Multilateral Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Bosnia, Somalia, and Darfur

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Multilateral Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Bosnia, Somalia, and Darfur

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**Introduction:**

Intrastate conflict or civil war has been a constant throughout human history as nations have been repeatedly plagued by divisive internal wars. Yet as much as civil wars have beset nations, other states have sought time and time again to intervene in these conflicts. By the past century, intervention by a third party in an intrastate conflict became a prominent feature of the international system. Prior to the end of the Cold War, powerful nations routinely intervened in the civil wars of other nations in an attempt to favor one combatant over the other for a multitude of reasons including strategic, political, and economic interests. While such a mode of foreign involvement in civil war still exists, the last two to three decades of international politics has seen the growth of a new variant of intervention: multilateral intervention. This multilateralism is markedly different from the previous means of foreign involvement in intrastate conflict.

Interference in domestic conflicts by via multilateralism is not supposed to be performed primarily out of geopolitical self-interest. Rather, it is to be done under the auspices of alleviating the humanitarian crises endemic to violent intrastate warfare. Furthermore, as the name implies, foreign involvement is to be conducted by a number of parties usually under the authority of an intergovernmental organization rather than by one major state acting unilaterally. By the 1990s multilateral intervention via international organizations like the United Nations and under the leadership of the United States gained prevalence, leading author Nicholas J. Wheeler to argue that it had became the norm of intervention.\(^1\) Different forms of multilateral involvement included providing humanitarian aid and putting in place post-conflict peacekeeping missions. Yet, a more expansive form of multilateral intervention involved the use of military force by interveners. Harkening back to the unilateral military oriented intervention of the Cold

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War, this form of foreign involvement called for the application of military force in an intrastate conflict by which the intervening coalition would become a combatant.

However, multilateral intervention even if primarily carried out by the United States differed from unilateral intervention as it was predicated on the approval and assistance of other actors in the international system. While meeting resistance from policy and military officials who saw such intervention as risky and strategically disadvantageous, this approach gained a number of proponents in the early 1990s.\(^2\) Scholars like Stanley Hoffmann argued “military intervention [was] ethically justified when domestic turmoil threatens regional or international security and when massive violations of human rights occur.”\(^3\) New advocates of military multilateral intervention like Hoffman claimed humanitarian aid could not go far enough in mitigating severe civil wars. As it gained proponents, multilateral military intervention in intrastate conflict occurred more frequently in the international system as a number of conflicts in the last twenty years saw action taken by multilateral coalitions often led by the United States.

More often than not, as was the case with Bosnia and Somalia, nations that saw military intervention initially were the recipients of humanitarian aid until the intervening forces felt compelled to resort to force. However, despite Stanley Hoffmann’s assertion that military intervention was justified in cases where civil war undermined regional stability and human rights, military intervention was not constantly utilized by the United States to mitigate intrastate conflict around the globe. Furthermore, while some intrastate conflicts saw the delivery of humanitarian aid followed by military intervention, some intrastate conflicts never saw any foreign involvement beyond humanitarian aid. What then could account for this discrepancy? If

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there is an exigency for military intervention in an intrastate conflict then why have there been
civil wars that did not see foreign military action? To answer such a discrepancy, this study seeks
to identify conditions under which U.S. led aid based multilateral intervention escalates to
military intervention in intrastate conflict. This study also seeks to partly account for
discrepancies in the level or duration of such military intervention. Before going further an added
clarification should be made in regards to what this study designates as intervention. The term
humanitarian intervention is often used to generally describe efforts by a third party to reduce or
end intrastate conflict whether such efforts involve the use of force or aid.

This study draws a distinction between intervention that is oriented at providing relief
and peacekeeping and intervention that involves a multilateral coalition engaging in military
action. The former type of intervention refers to non-military involvement that includes the
deliverance of food and medical aid and the deployment of neutral peacekeepers among other
things. Military intervention on the other hand refers expressly to instances where a third party
intervener inserts itself into combat thereby becoming a belligerent within a conflict and losing
any former semblance of neutrality. As such, the study here draws a distinction between
peacekeeping and peace implementation. For example, UN Chapter VII missions are sent into
intrastate conflicts and armed UN sanctioned peacekeepers are put on the ground in conflict
zones. However, while these forces seek to reduce the humanitarian conflict via peacekeeping,
they do not attempt to resolve a conflict via peace implementation by taking sides in a conflict.
The research question at the heart of this piece asks why peacekeeping goes to peace
implementation in some cases and not in others.

This type of study is merited by the growing prevalence of intrastate conflict over the last
few decades and a number of predictions within political science literature that the frequency of
civil wars will continue to grow. Policy makers will have to increasingly cope with this problem as civil wars provoke public outcry and pose economic and security risks for the international system. As military intervention is a viable option for policy makers to stem civil war, a study of its application might serve useful to determine when such an option is likely to be pursued. To analyze the factors behind the escalation of humanitarian aid to military intervention this study will use three intrastate conflicts that saw U.S. led multilateral intervention as case studies: the Somali Civil War, the Bosnian Civil War, and the current conflict in Darfur. These case studies merit examination as opposed to other conflicts given as they are some of the most clear cut cases of multilateral action and are some of the most serious instances of intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Intervention in the Somali Civil War in 1992 was the first acclaimed instance of multilateral humanitarian intervention when U.S. and international peacekeepers under several UN sanctioned missions entered Somalia to stabilize a state that had grown increasingly fragmented since the overthrow of long time dictator Siad Barre. By 1993, with a deteriorating situation in Somalia, U.S. troops became involved in military efforts against warlords in the conflict. However, this action was short lived as the American government began withdrawing troops within the year after suffering a public defeat at the Battle of Mogadishu. Intervention in the Bosnian Civil War was a far more sustained endeavor in which after three years of unsuccessful peacekeeping efforts by the UN, a U.S. led NATO bombing campaign in 1995 against the Bosnian Serbs brought about a successful end to the war forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table. Meanwhile, the current conflict in Darfur between the Sudanese government and regional rebels has lasted since 2003 going through and ebb and flow in the

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level of conflict since the early years of the civil war. Like Bosnia and Somalia, UN peacekeeping forces were and still are deployed in the region. Additionally, aid based missions backed by the U.S. and other Western powers have been deployed to contend with the humanitarian disaster prompted by the war. However, the intervention mission in Darfur has not sought to carry out peace implementation in order to bring about the war’s conclusion.

This piece focuses specifically on U.S. led interventions as the nation has been the prime initiator and backer of multilateral intervention in intrastate conflict. All three case studies included here were the recipients of some form of foreign intervention and were marked by a high level of conflict. However, discrepancies between the three exist as military intervention in the Bosnian Civil War was intense and sustained, military intervention in the Somali Civil War was brief, and only peacekeeping has been pursued in Darfur. In determining the root of these discrepancies this piece proposes that self-interest on the part of the U.S. along with international support or acquiescence dictate whether or not a particular intervention will escalate from peacekeeping to peace implementation. This study further argues that self-interest determines the extent to which military force will be pursued and that this factor accounts for variation in force commitment in the cases of military intervention examined in this piece.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Argument:**

Theoretical debate in political science literature regarding what kind of conditions are conducive to an escalation of humanitarian to military intervention is limited to a degree. Instead, a number of different perspectives on intervention have looked at specific factors that might encourage or deter intervention. A few authors have looked at a cross-section of factors for intervention. Among these authors, Patrick Regan notably argues that a mix of domestic and international “audience constraints” motivate states to become involved in external intrastate
conflicts. While broad comparative analyses of different influences behind intervention are few in number, perspectives on intervention have been viewed by authors like Martha Finnemore as falling within two broad schools of how to view the international system, realism and liberalism. Liberal perspectives of intervention commonly see it as motivated by altruistic humanitarian intentions while realist perspectives tend to view interventions, even those of a humanitarian nature, through the prism of self-interest. This study, while answering the fundamental question of what prompts multilateral military intervention, also serves to agglomerate and contrast the array of viewpoints on the subject.

On a broad level, the perspectives regarding why military intervention occurs can be grouped into three categories or condition sets: those that see intervention as motivated by severity of conditions on the ground, those that see it as the product of domestic political influences, and those that see it as a product of geopolitical considerations. In evaluating these different assessments of intervention, this study argues that an escalation in the level of intervention is likely due to geopolitical considerations and certain domestic political influences. This is not to deny that the severity of a conflict is not pertinent in the choice to intervene. In accordance with principles found in the UN Charter, it seems unlikely that a multilateral coalition would violate the sovereignty of another state by interfering in its domestic affairs without a serious humanitarian impetus. This paper would argue that a high level of violence and instability in a nation is necessary for prompting a violation of a state’s sovereignty. However, a conflict’s severity does not account for the discrepancy of why escalation occurs in some cases but not in others. Instead, this study claims that a mixture of domestic political influences and geopolitical influences are likely the primary conditions behind the escalation of

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humanitarian intervention to military intervention. In particular, this piece proposes that self-interest on the part of interveners combined with a favorable international system set the conditions for multilateral forces to intervene militarily.

**Condition Set #1: Severity of Conditions on the Ground**

One less nuanced perspective of intervention in the literature sees the escalation of multilateral action as flowing from humanitarian exigencies. This subset of the literature on the intervention mostly comprises of arguments by scholars like Stanley Hoffman who state the use of force is justified if a conflict intensifies to the detriment of civilians. Early writings regarding intervention from academics like Michael Walzer state that in the event of increased suffering, there is a moral imperative for major powers and intergovernmental organizations to use force in order to alleviate such a crisis. While such arguments for the humanitarian impetus of escalation to force were espoused in the early years of multilateralism, some authors who wrote after this period did not see the increased intensity of a conflict as necessarily prompting escalation. In fact William A. Boettcher, in analyzing the decision making behind military intervention, posits that the increasing intensity of a conflict could likely deter a nation from applying military force as such an application might force an intervening actor to invest more resources and manpower than it would want. Boettcher along Patrick Regan concludes from observing the conduct of intervening nations that this increased force investment is seen as undesirable as no nation wants to potentially be mired in a quagmire by investing too heavily in an intrastate conflict. Such assessments of a conflict’s severity and the willingness of a state to intervene are supported by David Cunningham’s argument that a greater number of actors in an intrastate conflict make third party intervention increasingly difficult. According to Cunningham

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multiple parties in a civil war can act as “veto players” hindering any kind of conflict settlement or mediation. With such a situation in place on the ground, there is a greater uncertainty for interveners whether or not they should seek to invest forces as force escalation might not be able to target or convince every warring party in a conflict to cease hostilities.  

Flowing from this body of literature, this paper seeks to examine the effect of a conflict’s severity on force escalation in the three case studies proposed in the introduction. In examining the severity of the conditions on the ground, the research in this paper analyzes whether or not an escalation is prompted by an intensification in the character and scale of violence within a civil war. Unlike the other two condition sets this paper puts forth to examine the case studies, this category of conditions is less nuanced. It is intended to act as a measure of whether or not a humanitarian impetus plays a role in force escalation. Should conditions on the ground play a role in force escalation, then the case studies would show increased casualties or continued high levels of atrocities in an intrastate conflict would be followed by a resort to military intervention by the intervening party. Similarly, an escalation in the level of violence toward peacekeepers already on the ground in a non-military capacity should also result in force escalation.

In this case, an increased level of conflict may make what were previously aid based missions untenable as efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in a nation are obstructed by violence on the ground and by violence against an intervening mission. As such multilateral military intervention may not only be prompted by an increase in the severity of on the ground conditions, but also by the fact such an increase prevents a multilateral mission from achieving its humanitarian objectives unless it resorts to force. Should a continued or increased number of deaths within a civil war not prompt the use of military force, this variable should not be

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completely discounted. Humanitarian intervention by its very nature is necessitated by intolerable atrocities within a state. If the severity of a conflict does not prompt an escalation to military intervention, it should not be discounted as a factor, but rather should be seen as a condition that is not as pertinent as others.

Conversely, the research in this paper also takes into account David Cunningham and William Boettcher’s ideas that conflict severity serves a somewhat reverse role than previously thought. As a result the paper examines whether or not increasing chaos or severity of a conflict actually inhibits intervention. If the conclusions of Cunningham’s work were to hold weight, this paper would see decreased prospects for intervention in scenarios in which an intervener lacked a suitable and reliable actor to ally themselves with in order to resolve the intrastate conflict. Such a perspective of conflict severity, which is in part tied to a self-interest view of intervention, may in fact prove to be a better determinant of conflict severity’s effect on the likelihood of intervention.

**Condition Set #2: Domestic Political Influences**

Other perspectives in the literature regarding the likelihood of intervention stress the domestic political considerations of the intervening states. These perspectives posit that state interests and domestic constraints within an intervening nation impact intervention. Such hypotheses are largely based on the model of multilateral intervention that has emerged over the last two decades. Though multilateral intervention is done under the auspices of an international organization and supported by a coalition of many participating states, scholars like Robert Bauman argue that one nation tends to be more involved than others in directing military action
given the greater resources it can devote to such an effort. As this country has largely been the United States in recent years, a number of perspectives of domestic considerations for intervention tend to focus on the effects of politics and opinion within the US on intervention. Within the literature on domestic political influences, three categories of domestic drivers for intervention can be identified: leadership preferences, public opinion, and self-interest. Elizabeth Saunders, in her analysis of American involvement in intrastate conflicts, posits the influence of leadership preferences for intervention arguing that the disposition and willingness of governments and leaders to intervene in a civil war are influential in whether or not they take such action. Looking at the presidencies of Kennedy and Clinton, Saunders notes that leaders who take a proactive stance in favor of intervention are often successful in promoting and effecting interventionist policy.

However, another perspective of domestic influences on intervention notes that a willing government is not enough. Glen J. Antizzo in his analysis of conditions for successful American intervention finds that Congressional and particularly public support for intervention is needed for its execution. Such perspectives on intervention argue that there has been an increased awareness of international issues, particularly humanitarian crises, among citizens as a result of increased media coverage of these issues in what scholars like Stephen Livingston have deemed “the CNN effect.” According to authors Alynna Lyon and Chris Dolan, this increased awareness then parleys into greater pressure by citizens on their leaders to intervene in a nation

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to ameliorate the suffering caused by an intrastate conflict. Other models of domestic considerations have also looked at to what extent self-interest in political, security, or even economic issues on the part of a nation drives intervention. Such a perspective is decidedly realist in outlook arguing that intervention, though justified altruistically, is grounded by cost-benefit considerations.

