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The Return of the Nativist? Why did anti-migrant parties emerge and succeed in Mumbai, fail in Bangalore, and not even emerge in Delhi?

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Abstract
Migration as well as group conflict has occurred throughout history. This thesis examined why in response to internal migration to Mumbai, Bangalore, and Delhi there are varying levels of nativism. The level of nativism was found to be high in Mumbai, medium in Delhi, and low in Bangalore. Anti-migrant sentiment was explained by political competition in Mumbai, class prejudice in Delhi, and an overlaying of class and ethnic conflict in Bangalore. I conclude that mobilization against migrants is easiest when they are largely of a specific regional or ethnic background, that there is a tipping point beyond which opposing migrants is electoral suicide, and that taken together these suggest a window of opportunity for nativist mobilization. Thirdly, the success of nativist parties is a function of the strength of national parties at the state and local level.

Keywords
india, nativist, nativism, sons of the soil, anti-migrant, migration, shiv sena, mumbai, delhi, bangalore, bombay, bengaluru, ethnic conflict, Social Sciences, Political Science, Devesh Kapur, Kapur, Devesh

Disciplines
Asian Studies | Comparative Politics | Other Political Science | Peace and Conflict Studies | Public Policy | Urban Studies

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The Return of the Nativist

Why did anti-migrant parties emerge and succeed in Mumbai, fail in Bangalore, and not even emerge in Delhi?
“The process of migration should be welcomed and encourage.”


“The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages.”

Samuel P. Huntington, in “The Hispanic Challenge” (Foreign Policy March/April 2004)
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INTRODUCTION

Since the first migration out of Africa, human beings have moved from their place of origin to new places.\(^1\) In recorded human history, this movement of people has rarely been to undiscovered, unpopulated lands and rarely without opposition from existing inhabitants. Today, local opposition towards international migrants in the name of economic self-interest is a familiar part of public debate in Western countries.\(^2\) Such a reaction is not limited to the developed world however, as recent anti-immigrant

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rhetoric in South Africa illustrates. I focus my attention on another variation of this theme. Through an examination of Mumbai, Bangalore, and Delhi, this thesis attempts to identify the conditions under which local opposition develops towards internal migrants in a multiethnic, democratic state.

Implications for India

In India, there are cleavages of language, ethnicity, and religion that have figured prominently in the literature on migration and ethnic conflict. In this study of three major Indian cities, my intention is to add to our understanding of the conditions under which migration induces local opposition. The definitive work on this topic, Myron Weiner’s Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India, was published in 1978. He examined movements demanding preferential hiring policies for members of the indigenous ethnic group, or “sons of the soil,” in five regions and cities of India. The sparse amount of work on migration and ethnic conflict in India since then suggests the salience of the issue has diminished significantly. It is quite likely the Hindu-Muslim divide

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4 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Why Democracy Survives.” Journal of democracy 9 (1998):36 – Varshney discusses the different cleavages in India, noting that all of them except for the Hindu-Muslim cleavage are specific to and contained within their respective regions.


6 In a search of the literature, I did not find any other comprehensive works of nativist movements across the length and breadth of India. There were studies of particular movements or regions, such as Mary Fainsod Katzenstein’s The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay, Sanjib Baruah’s India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, and Dipankar Gupta’s
became more visible and overshadowed the earlier regional chauvinism, of which “sons of the soil” agitations were a part. The growth of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from the 1980s through the mid-1990s supports this. The shifting of the Shiv Sena, a Mumbai-based nativist party Weiner studied, from its regional, nativist stance towards a broader Hindu nationalist stance exemplifies this paradigm shift.

In the last national elections in 2004, the two major electoral coalitions were the right-of-center, BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and the left-of-center, Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. Recently there has been a resurgence of regionalism, with the announcement of a “Third Front” electoral coalition of regional parties for upcoming national elections. A new anti-migrant campaign in Mumbai by the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena against migrants from the states Bihar and Uttar Pradesh further suggests that the key cleavage in Indian politics is no longer the Hindu-Muslim divide. If regionalism is returning, continued migration across India’s regions means the “sons of the soil” issue could return as well.

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8 Palshikar, Suhas “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” *Economic and Political Weekly* 3 April 2004: 1499

9 BBC. “How India’s elections were won and lost.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3711395.stm (accessed March 1, 2009)


11 “Respect Local Culture or Suffer: Raj Thackeray” 10 Feb 2008 <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2770188.cms> Times of India
Wider Implications

Local opposition to migrants is not merely a phenomenon particular to India but is seen in many societies. A case in point is migration of southern ethnic groups in Nigeria to the predominantly-Islamic north leading to calls for Sharia law.\(^{12}\) Indonesia, another multiethnic state, has seen violence between the indigenous Dayak people of West Kalimantan and migrants from the island of Madura.\(^{13}\) Even authoritarian states such as China are not strangers to this phenomenon.\(^{14}\) Moreover, worldwide internal, \textit{intra}-national migration is expected to increase given the opportunity for economic advancement it offers.\(^{15}\) An understanding of internal migration’s political consequences could encourage responsible actions on the part of governments, civil society, and other key actors.

Organization of the Thesis


\(^{14}\) The Economist. “Fire on the Roof of the World.” 

This thesis is organized in the following manner. The Theory chapter develops theoretical explanations for local opposition to migrants by drawing upon existing literature. The primary aim of this critical review of literature, both international and India-specific, was to offer hypotheses for each of the three cities. In the Data and Analysis chapter, I present my findings and consider explanations developed in the Theory chapter, alternative explanations where my earlier ones are insufficient, and the limitations of these findings. Following this, I revisit my initial hypotheses and consider the implications of my findings.
THEORY

Broadly, this thesis and much of the literature I draw upon concerns the political consequences of one ethnic group moving into the territory of another group. An anti-migrant reaction is one possible political consequence. A second possibility is that migrants may be integrated, and no longer be considered outsiders. For this thesis however, it is assumed that India’s internal migrants and their descendents continue to be considered “migrants” or “outsiders.” Though the question of when or if migrants can become native is of great importance, it will be properly addressed in the Conclusion. The following pages critically review international and India-specific literature on migration and ethnic conflict, attitudes towards immigration, and political competition. I draw on this literature to develop appropriate hypotheses and methods for internal migration in India.

International Migration

Prejudice

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16 The question of when migrants (or their descendents) are no longer considered migrants is a very pertinent but difficult one. Even some anti-migrant political parties would rather not address it, as Mary F Katzenstein notes in Preferential Policies: The Shiv Sena in Bombay. Though I assume that migrants and their descendents remain “migrants” or “outsiders” rather than eventually becoming “sons of the soil,” I am mindful of the broader normative question this raises. For further discussion of whether and when migrants and their descendents become locals, please see pg.66 (Conclusion).
One possible factor behind opposition to immigration is racial or cultural prejudice. Such prejudice is “likely to be related to the ethnic origin of immigrants,” and be stronger “the more dissimilar the immigrant population is ethnically and culturally.” Dustmann and Preston in their 2000 study on “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration” use data from multiple rounds of the British Social Attitude Survey. Questions on this survey dealt with ethnic groups both similar to and relatively different from the indigenous population as well as welfare and labor competition concerns. Their most interesting finding was that “racial attitudes” have a “quantitatively and statistically” strong impact on “hostility to immigration from the West Indies or from Asia.” Racial and cultural factors had no impact however on attitudes towards immigration from Australia and New Zealand and only a weak impact on attitudes towards immigration from Europe. While these racial factors affected the attitudes of people of all education levels, this was most visible amongst the least educated, suggesting another possibility discussed below.

Economic Self-Interest

It is possible that racial and cultural prejudices that inform opinions on immigration are really epiphenomena of economic self-interest concerns. Much recent scholarship

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18 Dustmann and Preston: 23 – In their data, “Asia” refers primarily to India and Pakistan with the term “Asians” used to describe these nationalities and others from the Indian Subcontinent

19 The term epiphenomenon is used in this thesis to denote a phenomenon that is not a causal factor itself but a “side-effect” of a causal factor. For example, the causal factor behind local
has examined economic self-interest explanations, focusing on individual education or skill level and immigration preferences. Normally, an increase in the labor supply, such as that due to immigration, increases labor competition and depresses wages, hurting the low-skilled most. As expected, their analysis of 1992, 1994, and 1996 National Election Studies (NES) survey data reveals “a robust link between labor market skills and preferences” on immigration. Additional findings that union members will in some cases favor immigration restrictions further support their conclusions. The less-skilled want more restrictions on immigration and the more-skilled want fewer, consistent with factor-proportions analysis and the Heckscher-Ohlin model.

However, their claim in favor of an education – labor market competition link in explaining greater anti-immigrant sentiment among the less-skilled is unconvincing in certain respects. They control for ideology and gender but fail to analyze questions in the NES survey data that directly ask for opinions on immigrants of certain ethnic groups. Their only evidence that education has a role in determining economic self-opposition to migrants could be fear of labor competition. However, locals may exhibit make display racial and cultural prejudice towards migrants even though their primary grievances are economic, not cultural. In such a scenario, racial and cultural prejudice is an epiphenomenon of economic concerns.


21 Scheve and Slaughter: 143

22 For more information on this general equilibrium model of international trade that emphasizes the respective factor endowments of trading states, see Ohlin, B., 1933, *Interregional and International Trade*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

23 Scheve and Slaughter: 137 - 138 see mention of questions pertaining to Asians and Hispanics on the NES survey on bottom of page 137.
interest rather than one of socialization and shaping attitudes are broad, general questions on tolerance.\textsuperscript{24} It is entirely possible that more specific questions involving specific ethnic groups or foreigners rather than any type of people who are different would elicit a different response. Even their central claim of labor market competition is somewhat weakened by the fact that high-skilled workers are not shown to support more restrictions on high-skilled labor.

Controlling for non-economic factors, Anna Maria Mayda also finds that “economic variables play a key and robust role in preference formation over immigration policy.”\textsuperscript{25} Her work also employs the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and factor proportions analysis labor model while a cross-country data set suggests greater external validity than Scheve and Slaughter (2001) or Dustmann and Preston (2000). However, she establishes a relationship between skill-level and immigration preference that in contrast to Scheve and Slaughter’s is conditional upon per capita GDP. In high per capita GDP countries, “individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences” while it is negatively correlated in low per capita GDP countries.\textsuperscript{26} From analysis of a smaller set of countries, she also finds that individuals in occupations where immigration increases the labor supply are less likely to be pro-immigration.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Scheve and Slaughter: 142
\item \textsuperscript{25} Mayda, Anna Maria. “Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants.” IZA DP No. 1115 (April 2004): 2
\item \textsuperscript{26} Mayda: 3
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid
\end{itemize}
this correlation of skill and preference. Still, there was significant correlation of crime and cultural concerns with attitudes as well as a strong, negative impact due to racism.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, Mayda concludes that economic factors have a robust and key role, while still seeing a role for non-economic factors.

O’Rourke and Sinnott in their 2004 study “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration” begin by considering the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century’s unrestricted immigration policies. Approaching the paradox of why governments restrict immigration despite its compelling economic logic, they also distinguish between non-economic (racism, xenophobia, forms of nationalism) and individual economic self-interest explanations. They refer here to Timmer and Williamson’s finding that rising economic inequality was the central concern while cultural/racial concerns were mere epiphenomena of economic self-interest concerns.\textsuperscript{29} Explanations based on widening ethnic gaps between the native-born and immigrants as well as any sort of xenophobia or nationalism were rejected by Timmer and Williamson. However, O’Rourke and Sinnott sought to determine if economic factors alone were still sufficient to explain opposition to immigration. As with Scheve and Slaughter (2001), they examined individual voters’ attitudes, though their cross-country survey data places them closer to Mayda (2004).

