
298 UNSC Resolution 1072
299 Resolution 1072 was adopted under the binding Chapter VII, and “demanded that all sides cease hostilities, call for an immediate halt in the violence and initiate unconditional negotiations towards a comprehensive political settlement.” Due to the binding nature of the resolution, a failure to end all violence would be grounds for an international intervention.
300 UNSC Resolution 1994
international peace and security. According to the UN press release for Security Council Resolution 1994, “Underscoring the technical nature of the text, [the Russian representative] stressed that it did not address the political situation in Syria, which was not on the Council’s agenda. Furthermore, events there posed no threat to international peace and security.” In other words, Russia’s willingness to support the resolution was contingent upon the decision not to include the political situation in Syria, which did not fall under Security Council legal jurisdiction, because the political infighting taking place in Syria did not pose a threat to international peace and security.

However, when the Security Council tries to take action on events that Russia does not believe threatens international peace and security, then Russia will not support the resolution because of Russia’s belief that such resolutions violate international law. Russia did not believe that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to international security. However, in resolution 1203, the Security Council introduced the draft resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire under the binding Chapter VII. Therefore Russia could not legally support the resolution, which violated the Security Council mandate by extending it beyond threats to international peace and security. As Russia explained,

“For reasons such as that the use of force had been reflected in a draft and Russia would not condone that, it would abstain in the vote on the resolution, but would continue to make a contribution to the solution of the Kosovo situation. The resolution also did not take into

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301 UN Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1994
302 One might respond by questioning why Russia was willing to support a resolution extending the Syrian-Israel ceasefire observer force (UNDOF) if it does not pose an immediate threat to international peace. The critical difference here, however, is the presence of both Syrian and Israeli consent to the presence of the UNDOF observer mission.
303 UNSC resolution 1203. Therefore, unless an immediate ceasefire was implemented, the Security Council would have grounds for intervention.
account recent developments in Belgrade, and it could not be agreed that the situation in Kosovo presented an international danger.\textsuperscript{304}

Russia justifies its vote on legal grounds—the draft resolution authorizes the use of force, but due to Russia’s belief that Kosovo did not threaten international security, Russia could not legally authorize military force.\textsuperscript{305} This vote contrasts sharply with Russia’s positive vote on resolution 1160 just seven months earlier, where Russia agreed to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia “would support that action on an understanding that there was no threat to international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{306} Therefore, one sees that the legal designation of the resolution as not posing a threat to peace and security was critical to Russian voting behavior.\textsuperscript{307}

Next, Russia’s interpretation of the UN Charter also places a heavy legal emphasis on obtaining the consent of all parties to a conflict when assisting in diplomacy and peacebuilding. For example, a draft resolution circulating the Security Council aimed to establish a United Nations Observer Force in the contested Palestinian territories.\textsuperscript{308} In principle, Russia agreed with the resolution. However, “the only way for the Council to take action to establish an observer force was with the consent of both parties. Ensuring an international presence could be done only under conditions on which the two parties could

\textsuperscript{304} Press release for UN Security Council resolution 1203.

\textsuperscript{305} One critique here might argue that Russia is only officially justifying its resolution in legal terms but in truth its opposition stems from a desire to prevent the Security Council from using force against Kosovo. This is a strong critique, but the evidence does not support this logic. If Russia’s motive was to stop the Security Council from legitimizing force against Kosovo, then one struggles to explain Russia’s decision to abstain on (and not veto) the resolution.

\textsuperscript{306} UN Press release for Security Council resolution 1160

\textsuperscript{307} One question here is why Russia agreed to an arms embargo if there was no threat to international peace and security, which seems legally inconsistent. The answer here lies in the fact that Russia saw the embargo as a short-term measure clearly defined criteria for lifting the embargo and saw the measure as a way from preventing the escalation of the conflict into one that would threaten international peace and security. See UN Press release for Security Council resolution 1160.

\textsuperscript{308} UNSC Draft Resolution S/2000/1171
In other words, Russia’s respect for the legal mandates of the UN Charter, which limited observer forces to situations of mutual consent, led Russia to cast a negative vote on the resolution.  

On the other hand, when the parties to the conflict consent to Security Council assistance, then Russia is willing to support the resolution. In fact, for resolution 1031, Russia was willing to cooperate with NATO in order to help implement the Bosnian peace agreement. Resolution 1031 created the Implementation Force (IFOR), a combination of both NATO and Russian troops. When discussing the resolution, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov “emphasized that the most important feature of the resolution was that the Member States were authorized to do only what the Bosnian sides agreed to and that included the use of force.” The consent of all the parties to the conflict—the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska—established the legal basis on which a peacemaking mission could be established. Thus, one sees the impact of legal restrictions on influencing Russian voting behavior.

Finally, one finds the influence of legal restrictions on Russia’s voting behavior when examining the importance that Russia places on maintaining the Security Council as the sole arbiter on the legitimate use of force. Because the UN Charter sets a strict legal limit on the Security Council as the single legitimate international peacekeeping body, H1 would expect Russia to strictly uphold the Security Council’s legitimacy. Moreover, due to Russia’s

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309 Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/2000/1171
310 This case provides a particularly interesting example, as Russia had no reason to dissemble regarding their voting behavior, as it knew that the United States would veto the resolution anyway.
311 UNSC resolution 1031
312 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1031
disproportionate influence in the Security Council,\textsuperscript{314} Russia also has further incentives for its strict legalist approach. In a 2011 resolution on establishing an observer mission to Syria, Russia supported the resolution. However, Russia’s voting justification did not address the observer mission directly, but rather stressed that “the resolution sent an important international legal signal — only the Council had the prerogative to take such a decision involving a regional crisis, including the Syrian crisis.”\textsuperscript{315} From Russia’s statement, one sees the clear focus on the legal environment—Russia is primarily concerned with clearly delineating the Security Council’s sole legitimacy on questions of military force.

Similarly, Russia demonstrates its concern for the Security Council as the legitimate international authority through a negative vote on Sudan sanctions. In resolution 1070, Russian critiques the decision to sanction Sudan.

“The rash use of the sanctions instrument is not only destructive for the people of Sudan and the countries of the region, but creates a precedent which could do real damage to the Security Council’s authority.”\textsuperscript{316}

Once again, Russia demonstrates its concern with the Security Council’s accepted legal jurisdiction. While in the other resolutions, Russia sought to limit Security Council jurisdiction, resolution 1070 shows Russia defending the importance of the Council. Without this resolution, a reader might conclude that Russia’s concern with limiting the legal jurisdiction of the Security Council is actually a ploy to undercut the Security Council’s ability to impact international affairs. Therefore, this resolution plays an important role in demonstrating that Russia believes that the Security Council plays an important, albeit strictly limited, role in international affairs.

\textsuperscript{314} International Monetary Fund (2009)
\textsuperscript{315} UNSC resolution 2043
\textsuperscript{316} Press release for UN Security Council Resolution 1070
However, Ian Johnstone offers a challenge to the theory that Russia genuinely votes along strict legal norms in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{317} Instead, Johnstone alleges that states merely discuss actions within a legal context to avoid discussing their actions in terms of self-interest, which are considered less legitimate.\textsuperscript{318} While Johnstone is right to point out that Russia’s original legal positions advocating international stability and the state sovereignty principle are founded in Russia’s self-interest, the evidence demonstrates that Russia genuinely believes in the Security Council as a tool for maintaining international peace, and will not oppose resolutions that fall within the legal guidelines as Russia understands them. In other words, Russia’s legalist approach is consistent. For example, while the specific U.S. ISAF mission in Afghanistan may have not been in its self-interest, Russia’s legal interpretation led it to support the mission, because it follows Russia’s legal standards.\textsuperscript{319} In other words, while the basic legal outline supports Russian general interests, when assessing an individual case, Russia consults its legal interpretation, not its immediate self-interest.

In sum, whether focusing on threats to international stability, consent of parties involved, or the sole legitimate authority of the Security Council, Russia demonstrates its concern with a strict compliance with the legal jurisdiction of the Security Council. This focus on a strict legalist approach provides further evidence for H1, which predicts Russia to vote in the Security Council based off of a strict interpretation of the Security Council in the U.N. Charter. However, while the evidence provides strong support for consistent Russian legalist behavior with the Security Council, the following hypothesis helps explain why Russia takes such a strict approach on Security Council jurisdiction.

\textbf{H2: PROTECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY NORMS}

\textsuperscript{317} Johnstone (2003)
\textsuperscript{318} Johnstone (2003)
\textsuperscript{319} See the qualitative discussion on Afghanistan in H4. UNSC resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563.
While H1 gives a compelling account of Russia’s commitment to precise legal guidelines by which Russia bases its voting behavior, H2 better contextualizes the reasons why Russia takes such a strict legalist stance. H2 predicts that Russia will oppose violations of state sovereignty norms. Specifically, H2 predicts that Russia will promote the normative legitimacy of state sovereignty over that of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{320} Combining the insights of H1 and H2, one finds that Russia’s goal in the Security Council has been to strengthen and maintain international norms of state sovereignty and codify those norms into international law. From a more basic perspective, Russia tries to ensure that (preexisting) states remain the smallest relevant units in the international legal community.\textsuperscript{321} While H2 received substantial support from the statistical testing, Russia’s concern for sovereignty norms is inherently more easily approached from a qualitative perspective. Moreover, given the centrality of H2 to the overall thesis, it is important to demonstrate that the qualitative evidence complements the quantitative analysis. Below, I present a number of cases that intend to demonstrate that “Russia has consistently rejected any dilution of what it sees as the Charter’s defence of domestic jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{322} In other words, Russia believes that the UN Charter’s sovereignty-driven worldview has been most appropriate for the understanding of international relations, and Russia wants it to stay that way.