Academics like Andrew Mason first argued for the existence of “cases in which humanitarian objectives and self interest coincide.” In a correlative study examining the likelihood of American intervention in intrastate conflict, Benjamin Fordham posits that American desires to maintain strategic alliances and secure export markets for their goods motivated the nation to undertake intervention. In regards to general intervention in intrastate conflict, Paul Huth also proposes the importance of self-interest arguing that a major power would be more likely to get involved militarily in a state or region should it feel it was of “military strategic value.” However, not all scholars see self-interest as governing the choice to conduct intervention in intrastate conflict. Martha Finnemore argues that the interventions of the 1990s were “insignificant by any usual measure of geostrategic or economic interest.”

Flowing from this literature on the influence domestic concerns on intervention, this paper proposes a condition set of domestic political influences in order to assess what prompts force escalation in intervention. In terms of domestic political influences, this study aims to look at to what degree domestic interests and constraints of the nations participating in a multilateral

18 Finnemore, pp. 52-53.
intervention influence an escalation to force use. Much like the literature, the research here is primarily focused on evaluating domestic influences within the U.S., the primary force behind multilateral interventions in the last two decades. In particular, this category looks at what effect public opinion, governmental disposition toward intervention, and domestic self-interest have on the escalation of humanitarian action to military action.

If public opinion plays a tangible role in prompting force escalation, the data would show that low public support for intervention would result in a decreased likelihood of intervention across the case studies while high public support would result in an increased likelihood. Similarly, should governmental willingness to pursue intervention be a prominent factor, an escalation to the use of force should be seen if policy pronouncements from a government favor engaging in military intervention. Finally, if domestic self-interest plays a role in motivating military intervention, force escalation would be correlated with a nation having strategic or economic interests in the outcome of an intrastate conflict. Such interests could be directly related the nation experiencing intrastate conflict or the region around it.

**Condition Set #3: Geopolitical Considerations**

An additional perspective of intervention looks at the influence of the international system on foreign involvement in intrastate conflict. In discussing arguments for the use of force, Carola Weil writes that norms and attitudes toward military intervention in the international system at a given time could play a role in determining its likelihood.\(^{19}\) If the international system was receptive to interventionism at a particular period in time then according to Weil intervention would be more feasible. Other pieces in the literature also see whether actors can intervene in intrastate conflicts as based on whether other nations approve of

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their conduct and are willing to accept it. Alynna Lyon and Chris Dolan both theorize that international support and norms favorable to intervention in combination with domestic support create the conditions for military intervention in an intrastate conflict. However, other writings on earlier unilateral and Cold War interventions including those of Frederic Pearson, Robert Bauman, and Jeffrey Picking view military intervention by great powers as shaped by realpolitik in the international system. According to such a view, if the intervention aims of a state are strategically desirable and there is a lack of organized opposition, then intervention would be more likely. This view, though stressing the influence of international opinion on intervention, differs from a norms perspective given by Weil.

This perspective within the literature views current multilateral intervention as motivated by the same wider strategic concerns as intervention had been during the Cold War. In such a model, actors assess the utility of interfering in an intrastate conflict based on how it can improve their standing, how it can expand their influence, and how feasible it is given the existence of other major powers who might take action to block or subvert such intervention. In this manner, this view of the influence of the international system differs from Weil’s view as it sees acquiescence by other states to intervention as more important than their approval. Intervention is not so much influenced by the approval of other states but rather by the lack of active and direct opposition to it by other actors. Such a geopolitical considerations perspective partly overlaps a self-interest perspective as states could weigh their interest in intervening based on what kind of response such action would provoke from other states. However, these measures are discernable as self-interest is concerned with a state’s own rationale for pursuing intervention.

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20 Dolan Chris, pp. 55.
21 Bauman, pp. 205.
thereby looking inward while a geopolitical considerations condition set looks outward at the reactions of other states.

A final perspective of the influence of the international system on intervention looks at “conflict spillover.” Scholars Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo note that an actor may intervene in a war should it feel that “the growing intensity of the conflict threatens to spread across state boundaries.” Such a perspective within the literature sees intervention as prompted by instances where a civil war is so pervasive and malignant that its effects could spread to neighboring nations. Civil wars could prompt an influx of refugees, deteriorate regional economic conditions, or even lead to violence in surrounding territories. As argued by Robert I. Rotberg, internal violence caused by civil wars has the potential of eliminating nation-states resulting in state failure that could upset “international norms such as stability and predictability.” Given this possibility, nations might be best served in intervening within intrastate conflicts to negate their corrosive influence.

In light of this literature, this paper proposes another condition set by which to analyze the case studies, a geopolitical considerations conditions set. By assessing the case studies using such a condition set, this paper seeks to analyze the extent to which external concerns of regional stability, international norms, and the geopolitical balance of power influence intervention. Concerns of regional stability primarily refer to worries of conflict spillover in which nations are motivated to take increased action in an intrastate conflict for fear that the violence and instability of a civil war might affect neighboring countries. Should these concerns genuinely

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prompt an escalation of multilateral intervention, this study can expect to see policy
pronouncements from leaders and officials justifying force based on such factors.

Even if policy pronouncements may not exist on the issue, the data could also be
expected to illustrate a correlation between military intervention and the existence of worrisome
regional issues if conflict spillover plays a role in force escalation. If international norms
favorable to intervention influence force implementation then we should see a correlation
between the level of international support for intervention and its actual occurrence. If
geopolitical balance of power plays a role in force escalation, then the data could expect to show
force escalation in light of a lack of international resistance toward intervention. Similarly, a
lack of force escalation in light of a major actor or actors blocking military action would indicate
the influence of this variable.

While the existing literature regarding intervention is fairly expansive, a few limits on it
must be noted at the outset of this piece. One limit is that the majority of the perspectives in the
literature regarding intervention are often concerned with intervention by a single actor. The
research of scholars like Regan and Saunders provides a useful framework for how to study
intervention, but it does not focus solely on action taken by international organizations or
multinational coalitions. However, this is not necessarily problematic as the principles that
govern one subset of intervention can be applicable to another. Another issue with the current
literature on the subject is that much of it posits variables for intervention that are speculative in
nature. While authors like Fordham and Regan set out variables of self-interest and domestic
constraints for intervention, these are broad categories that do not serve as strict barometers but
are rather flexible in what they can refer to.
A general issue with the literature on the subject is that while there are policy statements on why nations and interveners become involved in a conflict, it is likely that the literature does not take into account nor has the ability to account for closed door decision making. Instead authors like David N. Gibbs look at a mix of policy pronouncements and actual events to try to ascertain the motives of leaders. To that end, the speculation within literature regarding intervention motives is another limit to its reliability. Authors are often forced to hypothesize to a large degree what the motivations of actors are in light of their statements and their actions. However, this is not just a problem of intervention literature, but one endemic to political science research which forces scholars to hypothesize the motivations of an actor given a lack of clear and complete information on governmental decision making.

Methodology:

In analyzing under what set of conditions multilateral intervention will increase, this paper, as previously mentioned, studies three contrasting cases of intervention: Bosnia, Sudan, and Somalia. The study will consequently be of a comparative nature that relies on qualitative data. Between the three cases, the interventions in Bosnia and Somalia will serve as examples to analyze when escalation to multilateral military intervention occurs. Meanwhile, the example of Sudan will act as a control in which escalation did not and has yet to occur. This study outlines three broad categories of conditions for the escalation of multilateral intervention as touched upon in the literature review. These three categories include domestic political influences, the severity of conditions on the ground, and geopolitical considerations. Contrasts in these categories between the case of non-intervention and the two existing cases of intervention may give some insight regarding which factors are more influential for force escalation.

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The evidence used within this paper comes from a variety of sources. Historical accounts of the conflicts will serve as the backdrop for the final evaluation of whether or not certain conditions are influential while they will also serve as sources for the intensity of the conflict. To determine the willingness of governments to engage in intervention, self-interest in intervention, and concerns of the international system, this paper will make use of policy statements that emanated from the U.S. governments and the international organizations involved in the three interventions. Additionally, the paper will examine post-conflict accounts from policy makers that would likely to be more open accounts of the decision making processes in the choice to escalate. Though such post-facto accounts may not likely be available in the case of Sudan, these accounts might be easier to come by for the cases of Somalia and Bosnia since military action in these states has long since ended.

While such accounts could be biased, the period of time since the conclusion of these conflicts gives former policy makers little incentive to lie about what went on as they face no risk of losing their jobs or losing a successive election by telling the truth. In determining the influence of public opinion, opinion polling on all three intrastate conflicts is available and will be used. Other important sources of evidence that will be used in this paper are individual case studies of the conflicts which offer nuanced background information that can be used to gage perspectives on particular multilateral interventions. To this end, while researching this paper, scholarly works examining the three particular case studies have been found including Kenneth R. Rutherford’s examination of military intervention in Somalia and David N. Gibbs’ aforementioned work on the Bosnian Civil War.25

Notes on Methodology:

Going forward with this paper, a number of issues with the research design must be noted. First, one of the case studies used within this piece, the conflict in Darfur, is an ongoing issue. While it may seem unlikely that military intervention in Darfur would occur given current and recent inaction, there is a possibility that this could change which would in turn complicate any findings derived from Darfur as a control case. Second, the research within this study consists of secondary sources involving critical sources and policy statements that are speculative to a degree. Policy pronouncements made by leaders while possibly indicative of a government’s actual intentions could also be deceptive. Such pronouncements could be nothing more than hollow rhetoric employed by a state to mask its intentions. For instance in the case of intervention, a government could claim it favors peace implementation in an intrastate conflict in official policy statements even though it may have no intention of actually doing so.

Governments could potentially be dishonest about their course of action in order to deflect public and international pressure and give the semblance of action. Ascertaining the actual motivations of an actor or state as previously mentioned is difficult and such a problem is germane to other studies of state decision making. Despite this issue, factors in this study that are assessed through policy pronouncements like a government’s willingness to intervene should not be wholly discounted. While policy pronouncements can be deceptive to a degree, taken in tandem with actual state action, they might indicate an actor’s preferences in intervention. Additionally, the research here is looking at the United States government over the last two decades, a relatively transparent democracy in which leaders do not have the ability to be as secretive of their intentions as they might like to be given the existence of media leaks and the government’s inability to repress political discourse. Nonetheless, the study is limited in that it only assesses three case studies and three sets of conditions. The research here does not account
for the whole range of instances where multilateral intervention occurred as this would be unfeasible in a qualitative study such as this one.

The study also does not quite account for the various types and degrees of force used in both cases of intervention. Instead the research here merely treats any use of force whether it be aerial, land, or naval as evidence of military intervention. Finally, a general issue of this paper as with other comparative studies is that the studies used can be dissimilar to a fault. While the piece has tried to identify cases with similar characteristics and test them using expansively defined variables, the research here may neglect the pertinent intricacies and peculiarities of the particular case studies being used to study intervention. However, this piece intentionally applies broad variables to the cases so that even nuances of a case could be subsumed within these variables. This paper is not intended to deeply analyze each case but rather use the examples to construct a model that could posit an answer to the research question posed in the introduction.

Bosnia

Background:

Arguably, one of the more successful and prominent examples of multilateral intervention was the military action taken by NATO forces in Bosnia during the Yugoslav Wars in 1995. Prior to NATO intervention, the country was beset by a civil war in effect since 1992 between the nation’s three major ethnic groups, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Bosnian Muslims sought to carve out a new republic in the territory that had been previously part of the disintegrating Republic of Yugoslavia while the other ethnic groups in the region sought to create their own ethnic homelands or integrate with outside republics. The war from the outset was marked by a high degree of violence as the sides involved engaged in mass executions,
erected concentration camps, and actively targeted civilian populations. Due in part to the
collict’s brutality, its position at the doorstep of Western Europe, and the growing influence of
television journalism, the Bosnian Civil War drew the attention of the major powers in the world.
Consequently, within the first year of the war, the United Nations sent humanitarian aid via
UNPROFOR, the organization created by Security Council Resolution 742 as a peacekeeping
force amidst the Yugoslav Wars.

While the mandate of UNPROFOR was initially to provide humanitarian assistance and
attempt to provide a peacekeeping force within the nation, the multilateral intervention in Bosnia
expanded in scope. Safe zones were established for Muslim refugees in the nation by
UNPROFOR who increased the flow of humanitarian aid into the war torn nation. By 1992, in
an effort to both mediate and lessen the severity of the conflict, the United Nations at the London
Conference put forth an agreement between the belligerents that placed the heavy weapons used
in the war under UN supervision. Additionally, NATO began to enforce a no fly zone over the
territory and the UN was charged with monitoring Serbian heavy artillery to lessen the severity
of the conflict. Meanwhile the multilateral coalition under the leadership of the U.S. attempted
to procure and enforce an effective plan for peace offering a number of ultimately unsuccessful
solutions for peace including the Vance Owen Plan. Despite these efforts at mediation, the
humanitarian cost of the war did not reduce in its severity and the United Nations frequently
found its policies compromised and its UNPROFOR contingent attacked.

The Bosnian Serb Republic, Republika Srpska, who increasingly saw the UN presence as
partly designed to stifle their military endeavors against Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible
for much of these violations. The military of the ethnic republic first began attacking UN

convoys in 1992 all the while infringing upon the established safe zones in an effort to extend their campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims in areas like Bihac. As UNPROFOR’s presence on the ground proved increasingly ineffective at mediating the conflict, Spyros Economides argues that the multilateral coalition of Western nations switched their strategy from “peacekeeping to peace enforcement” via NATO. By 1994, in an effort to enforce the no fly-zone NATO shot down Serb jets effectively upgrading the multilateral mission in Bosnia from one of a purely humanitarian nature to one that had a military side to it. By the next year, in light of new atrocities at Srebrenica and the need to enforce a peace plan, Western interveners took further steps to militarily intervene in the conflict sending in a Rapid Reaction Force of soldiers designed to both enforce the peace and protect UNPROFOR soldiers.

In August 1995, the intervention mission clearly took sides in the conflict with NATO bombing Bosnian Serb targets in retaliation for attacks on peacekeepers and in an effort to help resurgent Muslim and Croat offensives against Serb positions. Through the added military effort, the intervening force in Bosnia was able to put pressure on the frequently unwilling and uncooperative Bosnian Serb republic to finally resolve the conflict at the negotiating table. Consequently, by December 1995, the escalation to military intervention paid off for the intervening coalition as the signature of the Dayton Accords brought about an end to the Bosnian Civil War and set up a new confederated republic in the aftermath of the four year long conflict.