In approaching the analysis, they offered two hypotheses that are of interest for studying internal migration in India. Firstly, they expected to confirm Mayda’s finding

\textsuperscript{28} Mayda: 26

that the high-skilled are more pro-immigration in rich countries and more anti-immigration in poor countries. Additionally, they believed that inequality would play a role in the relation between skills and anti-immigrant sentiment. Their contention was that if inequality increases (decreases) then anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the high-skilled increases (decreases). Their findings were close to Mayda’s as they did concede “that attitudes towards immigration are not a function of economic interests alone.” A pertinent result, “robust to all specifications,” was that “patriotism, and especially chauvinism” had “a large positive effect on anti-immigrant sentiment.” Still, they found that for explaining the preferences of those in the labor market, “standard economic theory does a pretty good job.” Their results on the interaction of skill and immigration preferences conditional on per capita GDP also match Mayda’s. However, they differ in concluding that the effect is stronger “in more equal countries than in more unequal ones.”

31 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 8
32 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 19
33 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 13
34 O’Rourke and Sinnott: Pg. 26 (Table 4), significant impact of independent variables for skill upon dependent variable anti-immigrant attitudes for those in the labor force
35 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 19
In direct response to Dustmann and Preston’s findings, Malchow-Moller et al examined the role of economic self-interest in a 2006 paper.\(^\text{36}\) As with the aforementioned studies, they make use of a factor proportions model though they look at individual job status (employer, employee, unemployed) in addition to education level. Their sample of countries was restricted to the EU-15 and Norway – the richest countries of Europe. As expected, they found “a strong positive relationship between education and the general attitude towards immigration,” in line with Scheve and Slaughter, Mayda, and O’Rourke and Sinnott.\(^\text{37}\)

What set this paper apart however was its more direct test of individual preferences for different skill-level immigration.\(^\text{38}\) The expectation beforehand was that findings would match factor proportions analysis, with for example the more-educated favoring less-skilled immigration. Unfortunately, the results were not conclusive. A third step assessed people’s perceptions of the economic consequences of immigration. This was conclusive as the following groups were significantly more opposed to immigration: the poor amongst those who believed immigration hurt the poor, workers amongst those who believed immigration depressed wages, and welfare recipients amongst those who believed immigrants burdened public budgets.\(^\text{39}\) Thus, this paper offers further,


\(^{37}\) Malchow-Moller et al: 16

\(^{38}\) Malchow-Moller et al: 8

\(^{39}\) Malchow-Moller et al: 16
deeper, and more geographically diverse confirmation of the role of economic self-interest in opposition to immigration.

**Education as Socialization**

At present, there are explanations emphasizing racial and cultural prejudice on the one hand and economic self-interest on the other. There is one possibility however that incorporates elements of both sides of the “ideology versus interests” debate, of both the economic and non-economic variable camps.\(^4\) I would argue that education, along with determining job opportunities, has a socializing effect. Education can shape cultural attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners more generally. Hiscox and Hainmueller in a 2007 study on education and immigration preferences consider this somewhat forgotten aspect. They begin by noting that in much of the literature, “the immigration debate is to a large extent about economics” where a “critical battle line” separates “high-skilled and low-skilled workers.”\(^5\)

Hiscox and Hainmueller question this repeated assertion of Mayda, Scheve and Slaughter, and other authors. They note that even the “most sophisticated economic models are quite equivocal” on the actual impact of immigrants on labor market

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Moreover, the findings of Dustmann and Preston we considered earlier favor a cultural explanation involving racism, nationalist feeling, or xenophobia. One school of thought emphasizes economic self-interest based upon one’s education. The other sees increasing education leading to a more tolerant view of immigrants. The findings of Hiscox and Hainmueller support the latter view, as “people with higher education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes.”

For example, one would expect people of a given “education level” to oppose similar skill-level immigration if labor competition fears were present. However, this was not borne out by the data. The authors emphasized that data showed “more educated respondents” were “significantly less racist and place far greater value on cultural diversity.” Employing the European Social Survey, which asked questions on rich versus poor country immigrants and European versus non-European immigrants, they were able to determine the role of cultural/racial beliefs. Such cultural/racial beliefs accounted for about “65% of the estimated effect of education on support for immigration.” As the authors note, “immigration brings to the fore very different

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42 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 2
43 Dustmann and Preston
44 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32
45 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32
46 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 10 See the paragraph mentioning “four different versions of this question in which the source…”
47 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32
conceptions of national identity – involving different views about the importance of ethnicity, religion, and language."  

Their findings were also quite robust in a number of respects. Their finding held when measuring “education level” with qualifications or occupational measures. Objections they noted included survey response bias, misperceptions about immigrants, and cross-national labor market variations. Survey response bias could for example involve the more-educated having a greater desire to appear less prejudiced, hiding their real attitudes. However, any study drawing upon public opinion data including those I have covered will be prone to such bias. Perceptions amongst the low-skilled that the education level or labor market effect of migrants is greater than it actually is could lead to greater anti-immigrant sentiment. The authors contend however that “the clearest (and perhaps the only) explanation” for such a misperception would be the same one linking xenophobia and education that they found.

Nonetheless, I do have some concerns. Their sample was of European countries, suggesting one may see different results in poorer countries or ones with less extensive welfare systems, such as India. Moreover, they note that Western education systems are often designed “explicitly to increase social tolerance.” Whether this is true of the Indian education system is debateable. In terms of internal validity, it is also unclear whether French and Dutch high school graduates can be considered the same. Assuming French and Indian high school graduates, or Indian graduates of a private high school

48 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 33

49 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 35
and a rural government high school have had the same socializing experience is even more problematic. It remains unclear whether education’s mechanism is a labor market or tolerance through socialization one. Still, the basic relation remains that the lower the education level, the greater anti-immigrant attitudes are.

The State of the Economy

Analyzing Canadian Gallup surveys from 1975 to 2000, Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris find that “the state of the national economy has a relatively uniform effect across groups” on attitudes. While limited to one country, the result of Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris does suggest that during economic downturns, one should expect greater anti-immigrant sentiment. Indeed, this finding confirms the initial paradox that motivated this paper. This was indeed a statistically robust result, but it does stand alone as other studies have not discussed this possibility. Moreover, testing this proposition is not possible for Mumbai, Bangalore, and Delhi. None of these cities have seen a prolonged economic downturn in this timeframe nor are there adequate public opinion surveys in this context.

The Rate of Immigration

In addition to examining the effect of the state of the economy, Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris also analyzed the impact of the rate of immigration. Specifically, they considered

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50 Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris: 302
the effect of variation over time in Canada’s immigration rate on attitudes. There can also of course be geographic variation. In the case of the United States, one can speak of certain states and cities as immigration gateways, where the native-born interact with larger numbers of immigrants than elsewhere. For variation over time though, they “found little effect of annual variation in the rate of immigration.”\(^5^1\) Scheve and Slaughter, in addition to writing on the education–labor competition link, had also explored this factor. Their same 2001 study finds that the skills-opinion relationship is no stronger in high-immigration communities.\(^5^2\) They do suggest however that the link between skills and immigration preferences could be connected with “mainstream redistributive politics over which political parties often contest elections.”\(^5^3\)

\[\textit{National Salience and Local Opposition} \]

Focusing on the local level, a 2007 paper by Daniel J. Hopkins develops the theory of politicized change to explain perceptions of immigrants as threatening in the United States. He establishes that sudden local demographic change is not by itself a sufficient condition for sustained anti-immigrant attitudes, which also require “external, politicizing agents.”\(^5^4\) The theory of “politicized change” states that a social cleavage

\(^{5^1}\) Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris: 325

\(^{5^2}\) Scheve and Slaughter: 144

\(^{5^3}\) Scheve and Slaughter: 144

\(^{5^4}\) Hopkins, Daniel J. “Threatening Changes: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition” Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for the Study of American Politics – Yale University (September 6, 2007): 33
or political issue can become relevant if it is “amenable to framing but not consistently framed” by national political rhetoric.\textsuperscript{55} He finds that whenever the immigration issue is raised nationally, communities that have experienced a recent influx of immigrants see anti-immigrant measures and opinions develop.

To make his case, he notes the timing of opinion swings and ordinances. A prime example is such swings “in late 2005 and 2006, just after immigration became nationally salient,” which neither the state of the economy nor economic self-interest nor socialization can account for.\textsuperscript{56} His measurement of “national salience” with surveys of television and print media mentions of the word “immigration,” of “local opposition” with geo-coded survey and local ordinances, and changes in the share of immigrants with census data is reasonable. The only difficulty here, which I faced for migration in India as well, is that census data is too infrequently collected. 1990 and 2000 data indicating a sudden influx of immigrants may not capture specific fluctuations in the mid-90s nor can fluctuations in 2006 be noted.

Moreover, his claim that the change in the number of immigrants rather than the level is necessary for politicized change has implications for the Indian case. Perhaps change in interstate migration figures over time rather than the absolute number of migrants (and their descendents) matters. Yet what of the possibility that a large, established community may attract further immigrants? In the Indian context especially,
a large existing population of migrants (and their descendents) may be more electorally important than the rate at which additional migrants are arriving.

The “national salience” component is quite acceptable, though one could argue it is epiphenomenal of economic self-interest. One outlier situation of national salience but no corresponding local opposition was the Elian Gonzalez episode, where no economic self-interest was present.\(^{57}\) Broad economic concerns that certain workers are facing increased labor market competition may lead to national rhetoric. Communities where this increased labor competition is most felt due to substantial recent immigration would then see this rhetoric shaping public opinion and local ordinances. Still, it was relatively “wealthier, larger, and better educated” communities that considered anti-immigrant proposals from 2000 to 2006.\(^{58}\)

Lastly, it is worth noting that while Guppy, Wilkes, and Farris found that the state of the economy had a uniform effect on attitudes in Canada, Hopkins’ examination of the “September 11\(^{th}\) Effect” challenges this.\(^{59}\) He found that in October 2001 anti-immigrant feeling rose in counties with growing immigrant populations but abated by March of 2002, even though the economic outlook changed little.\(^{60}\) Hopkins has provided much to consider, though for his insights will need some adaptation. Firstly, in a situation of internal migration where migrants can vote, their absolute level may


\(^{58}\) Hopkins: 29

\(^{59}\) Hopkins: 15, title mentions 9/11 effect

\(^{60}\) Hopkins: 16, 17
matter as much or more than changes in the rate of migration. Secondly, “national salience” may have to be defined more broadly to incorporate regional and ethnic demands, political competition, and other phenomena beyond the issue of migration alone.

*Immigrants and Electoral Outcomes*

In a more recent study, Gerdes and Wadensjö further explore the local political implications of immigration through its impact on Danish municipal election outcomes.61 They find that anti-immigrant parties “enjoy support in local elections in municipalities with an increased ‘share of non-Western immigrants.’”62 Initially, they had trouble accounting for the different set of candidates and parties competing in each municipality and each new election cycle. Their solution was to measure the dependent variable of support for an anti-immigrant party as a binary variable.63 On the independent variable side, they first considered changes in the number of non-Western immigrants and then the total number of immigrants (including second and later generation immigrants).

