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Cultures in Conflict: The Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey

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Cultures in Conflict: The Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey

Disciplines
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CULTURES IN CONFLICT:
THE COMPULSORY POPULATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

By
Julie A. Hanlon

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ABSTRACT

The compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey resulted in more than a physical separation of peoples. The events of violence and political conflict between Greeks and Turks became imbedded in their respective nationalistic retellings of history and left an enduring mark on their oral traditions. In order to understand the ramifications of the population exchange it is necessary to examine the long history of interaction leading up to the event, beginning as early as the rise of the Ottoman Empire. It is also important to understand the role of nationalism and collective memory in the formation of new identities which occurred post-Lausanne. These nationalistic identities and views of the past serve to perpetuate hostilities between the two countries even today.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................. ii
Table of Contents .......................................................... iii
List of Tables and Figures ................................................... v

IntRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

I. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ....................................................... 6
   Christians in the Early Empire .............................................. 6
   Constantinople .................................................................... 9
   Demography ....................................................................... 14
   Seeds of Decline .................................................................. 15
   Interna Disorder .................................................................. 16
   External Changes .................................................................. 17
   The Greek Revolution ......................................................... 20
   The 'Eastern Question' ......................................................... 27
   Reform and Decline ............................................................ 29

II. GREECE AND TURKEY DURING WWI ................................. 40
   The Megali Idea and the Balkan Wars ................................. 40
   Persecution of the Christians Begins ................................. 43
   World War I ....................................................................... 49
   Paris Peace Conference ....................................................... 51

III. THE SMYRNA MASSACRES: THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR /
    TURKISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1919-1922 ...................... 55
   Historiography and Hermeneutics ........................................ 55
   The Greek Atrocities in Smyrna .......................................... 64
   Turkish War of Independence .............................................. 66
   The Turkish Atrocities in Smyrna ........................................ 70

IV. THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE ................................................. 73
    Precedents and Particulars ............................................... 73
    Demography and Population Figures ................................... 84

V. THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE ............................................. 88
   Immediate Effects on the Greek Population 1923-1930 .......... 90
   Settlement ......................................................................... 90
   Economy .......................................................................... 95
   Social Adjustment ........................................................... 97
   Politics and Identity ......................................................... 101
   Immediate Effects on the Turkish Population 1923-1930 ....... 102
   Settlement ....................................................................... 103
   Economy ......................................................................... 105
   Social Adjustment .......................................................... 106
   Conclusions ....................................................................... 107

VI. THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND ............................................ 110
    The Experiences of the Greek Orthodox in Turkey .............. 111
    The Experiences of the Muslim Turks in Greece ................. 113
## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table/Figure</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Appendix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>Total Muslim and Greek Populations in Provinces, 1885 and 1914</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Total Populations in Anatolia by Province and Millet, 1911-1912</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Scene from the Battle Defending Constantinople, Paris 1499</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Expansion of the Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.</td>
<td>Massacre of Chios</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.</td>
<td>The Geography of the Nationals Schism: ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Greece in 1916/1917</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.</td>
<td>Schematic map of Lloyd George’s proposal for a Turkish settlement, as it took shape in the discussion on May 14, 1919</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.</td>
<td>Greek Invasion of Asia Minor, 1919-22</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.</td>
<td>Refugees crowded on the waterfront at Smyrna on Sept. 13, 1922</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.</td>
<td>Greek Population Statistics Presented by Venizelos to the Paris Peace Conference</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9.</td>
<td>Grand Totals of Population in 1885 and 1914</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10.</td>
<td>Division of Ottoman Anatolia into Provinces, 1895</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11.</td>
<td>Tables adapted from the 1928 census, showing makeup of refugee population and arrival date relative to the ‘Asia Minor Disaster’</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12.</td>
<td>Ethnological Composition of the Population of Greece</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13.</td>
<td>Flag of the Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the history of Greek and Turkish relations, focusing primarily on the effects of the compulsory population exchange of 1923. The idea for this project was formulated during my trips abroad to Greece and Turkey between 2002-2003. While abroad I was struck by the stark contrast in the accounts of events as they were told to me by Greek and Turkish colleagues. I began to wonder how two populations who had lived together for centuries, and today still bear a number of similarities in culture and tradition could have such opposing views of history and hold such deep-seated hostilities toward each other.

When I returned to the United States, I continued to engage in discussions with people of Greek and Turkish descent, searching for answers. What I discovered was a long history of conflicts and struggles, beginning under the Ottoman Empire and continuing to the present day with the war over Cyprus. The watershed event in the history of the two nations was the signing of the Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations in January of 1923. This document provided the legal framework for the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey following the atrocities which occurred in September of 1922 in Smyrna. Unable to find a more suitable way to enforce the protection of minorities, the population exchange became the most effective short term answer to the massacres of Greek Orthodox Christians in Asia Minor.

While it may have saved lives in the short term, what it created in the long term was the formation of two 'homogenous' nations which would be forever rivals and enemies. Anger and hostility between the two countries made the remaining minority populations convenient scapegoats and targets of aggression. In a 'zero sum game' of politics, whatever benefited one
nation, was to the detriment of the other. Moreover, by 'unmixing' the two populations, they essentially became isolated both physically as well as mentally from one another, focusing instead on the development of their own nations and prejudiced by their own nationalistic versions of history.

What I have tried to do is bring together a variety of perspectives on the history of the two cultures, dating from the Ottoman Empire through the Treaty of Lausanne and its aftermath. I believe that the lack of cross-cultural dialogue between the two countries and the limited viewpoints of their nationalistic histories has served to reinforce past prejudices and fuel present conflicts. It is my hope that by examining and understanding both sides of the story, and discrediting the biased versions which breed ignorance, bigotry, and hate, that readers may gain a better understanding of the two cultures and their shared history.

Chapter one examines the complex relationship between the Greeks and the Ottomans. In the early years of the Empire, the sultans employed an elaborate system of colonization and mass deportation in order to assimilate the newly conquered lands. Many Christians converted under favorable conditions, gaining high positions within Ottoman society. The legacy of conflict between Greeks and Turks began with the fall of Constantinople in 1453. This was a major blow to Byzantine Hellenism. However, the Greeks always believed that one day their great city would be returned to them. These hopes would later form the foundation of the Megali Idea. By the mid 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had grown beyond the political control of the sultan. The government became plagued by internal disorder and inept rulers. Outside the Empire the Western world was developing at a great speed, and international voyages of discovery were leaving their mark on Western Europe. The Ottoman Empire began to fall
behind the times, due to the myopia of the sultans in their inability to take seriously the changes occurring outside Ottoman borders. Meanwhile, the Greeks and other Christians took advantage of new opportunities in international trade and diplomacy and began to excel both politically and economically. The Greek Revolution caused another major rift in Greco-Turkish relations. Greece declared her independence from the Ottomans, followed by other Balkan nations. The Ottoman Empire continued to decline in territory as well as internal stability, despite efforts at reform.

Chapter two discusses the events leading up to the Treaty of Lausanne, specifically the Balkans Wars and World War I. Religious tensions began to rise in the declining empire. Large numbers of Muslim refugees flooded Anatolia, fleeing the war and destruction in the Balkans. World War I signaled an end of the dynastic realms, and the rise of nation-states and the notion of self determination. The Great Powers manipulation of both Greece and the dwindling Ottoman Empire exacerbated hostilities between Greeks and Muslims. After the Paris Peace Conference, the West had decided that they would carve up the remains of the Ottoman Empire amongst themselves, and allow Greece to occupy the Smyrna and Aydin province. The Greek landing in Smyrna in May 1919, was another major event which would leave a black mark in the shared history of the two countries.

Chapter three describes the atrocities which occurred against both Greeks and Turks during the Greco-Turkish War, or the Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922. The first half examines the historical sources available concerning the massacres at Smyrna. The second half attempts to present a moderate view of the events, taking into account both sides of the story.
Chapter four discusses the legal significance and parameters of the Conventions concerning the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne. It examines some of the precedents for the population exchange as well as the weaknesses inherent in its structure. It also briefly examines the population figures of Anatolia leading up to the exchange, which are significant in understanding the demographic impact of the previous years of war.

Chapter five explores the impact of the exchange on Greek and Turkish populations in the years following the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe'. Both countries suffered greatly as a result of the exchange, however they each suffered in different ways. Greece gained an enormous refugee population, increasing her population by about 25%, which resulted in a major humanitarian emergency. Turkey lost several million people as a result of the wars and population exchange. Moreover, Turkey lost a major portion of her entrepreneurial and elite classes, and the entire social and political structure had to be rebuilt. While the Asia Minor Greeks were a powerful and ever-present reminder of Greek anguish and defeat, the Muslim refugees in Turkey were swept up in the new nationalism of the Kemalist regime. Their voices have remained silent up until recent scholarship.

Chapter six briefly examines the hardships faced by the exempt populations who were left behind. The environment around them seemed to change overnight. The lands they once knew transformed into 'homogenous nation-states'. They became strangers in their own homelands, and were forced to live a separate life apart from the ethnic majority, one often characterized by harassment and persecution.
Chapter seven addresses the concepts of Nationalism and Collective Memory and their role in identity formation. The second half of the chapter examines the rise and dissemination of Greek and Turkish nationalistic ideologies, and concludes with their impact on present conflicts.

In the final chapter, I incorporate the statements and testimonies of some of my interviewees, and examine the role of collective memory on the formation of present identities. Moreover, I discuss the role of nationalistic histories in perpetuating cultural stereotypes and feelings of hostility between the two countries. I conclude with a short section on changing perspectives and the importance of cross-cultural dialogue.
I. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Christians in the Early Empire

As the early Ottoman Empire expanded throughout Anatolia and into the Balkans, the conquered Christian peoples became integrated into the new state through a variety of ways. The dominion of medieval Hellenism over Asia Minor both politically and culturally began to decline after the incursions of the Turks from Asia and the Latins from Europe during the latter part of the 11th through 14th centuries. Although the majority of the population throughout Anatolia had been predominantly Christian, it was primarily the western half, where “Greek culture and Orthodoxy had sunk deep roots,” (Augustinos 1992:15) that remained true to their traditional Byzantine faith and culture. The transformation in the interior of Anatolia was more thorough and characterized by intermarriage and ethnic mixing, resulting in a predominantly Muslim population by the beginning of the 15th century. Moreover, the Ottoman conquest was a gazi, or holy war, and thus as the Ottoman troops invaded the countryside, many Greek Orthodox churches and church properties were destroyed. Many bishops fled, leaving congregations isolated from Constantinople and the rest of the Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Orhan, the second sultan in the Ottoman dynasty, created the institution of the Yeniçeri, better known as the Janissaries. The best-looking and most intelligent Christian youths between the ages of 12 to 20 were conscripted, converted to Islam, and trained to become part of the state’s ruling elite, serving principally as the infantry division within the Ottoman military (‘askeri). Although they received significant schooling and some were able to climb to the ranks of the elite, the Janissaries were legally slaves of the sultan. Often times the boys were taken by force. Other times parents turned over their sons to the sultan freely, knowing that there was a
possibility of social advancement. Although they were essentially cut off from their religious and ethnic roots, some highly placed janissaries were able to grant favors to their old relatives or villages. In the beginning, the Ottomans were consisted of a federation of clans, each with its own leader, making the sultan “little more than the first among equals” (Ahmad 2003:3). The Janissaries pledge of absolute loyalty to the sultan, gave him an edge over the local chieftains. Because the Janissaries were responsible for artillery and firearms, they became increasingly vital to the Ottoman military success. By the late 15th century, they were deeply involved in court politics, and by the mid 16th century, they were powerful enough to depose the sultan and decide which surviving son would take the throne (Stearns et al. 1992:597).