Application of Conditions Sets:

I. Severity of Conditions on the Ground

Prefacing an examination of the severity of the conditions on the ground in Bosnia, a brief note must be made that the conflict was and so far has been the worst war seen on the

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27 Ibid, pg. 81.
28 Ibid, pg. 89.
European continent in loss of life since the Second World War. Much like the civil wars in Somalia and Darfur, the Bosnian War left the nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina politically unstable and exacted an enormous humanitarian toll. Yet this case study seeks to examine whether or not the conflict had grown in such severity by a particular period in the conflict, specifically on the eve of intervention, that an overwhelming humanitarian impetus could have prompted an escalation to force use. Examining the situation in Bosnia just prior to August 1995, there had been a substantial increase in the severity of the war. Though the combatants engaged in ethnic cleansing in the early years of the war, the scale and character of interethnic violence in the Yugoslav republic had arguably ratcheted up toward the latter part of the war from 1994 to 1995.

Despite numerous agreements and ceasefires designed to prohibit the shelling of the civilian population of Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb Army under General Mlatko Radic repeatedly shelled the Bosnian capital while paramilitaries within the capital targeted civilians in areas like Sniper’s Alley.\footnote{Berdal, pp. 98} Outside of Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb forces committed numerous atrocities perhaps the most infamous of these being the Srebrenica Massacre in which they massacred some 5,000 Muslim men after penetrating a UN safe zone in July 1995.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 99.} While the war had been marked by ethnic cleansing mostly by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims, Srebrenica arguably represented a more intense level of violence. Events like Srebrenica provided a strong humanitarian impetus for military intervention prior to the NATO bombing campaign. So too did the drastic casualty count of the war estimated at a minimum of 102,000 deaths at the war’s
end only a few months later. Soon after the safe area of Srebrenica was overrun, a July 1995 NATO press release stated that it viewed the situation with “grave concern” while further condemning the Bosnian Serb action indicating perhaps a greater uneasiness within NATO of letting the conflict go on as its humanitarian costs intensified. In fact, according to Samantha Power, it was another Bosnian Serb shelling on a Sarajevo Market on August 28, 1995 that prompted the Clinton administration to authorize the first directed air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs two days later.

Assessing whether or not the severity of on the ground conditions obstructed peacekeeping efforts enough to merit military intervention, a similar impetus can be seen for force escalation. By 1995, the UNPROFOR mission had become increasingly difficult. Since 1994, Bosnian Serb forces had frequently impeded or outright blocked UN relief convoys from reaching war torn areas. In one such instance, UNPROFOR forces were prevented from delivering desperately needed aid and relief to the city of Gorazde as it was surrounded and attacked by Bosnian Serb detachments. Even more serious obstructions to peacekeeping efforts occurred with the aforementioned example of Srebrenica as safe zones like Srebrenica, set up by peacekeepers to protect pockets of civilian populations, were attacked by the Bosnian Serb army. While these hindrances occurred, the mediation and resolution of the conflict proved increasingly frustrating as plans calling for the resolution of the conflict between the warring parties had repeatedly fallen through. Though the participants in the conflict had been brought to the negotiating table, by December 1994 the combatants were still unable to agree on how

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34 Power, pp. 439.
Bosnia would be divided between them. Additionally, as previously mentioned, combatants in the conflict particularly the Bosnian Serbs broke agreements and measures set in place by the international community to lessen the impact of the fighting. Besides violating the prohibition against shelling Sarajevo agreed upon in the London Conference, the Bosnian Serb military violated the no-fly zone imposed over Bosnia by the UN in October 1992 at least “465 times” by March of the following year.

It seems likely that such hindrances to the peacekeeping effort of UNPROFOR influenced the path to force escalation as NATO airpower was first used in the conflict in March 1994 to shoot six Bosnian Serb aircraft in response to violations of the no-fly zone. The obstruction of the peacekeeping effort was not just limited to violations of agreements though as UNPROFOR troops were repeated targets of violence since entering the conflict zone. As early as 1993, UNPROFOR soldiers had been attacked and killed by Bosnian Serb troops who were involved in the death of two Nigerian peacekeepers in April of that year. By 1995, in reaction to increasing enforcement of the no-fly zone by NATO, the Bosnian Serb military increased their attacks on peacekeepers. Besides attacking UN soldiers, the military also engaged in the hostage taking of UNPROFOR troops taking some 300 hostage between May and June of 1995. Though hostage taking was employed by the Bosnian Serbs in the hope of deterring NATO bombing, the succeeding wave of air strikes that followed indicates that the increasing

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36 Berdal, pp. 91.
40 Berdal, pp. 100.
severity of the ground conditions for the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia might have actually influenced the choice by NATO to use greater amounts of force in late 1995. This assessment is supported by an address given on September 23, 1995 by Bill Clinton in which he cited Serb violations of ceasefires and UN authority as reasons for the ensuing NATO intervention.42

Analyzing the effect of conditions on the ground in Bosnia from the perspective of Cunningham and Boettcher, intervention might have been more likely and sustained in the case of Bosnia given the clear makeup of actors in the intrastate conflict. This in turn may have influenced why NATO force use was more prolonged and why interveners were more committed in their mission than in the case of Somalia. By taking sides in the Bosnian War, NATO entered into a conflict that by 1995 included two primary readily identifiable actors at war within one another, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb Republic. Thus NATO had clear actors to target or ally itself with simplifying its mission as it could be assured military intervention would have a tangible impact on the course of the conflict resolving it and facilitating the original peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR. Furthermore, in the case of Bosnia, NATO was from the outset faced with an actor that welcomed its intervention as the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina actively sought international aid in its fight against the Bosnian Serbs. The nation even hired professional public relations firms to help sway international opinion to their side, according to David Gibbs.43

Not only might have the clarity of the scenario and the willingness of actors to accept foreign intervention bolstered the likelihood of intervention but so too might have the existing capabilities of the potential Bosnian ally. Though beleaguered by defeats throughout the Bosnian War, the Bosnian army was still a capable ally by late 1995 whose ability to act as a

43 Gibbs, pp. 127.
reliable partner against the Bosnian Serbs was enhanced with the cooperation of Croat forces for its offensive campaigns. This combined Bosnian-Croat force would prove its capabilities as an ally for interveners as while NATO bombed Bosnian Serb positions by air, Bosnian-Croat led Operations Storm and Mistral resulted in the Bosnians regaining almost half of the nation’s territory by October 1995.44

II. Domestic Political Influences:

The NATO intervention in Bosnia was very much driven by the American government. Consequently, it is logical to examine the domestic political influences that impacted America’s pursuit and escalation of intervention as it is unlikely that the nation would have pursued intervention with a lack of willingness to do so either by policymakers or by the general population. In terms of the willingness of a government to intervene in Bosnia, both the behavior and policy pronouncements issued by the Clinton administration at the time indicate a willingness and inclination by the American government to militarily intervene in the conflict.

Upon Clinton’s ascendency to the presidency, scholar Stephen Stedman remarked the new president was “sympathetic to the new [school of] interventionism” of the early 1990s.45 Even prior to the Clinton administration taking power, the president and figures within his administration had been proponents for intervention. According to Spyros Economides “President Clinton… declared himself prepared in spring 1993 to authorise [sic] strikes by US aircraft against Serb positions.”46 In a February 1994 address, the President continued to threaten the willingness of the U.S. to use force in response to ceasefire violations stating that in regards to a possible NATO bombing campaign, “American pilots and planes stand ready to do

44 Ibid, pp. 65.
46 Berdal, pp. 79.
Two months later in April 1994, the President reiterated his willingness to employ force stating that any further violations of safe areas by Bosnian Serbs “would be grounds for NATO attacks” conducted by the U.S. and its allies. Such rhetoric continued up until the war’s end as in November 1995, upon announcing American commitment to a peace implementation mission after the Dayton Accords, Clinton argued for a general importance of “American leadership” and involvement in Bosnia. David N. Gibbs noted that President Clinton was initially hesitant after his inauguration to promote force escalation. However this hesitance was due to resistance regarding the proposition from members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the new administration’s belief that it had to live up to expectations that it would focus primarily on domestic political and economic issues.

Outside of the hesitant military decision making apparatus, Gibbs points to the existence of pro-interventionist figures in the Clinton administration like Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright. In Gibbs’ opinion, these figures, who frequently argued for expanded U.S. involvement in the conflict, reflected the administration’s inclination to pursue escalation and peace implementation in Bosnia. In examining much of the policy pronouncements and attitudes regarding intervention of the Clinton administration it would seem that the U.S. government at the time of the Bosnian Civil War was genuinely predisposed to the pursuit of peace implementation through military means. Even in light of previous factors that must be accounted for in determining the sincerity of such sentiments, it would appear the government’s

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50 Gibbs, pp. 149.

51 Ibid.
policy pronouncements reflected a genuine belief in policy makers of the importance of peace implementation as both a concept and as a strategy.

Given what will be seen in terms of public opinion government willingness to intervene in Bosnia does not seem to be a reflective reaction to increasing public pressure. Additionally, other factors seem to show the American government at the time favored interventionist policy. Many Clinton officials including the president himself indicated a willingness to use military force prior to their assumption of executive power. Furthermore, the succeeding U.S. led intervention in Kosovo, taken by the Clinton administration, indicates an overall inclination toward intervention that existed during the Clinton presidency.

Before discussing the role of public opinion in Bosnia, another brief point must be mentioned about determining public support for multilateral military intervention that is applicable to both this particular case and subsequent cases. Responses to opinion questioning on the matter of intervention can vary depending on how questions are posed. For example, in examining two opinion poll results regarding public support for U.S. intervention in Bosnia, two different conclusions could be reached regarding public support. One poll taken by Gallup in May 1993 found 36% of respondents opposed the use of U.S. air strikes against Bosnian Serbs while a poll released in the same month conducted by ABC News found 65% of American respondents favored air strikes if they were done in coordination with American allies. In looking at these and other public opinion polls on Bosnia during the time, Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych note that perceptions of the U.S. acting alone to intervene in the conflict reduced public support for military action by an average of 18%.

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53 Ibid, pp. 70.
Other authors like Frank Chalk also note that in addition to the influence multilateralism can have in shaping public attitudes toward intervention, the use of the word genocide to describe a conflict can be effective in “garnering international public, media, and allied support.” Yet even with these factors accounted for, the variation in public support depending on multilateralism is not that pertinent given the fact this piece is looking solely at multilateral interventions. Similarly, the impact of phrasing a conflict as genocide or ethnic cleansing does not seem to be that important considering Bosnia was indeed experiencing ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian Civil War. Putting aside possible contortions of polling data via questioning, American public opinion polls in the early 1990s showed a modest but mixed and conditional support among the U.S. population for force implementation in Bosnia. For instance, in amalgamating public opinion polls on the support for force implementation in Bosnia, Eric Larson and Bogdan Savych concluded that the base level of support for the use of force in Bosnia was only around 31% among survey respondents.

This amalgamation took into account support for the use of limited ground troops. However, surveys conducted in 1993 prior to the NATO bombing campaign like the aforementioned one done by ABC News saw the majority of respondents in such surveys favor the use of force so long as it was solely done through the air and in conjunction with a multilateral coalition. The conditionality and mixed level of public support for force use in Bosnia continued even up to when NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb targets. A poll in June 1995 found that 64% of American respondents believed the United States had no responsibility

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55 Larson, pp. 102.
to act in Bosnia though 71% of respondents supported the use of force by the U.S. if UN peacekeepers were attacked in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{56}

Though American popular support for a military intervention was lacking, author Steven Burg notes that a lack of support for intervention was more rooted in a lack of knowledge and a general apathy toward the conflict given more pressing domestic issues Americans felt their nation had to deal with.\textsuperscript{57} So while public support for involvement in Bosnia waned based on the questions posed, this lack of support was apathetic rather than combative toward the prospect of force use in Bosnia. Despite a lack of pressure from the public to take action in Bosnia, the United States government may have felt a form of public pressure that induced action as argued by Michael Beschloss. Scholars like Beschloss argue that in spite of a non-responsive public to the issue of intervention, the media’s heavy coverage of events in the Bosnian Civil War acted as a mechanism of popular pressure that induced policy makers at the time to contemplate increasing action in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{58}

Thereby through looking at public support for military intervention in the Bosnian Civil War, it can be concluded that while there was support for the use of force it was still modest and conditioned on a particular type of force use. Policy makers may have taken into account such sentiments given that air power rather than ground troops was used to militarily intervene in the conflict. After examining the effect of public opinion on the decision of the U.S. and thereby NATO to intervene in the conflict, it seems that while support for intervention did exist, there was a lack of overwhelming and consistent support for intervention. In fact, opinion polls taken when the bombing campaign was winding down in fall 1995 affirmed the opposition of the

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, pp. 163.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, pp. 164.
American public to specific forms of intervention as 66% of respondents responded “no” to a question asking them if the United States should send 20,000 ground troops to Bosnia.\(^{59}\)

Given a lack of widespread popular support or advocacy for action as will be seen in the other case studies, it seems highly unlikely policy makers in the Clinton administration were motivated to intervene through considerations of public support. This is not to say that this policy decision was made in a vacuum devoid of any consideration for public opinion. The Clinton government frequently tried to curry support for the mission from the American public in emphasizing the gravity of the conflict, and ultimately chose to pursue an option of intervention in line with the wishes of the public, eschewing the use of ground force for air power. However, public opinion here did not seem to act as a driver for intervention but more so as factor the United States government had to consider in evaluating what measures it could take.

Unlike public opinion, the measure of self-interest on the part of the United States to intervene may offer more reasons as to why the U.S. was willing to pursue force escalation in the Bosnian War. In intervening in Bosnia, the U.S. had both economic and strategic interests at stake. These stakes were noted prior to the Dayton Accords in October 1995 by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who in defending a later deployment of U.S. troops in the peacekeeping entity IFOR, stated that U.S. involvement in Bosnia was essential to its “political, security, and economic interests.”\(^{60}\) Besides active admission by U.S. officials that action in Bosnia was conducive to U.S. interests, other scholars including David Gibbs have noted the interest the U.S. had in the outcome of the conflict. David Gibbs argues that the U.S. involvement in Bosnia, particularly through NATO, kept NATO relevant in post-Cold War

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Europe. As a result, he claims the U.S. pushed for a greater role in Bosnia and for active intervention via NATO so that the U.S. could continue exercising political and economic hegemony over European nations. These states seemed to be pursuing more independent economic and political policies in the wake of the Cold War as they no longer needed U.S. support against the Soviet Union and sought to further integrate the continent via the European Union. 61 Though Gibbs’ points are speculative to a degree, the argument for U.S. interest in intervening in Bosnia in order to give a renewed role to NATO seems plausible as the Bosnian intervention gave renewed life to a security organization that seemed to have an uncertain purpose after the demise of the U.S.S.R.