Russia promotes state sovereignty norms in contradistinction to a more humanitarian-motivated, individualist-oriented West. While both agree that threats to international peace and security supersede state sovereignty norms, the West also believes that state sovereignty cannot be used to shield a country from the consequences of human rights violations. Russian disagrees, arguing that in such cases, state sovereignty takes priority

\textsuperscript{320} Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)  
\textsuperscript{321} As opposed to individuals.  
\textsuperscript{322} McFarlane (2006)
over humanitarian concerns. This disagreement over the relative strength of sovereignty versus humanitarian norms is reflected in a number of Security Council resolutions. For example, a 2007 draft resolution vetoed by Russia and China demanded that Myanmar cease violence in ethnic minority regions. As Russian representative Vitaly Churkin explained,

“[Russia] had consistently opposed the consideration of the Myanmar issue in the Security Council. Not denying that Myanmar had been facing certain problems, particularly in the socio-economic and humanitarian areas, the situation in that country did not pose any threat to international or regional peace…. “Attempts aimed at using the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview are unacceptable.”

According to Churkin, Russia sees the attempt to condemn Myanmar’s behavior in the Security Council as violation of Myanmar’s sovereignty—Myanmar did not threaten international peace and security. While this explanation sounds reminiscent of the justifications analyzed under the strict legalist interpretations of threats to international peace and security, this draft resolution on Myanmar introduces one more critical element: humanitarian crises. In his justification, Churkin alludes to Myanmar’s ‘problems in the humanitarian areas.’ In other words, there were reasons to believe that Myanmar’s government was not sufficiently caring for its citizenry, particularly when judging by Western standards. Therefore, if Russian did not oppose the draft resolution, then Russia would be tacitly accepting a normative shift in the Security Council prioritizing humanitarian concerns over state sovereignty—moving the legal focus away from state governments and onto individual state citizens. Moreover, the inclusion of state sovereignty allows the reader to round out the conversation on legalist concerns—the reason why Russia is so engaged with a strict interpretation of the Security Council mandate is because the Security Council is the

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323 UNSC Draft Resolution S/2000/14
324 Press release for UN draft resolution S/2000/14
one body legitimately empowered to override state sovereignty. While the qualitative conversation of H1 demonstrated that Russia genuinely supports the Security Council, state sovereignty considerations compel Russia to limit Security Council jurisdiction to narrowly focus on serious threats to international peace and stability.

If Myanmar were the only resolution with justificatory evidence demonstrating Russia’s view of the supremacy of state sovereignty norms, then the case could be dismissed as an outlier. However, justificatory evidence from a number of other resolutions also focuses on the supremacy of state sovereignty norms. For example, in resolution 1894, discussing civilians in armed conflict, or humanitarian law, Russia stressed that state sovereignty supersedes humanitarian law. While reiterating the importance of humanitarian conduct, Vitaly Churkin said the “protection of civilians was primarily the responsibilities of States involved in conflict, and the actions of the international community should be aimed at assisting national efforts.” In other words, state sovereignty comes first. While states should follow humanitarian law, and the international community should offer assist its assistance with the implementation of humanitarian law, the sovereign state must lead the effort. In order to dispel any remaining lack of clarity, Churkin continued, “The international community could take appropriate steps only under the auspices of the Council and in accordance with the United Nations Charter.” In short: no state can intervene on humanitarian grounds without Security Council authorization, and the Security Council can only authorize such a unilateral intervention in accordance to the UN Charter—when the present situation poses a threat to international stability. Therefore, in cases that do not pose an immediate threat to international peace and stability, Russia does not believe that the

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325 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1894
326 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1894
327 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1894
Security Council may unilaterally authorize intervention, and thus requires state consent. Said more clearly, no one can intervene on solely humanitarian grounds without state consent. Therefore, Churkin here is diplomatically sending a very straightforward message—state sovereignty norms supersede humanitarian interventions.

Similar statements issued in resolutions even more recently were equally firm in their insistence of the primacy of state sovereignty norms. In a resolution condemning the use and targeting of children in armed conflict, Russian nearly repeated its justification from its conversation on civilians. “The primary role in protecting children continued to rest with national Governments, and support should aim at complementing their efforts,” said Russian representative Sergey Karev. Russia opposed this resolution because it attempted to implement sanctions on the basis of humanitarian violations. However, as explained in the legalist discussion on Security Council jurisdiction, Russia believes such an act of sanction falls outside of the Security Council’s jurisdiction. Because humanitarian crises in and of themselves do not pose a threat to international peace and stability, the Security Council cannot step in. Thereafter, the highest reigning norm is state sovereignty. Thus, only if the state acquiesces to humanitarian help may the international community intervene.

(Figure 24)

328 Meaning, in a case that does not otherwise pose a threat to international peace and stability.
329 Press Release for Security Council resolution 2068
Figure 24: Difference in normative approaches to Security Council authorization between Russia and the West

One more recent example where Russia promoted sovereignty norms was during a resolution endorsing post-conflict peacebuilding during peacekeeping missions. While Russia supported the resolution, Vitaly Churkin also took the opportunity to warn against the danger of giving precedence to humanitarian norms:

“It was counterproductive and, in some cases, even dangerous, for individual States or the Secretariat to interpret Security Council mandates. As important as civilian protection was, it must not put aside other important aspects of the mandates. He was also concerned with arbitrary interpretations of international law for civilian protection. It was unacceptable, for example, to use that to achieve political goals, especially as a pretext to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign States.”

In the above statement, Churkin not only warns against the dangers of humanitarian interventions, but he also declares such unilateral interpretation of the Council mandate as illegal through the inconsistent application of international law. Therefore, in one fell swoop,

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330 UNSC Resolution 2086
331 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 2086
Churkin has both attacked the legitimacy of humanitarian norms as well as associated state sovereignty norms with Security Council legalism.332

The case of the extension of a 1996 UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) further illustrates the significance that Russia places on state consent in the absence of a threat to international peace.333 In its explanation for its support for the observer mission, Russia emphasizes that the mission does not violate Georgia’s sovereignty: “The Russian Federation had helped to draft the text before the Council. It believed that the main responsibility for a solution to the conflict lay with the parties themselves.”334 Georgia’s internal upheaval did not pose a threat to international security. Therefore, while Russia was willing to support a Russian-led assistance mission that facilitated peace negotiations, it also emphasizes that the internal nature of the dispute required the sovereign Georgian government to solve its own conflict.

Furthermore, the promotion of the state sovereignty principle does not just result in conflict with humanitarian norms. The Russian focus on state sovereignty norms has also resulted in a zero tolerance policy when it comes to terrorist activities. When Russia refers to terrorists, it specifically refers to non-state actors. The state sovereignty system does not recognize the legitimacy of non-state actors, and therefore non-state terrorist groups are an anathema to the state system. Moreover, nearly all of these groups perpetrating politically motivated violence conduct their asymmetric attacks in order to change the status quo—a status quo that Russia very much would like to preserve. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that Russia should adamantly feel that “Terrorism was categorically unacceptable and deserved condemnation by the international community.”335 Moreover, by posing a

332 This is not to say that there is any nefarious normative manipulation at play. In fact, the evidence suggests that Russia genuinely believes that the UN Charter promotes a sacrosanct state sovereignty.
333 UNSC resolution 1036
334 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1036
threat to the state-based sovereignty system, terrorism poses “a serious challenge to
international peace and security.” 336

Another resolution stated more explicitly that “the world continued to face a strong
and ruthless enemy, which threatened international security and the foundations of the
modern world order.” 337 In this case, the ‘world’ is a world of sovereign states, and the threat
of non-state terrorism threatens to shaken the foundations of the state-sovereignty principle
on which the international community is currently based upon. 338 Due to the severity and
asymmetry of the threat, Russia has encouraged the international community to take extreme
steps to bar terror organizations from gaining any legitimacy, including the “inadmissibility
of giving a podium in the mass media for the spread of terrorist views. The right to freedom
of speech and dissemination of information was not without limitations.” 339 In resolution
1618, Russian essentially encourages the international community to censor media in order
to rob terrorist organizations of any potential platform for disseminating its political agenda.

Russia has particular reasons for taking such a hard-line on terrorism—Russia faces a
number of aspiring separatist groups operating within its own borders, including some of
who have resorted to terror tactics. 340 For example, in resolution 1333 discussing the Taliban
in Afghanistan, Russia’s voting justification lends insight to its own terror concerns. Russia
urged an unabashedly ‘one-sided’ text sanctioning the Taliban. 341 Russia explains,

335 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1160.
336 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1269.
337 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1456
338 Ringmar (2012)
340 Toft (2002). For examples of terror attacks against Russia, refer to the Moscow hostage crisis and Beslan school attack.
341 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1333
“They had also provided their territory for use by terrorists, including Chechynans, Uzbeks, Tajiks and other extremists. Also, the weapons that ended up with the Taliban were not only for their use, but to assist international terrorists.”

As evidenced by the Russian statement, Russia faces a number of organizations that it labels as ‘terrorist’ on its own soil, giving Russia added incentive to assume a stalwart hard-line position against terrorism. Moreover, this presence of separatist groups also incentivizes Russia to promote sovereignty in the first place. By establishing inviolable state sovereignty, Russia has the diplomatic leeway to clamp down on separatist groups without the fear of repercussion on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, Russia has demonstrated that it is not squeamish about brutally cracking down on opposition groups, as evidenced by Russia’s crackdown on Chechen separatists in 2004.