In most cases, the early Ottoman leaders were more interested in accommodating their Christian neighbors than in converting them to Islam. This was the first step in the process which ultimately resulted in cultural assimilation (Lowry 2003:132). In the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, religion did not play a role in determining whether or not one could serve in the ruling elite. During the 15th century, the Christian nobility was assimilated into the Muslim empire. Secure that they would not have to give up their social position or their lands, many Christian garrisons surrendered without resistance (İnalçık 1954:115). The noble Christian families of the Balkans became Ottoman timariots, equivalent to feudal lords. Rather than pressuring them to accept Islam, the early sultans “left the issue of religion open” (Lowry 2003:133). Much of the Christian military had been used as auxiliary forces of the Ottoman army during the vassalage of their respective countries. Once their countries had surrendered, many of the troops converted to Islam and joined the Ottoman forces, inspired primarily by the promise of a share in the spoils. As a result of this open policy of religion, many children of the Christians converted to Islam in subsequent generations. As the Ottoman Empire grew, the
Byzantine Christians tried to maintain cordial relations. Emperor Palaeologos gave one of his daughters in marriage to the Sultan Murad (r.1359-89), and two of his other daughters to Murad’s sons Bayezid and Yakub Çelebi (Ahmad 2003:6).

The Ottomans also used an elaborate system of colonization and mass deportation in order to assimilate the newly conquered lands. If the people surrendered and agreed to pay the poll tax (jizya), they were allowed to stay. Some of the conquered Greek cities that surrendered remained predominantly Greek. Others, which did not surrender peacefully, were destroyed, rebuilt, and repopulated with Turks. During repopulation, entire villages of Ottoman Muslims were moved from Anatolia into the Balkans. Compulsory resettlement served a variety of social, political, and economic purposes. For example, a rebellious population could be relocated, or a deserted countryside or ruined city could be repopulated from areas of overpopulation. Those deported under favorable circumstances often enjoyed a special status and were exempt from taxation for a specified period, but were also forbidden to move elsewhere (İnalçık 1969/70:235).

Numerous examples of the mass deportations practiced by the early state are evidenced in the Ottoman chronicles (İnalçık 1954:122). “With the passage of time and successive generations of converts, the indigenous population was religiously Islamicized, linguistically Turkified, and culturally Ottomanized” (Lowry 2003:132). Those communities that remained Greek Orthodox often did so by virtue of their economic independence and relative self-sufficiency. These Greeks dominated the western coast and the region of Cappadocia as well as the northeastern province of Trebizond along the Black Sea.
Constantinople

Essentially, the legacy of conflict between Greece and Turkey began with the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 (Figure 1). By the reign of Mehmed II, also known as ‘The Conqueror’ (r.1451-1480), the religio-social hybrid of Islam and Christianity that characterized the early Ottoman state had disappeared. The conquest of Constantinople “quickly shed the last vestiges of syncretism” (Lowry 2003:143). Leading up to the conquest, Mehmed had drastically limited the wealth and power of the Christian families in the Balkans by taking away their land rights, and making them dependent on the state. In their place he surrounded himself exclusively with the loyal Janissaries and his grand vizier.

As a Muslim, Mehmed was bound by Islamic Holy Law, Sharia, which decrees that if a community of the ahl al-kitāb (people of the Book) reject the obligatory invitation to surrender and continue to resist, then lose this privileged status and become infidels. If they are subdued by force, then no rights are conceded to them, their goods become legitimate booty, and they along with their children are reduced to slavery. The Byzantines occupying the city refused to surrender, even after the three obligatory requests to surrender by Mehmed, and despite a brutal siege lasting seven weeks. Finally, on May 29, 1453 the ‘bastion of Christian civilization’ fell.

Volkan and Izkowitz have examined the socio-psychological significance in Greek culture of the conquest of Constantinople. They argue that “the Turkish victory was experienced as a knife plunged into the heart of Christianity,” (1994:44) and the Greeks have held onto this pain because of their inability to mourn. They characterize the Greeks as ‘perennial mourners,’ a people locked in an endless struggle between the hope of regaining the loss and the ability to let it go. Constantinople is said to have been captured on a Tuesday, and this day continues to be
regarded as inauspicious by Greeks everywhere. That this folk belief persists shows the lasting influence this event has had on the Greek culture.

Even after the conquest, the Byzantines never thought that they would remain under Ottoman domination for long. According to legend, the world was calculated to end in 1492, and thus everything would be restored within a matter of decades. However, 1492 came and went, and the Greek people remained under the Ottoman yoke, but still retained the hope that Constantinople would again be theirs. In this way, the fall of Constantinople also served as the 'seed of the Megali Idea,' the notion that one day all lands of Classical and Byzantine Hellenism would be reclaimed for the Greeks. Although this ideology did not fully emerge until the mid-19th century, the Greeks cited the fall of Constantinople as its origin.

In complicated or perennial mourning, when there is too much anger, too much dependency or other conflicts, or a suddenness of loss which does not allow the mourner to be prepared for the change, the identification may be with undesirable and/or conflicted aspects of the lost person. Instead of the mourning enriching himself, he may embrace the struggle, now felt within himself. [Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994:46]

According to Volkan and Itzkowitz, the fall of Constantinople served as the source for the later irredentist ideology because of the Greeks' perennial mourner mentality. They embraced the loss rather than moving on; they never gave up the dream that Constantinople would one day return to the hands of the Orthodox Christians.

Because the city was taken by force, all property became the lawful spoils of the Ottoman army and the citizens were reduced to slavery. According to Sharia, the sultan was entitled to 1/5 of all moveable property, while all immovable property, mostly land, whether acquired through force or through peace, became the property of the state treasury. Following the
conquest the army was entitled to three days of plunder. However İnalçık suggests, “It is clear that he [Mehmed] put an end to the pillage on the evening of the first day” (1969/70:232).

While many Greek historians focus on the role of Mehmed as a conqueror, Turkish historians bring to light his achievements in restoring vitality and prosperity to the city, transforming it into the most powerful city of the Ottoman Empire. The city of Constantinople had been in a state of decline since the Latin occupation of 1204, with a population of approximately 50,000; “in effect no more than a collection of villages” (İnalçık 1969/70:232). Immediately after the sack, Mehmed II began plans to restore the lost glory of the ancient city. He first split up the churches and residences among his closest dignitaries and officers.

According to Sharia, in addition to moveable property, the sultan was also entitled to 1/5 of the population, who became his personal slaves. These people, Mehmed moved to the shores of the city harbor, to the Phanar, or Lighthouse, region. Their descendents would later become the powerful and influential Phanarion Greeks, so named after their residence in Phanar quarter. For the rest of the surviving population, also reduced to slavery, Mehmed allowed them the ability to purchase their freedom and remain in the city. As in the early Ottoman conquests, the Christian nobility were given extra privileges, and in this case were allowed to stay in their own homes, or resettle if those had been destroyed. In an effort to repopulate the city, he ordered mass deportations from Serbia, Albania, Morea (Peloponnesus), and Caffa (a Black Sea port) to the new capital, which he renamed 'Istanbul'.

Building projects began almost immediately after the conquest. Mehmed ordered the walls repaired, construction of a citadel, and the building of a palace for himself in the center of the city. Between May 1453 and January 1454, the sultan’s personal slaves were hard at work building aqueducts, mosques, rest houses, religious schools, hospitals, and public gardens. The
slaves were paid for this word, so that eventually they would be able to buy their freedom and settle in the city as free men.

In January 1454, Mehmed appointed George Scholarios (later known as Gennadios II) as patriarch in Constantinople. The Sultan also granted the Orthodox Church a charter that gave the Patriarch total jurisdiction over his community in return for the payment of the poll tax. Some argue that this religious autonomy had come too late for the Christians. At this point, there had already been significant damage to the Greek Orthodox community throughout the empire, reducing its influence to a mere shadow of what it had once been (Augustinos 1992:16). The Sultan’s motivations in installing the Orthodox Patriarch were two-fold: first, to encourage Christians who had fled the city to return and settle in Istanbul; second, for the Ottomans to represent themselves as protectors of the Orthodox Church in opposition to the Latins, who were eager to unite with the Orthodox and rise up against them.

At the end of 1459 Mehmed was still having difficulty repopulating the city and renewing its prosperity. He then declared that all Greeks who had left Istanbul, before or after the conquest, as slaves or refugees should return. This applied particularly to the Greek craftsmen who had settled in nearby cities like Adrianople, Philippopolis, Gallipoli, and Brusa, and become rich. According to İnalcık, all of the neighboring Greek merchants and craftsmen “were brought to Istanbul, given houses and plots of land, and helped in other ways” (1969/70:238). In another effort to ensure the prosperity of the new capital, Mehmed resettled as slaves large numbers of peasants in the neighboring villages which had been ruined or abandoned during the siege. The enslaved peasants were not permitted to leave the village in which they were settled, nor marry outside of it. They also were required to give half of what they produced to the state. However,
by the end of the 16th century many of the peasants had acquired free status and settled permanently as free men.