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62 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 23

63 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 10, Regression estimations involved a log-form binary dependent variable, “indicating that party i either did or did not get a vote,” with the independent variable given by the change in the immigrant population.
In their regressions, entity and time fixed effects controlled for heterogeneity of municipalities and variance over time.\textsuperscript{64} The annual number of refugees receiving government assistance was used as an instrument for the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ though they would have preferred actual numbers of refugees assigned under a program of dispersing refugees across the country. Given the variety of methods and their exploration of both changes and levels, this limitation is not of great concern.

In their concluding discussion they suggest that “people seem less influenced by direct personal experience of immigrants than by the \textit{general political debate}.”\textsuperscript{65} Such a statement echoes Hopkins but is not supported by their data and analysis. Immigration has been a topic of political debate in Denmark and they found that non-Western immigration positively impacts the local vote shares of two anti-immigrant parties. What they have not done is examine, through public opinion surveys or any other mechanism, the effect “direct personal experience.”

What is of perhaps great concern is whether opposition to “non-Western” immigrants is actually a case of inter-religious tension. If religion matters, then immigration of “non-Western” peoples predominantly of a different religion may cause no change in the local vote shares of anti-immigrant parties. They also do not consider situations where large numbers of immigrants can vote, as they would be able to in the Indian case. Still, this study provides a framework for examining (and reinforces) the link

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gerdes and Wadensjö: 11, This allowed them to isolate “the effect of (a change in) the (log) share of first-generation non-Western immigrants.”
\item Gerdes and Wadensjö: 25
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
between migration (both changes and levels) and electoral outcomes and further supports Hopkins’ findings.

**Internal Migration in Multiethnic States**

Although the above studies situated in Western, developed countries offer explanations for local opposition to migrants, the Indian case is different in one fundamental respect. India’s experience is one of internal migration in a multiethnic state, while the above papers concern international migration and thus have some limitations. A recent paper by David Laitin on the likelihood of immigrants as participants in a civil war further sheds further light on the importance of this difference. He stresses that immigrants, or “Newcomers to the Soil” lack the regional base that allows “Sons of the Soil” to challenge the state militarily. What this implies is that for “Newcomers to the Soil,” returning home is an option and thus there is less incentive to instigate any sort of ethnic conflict.

With the seemingly anomalous case of the Muhajirs in Pakistan, Laitin shows that if “regional base” can be understood broadly then even “Newcomers to the Soil” can obtain one. His description of Urdu-speaking Partition-era refugees from India settling

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67 Laitin: 36

68 Laitin: 56, He notes that “the social solidarity of these urban communitarians, and the impenetrable (to national armies) back alleys of their neighborhoods” meant that “the insurgent violence in urban Sindh organized by the sons of immigrants could escalate to attain rural-based standards.”
in and becoming the majority population of urban Sindh is meant to suggest that migrants can challenge the state by building a regional, *urban* base. In the Indian context, this would suggest that sustained migration could allow a non-native group, such as Hindi-speakers in Mumbai, to build a regional base at the expense of the current “Sons of the Soil.” Fear of a large migrant minority building such a base, i.e. fear of “swamping,” could motivate local opposition to migrants.

It is precisely such fears of “swamping” that are voiced in the debate over Tibet. Moreover, in this case, electoral competition is irrelevant as China is a multiethnic, authoritarian state. Andrew Martin Fischer notes that “the key issue is not whether the population balance has shifted towards the Tibetan or the Han, but that the latter have dominated urbanization.” His study suggests that interethnic conflict between Tibetans, Hui Muslims, and Han Chinese is really a story of economic competition in towns, with Tibetan upward mobility blocked by Hui migrants. This crowding in urban areas could also help further the perception of “swamping” by migrants.

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69 The Guardian “Tibet could be ‘swamped’ by mass Chinese settlement after Olympics, says Dalai Lama” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/24/tibet.china (accessed January 1, 2009)


71 Fischer: 18, “Hence contemporary contestation in these areas takes place in the towns.” And “The expansion of Muslim business networks into Tibetan towns leads to heightened competition precisely where the chances for Tibetans to integrate into the urban economy should be highest.”
However, there is another aspect that might have implications for the Indian case. Given public projects in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the “upper range of skilled labour is definitely required.”72 The prime jobs are thus almost always inaccessible to Tibetans while they face increased competition for lower level jobs as well with the immigration of better-qualified Han and Hui. Such a scenario, which may not be reflected in general unemployment and education figures, could well occur in Indian states too. Jobs in Information Technology (IT) and other new industries often recruit nationally for specialized skills, thus excluding locals to some extent. A concurrent influx of low-skilled migrants would compound this exclusion by increasing competition for lower level jobs as well. In the Indian case, “marginalization from political and economic power” may not be as acute as in the case of Tibet. Still, exclusion due to “lower education and skill levels” that is exacerbated by “competition over lower-skilled work” is possible and would produce anti-migrant sentiment similar to that seen in Tibet.

In northern Nigeria, a democratic and multiethnic setting like India, there is a situation of local opposition to migrants as well. The local Hausa-Fulani population has opposed the in-migration of southerners for reasons of economic self-interest concerns.73 Here, the local, Muslim population’s nativist reaction has taken the form of a call for Islamic law (Sharia), which the predominantly Christian southerners oppose. Edlyne Eze Anugwom notes that “in popular imagery, the economic promises of

72 Fischer: 22, “Undoubtedly, there is a skills deficit in the region, particularly for the current large-scale projects that dwarf the local economy, and the upper range of skilled labour is definitely required for the province, so long as such projects persist.”

73 Anugwom: 159 “These distinctions in Nigeria’s pluralistic society have been heightened by economic or labor migration, especially by Christian Southerners moving to the core Muslim areas in the North.”
Sharia often translated literally into the expulsion of outsiders and non-Muslims from their economic niches.”

The Sharia regime, she argues, is thus in practice used to advance the economic interests of the native-born at the expense of migrants. In India, I would argue that the controversy over migrants celebrating their holidays versus native holidays is somewhat similar to the controversy over implementing Sharia. On the other hand, the impact of Sharia would seem akin to that of preferential policies.

**The Indian Case: Internal Migration in a Democratic Multiethnic State**

Although the international literature provides useful insights, the Indian case differs in that it involves migration *within* a multinational state rather than across national borders. Per India’s Constitution, migration across state borders (which are often cultural and linguistic borders) is free except in special circumstances. As my focus is migration to India’s three largest cities, it is worth noting that local urban governing bodies in India are weak relative to the governments of their state. In Delhi’s case, this is not as

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74 Anugwom: 177

75 I have in mind here the rhetoric of the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, a nativist party in Mumbai, against Chhat Puja, a holiday celebrated by the large number of migrants from the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh – “MNS to take on Lalu’s Chhat Puja with ‘Hatt’ Puja” May 20, 2008 Expressindia.com <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/MNS-to-take-on-Lalus-Chhat-Puja-with-Hatt-Puja/312088/>

76 By Article 301 of the Indian Constitution, free movement of citizens within India is allowed, with Article 304 requiring presidential approval for a state government to limit movement across its borders.

77 Ren and Weinstein. “The Shanghai Effect” [http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/node/127](http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/node/127); They note that “with states tending to view local governments more as rivals than partners, most states – including Maharashtra – have chosen to retain the powers of urban development.”
apparent given that its state government presides over what is effectively the greater Delhi urban area.\textsuperscript{78} Even if a native ethnic group is not a majority in a large city, it more often than not will be at the state level and thus nativist demands can be made and acted upon at this level.

Thus, in focusing on the Indian case there are some points to keep in mind. One limitation upon nativist politicians as compared to Western countries is that they cannot demand legal restrictions upon migration. On the other hand, politicians can and have campaigned for preferential policies for the “sons of the soil,” amongst other groups.\textsuperscript{79} Meanwhile, the distribution of power across levels of government in India means that one must ideally consider both the local AND state levels of government. National elections could also be pertinent as a very prominent nativist party in a given state could play a role in forming a governing coalition in Parliament. The following scholars focus on ethnic conflict, migration, and political competition in India, providing an additional layer of specificity above the broad foundation provided by the international literature.

\textit{Nativism as Labor Market Protectionism}

The late Myron Weiner’s 1978 \textit{Sons of the Soil: Ethnic Conflict in India}, although written before the present era of national coalition governments and regional parties,

\footnote{\textsuperscript{78} The NCT of Delhi is effectively one metropolitan area and thus its CM is like a local executive as well as a state-level executive.}

remains the definitive work on this subject. Over several years, he conducted fieldwork, analyzed census data, and produced a work comparing and contrasting five cases of nativism within India: Assam, the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar (modern Jharkhand), the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, Mumbai, and Bangalore. He arrived at the conclusion that in India “nativism tends to be associated with a blockage to social mobility for the native population by a culturally distinguishable migrant population,” placing the ‘sons of the soil’ phenomenon as a question of “social mobility versus spatial mobility.”

This analysis places him in the company of earlier authors who emphasized labor market competition in explaining opposition to immigrants in the developed countries. Indeed, Weiner explicitly labeled nativism in India “a protectionist movement” in the labor market, demanded by local groups in much the same way infant industries demand tariff protections against foreign imports. Given the available evidence and similar findings elsewhere in the literature, such a claim does not seem controversial. Moreover, this is supported by five conditions he established, common to all five cities and regions he studied, under which “sons of the soil” sentiments emerge.

His first condition was that “each area with a nativist population has migrants from outside the cultural region.” This seems self-evident but difficulty can arise in defining a “cultural region.” Language would be an ideal measure but even he found

difficulties in this. The case of Telengana saw nativist demands against a wave of migrants from coastal Andhra Pradesh despite both groups sharing a language and culture with only minor differences in customs. His second condition, “that there must be some perceived cultural differences, no matter how small, between the migrants and the local community,” was perhaps conceived in anticipation of such situations.\footnote{Weiner, Myron. \textit{Sons of the Soil} Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 276}

Though there may not be one dimension along which “cultural differences” or “cultural region” can be defined, this condition will still be useful in approaching each case.

Measurement is even more difficult for Weiner’s third condition, which states that “the local population is likely to be immobile relative to other groups in the population.”\footnote{Weiner, Myron. \textit{Sons of the Soil} Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 278} Census data was not available from the Registrar General of India on the reported ethnicity of citizens and mother tongue data would only be a crude measure. Finding that the data to support this condition was incomplete, Weiner suggested instead that there was data to support the inverse condition: “states or regions with a high in-migration and a high rate of out-migration tend not to have nativist movements.”\footnote{Weiner, Myron. \textit{Sons of the Soil} Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 279} Again, data was not available to test this proposition down to the district or city level, though state-level data is available. Thus, for Bangalore and Mumbai, one would have to consider in- and out-migration rates for the whole states of Karnataka and Maharashtra respectively.
In the post-liberalization environment, the fourth condition, "the rate and pattern of unemployment", is most interesting. In elaborating on this condition, Weiner noted India’s growing unemployment, and especially the growing number of educated-unemployed. In fact, he listed as the fifth condition, that “areas with nativist movements have experienced a rapid growth of educational opportunities for the lower middle classes.” Taken together, one could expect that rising unemployment and increasing education levels, along with the first three conditions, would produce a nativist backlash.