In addition, U.S. self-interest in Bosnia may have partly been motivated by prevailing links between the U.S. and Europe as the major superpower did not wish to see instability in Bosnia upset the economic and political stability of its closest allies and trading partners. American concern of possible harm imposed on their European allies via the conflict was used justification for growing U.S. involvement in the conflict given by President Clinton. In February 1994, Clinton claimed America’s and NATO’s increasing intervention had “the importance of preventing a wider war in Europe.” 62 Beyond securing interests in Europe, the U.S. also had reputational interests at stake in pursuing intervention as President Clinton later noted that “America’s commitment to leadership” and to its allies would have been questioned should it have failed to take action in the region. 63 Considering the following policy pronouncements and the general U.S. interests in Europe, it would seem that self-interest on the part of the U.S. was influential in the pursuit of force escalation by the superpower. Beyond

61 Gibbs, pp. 41.
63 Clinton, Bill. Address on Bosnia.
these individual American interest, Samantha Power also claims that the Clinton administration itself had a domestic political interest in force escalation as Republican opposition leaders had repeatedly criticized the administration over not getting involved earlier in the conflict. According to Power, seeing these pressures as a possible political threat, Clinton finally “saw the costs of noninvolvement as greater than the risks of involvement.”

III. Geopolitical Considerations:

When applied to Bosnia, our model’s variables for assessing the influence of geopolitical considerations in force escalation seem to indicate this condition set had an impact on the use of military intervention within the Yugoslav Republic. Examining conflict spillover in Bosnia, this paper finds that there was not much direct spillover from the conflict into the surrounding regions as Bosnian War itself was the result of spillover from the other Yugoslav Wars going in the region at the time. However, it appears that concerns regarding possible military and economic spillover of the conflict did exist. Policy makers within the U.S. expressed their concerns over the potential of the violence in Bosnia to travel across boundaries. On March 12, 1993, while giving a report to a Senate subcommittee on Foreign Relations, then U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright expressed concerns that fighting in Bosnia and in other Yugoslav conflicts would prompt fighting in Kosovo while calling for increased pressure on the Serbs to prevent such an action from occurring. Giving a similar report only months later, Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, also indicated concerns involving conflict spillover expressing concern that the war

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64 Power, pp. 441.
could spread to neighboring nations or untouched Yugoslav republics like Macedonia. While concerns of political spillover existed possible concerns of economic spillover in the conflict may have also existed. At the time the Bosnian War was taking place, the European Community was about to undertake greater economic integration after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Bosnian conflict along with the other ongoing intrastate conflicts in the Yugoslav wars may have provoked worries of economic spillover at the time. According to research by Alberto Ades, political instability including intrastate conflict “in neighboring countries has a strong adverse effect on economic performance [in another nation].” As such, the European Community was concerned with the Bosnian War as spillover from it could have hindered European economic integration.

While concerns of conflict spillover seem important for force escalation in the Bosnian War, military intervention in this conflict may have also been influenced by the international climate at the time. Looking at the international attitude toward intervention at the time of intervention in the Bosnian War, one does not necessarily find an international community whole heartedly receptive to military intervention after the failure of the UNOSOM II Mission in Somalia. Despite the seeming support for NATO’s bombing campaign within Europe author David Gibbs charged that Western European nations like France and Britain privately disapproved of U.S. efforts to ratchet up foreign military involvement in the conflict but kept such disapproval private as they were pressured by the U.S. and did not want to seem obstructionist of peacekeeping efforts. Further evidence of the hesitance of the international community toward military intervention in Bosnia can be seen in the fact that U.S. officials

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68 Gibbs, pp.159.
bypassed putting the NATO bombing mission, Operation Deliberate Force, to a vote within the United Nations.\textsuperscript{69} However this bypass might have occurred for the sake of expediency and was necessitated by the fact the UN presence in Bosnia was supposed to be a strictly neutral.\textsuperscript{70}

Moreover, though nations may have at times disagreed on the exact course of policy and come into disputes with the U.S. over force escalation as argued by Gibbs, this may have been only a policy disagreement and not necessarily a fundamental opposition to force escalation. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides noted that military intervention, as a general course of action, had been favored by major European states like Britain and France as early as 1992.\textsuperscript{71} Though the general international approval of military intervention is alleged to have dissipated after Somalia, it appears that the intervention in Bosnia was done amidst a geopolitical environment that appeared supportive of force escalation. Besides general approval or acquiescence to intervention, force escalation in Bosnia may have been aided by another variable proposed in the model, the lack of a major actor opposed to intervention. Initially worries regarding military intervention in Bosnia were centered around concerns regarding a negative reaction by the Russian Federation to such action as Bosnia was within their traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Military intervention in the affairs of Bosnia was worrisome in this aspect as it was an action that would not have been tolerated under the previously hegemonic Soviet Union. Furthermore, there was strong pro-Serb sentiment among Russian nationalists that supported aiding Russia’s “Serbian brothers” in the conflict.\textsuperscript{72} However, with the Russian Federation weak and facing its own domestic worries by 1993, Mats Berdal notes they could pay

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, pp. 166.
\textsuperscript{70} Berdal, pp. 98.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, pp. 77.
\textsuperscript{72} Malone, David. \textit{The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}. Boulder: Lynne Rienier, 2004.
little more than lip service to the conflict as they did not have the capacity to take “an activist line” and deter the pursuit of military intervention.\(^73\)

The intervention mission though not completely sure of Russia’s inability to obstruct the intervention effort also made steps to obtain Russian cooperation. Russia was included in what was deemed the “Contact Group” in April 1994, a group of representatives from the major European powers and the U.S. who were initially charged with negotiating an end to the conflict.\(^74\) Russian support for military intervention did not immediately follow as the initial retaliatory bombings against the Bosnian Serbs like the one carried out on a Bosnian Serb ammunition depot in Pale in May 1995 were criticized by the nation’s representatives.\(^75\) However, as previously noted, the Russians could do little other than criticize and their criticisms may have just been discontent over not having been consulted on such a course of action. This seems to be the likely case as in 199, Russian representatives had made ambiguous military threats against the Bosnian Serbs to try to persuade them to accept existing peace plans.\(^76\) When the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin was consulted on the eve of the NATO campaign a few months later Joyce P. Kaufman notes that they gave their approval to a military course of action.\(^77\)

Military intervention in Bosnia also did not face any challenges from other major powers as China abstained from Security Council votes on the issue, supporting a principle of nonintervention but doing nothing diplomatically to obstruct force escalation in Bosnia.\(^78\) Ultimately, geopolitical considerations seemed to have played a role in influencing the decision

\(^{73}\) Ibid, pp. 69.
\(^{74}\) Burg, pp. 300.
\(^{76}\) Burg, pp. 306.
\(^{78}\) Malone, pp. 459.
to intervene in Bosnia through three factors. Concerns of conflict spillover were pertinent in the
decision making process, the NATO intervention found an international environment that while
hesitant still supported force escalation, and there was no country who could use its political
might to obstruct a military intervention.

Somalia

Background:

The intervention in Somalia much like the successive Bosnian intervention was
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations to lessen an incredibly tumultuous conflict.
Created in 1992, the same year as UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I was set up via Security Council
Resolution 751 as a relatively small peacekeeping entity deployed to Somalia in order to
preserve ceasefires as the Somali Civil War’s human toll escalated.\textsuperscript{79} Rooted in the rebellion
against the repressive Somali dictator, Siad Barre, the Somali Civil War had begun in earnest in
1991 when the factions that had deposed him began fighting amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{80} With a
multitude of combatants in this conflict, warlords rather than any central government emerged to
rule over parts of Somalia. Troubled by this lack of a central government and fighting between a
number of factions for control of the country, Somalia looked much like Bosnia in terms of its
need for tremendous humanitarian intervention especially in light of a famine that gripped the

However, the initial force deployed under UNOSOM I comprised of only 500 United
Nations peacekeepers who were seen as ineffectual in securing a cease fire and delivering aid to
the region by late 1992. Though the UNOSOM I force had been sent to provide peacekeeping
efforts the force under the leadership of UN Special Representative Mohammed Sahoun seemed

\textsuperscript{79} De Maio, Jennifer L. \textit{Confronting Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Third Parties in Managing Africa’s Civil Wars.}
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, pp. 118.
unable to contain a growing humanitarian crisis that became increasingly played up the global media. At this time, the U.S. then under President Bush gave little more than nominal support for the mission but, when faced with greater attention to the crisis from politicians and the public, began to take a more proactive role airlifting aid in August 1992 while officials debated the possibility of a U.S. military presence in Somalia behind closed doors. As UNOSOM I was seen as too limited of a response to the increasingly worsening situation in Somalia, by late 1992 the UN sought to bolster the mission.

Expanding the mission further, UNITAF was set up in December 1992 by UN Security Council Resolution 794 creating a more expansive organization which drew membership from a number of countries while being intended to secure and provide humanitarian relief to the southern regions of the country. Much like with Bosnia, the distribution humanitarian relief by the United Nations was coupled with concerted efforts at easing the Somali Civil War as UNITAF was a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission. UNITAF significantly raised the level of forces on the ground sent by the intervening UN mission with some 38,000 troops sent to secure the delivery aid of which some 27,000 were American soldiers. The mission signaled a greater involvement by the United States to address the Somali Civil War and its new role as the leader of the intervening force, a role that would continue to grow after December 1992.

However, on the ground chaos caused by warring factions in the intrastate conflict continued during the UNITAF mission. As UNITAF was only a temporary mission, the UN declared the deployment of yet another operation in Somalia in March 1993. The new UNOSOM II mission unlike its predecessors made disarmament and demobilization of existing warring factions its top priority. Under the heavy direction of the American military

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81 Woodard, pp. 62.
82 Ibid, pp. 65.
83 Ibid, pp. 67.
commanders, UNOSOM II was to ensure that ceasefires between combatants in Somalia would be maintained. In this mission, the U.S. was no longer providing soldiers just for peacekeeping but was acknowledging troops on the ground might be used in force implementation in order to bring the conflict to a halt.

Yet in June 1993, UNOSOM II troops came under attack from the forces of Mohammed Farrad Aidid when a convoy of Pakistani peacekeepers were killed prompting an escalation to force use as UNOSOM II engaged in hostilities against the forces of Aidid in June 1993. These hostilities ultimately culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu in September 1993 during which 20 peacekeepers were killed leading Bill Clinton to announce on October 3rd of that year that the U.S. would begin withdrawing its forces from the nation.84 With American forces withdrawn from the nation by March 1994, the UNOSOM II peacekeeping force eventually lost support and was withdrawn in 1995. This withdrawal left Somalia, unlike Bosnia, still engrossed in intrastate conflict which it still remains to this day. As with Bosnia and Sudan this case study of Somalia seeks to answer what prompted an escalation from humanitarian aid to peace implementation in the nation and why the succeeding peace implementation taken by UNOSOM II was so brief in duration.

Application of Condition Sets:

I. Severity of Conditions on the Ground

Examining the conditions on the ground at the time UNOSOM II became a military intervention, one finds a strong urgency for intervention given the political instability and humanitarian crisis in Somalia by 1993. From the outset of the conflict, the humanitarian toll began to rise as fighting between two factions, the SNF and the USC, in 1991 destroyed crops

84 Rutherford, pp. 181.
and prompted the first of many refugee flows in the civil war.\textsuperscript{85} By the summer of 1992, on the ground conditions had grown increasingly dire with over half a million Somalis displaced by the fighting and famine in the Bay and Lower Shebelle provinces.\textsuperscript{86} According to testimony delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1992, the situation in Somalia was so severe that one third of the nation’s population was at risk of starvation, 1,000 to 2,000 were dying daily, and some 800,000 Somali refugees had dispersed themselves within neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{87} Such statistics were partly the result of increasing violence toward civilians by combatants as offensives taken by the USC faction in the summer of 1992 led to a new wave of atrocities.\textsuperscript{88}

Though this humanitarian cost of the Somali Civil War would motivate the insertion of the UNITAF mission into Somalia, the death toll from the war and its related effects were not tamed. Only months before UNOSOM II commenced fighting, a \textit{Los Angeles Times} report placed the number of deaths from the war and famine at around 400,000.\textsuperscript{89} Beyond the damage the conflict caused to Somali civilians, the political situation on the eve of the UNOSOM II military intervention was markedly unstable. Despite agreements by rival clans to stop fighting one another and turn over weapons to the intervention mission as part of the Addis Abba agreements in January 1993, the various factions had resumed fighting all while UNOSOM II attempted to stabilize the county.\textsuperscript{90} In light of this instability and the high casualty count caused by the early years of the civil war up to June 1993 it would appear that the Somali Civil War gave a strong humanitarian impetus for military intervention.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, pp. 54.
\textsuperscript{87} Rutherford, pp. 53.
\textsuperscript{88} Prunier, pp. 55.
\textsuperscript{90} Rutherford, pp. 104.
Besides the humanitarian impetus for military intervention offered by the worsening severity of on the ground conditions, force escalation may have been prompted given increasing difficulties for the U.N. in the provision of aid and peacekeeping in Somalia. Deteriorating conditions by 1993 prevented peacekeepers on the ground from effectively delivering aid as aid missions were frequently harassed by local warlords who in turn began targeting the UN forces sent to deliver this aid. According to Kenneth Rutherford, humanitarian assistance operations were “shaken down” for money by Somali militias prompting UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to call for a forcible disarmament of the warlords by UN forces.91 Conditions arguably reached a breaking point in 1993 rendering the humanitarian mission of UNOSOM II extremely difficult as food and drought aid desperately needed by the civilian population were frequently seized by warlords. While the aid efforts of troops on the ground were stifled, warlords also continued to engage in clashes with one another hindering the peacekeeping mission of UNOSOM II as its brokered ceasefires were not obeyed.