According to the census of Istanbul in 1377 there were a considerable number of Greeks in Istanbul: approximately 8,951 Muslim households, and 3,151 Greek households. All other non-Muslim communities, including Armenians, Latins, and Gypsies, amounted to approximately 3,095. Concerned with the future prosperity of Istanbul, Mehmed gave considerable concessions to the Greeks, which may have been outside the bounds of Sharia, particularly because of the nature of the conquest as forced. Some Islamic scholars have considered his actions within the bounds of Sharia because it served the best interest of the Muslim community at the time. However, as the Greeks of Istanbul began to gain wealth and affluence, the Muslims felt increasingly threatened by their growing power, and thus hostility between the two groups began to grow. (İnalçık 1969/70:247-250)

"Mehmed II and his successors regarded themselves, though their possession of the throne of the Caesars, as emperors of Rome and legitimate heirs to all the territories which the emperors had formerly ruled" (İnalçık 1969/70:233). In the two centuries following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans set about creating a worldwide empire, conquering Syria, Egypt, and North Africa, bringing the bulk of the Arab world under their rule. In addition, the Ottomans made significant headway in the Balkans extending into Europe, as well as around the Black and Red Seas. They also developed an impressive naval power in the Mediterranean Sea, capturing Rhodes, Mitilini (Lesbos), Crete and Cyprus.
Demography

As the empire expanded, the Ottomans were faced with the task of ruling a vast ‘agglomeration’ of peoples and faiths that embraced much of the Balkan Peninsula, North Africa and the Middle East (Clogg 1992:10). They created a system of organization, inspired by the rules in Sharia regarding the conquest of non-Muslims, which grouped people into millets based on religious rather than ethnic origin. As noted above, religious groups that possessed a revealed written scripture, ahl al-kitāb (people of the Book), were protected under Islamic law. These people were also called ahl al-dhimma (people of the pact) or dhimmis. These religious communities were given a degree of autonomy, particularly with regard to issues of personal status such as marriage, divorce, or inheritance. In return for this autonomy, the dhimmis were subject to the poll tax (jizya) and later to “a series of sumptuary laws that regulated what they could and could not wear, what animals they could ride, and deprived them of the right to bear arms” (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994:61). Christians were not allowed to bear witness in court against a Muslim, nor could they marry a Muslim. Besides the jizya, they were also required to pay the ḥaradji tax in lieu of military service. Exemption from military service was viewed as a privilege by the Ottomans. However, warfare was part of their Islamic tradition, and Christians were generally not welcome in the ranks. Despite the requirement of Islamic law to be tolerant of other ‘Peoples of the Book’, the dhimmis were strictly segregated from the Muslims and placed in their own separate communities. Lewis notes that “the unconverted were excluded so thoroughly that 500 years after the conquest of Constantinople, the Greeks and, to a lesser extent, the Jews in the city had not yet mastered the Turkish language – though neither people is lacking in linguistic versatility” (2002:15). Moreover, this framework of religious segregations
continued into the modern culture of today’s secular Republic, where a non-Muslim may be a Turkish citizen, but will never be called a Turk (Lewis 2002:15).

In the case of the Orthodox Christians, the Patriarch served as the head of the ‘Greek’ millet, or millet-i Rum, which was the second largest millet after the Muslims. The sultan granted the patriarch ecclesiastical and civil control over his co-religionists. The Orthodox Christians were not an ethnically homogenous group. Because they were organized according to the church into which they were born, regardless of language or ethnic group, the Orthodox millet included not only Greeks, but also Bulgarians, Serbs, Vlachs (a nomadic people scattered throughout the Balkans), Albanians, and Arabs. However, it was the Greeks – particularly the Phanariot Greeks of Istanbul – that dominated the Patriarchate, the Holy Synod, and the more important positions in the Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy. The autonomy inherent within the millet system allowed the Greeks to preserve their customs, their religious and educational institutions, and ever their basic civil structure while under Ottoman rule. In this way, the Christian population remained relatively separate from Muslim society, and most significantly, retained its national consciousness. The unique relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire is poignantly summarized by Volkan and Itzkowitz: “In the Ottoman Empire everyone was equal, but the Muslims were more equal. There was a place for everyone in the empire, but the sultan’s role was to keep everybody in his place” (1994:64).

Seeds of Decline

The Ottoman Empire reached the limits of its expansion in the 16th century under Sultan Süleyman ‘The Magnificent’ (r.1520-1566). From this time forward the empire sank into a perpetual state of decline as it struggled to maintain control within its borders, and faced
significant territorial losses through continuous wars with Russia, Europe, and the Arabs of the Middle East. The seeds of decline may be categorized into two main groups: internal disorder, and external change.

*Internal Disorder*

By the mid 16th century it became evident that the empire had become too large to be controlled under a single sultan. Its territory stretched over three continents and five seas (Europe, Asia, Africa, and Aegean, Mediterranean, Red, Marmora, and Black Seas) (Figure 2). The sultan was forced to create a *divan*, an early cabinet, consisting of a grand vizier and other ministers. Even still, the vast nature of the empire caused a decline in the effectiveness of the administrative system, spurring the growth of corruption among Ottoman officials. Ottoman regional and local officials began keeping tax money for themselves, impoverishing the central administration. They overworked the peasants and laborers on their lands, forcing them to come up with additional taxes. As a result, peasant revolts began throughout central Anatolia as early as the 1590s. Rather than resorting to violence, most often peasants were able to simply move to other lands. The less fortunate, were forced to become vagabonds, bandits, or beggars in the cities. The abandonment of cultivated lands and social dislocations as peasants began to migrate in search of new lands or new forms of work drained the agricultural resources of the empire.

The quality of the state bureaucrats and sultans also began to decline. During the 17th century, the tradition of assigning royal princes administrative or military positions in the empire in order to prepare them to rule was abolished. Instead, in an attempt to prevent fratricide, the princes and other potential rivals were kept like hostages in special sections of the palace where they remained until one of them ascended the thrown. This resulted in weak and corrupt rulers,
more absorbed in the sumptuous pleasures of palace life than in matters of the state. Overall, the "breakdown in the apparatus of government affected not only the supreme instruments of sovereignty, but also the whole of the bureaucratic and religious institutions all over the Empire" (Lewis 2002:23). The most striking decline was seen in the military, which suffered a long series of humiliating defeats. The Ottoman standards, training, and equipment lagged behind those of its European rivals. There was also a decline in alertness, as well as the professional and moral standards of Ottoman soldiers, stemming from poor management and leadership.

Despite the shortcomings of Ottoman bureaucracy, the empire continued to hold itself together by relying on talented grand viziers. Through the 17th to 19th centuries, control of the empire wavered back and forth between the joint control of sultans and viziers, and the joint control of the ulema (Islamic religious scholars) and the Janissaries.

**External Changes**

While the empire struggled within, revolutionary changes were transforming Western Europe and the world beyond Ottoman borders. The Ottomans were falling at an accelerating rate behind their western rivals in most areas of endeavor, but most critically in trade and warfare (Stearns et al. 1992:600). The oceanic voyages of discovery had lead to new international trade outside of the Mediterranean Sea. This deprived the Ottoman empire of the greater part of foreign commerce, and "left her, together with the countries over which she ruled, in a stagnant backwater through which the life giving stream of world trade no longer flowed" (Lewis 2002:28).

The European colonization of the New World indirectly led to the infamous 'crisis of the 17th century', which resulted in drastic inflation and economic difficulties within the Ottoman
Empire. Ahmad suggests that the main cause of inflation was "the growth in population, urbanization, and monetization of the economy that increased the demand for money and pressure on the empire's limited resources" (2003:19). A cash economy had already penetrated large parts of the Balkans and Anatolia by this time, but the influx of New World silver served to accelerate the process of inflation. Moreover, at the same time as the state was suffering from economic difficulties it was also forced to finance larger armies in order defend Ottoman territory against the Hapsburgs in Europe, the Safavids in Anatolia, and the growing power of the Russians in the Crimea. European weapons surpassed those of the Ottomans with the introduction of light field artillery, and the Ottomans suffered numerous defeats. In order to finance the wars and try to stabilize the economic crisis, more brass than silver was added to the coins. This escalated the rate of inflation and resulted in a significant depreciation of coinage. Consequently, the empire was not able to retain the large wages of the bureaucratic and military elite. The Janissaries saw the decrease in wages as a blow to their prestige, and it affected their loyalty to the sultan and made further recruitment difficult.

While the Ottomans declined, the Greeks and other non-Muslims grew in prosperity at the expense of their Muslim peers. In the old expansionist empire, the Muslims knew only four professions: government, war, religion, and agriculture (Lewis 2002:35). Industry and trade were left to the non-Muslim subjects who continued to practice their inherited crafts. In the era of international trade many Christian and Jewish merchants, who were exempt from certain Muslim ethical and legal restraints on money-lending at interest, created a niche for themselves and established international business partners. Greek became the lingua franca of Balkan commerce, and Greek mercantile paroikies, or communities, were established throughout the
Mediterranean, the Balkans, central Europe, southern Russia, and even as far away as India (Clogg 1992:23).

While the bourgeoisie began to challenge the feudal classes in Europe, the Ottomans were conservatively bound to the status quo and the old ruling elites became increasingly suspicious of any threat to their power. The Ottoman rulers lashed out at the rising classes, as they desperately tried to maintain their social position and control.

For example, a Greek merchant, known as Sheytanoglu, from a prominent Byzantine family, made a fortune from the fur trade and the imperial salt monopoly and, as a result, was able to fit sixty galleys for the Ottoman navy. But Murad II became suspicious of his increasing wealth and power and executed him in 1578. There were other prominent rich bankers and merchants, but the Ottoman ruling class never permitted them to alter the character of the state or economy. [Ahmad 2003:17]

Despite Ottoman fears against an upset in the balance of power, much of the legislature between the 16th and 19th centuries favored the rise of a non-Muslim elite, particularly the Phanariot Greeks. As the empire continued to lose wars, the Ottomans were forced to enter into a series of peace treaties dictated by foreign victors. Because Muslims were discouraged from learning foreign languages, they required skilled bi-lingual diplomats to oversee these treaties. The Phanariot Greeks filled this position in the office of the Dragoman, the head of the sultan's interpreters' service. Phanariots also served as interpreters to the kaptan pasha, or admiral of the Ottoman fleet, and "in this capacity came to act as the de facto governors of the islands of the Archipelago" (Clogg 1992:21). During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Phanariots also held the offices of hospodar, or prince, of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (Romania). Their courts resembled miniature versions of the sultan's court in Constantinople.
The Phanariots prospered and became more integrated into state bureaucracy. At the same time, they also became more corrupt, and started to identify more closely with the Ottomans.

The Greeks also excelled on the sea. According to a Turkish law (enforced between 1529 and 1774), only ships under Ottoman registry could navigate in the isolated waters of the Black Sea. Thus the Greeks were able to trade essentially without any competition. Moreover, the wars in the Mediterranean between the Ottomans and various European groups also allowed Greek merchants and ship-owners to establish dominance in the Aegean.

Many scholars have noted the myopia of the Ottoman sultans, their inability to take seriously the changes occurring outside their borders. Lewis notes the “technological backwardness of the Ottoman empire” and “its failure not only to invent, but even to respond to the inventions of others” (2002:32). The seeds of decline are essentially found in the Ottomans’ inability to adapt to the changing nature of their empire, which went from expansionist to a bureaucratic state. In contrast to its European neighbors, the Ottoman Empire had “remained or reverted to a medieval state, with a medieval mentality and a medieval economy – but with the added burden of a bureaucracy and a standing army which no medieval state had ever had to bear” (Lewis 2002:35).

**The Greek Revolution**

During the 18th century there were a number of significant changes in the nature of Greek society which led to the revolt against the Ottoman Turks. The second Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 aroused excitement in the Greek millet, which clung to the legend of *xanthon genos*: that a fair-haired race of liberators from the north would give back the throne of Constantinople to the Greeks and free them from Ottoman rule (Clogg 1992:17). These ‘liberators’ were widely
identified with the Russians who shared the Eastern Orthodox faith of the Greeks. The peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed 1774 made the Crimea and northern coast of the Black Sea independent of Ottoman Rule, and also granted Russia the right to protect the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

Philhellenic movements were also changing the Greek cultural identity in Anatolia. The financial success of the Greek merchants enabled them to send their children to study in the universities of Western Europe, particularly those of the German states.