In sum, a qualitative analysis of the data displays clear evidence that Russia cares deeply about the primacy of sovereignty norms, as H2 predicts. This dedication to sovereignty norms manifests itself through limiting the legal jurisdiction of the Security Council, attacking the humanitarian intervention normative principle, and taking a staunch stance against terrorism. This sovereignty explanation helps explain why Russia takes the strict legalist stance in H1. Moreover, H2 also explains why Russia is so opposed to some of the Western intervention attempts later outlined in H4; Russia does not oppose these attempts out of a fear of hegemony, but rather because they constitute a violation of sovereignty. Furthermore, sovereignty also provides a state cover for Russian human rights violations, and provides an international system under which potential separatist groups cannot find a ledge of legitimacy upon which to stand. Finally, the state sovereignty system allows for the maintenance of the status quo, ensuring that Russia maintains its

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342 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1333
343 Tsygankov (2005), Bugajski (2008)
institutionalized great power status until Putin can rebuild Russian infrastructure up to its former Soviet glory.  \(^\text{345}\)

**H3: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE**

The spheres of influence hypothesis borrows elements from both the expansionism in H4 as well as the sovereignty conversation discussed above in H2. H3 predicts that Russia feels protective of its sovereign sphere. Therefore, Russia is less inclined to see international meddling in its near abroad, particularly when Russia has the region under control. Moreover, because Russia maintains status quo stability in the CIS sphere, it will view international attention as unwarranted and Security Council action as illegal. Specifically, Russia views international intervention as introducing unrest and instability—the opposite of the Security Council’s mission! Therefore, one may most usefully consider H3 as a theoretical extension of H2, which clearly falls within a defensive Russia paradigm. However, Russia has also indicated its concern over NATO expansion into its sovereign sphere of influence, a finding consistent with H2 as well as H4. Thus, one may view H3 as a permutation of H2’s concern with sovereignty while also displaying H4’s concern for Western expansion (when specifically applying the H4 filters to Russia’s sovereign sphere). The qualitative analysis provides strong support for H3, a finding that agrees with the quantitative data. However, while Russia’s desire to protect its sovereign sphere of influence is doubtlessly a factor motivating Russian voting behavior, its limited applicability to explain the primary phenomenon suggests H3’s role as secondary explanatory mechanism.

While Russia does not want the Security Council intervening into Russia’s sphere of influence, Russia will allow the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping missions where Russia takes the leadership role—essentially, Russia use these mandates to reaffirm and

further legitimize its policing of the CIS sphere. The peacekeeping observer mission stationed in Tajikistan provides a good example of Russia using the Security Council to reinforce its sovereign policing influence. In the 1996 resolution 1089, extending the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), Russia asserted its role as an “observer State” ensuring the implementation of the negotiated agreement between the Tajik government and opposition forces.\footnote{Press release for Security Council resolution 1089} From this resolution, one finds that despite the official concern of the entire international community, in practice, Russia establishes itself as primary state ensuring peace in its sovereign sphere. One sees more evidence of this interpretation during the following year, in resolution 1099, also extending the UNMOT mandate.\footnote{UNSC resolution 1099} In the discussion of this draft resolution, Russia pledged that “the Russian Federation would attempt to move the negotiating process towards true national reconciliation.”\footnote{Press Release for Security Council resolution 1099} Russia’s statement clearly displays its intention to play an active role in policing its near abroad and reestablishing stability to the region. Finally, these resolutions recognized the important peacekeeping role that the Russian-led CIS peacekeeping coalition played in stabilizing the region. For example, in resolution 1099, the UNMOT team is referred to as “observers” while the CIS force are called “peace-keepers,” indicating the more substantive role of the CIS force.\footnote{Press release for UN Security Council Resolution 1099} This emphasis on the greater weight placed on CIS peacekeepers is even more clearly reflected in resolution 1138, also extending the UNMOT mission. When discussing the UNMOT mandate, the Russian representative said, “The collective peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was also prepared to provide assistance in the implementation of the General Agreement, particularity in the military area.” The reference to the “the military arena” was not haphazard. Russia
wanted to clearly establish that only the Russian-led peacekeepers had the authorization to use force in Russia’s sovereign sphere. In short, the UNMOT cases demonstrate Russia’s perception of a Russian sphere of influence, where a sovereign Russia rules supreme. Russia was willing to support the UNMOT mission to Tajikistan because it helped legitimize Russia’s police action through the CIS. Therefore, because the UNMOT resolutions respect Russia’s sovereign sphere, Russia’s support on these resolutions is consistent with H3.

Similarly, Russia had traditionally supported the mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) when the mission had complemented Russian police action maintaining stability in the country; particularly in the breakaway province of Abkhazia. For example, the text of resolution 1187 extending the UNOMIG mandate in Georgia explicitly emphasized Russia’s leadership role,

"Supporting the vigorous efforts made by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator as well as of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to give a new impetus to the negotiations within the United Nations-led peace process…"

The resolution texts for the observer mission in Georgia recognize Russia’s special status in mediating conflicts within the CIS. Russia’s concern with regional stability is reflected in its voting justification for the resolution: “the use of force was counterproductive and could lead to an explosion in the entire Caucasus region.” In other words, Russia saw the violence in Georgia as a threat to the stability of Russia’s larger sovereign sphere, and therefore viewed Russian peacekeeping as its sovereign responsibility. Moreover, as independent research has found,

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350 The other breakaway province, South Ossetia, was overseen almost exclusively by Russian peacekeeping forces. For more information, see Security Council Report. “Update Report No.2: Georgia.” 12 August 2008.
351 UNSC resolution 1187
352 Press release for UN Security Council Resolution 1187
“[Russia decided] to use the ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ as a cover for what was a series of essentially unilateral Russian peacekeeping deployments with very limited neutral oversight from the OSCE and in the case of Abkhazia, UNOMIG.”

Russia found the UNOMIG arrangement satisfactory because it provided another avenue for legitimizing Russia’s sphere of influence over the CIS. One Caucasus expert explained that the United State’s traditional failure to contest Russian sovereignty has led to an infringement upon the other CIS states’ sovereignty. However, Russia would likely respond by identifying the responsibility of great power states to maintain peace and stability within their relative spheres of influence. Specifically, Russia would point to the U.S. ‘Monroe Doctrine’ as an exemplar of this point, and would argue that Russia’s own sovereign sphere follows along similar normative lines. Sergey Lavrov supports this interpretation,

“It is exclusively within international law, without any violation of international legal norms and in the interests of reinforcing stability and maintaining security in the regions which are located close to the Russian Federation and in other regions of the world regardless of whether somebody likes that or not.”

Lavrov insists that Russia has an international legal responsibility to maintain international stability in its region, implying the existence of ‘regional sovereignty norm’ for great power states.

Russia feels that through NATO expansion into Georgia, the United States attempts to undercut Russia’s sovereign sphere. Prior to the U.S.-led expansion, the situation in Georgia was stable—with Georgia securely under Russian influence. However, NATO’s attempts to push into Eastern Europe through relationships with the post-Soviet periphery

354 Starr (1997)
355 Kubichek (1999-2000)
356 Lavrov (2007)
not only violates Russia’s sovereign sphere, it also undermines the stable power paradigm in the region.\textsuperscript{357} Thus, in the build-up to the short 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Russia found itself facing an increasingly aggressive NATO-backed Georgia willing to challenge the current Caucasian security paradigm and recapture its breakaway Georgian provinces. As Russia explained in a letter to the Security Council in explanation of Russian military force, “The use of force by the Russian side in self-defence will continue until the circumstances that brought it about cease to exist.”\textsuperscript{358} Russia justified its military behavior on legal grounds under Article 51 of the UN Charter giving states the right to self-defense.

This disagreement over the NATO expansion into Russia’s sovereign sphere manifested itself in a 2009 draft resolution extending the mandate of the UNOMIG mission.\textsuperscript{359} However, unlike the earlier mandates, this stabilization mission “could be taken as a mandate for a new stabilization mission.”\textsuperscript{360} Unlike the earlier mandates, which allowed for unilateral Russian peacekeeping control, this resolution would introduce foreign peacekeepers into Russia’s sovereign sphere. Such a draft, Russia argued, was “clearly unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{361} Moreover, Russia argued that the proposed draft was

\begin{quote}
“not in the interest of supporting stability in the trans-Caucasus, which was not to be found in blind adherence to the vestiges of an outdated reality. The Russian Federation would continue efforts aimed at ensuring the reliable security of the new young States in the trans-Caucasus and the security of their peoples.”\textsuperscript{362}
\end{quote}

In other words, the draft resolution did not promote international stability, and was therefore illegal under the UN Charter. Given the fact that this resolution concerned

\begin{itemize}
\item Monaghan (2008), Urmas (2010), Moscow Says NATO Hasn't Learned Lessons Of 2008 Georgia War (10 September 2012) Sarote (2010)
\item Letter to the UN Security Council President. S/2008/545
\item UN Draft Resolution S/2009/310
\item Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/2009/310
\item Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/2009/310
\item Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/2009/310
\end{itemize}
Russia’s sovereign sphere, Russia was opposed to external intervention. Moreover, because Russia’s preexisting role as the sovereign preserver of the regional status quo stability, Russia felt that the resolution promoted neither its own sovereign interests nor the interests of regional stability. Therefore, Russia felt legally justified in opposing the resolution. Thus, one sees Russia’s perception of a distinct Russian sphere affects Russian voting behavior, as H3 predicts. However, one also finds that this justification for this behavior results from the normative incentives proposed in H2 (sovereignty norms), and the fear that NATO expansion (H4) is violating those norms.

Finally, the qualitative evidence also provides evidence that reinforces the decision to classify the states bordering the CIS states as also part of the Russian sovereign sphere. In 1998, Russia supported resolution 1214, which demanded that the Taliban government in Afghanistan cease its support for terrorist organizations. Russia’s representative justified its support for the vote in regard to Russian security: “His country viewed that military escalation as a real threat to the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As such, all necessary measures should be undertaken to protect those borders.” In this resolution discussion, Russia clearly indicates that the developments in CIS Border States affect the security of the CIS states. As such, one would expect Russia’s voting behavior to pay special attention to the border states as well, just as the statistical evidence demonstrates.