The conflict by 1993 was not only qualified as severe given its humanitarian cost and the obstruction of the UNOSOM II mission, but also by the level of violence toward peacekeepers. By June 1993, peacekeepers acting as part of the multilateral intervention in Somalia had become targets of violence of the rival factions engaged in the Somali Civil War. In particular, as previously mentioned, the forces of Mohammed Farrad Aidid attacked Pakistani UNOSOM II troops that month.92 This event would prove to be the impetus for an escalation to force use in the civil war by the intervention mission. Given this fact, it would seem that the particular variable of violence toward peacekeepers played a substantive role in the escalation to force use in the case of Somalia.

91 Ibid, pp. 120.
92 Ibid, pp. 133.
However, while this analysis of conflict severity accounts for initial intervention, an analysis of conflict severity from the perspective of Boettcher and Cunningham may offer insight as to why the UNOSOM II mission was short lived. In the case of Somalia, UNOSOM II entered into a political situation with a multitude of factions like the Somali National Alliance, the Somali National Front, and the Somali Democratic Alliance who were fighting with one another in the aftermath of Siad Barre’s overthrow. These organizations were short sighted in their goals seeking to grab whatever loot they could at that particular point in the Somali Civil War. Thus the UNOSOM II mission lacked an easily identifiable actor who they could aid through their intervention and whose victory in turn could have helped resolve the conflict.

Additionally, the mission did not have a possible partner to begin with as rival warlord factions in Somalia saw the UNOSOM II mission as an impediment to their territorial and political ambitions. According to A.J. Bacevich while warlords were willing to tolerate aid missions to the beleaguered nation, “they viewed as unacceptable any effort to meddle in Somali politics.”

Consequently, any military action of UNOSOM II was done in a politically unclear environment where the use of force would not have any certainty in resolving the conflict. A military intervener could not be assured that its actions would benefit a particular actor who in receiving assistance could be relied upon to help resolve the conflict. It is possible that in light of such political uncertainty, U.S. policy makers were less inclined to intervene in Somalia initially and then quick to withdraw troops shortly after force escalation for fear of being pulled into a quagmire whose resolution was unclear.

II. Domestic Political Influences

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In analyzing the effect of governmental willingness to militarily intervene in the case of Somalia, one faces a slightly more difficult task as the transition from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred amidst the transition from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration. Accounting for this shift, there seems a contrast between both governments in their willingness to use ground troops in Somalia. The administration of George H.W. Bush in its waning days approved an increase in American troop presence in Somalia according to Kenneth R. Rutherford in part due to Bush’s own personal disgust with the humanitarian disaster having witnessed the effect of similar disasters in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, scholar Peter Woodward argues that Bush himself favored interventionism priding himself as “a foreign policy president” intervening in conflicts to preside over a “New World Order.” In his final days in office, while committing to the deployment of American troops to deliver aid to the nation, President Bush indicated a willingness to possibly pursue military intervention in the conflict. In particular, the former president stated that the American military presence had “the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and he lives of Somalia’s people.”

Yet the sincerity of Bush’s willingness to engage the conflict could be suspect given the enormous public and international pressure placed on him to act at the time. Additionally, Bush agreed to an increase in American participation in the waning days of his presidency effectively ensuring he would not have to deal with the consequences of a failed intervention. These facts may indicate that the Bush administration may not have truly been committed to intervention in Somalia but did so in order to save face and reputation in light of a lack of consequences. However, a willingness to pursue intervention did exist in other branches of government such as

94 Ibid, pp. 78
the military establishment which, according to David N. Gibbs, appeared “to have been the main advocates for the intervention within the Bush administration.”

Upon his election, President Clinton was initially hesitant towards investing troops into Somalia, as noted by Peter Woodward. Clinton needed to confront domestic issues at the start of his presidency and did not want to appear hypocritical by focusing on intervention as he had criticized George H.W. Bush for paying too much attention to foreign policy. It would appear that the Clinton administration, despite its interventionist stance was not wholly willing to pursue peace implementation on the eve of UNOSOM II’s brief military involvement in the conflict. According to David Halberstam, policy pronouncements made by administration officials like then UN ambassador Madeleine Albright indicated at the time that “Washington was not taking events in Somalia seriously enough.” In ending the UNITAF mission in Somalia and transitioning to UNOSOM II, Kenneth R. Rutherford notes the U.S. left behind less troops and that at the time the U.S. government had begun transitioning out their forces starting on May 4, 1993 in spite of official UN requests that they stay longer.

According to Rutherford’s account, hesitance toward any kind of force deployment was only overcome when Mohammed Aidid began openly challenging and attacking the UN presence in the nation. Even then, leaders in the Clinton administration and Pentagon were cautious of the level of troops to send to deal with what had by then become a punitive mission against Aidid, rejecting the use of commandos to assassinate the leader for fear of the military operation intensifying. The lack of willingness within the Clinton administration was further

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97 Gibbs, pp. 135.
98 Ibid, pp. 65.
100 Rutherford, pp. 125.
101 Ibid, pp. 132.
102 Ibid, pp. 134.
demonstrated by the quick pullout of troops by the president soon after the Battle of Mogadishu. Though the president in his Address on Somalia on October 7, 1993 attempted to dissuade notions that the U.S. was abandoning its commitment to the UNOSOM II mission, he nonetheless announced a reduction in troop presence. Clinton further argued in this address hat the U.S. had only a duty to provide humanitarian relief and not “to rebuild Somalia’s society” in part justifying the withdrawal of U.S. troops as the conflict began to escalate.\footnote{Clinton, Bill. \textit{Address on Somalia}. White House, Washington D.C. 7 Oct 1993. Address.}

The Clinton administration’s attitude toward the Somali intervention shows a lack of willingness on the part of the American government at the time to deal with the crisis militarily despite its aforementioned interventionist reputation. In fact, the action taken by the administration shows somewhat of an inverse of what occurred in Bosnia in which the government, despite lacking firm public support, still undertook military operations. Despite receiving greater and more affirmative public support, the administration hesitated even when committing more forces to the humanitarian mission in the country and only pursued military action as a reaction to assaults on UN troops. This hesitation seems to call into question the general willingness of the Clinton administration to intervene in conflicts as suggested by scholars when examining the Bosnian Civil War.

This disparity could be explained by the variable of self-interest or by the disparity in what kind of force was likely to have been used in Somalia as opposed to Bosnia. The disparity in the willingness of the Clinton administration to pursue force could possibly be explained by the fact force use constituted the deployment of ground troops in Somalia as opposed to air power in Bosnia making Somalia potentially more costly for the U.S. in terms of casualties and reputation. What the lack of willingness on the part of the Clinton administration to intervene
may explain is why U.S. military involvement was so brief as opposed to Bosnia. Unlike Bosnia in which a general willingness within the administration allowed for a sustained bombing campaign and subsequent commitment to ground peacekeeping, a general uneasiness within the Clinton administration even prior to intervention in Somalia may explain why American forces were pulled out of Somalia only a few months after engaging in clashes with Somali warlords.

In regards to the other domestic political factor studied here, U.S. popular support for intervention in Somalia, though later riled after the events of the Battle of Mogadishu, seems to indicate a level of approval and support for the interventionist policies the country eventually pursued there. Initial polls prior to UNOSOM II regarding whether or not Americans approved of the loss of U.S. lives in order to ensure humanitarian relief to the nation saw 69% of respondents indicate they were willing to support the operation even if it were to incur American casualties.\textsuperscript{104} Polls regarding force use in January 1993, only a month after the UNITAF mission’s commencement in December 1992, indicated that while 52% of respondents felt the U.S. in Somalia should only deliver food as part of a humanitarian mission, only 41% felt troops needed to play an active role in disarming the Somali warlords.\textsuperscript{105}

Yet despite this, a survey conducted by Gallup in June 1993, right after the UNOSOM II operation commenced military operations saw 65% of poll respondents approve of the military action.\textsuperscript{106} In light of the results of these polls, particularly the last one, it would seem as if U.S. public opinion favored an escalation to force use in Somalia prior to and at the outset of the UNOSOM II mission. Beyond public opinion polls, support for intervention in Somalia was also actively expressed by non-governmental organizations in the U.S. like the Congressional Black

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, pp. 536.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
Caucus which had asked the U.S. government to become involved in Somalia as early as April 1992.\textsuperscript{107} It cannot be completely ascertained to what degree policy makers in Washington were influenced by public opinion in their willingness to use military force. However, scholars like Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay point to the influence of negative U.S. opinion toward UNOSOM II after casualties at the Battle of Mogadishu as partly influencing the American government’s desire to lessen its presence in the conflict and pull out of Somalia.\textsuperscript{108} While public opinion may have only marginally affected U.S. involvement in Bosnia, it seems more plausible that American public support could have partially driven decision making in regards to Somalia given the steadier and more emphatic public support for involvement.

Though public opinion and government disposition favoring intervention are correlated to the outcome of force escalation in Somalia, the other measure of domestic political conditions, self-interest, has little relationship to the outcome of force escalation. Though the model proposed in the beginning of this paper predicts an escalation to force use in light of strong self-interest, a fairly weak relationship exists in the case of Somalia. The U.S. initially had strategic interests in Somalia during the Cold War aiding Siad Barre’s regime in order to maintain a foothold in the region and to offset Soviet aid that was pouring into Ethiopia by the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{109} However, Kenneth Rutherford notes that these strategic interests petered amidst Siad Barre’s overthrow. The U.S. did not want to maintain a presence in what was becoming an unstable nation whose human rights record under Biarre had disgusted many U.S. politicians leading to a cut off of U.S. financial support for the nation by 1989.\textsuperscript{110} Furthermore, the U.S. no longer had

\textsuperscript{107} Rutherford, pp. 27.
\textsuperscript{108} Kull, Steven and Clay Ramsey. “U.S. Public Attitudes on Involvement in Somalia.” (College Park, MD: Program on International Policy Attitudes of the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes and the School of Public Affairs, 26 October 1993.)
\textsuperscript{109} Rutherford, pp. 6.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, pp. 8.
to counter Soviet influence with the decline of the communist superpower and had established a strategic foothold elsewhere in the region after securing the rights to set up bases for its forces around the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{111}

Though Peter Woodard notes that the U.S. sought to maintain a presence around the Horn of Africa given its proximity to key waterways around the Middle East, the U.S. withdrawal of support and personnel from the region in prior to the civil war indicates that the U.S. likely did not have high strategic interests in the nation.\textsuperscript{112} Besides strategic self-interest, it has been proposed that economic self-interest could have played a role in the military intervention in Somalia. In particular, it has been posited that U.S. interests in securing possible oil reserves in Somalia could have motivated force escalation. In a 1993 \textit{Los Angeles Times} article, reporter Mark Finneman stated that four American petroleum companies had signed agreements with the Barre government to extract possible oil reserves in Somalia and indicated an economic dimension to the U.S. desire to get involved in Somalia.\textsuperscript{113} However, while these agreements might indicate economic self-interest, by that point no substantial oil reserves had been found in Somalia and none have been found since. Such agreements also had dubious influence as they were also null and void by the time the U.S. resorted to force escalation as they had been signed with the government of Siad Barre prior to the advent of the civil war. Even though such economic interests may have existed, these interests are alleged and cannot be proven. Moreover, if substantive economic interests had truly influenced force escalation in Somalia then it would be conceivable that the UNOSOM II mission would have lasted longer.

\textbf{III. Geopolitical Considerations}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid, pp. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Woodard, pp. 26.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Fineman, Mark. “The Oil Factor in Somalia.” \textit{The Los Angeles Times}. Jan. 18, 1993: 1A.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
When the final condition set of geopolitical considerations is applied to Somalia, the results seem to be in line with the research model that force escalation would occur in light of concerns over conflict spillover and in an international environment that was conducive to intervention. Admittedly, concerns of conflict spillover were not as prevalent as concerns of decreasing stability within Somalia among policy makers. However, the initial effects of conflict spillover in the Somali Civil War were evident prior to military action by UNOSOM II. The war’s outbreak in 1991 had prompted massive refugee flows of Somali citizens to neighboring states. Kenya was overwhelmed by an influx of these refugees that totaled some 300,000 people by 1993 while Djibouti’s refugee count numbered a staggering 530,000. Meanwhile, Ethiopia had to contend with similar refugee flows even as the country was recovering from its own civil war. In addition to refugee flows the conflict had also partly shifted across borders as forces loyal to deposed leader Siad Barre set up bases within Northwestern Kenya from which they would launch their military campaigns. Though concerns of conflict spillover were not evoked to justify intervention in the case of Somalia as they were in Bosnia, the consequences of conflict spillover did exist in Somalia.

If conflict spillover indicates a degree of influence for geopolitical conditions, then the next question according to the research model is how international attitudes toward intervention and the geopolitical balance of power influenced force escalation in the UNOSOM mission. Examining the first variable of international attitudes toward intervention, the disposition of the international community at large toward humanitarian and military intervention in Somalia was perhaps the most favorable of any intervention in the last two decades. In fact, it was only after

115 Woodward, pp. 61.
116 Rutherford, pp. 16.
the perceived failure of Somalia that international approval of armed intervention waned. It was only in the aftermath of the mission, the Clinton administration signaled a decreased willingness to engage in “armed humanitarian interventions.”

Similarly only after the intervention in 1995 did UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali express decreased optimism that intervention would become the norm, a marked change from his enthusiasm for force implementation set out in the UN’s 1992 peacekeeping policy document, *An Agenda for Peace.* Indeed, much of the literature on the need for peace implementation had been written prior to the UNOSOM operation and a general enthusiasm for peace implementation seemed to exist in academia and in the international realm.

In 1993, according to Mark R. Hutchinson the intervention in Somalia was welcomed and agreed upon by all the nations in the Security Council as they unanimously approved Operation Restore Hope with an implicit approval of the possibility of force use for this operation. As such, the military intervention seemed to occur with the fulfillment of two variables proposed in the initial model of how geopolitical considerations might influence force escalation. On one hand, a favorable international environment toward intervention existed at the time as the Security Council unanimously approved the operation. On the other hand, there were no major powers obstructing the mission or preventing a military intervention from being carried out. Though this lack of obstruction may seem like a foregone conclusion, intervention in Somalia might not have acquired universal support prior to 1993. According to Peter Woodard, during the later phases of Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union battled for influence in the Horn of

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118 Ibid, pp. 71.
Africa, particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia. As such, intervention in the region might have been contested at one point. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union ensured there would be no nation to impede a U.S. directed intervention in Somalia.