Here they came into contact not only with the heady ideas of the Enlightenment, of the French Revolution and of romantic nationalism but they were made aware of the extraordinary hold which the language and civilization of ancient Greece had over the minds of their educated contemporaries. [Clogg 1992:27]

Up until this time knowledge of the ancient glories of the Hellenic Age had all but died out. Under stimulus of western scholarship rose a new class of Greek intellectuals and political leaders who spread an awareness of Greek culture and heritage throughout the rest of the Ottoman Empire, along with ideas of nationalism, revolution, and independence.

For four centuries the Greek Christians had lived as subjects in lands they considered historically theirs, nurtured since the Fall of Byzantium in 1453 by the hope that eventually the Eastern Roman Empire, Tó Roméiko, would again be led by a Christian Emperor in Constantinople and a reconsecrated Saint Sophia would again be the spiritual heart of Byzantine Christendom. [Doulis 1977:8]

It was in this environment that the Megali Idea, or Great Idea, was born: that Constantinople would again become the capital city of a reconstituted Greek Empire composed of all lands historically considered integral parts of the Greek world. Under Ottoman rule, the seeds of the
Megali Idea had survived in the form of folk songs and legends about the fall of Constantinople and its inevitable return to the Greek people (Doulis 1977:9-15).

The rise of nationalism drew the imagination of the Greeks away from the restoration of the Byzantine Empire and toward the idea of a new nation all their own. Nationalism manifested itself most strongly immediately after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, whose territorial settlements left millions of people either disunited or under foreign rule. Nationalist revolts began to break out all over Europe after 1815, beginning with the Serbs in the Balkans. These revolts challenged the efficacy of the millet system, and began to cause instability both within and between the millets of the Ottoman state.

Despite the previous reforms of Sultan Selim II (r.1789-807), the Ottoman state continued to fall apart. Internal instability reached an all-time high when the Janissaries and conservatives who opposed his reforms revolted and imprisoned Selim, placing Mustafa IV on the throne. Before a loyal army could restore Selim to power he was executed. Mustafa IV was subsequently killed and replaced by Mahmud II. During this tumultuous time of war with Russia and France and internal conflict, Egypt had become virtually independent under Muhammad Ali, as did Janina (Albania) under Ali Pasha.

In 1814 Emmanouil Xanthos, Nikolaos Skouphas and Athanasios Tsakaloff formed the secret revolutionary society Pﬁiliki Hetairia, or Society of Friends. Their aim was to liberate the ‘Motherland’ from the Ottoman yoke through an armed and coordinated revolt (Clogg 1992:32). By 1818 its membership had grown significantly, particularly in the diaspora communities, and consisted largely of Greek merchants. Alexander Ypsilanti, a Phanariot who had gone to Russia to study and had remained to serve in the Russian army, became the head of the movement. At his side was Ioanni Kapodistrias, another Phanariot who served as close adviser of the czar. By
association with the Russian Empire, their membership enabled the society to gain greater support among the Orthodox millet which hoped for Russian intervention.

Aside from its Phanariot leaders, the greater portion of the Phanariot Greeks did not support the ideas of Greek nationalism or revolution. Comfortable in their role as the wealthy Greek aristocracy, they remained predominantly conservative: “recognizing the danger to the existing Ottoman order, [the Phanariots] preferred at first to preserve a regime in which they had so considerable an interest” (Lewis 2002:62).

Under Mahmud II, Ali Paşa continued to extend his power in Albania and southward into mainland Greece and Morea (Peloponnese). In order to restore stability in the area and the authority of the Ottoman central government, Mahmud sent Ottoman forces to destroy Ali Paşa in Janina in the winter of 1820-1821. The Greek revolutionists saw this as their opportunity to strike, and Ypsilantis launched a small army in Moldavia (Romania) in March of 1821, appealing to the czar for aid. However, Czar Alexander renounced him and refused to approve the revolutionary movement. Ypsilanti lost courage and was defeated by an Ottoman force at Dragashan in June. He subsequently fled, but was captured and imprisoned by the Austrians. Meanwhile, a more imposing insurrection took place in Morea, which was joined by some of the more prosperous islands. The Greek victory in Morea was resulted in the massacre of 10,000 Turks: “with a ferocity betraying accumulated rage against their oppressor, the Greeks, vowing to extirpate them to the last, massacred the local Turks, who were a small minority” (Dadiani 1995:12).

Following the Greek victory, the movement spread rapidly to the rest of Greece. The Ottomans retaliated by hanging the Greek Patriarch as well as the archbishops of Adrianople, Salonica, and Tinrovo on Easter Sunday April 22, 1821. The Ottomans felt justified in the
executions because the patriarch and other religious leaders had failed in their primary duty – to ensure loyalty to the sultan. In the West, the executions caused outrage and a powerful upsurge of sympathy for the Greeks. “It was from this point forward that European religious bigotry was to rear its ugly head, with every massacre inflicted on innocent Muslim villagers ignored, while Muslim measures of self-defense were emblazoned throughout Europe as examples of Muslim ‘brutality’” (Shaw 1977:18). Many philhellenes marched down and enlisted in the cause, while others raised money for the conduct of war and for the relief of Greek wounded.

In April 1822 the Ottomans slaughtered 30,000 Greeks on Chios (Figure 3), almost the entire population of the island. Most of the men were “put to the sword, while several thousand young girls were carried off into slavery” (Dadrian 1995:12). The Greeks later retaliated and attacked the Ottomar fleet that had captured Chios. After the Greek navy blew up Ottoman Admiral’s flagship, killing everyone aboard (about 1,000 men), the rest of the Ottoman fleet fled. By the summer of 1822, Morea, Athens, Thebes, and Missolonghi were under Greek control. The Ottomans were able to suppress outbreaks in Macedonia and Thessaly and eventually recapture Athens and Corinth, but remained unable to move south into Morea. This ‘stalemate’ continued on for three years, contributing further to general public dissatisfaction in Istanbul with the Janissaries and the rest of the Ottoman army (Shaw 1977:18).

The early Greek successes lead to the establishment of three provisional regional governments and early in 1822 a constitution was adopted. The following year, 1823, the constitution was revised and the three regional governments merged into a single central authority. Unfortunately, the Greeks were plagued by disunity and factionalism, and by 1824 the fighting had degenerated into a civil war. While the Greeks quarreled amongst themselves the Ottomans under Mahmud II made another attempt to crush the rebellion. This time Mahmud
called on the assistance of Muhammad Ali of Egypt and his modern army, promising that if successful Muhammad would be appointed governor of both Morea and Crete.

In 1825, Ibrahim Paşa, Muhammad’s son, and an expeditionary force of 17,000 men succeeded in establishing control over Crete. His forces then moved onto Morea where he “overwhelmed the rebels and devastated the countryside as he advanced” (Shaw 1977:19). Meanwhile, the Ottomans renewed their attacks in the north, advancing south to Missolonghi, which was finally taken after a year-long siege (April 1825 to April 1826). According to Shaw, “For all practical purposes, then, the Greek revolution was at an end, and with Ali Paşa of Janina gone and the Serbs cowed, Mahmud II had succeeded in reestablishing centralized control throughout most of his empire” (1977:19).

In March 1826 Russia sent an ultimatum to the sultan regarding the autonomy of Serbia and the privileges of Ottoman principalities. Under pressure from the British, Mahmud gave in to these demands in order to prevent a new war with Russia, and signed the Convention of Akkerman in October 1826. The convention allowed Russia domination over the Caucasus and free access to all Ottoman waters, including the Dardanelles. Following the Convention of Akkerman, Russia continued to pressure the Ottomans to make concessions to the Greeks, and proposed a joint intervention with Britain. Mahmud refused, and in turn reinforced his authority by sending more Ottoman and Egyptian forces to Greece. The allied Ottoman and Egyptian forces continued to regain territory, and captured Athens in June 1827.

Facing certain defeat, the Greeks called on the Great Powers for help. In 1826, by the Protocol of St. Petersburg, Britain and Russia committed themselves to a policy of mediation, to which France became a party through the Treaty of London in 1827. These treaties stated that all parties would intervene if the Greeks or the Ottomans refused mediation. Mahmud declined to
accept the treaty, causing allied fleets to sail into the Mediterranean. They blockaded the Dardanelles as well as Morea in order to cut off supplies to the Ottoman forces. Although the policy of intervention had been characterized by George Canning, the British foreign secretary and sympathizer to the Greek cause, as one of ‘peaceful intervention’, the Battle of Navarino in October 1827 proved otherwise. The allied forces of the Great Powers had hoped to draw the Ottomans out of the harbor and into the open sea, but to no avail. When the allied forces began to enter the harbor they were met by an Ottoman fire ship. It is uncertain whether the Ottomans ever opened fire. Regardless they were met with intense artillery barrage that completely destroyed 57 Ottoman and Egyptian ships, killing about 8,000 soldiers and sailors in the span of three hours (Shaw 1577:30). “With the kind of attitude that was to characterize European relations with the Porte during the remainder of the century, the allies blamed the Ottomans for the battle because of their attempt to resist the move into the harbor!” (Shaw 1977:30). Overall, the battle destroyed the Ottoman fleet, cut off all reinforcements and supplies to the Ottoman troops, and assured the Greeks of ultimate victory.

Despite this major setback, the Ottomans continued to wage war in Greece, even in the face of another war with Russia from 1828-1829, which resulted in considerable territorial losses. The Greek soldiers were not the only ones who suffered during the Revolution, the Greeks of Anatolia also suffered. The Ottomans reacted to the revolt with a general suppression of Greeks throughout the entire empire, dismissing many from government positions. Mahmut II also set up a new translation bureau to train Muslim interpreters, a task that had traditionally been performed by the Phanariot Greeks before the war of independence.

In the meantime, Greece enacted a third constitution in May of 1827, and elected Count Kapodistrias as the first president of Greece. In London, another tripartite agreement was draw
up by the Great Powers, outlining the organization of the new Greek state. Their new
government involved a hereditary monarchy whose king would be drawn from one of the royal
houses of Europe. Schooled in the tradition of the Russian autocracy Kapodistrias came into
conflict with the rising elites of Greek society – the landed nobility in the Peloponnesus, the
military chieftains, the intelligentsia, and the Phanariots. On October 9, 1831 two members of a
powerful family in the Peloponnesian assassinated Kapodistrias on his way to church in Naflion.

In May 1832 Greece’s existence as an independent state gained formal recognition
through a treaty between Bavaria and the Great Powers. Significantly, the Greeks themselves
were not party to the treaty. The new state would include the Peloponnesus, southern Roumeli
(Romania), and a number of islands near the mainland. The new King Otto, only seventeen
years old, arrived in the provisional capital of Naflion in February 1833 and took the throne.
The fact that the kingdom embraced within its borders such a small proportion, less than a
third, of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire was to create tensions that were only to
be resolve when, some ninety years after the granting of independence, the irredentist project
of the Megali Idea was consumed in the ashes of Smyrna in 1922. [Clogg 1992:47]

One aspiration would occupy the minds of the newly-born kingdom in the years following the
Revolution. This aspiration was the Megali Idea, the desire to liberate all of the ‘unredeemed’
Hellenes remaining throughout the Balkans and deteriorating Ottoman Empire, and to extend
Greece’s territorial expansion over all the regions they inhabited.