In short, the qualitative evidence supports H3’s prediction that Russian will be more likely to veto resolutions concerning their sovereign sphere of influence, especially when those resolutions do not cede to Russia a leadership role in managing related missions.

Russia considers outside intervention a threat to the status quo maintained by Russian

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363 UNSC resolution 1214
364 Press release for UN Security Council resolution 1214
action. In particular, one finds the role that H2’s conception of inviolable sovereign territory plays in defining Russia’s legal interpretation of the Security Council mandate. Moreover, as H4 suggests, fears of NATO expansion into Russian sovereign space affects Russia’s voting within its Eastern European sphere.

However, while H3 certainly describes phenomenon affecting Russian voting behavior, this explanation plays a secondary role. The fact that these votes take place in Eastern Europe is far less important than the fact that Russia’s sphere of influence is being violated, as evidenced by the observer missions in Tajikistan and Georgia. Further, less than 35% of the negative votes cast by Russia concerned the CIS, Balkans, and CIS border states, and less than 5% of the negative votes concerned the CIS states themselves.365 Finally, it bears noting that a number of the negative resolutions, particularly in the Balkans, may be motivated by concerns outlined in other hypotheses. For example, Russian opposition may have been motivated by concerns over the Russian sphere of influence, but also may have been motivated by a desire to set legal precedents or protect the norms of state sovereignty against humanitarian intervention. Therefore, one may conclude that H3 does identify a significant factor in Russian voting behavior, but this factor does not play a primary causal role.

H4: U.S. HEGEMONY

The predictions for H4 were not born out by the statistical data. While a superficial inspection of the qualitative evidence seems to lend support for H4, a deeper examination suggests that Russian voting behavior is driven by Russia’s strict legal interpretation of Security Council jurisdiction, and not by Russian fears of United States hegemonic expansion. While Russia does choose to oppose a number of resolutions involving U.S.

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365 There were 15 negative resolutions falling within the CISBB and 2 negative resolutions falling within the CIS out of a total of 44 negative resolutions.
expansion, the qualitative evidence below seeks to demonstrate that fear of US hegemony does not serve as a driver for Russian voting behavior.\textsuperscript{366} Instead, one finds that Russia’s opposition to U.S. expansion is part of a greater Russian opposition to perceived normative changes in the Security Council’s legal jurisdiction lowering the bar for military interventions. Therefore, when taken in conjunction with the statistical analysis, the qualitative analysis does not support H4 as a primary causal factor.

At a basic level, the U.N. press justifications contain evidence indicating that Russia’s voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Such evidence of Russian fears of U.S. hegemonic ambitions comes in 1999, through a draft resolution introduced by Russia demanding a cessation of NATO’s use of force against the Yugoslav government.\textsuperscript{367} At the time, the United States-led NATO coalition was conducting airstrikes against Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in an attempt to compel an end to the ethnic violence in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{368} Russia defended its introduction of the draft resolution by attacking NATO’s aggression against Milosevic. Further, Russia accused anyone who voted against the draft resolution as contributing to “the continuing military action undertaken under the pretext of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe.”\textsuperscript{369} The key word here is the inclusion of ‘pretext’, suggesting that the U.S.-led intervention was only nominally a humanitarian mission, but the implication is that Russia suspects less honest motives, such as U.S. expansionism. Moreover, two months later, through Security Council resolution 1239, Russia once again referenced its concerns over U.S. expansionist ambitions. After placing the blame of the ongoing Kosovo conflict on NATO bombing campaign, Russia criticized Security Council members, saying that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{366} Instead, I argue that opposition on these resolutions is the result of an associative effect, but H4 does not play a causal role.
\textsuperscript{368} UN Press Release SC/6659, Bugajski(2010), Ramakrishna (2000)
\textsuperscript{369} Press Release for draft resolution S/1999/328.
\end{footnotesize}
“narrow national interests had prevailed over Charter obligations in the case of some Member States.” In this case, Russia accuses the NATO states of using the Security Council to further their national interests—precisely the fear outlined in H4. However, one must also keep in mind that Russia’s opposition to NATO attempts to use the Security Council for NATO’s political interests are not automatically motivated by fears of U.S. hegemony, and that H4 predicts that Russia may oppose even less politically motivated expansions of US power in an effort to limit the United States’ relative power.

Nonetheless, Kosovo was not the only example of Russia’s opposition to NATO attempts to use the Security Council for political purposes. An examination of Security Council resolution 1284, authorizing a United Nations mission responsible for “monitoring the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,” reveals similar concerns of politicized expansionism. In this case, Russia specifically argued “that blame for the delay in completing the inspections programme and obtaining Iraqi compliance lay in the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had circumvented the Council.” Russia accused the United States and the United Kingdom of blocking earlier resolution drafts in order “to attain their own unilateral goals.” While Russia had managed to make progress in addressing some of their concerns of Western unilateralism, it did not support the resolution due to the fact that the United States and United Kingdom had taken “illegal unilateral actions” by implementing no-fly zones and undermining the Iraqi government. In Iraq, it once again appears that Russian fears of U.S. hegemonic expansion lead to Russian opposition in the Security Council. However, as with the examples from Kosovo, it is worth

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371 UNSC Press release for resolution 1284.  
372 UNSC Press release for resolution 1284  
373 UNSC Press release for resolution 1284  
374 UNSC Press release for resolution 1284
noting that the Russian statement may be ambiguously interpreted as to whether or not the source of the Russian objection stems from a fear of expansionism or an opposition to the subversion of the Security Council as an institution.

Moreover, the Security Council vote used as a justification for NATO invention in Libya is equally ambiguous. Leading up the 2011 intervention in Libya, Russia abstained on resolution 1973 implementing sanctions and a no-fly zone in Libya. Russia had been concerned by the lack of precision as to “how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits of the engagement would be.”

In this case, Russia cast a negative vote out of concern over a lack of specificity. This ambiguity could have been problematic because it gives United States space to take advantage of a vague mandate, but could also prove problematic as emblematic of a decline in Security Council legalism. One potential source of clarification of Russian voting comes from the unlikely source of NATO Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen, who states that “Russia consciously stepped aside to allow the UN Security Council to act.” While Rasmussen’s statement implies that Russia was not concerned about U.S. expansion, there are obvious political reasons for Rasmussen to paint Russia’s abstention as consent, and thus the case remains ambiguous.

Either way, this concern for U.S. expansion proved well-justified, as reiterated in draft resolution S/2011/612 eight months later concerning Syria: “[Russia’s representative in the Security Council] expressed alarm that compliance with Security Council resolutions on the situation in Libya had been considered a model for future actions that could include the

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375 UNSC Press release for resolution 1973
377 If the case is perceived as NATO having received the consent of the other members of the Security Council, rather than the begrudging agreement to withhold a veto, then NATO’s follow-up operation in Libya becomes much more legitimate.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)." This statement provides specific evidence for Russia’s concern for trends of NATO-led expansionism as the United States tries to push its hegemonic reach. Russia’s statements later in the resolution, however, beg the question of whether interpreting its voting as motivated by fear of U.S. hegemony is indeed correct. Vitaly Churkin, representing Russia at the Security Council, said,

“it was obvious that this evening’s result was not a question of the acceptability of wording; it was a conflict of political approaches. The Russian Federation could not agree with the accusatory tone against Damascus, he said, nor the ultimatum of sanctions against peaceful crisis settlement. The Russian Federation’s proposals on the non-acceptability of military intervention, among others, had not been taken into account.”

Churkin here stresses that Russia’s opposition is grounded in the variance of political approaches between Russia and the United States, who “expressed outrage” over the veto. Thus, the focus of Russia’s justification seems to point directly at the politicized text and the implicit acceptance of military intervention that Russia found destabilizing and presumably an attempt to change the Security Council’s jurisdiction.

Moreover, when the Security Council follows Charter protocols, Russia does not object to the resolutions, even if the goals coincide with U.S. national interests. For example, in resolution 1747 discussing Iranian nuclear proliferation, Russia voted in favor of imposing sanctions on Iran. Due to the fact that “the resolution’s measures were also imposed in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and precluded the possibility of the use of force,” Russia felt comfortable that U.S. expansionist ability was severely

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378 UNSC Press release for draft resolution S/2011/612
379 UNSC Press release for draft resolution S/2011/612
380 UNSC Press release for draft resolution S/2011/612. See also “Russia proposes diluted UN text on Syria attack in Turkey.” Reuters. 4 October 2012.
381 UNSC Resolution 1747.
constrained. Still, because these resolutions do more to promote U.S. interests relative to Russian interests, Russia’s support behind these resolutions raises a weighty challenge against H4’s expansionist Russia premise.

Additionally, according to the Russian officials, the key for Russia was not the limit of U.S. influence but rather, that “[the resolution] left the door open to negotiation.” In other words, Russia felt comfortable voting for the sanctions legislation because of the focus on constructive diplomacy, one of Russia’s staple prerequisites for legitimate Security Council procedure. However, critics might argue that while Russia nominally supports constructive diplomacy, there is discrepancy between Russia’s stated position and Russia’s actual motivations. Such a discrepancy is indeed possible, and the final two resolutions aim to demonstrate that Russia’s stated goal of maintaining current Security Council legal protocols drives Russian voting behavior.

Security Council Resolution 1318—which discusses the maintenance of international peace and security as the world enters into a new millennium—highlights the associative nature of the qualitative evidence’s support for H4. On one hand, Russia explicitly states its concern for member states taking advantage of Chapter VII peacemaking operation in pursuit of their ‘self-serving interest.’ On the other hand, Russia also emphasizes the importance of United Nations’ traditional role as the international guarantor for world stability, and stresses that “under no circumstances can the new century and the new millennium be a cause for a reconsideration of norms and behavior tested by time.”