**Darfur**

*Background:*

The final case study of Darfur in this paper is an ongoing conflict that is further distinguished from the other two cases in that it is regionally confined and marked by a lack of military intervention. The conflict in Darfur originally began in 2003 as Darfur based groups rebelled against the Sudanese government in the wake of the Second Sudanese Civil War citing a history of exploitation and suppression by the central government as grievances. The ensuing conflict has largely been a guerilla war between Darfur rebel groups like the SLM and JEM on one side and the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed paramilitaries on the other side. The civil war has been marked by genocide against the inhabitants of Darfur by the Janjaweed operating under the authority of the Sudanese government.

The conflict has an ethno-racial element to the violence as the Janjaweed Arab herdsmen have engaged in racially motivated violence against the predominantly sedentary black inhabitants of Darfur. Consequently, the war has sparked international outcry given its level of atrocities though Western governments were initially passive toward the crisis. Fighting in the region has ebbed and flowed in severity since the conflict’s beginnings in 2003. However, the region has yet to see any resolution of the conflict as of the time this research paper was being written. As the war in Darfur has been protracted for quite some time, some policy makers including UN officials labeled the war as a “low intensity conflict” in 2009 arguing that while casualties had not subsided, the degree of violence had become tame when compared with what

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120 Woodard, pp. 25.
the region experienced in 2003 and 2004.\textsuperscript{121} However, as of the time this paper is being written the conflict in Darfur has seen somewhat of an upswing in the level of violence. The war in Darfur does not appear to be a low-intensity conflict as heavy fighting between the government and rebel forces resumed in December 2010 displacing some 40,000 people and leading to a new round of combatant and civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{122}

While the conflict has continued, a number of international efforts have tried to broker peace within the region and alleviate the crisis. In 2004 the African Union (AU) sent in peacekeepers under the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Charged with monitoring the situation rather than implementing peace via force, these peacekeepers did little to alleviate the severity of the situation while the African Union brokered peace talks between the Darfur rebel groups and the Sudanese government fell through. By 2005, the AU mission began to receive logistical assistance and training from NATO, though the security organization did not expand the goal of its mission.\textsuperscript{123}

Finally in 2008, the UN became involved in Darfur sending in its own peacekeepers in conjunction with the AU under the UNAMID mission. UNAMID was charged with continuing the flow of humanitarian aid to Darfur and with brokering peace in Sudan. Despite the deployment of UN peacekeepers, the mission has never escalated into the realm of peace implementation as the other two case studies in this paper did. This lack of military intervention still continues despite the conflict being labeled as genocide by a multitude of nations and IGOs and the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Bashir by the ICC for war crimes. Unlike the


previous two case studies presented, the case study of Darfur seeks to understand why military intervention did not and has yet to occur in the region.

Application of Condition Sets:

I. Severity of Conditions on the Ground

Examining ground conditions in Darfur, a serious humanitarian crisis has existed since the conflict’s onset that would give other nations a moral imperative to intervene. In 2003, the Sudanese government and Janjaweed paramilitaries began targeting the civilian population of Darfur using air power and ground forces. According to M.W. Daly, such attacks were directed against “a largely unarmed and sedentary population” that, while home to the SLA rebels, did not actively engage in fighting.\textsuperscript{124} By the following year, the U.S. State Department stated that the violence in Darfur had destroyed “at least 400 villages” and displaced as many as 200,000 refugees while the UN estimated that at least a third of Darfur’s population had been affected by the violence.\textsuperscript{125} In the years that followed the commencement of hostilities, violence in the region, directed particularly at civilian targets, has remained a constant. In September 2005, the Sudanese government launched another wave of bombings against the civilian population of the region that killed hundreds as government forces even went into Chad to attack refugees fleeing the violence.\textsuperscript{126} Following the insertion of UNAMID into the nation, the violence categorizing the initial years of the conflict has subsided to a degree.

As opposed to the thousands of deaths that categorized the first two years of the conflict, the highest monthly death toll of the last two years stands at just 220 casualties suffered in June

\textsuperscript{124} Daly, pp. 283.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, pp. 284.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, pp. 300.
However, the conflict, despite claims from critics, has yet to die down between the Darfur rebels and the Khartoum government as clashes between the two sides flared up again in December 2010 continuing into January 2011 displacing some 40,000 people in the process. These recent wave of attacks underscored the limited efficacy of UNAMID in tempering the conflict as the Sudanese government denied the mission access to areas affected by the fighting and prevented refugees fleeing the fighting from receiving UNAMID assistance. While the current level of violence is not quite as extreme as it was in the earlier years of the conflict, it is nonetheless severe enough to warrant the kind of humanitarian impetus believed to be necessary for intervention. Overall, the conflict merits military intervention according to the principles put forth by scholars like Michael Walzer as it has resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths, and an even greater number of displaced individuals.

Assessing the other factor used to gauge the severity of on the ground conditions, the situation in Darfur also has become chaotic enough to obstruct the function of peacekeepers in the region. As shown by the recent clashes in December 2010, UNAMID peacekeepers on the ground obstructed from delivering aid and relief by the Sudanese government and the general chaos on the ground. According to a 2009 UN report, from January to November of that year, there had been at least 42 incidents in which Sudanese officials denied passage to UNAMID peacekeepers to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps or other areas of Darfur while threatening UN staff with violence. Beyond obstruction, the UNAMID mission has also had to contend with frequent intimidation by the Sudanese government and army. As recently as January 2011, an IDP camp set up by peacekeepers was surrounded by Sudanese forces who

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128 IRIN.
threatened to burn down similar camps if UNAMID persisted in what one Sudanese commander felt was the mission’s intervention in the internal affairs of Sudan.\textsuperscript{130}

While the difficulties of peacekeeping faced by the UNAMID mission qualifies Darfur within our model as meeting severe enough conditions for humanitarian intervention, the violence aimed at these peacekeepers also meets another key factor of whether or not a conflict has become severe enough to merit intervention. Similar to what happened to UN peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia, AMIS and then UNAMID troops have had to deal with attacks against them by combatants. Since UNAMID’s insertion into the region in 2008, its convoys came under repeated attack. UNAMID peacekeepers have also been targets of kidnapping by forces within the conflict as evidenced by the abduction of three Latvian peacekeepers delivering food aid in November 2010.\textsuperscript{131} As of May 2010, the UNAMID mission has suffered 24 casualties as a result of attacks on peacekeepers, not including casualties from the prior AMIS mission.\textsuperscript{132}

While the sheer humanitarian cost of the war in Darfur qualifies it as severe enough to warrant military action according to our variable, the difficulty encountered by peacekeepers in delivering aid to the region would also qualify it. However, despite Darfur satisfying the variables of this particular condition set, there has nonetheless been no escalation to force use. In light of this, it may be the case that the severity of the conflict in Darfur acts as an inhibitor of military intervention as this variable did in Somalia given the highly politically unstable environment of the conflict. Much like with Somalia, there are a number of sides at play in the conflict. Given the need to stop atrocities largely being committed by the Sudanese


government, it might seem that a U.S. led military intervention in Sudan would ally itself with forces from Darfur fighting against the government. However, the Darfur rebel groups, the SLA and JEM, have occasionally clashed with one another over leadership of the secessionist cause and, despite uniting temporarily, for the most part retain separate identities and operations. As such, military intervention in Darfur, if it were occur, would benefit the secessionist rebels but would not necessarily resolve the conflict given the lack of cohesion among the rebels. Additionally, such intervention might not help the peacekeeping mission set up there as these rebel groups have themselves targeted civilians and may be responsible for some attacks on UN peacekeepers. These groups even if they were to be united are unlikely partners for the U.S. in the event of an intervention as the U.S. government has had JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim under a sanctions list since 2007 and has criticized the JEM for trying to extend its influence beyond Darfur the secessionist faction executed a raid on Khartoum in 2008. Given an unclear scenario and less than satisfactory allies in the event of intervention, a U.S. led intervention may be unlikely. Policy makers may see the Darfur rebel groups as less than likely allies whose cooperation might not be guaranteed and who might do little to end the conflict, exacerbating an already precarious humanitarian crisis.

II. Domestic Political Influences

When analyzing what effect an American government’s willingness to engage in intervention has had on force implementation in Darfur, the same problem found in the Somali intervention occurs in Darfur. The administration that initially faced the Darfur the conflict, the George W. Bush administration, much like the Clinton administration, showed a willingness to


intervene and a seemingly pro-interventionist attitude in light of its involvement in a number of conflicts over the course of its tenure notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. While it could be argued that these missions did not involve intervention in intrastate conflicts with the same humanitarian impetus as Somalia or Bosnia, these wars indicated a willingness of the Bush administration to deploy forces abroad. Additionally, these missions were partly justified along humanitarian lines and by the “Bush Doctrine” by which the administration stated it would intervene in other nations’ affairs to ensure its security interests and promote democracy. However, much like with the Clinton administration and Somalia, despite this seemingly pro-interventionist stance, the administration was hesitant about using military force in Darfur. The Bush administration skirted the issue and declined to commit itself to any kind of force implementation.

While the conflict grew increasingly worse, the Bush administration up until 2004 avoided labeling what was going on in the region as a genocide for fear of forcing the administration to intervene given the Genocide Convention’s call for states to interfere in a nation’s affairs should there be genocide. U.S. officials instead referred to what was going as “ethnic cleansing” to avoid any involvement in Darfur while seeking to defer responsibility to the existing African Union presence in the region. It was not until September 2004 that the severity of the violence in Sudan was acknowledged as a genocide by a Bush government official when then Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled events in Darfur as genocidal in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After this declaration, officials in the American government grew more favorable to intervening in Darfur by calling for increased humanitarian aid to the region while helping existing peacekeeping efforts on the ground. In 2004 and 2005,

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137 Ibid, pp. 294.
the American military assisted the AMIS force in Sudan by helping airlift Rwandan peacekeepers and supplies to Darfur while training African Union troops sent to the region.\textsuperscript{139} As time went on, U.S. policymakers began to press for more action in the conflict with President Bush calling for a doubling of peacekeepers in the region in 2006 and for increased help by NATO to the AMIS mission.\textsuperscript{140}

However, this seeming willingness to intervene was a willingness to support existing missions and expressly dismissed the notion of any American ground troops or force use in the conflict.\textsuperscript{141} Consequently, the position of the Bush administration from 2004 onward was one of support for existing missions and acknowledgement of the conflict’s severity coupled with a distinct aversion to implementing any kind of force use. The current Obama administration prior to taking office gave hints in January 2009 that it would be willing to intervene directly in Darfur unlike its predecessor.\textsuperscript{142} Though this initial sentiment seemed to indicate a new willingness by the American government to intervene in Darfur, the administration shifted its stance on the question of intervention in the months that followed.

In October 2009, the administration announced that it would attempt to address the civil war in Darfur through engagement with the Sudanese government rewarding President Bashir for improvements to the situation of Darfur effectively eschewing the option of military intervention.\textsuperscript{143} Reviewing the effect of a government’s willingness to intervene in Sudan, the


\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.


evidence indicates that pro-interventionist policy and aspirations by both the Bush and Obama administrations did not translate into a willingness to engage the conflict in Darfur. The case of Darfur, more so than Somalia, shows the disparity between interventionist sentiment within the American government and its application.

In terms of public opinion, it could be argued that unlike the cases of Bosnia and Somalia, public opinion regarding possible intervention in Darfur is fairly clear cut even without a manipulation of questions in opinion polls. A number of public opinion polls taken have found that the public in the United States favors some sort of intervention in Darfur. According to a 2006 research poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, 51% of American respondents believed the U.S. had a responsibility to something about ethnic genocide in Darfur while 53% of respondents favored the use of U.S. troops to intervene in the conflict as part of a multinational force. Similarly, a poll conducted that same year by Zogby International found that 62% of its respondents felt that “the United States ‘has a responsibility to help stop the killing in the Darfur region.’”

Besides public opinion in favor of intervention, there has also been a substantial popular movement in both the U.S. and elsewhere in the world to push for intervention in Darfur which seems to indicate a substantial level of support for intervention. While the intrastate conflicts of Bosnia and Somalia saw heavy press coverage, the same kind of powerful grassroots movements arguing for their end did not exist as they currently do in the case of Darfur. The war in Darfur along with the tepid response of major states to the conflict has sparked outrage and outreach by

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groups solely dedicated to calling for intervention in the conflict. Organizations like the Save Darfur Coalition have organized a number of campaigns to raise money for the region’s humanitarian crisis and staged rallies to call for an end to the conflict particularly via multilateral intervention. Nonetheless, in spite of the support for military intervention in Darfur, the region, as previously mentioned, has only seen limited humanitarian intervention that has often found it difficult to maintain peace and provide aid. Even in the face of greater pressure from the general public and NGOs, it seems unlikely that such pressure will prompt the current UNAMID mission to engage in force implementation.

The factors of public support and government disposition toward intervention do no shed light on non-intervention considering the research model proposed would indicate a correlation between strong measures of each and the pursuit of multilateral military intervention. Rather than these measures domestic political conditions, the measure of self-interest may provide a better explanation of the outcome of non-intervention in Darfur. In particular, the lack of self-interest for the U.S. to intervene in Darfur could explain the lack of force escalation. According to M.W. Daly, Darfur has no valuable resources and had little if any place in the international consciousness prior to the outbreak of the civil war there. Though the prospect of securing oil resources within Sudan itself may qualify as economic self-interest that could motivate the U.S. to push for force escalation in Darfur, these interests are only prospective. The U.S. currently has no economic interests within the nation as the last American petroleum company operating in

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147 Daly, pp. 1.
Sudan, Chevron, left the nation in 1992.\textsuperscript{148} Furthermore, Sudan, despite claims that it could have massive oil reserves is only a minor exporter of oil in the world market.\textsuperscript{149}

While there is little economic self-interest for the U.S. to actively push for force escalation in Darfur, there is also little political or strategic imperative to do so as well. In particular, intervention is not in the strategic interests of the United States as the force use it would require is beyond the capabilities the U.S. can currently deploy given its existing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Scholar James Kurth argues that the Iraq War in particular destroyed both the “political will” and military capability” of the United States “to undertake any humanitarian intervention in the foreseeable future.”\textsuperscript{150} Kurth adds that as a result of U.S. troop deployment in Iraq U.S. ground forces were “stretched to their limit” and that “there is no reserve of ground forces left to engage in sizable and extended operations anywhere else.”\textsuperscript{151} As a result, there is little reason for the U.S. to invest its resources in another conflict in Darfur when it is already strained. It could be argued though that strategic self-interest to intervene does exist as the U.S. may want to preserve stability in Sudan to prevent it from harboring terrorism as it did at one point in the early 90s.\textsuperscript{152} However, if anything, the U.S. has strategic interests to not become involved in Sudan for such a reason.