The ‘Eastern Question’

The ‘Eastern Question’ is the term used to describe the problems posed between the 18th
and the early 20th centuries by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, centering on the contest
for control of former Ottoman territories by the Great Powers of Europe. The Treaty of 
Karlowitz in 1699, granting territorial concessions to Austria, Poland, and Venice, marked the 
beginning of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In the first Russo-Turkish War, Russia 
secured favorable terms in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). The Russians also made considerable 
headway in Persia and in the Caucasus between 1813 and 1828. These developments and the 
outbreak of national aspirations among the oppressed peoples of the Balkans again made the 
‘Eastern Question’ a major European problem. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 ended 
with another set of territorial gains for Russia in the Treaty of Adrianople.

Following the end of the Greek War of Independence, Russia assisted the Ottomans 
militarily against Muhammad Ali of Egypt, and formed the Russo-Turkish alliance in 1833. In 
the final settlement of what became ‘the Egyptian question,’ the five Great Powers (Britain, 
France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) acted in concert, and created the Treaty of London in 1840, 
which offered international guarantees of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity.

In 1853 rivalry between Britain, France, and Russia precipitated the Crimean War, which 
ended with the Congress of Paris in 1856. In the Treaty of Paris, Russia agreed to open the 
Black Sea to all international merchants. The Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia 
(Romania) were recognized as quasi-independent states under Ottoman domain, and Russia 
ceded considerable territories back the Ottomans. In return for international protection by the 
Great Powers, the Sultan promised to improve the status of his Christian subjects. However, the 
Ottoman Empire had already been coined the ‘sick man of Europe’ and its eventual 
disintegration seemed inevitable.

Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to another Russo-Turkish War from 1877-1878. 
The Treaty of San Stefano, which concluded the war, was so favorable to Russia that Britain
nearly declared war in order to compel a revision. The Congress of Berlin (1878) revised the Treaty of San Stefano, but created new problems in the Balkans. The new Balkan states, dissatisfied with their borders, turned to individual Great Powers to support their claims. During this time, Germany became increasingly interested in extending its influence over the Ottoman Empire. The Germans helped in the reorganization of the Ottoman army, the construction of Baghdad Railway, the crisis over Morocco, and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. The amicable relationship with Germany would carry over into the First World War, where the ‘Eastern Question’ finally concluded with the complete annihilation of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Entente.

Despite the fact that the ‘Eastern Question’ was inextricably bound up with the future of the Ottoman Empire and its people, they were never consulted when the time came to search for answers. As shown above, the Great Powers maintained full control of the situation. Their interference was felt strongly among the Ottoman political leaders, who desperately wanted the independence to govern according to their own principles and wishes. The numerous attempts to appease the West, primarily through governmental reforms and unfavorable peace treaties, only accelerated the empire’s demise. This frustration would culminate in the Turkish War of Independence, and the ones who would suffer for the transgressions of the Great Powers would be the Greeks.

**Reform and Decline**

During his rule from 1808-1839, Mahmud II launched a significant reform program within the Ottoman bureaucracy based on Western precedents. Mahmud sought to modernize the empire in order to restore stability within the government and of the Ottoman borders.
Mahmud built up his own professional modern army, and rid the military of the Janissaries, who had become increasingly powerful and increasingly incompetent, by inciting a mutiny in 1826. He also established diplomatic corps on Western lines and exchanged ambassadors with European powers.

Mahmud set out to ‘Turkify’ the empire. The strength of nationalistic ideology had become abundantly clear through the revolts in the Balkans and Greece. Mahmud sought to quell the possibility of more rebellions by substituting the individualistic nationalism brewing in the millets, with a unifying Ottoman nationality. The notion of ‘Ottomanism’ developed slowly. One of the first steps was the establishment of the empire’s first newspaper in 1831, which helped to influence the creation of ‘public opinion’ and the development of the language.

After the Revolution, the Phanariots began to lose ground in the Ottoman bureaucracy. The Muslims began to send their children to Europe for a modern education, and also began replace Christians in government, using the tools of a Western education to help modernize the empire. Muslims began to send their sons to Europe for a modern education, and new schools including a school of medicine and a school of war were built in Anatolia. The entire governmental structure became bureaucratized. As Muslims began to learn European languages, these languages, particularly French, brought them in contact with the ideals of liberty and constitutionalism.

In 1824 Mahmud II took away the privileges that protected Ottoman merchants, forcing them to compete with foreign merchants. Although this undermined Ottoman commerce and manufacturing, the agrarian middle class benefited because they were able to sell their produce at prices higher than those paid by the state. Additionally, merchants who sold foreign imports and acted as middlemen on behalf of European companies also prospered. Ports such as Izmir,
Istanbul, Salonica, and Beirut prospered the most, and “created a vibrant economic climate that led to the immigration of Greeks from a stagnant Greece to a dynamic Ottoman Empire” (Ahmad 2003:31).

The benefits of free trade went disproportionately to the Christian communities. According to the Great Powers, the capitulations permitted them to sell protection to their co-religionists and to make them ‘protégés.’ This international status allowed Ottoman Christian merchants to benefit from lower taxes, and also created difficulty in the application of Ottoman law since the internationally protected Christians could only be tried before consular courts. Finding it difficult to compete against the protected Christian merchants, many Muslims abandoned commerce and industry and sought employment in the state bureaucracy and army.

Pressure from the Great Powers ushered in a series of reforms particularly dealing with the minorities of the Empire. In 1838, the Charter of the Rose Chamber promised the beginning of a new age with equality for all; it guaranteed the lives, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects. While the communities welcomed the possibility of equality, many were unwilling to abandon the privileges of autonomy that came with the millet system. The 1856 Royal Charter defined in more precise terms ‘equality’ as equality between Muslim and Christian subjects, and equality before the law for all Ottoman subjects with communal privileges restricted to religious affairs. However, the Great Powers’ interpretation of ‘equality,’ “equality of the millets as corporate communities and not equality between Christians and Muslims” only served to strengthen the position of the Christian population, especially of the rising middle class, while the Muslim counterpart weakened (Ahmad 2003:35). Christian communities became secularized and acquired characteristics of individual ‘nations’. In turn, each began to undergo a ‘renaissance’ during which they rediscovered their history, language and literature.
During the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876), the Porte carried out educational measures to promote understanding between communities and lead to the success of Ottomanism, which had now developed into an ideology that focused on loyalty around the person of the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty. University education within the empire was reorganized on Western lines, including training in the European sciences and mathematics. State-run postal and telegraph systems were established in the 1830s, and railroads were built in the 1860s. In 1876 a constitution was established based heavily on European prototypes. The constitution improved the position of minority religious groups, whose role in the Ottoman economy had been steadily increasing.

Discontent mounted among the Muslims due to the concessions Tanzimat statesmen had made to Europe and to the Ottoman Christians. Out of this discontent grew the Young Turks. They rebuked the high bureaucrats for making Christians a privileged group while neglecting the Muslim population. “All the reforms of the Tanzimat had not led to the creation of a modern economy; they had merely led to the subordination of the Ottoman economy to that of Europe” (Ahmad 2003:37).

Unable to voice their opinions in the government-controlled press, the Young Turks were forced to create an underground movement of secret societies. The rebels regrouped in France where they formed the Young Ottomans Society. They distributed their own journals in which they repeatedly called for a constitution and representative government. They emphasized deterioration in the economic life of the people, financial situation of the state, and the Porte’s dependence on the Great Powers, significant factors which undermined the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.
The Ottoman Empire seemed to be falling apart. Money borrowed from Europe in 1854 for the Crimean War was wasted on arms, lavish palaces, and weddings. As a result, the Empire went into bankruptcy. To make matters worse, the Ottomans were forced to slowly watch their empire slip away as continuous warfare resulted in the increasing loss of territory, and the subsequently influx of Muslim refugees. The Serbs and the Bulgarians revolted in 1875. In Britain, William Gladstone, leader of the Liberal Party “denounced the Ottomans as barbarians who had committed atrocities against the Christian Bulgarians, and appealed for British support for the rebels” (Ahmad 2003:40). In 1877, Russia declared war – again – on the Ottomans and managed to advance all the way to Istanbul by the spring of 1878. The peace treaty of San Stefano ordered the Porte to grant independence to many groups in the Balkans and gave Russia control over the provinces in the Caucuses. The Great Powers feared that this gave Russia too much power, and Britain, unwilling to accept Russian gains, sent warships to Istanbul.

In the eyes of the Ottomans, Lord Bismarck, the German chancellor, acted as ‘honest broker’ and assembled the Great Powers in Berlin to reconsider the terms of San Stefano. The revised treaty divided the provinces between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Britain while granting independence to Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania. Overall, the Ottomans lost about 40 percent of their empire and about 20 percent of their population (Ahmad 2003:41). Many Muslims fled the Balkans as refugees and moved to Istanbul and central Anatolia.

At this point, all that the Ottomans desired was the Great Powers out of their business. They hoped that by establishing a constitutional monarchy they might win the sympathy and support of Europe, and that the Great Powers would finally allow the empire to manage its own affairs. Because a constitutional regime was not possible under the current sultan, Abdülaziz, he
was forced to abdicate in May 1876. Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) took the throne on August 31 with a promise that he would rule as constitutional monarch.

However, the Great powers had already decided to go ahead and hold an international conference in Istanbul to decide the Ottoman Empire’s fate. The conference met on December 23, 1876, the same day that the Porte proclaimed the inauguration of the constitutional regime. The Great Powers didn’t leave. Instead they presented their answer to the crisis in the Balkans—that the Ottomans grant Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomy. When the Porte rejected this proposal, the ambassadors warned that they would leave the capital, and suggested that in such circumstances Russia might declare war. Despite their threats, the Porte still rejected the proposal. As expected, the ambassadors left and Russia declared war.

In spite of the Great Powers conference, the Porte had already carried through with the institution of their new constitutional monarchy. They held elections which created an upper and lower house, the former composed of representatives of the millets, and the latter of members appointed by the Sultan. But with the onset of war, the sultan was forced to suspend parliament, which did not reconvene until the restoration of the constitution in July 1908.

The war against Russia, Europe’s partisan attitude towards the Ottomans and the crisis in the Balkans shattered the illusions of the reformers with regard to Europe’s attitude towards the Muslim world. The reformers were faced with the contradiction of adopting Western ideas and institutions while struggling against western imperialism. [Ahmad 2003:43]

As it became quite evident that the Ottomans could not trust the Great Powers, who only sought to dismantle their empire piece by piece and claim the spoils for themselves, Abdülhamid called for Islamic unity in the face of Western imperialism. At the same time Germany, who had no Muslim colonies, saw this as a perfect opportunity to use an alliance with the Ottomans.
against its imperial rivals. In October 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II paid a state visit to the Ottoman Empire, distinguishing himself as the only European ruler to do so. After visiting Istanbul he traveled on to Jerusalem and placed a wreath on the tomb of Saladin, the great Muslim hero who had defeated the crusaders. This act symbolized his friendship towards the Muslims and his separation from the Western Powers that once ravaged the Muslim world during the crusades and were now seeking to destroy the Ottoman Empire. He proclaimed himself a friend of the Muslim peoples, cementing a relationship that led to the German-Ottoman alliance during the First World War.