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382 Press release for UN Security Council Resolution 1747
383 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1747
384 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1747
385 As opposed to fears of expansionism or increased United States power.
386 Press release for UN Security Council resolution 1318
387 Press release for UN Security Council resolution 1318
this perspective, self-serving expansionist pursuits are not motivated by concerns about hegemony, but rather by greater efforts to loosen the legal norms around intervention. Russia’s primary voting motivation concerns the maintenance of the current norms in the United Nations Security Council. As such, while stopping U.S. expansionism is included within Russia’s drive to maintain current Security Council norms of legitimate jurisdiction, the evidence does not clearly establish that a fear of U.S. hegemonic expansionism drives Russian voting behavior.

Finally, resolution 1776, which mandates that United Nations Member States contribute resources to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, offers the clearest case where Russian opposition was not motivated by concerns of U.S. expansion.\footnote{UNSC resolution 1776} As Russia explained before the vote, it consistently supported the U.S.-led ISAF and the extension of the ISAF mandate.\footnote{Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1776} Moreover, Russian supportive votes extending the ISAF mandate in resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563 corroborate this claim. Therefore, this voting behavior seems to imply that Russia did not vote against the resolution because of fears of expansionism, but rather, as Russia claims, it could not support the resolution “because the new issue of maritime interception had yet to be clarified.”\footnote{Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1776} This focus on legal clarification therefore challenges the notion in H4 that Russian voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemony.

In sum, the qualitative evidence signals that in a number of cases, U.S.-led military expansion concerns Russia. However, the evidence has not been able to definitively link U.S. hegemonic ambitions, or even U.S. military intervention in general, as the \textit{motivating factor} for Russian voting behavior. According to the evidence, Russian voting behavior may just as
likely be inspired by concerns about reinterpreting the Security Council mandate beyond its original jurisdiction. If the latter motivates Russian voting behavior, then Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion displays an associative effect, but fear of such expansion does not play a causal role. Therefore, while the qualitative evidence supports the plausibility of H4, the lack of statistical support suggests that Russia’s opposition to NATO interventions is part of a larger effort to prevent the Security Council from overstepping its legal bounds rather than based on fears of hegemonic expansionism, as H4 would suggest.

H5: Relative Power

According to H5, relative power should drive Russian opposition in the Security Council. Such a metric is difficult to assess qualitatively through Russian voting justifications, as Russia is not likely to publicly state that they have been bullied into voting for a resolution by a vastly more powerful United States. That said, the statistical evidence did not find significant support for this finding, which should already predispose the reader to doubt the validity of H5. However, because H5 would expect Russia to avoid challenging the U.S. when Russia was relatively weak and core U.S. interests were at stake, examples of Russian negative votes in such situations challenge H5.

Security Council Resolution 1454 provides one such challenge. In the 2002 resolution, Russia abstained on a vote discussing the implementation of sanctions on Iraq. Already in 2002, the United States felt that Iraq posed a serious threat to U.S. national security interests. As U.S. President George Bush stated in his 2002 State of the Union address,

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391 However, as will be discussed in H3, fears of U.S. expansionism may play a larger role specifically within Russia’s sphere of influence.
392 The one area where H4 will hold more weight is in the CIS sphere, but for reasons outlined in H3 above.
393 UNSC Resolution 1454
“States like [Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.”  

Thus, when resolution 1454 was introduced, the U.S. considered the Iraqi threat as a vital national security interest. Moreover, Russia was relatively weak against the United States in 2002.395 However, due to the fact that the resolution did not include a constructive measure stipulating the conditions under which the Security Council would lift the sanctions, Russia did not support the resolution. Therefore, it does not appear that Russia was cowed by U.S. superlative power.

Furthermore, one should also keep in mind the inherent opportunity for counterfactual evidence: the United States may not even introduce resolutions that it knows will not have any support in the Security Council. Because H5 predicts that a powerful United States will be able to coerce a weak Russia into supporting Security Council resolutions, one would certainly not expect a weak Russia to keep the U.S. from introducing resolutions of interest. However, in the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Russia did just that. In early 2003, Russia threatened to veto a Security Council resolution that would lead to the use of force against Iraq.396 France shortly thereafter joined Russia’s pledge to veto, and the United States and United Kingdom withdrew the resolution.397 Thus, given the fact that Russia was relatively weak,398 this counterfactual case further challenges the hypothesis outlined in H5.

H6: CHINESE LEADERSHIP  

395 Russia’s relative CINC score was 0.248992006 in 2002, the fifth lowest score out of the relative CINC scores generated (CINC data sample was from 1990-2007).  
397 Ibid.  
398 With a relative CINC score of 0.249735469, Russia was only marginally stronger versus the United States and was still relatively weak.
H6 predicts that Russian votes are influenced by Chinese voting behavior. The statistical section supported this hypothesis by finding a strong associative relationship between Chinese and Russian voting behaviors. However, the qualitative cases strongly suggest that while both Russia and China vote similarly in the Security Council, both countries are motivated by similar variables rather than exhibiting a leader-follower relationship. In particular, China, like Russia, places a very high premium on the state sovereignty principle. This finding is unsurprising—like Russia, China also hosts a number of ethnic minorities who are more easily kept in check and aspirations delegitimized through the promotion of the state sovereignty principle.\(^{399}\) Thus, the qualitative evidence allows one to conclude that Chinese voting behavior does not drive Russian voting behavior.

One strong piece of evidence indicating that the Russia-China voting relationship was strictly epiphenomenal came from Russian voting justifications. If Russia was indeed influenced by Chinese voting behavior, then one would expect to see Russia reference China’s voting behavior when justifying their own. However, not once in all 1095 examined resolutions did the Russian Federation refer to the Chinese voting position when casting their own vote. Thus, it does not appear that Russia bases its votes off of Chinese decision-making.\(^{400}\)

Instead, it appears that China, like Russia, is strictly concerned with sovereignty norms. In fact, while Russia justified its voting behavior primarily in legal terms, China explained its own voting positions primarily based on its concern with sovereignty norms. For example, when justifying its veto on a 2012 draft resolution that would have authorized

\(^{399}\) For more information, see the discussion in H2 on state sovereignty. Also, see Coggins (2012) p. 451 and Toft (2002). Moreover, China has also been criticized on its poor human rights record as well.s

\(^{400}\) Additionally, such voting behavior would be grossly inconsistent with Russia’s self-conceptualization as a great power, as outlined in the theoretical section. See Welch and Shevchenko (2010); Wohlforth (2009); Tsygankov (2012A); Thorun (2009); and Clunan (2009).
sanctions against the Syrian regime, China defended its veto: “The purpose was safeguarding the interests of the Syrian people, as well as the basic norms covering international relations.” Here, the ‘basic norms’ that China strives to protect are those norms of state sovereignty.

Similarly, when defending its decision to abstain on the implementation of a no-fly zone against Libya in early 2011, China justified its vote on the resolution in terms of its commitment to state sovereignty. “The United Nations Charter must be respected and the current crisis must be ended through peaceful means. China was always against the use of force when those means were not exhausted.” Here, China explains the practical implications of the state sovereignty principle on the UN Security Council: due to the fact that the United Nations Charter institutionalizes state sovereignty, the UN Security Council can only take action as a last resort. Again, this language sounds similar to much of the rhetoric employed during Russian justifications. However, the evidence seems to imply nothing more than similar motives.

Finally, Chinese and Russian voting patterns in 1998 and 1999 on the conflict in Kosovo demonstrate that neither state was following the other’s voting pattern. In both Security Council resolutions 1160 and 1199, China abstained on both resolutions, but Russia voted in favor of the resolutions. Such a result is counter-intuitive—Russia had a greater stake in avoiding conflict in the Balkans and was a close Yugoslav ally. While Russia justified its supportive voting on behalf of promoting peace through constructive dialogue,

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401 Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/2012/538
402 UNSC resolution 1973
403 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1973
404 In fact, China goes even further to say that the only reason “It had not blocked the passage of the resolution, however, [was] because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the African Union.” Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1973
405 UNSC resolution 1160; UNSC resolution 1199.
China took a more hard-line position on state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{407} Despite the willingness of the international community to work towards a constructive peace, China took a principled stance, arguing that

“The question of Kosovo was in essence an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It should be resolved properly through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{408}

China clearly states that the case of Kosovo is an internal, sovereign question for the Yugoslav government, and the international community has no business involving itself in this sovereign matter. Moreover, China asserts that the basic principle on which Yugoslavia should be negotiating with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is based on the principle for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. In other words, any final agreement must deny Kosovar separatist demands and retain the complete sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Such a stance goes even farther than Russia, who prioritized the pragmatic objective of maintaining international stability, even at the possible expense of Yugoslav sovereignty. In contrast to the Chinese stance, Russia “strongly believed that the basis for a settlement in Kosovo was the retention of the autonomous region within Serbia on the basis of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”\textsuperscript{409} Critically, the Russian stance recognizes that the international community may have a role to play in bringing about a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict, even at the expense of Yugoslav sovereignty.

China had a similar critique in resolution 1199, where it feels that “The draft resolution did not take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Federal Republic of

\textsuperscript{407} As Russia says on the discussion on resolution 1160, “A solution could be achieved through dialogue.” Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1160.
\textsuperscript{408} Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1160
Yugoslavia within its sphere of sovereignty. It might reinforce the separatist and terrorist forces in the region and intensify the tension there.\(^{410}\) China explicitly voices its concern that a resolution infringing upon state sovereignty will lead to increased support for state separatism. This declaration most clearly links Chinese support for state sovereignty and China’s concern for the rise of ‘state separatist and terrorist forces.’ These two votes on Kosovo expose a subtle but critical difference between the Chinese and Russian voting approaches to the Security Council. While China places an absolutist priority on the maintenance of sovereignty norms, Russia prioritizes international peace and stability.\(^{411}\)

Therefore, a combination of the lack of reference to each other’s voting positions, a joint interest in preserving state sovereignty norms, and their voting differences over votes on Kosovo, one finds that the qualitative evidence strongly suggests that the Russian and Chinese leadership are not basing their votes off of one another, but rather simply share similar (but not identical) views about the appropriate role of the Security Council. Russia and China’s shared interest in maintaining the primacy of sovereignty norms explains the extremely high correlation between their voting patterns identified by the statistical analyses. Finally, Russia’s willingness to place constructive pragmatism before an uncompromising normative stance sets its voting apart and proves that Russia is not taking its voting cues from China, and, by extension, the ‘non-Western world.’ In short: the qualitative evidence conclusively invalidates H6.