*Political Competition*

One limitation of Myron Weiner’s research for this examination in the post-liberalization period is that it was conducted at a time of limited political competition. While no fault of his own, the fact that his study was conducted in an era when the Congress party ruled in most states makes it prudent that I consider additional explanations. In particular, political competition explanations of when a party seeks to make ethnic identities relevant through actions against a minority are of interest. Many states in India have more than two significant parties and interstate migrants often are an ethnic minority, living amidst a native, ethnic majority.

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Steven Wilkinson in his *Votes and Violence* found that under certain conditions, electoral incentives lead parties to incite ethnic (Hindu-Muslim) violence.\(^89\) He sees riots and political violence a method for changing “the salience of ethnic issues and identities among the electorate in order to build a winning political coalition.”\(^90\) Though similar to Hopkins with a desire to make certain issues and identities salient, Wilkinson’s main finding concerns party fractionalization, i.e. the number of effective political parties. He notes that in electoral constituencies “with high levels of party fractionalization, such as Bulgaria, Malaysia, and the Indian states of Bihar and Kerala, governments will protect minorities in order to hold their existing coalitions together as well as preserve their coalition options for the future.”\(^91\) However, in two-party situations where the party in government does not rely on minority votes, riots are not prevented.\(^92\) Though his study concerned two religious, or per his definition, ethnic groups, it offers insights for this study of the native ethnic group’s reaction to another ethnic group (migrants and their descendents).\(^93\) If instead of Hindus and Muslims, I consider locals and migrants, then I can expect that areas with fewer parties will see more anti-migrant sentiment and even violence.

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**Research Design and Hypotheses**

\(^89\) Wilkinson, Steven I. *Votes and Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004

\(^90\) Wilkinson: 1

\(^91\) Wilkinson: 237

\(^92\) Wilkinson: 6, see figure 1.1

\(^93\) Wilkinson: 8, Wilkinson uses Weber’s definition of ethnic groups, which he provides
From the literature review I sought to adapt certain findings as hypotheses for the Indian case. For example, the literature showed that those with a lower education or skill level had less favorable attitudes towards migration. The mechanism for this result however, was much debated. Some argued that racial and cultural prejudice toward migrants were epiphenomena of labor market competition worries. Others argued that education socialized greater tolerance and preference for diversity. Before settling this debate in my own mind, I had to consider how to measure these variables.

*Research Design*

I identified feasible methods for testing and measuring different variables, beginning with a labor competition explanation. The labor competition explanation could be tested with data on skill-sets or education level of the local population versus those of migrants. In such an analysis, the difference between migrants’ and locals’ skill sets and education would be the independent variable. With a greater “difference” one would expect to see less of the dependent variable of “anti-migrant sentiment” as migrants and locals would not be competing for the same jobs. While in this case census data for the independent variable may not be very precise, measuring the dependent variable poses even more challenges.

Quantifying “anti-migrant sentiment” would be best done with opinion polls such as the European Social Surveys or Canadian Gallup surveys of aforementioned studies. Surveys on attitudes towards internal migration in India were not available, though I would look forward to conducting such a survey as part of future research on this topic.
Another ideal measure would have been police reports of violence or some similar dataset on ethnic or “language” riots similar to that of Hindu-Muslim riots developed by Wilkinson and Varshney.94 If such a survey or dataset were not available, developing one through either surveys or a review of media sources and official records at different levels of government would be best.

Within the scope of this thesis, collecting data for a survey or dataset similar to the Wilkinson-Varshney dataset is not possible. In lieu of such measures, I will measure the dependent variable of “anti-migrant sentiment” indirectly. When nativist parties are present and electoral data is available, their electoral success will be considered a proxy for “anti-migrant sentiment.” I will also examine scholarly work on nativist organizations, media reports, and statements of public figures for a sense of how politically salient the “sons of the soil” issue is. These methods represent the best alternative, given practical constraints, for measuring the dependent variable of “anti-migrant sentiment.”

Hypotheses

Having identified some methods and measures as well as feasibility concerns, I then developed a set of general explanations and specific hypotheses. Firstly, I adapted Myron Weiner’s conditions. In doing so, I also drew upon the labor competition literature. Educated preferences unfortunately could not be easily tested

as the necessary public opinion data was not available. It is also a problematic explanation as the quality of matriculation, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and other levels of education differs greatly across states, school types, neighborhoods, etc. Furthermore, Myron Weiner’s depiction of “sons of the soil” movements as “labor protectionist” and the preferential labor policy demands of such movements led me to favor a labor competition explanation.  

1. LABOR COMPETITION: Nativist sentiment will develop in these cities if the following conditions are met:

   a. Migrants *perceived* as culturally distinct are arriving in the area.

   b. The native ethnic group is relatively immobile, as measured by ratio of in-migrants to out-migrants.

   c. Unemployment and native education levels have been increasing.

Given the explosive growth of parties since liberalization, I also employed Wilkinson’s findings for developing hypotheses. The nativist issue has in the past given rise to new political parties in Mumbai and the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, it may explain more extreme and violent incidents, beyond mere anti-immigrant rhetoric. The demographic change condition of Hopkins’ “politicized change” approach can also be incorporated. His second condition – that the issue be nationally salient – can be assumed to be already met given the proliferation of regional, caste, and other identity-based parties. Testing his full “politicized change” approach with a

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survey of media reports, public opinion surveys, and other data would be ideal but is simply not possible. Nonetheless, combining the findings of Wilkinson and Hopkins produces a political competition explanation:

2. POLITICAL COMPETITION: Parties will champion the nativist issue if the following conditions are met:

   a. Migrants perceived as culturally distinct are arriving in the area.

   b. There is a recent demographic change due to migration.

   c. There is an electoral incentive to take a nativist stance.

Though these general, open-ended explanations were developed, I offered more simple hypotheses prior to data analysis. For each city, I offered hypotheses on the expected level of nativism as well as the role of different factors. These hypotheses, listed on the next page, drew upon the general explanations given above but are more easily verifiable and city-specific.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Labor Competition</th>
<th>Political Competition</th>
<th>Expected “Level” of Nativism</th>
<th>Nativist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>Unemployment ↓</td>
<td>Political competition</td>
<td>HIGH: Political parties have won elections with the</td>
<td>Yes, there is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>(regional parties) ↑</td>
<td>issue and there has been violence in the past. Mumbai</td>
<td>one major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>also has more regional parties than in earlier years,</td>
<td>party that has</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>each with no incentive to protect migrants.</td>
<td>ruled the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nativism ↑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>as well as a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>splinter party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore</td>
<td>Unemployment ↓</td>
<td>Recent demographic</td>
<td>MEDIUM: There have been spontaneous riots in the past</td>
<td>Yes, a small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>change? YES Migration</td>
<td>but no nativist party has actually seized power in a</td>
<td>party is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>fashion similar to the Shiv Sena in Mumbai.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nativism ↑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>“Unemployment ↑” and “native</td>
<td>Electoral incentives for</td>
<td>LOW: Labor competition is present but there has been no</td>
<td>No such party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>immobility (YES)”</td>
<td>nativism? NO</td>
<td>violence. Also, the lack of a nativist party implies</td>
<td>is present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nativism ↑</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>nativism is electorally disadvantageous.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA AND ANALYSIS

In this section, I first examine the level of nativist sentiment in each of 3 cities, drawing on evidence from electoral data, news reports, and interviews and statements of public figures. I then discuss and explain these findings drawing heavily on the Census of India for the years 1991 and 2001. As a point of clarification, terms such as “migrant” and “sons of the soil” will be used in a very strict sense. Henceforth, any mention of “migrants,” “migration,” or “outsiders” refers strictly to interstate migration, unless specified otherwise. Likewise, the terms “sons of the soil” and “native” or “local” refer to the indigenous ethno-linguistic group of a given state. Meanwhile, “nativism,” “nativist sentiment,” and “anti-migrant sentiment” refer to “local opposition to migrants.” The larger normative question these definitions raise is something I explore in my Conclusion.\textsuperscript{96}

Assessing Nativist Sentiment

The ideal way to obtain systematic evidence of “nativist sentiment” would be a proper survey of public opinion that would give us individual level data. Unfortunately, such surveys do not exist in India. Consequently, to measure the dependent variable, \textsuperscript{96} In defining these terms as I have done, I am making the very assumptions that are implicitly made by nativist movements such as the Shiv Sena (Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, The Shiv Sena in Bombay: Preferential Policies). This raises the normative question of whether and when migrants or their descendents can be considered “sons of the soil” akin to the indigenous population. As stated in the Theory chapter (pg. 5), I properly address this question in the Conclusion (pg. __).
the performance of nativist parties is the next best alternative. The presence of a nativist party and its electoral performance give some sense of how much support there is for nativist ideas. However, for reasons explained below, this proved to be inconclusive. Therefore, I also examined the media’s portrayal of migrants and migration as an alternative measure of the local reaction to migrants. To this end, I conducted a content analysis of major English newspapers published in each city.

To ascertain nativist sentiment in each city, I first looked for the presence of a nativist political party. Local opposition to migrants is possible even if a nativist political party does not exist. However, assuming that parties rationally seek votes, the presence of a nativist party is a “hard case” indicating that some section of the electorate is opposed to migration. In examining local, state, and national electoral data, I identified two nativist political parties in Mumbai, one in Bangalore, and none in Delhi. I then examined the impact of these parties in terms of their electoral performance, instigation of violence, and the ideological pressure they exerted upon mainstream parties.

**Mumbai**

Mumbai, once called Bombay, has long attracted migrants from different parts of India and the world. In 1955, as the old Bombay Presidency state was dissolved, Mumbai was given to the state of Maharashtra, which is home to the Marathi-speaking population.

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Maharashtrians. This was the result of a prolonged agitation on the part of Maharashtrian regionalist movements that saw Mumbai, where Maharashtrians constituted the largest ethnic group, as a natural part of the state. The city remains well-known for a cosmopolitan ethos and mind-boggling diversity, though this has at times clashed with the regional identity of Maharashtrians, the largest community in the city. Thus, Mumbai is also home to India’s most successful nativist party, the Shiv Sena.

Bal Keshav Thackeray, a cartoonist and journalist, launched the Shiv Sena at a rally in Mumbai’s (then Bombay) Shivaji Park in 1966 promising to secure the interests of Maharashtrians. In her 1979 study of the Shiv Sena, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein further notes that Mr. Thackeray raised the issue of “safeguarding jobs for Maharashtrians” well before this. Marmik, a Marathi-language weekly he launched in 1960, highlighted the prevalence of non-Maharashtrians in positions of power in the city.

Shiv Sena grew as it attacked a succession of opponents. Its first foray into politics was a successful campaign against Krishna Menon, former Defense Minister and South Indian, who was running against the Congress party’s Maharashtrian candidate.

98 For a thorough and page-turning account of contemporary Mumbai, see Suketu Mehta’s Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found

99 Katzenstein, M.F. Ethnicity and equality: the Shiv Sena party and preferential policies in Bombay. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press: 34. “In June 1966, Thackeray called a rally in Bombay’s Shivaji Park… the party was born.” Thackeray’s Shiv Sena would later change the official name of the city to its Marathi name of “Mumbai,” when it came to power at the state level. Shiv Sena, meaning “Shivaji’s Army” refers to Shivaji Bhonsle, a warrior-king and folk hero from Maharashtra who conquered a large empire in central India.