According to Asteris Huliaris, the Sudanese government, in response to worries of U.S. retaliation should it continue to harbor terrorists, began cooperating with the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts in 2000 while undertaking counterterrorism initiatives on its own

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, pp. 256.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, pp. 98.
starting in 2003. By 2007, the U.S. State Department felt such operations by the Sudanese government were commendable calling Sudan a “strong partner in the War against Terror.” This cooperation of the Sudanese government in counter-terrorism initiatives in turn gives the U.S. even less incentive to meddle in the nation’s affairs as it risks losing a partner in the ongoing Global War against Terrorism by doing so. In light of this evidence, it would appear that a lack of self-interest and overstretched capabilities on the part of the United States could better explain the outcome of non-intervention than other variables of domestic political conditions. Lacking similar economic and strategic stakes in the region as the nation had in Bosnia, the U.S. may avoid spearheading an intervention in the Darfur as such a campaign would not serve their interests while stretching the limited force capability the U.S. can flexibly deploy.

III. Geopolitical Considerations

Assessing the first measure of the geopolitical considerations conditions set, conflict spillover; this paper finds both strong concerns and effects of conflict spillover in the case of Darfur. The conflict has produced a steady flow of refugees to Sudan’s neighbors. Meanwhile violence from the war in Darfur has spilled over into neighboring states as well. Early on, the war produced an influx of refugees that flooded over Sudan’s borders into countries like Chad. Along with this influx, often came incursions by Janjaweed paramilitaries and Sudanese troops into Chadian territory as these forces sought to continue ethnic cleansing campaigns beyond Sudan’s borders. These refugee flows have persisted in spite of allegations that Darfur has become a “low-intensity” conflict with some 240,000 refugees from Darfur poring over into

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153 Ibid, pp. 718.
While refugees coming from Darfur into Chad worsened instability in the region by stretching the support systems able to handle this influx, rebel groups crossing over the border to retreat from the war also worsened political instability in Chad. Darfur rebels, particularly the JEM, became drawn in the ongoing civil war in Chad, assisting government forces under President Idriss Déby in fighting anti-government Chadian rebel groups.

This seeming support of the Chadian government for the Darfur rebels in turn prompted Bashir’s government to assist rebel groups fighting Déby’s administration, further worsening regional stability. The conflict, however, has not just affected Chad but has spilled over to Sudan’s other neighbors. By 2007, the Central African Republic (CAR) had also reported influxes of refugees from Southern Darfur. These refugee flows were followed by the Janjaweed who attacked villages on CAR soil killing some 116 people in the village of Birao in April 2007. Examining this spillover, scholar Jennifer L. DeMiaio counsels not to label Darfur’s impact on the CAR and Chad as complete conflict spillover instead arguing that the war in Darfur is interconnected with existing intrastate conflicts in both nations. Nonetheless, she concedes that the Darfur conflict has had a tangible impact on increasing instability in both states and that “Khartoum’s political will… drives the spread of the conflict.”

Even if we were to exclude the effects of the violence on Chad and the CAR, Sudan’s other neighbors have also experienced conflict spillover as Egypt had an estimated “hundreds of thousands” of refugees

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156 Ibid.


from the region in its borders by 2009.\textsuperscript{159} Given this impact of the war in Darfur on Sudan’s neighbors and region, it would seem as if the region instability caused by the conflict might merit the use of military intervention according to our model. However, much as with the variables of domestic public opinion and on the ground conditions, the fulfillment of this variable occurs in light of non-intervention.

Rather than concerns of conflict spillover, worries about the reactions of other states to intervention much like self-interest may give some hints as to why intervention has not occurred. Evaluating the influence of global norms of intervention, it must be noted that a general apathy within the international community toward military intervention in humanitarian crises over the last 15 years may drive inaction in Sudan. According to Nick Grono, apathy within the international community toward taking action in Darfur stems in part from the decreased enthusiasm for military intervention in humanitarian crises that emerged after the failure of the U.S. intervention in Somalia. Grono also notes that this apathetic response is further reinforced by a lack of “international legal basis” or agreed upon framework in the international community for when military intervention in humanitarian matters should occur.\textsuperscript{160} However, this explanation does not paint a completely clear picture of the reasons for inaction given that the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo occurred after this supposed apathy set in. Besides a lack of norms in the international community conducive to intervention, inaction in Darfur could be explained by a factor proposed in our model that did not exist in previous case studies. The existence of a major actor opposed to multilateral military intervention in an intrastate conflict may account for the inaction in Darfur.


In the case of Darfur this major actor appears to be China whose trade interests and substantial investments in Sudan make it likely that it would obstruct any military intervention in Sudan by a multilateral coalition. Unlike other nations in the West, China has pursued to what Li Anshan refers to as “a principle of noninterference” in Darfur where it has not sought to punish the Sudanese government for the war in Darfur, actively voicing its opposition to economic sanctions of Sudan.\(^\text{161}\) Though Anshan argues that this is a general policy of the PRC toward African nations, prevailing Chinese interests in Sudan indicate that noninterference is not necessarily advocated out of principle but rather out of practicality. According to Chin Hao-Huang, since the late 1990s, Chinese companies and the Chinese government have invested heavily in the energy sector of Sudan.

The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in particular has set up agreements granting it production rights for oil in the African nation and as much as a 40% stake in oil producing areas in the Northern oil fields of Sudan.\(^\text{162}\) Overall, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the People’s Republic of China has invested a total of $10 billion in Sudan since the 1960s.\(^\text{163}\) Though China has not outright stated it would block the pursuit of military intervention in Darfur, its actions in the UN Security Council regarding the imposition of any punishments on Sudan for the genocide in Darfur indicate it would likely block military action. According to reporter Kristina Nwazota, in 2006, the Chinese government blocked attempts by the Security Council to impose sanctions on Sudan over the war in Darfur.\(^\text{164}\) The Chinese government has in recent years taken a less rigid stance on the Darfur issue though. It has


\(^{164}\) Ibid.
involved itself in peace efforts by discussing the Darfur issue with its ally in Khartoum as foreign
pressure on China to take action has mounted.

In March 2010, the Chinese Special Envoy to Darfur, Liu Guijin proclaimed China’s
commitment to facilitating peace negotiations in the Darfur conflict. However, such efforts by
China have eschewed any notion that military intervention could occur with its consent in
Darfur. A year prior to the Special Envoy’s proclamations, China urged restraint in how the
conflict would be addressed criticizing the prosecution of Sudan’s leaders by the ICC and
criticizing more punitive measures against Sudan designed to resolve the war in Darfur.

Additionally, China’s claims of working more actively in peace efforts in Darfur could be seen
as dubious in light of reports that it frequently violated the UN arms embargo placed on the
conflict by shipping weapons to the region. As early as 2008, the BBC News alleged that it had
found evidence of Chinese weapon shipments to Sudanese government forces fighting in
Darfur.

A 2010 United Nations report similarly alleged that Chinese ammunition was being
smuggled into Darfur in violation of the arms embargo on the region. In light of Chinese
economic interests, opposition to greater modes of intervention, and military support for
Sudanese government forces in Darfur, it seems that China impedes force escalation. As a major
geopolitical power, the nation has signaled its unwillingness to tolerate greater means of
intervention to address the war in Darfur, and would most likely block any UN directed force
escalation via its Security Council veto. Though this paper notes that there is no great

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willingness to pursue force escalation on the part of the U.S. and other states, even if this willingness existed, intervention would be unlikely given the likelihood that the Chinese government would oppose such action. As such, the existence of a major state opposed to force escalation in Darfur may offer some explanation behind non-intervention in the region.

Analysis:

While the three cases offer a glimpse of which condition set was more pertinent in prompting force escalation for each individual conflict, a comparative analysis of all three cases may offer a clearer picture of the drivers of multilateral military intervention. In examining how the severity of conditions on the ground traditionally might impact escalation, the research here illustrates that this set of conditions is significant in accounting for military intervention but does not account for the disparity in military intervention. The case studies in this paper, Bosnia, Somalia, and Darfur all saw levels of violence that qualify or nearly qualify as genocide. Each conflict had a strong humanitarian impetus for military intervention in light of mounting casualties and the severity of each intrastate conflict. The Bosnian Civil War was marked by much publicized interethnic violence that saw Bosnian Serbs carry out ethnic cleansing campaigns, erect concentration camps, and kill massive amounts of civilians in massacres like Srebrenica. Somalia saw chaotic fighting between a number of sides that fractured the nation all the while creating famine and refugee flows that contributed to a humanitarian catastrophe.

The Darfur conflict has also been the site of a horrendous war that has claimed at least 300,000 lives while displacing huge numbers of the region’s population. It is hard to state that Darfur is markedly different in its severity than its counterparts in this study, yet the region did not and has yet to see military intervention in spite of the severity of the war there. Similarly, each conflict was marked by deaths of multilateral peacekeepers that should have also prompted
an escalation to force use. UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, and UNAMID peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions were attacked in all three cases by ground combatants. Yet despite UNAMID casualties and greater impediments to the peacekeeping mission in Sudan by the government, harm inflicted against the peacekeepers is not tied to any kind of military intervention.

This similarity in severity coupled with the disparity in outcomes for the aforementioned cases indicates that an increase in the severity of the conditions on the ground is not decisive in prompting force escalation the way it was traditionally thought. The fact that the severity of on the ground conditions is not a decisive variable in determining intervention does not mean that it plays no role whatsoever in the choice to pursue multilateral military intervention. Unlike domestic political conditions that serve as a consideration for force escalation, an increase of the severity of on the ground conditions in a nation serves as a prerequisite for any sort of humanitarian intervention. While an increase in conflict severity does not always prompt force escalation as traditionally thought, an increase in conflict severity may influence force escalation in a different manner.

William A. Boettcher’s point that conflicts with a higher degree of intensity are less likely to see military intervention may give some insight as to why no action has been taken in Darfur and for the variance in intervention duration between Somalia and Bosnia. In Darfur and Somalia, interveners were faced with unclear scenarios and a lack of possible on the ground partners who could aid a military intervention. At the moment, if the U.S. were to undertake a possible military intervention in Darfur it would lack a clear or favorable ally on the ground given the disunited Darfur rebels who are seen as promoting chaos in the region by U.S. policymakers. In this manner, the increased severity of the conflict in Darfur may inhibit
intervention as it gives a potential intervener less chances for success in terminating the war should it become involved militarily. Such an unclear or unfavorable scenario may have also influenced the brevity of the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia as the U.S. had little chance of successfully resolving an increasingly chaotic war in which it lacked possible on the ground partners. Meanwhile, intervention in the Bosnian Civil War was a more attractive endeavor when compared to intervention in Somalia or Darfur as NATO had a clear and favorable partner in the Bosnian Muslims to help them facilitate the end of the conflict.

In examining the influence of domestic conditions on force escalation, this study comes to the conclusion that these domestic conditions do not play a defining role. In examining the role of government willingness to pursue intervention, the case studies of Somalia and Darfur show that American administrations seemingly pro-interventionist in their rhetoric are hesitant to pursue intervention in certain cases. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations all espoused humanitarianism yet this espousal did not go hand in hand with action consistently. The Clinton administration was extremely hesitant to pursue action in Somalia opting out of the mission as soon as casualties amounted. Meanwhile, the Bush and Obama administrations, despite proclaiming their willingness to intervene in other states’ affairs on humanitarian grounds, failed to do so in Darfur. This suggests that, while a government may be predisposed to military intervention as a policy tool, military action will not always be employed. Instead, undertaking peace implementation seems to go hand in hand with self-interest on the part of the government.

As a general note, given the willingness of the last few American administrations to engage in multilateral military interventions, it seems that assessing such a factor is not useful in determining whether or not the U.S. will commit itself to force use. No American administration in the last twenty years has outright rejected the notion of using American force abroad for
humanitarian purposes. In fact, each administration mentioned in this piece, both by rhetoric and action, has shown a degree of commitment to implementing force in humanitarian crises. In light of this, it would appear that assessing the attitudes of an administration toward intervention gives little hint of whether or not an escalation to force use will occur.

Analyzing the influence of public support for intervention, the research here finds that public support is also not a decisive factor in the pursuit of multilateral military intervention for the United States. In all three cases, a relative degree of public support existed for the pursuit of military intervention. This is not to say this factor is irrelevant. As politicians in democracies, particularly the United States, are beholden to public opinion to a degree in order to accrue political support, it seems very unlikely that they would completely ignore public sentiment regarding an issue, particularly one involving the deployment of military force. The histories of U.S. involvement in Bosnia illustrates this point as the Clinton administration was extremely cautious to invest in force in light of what were initially less than favorable attitudes toward military intervention among the American people.

The cases Bosnia and Somalia seem to generally indicate the significance of public opinion in dictating the kind of force employment is used when the U.S. decides to take military action. While public opinion polls in the case of Somalia saw support for military action via the use of ground troops, similar polls for Bosnia saw support contingent upon heavy coordination with NATO and upon the use of air power rather than ground forces. The kind of public support in the latter may have resulted in the U.S. declining to commit ground troops prior to November 1995 when the conflicted ended and the IFOR peacekeeping mission began. However, the case of Darfur illustrates that public support, though a strong consideration for any administration engaging in multilateral military intervention, is not a decisive factor in force escalation.
While support for intervention in Bosnia and Somalia was modest, public opinion polls regarding force use in Darfur have been consistently supportive of military intervention. Even if the veracity of polls as indicative of public support was to be doubted, public support for multilateral military intervention in Darfur takes other forms including advocacy by non-governmental organizations and grassroots movements. These movements, which were not as pronounced in the cases of Bosnia and Somalia, illustrate that on the issue of Darfur, there is not just public support for intervention but clamoring among various sectors of the American population for military action. Should public support be a decisive variable for force escalation as proposed in the initial hypothesis, we would see the strong public support for intervention in Darfur translate to actual military action. However, force use is still lacking in Darfur in spite of this strong support. Public pressure may have caused the U.S. government to recognize the situation in Darfur as genocide and to increase its assistance to the humanitarian missions aiding the region. However, the continued lack of military action in Darfur indicates that this variable is not a prime factor in influencing whether or not nations choose to militarily intervene in an intrastate conflict.