**H7: NORMATIVE COMPROMISE**

\(^{410}\) Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1199

\(^{411}\) Similarly, China concern with state sovereignty norms has even led it to oppose resolutions admitting new members states (undermining the preexisting state structure). For example, refer to UNSC resolutions 1249 and 1333, where China abstained on votes recommending the addition of Nauru and Tuvalu to the United Nations, respectively.
This hypothesis expects to see Russia vote with the other members of the Security Council when the other members are willing to respect Russia enough to compromise on normative questions. While the quantitative analysis found an association between attempts at compromise and negative Russian votes, the discussion also highlighted severe methodological flaws in the data collection. Therefore, the qualitative analysis gives the reader an opportunity to assess the strength of the hypothesis without concerns of data collection methodology. However, when assessing the failure of normative compromise, one finds an insurmountable compound problem of diplomatic rhetoric and a lack of substantive insight. Regardless of the reason for Russia’s opposition in a given case, Russia can simply say that its “country’s views had not been taken duly into consideration.” This creates a tautological scenario where a Russian vote ‘no’ signals a lack of compromise, by definition. Therefore, this tautological problem undermines the explanatory insight for Russia’s justifications on compromise, and H7 fails to provide a convincing qualitative explanation for Russian voting behavior.

For example, in resolution 1305 extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), Russia stated that “while it was in the interest of the continuing peace process to pass the resolution, the Russian Federation could not do so because Russian amendments had not been taken on board.” This Bosnia case demonstrates the problem generated by the ‘lack of compromise’ rhetoric. Because Russia does not specify its metrics for compromise, Russian claims of insufficient compromise are completely subjective and gives little explanatory insight. Moreover, any time that Russia is unable to find an acceptable diplomatic agreement, Russia has incentive to characterize the lack of agreement on the failure of the other member states to sufficiently consider Russia’s

412 UNSC Resolution 1054.
413 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1305
position, creating a moral hazard problem. In these cases, the failure to reach consensus could have been fully due to Russian intransigence, and one would have no idea based off of the resolution data.

Even more critically, such a compromised-based analysis would miss the substance of the voting justification entirely. For example, the assessment in H2 for resolution 2068, discussing the use and targeting children in conflict, suggested that Russia voting patterns were motivated by sovereignty concerns.\textsuperscript{414} However, if looking for Russian justifications of failure to reach a compromise, one would hone in on the following statement: “When negotiating such an instrument all views of members should be taken into account, [the Russian representative] said, adding that he hoped to reach a consensus text in the future.”\textsuperscript{415} Such a focus obscures the real reasons motivating Russian voting.

Therefore, due to the unspecified nature of the Russian justification as well as questions of moral hazard, Russia’s rhetoric on compromise does not allow for H7 to provide much explanatory leverage and provides an unsteady foundation on which to base a rigorous analysis. One may thus conclude that H7 does not provide a useful approach, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively, for this paper’s research question. Nonetheless, I include H7 in the discussion as for instructive purposes—that not all research approaches are analytically equal, and in order to reinforce the point that each hypothesis was evaluated not only on its content but also on its analytical leverage.

**H8: Prestigious State**

The next hypothesis expects Russia to vote negatively in resolutions condemning prestigious states in an effort to build relationships with those states. The quantitative tests indicated preliminary support, but were limited by the small number of resolutions targeting

\textsuperscript{414} UNSC resolution 2068
\textsuperscript{415} Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 2068
prestigious states. A qualitative analysis of these cases helps the reader better understand the relative merits of H8’s prediction. The analysis of the two cases condemning the behavior of prestigious states provides moderate support for this hypothesis, but the small number of cases demonstrates the limited utility of this hypothesis in explaining Russian voting decisions for the vast majority of Security Council resolutions.

The first case condemned the nuclear proliferation efforts of India and Pakistan. In an ever-escalating war of threat and counter-threat, the two feuding countries have both striven to gain the upper edge in a decades-long dispute over the jurisdiction of Kashmir. In 1998, both India and Pakistan violated international taboo on nuclear proliferation and conducted nuclear weapons tests.416 In the Security Council resolution that ensued, Russia joined the rest of the Security Council in their condemnation of both South Asian countries’ attempts to join the nuclear weapons club.417 Russia justified its vote by emphasizing the danger of both nuclear tests to the non-proliferation regime and “to do everything it could to strengthen that regime and to prevent its being undermined.”418 It is noteworthy that Russia chose to designate the nuclear tests as a threat to the non-proliferation regime and not as a threat to international peace and security. While a threat to non-proliferation would likely be considered a threat to international security, the fact that Russia refrained from doing so may have reflected a conscious decision to specifically prevent avenues for future Security Council action against both countries. Such an interpretation is reinforced by Russia’s decision to explicitly highlight that “Russia felt that the economic sanctions imposed on the two countries in the wake of the nuclear tests were unjustified,…noting that the

416 Press Release for UN Security Council 1172
417 UNSC resolution 1172
418 Press Release for UN Security Council 1172
resolution before the Council did not contain such a provision." In other words, Russia’s statements indicate that its support for the resolution condemning nuclear proliferation was on condition that the Security Council not authorize further prosecution of India or Pakistan. Such an effort to forestall future punitive activities would likely generate goodwill towards Russia in both countries, and therefore fits with H8’s expectations, even if Russia did not vote against the West on this particular resolution.

The other case where a prestigious state faced censure in the Security Council involved Russia itself. In 2008, Russia fought a five-day war with Georgia, and faced a draft resolution demanding that it ‘pull back its forces.’ However, this case does not help H8, because Russia’s support for itself does not imply that it would support other prestigious states; it just reaffirms that Russia a self-interested actor in the international community.421 One may interpret this comment to challenge H1, which operates off of a legalist basis, and assumes less self-interest. However, as the H2 discussion of sovereignty illustrates, Russia’s strict legalist approach to the Security Council is steeped in self-interested motives. Moreover, Russia also defends their military action in Georgia as ‘self defense,’ authorized under Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.422 Nonetheless, that fact that Russia’s threat to veto a Security Council resolution on the Russian-Georgian conflict resulted in the resolution’s withdrawal does lend qualitative support to the explain finding that Security Council members do not introduce resolutions that they are confident will be vetoed by a permanent member.423

419 Press Release for UN Security Council 1172
420 “Russia Rejects UN Georgia Draft.” (20 August 2008)
421 One may interpret this comment to challenge H1, which operates off of a legalist basis, and assumes less self-interest. However, as the H2 discussion of sovereignty illustrates, Russia’s strict legalist approach to the Security Council is steeped in self-interested motives. Moreover, Russia also defends their military action in Georgia as ‘self defense,’ authorized under Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
422 Lavrov (2 October, 2008)
While the India-Pakistan case provides some qualitative support for H8, one cannot generalize here based off of a single resolution. As a whole, while H8 does not have enough evidence to explain Russian voting behavior within the Security Council as status seeking, it does convincingly demonstrate that the Security Council members address international crises involving prestigious states outside of traditional Security Council resolutions.

**H9: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY**

The next hypothesis was not tested from a statistical standpoint. Evidence for H9 would demonstrate that Russia has a different definition of democratic legitimacy than does the West. The qualitative evidence below does indeed demonstrate that Russia’s definition of a legitimate state differs from the West. However, this difference boils down to a question over the limits of state sovereignty, and not one of relational legitimacy. One permutation of the democratic legitimacy argument is that of sovereign democracy, which does have greater support. However, there is no practical difference in implications between the sovereign democracy theory and the more general protection of sovereignty norms discussed in H2. Therefore, H9 does not provide any new support not already established in H2. In short, as an independent hypothesis, H9 fails to explain anything new.

Russia bases its definition of state legitimacy on a relational perspective, or whether the state provides its people its basic goods. Most important, from the Russian perspective, is that the state provide order and stability to its society, and that it does not threaten the stability of the greater international community. As explained in H2, when a state maintains internal order and stability, then Russia believes that the state deserves its sovereign respect.\textsuperscript{424} Moreover, Russia considers attempts to violate state sovereignty on the grounds of promoting democracy to be illegitimate. As Lavrov writes, “The CIS space has turned

\textsuperscript{424} Sil and Chen (2004)
into a sphere for geopolitical ‘games,’ which involves such instruments as “democratorship.” Lavrov’s critique attacks NATO and others for disrespecting state sovereignty on the illegitimate grounds (according to Russia) of installing liberal democracies.