Rather than remaining true to the ideals of a constitutional monarchy, Abdülhamid II sought a return to despotic absolutism. Under the instruction of German advisors, he reconstructed the military. The Germans also helped in the establishment of railways and telegraph lines. Under Abdülhamid the old bureaucratic apparatus remained largely in place and social reforms were minimal, but the military and communication infrastructure for a modern state was established.

Also under his rule, the Christians began to feel the pressure of Ottomanism. Ottomanism was the Ottoman Empire’s own brand of nationalism, and they used it to try and homogenize the empire. The first thing that separated the minority millets from the dominant Muslim millet was by definition religion. Although forced and arbitrary conversion was officially scorned, towards the last quarter of the 19th century, as evidenced from Ottoman archives, accounts of forced conversion became more frequent (Deringil 1998:84).

This is particularly evident in the ‘bureaucratization’ of the conversion procedure documented in late 19th century regulations. According to these regulations, the convert had to be above the age of puberty and a priest, as well as the convert’s parents or next of kin, had to be in attendance. There were also documents that needed to be signed and sealed by Muslim and
Christian officials alike. These regulations developed in reaction to the frequent illegal conversions reported by the Greek and Armenian communities: “The Greek Patriarchate frequently complained that members of its congregation had approached it with tales of woe involving underage children converting as a result of being abducted” (Deringil 1998:86). The abduction of young girls was particularly common. Deringil suggests that abducted children were converted and kept at the imam’s house. There the imam promised that if they encouraged others to convert, it would be in their interest. Essentially, that “convert children were being used as decoys for others to follow in their footsteps” (Deringil 1998:87).

After the Greek War of Independence, it became evident to the Ottoman officials that the autonomous schools of the millets had been used to stir up feelings of nationalism. Therefore, “non-Muslim educational establishments were kept under the closest supervision and were always regarded with extreme suspicion” (Deringil 1998:105). Under Abdülhamid II, the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Tanzimat period disappeared, and a series of educational reforms were passed granting Ottoman authorities progressively more power over the curriculum and administration of non-Muslim schools. The first, 1858 Law on Education, stated that all non-Muslim schools must obtain a license and their activities must conform to the regulations of the Ottoman Ministry of Education. According to Deringil, the “Ottoman archives are full of orders to close down this or that school ostensibly for lacking a license’’ (199:105). For example, in March of 1890 the Ministry of Education closed down all of the Greek schools in the vilayet of Manastir due to lack of license. Overall, the policies on education served to reinforce the ideological legitimacy of the Ottoman social order, which felt increasingly threatened by the changing world conditions. Education was viewed as indoctrination, an attempt to secure the obedience, loyalty, and cooperation of the non-Muslim millets.
Also during this time, Crete revolted and sought a union with the new kingdom of Greece. Dadrian notes that “the conditions of Cretan discontent were part of the syndrome of Turkish misrule and oppression” (1995:52). Ahmad characterizes the revolt as “a war that the Ottomans won on the battlefield but lost at the peace table” (2003:46). In their usual character, the Great Powers intervened and forced Abdülhamid to give up Thessaly and establish an autonomous regime in Crete. By 1912 Crete had become part of Greece.

During this time, the Young Turks’ movement had developed considerable power. Led by intelligent and progressive officers and public servants, it aimed to destroy Abdülhamid absolutist regime and restore the constitution. By 1908 its leaders formed in Salonica the Secret Society of Union and Progress, and in July of that year staged a military coup and forced the sultan to restore the constitutional regime.

The restoration of the constitution on July 24, 1908 was a day of great joy throughout the Ottoman Empire. According to Housepian: “Joyous demonstrations took place in Athens, where parading Greeks carried Ottoman flags alongside their own. Armenians and Turks embraced one another on the streets, and Turkish delegations bore armfuls of wreaths to Armenian cemeteries” (1971:19). Overnight the press was free to publish without fear of censorship, people were able to speak openly of political views in coffee houses, and amnesty was declared for political prisoners and exiles. This was followed by a series of elections, favoring the new Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in congress. However, the new government was still unstable, and in 1909 a counter-revolution was launched by the Liberals of Anatolia. Abdülhamid II was deposed and Mehmed V rose to the throne.

Within three years, the Ottoman Empire was caught up in another war, this time in Balkans from 1912-1913. The Balkan allies (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece) took advantage
of Ottoman political dissension and its ongoing war with Italy in Libya (1911), and attacked in October 1912. The Ottomans suffered another humiliating defeat, and the Great Powers favored concessions for the Balkan minorities. Britain bullied the Ottomans to surrender Edirne (Adrianople) to Bulgaria. After repeated refusal, the city finally fell after a six-month siege. The Treaty of London gave Edirne to Bulgaria, along with all of the territory west of the Erez-Midya Line.

As if dismantling the empire through territorial gains was not enough, Britain tried to stage a coup within the Ottoman government but failed. A new Unionist cabinet of moderate character formed under Said Halim Paşa (1863-1921). The cabinet included members from the Arab provinces as well as the Armenian community. “That there was no Greek minister in the cabinet simply shows that the impact of the Balkan War had heightened Greek nationalism and the Greek community was no longer considered reliable and part of the Ottoman commonwealth” (Ahmad 2003:59).

War started up again in the Balkans in June 1913 when Bulgaria attacked the Serbs and the Greeks. In July, Rumania declared war on Bulgaria, followed by the Ottomans who joined the war acting independently of the Balkan states. Finding Thrace undefended, the Ottomans began to occupy the territory they had just recently lost and rushed to reclaim Edirne before the Greeks. The Great Powers again intervened. In September 1914, a treaty was signed with Bulgaria giving eastern Thrace, which included Edirne, to the Ottomans and also included terms for the exchange of populations.

The diplomatic isolation the Ottomans had experienced during and after the Balkan Wars made it clear that the Unionists must form an alliance with one of the two European blocks – the Triple Entente composed of Britain, France, and Russia or the Triple Alliance of Germany,
Austria, and Italy. The Unionists preferred the former, but were rebuffed by each. Germany was also reluctant to form an alliance with the Ottomans because they were viewed as a diplomatic and military liability. However, after the outbreak of WWI the Kaiser “saw the empire and the caliphate as the basis from which to foment *jihad*, or holy war, against England” and a secret alliance was formed in August 1914 (Ahmad 2003:62).
II. GREECE AND TURKEY DURING WORLD WAR I

The Megali Idea and the Balkan Wars

After the annexation of Thessaly and Crete in 1912, the hunger of Greece to acquire the lands of the ‘unredeemed’ Greeks on the other side of the Aegean grew. The heart of what defined a Greek was not to be found in Athens, but rather the nationalist fervor was emotionally much closer to Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire. The Turkish occupation had always been considered temporary, and folk songs and legends among the populace spread the idea that one day all the Greeks would be united again and form one nation with its capital in Constantinople, the “Polis”. Polis in Greek means ‘city’, but for a Greek there is really only one ‘Polis’ and that is Constantinopolis: “And even today, when one says that he is leaving for the ‘city’, or that his father was born in the ‘city’, or that a great fire destroyed many shops in the ‘city’, everyone understands that he is referring to Istanbul” (Pentzopoulos 1962:26).

Eleutherios Venizelos was a major player in Greek expansion and the spread of the Megali Idea. When he came to Athens from Crete in 1910, the small kingdom only contained within its borders a little more than a third (37%) of all Greeks living within the Balkans and Asia Minor (Pentzopoulos 1962:27). Most of these Greeks were found along the coast and made their living as sailors or merchants, while the interior was predominately Turks and other non-Greek races that had become the backbone of rural life through farming and agriculture. The Balkan wars (1912-1913) revealed the difficulty of trying to claim back the lands of these ‘unredeemed’ Greeks. The Balkans surged with not only the nationalist zeal of the Greeks, but also of the Serbs and the Bulgars who also felt they had a fair claim. The first of the two successive wars broke out in October 1912 between the Balkan League (Serbia, Montenegro,
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Bulgaria and Greece) and the Ottoman Empire spurred by twin massacres near Skopje (in Macedonia) during the summer of 1912. The Great Powers quickly interceded and warned the insurgents that no territorial conquest of any of the members of the Balkan League would be recognized. University students reacted in Istanbul by marching down the streets and chanting “We want war, war, war,” and “Down with Greece! Greeks, bow your heads!” They also cried “Down with Article 23, down with it” and “Down with equality... we don’t want equality” in regards to the provision in the Treaty of Berlin which stipulated reforms to benefit the oppressed Christian subjects (Dadrian 1995:189). The Bulgarian Premier, I.E. Geshof, defended the position of the Christian minorities, calling the war “a crusade against unbearable Turkish tyranny that is exploiting and martyring the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula” (cited in Dadrian 1995:190).

Greece accomplished several major military victories between November and March, enabling the allied Balkan forces to drive the Turks from all their European territories. In May 1913 peace had been restored, and it was now time to divide the spoils. Serbia aimed to annex a large part of Albania, but this was opposed by both the Albanians, who had since declared their independence, as well as Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Great Powers intervened and a settlement was drawn up in London to create an independent Albania. Unfortunately, this cut Serbia completely off from the sea. Unable to argue with the Great Powers, Serbia asked for larger concessions in Macedonia from Bulgaria. By June 1913 war had returned, and Bulgaria launched two surprise attacks against both Serbia and Greece, making “a mockery of the coalition” (Dadrian 1995:191).

By the end of the Second Balkan War each of the Balkan nationalities had emancipated themselves from Ottoman domain, leaving only the Armenians and Arabs as subject
nationalities. Bulgaria lost territory to all of her enemies in the Treaty of Bucharest, particularly Greece who increased in area from 25,014 to 41,933 square miles and in population from 2,660,000 to 4,363,000 (Anderson 1969). The annexed territory included Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salonika, Kavala, and the Aegean littoral as far east as the Mesta River. Greece also extended her northwestern frontier to include the great fortress of Janina. In addition, Crete was definitely assigned to Greece and was formally taken over on December 14, 1913.

Despite the significant gains, the success in the Balkan Wars was a mixed victory. Greece had now become much less homogenous. Greek Macedonia contained 528,000 Greeks, 465,000 Muslims, 104,000 Bulgarians and 98,000 Jews. Greeks amounted to less than half of the population (44.1 %) (Pentzopoulos 1962: 28). The realization of the Meχαlli Idea and the notion of a homogenous Greek nation needed to be altered to accommodate for this change in demography. The new and enlarged state would now contain many foreign elements along with the Hellenic, but would keep “naturally their particular national consciousness under the sovereignty of the Hellenic element and as their connecting link – the Greek language – the official language of the state” (Pallis cited in Pentzopoulos 1962:28).