The final measure of domestic political considerations, self-interest, seems to offer a better explanation for the discrepancies in intervention and non-intervention. The U.S. had tangible interests at stake in Bosnia given long standing interests in maintaining stability in Europe and a possible desire to give renewed function to NATO. However, the strategic and economic interests of the U.S. in intervening in Darfur were not as pronounced given weak ties to the nation and the lack of remaining economic interests in Sudan. Furthermore, an already extended American military commitment around the world gave the U.S. little additional incentive or interest to pursue military operations in Darfur. Self-interest may not appear to be
decisive in influencing intervention given our case study of Somalia in which the self-interest of the U.S. to intervene was relatively low. However, this low self-interest in the case of Somalia should not discount the importance of this variable in force escalation. Instead, the lower level of self-interest for the U.S. may account for the different levels of military intervention between Somalia and Bosnia.

Lacking vital interests in the Horn of Africa as they once did, the U.S. may have found the costs of the Somali intervention were far greater than any potential benefits they could derive. Consequently, the Clinton administration pulled out troops quickly as it sought to avoid becoming embroiled in a quagmire over a nation of little strategic interest to it. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, the U.S. committed itself to a NATO bombing campaign that ran until the war’s end and afterward committed ground troops for the maintenance of the Dayton Accords in light of important economic and strategic interests in the region.

The condition set of geopolitical factors, initially proposed as playing an influential role in force escalation does seem to play a major part with the exception of the variable of conflict spillover. All three cases show both concerns and actual effects of conflict spillover. The Bosnian War prompted concerns of conflict spreading to other former Yugoslav states and possible damage to European political and economic stability. The Somali Civil War produced a massive refugee problem and partly spread across boundaries into Kenya. Darfur offers perhaps the most prominent example of conflict spillover given the refugee flows and the impact of the war on the neighboring states of Chad and the Central African Republic. However, this spillover occurs without an ensuing military intervention. Perhaps conflict spillover, though important, should be assessed in conjunction with the variable of self-interest. Though concerns of how civil wars spill over might play a role in influencing intervention, the likelihood of intervention is
related to the degree to which major states involved in a possible intervention feel such spillover will negatively affect them. Such an explanation may be useful in illuminating disparities between the level of intervention in Bosnia and Somalia as well disparities between Bosnia and Darfur.

In the case of Bosnia, the primary leader of the NATO intervention, the U.S., had greater political, economic, and historical ties to Europe which stood to lose from increased spillover of the Bosnian conflict. Additionally, the international community at large would have been affected more by changes to European political or economic stability induced by the Bosnian War. However, concerns over nations in the Horn of Africa Central and West Africa are not as prominent in the eyes of major policy makers, particularly U.S. policy makers. Nations in these regions do not bear the same strategic significance they once did in the Cold War and in spite of their resources are not major trading partners with the West. As the stakes of conflict spillover are not as high in these regions for major states, it is possible that military intervention is eschewed as it has been Darfur or abridged as it was in Somalia.

The other variable of international support for intervention proposed in the geopolitical considerations condition set offers only slight explanation for discrepancies in cases where force escalation did and do not occur. International sentiment supportive of intervention existed in Bosnia and Somalia but is lacking in Darfur possibly accounting for discrepancies in intervention and non-intervention. However, as noted in the research on Darfur, international sentiment supporting military intervention has decreased since the mid-90s, yet multilateral military intervention did occur in other nations since Somalia and Bosnia. Furthermore, international support for intervention as a variable does not explain discrepancies in the duration of intervention between Bosnia and Somalia. The UNOSOM II mission had an arguably greater
amount of international enthusiasm for it than any other peace implementation operation before or since. However, the NATO intervention in Bosnia, which met with varying degrees of criticism and approval from international actors, was more sustained than the UNOSOM intervention.

The final variable of the geopolitical considerations conditions set, the presence of a major state willing to impede the path to force escalation, also does not account for the discrepancy in intervention duration between Bosnia and Somalia. However, it does appear to be useful in differentiating intervention and non-intervention. It is perhaps the one measure that stands out the most between the two case studies of force escalation and Darfur. The multilateral coalition engaged in Bosnia and Somalia did not have to intensely worry about aggravating another major state in pursuing force use. Prior to these missions the U.S. would have worried about provoking the Soviet Union by taking action near its borders in Bosnia or possibly risking a proxy war by becoming involved in Somalia. However, such concerns were non-existent in the early 90s with the dissolution of the communist nation and the relative weakness of other actors in the international system. Currently though, it is hard to imagine the U.S. leading a military intervention in Darfur without greatly upsetting China, a major state with substantial and pronounced interest in Sudan. Given this Chinese impediment, such a course of intervention seems highly unlikely and may serve as a primary deterrent to force escalation in the region.

As Patrick Regan noted in his research on military intervention, the reasons for intervention seem to be a confluence of different factors, and this paper arrives at a similar conclusion for multilateral military intervention. However, some factors are more important than others in determining force escalation and the duration of a military intervention. This research finds that certain factors are minimum requirements for multilateral military intervention. First,
conditions on the ground resulting from an intrastate conflict must be so severe so as to warrant interference in a sovereign state. Meanwhile failed efforts at non-military modes of intervention including peacekeeping, aid, and peace talks often prompt a final resort to force use. Additionally, public support within an intervening state seems to a minimum requirement for force use. However, beyond these factors, a degree of self-interest by the primary intervening party along with a lack of obstruction from other states and the general international community seem to play a greater role in influencing whether or not multilateral interventions become belligerent in nature. Such measures seem to successfully delineate when military intervention will and will not occur while accounting for discrepancies in the duration of multilateral intervention.

Conflict spillover while a variable that helps account for force escalation explains results of military intervention better when factored into self-interest. This paper concludes that government disposition to intervention is a factor that it is both hard to assess and one that has little utility considering the general interventionist stance of American governments since the late Cold War. Additionally, the paper notes that conflict severity may sometimes work in a counteractive manner to how it was previously assumed to have operated as an increasingly chaotic intrastate war with little chances of resolution may prompt states to reconsider military intervention. As noted in the beginning of this paper, this analysis of the factors behind force escalation in multilateral interventions is by no means conclusive or definite. This paper uses a limited set of case studies and derives its measures of intervention from literature regarding unilateral and multilateral intervention. Additionally, this paper focuses heavily on the influence of the U.S. on such intervention and consequently neglects possibly useful cases of humanitarian military intervention led by other nations like the British led intervention in Sierra Leone in
However, the research in this paper is useful in identifying certain mechanisms that may drive multilateral intervention and even unilateral intervention.

Furthermore, the heavy emphasis of looking at the U.S. in this paper is merited given the possible predictive value of the research included here. Until another actor replaces the United States as the primary driver of intervention or states share burden more equitably in multilateral interventions, it is hard to envision a scenario where other states do not turn to the U.S. to back multilateral military intervention. As a qualitative study, this paper has drawbacks, but it offers a glimpse into the underpinnings of multilateral intervention. A number of writings focus on motivations for unilateral interventions and some of the factors behind multilateral intervention, yet analyses of the logic behind multilateral military interventions do not abound. Going forward, more nuanced analyses of multilateral military intervention, particularly qualitative analyses, would provide further insight into the motivations for force escalation. Multilateral military intervention as a topic of research might seem to narrow and inutile given its non-existence in Darfur. However, further assessments of such intervention are useful as this is a likely mode by which states will intervene in intrastate conflicts in the future.

**Conclusion:**

If intervention seems to be driven a confluence of factors but primarily by self-interest and geopolitical considerations, then what do these findings bode for the future of multilateral military intervention and its likelihood? A first predictive answer to this question is that multilateral military interventions will not readily abound or be frequent in spite of whatever pressing humanitarian crises are occurring at a given time. As the example of Darfur shows, military interference in intrastate conflict undertaken under the auspices of humanitarian

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intervention is selective. Though intrastate conflicts may merit intervention based on their severity and may in fact be in dire need of foreign intervention for stabilization, such intervention will not always be forthcoming. Multilateral intervention, particularly military based multilateral intervention, imposes tremendous costs on the nations that intervene. States have financial costs of maintaining the forces necessitated by military intervention, human costs of possible casualties, and reputational costs.

This burden imposed by the pursuit of military intervention gives little incentive for nations, even the United States, to undertake campaigns well beyond their borders that will likely draw resources away that could be invested in domestic issues or matters of vital national security. If major states are to undertake such force investment, whether it is for humanitarian or security reasons, it must have tangible benefits or at the very least outweigh the costs of inaction. The UNOSOM II military campaign, possibly the first instance of multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War world, is a notable exception to this idea. However, the costs apparent in the UNOSOM II mission tempered the idealist interventionist sentiment that drove this endeavor.

Currently, a nation would be seldom pressed to undertake a multilateral military intervention solely given the humanitarian costs an intrastate conflict imposes on the conflict ridden state. Simply put, the risks and costs associated with using force abroad are often too great for a state to pursue military action purely in the name of humanitarianism. This paper does not seek to make the claim that humanitarianism is to be thought of in realist terms. States do not necessarily pursue humanitarian intervention through military means purely because it serves their interest. Many states, particularly the U.S., in the post Cold War era have not abandoned the rhetoric of promoting humanitarian intervention nor have they completely
eschewed any kind of aid to intrastate conflicts. Given this, it does not seem that multilateral military intervention results from states acting on self-interest alone. Though the results of this analysis might tempt the conclusion that the promotion of humanitarianism by U.S. administrations is a fallacy kept up in order to deal with public pressures, humanitarianism is still a key feature of American foreign policy. Rather, the extent of humanitarian action is limited by the costs and benefits such action incurs. As noted in the analysis, no American government would choose to eschew interventionism as a general policy in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe. However, leaders since the UNOSOM II debacle have been aware that dealing with such crises is politically and strategically hazardous. Though self-interest is not a complete motivating factor behind multilateral military intervention, it appears that governments should perceive some benefit of military intervention whether it be reward or more likely a benefit of containing the risks associated with intrastate conflict.

The second answer to the question of how frequent interventions will be in the future is that we should expect to see a decreasing occurrence of major state led multilateral military interventions. This is due to a number of reasons touched upon in this paper. For one, the international climate for military intervention has waned significantly since the initial enthusiasm behind it in the early 90s. States, whether senior or junior partners participating in this kind of endeavor are hesitant to undertake intervention in intrastate conflict in light of past failures and worries of future costs. Another issue as touched upon previously is that self-interest is a significant factor that must be weighted before a state chooses to participate in a military intervention. The general trend of intrastate conflicts over the last two decades indicates a greater frequency of civil wars in the developing world, particularly in Africa, that will likely be the sight of future intrastate conflicts. Major states that have led the multilateral interventions of
the past, particularly the United States, do not have the same kinds of interests in such regions as they do elsewhere in the world and have a low impetus to intervene. As a mere matter of fact, the chance of major states leading multilateral military interventions seems increasingly unlikely.

The United States stretched out from fighting two wars currently lacks the resources, willingness, or interest in committing its troops abroad, and appears will be unable to provide the forces and resources it has in the past for force escalation. As the U.S. has been the only major state with the willingness and capability to supply a military intervention, it appears that given its current low impetus to undertake such missions will result in a decreased likelihood of force escalation in multilateral intervention. No other nation has the capabilities to support massive multilateral interventions in the manner the U.S. was able to. Nations whose capabilities come close to that of the United States like the P.R.C. or the Russian Federation are doubtful new leaders of multilateral intervention given their more pressing domestic issues, a lack of public pressures for intervention in these nations, and their abidance to a principle of noninterference in the domestic matters of other states. Though a more balanced sharing of responsibility within an intergovernmental organization might be a new means by which major states can engage in multilateral military intervention, such burden sharing is inherently difficult in the international system and still unfeasible in providing the resources for intervention.

Besides the implications of greater intrastate conflict in Africa for decreased major state interest in pursuing military intervention, greater conflict in Africa also has implications for decreased intervention in light of the increased Chinese presence on the African continent. As noted in the Darfur section, Chinese interests in Sudan may serve as an impediment to any likelihood of military intervention there. According to scholars like Jerker Hellstrom, China, though not yet the leader of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa has expanded its political and
economic ties with the continent drastically.\textsuperscript{170} This increased interest of the traditionally “non-interference” Chinese government in Africa may present a significant obstacle to pursuing military intervention on the continent. The issue of China impeding the pursuit of multilateral military intervention is itself indicative of the growing importance of obtaining consent from other states in order to carry out humanitarian intervention. This paper does not seek to claim that the era of major state led multilateral military intervention has ended. Such a course cannot readily be ascertained. However, given what has been mentioned, at least a lull in such a mode of intervention appears likely.

This leads to the question of how intrastate conflicts can be resolved by outside actors in the near future. One path currently being undertaken in Darfur itself is that major states do not engage in military intervention but rather try to facilitate negotiation between warring factions. However, as the numerous cease-fire breakdowns in Darfur illustrate, this is not always an optimal solution. Another path to outside resolution of intrastate conflict is the pursuit of multilateral military intervention by regional actors and not by major states. Such appears to be the trend in Africa where the African Union has tried to act as a stabilizing force in Darfur and Somalia. Elsewhere in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS led interventions in an attempt to resolve civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{171} Such a mode of multilateral intervention is not wholly effective considering less resourced African nations participating in these missions have less force and resources they can deploy. However, this form of multilateral intervention is the most likely to take hold in the absence of major state led


multilateral intervention as regional actors who have greater interests in the outcome of nearby
civil wars may feel compelled to address such conflicts to prevent their spread.

In summation, the rationale behind the pursuit of humanitarianism through military
means is neither completely realist nor completely idealistic. Though major states like the
United States have advocated the resolution of intrastate conflict through action, such action does
not always deploy the military force that might provide a resounding end to a conflict. Civil
wars are unfortunate humanitarian tragedies that not only devastate the nations experiencing
them but impose costs on neighboring nations. They only continue to persist in light of a number
of factors ailing the developing world. Intervention is not to be discounted in aiding the pursuit
of an end to such conflicts, but as this study shows, intervention has limits and constraints in its
realization and its efficacy. However, humanitarianism serves a vital purpose in providing relief
to conflicts where there had previously been none. Though by all means imperfect, it is perhaps
the best collective solution the international community has to deal with the hazards of civil
wars. While the degree of humanitarianism in the future will no doubt be tempered by
considerations of self-interest and geopolitical realities, it should nonetheless remain a powerful
force in the international system for years to come.
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