100 Ibid

101 Katzenstein: 34
Following the 1968 local elections, it became the largest opposition party in the city. This was impressive given the Congress party’s national dominance and strong presence in most states and municipalities at the time. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, Bal Thackeray secured the Marathi manoos (“Marathi-speaking person”) working-class vote. This came at the expense of the communists, as Thackeray emphasized ethnic identity over class identity and intimidated opponents.102 Starting in the 1980s, Shiv Sena entered into an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and took up Hindu nationalist (and anti-Muslim) rhetoric.103 This carried on into the 1990s, where the Shiv Sena played a leading role in riots that followed the 1993 demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.104

Since the beginning of this decade however, there was peace on the streets but tension between Bal Thackeray’s son Uddhav and his nephew Raj over who would succeed Bal Thackeray as leader.105 When dropped in favor of Uddhav, Raj Thackeray launched the breakaway Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (Maharashtra Reconstruction Army, MNS) in 2006 on promises of an inclusive sort of politics.106 However, it fared poorly

102 Juned Shaikh “Worker Politics, Trade Unions, and the Shiv Sena’s Rise in Central Bombay” EPW, April 30th 2005

103 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1497 “Formed in 1966 as a small, Mumbai-based outfit….” and “It has also been one of the earliest allies of the BJP….”


105 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1500

in Mumbai’s 2007 local elections while running on this platform. Following this lackluster showing, Raj Thackeray took to espousing the cause of the Marathi “sons of the soil.” This led to violence last year in which a student from Bihar, who was in Mumbai for the Indian Railways job examinations, was killed. It is this setting of

Bangalore

The capital of Karnataka state, Bangalore has had a significant military and public sector presence since before independence and is home to one nativist party and several chauvinist groups. These organizations claim to be the protectors of the state’s native Kannadiga people and their language, Kannada. Yet in Bangalore, Kannadigas are at most a plurality, with the majority of residents claiming mother tongues other than Kannada (Table 3, pg 52).

Nativist demands in Bangalore date back to the 1960s, when nativist politician Vatal Nagaraj first began campaigning in the name of the Kannadiga “sons of the soil.” His Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha (KCVP) party has contested elections in Bangalore and the rest of Karnataka state, though in the last 20 years he has been the


109 Weiner: 291 and Nair, Janaki. The Promise of the Metropolis: Bangalore’s Twentieth Century Oxford University Press: 2005: 249. Vatal Nagaraj is mentioned both by Weiner and Nair, with the latter noting that one of his earliest political moves was to threaten to close, “with violence if necessary,” any cinema halls showing Tamil films in the city.
only member to win a state assembly seat (Table 12, Appendix pg. 69). In addition to the KCVP, there are assorted Kannada chauvinist groups engage in varying degrees of protests, strikes, and violence. Protests are organized and strikes called but in Bangalore, the nativist parties simply do not have as large a profile as a party like Shiv Sena has in Mumbai, nor have they engaged in as much violence.

Electoral Performance

I analyzed Shiv Sena’s electoral performance in local, state, and national elections (Table 1) over the last two decades. Local and state election performance was measured specifically for Greater Mumbai’s 227 municipal seats and 34 state assembly seats respectively. National election performance however was measured across the entire state of Maharashtra.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election (total seats)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Voteshare</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>state (34)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state (34)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national (48)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national (48)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state (34)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local (227)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national (48)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state (34)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local (227)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Commission of India, Times of India

Shiv Sena started to lose seats in the 1999 state elections. The lower the level of government, the more pronounced this downturn in Shiv Sena’s fortunes is. At the local
level, there was a 6.2% loss of voteshare and a loss of 14 seats from 2002 to 2007. Still, an alliance with the BJP allowed the Shiv Sena to remain in power. State assembly elections saw a decline of 4% vote share in both 1999 and 2004, with a loss of 7 and then 2 seats respectively. There are, however, some reasons to believe that the Shiv Sena’s decline may not represent a decline in local opposition to migration.

The Shiv Sena in the 1990s did not run on an exclusively “sons of the soil” agenda. Rather, it focused on Hindu nationalist rhetoric (and an anti-Muslim bias) that invoked the Babri Masjid issue, the 1993 riots, and its electoral alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).\footnote{Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1500} Separating the effects of Hindu nationalism upon Shiv Sena’s electoral success from those of nativism is not possible. At times, it has seemed as if Shiv Sena’s Hindu nationalism dominated its nativism, with party chief Bal Thackeray encouraging the formation of “Hindu suicide squads.”\footnote{International Herald Tribune “India police say they hold 9 from Hindu terrorist cell” <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/12/asia/12india.php> - Thackeray said in an editorial that “It is time to counter the same with Hindu terror. Hindu suicide squads should be readied to ensure the existence of Hindu society and to protect the nation.” – Mr. Thackeray did not however feel that his own sons were worthy of such a noble mission and declined to encourage them to join this outfit.} Bal Thackeray’s son and likely successor, Uddhav Thackeray, also attempted to reach out to North Indian voters prior to his cousin Raj Thackeray’s anti-North Indian campaign.\footnote{Rediff “Analysis: What drove MNS to violence” <http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/08mns.htm> (accessed February 1, 2009): Kumar Ketkar noted that ”Uddhav was having these Uttar Bharatiya sammelans”}

Moreover, the recent rise of the MNS suggests that the “sons of the soil” issue still has some currency. The current, nativist agenda of the MNS will be tested in the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1500
\item International Herald Tribune “India police say they hold 9 from Hindu terrorist cell” <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/12/asia/12india.php> - Thackeray said in an editorial that “It is time to counter the same with Hindu terror. Hindu suicide squads should be readied to ensure the existence of Hindu society and to protect the nation.” – Mr. Thackeray did not however feel that his own sons were worthy of such a noble mission and declined to encourage them to join this outfit.
\item Rediff “Analysis: What drove MNS to violence” <http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/08mns.htm> (accessed February 1, 2009): Kumar Ketkar noted that ”Uddhav was having these Uttar Bharatiya sammelans”
\end{thebibliography}
upcoming election but it will be too late for inclusion in this thesis. Still, Raj Thackeray failed to build a viable platform on his initially inclusive politics, winning a mere 7 seats in Mumbai’s 2007 local elections. He was outflanked by the Congress in the center-left space, by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) in the regional space, and by the Shiv Sena and BJP in the Hindu nationalist space. The Shiv Sena’s platform involved Hindu nationalism during the last few elections while the nativist platform of MNS remains unproven electorally. For these reasons, I find my analysis of the electoral performance of the Shiv Sena to be inconclusive.

Turning to Bangalore, I sought to do a similar analysis of the nativist party’s electoral performance as an indicator of local opposition to migrants. The Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha (KCVP), as mentioned earlier, has only secured one State Assembly seat. Its leader Vatal Nagaraj has consistently run, and often won, in the Chamarajnagar constituency of Southern Karnataka (Table 12, Appendix pg. 69). His performance in Chamarajnagar however, reveals nothing about nativist sentiment in Bangalore, where the KCVP has unsuccessfully fielded candidates over the years. Assuming the KCVP only contests elections when its nativist agenda has appeal, I took its contesting an election as an indication of nativist sentiment.

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The trend in the number of candidates fielded suggests nativist sentiment declined in the 1990s only to rise again from the early part of this decade. However, not a single one of these candidates has actually won an election. In fact, the only member of the KCVP who has won an election in the last 20 years is Vatal Nagaraj, the party leader. This somewhat rude measure of nativist sentiment is thus inconclusive. It does indicate at the very least that nativist sentiment is less than in Mumbai, where such parties have governed at the local and state levels.

Violence

A political party can be influential even outside the electoral domain through strikes, mobilization, or violence. The impact of the Shiv Sena and MNS in Mumbai is more significant in terms of political violence. For the former, one can consider both
actual use of violence and coercion through the threat of violence. As Wilkinson’s argued, it is not that the state lacks the capacity to stop violence but rather whether it is electorally advantageous for the ruling party to stop or prevent ethnic riots.\textsuperscript{114} A nativist party’s instigating of violence with impunity would thus suggest its ideas have some electoral currency. The Shiv Sena has used violence and the threat of violence since its founding.\textsuperscript{115} The 1993 riots provide further proof of the Shiv Sena’s capacity for violence.\textsuperscript{116} Recently, we have the example of public disturbances following vandalism of a statue of Bal Thackeray’s wife.\textsuperscript{117} Raj Thackeray and MNS have also proven capable of instigating violence, most recently in October 2008.\textsuperscript{118}

In Bangalore’s case, violence has occurred but it has not been of the same magnitude in Mumbai nor has it been instigated with such impunity. Whereas in the case of Mumbai, Shiv Sena and MNS have deliberately instigated violence, in Bangalore some of the worst incidents of violence have occurred spontaneously. The 2006 riots following the death of Rajkumar, the iconic Kannada-language film star, are a case in point.\textsuperscript{119} The spontaneity of the riots caught the police completely unaware and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Wilkinson: 6 “My central argument is that democratic states protect minorities when it is in their governments’ electoral interest to do so”
\item \textsuperscript{115} Hansen, Thomas Blom Wages of Violence. Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (Princeton University Press, 2001)
\item \textsuperscript{116} Praveen Swami, “A welter of evidence” Outlook, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1716/17160110.htm>
\item \textsuperscript{117} BBC “Hindu hardliners riot in Mumbai” < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5163288.stm>
\item \textsuperscript{118} Livemint “Raj Thackeray arrested for MNS attack on north Indians” < http://www.livemint.com/2008/10/21101338/Raj-Thackeray-arrested-for-MNS.html>
\item \textsuperscript{119} BBC. “Companies hit by Rajkumar riots” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4909432.stm>
\end{itemize}
resulted in many businesses, including multinational and Indian IT firms, closing down for the day. Rather than appeals for preferences for the “sons of the soil,” this mass mobilization produced only wanton property destruction, bodily injuries, and deaths.

Premeditated protests, mobilization, and violence on the other hand, are usually not able to be launched with impunity. For example, the police recently thwarted a planned agitation against Tamil actor Rajnikanth’s new film by the KCVP and various Kannada chauvinist groups. In 2002, a peaceful strike over a river-sharing dispute with the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu went as planned, albeit with tight police surveillance and arrests of Vatal Nagaraj and other activists who were blocking traffic. Bangalore, in contrast to Mumbai, does not have nativist parties that are above the law and can act independently of the wishes of the authorities of the state. Strikes, protests, and other mobilizations occur peacefully and sometimes violently, but rarely without the consent and supervision of the state. These mobilizations indicate some support for nativist parties like the KCVP and its cause but not to the same extent as one sees in Mumbai.

_Ideological Pressure on Mainstream Parties_

In Mumbai, the impact of Shiv Sena and MNS has also been felt by mainstream political parties they compete with. Most recently, the Congress supported the notion of

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120 The Hindu “Kannada groups suspend protests”<br> <http://www.hindu.com/2008/04/06/stories/2008040653870400.htm>

giving preference to the “sons of soil” after MNS’s October 2008 attack on railway exam candidates.\textsuperscript{122} The renaming of Mumbai and its acceptance by all parties is another example of nativist ideas being accepted by the mainstream parties. Perhaps the most towering example of the Shiv Sena’s ideological pressure on mainstream parties was a surprising proposal by the Congress party to place a statue of Shivaji in the Arabian Sea, overlooking the city.\textsuperscript{123} I would argue that the Sena’s impact has been substantial in perhaps the cultural and symbolic arenas and in terms of preferential policies for the “sons of the soil.” It has not however been so influential as to push Congress, BJP, or other national parties to attack migrants.