This Russia-Western disagreement mirrors the questions posed in H2 of whether state rights supersede individual rights. This dissonance seems to be exemplified by Russia’s veto over sanctions against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. As Zalmay Khalilzad, representing the United States, said, “China and Russia stand with Mugabe against the people of Zimbabwe. A majority of the Council stand with the people of Zimbabwe.” In other words, China and Russia stand in support of state sovereignty (and, they argue, the UN Charter). The United States and its Western allies, however, believe that humanitarian rights and the rights of the individual take the ultimate precedence, even before the rights of sovereign states. Nonetheless, while this case provides evidence for the importance of state sovereignty, it does not provide support for relational legitimacy perspective. As Zimbabwe’s leader, Robert Mugabe failed to provide basic goods and services to his people, and completely trashed his country’s economy. Therefore, Mugabe should not have liberal or relational legitimacy, and Russia should therefore have supported the resolution. Similarly, Russia’s negative vote on Myanmar could not have been based on Myanmar’s relational legitimacy—as discussed in H2, Myanmar was failing to provide essential goods to its people and thus causing a humanitarian crisis. Therefore, in both cases, it appears that the driver

425 Lavrov (2010)
429 Press release for UN draft resolution S/2000/14
for Russian voting was not whether or not these were legitimate democratic states, but rather whether the humanitarian crises warrants a violation of state sovereignty.\footnote{One may argue that this finding that a sense of relational legitimacy does not affect Russian voting behavior comes somewhat into tension with the argument that Russia adopts a relational legitimacy approach at home. However, such a finding does not mean that Russia would not encourage Mugabe to legitimize himself domestically through providing basic goods and services, it just means that the situation still does not pose a threat of international peace and security, and thus still does not warrant the attention of the UN Security Council.}

The U.S. support for violations of sovereignty in humanitarian crises does not mean that the United States supports blanket violations of state sovereignty. On the other hand, the United States is a major advocate of the rights of sovereign states, as evidenced by U.S. opposition to the International Criminal Court.\footnote{For example, the United States vetoed Security Council Draft Resolution S/2002/712 discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the fact that the United States would not allow for a peacekeeping resolution that placed the United States’ peacekeeping forces liable under the International Criminal Court, which the United States felt was a violation of United States sovereignty.} However, when it comes to humanitarian intervention, the United States and Russia do not see eye-to-eye.

This disagreement has led Russia to develop the theory of sovereign democracy, as explained in detail in the literature review and in the theoretical background for H9. To recapitulate: sovereign democracy means that Russia will take its own path towards the development of its democratic government, based on its unique cultural heritage and its rights as a sovereign state.\footnote{Monaghan (2006)} If a state decides to prioritize security over equality, Russia would argue that this remains the country’s sovereign right, and legitimate regime change can only come from an organic movement within that state.\footnote{A more in-depth discussion on this topic falls outside of the domain of this essay.} To quote Monaghan, “…Moscow sees things differently: as Kosachov put it, democracy does not worry Russians, but the ‘cardinally changing balance of security’ does.”\footnote{Monaghan (2008)} In other words, Russians are far less concerned about democratization or particular form of government than they are with
whether or not that government can provide legitimacy through stability, a finding consistent with H2.

For example, in Resolution 1618, Russia advocates a limitation on individual rights. “[The Russian representative] drew attention to the inadmissibility of giving a podium in the mass media for the spread of terrorist views. The right to freedom of speech and dissemination of information was not without limitations.” In this case of non-state terror, Russia believes that state security should take primacy over individual rights, such as the rights of free speech in the media. While the Western reaction is to immediately respond with the sacrosanct nature of individual rights, a closer examination of United States legislation such as the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act shows that the United States’ Congress would not completely disagree with Russia’s claim that “the right to freedom…was not without limitations.”

In sum, H9 does not offer any significant insights to understanding Russian voting behavior. While the qualitative evidence does not find a relational legitimacy perspective, it does support the conclusion that Russia has differing views of legitimate sovereign governance than does the United States. However, such a finding is a natural result of the normative differences outlined in H2. Therefore, H9 may be best categorized as minimally informative in understanding Russian voting behavior. Nonetheless, H9 does perform the service of clearly demonstrating the theoretical consistency of Russia’s sovereignty approach—a state concerned with promoting state sovereignty norms will respect state legitimacy regardless of the state’s individual human rights practices.

H10: Respected Power

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435 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1618
Finally, H10 expects Russia to cooperate more with the West when it feels respected. While the statistical testing supported H10, it is more difficult to show through qualitative, individual resolutions that Russia feels respected. Therefore, in order to ascertain whether or not respect had an influence on voting behavior, I identified a particularly salient ‘hard case’ for H10: the Iraq War in 2003. Scholars identify 2001-2005 as a time when Russia felt respected by the United States. Furthermore, if respect for Russia does not translate into Security Council voting support, then H10 has little explanatory power. The qualitative findings suggest that variations of respect do not have significant influence in the UN Security Council. Thus, the qualitative evaluation is not consistent with H10’s prediction.

If Russia’s level of respect actually impacted Russian voting patterns, then one would expect it to vote in favor of resolutions important to the United States when it felt respected by the United States. The prime example of a case that the U.S. felt was vital to its national interests was the case of Iraq in 2003. As explained in the qualitative analysis of H5, the U.S. felt that Iraq posed a threat to United States security, and placed a high premium on support for the resolution. As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said,

"The president would look at this as a missed opportunity for Russia to take an important moral stand to defend freedom, and to prevent the risk of a massive catastrophe taking place as a result of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction."

Thus, if an increased level of respect for Russia drove Russian voting behavior, then one would expect Russia to support the resolution. However, as discussed above, Russia took the lead in informing the United States that Russia was determined to “exercise its veto right.”

This qualitative example shows that a respected Russia was not willing to consider voting for

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437 Thorun (2009); Tsygankov (2012A)
438 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002)
439 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002)
440 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002)
a resolution that the United States considered fundamentally important. As such, in cases where the United States does not respect Russia, one has all the more reason to expect Russia to avoid voting along with U.S. interests.

Therefore, the salient case of Iraq during a time when Russia was respected and the United States strongly desired Russian support challenges H10. Russia still supports a vast majority of votes when it feels disrespected, and still votes against resolutions when it feels respected. Moreover, H10 gives us little insight into the specific cases—when looking at individual resolutions, H10 gives no insight by which one may determine the likelihood of Russian opposition on a given vote in a given year. Therefore, due to the fact that the salient case of Iraq fails to complement the statistical findings and the fact that H10 has a limited practical applicability to differentiate between specific resolutions, H10 does not offer a strong explanation of Russian voting behavior.

The qualitative results provided strong support for the thesis argument proposing a conservative-minded Russia intent on preserving its current international influence. All three of the ‘defensive realist’ hypotheses enjoyed strong support from the case analysis. In particular, the qualitative piece has established the connection between Russia’s desire to maintain the international status quo and the ways that a strictly defined legal mandate and the promotion of the state sovereignty principle helps defend the current balance of power. Furthermore, the sphere of influence (H3) remained the only other hypothesis that received consistent support in both resolutions. However, as discussed in the qualitative piece above, while H3 is a relevant motivating factor, its relevance stems from a permutation of H2. For the three hypotheses falling under the offensive realist approach (H4, H5, and H6), only H4 received some empirical support. However, a thorough examination of the hypothesis revealed that the voting was motivated by the desire to defend current sovereignty norms
(H2) and protect a narrow legal UNSC mandate (H1) and was less motivated by a desire to challenge U.S. hegemony (H4). Finally, while the primary status seeker hypothesis, H10, found support in the statistical section, a qualitative case study demonstrated that the hypothesis' explanatory power for individual cases was non-existent.

The chart below provides a summary of the qualitative results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Qualitative Findings</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Legal Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Russia interprets Security Council jurisdiction in a strictly limited fashion</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Genuine Russian priority in maintaining peace and stability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Struggles to explain why Russia takes a legally orthodox stance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Protection of Sovereignty Norms</td>
<td>Russia maintains state sovereignty norms through strict legalism</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia maintains status quo through sovereignty norms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia protects itself from separatism and terrorism through state sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Sphere of Influence</td>
<td>Russia views external intervention a threat to regional stability</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia has a sovereign sphere of influence and opposes NATO expansionism and</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary causal role to protection of sovereignty norms</td>
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<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>U.S. Hegemony</td>
<td>Russian opposition aimed at limiting Security Council legal jurisdiction, not</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fears of U.S. hegemony</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia fears U.S. expansion within sovereign sphere</td>
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<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Relative Power</td>
<td>Substantive evidence that Russia is willing to challenge the United States in the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security Council even when Russia is weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>Chinese Leadership</td>
<td>No references to Chinese voting in justifications</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both motivated by protecting sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia more willing to make pragmatic choices of stability over compromise</td>
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<tr>
<td>H7</td>
<td>Normative Compromise</td>
<td>Justifications fail to specify specific motivations</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Insurmountable moral hazard concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Prestigious State</td>
<td>Prestige fails to explain general voting behavior</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence that prestigious states not considered in Security Council</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>H9</td>
<td>Democratic Legitimacy</td>
<td>Supports sovereignty hypothesis</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not support the influence of relational legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

441 Key: Y=Yes   N=No   M=Marginal Yes   N/A=Not applicable
**Conclusion**

In conclusion, this essay finds that Russian voting in the Security Council is motivated by Russia’s desire to protect its preexisting interests. Russia protects these interests by opposing changes to the current status quo. In particular, this entails a reluctance to authorize the destabilizing use of international force unless the threats to peace and security are sufficiently severe and there are no other viable alternatives. Russia believes that the UN Charter has codified the narrow Russian definition on the use of force into international law. Russia also opposes changes to the status quo through its insistence upon state sovereignty, which precludes the recognition of non-state actors and also protects states from critiques of their governance practices by promoting states’ rights over individual rights. Due to the presence of state separatists and its questionable human rights record, Russia’s advancement of the state sovereignty principle advances its own interests in both of these areas. This concern with state sovereignty has also led Russia to promote a normative concept of Russia’s own domestic sovereign democracy, which grants Russia democratic legitimacy even if its “democratic development” does not mirror the traditional Western model. Moreover, Russia extends this theory of sovereignty to include the CIS states, which it considers to fall under its sovereign sphere of influence. Thus, Russia opposes outside incursions into its sphere of influence both because it views such activities as a violation of its sovereign space and also because such interventions threaten the regional stability Russia maintains in the post-Soviet space.
Each of these theoretical elements receives support from the quantitative and qualitative data. From the quantitative side, the statistical significance of labeling a resolution as ‘a threat to international security’ under Chapter VII provided strong support for the existence of Russian legal consistency. Moreover, the statistical significance of Russian opposition to cases where there were violations of sovereignty (particularly without consent) also provided critical evidence for a concern with violations of state sovereignty. In a similar vein, Russia’s consistent justificatory defense of its voting decisions in situations with violations of sovereignty also provided vital evidence that Russia was not only concerned with the practical result of the resolution in question, but also with material implications. Similarly, Russia’s statistically significant tendency to vote against resolutions concerning the CIS demonstrated strong empirical support for the existence of a sovereign sphere. Further, a wide array of qualitative resolutions provided evidence for this theory of a defensive Russia. Some important cases were those that demonstrated Russia’s willingness to authorize force when they felt there was a genuine threat to international peace and security (like in Burundi)\(^\text{442}\) as well as cases such as Myanmar, which demonstrated Russia’s prioritization of state sovereignty over humanitarian intervention.\(^\text{443}\)