The only large Greek settlements remaining outside the country lay in Ottoman Anatolia. Venizelos knew that it would require a major international upheaval in order to make these lands available to Greece. Moreover, it had become quite obvious that no Greco-Turkish agreement would have any hope of permanence unless it was sanctioned by the Great Powers. After the Balkan Wars, Greece did not have to wait long for an upheaval. Austria declared war on Serbia in July 1914, and a domino effect of war declarations based on international alliances quickly spread the war over all of Europe.
Meanwhile, nearly 250,000 Muslim refugees appeared in Anatolia. In Istanbul mosques were converted into shelters to house the homeless refugees. The Turkish government struggled financially to accommodate all of the displaced Muslims. According to Toynbee:

The arrival of the Rumelian [Turks from the Balkans] refugees from the end of 1912 onwards produced an unexampled tension of feeling in Anatolia and a desire for revenge; and so the Balkan War had tow harvests of victims: first, the Roumeli Turks on the one side, and then the Anatolian Greeks on the other. [1922:139]

**Persecution of the Christians Begins**

The state of Christians, particularly Greek Orthodox Christians, had steadily declined following the Greek War of Independence. The Ottoman state was well aware of the danger of nationalism, and was determined to squelch insurrection among its minorities through the proliferation of its own nationalist ideology – Ottomanism. Unfortunately for the Christians, proscribing to Ottomanism meant virtually complete assimilation – loss of religion, language and traditions. In May 1890, in accordance with the educational reforms of Abdülhamid II, the vilayet of Bursa was instructed to ‘punish in an exemplary fashion’ the teachers and director of an Armenian school in western Anatolia, because the schoolchildren’s songs sung in the Armenian language had been deemed ‘subversive’ (Deringil 1998:106).

A book published in 1918 by the American Branch of the Oxford University Press for the American-Hellenic Society in New York, tells of the Greek persecutions leading up to, and during WWI. The Ottoman attempt to develop a united nationalist culture was viewed by the Greeks as a “program put into operation by the Young Turks in the year 1913, with the object of annihilating Hellenism” (Brown and Ion 1918:v). The book is on the whole tainted with
nationalist propaganda aimed to gain the support of the Greek diaspora. However, it also makes reference to historical pieces of legislature and may be used to show the effects these new laws, along with the Ottoman attempts at nationalization, had on the Greek population of Asia Minor.

Some aspects of the Hamidian educational reform have already been discussed. The biggest issue with this legislation was the requirement that Turkish language must be taught in equal measure to the Greek language. Geography and history also had to be taught in Turkish. The Greek language, along with the Orthodox religion, is a key component of the Greek identity. These laws were viewed as a severe blow to Hellenism in Asia Minor, where the Greek language was one of the few ties remaining that connected the Greek communities of Asia Minor to the Greeks of Greece.

The Ottomans slowly began to remove power from the Greek Patriarchate in an effort to bring all of Ottoman subjects under the jurisdiction of the Muslim courts. The power of the patriarch to draw up wills was abolished. The clergy became subject to Ottoman law and could therefore be summoned to court or jailed. While the Greeks viewed this as an abuse which the Ottomans would use to imprison the Christian clergy at will, the Ottomans viewed this as establishing equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim courts of law.

Conversion to Islam also increased at the expense of the patriarch. Although early legislation had required a priest to be present at the time of conversion, new laws passed in 1915 denied the Patriarchate all rights of intervention. According to Brown and Ion, and supported by Deringil, the abduction of young Christian girls had become rampant, and with the new legislation the Greeks had no legal course of action to protest the subsequent conversions (1918:4-5, 1998:86).
Traditionally, under the Ottoman Empire all property belonged to the state. It was only through ‘gifts’ made by the sultan that property came into the hands of the millets and their leaders. In an attempt to establish equality among all Ottoman subjects, communal privileges became restricted to religious affairs and the religious communities, millets, were reduced to a congregations (cemâat) (Ahmad 2003:35). As the privileges of the Greek Patriarchate began to disappear, so did Greek rights to Ottoman lands. Greeks viewed this as the confiscation of “the national property of the Greeks” (Brown and Ion 1918:6). Notably, the lands taken away from the Greeks were actually purchased by the state, although according to the Greeks, significantly below their actual value. The Greeks of Asia Minor felt abandoned by the new Greek state, which they felt should have come to their aid. Rising hostility against the Muslims of Greece can also be heard in their cries:

The application of such a decision completely stripping the Patriarchate, the Greek communities and the monasteries of their property, which reached a total value of many million pounds, could only have been stopped if the Greek Government had threatened, as a retaliatory measure, to confiscate the property belonging to the Turkish religious institutions in Greece. Unfortunately, it was the epoch at which, far from appreciating the importance of such a loss of wealth, Greece seemed rather to be seeking to make amends…” [Brown and Ion 1918:6]

While the early reforms were a blow to Greek culture, the later reforms threatened the lives of the Greek subjects. The Balkan Wars had left the Empire materially and politically bankrupt. Meanwhile, the Greeks had prospered through the domination of local trade. With thousands of poor Muslim refugees flooding Anatolia at war’s end, hostilities between the
Muslims and Christian minorities rose. Reforms were now aimed at reestablishing the balance of power, with the Muslims in a position of dominance.

Under Abdülhamid II, non-Muslims were required to pay a yearly war tax in return for exemption from military service. After the restoration of the Constitution, everyone became equal under the law, and so Muslims and non-Muslims alike were all required to render military service up to the age of 31. Those over the age of 31 that had never served were still exempt. After the outbreak of the World War I, the age was increased to include those up to 48 and the exemption fee was increased to £45 (Brown and Ion 1918:7). Those who were able to pay the exemption fee did, but most of the Greeks conscripted were unable to pay the fee, and were therefore forced to serve. According to Brown and Ion the Ottomans purposefully subjected the conscripted Greeks “to such deprivations and hardships as to compel them to dispose of their small properties in order to pay the exemption fee and obtain their release, or else not to enter the service at all, in which case they were proclaimed deserters” (1918:8). The latter was never a safe option since severe penalties were imposed on deserters and men who avoided military service. Within a short time frame their families were forced to move and were escorted by Ottoman officials into the interior of Anatolia. While the Ottomans had always kept a good account of the Muslim populations for conscription, the new addition of non-Muslims led to some problems. According to Brown and Ion “no distinction was made between those who were banished and those who had for many years been living abroad.” So regardless of the circumstances, if the man of the house was missing, and therefore unable to serve, his family was sent to the interior (1918:10).

Those Christians that did not serve, by virtue of the tax exemption, were not necessarily better off. The Ottomans established a system of labor battalions into which Christians were
drafted. These divisions of laborers predominantly worked in the interior of Anatolia, to build public roads and Muslim houses, work in quarries, and cultivate the fields of Turkish immigrants. They were subjected to hard labor and given little food. A report from the Greek consul in Iconium dated March 7, 1917 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7027) describes the conditions of workers:

As a result of this law these unfortunate men, on being drafted into these battalions are distributed throughout the interior of the empire, [taken] from the coasts of Asia Minor and the Black Sea [and sent] to Bagdad, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Egypt, some to construct military roads, others to make tunnels for the Bagdad railroad, and others to cultivated the fields. Receiving absolutely no pay, badly nourished and clothed, exposed to changes in the weather, the blazing sun of Bagdad and the intolerable cold of the Caucasus, assailed by sickness, fever, eruptive typhoid and cholera, they are perishing by thousands. For a while those able to pay the exemption fees were released from service, and thus those who were relatively well off were rescued from ruin and sure death, but for the last five months these, too, have been compelled to serve in these labor battalions. While visiting the hospitals of the city of Iconium, I have seen these unfortunates stretched out on their beds or on the ground like living skeletons, waiting in agony for death as their deliverer from this life of misery and privation. There is a total lack of drugs and food, and the only attention the sick receive is a visit from the doctor twice a day. Those who are able to stand go about the streets of the city begging a piece of bread. In order to give a faithful picture of these grievous situation it is enough to state that the cemetery of Iconium, as a result of the great mortality of the Greeks working in these labor battalions, has been filled to overflowing with graves in which not one corpse, as is the usual custom, is buried, but into which are cast, like dogs, as many as four, five or even six dead. [cited in Brown and Ion 1918:9-10]

Though this book was published over twenty years before the outbreak of World War II, the labor battalions depicted in the above ‘report’ are reminiscent of the concentration camps used
during the Holocaust. The concepts are relatively similar: a persecuted minority is forced to perform hard labor with little food or medical care, resulting in starvation and death.

Those Christians who spoke out against the new reforms and participated in the rhetoric of Western nationalism “mysteriously disappeared or were found murdered” (Housepian 1971:20). The American consul in Salonika, George Horton, noted that despite the Ottoman excuses to the men’s wives that their husbands had simply run away, the truth “could not long be hidden as shepherds and others were soon reporting corpses found in ravines and gullies in the mountains and woods…” (cited in Housepian 1971:20).

After Turkey had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and the British failed to take the Dardanelles, the Young Turks felt secure that they were free from foreign control and could do as they pleased. The rising insurrection of the Armenians in western Anatolia was brought to an end through large scale massacres and deportations, the most infamous occurring at Van in April 1915. Whether this so-called “policy of extermination” was planned by the central government or not, is beyond the scope of this paper. What is most important to note, is that at this point in the game the Young Turks were willing to resort to the physical removal, whether by death or deportation, of all members of the Christian millets unwilling to assimilate, which essentially meant conversion to Islam and the adoption the Turkish language. The attacks against the Christians were no doubt partially motivated by the fact that Muslims all over the empire were suffering from poverty and war. As the borders of the Ottoman Empire shrunk with each defeat, thousands upon thousands of Muslims fled the subjugated lands and came to Anatolia destitute and ravaged by war. That the Muslims of the empire, who for centuries had been the dominant class, the ‘more equal’ and favored millet, were now suffering while the Christian minorities prospered, must have been hard to bear. Past legislation which had allowed
the Christian merchants to prosper through international trade was a major cause in the
differential prosperity between the two groups. The Young Turks rose to represent the Muslims
of the empire, and in this role, made it their duty to reset the balance of power, even if this
entailed brutal measures against non-Muslims.

Following the deportation of the Armenians from western Anatolia, the Young Turks set
their sights on the Greeks in the hinterlands of the Smyrna district. In June 1915 the Turkish
press launched a violent campaign against the Greeks. This inflamed hostilities that had been
growing for decades, and murders of Greek peasants broke out all over the countryside. This
culminated in a massacre of Greeks at Phocia, the deportation of several hundred thousand
others, and the destruction of their homes and vineyards. George Horton, the American consul in
Salonika, admitted “There is no doubt that the people who were expelled to the interior from the
coastal towns were robbed and malevolently maltreated and that many girls were
violated...many Greeks from the coast escaped to nearby islands where they have been nursing
their vengeance” (cited in Housepian 1971:30).

World War I

The First World War signaled the end of the old ruling dynasties, including the Ottoman
Empire. The set of alliance systems that had divided Europe in two parts – the Entente: Britain,
France, and Russia, and the Central Powers: Germany and Austria-Hungary – quickly
accelerated the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia into an international affair. Turkey,
shunned in earlier attempts to ally with the forces of the Entente, sided with Germany and the
Central Powers. Turkey entered the war in November 1914, and won great victories in the
Dardanelles, and Gallipoli. In August 1916 Rumania joined the Allies. The Central powers
“now decided to make an object lesson of Rumania as a warning to other neutrals who might be thinking of following its course” (Stavrianos 1995:574). German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish forces descended upon Rumania and succeeded in knocking out over 2/3 of the country, including the capital. This left Greece as the only neutral in the Balkans.