On the other hand, the ideological impact of KCVP upon mainstream parties in Bangalore has been much more limited. The changing of the city’s official name from “Bangalore” to its Kannada name of “Bengaluru” in 2005 is one instance of nativist demands being met by mainstream parties in the state.\textsuperscript{124} Mainstream parties however have preferred to adopt such cultural demands rather than more contentious economic ones. As a case in point, the Sarojini Mahishi report’s recommendations for employment preferences for Kannadigas have long been in the news and will likely

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Rediff “300-feet Shivaji statue in Mumbai’s Arabian Sea!” http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jun/03shivaji.htm
\item \textsuperscript{124} Times of India “Bangalore to be renamed Bengaluru” (11 Dec 2005) – the Chief Minister at the time, N Dharam Singh, was a member of the Congress Party <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1327370.cms>
\end{itemize}
remain there.\textsuperscript{125} Indeed, the current Chief Minister, from the BJP, was willing to speak at length on Kannada being accorded classical language status while only briefly speaking about the Mahishi report.\textsuperscript{126} This further shows that the KCVP has exerted only limited ideological pressure on mainstream political parties in Bangalore.

At the same time, there are limitations to taking the impact of nativist political parties as a measure of local opposition to migrants. The activities of such parties do not give a clear indication of how salient the issue of migration and opposition to it actually are. Most obviously, levels of nativist sentiment in Delhi cannot be measured in this manner as Delhi does not have a nativist political party. Political parties act within a system and their rhetoric and actions (including violence) are framed in a certain manner. If there is local opposition to migration then it will be reflected in this framing of the issue. Examining the impact of nativist political parties is one way to understand this, from the perspective of actors within the system. A second way, from outside the system, would be analyzing how these issues are portrayed in the media.

\textit{Content Analysis}

The media portrayal of migrants and migration in local media would ideally be examined across vernacular language print, television, radio, and even internet sources from the period of interest. Procedures must be clearly defined and consistently


\textsuperscript{126} 2008 <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/11/26/stories/2008112655130400.htm>
applied. With this in mind, I conducted a content analysis of the major English language newspaper published in each city. Specifically, I scanned the archives of the Times of India (Mumbai), Deccan Herald (Bangalore), and Hindustan Times (Delhi) for mentions of the words “migrant” or “migration” and the name of the respective city within the same paragraph.

As stated, I would ideally analyze all vernacular language media in each city. The daily newspaper was the most regularly issued and accessible format for a news source of local origin. While the major vernacular newspaper of each city would have been the ideal source, there are two reasons for which I chose a different approach. Firstly, I am not able to fluently read Marathi (Mumbai), Kannada (Bangalore), or Hindi (Delhi). Secondly, the advantage of using an English language newspaper with a primarily educated middle class and elite audience is that it can serve as a hard case for nativist sentiment. Nativist sentiment may influence coverage of migrants in vernacular media while having no impact on coverage in a city’s English newspapers, which reflect a more cosmopolitan ethos. However, if anti-migrant sentiment is substantial, then it is reasonable to assume that a city’s major English newspaper will reflect this in its portrayal of migrants.

While comparing the portrayal of migrants in one paper to that in another is problematic due to the different bias of each paper, each city can be compared to itself. Factiva was used to search the archives of Hindustan Times (Delhi) and Times of India (Mumbai) from March 18th 1999 to March 18th 2009. For the Deccan Herald (Bangalore), the paper’s web archives and Google News Archives only provided articles from April 2nd 2005 to March 18th 2009. The portrayal of migrants in each article
was coded as positive (1), neutral (0), and negative (-1) in Table 11 (Appendix, pg. 69). The annual number of articles that negatively portrayed migrants was then obtained for each city (Tables 4, 5, and 6).

I used the following criteria when coding articles. Any mentions of migrants as creating new businesses, improving their own lives or their community, or working on large, prestigious projects were coded as positive. Human interest stories profiling migrants, their neighborhoods, or their accomplishments were also coded as positive. Mentions of migrants exerting pressure on public services and infrastructure, illegally voting or using public services, committing crimes, or spreading disease were coded as negative. Whenever migration or migrants were referred to as a “problem,” the article was coded as negative. However, situations where an article offered both negative and positive portrayals of migrants were coded as neutral. Articles that simply reported an incident involving a migrant without referring to migrants in a positive or negative manner were also coded as neutral.
The dashed vertical lines in Figures 2, 3, and 4 indicate an election year, with the level(s) of government noted. Interestingly, since 1999 the number of negative articles on migrants has fallen or remained the same during election years in Mumbai (Figure 2). It could be the case that opposition to migrants is not electorally advantageous. Thus, there are fewer stories on violence or statements of public figures against migrants. I do find this line of reasoning persuasive for the 1990s, when the Shiv Sena assumed a broader Hindu nationalist avatar.\textsuperscript{127} At the same time, 2008 saw the rise to prominence of Raj Thackeray’s MNS and an increase in negative articles on migrants. Prior to this, the Shiv Sena’s Hindu nationalist tendencies might have dominated its nativist ones as it

\textsuperscript{127} Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3\textsuperscript{rd}: 1497
sought to underplay the latter and expand beyond its “sons of the soil,” Marathi-speaking base.

For the case of Bangalore, analysis of the Deccan Herald newspaper did show increased negative coverage of migrants in 2008, a state assembly election year. When the city’s official name was changed in 2005 to the original Kannada name of “Bengaluru,” Ramachandra Guha argued that this appeasement of nativist demands would lead to a decline in nativist sentiment.\(^\text{128}\) I would attribute the drop in negative

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\(^{128}\) Ramachandra Guha, India Together. “Bangalore or Bengaluru? A divided city” (25 December 2005): Mr. Guha, a Bangalorean and well-respected historian claimed that nativism had declined in Mumbai after its name change and hoped for the same in Bengaluru/Bangalore.
coverage from 2005 to 2006 to such a phenomenon. However, in 2008 the nativist KCVP did field three candidates in Bangalore as compared to only one in the last state election. Although they have yet to win an election, this willingness to contest more constituencies suggests that the 2005-2006 drop in nativist sentiment was only temporary. As the Deccan Herald’s archives were only available from 2005 to the present, I could not examine media portrayal of migrants during more than one election. Despite a key nativist demand being met, KCVP’s contesting more seats and the return of negative coverage of migrants indicate that nativist sentiment is present, but weak in Bangalore.

![Figure 4: Media Portrayal of Migrants in Delhi](source)

Source: Hindustan Times
In the case of Delhi, I found somewhat stronger nativist sentiment. The ideal measure of electoral performance was not possible as there are no nativist parties in Delhi. However, the above content analysis of the Hindustan Times’ coverage of migrants and migration suggests that there is local opposition to migrants (Figure 4). In the years of local and state elections, negative coverage of migrants has increased from the previous year. I do not believe these increases are merely coincidental. Negative coverage does not increase in national election years precisely because national elections do not concern issues particular to Delhi, such as migration.

Moreover, state and local level public figures have weighed in on the issue. Most notably, Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dixit of the Congress Party spoke disapprovingly of migrants from the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, resulting in controversy and a prompt apology. In Delhi, this indicates that while there is local opposition to migrants, they are present in such large numbers that it is politically damaging to attack them. Thus, no political party has emerged to champion the anti-migrant cause.

Summary of Findings

My examination of the impact of nativist political parties and the media’s portrayal of migrants in the three cities shows levels of nativism in each city. I find that Mumbai and Delhi have high and medium levels of nativism respectively. In the former,

129 IBN Live “BJP demands Sheila Dixit’s resignation” <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/bjp-demands-sheilas-resignation/40179-15-2.html>: This was as bizarre a statement as it was controversial given that Mrs. Dixit was born in the state of Punjab. Furthermore, she represented Uttar Pradesh in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) prior to her career move to Delhi.
nativist appeals continue to allow instigation of violence with impunity while in the latter, the media and public figures take a dim view of migrants even if opposing them may not be electorally feasible. Bangalore on the other hand, is a case of low anti-migrant sentiment that has given rise to a nativist party. This anti-migrant sentiment however is insufficient to help such a party win elections. All of these findings are summarized on the next page in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Level of Nativism</th>
<th>Nativist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>HIGH: Nativist parties have been electorally successful and instigated considerable violence with impunity. Lately, negative media coverage of migrants has increased.</td>
<td>YES, there are Shiv Sena and Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS). The latter split from Shiv Sena in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bangalore</td>
<td>LOW: There is the KCVP nativist party and an important nativist demand was implemented by mainstream politicians. Still, the KCVP has not won an election in Bangalore and cannot instigate violence with impunity.</td>
<td>YES, there is the Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha (KCVP). It has not won state elections in Bangalore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>MEDIUM: There is no nativist political party but negative coverage of migrants has consistently increased during state and local election years. High-ranking public figures have also made anti-migrant statements.</td>
<td>NO such party is present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation of Results**
There are several possibilities for explaining high nativist sentiment in Mumbai, low nativist sentiment in Bangalore, and medium nativist sentiment in Delhi. As a starting point, I examined the labor competition and political competition frameworks developed earlier (Theory, pg. 30) across the three cities. Labor competition was pertinent to nativism in Delhi, but provided an incomplete explanation. I subsequently found an alternative explanation of class prejudice to be more appropriate. For Mumbai, I identified political competition as the reason for local opposition to migrants. Finally, I considered an alternative explanation for Bangalore, viewing the diversified sources of migration as impeding political mobilization against migrants.

Both the labor competition and political competition explanations required that migrants be perceived as “culturally distinct.” There are multiple ways to define “cultural distinctiveness.” State borders are often linguistic and cultural borders, allowing one to reasonably assume that physical distance is a proxy for cultural distance. Another option is to use language itself as a measure of cultural distinctiveness. Both measures are given in Table 3:

**TABLE 3: Migrants by Birth and by Mother Tongue Language**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Born Out of State</th>
<th>Native (by Mother Tongue)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Territory of Delhi</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Mumbai Urban Area</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore (Urban) District</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India (2001), Tables D1 and C16

If interstate migration figures are used, the National Capital Territory of Delhi has clearly seen larger migration with 38.4% of its population born out of state. However,
using language as a measure of cultural distinctiveness suggests that relative to Mumbai and Bangalore, Delhi has not seen as much migration of “culturally distinct” persons as 80.9% are Hindi-speaking. Still, given Myron Weiner’s cautioning that “cultural differences, no matter how small” are relevant, I do consider this condition met in all three cities.\textsuperscript{130} At the very least, it is strongly met in Mumbai and Bangalore but only weakly met in Delhi.

\textit{Labor Competition}

The labor competition explanation’s second condition was that the native ethnic group be relatively immobile. I take out-migration to in-migration ratios as a measure of the mobility of people native to a given state:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{State} & \textbf{out-migrants as \% of state of origin’s current population} & \textbf{in-migrants as \% state of residence’s population} & \textbf{ratio of out-migrants to in-migrants*} \\
\hline
Jammu & Kashmir & 2.2% & 2.5% & 90.2% \\
Himachal Pradesh & 7.4% & 7.2% & 103.6% \\
Punjab & 6.8% & 6.7% & 101.1% \\
Chandigargh & 16.9% & 23.1% & 73.2% \\
Uttranchal & 10.9% & 10.5% & 103.8% \\
Haryana & 8.3% & 8.2% & 100.4% \\
\textbf{NCT of Delhi} & 5.4% & 6.7% & 80.7% \\
Rajasthan & 4.9% & 4.6% & 105.5% \\
Uttar Pradesh & 5.8% & 5.6% & 104.0% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Native Mobility}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{130} Weiner Sons of Soil, pg. 276 – “A second condition is that there must be some perceived cultural differences, no matter how small, between the migrants and the local community.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Ratio1</th>
<th>Ratio2</th>
<th>Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>105.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>104.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>106.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>101.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>103.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>102.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>102.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhatisgargh</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>102.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daman &amp; Diu</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>109.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadra &amp; Nagar</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>102.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maharashtra</strong></td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td><strong>100.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>104.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Karnataka</strong></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td><strong>106.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakshadweep</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>116.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>104.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pondicherry</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>106.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A &amp; N Islands</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The higher the ratio, the more mobile a state’s population is (within India)

Source: Census of India (2001), Tables D-1 and D-3?