On the other hand, the evidence is inconsistent with the rival theoretical approaches. Contrary to H4 and the school of thought that sees Russia as an expansionist power, the authorization of intervention did not impact Russian negative voting behavior. Moreover, the failure to find any empirical evidence that relative power affects Russia’s voting behavior is inconsistent with the expansionist school. While the status seeker theory had statistical support in that Russia was more likely to vote positively on resolutions in the period categorized by Russian experts as respected, this added prestige did not help the U.S. win

\(^{442}\) UNSC Security Council 1049
\(^{443}\) UNSC Draft Resolution S/2000/14
Russian support on Iraq, where the U.S. had the most interests at stake. Such a finding strongly suggested that Russia’s primary motivation could not be based on a search for prestige.

This study also identifies a number of interesting questions for future research. One avenue for future research would be the relationship between Russia’s voting in the Security Council and the views of Russia’s domestic populace. While a substantial literature has developed examining the impact of domestic audience costs on foreign policy decision-making, one might also consider examining whether foreign policy decision-making in the Security Council impacts Russian domestic attitudes. Public opinion surveys conducted within Russia have assessed Russian popular opinion on normative principles in the Security Council, and a further comparison of these two perspectives may provide valuable revelations in light of the findings outlined in this paper.

Another avenue for future research would be to further explore the relationship between Russia and the states within its sovereign sphere of influence. This paper has established that Russia considers these CIS states to have a special historic relationship to Russia, and Russia takes a protective sovereign stance of the CIS in the international arena. Moreover, this paper found that the West disputes Russia’s sphere of sovereignty, and encourages the CIS states to pursue a foreign policy independent from Russian interests. Thus, an area for future research would be to examine how different CIS states’ foreign

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policies have developed since the fall of the Soviet Union, and whether Georgia’s rejection of Russia’s heavy hand is an exception or the norm.

Moreover, these findings have specific implications for the success of the United States’ diplomatic tactics at the Security Council. First, Russia’s legalist approach offers distinct opportunities for engagement and compromise in the Security Council. According to this paper’s findings, diplomatic advances should not focus on Russia’s benefit or self-interest when discussing potential draft resolutions. In other words, if the United States wants to push for the authorization of an intervention in Syria, the U.S. will make little progress in reassuring Russian security interests. Rather, the United States should emphasize the compatibility of Russian legal principles. In the case of Syria, the United States might emphasize the threat to international security. For example, the United States could try to convince Russia that the conflict in Syria threatened regional stability through the refugee spillover into Iraq and Turkey that was quickly expanding the scope of the conflict. Such an appeal to legal norms based on the UN Charter would be much more likely to receive Russian support than if the U.S. relied on humanitarian arguments. Therefore, while the humanitarian rhetoric may help legitimize military action for domestic Western audiences, that same rhetoric may delegitimize the intervention from the Russian perspective.

Second, this paper emphasizes the lack of normative consensus on international law. Currently, the differing normative priorities between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention have led to conflict amongst the Security Council members. This conflict will continue to grow as ‘state-first’ countries like China continue to rise in influence and exert more diplomatic leverage in the Security Council negotiations. Thus, this essay also identifies the need for codification of current international law. Else, one should expect a continual

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446 Although as Baum (2004) notes, domestic audiences may be extremely fickle.
trend for the state sovereignty principle based on a strict interpretation of the UN Charter to reign supreme over the concerns of individual citizen rights.

Finally, the findings in this essay have wider implications for understanding Russian foreign policy motivations. The research conclusion takes a definitive stance on Russia’s foreign policy outlook. Contrary to the portrayal of Russia as an aggressive expansionist, the empirical study of Russian Security Council voting shows Russia in a principled, defensive light. If one extrapolates Russia’s motivations in the Security Council to its general foreign policy motivations, then one finds a strictly conservative Russia ambitiously seeking to protect its current resources and influence. Thus, one should not interpret Russia’s overtures towards rising non-Western powers as a reversion to Soviet-era expansionism, but rather as an attempt to strategically align itself to protect what it already has. As such, Russian foreign policy does not seek to change the balance of power in ways inimical to American interests. Therefore, one would be misguided to suggest that the U.S.-Russian relationship must be inherently combative.

On the other hand, one sees increasing strategic opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Russia. As the United States becomes increasingly focused on maintaining its own relative influence in the world, both Russia and the United States will share a defensive realist world perspective. Thus, with both states focusing on protecting their international influence, the United States and Russia have shared interests in retaining the status quo. Moreover, both the United States and Russia share a core conviction that the basis for international relations should be the state system, and that individual states bear the primary responsibility for the governance of their individual citizenry. For the United States,

447 Along the lines of Jervis (1978), this defensive realist approach would see the possibility of overcoming the security dilemma as challenging but not impossible.
this commitment to state sovereignty is manifested by its strong resistance to International
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over United States citizens. The United States believes that it
has primary jurisdiction over its own citizenry, and therefore will not defer that “sovereign
right” to any other decision-making body. Similarly, Russia takes an approach of “sovereign
democracy” to its own governance, arguing that no other body has the authority to dictate
Russian policy towards its domestic citizens within sovereign Russia, and to a lesser extent,
to those in Russia’s immediate sphere. However, the United States believes that states can
‘forfeit’ that sovereign right if the government human rights violations are sufficiently severe.
The evidence suggests that Russia does not share these sentiments. Thus, while
disagreements do challenge U.S.-Russian cooperation, both countries have shared objectives
and would mutually benefit from trust and cooperation based on jointly recognized shared
interests.

Nonetheless, cooperation with Russia comes at a cost. A robust relationship requires
the U.S. to recognize Russia’s interests as a sovereign equal.449 Moreover, it requires the U.S.
to accept Russia’s unilateral sovereign influence over the CIS states. Lastly, and most
importantly, Russia requires that the United States accept the inviolable supremacy of the
state sovereignty norm in the international system, even outweighing humanitarian concerns.
Thus, while cooperation with Russia is indeed achievable, and possibly even in the U.S.
strategic interest, only the U.S. can decide whether this great power alliance comes at too
high a price.

449 A note on sovereignty: both Russia and the United States have extraordinarily similar views of state
sovereignty. Both states view that their domestic government should supersede any international government’s
determination of national legitimacy. For the United States, this conviction to state sovereignty is manifested by
its strong resistance to International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over United States citizens.449 The United
States believes that it has primary jurisdiction over its own government, and therefore will not defer that
“sovereign right” to any other decision-making body. Similarly, Russia takes an approach of “sovereign
democracy” to its own governance, arguing that no other body has the authority to dictate Russian policy
within sovereign Russia, and to a lesser extent, in Russia’s immediate sphere.
APPENDIX:

Appendix I: Security Council activity per year

Appendix II: Sample Coding-List of Vetoes and Abstentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>RUS Vetos</th>
<th>RUS Abstain</th>
<th>CHN Vetos</th>
<th>CHN Abstain</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Justiification</th>
<th>Intervention(s) or No?</th>
<th>Chapter VIII</th>
<th>Specific Policy Implication(s) (H4)</th>
<th>Absolutely specificaly US outside of UN (H5)</th>
<th>Consent? (H6)</th>
<th>Significant Ongoing Violence (H7)</th>
<th>Violate State Sovereignty (H8)</th>
<th>Does Wordung Prevent Intervention(s) (H9)</th>
<th>Compromiss(e) (H10)</th>
<th>Prestigne Country (H11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2002/277</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11-Mar-02</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>A Security Council report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2007/14</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12-Mar-02</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>A Security Council report</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2004/173</td>
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<td>21-Apr-01</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>A draft veto report</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2000/101</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>18-Dec-99</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/1999/221</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>25-Feb-98</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2001/119</td>
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<td>25-Feb-97</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2002/119</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18-Dec-96</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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Appendix III: Percentage of Russian negative votes per year over total number of votes per year

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2. | 1996   .1034483        58          6 |
3. | 1997   .0350877        57          2 |
4. | 1998   .0273973        73          2 |
5. | 1999   .0746269        67          5 |
|--------------------------------------|
6. | 2000   .0392157        51          2 |
7. | 2001   0                   54          0 |
8. | 2002   .0142857        70          1 |
9. | 2003   0                   69          0 |
10. | 2004  .0483871        62          3 |
|--------------------------------------|
11. | 2005  .0140845        71          1 |
12. | 2006  .0337079        89          3 |
13. | 2007  .0877193        57          5 |
14. | 2008  .0151515        66          1 |
15. | 2009  .0204082        49          1 |
|--------------------------------------|
16. | 2010  .0169492        59          1 |
17. | 2011  .0441176        68          3 |
18. | 2012  .0727273        55          4 |
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