Table 4 shows Maharashtrians as having average mobility, natives of Karnataka having some of the highest mobility of any group in India, and Delhites as having extremely low mobility. Although it might be ideal to isolate Bangalore and Maharashtra from their respective states, this was not possible. On the other hand, considering states may be best as the very concept of a “son of the soil” could be more ethnic than geographic. Per the usage in this thesis, it is a term used only to
denote members of the local ethnic group, wherever they reside.\textsuperscript{131} This question does not arise however in the case of Delhi as we are considering the entire union territory.

The third condition of increasing unemployment and native education levels is also met by Delhi if one looks at employment and literacy figures since liberalization. Bangalore and Mumbai again fail to meet the condition. As Table 5 shows, they have seen increasing education levels (literacy), but unemployment has fallen rather than increasing.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 State & Male Youth (15 to 29 years) Unemployment in Urban Areas & State-wide Male Literacy (All Ages) & \\
\hline
 Maharashtra & 12.5\% & 8.1\% & -4.4\% & 76.6\% & 86.3\% & 9.7\% \\
 Karnataka & 7.0\% & 4.3\% & -2.7\% & 67.3\% & 76.3\% & 9.0\% \\
 Delhi & 7.9\% & 10.2\% & -2.3\% & 82.0\% & 87.4\% & 5.4\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Male Education and Employment}
\end{table}


I looked specifically at male and youth unemployment because “youth bulges” and a surplus male population have been found to increase the risk of political violence.\textsuperscript{132} Urban unemployment figures for Maharashtra and Karnataka were substituted for Mumbai and Bangalore unemployment figures as the latter were not available.

\textsuperscript{131} This again brings us to the very difficult question raised in our introduction: when is it that a migrant becomes a local? Moreover, can a migrant or his or her descendents become “sons of the soil”? As mentioned earlier, I shall address this question in my conclusion. I assume throughout the paper that “sons of the soil” refers to the local ethno-linguistic group while “migrant” refers to migrants and their descendents who are not of this local ethnic group.

available. Likewise, literacy rates were only available at the state level. Delhi’s increased male unemployment and literacy suggest that labor competition could account for Delhi’s medium level of nativist sentiment. Labor competition cannot however explain nativism in Mumbai or Bangalore.

Delhi: A Matter of Class

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that nativism in Delhi is motivated by something other than labor competition. Firstly, unemployment and literacy rates for Delhi are for the entire population of Delhi, 38.4% of which was born in other states (Table 6). Thus, the data in Table 5 is actually quite inconclusive on whether it is locals who are bearing the brunt of increased unemployment or migrants. Delhi is also the national capital, site of large out-migration and in-migration during Partition, and the destination for migrants from neighboring Hindi-speaking states. After migrants exceed a sufficiently large, “tipping point” share of the population, a nativist stance constitutes political suicide. The lack of a nativist party and reluctance of politicians to explicitly attack migrants, Sheila Dixit notwithstanding, confirm that this tipping point has long passed in Delhi.\(^{133}\)

In Delhi, I thus see local opposition to migrants as rooted in class prejudice rather than political competition or labor market competition. My content analysis of the Hindustan Times showed negative coverage of migrants increasing in local and state

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election years. Nevertheless, English language newspapers such as the Hindustan Times are read primarily by the educated elite and professional middle class. Sheila Dixit and Lieutenant-Governor Tejendra Khanna, another public official upbraided for offending migrants, are both of this class.\textsuperscript{134} Most migrants meanwhile are not of this class.\textsuperscript{135} Their critics I would argue are overwhelmingly of the Anglophone professional and elite classes, given the negative coverage in Delhi’s major English daily.

My interviews in two working-class migrant communities in Delhi corroborate a class prejudice account of nativism in Delhi.\textsuperscript{136} The migrants interviewed did not report any instances of migrants being told to leave Delhi by politicians. They also did not mention any resentment on the part of locals over jobs as working-class competition was overwhelmingly between migrants. They were however told (and felt) that they were “the very last” in line for access to public services. Moreover, when commercial, public transit, and road construction projects were undertaken, they were not consulted. By their own account, poor migrants such as themselves were what made such construction projects possible even if richer Delhiites looked down upon them. The labor competition explanation’s conditions were met to some degree in Delhi.

\textsuperscript{134} LG backtracks, row continues < http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/LG_backtracks_row_continues/articleshow/2681611.cms>

\textsuperscript{135} Census of India (2001), Table D-8 – 70.5% of migrants to Delhi are employed in Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing and repairs, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, and Transport, Storage and Communications. The rest are employed in Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities, Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security, Education, Health and Social Work, Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities, Private Households with Employed Persons, and Extra-Territorial Organisations and Bodies.

\textsuperscript{136} Interview: December 26\textsuperscript{th}, Vayusenabad, Delhi, India
Nonetheless, only a class prejudice explanation can completely account for the particular source of local opposition to migrants and the lack of a nativist political party.

**Political Competition**

Having examined the labor competition explanation, we now turn to the political competition explanation. The first condition, of culturally distinct migrants, was met in all three cases. The second condition, of a recent demographic change, can be understood in two respects. It can be understood as a simple increase in the number of migrants and their share of a city’s population, as has occurred in all three cities (Table 6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Migration Since Economic Liberalization*</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Mumbai Urban Area</td>
<td>Migrant Population: 2095697</td>
<td>3171728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population: 9925891</td>
<td>11978450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of Migrants: 21.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore (Urban district)</td>
<td>Migrant Population: 556593</td>
<td>895632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population: 4839162</td>
<td>6537124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of Migrants: 11.5%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Territory of Delhi</td>
<td>Migrant Population: 3333161</td>
<td>5318362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population: 9420644</td>
<td>13850507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of Migrants: 35.4%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A migrant is defined as any person born outside of the city Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1
Yet, it can also be understood as an increase in the share of migrants from certain states or regions. For example, migration to Mumbai from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar has increased noticeably (Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in India beyond the state of enumeration</th>
<th>Total Migrants</th>
<th>Share of Population</th>
<th>Total Migrants</th>
<th>Share of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2095697</td>
<td>21.11%</td>
<td>3171728</td>
<td>26.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>28460</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>29128</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>11820</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>17076</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>18290</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>26843</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>120500</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>200850</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>712570</td>
<td>7.18%</td>
<td>1240020</td>
<td>10.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>51900</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>158597</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>40230</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>104151</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>13800</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>40114</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>36570</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>53083</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>439260</td>
<td>4.43%</td>
<td>496271</td>
<td>4.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>84930</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>125069</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>242137</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td>302348</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>38360</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>31809</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>108290</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>114568</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>128210</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>161715</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1

At present, Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena and other political parties have attacked migrants from UP and Bihar both physically and rhetorically, further confirming that Mumbai has undergone “sudden demographic change.” With elections approaching in April of 2009, this has also included a war of words with

137 News articles on Raj Thackeray’s MNS and other parties too issuing statements or “taking action” against North Indian migrants
politicians from Bihar and UP. This would suggest that the third condition, an electoral incentive to take a nativist stance, is also present in Mumbai. Beyond the MNS, the Nationalist Congress Party and Shiv Sena have also issued similar nativist appeals.

Mumbai: The Return of the Nativist

The return of the nativist agenda in Mumbai can be attributed primarily to Raj Thackeray and his Maharashtra Navnirman Sena. I am interested however in what motivated him to take this nativist stance and instigate violence in the name of the “sons of the soil.” One way to understand political competition and ethnic violence is in terms of the Effective Number of Votes Parties, as detailed by Wilkinson in his *Votes and Violence*. Generally, situations of 3 or more effective parties preclude violence of the sort MNS instigated in 2008. Indeed, it is unusual that a city with as many parties as Mumbai should witness as much violence.

To understand Raj Thackeray’s actions since leaving the Shiv Sena in 2006, I initially found the literature on marketing and strategy useful. Raj Thackeray sought to secure political space for himself, as a new entrant in the market for political parties. Unfortunately, he did not realize that his new Maharashtra Navnirman Sena party was competing in a segmented market. Segmentation implies that a given brand’s (or

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138 Some quote of Raj or Bal attacking Lalu or Mulayam Singh Yadav

139 NCP and others showing support for “Maharashtra” and “maharastrian sentiment” etc after Railway Attacks

140 Votes and Violence, Wilkinson
political party’s) “market is limited (i.e. there are some consumers you need not sell to).” The consumers, or rather voters, he fruitlessly attempted to sell his party to normally voted for the Congress Party or Nationalist Congress Party. I would argue that his rather generic “brand” fared poorly amongst secular, progressive types as the established Congress “brand” had an *incumbency advantage* in this segment. He also failed to differentiate himself sufficiently from the regional party within this segment, Sharad Pawar’s Nationalist Congress Party (NCP).

Raj Thackeray’s long association with the Shiv Sena meant he simply could not build a credible platform wrest the secular, Left-of-Center space from the Congress and NCP. Migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar meanwhile were voting for local units of parties from their states. Thus, MNS narrowed its focus to the *Marathi manoos* (“Marathi person”) segment of the electorate. Raj’s alma mater, the Shiv Sena, was dominant in this segment although Raj Thackeray’s past association with the Shiv Sena lent credibility to the MNS “brand.” However, the MNS had to *distinguish* its product, i.e. platform, from that of Shiv Sena as Shiv Sena had an *incumbency advantage*.

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143 Pg. 4, Journal of Marketing, April 1987 Market Segmentation, Product Differentiation, and Marketing Strategy, Peter R. Dickson and James L. Ginter, Vol 52 No 2 – “A product offering is perceived by the consumer to differ from its competition on any physical or non-physical product characteristic, including price.”
Raj Thackeray and MNS effected this differentiation through a process of *ethnic outbidding*, or establishing a platform towards one of the extremes of the political spectrum. Specifically, this was a far-right nativist stance against migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, with violence reminiscent of the Shiv Sena’s anti-South Indian campaigns in earlier years. In doing so, Raj sought to outflank the Shiv Sena by going to the right of them. I would also contend that the Shiv Sena and MNS are not the only players in this game.

Political competition in India has sometimes seen dominant parties take imprudent actions in the name of short-sighted “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic. In the late 1970s, Indira Gandhi’s Congress party supported a Sikh extremist, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, in the hopes that he would outbid and split the supporters of Punjab’s Akali Dal regional party. The result was much unnecessary bloodshed that only ended in the 1990s. Jawaharlal Nehru’s engineering of a split in Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah’s party in 1953 created similar resentment that gave rise to an insurgency in Kashmir that persists to this day. I consider the rise of Raj Thackeray and the MNS to be another instance of such politics.

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144 Kanchan Chandra - 2005, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” Perspectives on Politics. Vol 3(2): 236 – “The terms outbidding and centrism refer to the location of party positions on a given dimension. Outbidding occurs when parties assume positions toward the endpoints on this dimension. Centrism describes the assumption of positions closer to the middle.”

145 Times of India “For the Soul of Sena” <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/TODAYS_EDITORIAL_For_the_Soul_of_Sena/articleshow/2756871.cms>


There is reason to believe that Raj Thackeray has been encouraged by the Congress and perhaps even the NCP in his new political venture. In the 2004 State Assembly elections, 15 out of the 34 constituencies in Mumbai were won with a margin of victory of less than 10% (Table 8). Of these 15 close races, 10 involved the Shiv Sena and 6 (involving the Shiv Sena) were within a 5% margin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Runner-Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chembur</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazgaon</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>NCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahim</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhandup</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malabar Hill</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matunga</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andheri</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malad</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amboli</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandivali</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kherwadi</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goregaon</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>NCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vileparle</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagpada</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>SHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khetwadi</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>BP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Commission of India

This number of extremely close elections suggests that there would be every reason for the Congress party and NCP to support a party like MNS. By its stance and attempts to outbid the Shiv Sena with its anti-North Indian campaign, the MNS does not compete directly for votes with either the Congress or NCP. The only party it directly competes, the only party focusing on the same Marathi manoos segment of the electorate, is the Shiv Sena. Informed observers such as Kumar Ketkar, editor the Marathi daily Loksatta, and Vaibhav Purandare, who has closely followed Shiv Sena,
have suggested such a game is being played by the Congress. Anonymous sources within the Congress party have also admitted as much to the media.

What is most revealing however is that the state of Maharashtra’s Congress government has allowed Raj Thackeray to run amok in its capital, raising tensions between Hindi-speaking migrants and the Marathi “sons of the soil.” Wilkinson’s central argument is at work here as it is in the electoral interest of the Congress government to not protect an ethnic minority, Hindi-speaking migrants, from Raj Thackeray’s men. The Congress wished to maximize the salience of voters’ regional identities so that Hindi-speaking migrants desert the Shiv Sena and the Marathi vote splits between Shiv Sena and MNS. Over the next month, we shall know if this strategy succeeded electorally. In the long run however, the Congress may come to regret condoning chauvinism and lawlessness for reasons of electoral expediency. Whatever the outcome, nativism in Mumbai is clearly a product of political competition.

Bangalore

For Bangalore, neither the labor nor political competition explanations adequately explain the low level of nativism I observed. Culturally-distinct, interstate


migrants form only 13.7% of Bangalore’s population (Table 9). However, Kannada-speakers are only 41.5% of the city’s population, indicating that migrants and their descendents form a majority of the city’s population as in Mumbai. Those born in Karnataka are amongst the most geographically mobile of all Indians, further negating labor competition’s explanatory power.

The inadequacy of a political competition explanation is most revealed by the inability of the KCVP to win elections in Bangalore. This suggests that the third condition, electoral incentives for an anti-migrant stance, is only weakly met. In terms of the second condition of a sudden demographic change, migration to Bangalore has grown but not as fast as migration to Mumbai. Moreover, no single state’s share has grown as prominently as those of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar did in Mumbai:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 10: Bangalore District</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 10 States of Origin for Migrants</strong></td>
<td>Total Migrants</td>
<td>Share of Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States in India beyond the</td>
<td>556593</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>286873</td>
<td>5.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>93850</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>85730</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>17030</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>20220</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>10430</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>6590</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>6280</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1

From Table 10, we can see that there has been no great increase in the share of migrants from one state or region as was the case with Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in Mumbai. Though migrants from Tamil Nadu constitute nearly 6% of the population in
both 1991 and 2001, this share remains constant. In Mumbai, the identifiable concentration of migrants from one region is in my view culturally threatening, political consequences aside. Similar concentrations of migrants have produced fears of “swamping” and loss of local culture the world over. A case in point would be fears in the United States that Hispanic immigrants are not assimilating into the mainstream culture as earlier immigrants did.\textsuperscript{150} In Bangalore however, such fears do not arise as the stream of migration is diversified and has not changed greatly in composition.

However, it could the case that Kannada-speakers in Bangalore feel economically excluded as outsiders capture most of the labor and capital share of gains from the city’s astounding growth. The best jobs will more often than not be filled by outsiders rather than “sons of the soil.” The simple reason for this is that the demand for high-level skills and education cannot be fully met in Karnataka. This in some ways resembles the situation of native Tibetans vis-à-vis Hui and Han Chinese migrants.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, Myron Weiner in \textit{Sons of the Soil} saw “blockage to economic mobility for the native population by a culturally distinguishable migrant population” as the central motivation for “sons of the soil” agitation.\textsuperscript{152} The growth of Bangalore’s IT and other high-skills industries through recruiting from all parts of India is certainly not blocking mobility for Kannadiga. This growth however could be creating high expectations of mobility that are not met, leading to resentment at outsiders who are getting the “best jobs.”

\textsuperscript{150} “The Hispanic Challenge” Samuel P. Huntington, Foreign Policy, No. 141 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 30-45

\textsuperscript{151} This is somewhat akin to the case of Tibetan economic exclusion in China (Theory, pg. 22), though in the Indian case Kannadigas are of course able to participate politically.

Thus, Bangalore’s low level of nativism can be attributed to a class divide that superficially resembles an *ethnic division of labor*, as outsiders are overrepresented amongst Bangalore’s *nouveau riche.*"¹⁵³ This situation is obviously resented by Kannadigas, yet does not constitute a true *ethnic division of labor* as it is neither driven by parochial concerns nor static.¹⁵⁴ Rather, the present division of labor is due to the fact that IT and other high-skills industries have had to recruit far and wide for specialized skills that are in short supply.¹⁵⁵ There is a class aspect to anti-migrant sentiment in Bangalore, given the increased labor competition that migrants have created for the most sought after jobs. Nativism in Bangalore is low however because migration is diversified rather than concentrated from a single region, impeding effective mobilization against migrants.

¹⁵³ *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Horowitz Pg. 108 – Horowitz defines *ethnic division of labor* as “ethnic specialization of occupation in general; the phenomenon is not confined to “labor” in the narrow sense.” He further writes that “The concentration of particular ethnic groups in particular sectors of the economy and in particular occupations within sectors is a feature of many societies, but it reaches its apogee in the ex-colonial countries.”

¹⁵⁴ It is hard to imagine Kannadigas are receive unfair treatment from IT and other new industries when Infosys, a leading IT firm, has a large proportion of employees and upper management that is Kannadiga. In 2007 the head of human resources, a Kannadiga himself, claimed nearly half their employees were Kannadigas (The Hindu “Jaipur an emerging IT hotspot: Infosys official” http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/12/stories/2007011202881500.htm)

¹⁵⁵ “NASSCOM fears shortage of staff for knowledge industry by 2010” *The Hindu* Dec 17 2005
CONCLUSION

From the results of this thesis, I have my initial hypotheses to revisit and three conclusions to offer. My hypotheses were only partially correct. Mumbai, as predicted, had a high level of nativism due to political competition. For Bangalore, I found only a low level of nativism rather than medium level I had predicted as conditions for political and labor competition-induced nativism were only partially met. Elements of labor competition, especially for very high-skilled jobs, and a class divide between high-skilled outsiders and locals, explained nativist sentiment in Bangalore. The predicted “sudden demographic change” was also absent as there was no concentration of migrants from one single region. In Delhi meanwhile, I found a medium level of nativist sentiment rather than the expected low level. I attributed this to class prejudice rather than labor competition given that such a large share of Delhi’s population was born out of state.

My first conclusion is that political mobilization against migrants is easiest when there is a concentration of migrants from one region or of one ethnicity. This conclusion accounts for the ease with which Raj Thackeray launched his anti-North Indian campaign amidst increasing migration from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to Mumbai. It also explains the difficulty Vatal Nagaraj’s KCVP has faced in opposing the more diversified stream of migration into Bangalore.
My second conclusion is that once the population share of migrants exceeds a tipping point, nativist political mobilization is no longer electorally feasible. Delhi is a case in point, as first-generation migrants comprise almost 40% of the city’s population and no politician dares oppose them. Some American states and immigration gateway cities, where the Hispanic population has grown tremendously, would also fit this pattern.

Taken together, these two conclusions imply that there is a window of opportunity for local opposition to migrants to mobilize and have an impact. If a significant share of migrants are of a particular region or ethnicity and their numbers do not yet exceed a tipping point, then an effective nativist party can form. This is precisely what happened in 1966 with the formation of Shiv Sena and will have occurred once again if the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena fares well in April. In Delhi on the other hand, this window of opportunity has passed.

My third conclusion is that the degree of success of nativist parties is a function of the strength of national parties at the state and local levels. The BJP and Congress are dominant in Delhi and compete in Bangalore with the Janata Dal (Secular), a regional party with national aspirations and a former Prime Minister at its head. This is most exemplified by Raj Thackeray’s nativist niche strategy as he has few prospects at the national level and faces weak national parties (Congress and BJP) in Mumbai.

These conclusions raise some broader, historical questions of nation and community. Is it possible for interstate migrants or their descendents to become “sons of the soil”? Or is the central premise of nativism, that a given group has the prime claim
to the territory in which it has historically resided, destined to become the norm? With the decline of the Congress party, India’s party system has fragmented and regional parties have grown in strength. The likely result of increased sub-nationalism will be greater nativist sentiment and political mobilization, at the expense of a broader Indian identity.

At the same time, the economic logic of internal migration will remain compelling. Current literature has noted that destination cities or regions gain from “labor mobility driven by economic reasons” as such migration concentrates people and talent there. The recently released World Development Report for 2009 also noted increased population mobility in India. As migration continues, additional cities may join Delhi with their migrant population share passing the tipping point. In such a scenario, nativist demands would become politically untenable in these cities and regions, as they are in Delhi. The question then becomes one of which effect dominates: party fragmentation and regionalized politics or demographic transformation due to continued migration?

On a closing note, I remain optimistic as the process of internal migration itself may strengthen a national, Indian identity over sub-national identities that facilitate nativism. In a forthcoming book, Devesh Kapur argues that increased mobility of people

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through Hindu pilgrimage routes, British-era railways, and the post-independence public sector created broader conceptions of identity.\footnote{Kapur, Devesh. Unpublished Manuscript. NJ: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming: Ch 1, pg. 10} For children of public sector employees growing up outside their native state, the “identity that became more prominent in their repertoire was ‘Indian’.\footnote{Kapur, Devesh. Unpublished Manuscript. NJ: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming: Ch 9, pg. 2} Furthermore, these “cosmopolitan” effects held for poorer migrants as well. For these reasons, I believe that in spite of regional parties’ growth, the very mobility that provokes nativism will ultimately foster a national, “Indian” identity.

### APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Portrayal of Migrants in Major Local Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/99 to 3/18/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Articles (n):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive (1):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral (0):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (-1):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{Kapur, Devesh. Unpublished Manuscript. NJ: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming: Ch 1, pg. 10}
Mean Portrayal*:

|       | -0.22 | -0.23 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.21 |

*Higher mean implies more positive portrayal
Source: Times of India, Deccan Herald, and Hindustan Tim

Table 12: Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha’s Electoral Performance: Chamarajnagar State Assembly Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voteshare</th>
<th>Seat Won</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>-22.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Commission of India

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