When war broke out in the summer of 1914 Venizelos, who had strong emotional attachment to Britain and France, favored Greece’s entry on the side of the Entente. He viewed the war as the decisive historical moment at which the Megali Idea might be realized. However, King Constantine, who had ascended the throne in 1913, was an honorary Field Marshal in the German army and married to the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and preferred that Greece remain neutral. This conflict between the two great leaders escalated when Venizelos resigned in March 1915 and formed the Revolutionary Government in Salonika in 1916, resulting in a destructive period in Greek political life known as the dichasmos, or dissension. The country divided itself between the Royalist government, headed by Constantine, and the Revolutionary government, headed by Venizelos (Figure 4).

Meanwhile the Allies had decided that Greece’s assistance in the war was essential in order to succeed in Macedonia, where they had been fighting inconclusively against Bulgaria. After numerous attempts to persuade Constantine to join the war, the Allies decided to increase the pressure using extra-legal measures. In December 1916, British and French forces landed in Piraeus and Athens with aims to back up their demands for war materials and to secure control of the railway to the north. Threatened, Greek troops began shooting at the Allied forces, forcing them to retreat. Constantine then purged the government of all known supporters of Venizelos. The Allies responded by seizing the Greek fleet and blockading Greek ports. These “increasingly flagrant violations of Greece’s sovereignty” culminated with the recognition of
Venizelos's provisional government in Salonika and the demand that King Constantine leave the country because he had “violated his oath as constitutional monarch” (Clogg 1992:92-93). In turn, Constantine was succeeded by his son Alexander, and Venizelos became prime minister. Prominent supporters of the deposed king were exiled as ‘germano-philes’ and Greece entered the war on the side of the Entente in June 1917.

America joined the war in April 1917, and over the course of the next year, the Allies won significant battles against the Central Powers. The Allied victory began with the surrender of Bulgaria in September 1918. After suffering a significant defeat at the hands of the British imperial forces and isolated after Bulgaria’s surrender, the Turks accepted an armistice on October 30, 1918. Austria-Hungary and Germany quickly followed in November 1918.

Paris Peace Conference

In January 1919, The Four (Britain, America, France, and Italy) gathered near Paris to negotiate a peace treaty to end World War I. By the time work began, it was clear that the pre-war, world map required drastic revision. The high cost of the war, in terms of both human life and money, along with the secret treaties among the Great Powers, made negotiations difficult. The ‘Eastern Question’, how to handle concessions in Asia Minor, became a topic of great debate. Notably five of the secret treaties related to the partition of the Ottoman Empire: three concerning rules and regulations governing the Dardanelles and the division of various territories, and two dedicated exclusively to the partition of the western districts.

In the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) in return for services to the Entente, Britain and France agreed to give Italy full possession of the Dodecanese, as well as rights in the Antalya province in Asia Minor. They also stated that Italy’s territory in Asia Minor would be
proportional to that of the other Allied Powers. In the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (April 19, 1917) Italy had been promised large additions to the west of Antalya, including Smyrna. However, this treaty was considered null since Russia, who was not present at the conference, had been unable to ratify it as provided in the text. These secret treaties stood in direct conflict with an earlier agreement between Venizelos and British Prime Minister, Sir Francis Elliot, in January of 1915. At this time the Allies were still trying to persuade Greece to enter the war. On January 23, Sir Elliot announced to Venizelos that if Greece entered the war, it would receive in exchange Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese except Rhodes, and a large territorial zone on the western coast of Asia Minor. However, no formal treaty was drawn up or signed.

Venizelos attended the Paris peace conference as leader of the Greek delegation with the Megali Idea on the top of his agenda. He sought to gain the lands promised by Sir Elliot as a reward for his devotion to the Entente. His main objective was Smyrna and the surrounding vilayet of Aydin. He also hoped for international control of Constantinople, with Greek control of both western and eastern Thrace leading up to Constantinople. Venizelos was willing to concede Northern Epirus and the Dodecanese if these initial aims could be reached. Moreover, Northern Epirus was already part of the new nation of Albania, while the Dodecanese was already known to have been ceded to Italy through the 1915 Treaty of London.

The Italians’ theatrics, such as leaving in the middle of the Conference, and their unwillingness to compromise on any concessions in Asia Minor or with the Yugoslavs made the Italians a force to be reckoned with: “It was finally decided, because the Italians were insistent, that the effort to settle their claims be continued and, as far as possible, completed in the treaties of peace” (Baker 1922:183). The combination of the fight over land between Italy and the Yugoslavs and the fight over land in Asia Minor resulted in a huge mess, as Britain and France
tried to settle one dispute, e.g. the Yugoslavs, by increasing Italy’s concessions in the other
dispute, and vice versa. Besides western Turkey, which Greece had its eye on, Great Britain and
France also had ambitions in Asia Minor, particularly the eastern lands containing oil and
mineral resources. To try to fix the “Italian-Turkish Mediterranean problem” Lloyd George, the
British Premier, decided he “would satisfy the Italians by giving them a big slice of Turkey”
(Baker 1922:187). No sooner had they begun to recarve the pieces, than the Italians got into
another disagreement, this time with Britain over the Austro-Hungarian ships. “There were
clashes with the Italians on every hand…[they] were unable to keep from adding to the essential
difficulties of the situation by piling little things on top of their main demands” (Baker
1922:187). The Italians continued to prove uncompromising, and finally, when “they could not
get what they wanted at the Peace Conference, were prepared to take it by force” (Baker
1922:189). Italy sent warships to Smyrna to secure her claims.

At this point all of the other delegates were exasperated at the “utter absorption of Italy at
every turn in her selfish interests and her tactlessness in pursuing them to the minutest end”
(Baker 1922:189). The proposal of giving Smyrna to the Greeks was suggested. In February
Venizelos had spoke to the Supreme Council and presented the case for the reconstitution of
Hellas and the unification of all the Greek-speaking peoples under one flag. Venizelos based his
claim on Point Twelve of the Wilson Principles and on the right of self-determination. The
question of Greek demands had since then remained relatively dormant. Wilson, who had been
won over by the eloquence of Venizelos and the fact that Smyrna was a predominantly Greek
city, supported giving the western concessions in Asia Minor to Greece.

On May 5 reports reached Paris that the Italians had arrived at Antalya and Marmaris.
Anxiety spread that the troops might soon be put ashore in Smyrna. Thus Lloyd George
proposed an immediate redistribution of the armies of occupation in the east, and the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops. The division of Asia Minor was again redrawn (Figure 5), this time Britain sacrificed its rich oil producing region of the Caucasus as a concession to the Italians. The American troops would occupy Constantinople and Armenia, while France occupied Syria.

On the eve of May 5, The Three met Venizelos in Lloyd George’s apartment to plan the occupation of Smyrna. They all decided to say nothing to the Italians or the Turks until the Greek force had disembarked. Overall, “arrangements were made for having small parties of British, French, and Italian marines take part in the landing to give it an international character; but the forts were to be handed over to the Greeks” (Baker 1922:192). On May 12 The Three broke the news to Italy, who could do nothing but capitulate. On May 15 Greek forces, protected by allied warships, occupied the city with the purpose of protecting the local Greek population from Turkish reprisal during the peace process. From this point forward, relations between the Turks and the Greeks took a horrifying turn for the worst.
III. THE SMYRNA MASSACRES:
THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR / TURKISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1919-1922

Historiography and Hermeneutics

The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks in May of 1919 acted as the catalyst for the brutality and intolerance between Greeks and Turks which continues to this day. In the three years between the Greek campaign in 1919 that began in Smyrna and the Turkish campaign in 1922 that ended in Smyrna countless atrocities were committed by both sides. It was a savage war of revenge, fueled by nationalistic ideology and religious intolerance. Much of the murder and destruction came not from organized national armies, but by the civilians themselves, "intent on avenging real and imagined injuries – some recent, some centuries old" (McCarthy 1983:120). The rules of war did not apply. The rising hostility between the two groups, caused by political factors, in turn encouraged religious intolerance. Religion became an issue in apart because of the previous divisions between Greeks and Turks, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, in the millet system. In addition, the Great Powers, in favoring the concerns and desires of their Christian neighbors, did not listen nor did they respect the concerns and desires of the Ottoman Muslims. Moreover, the notion of the true Turk as a Muslim Turk was and still is intrinsic to the Turkish identity. In the face of extreme oppression by the West, the call to jihad and Muslim unity was a predictable recourse.

In researching the events of 1919-1922, I was struck by how significantly the accounts of the atrocities vary between sources. The nationality of the author, even in the most recent texts, almost always determines on which side the guilt will lay. Authors writing about Greek history tend to gloss over the Turkish massacres that occurred in Smyrna during the Greek occupation. Pentzopoulos does not even mention them, but rather jumps quickly to the Turkish nationalist
movement and the Greco-Turkish War. Clogg acknowledges the massacres, but describes them succinctly: "...the landings were marked by Greek atrocities, with some 350 Turks being killed or wounded in fighting with Greek troops. Despite the ruthless punishment of the Greek culprits and the arrival a few days later of the Greek high commissioner...the damage had been done."

On the other hand, when it came time to describe the Greek massacres in Smyrna in 1922, both Clogg and Pentzopoulos were more articulate, using expressions such as "bloodbath," "slaughter" and "terrified screaming" to describe the chaos. Particularly in recounting the death of Archbishop Chrysostomos, Clogg writes that he was "hacked to death after being handed over to a Turkish mob" (1992:98). Pentzopoulos quotes an eye-witness account: the mob "pulls away his beard, gouges his eyes, and cuts his nose and ears" (1962:47). These gruesome details would sway any reader to believe that the atrocities committed by the Turks were well beyond the level of brutality of those committed by the Greeks.

Housepian, while describing the "robbing, raping, and killing [of] Turkish civilians" by the Greeks, also provides the eye-witness testimony of the American consul, George Horton, who called the Greek atrocities "so natural that they could have been foreseen by anyone familiar with human nature" (1971:50). Moreover, Horton justifies the Greeks' actions by stating, "These people had been driven from their home, their relatives had been murdered, their women violated; very probably in the army of occupation there were many who had either resided in Asia Minor or who had relatives or friends here" (1971:50). Housepian also admits that no one really knows who fired the infamous first shot, but according to a Captán Dayton, "Reports indicate it was fired by some Turks from some concealed position" and some Americans claimed that it had come "from a small Turkish boat anchored by the shore" (1971:51). In presenting this testimony, Housepian suggests that a Turk fired the first shot which began the 1919 massacre in
Smyrna. As her book is entitled *The Smyrna Affair* in reference to the atrocities of 1922, it goes without saying that she puts considerably more effort into describing the later atrocities in grim detail. In this account the Turks are reduced to inhuman vindictive killers.

The use of "eye-witness" reports by historians serves to validate their interpretation of the events. History, at times, can be a matter of selective documentation. Each historian, when faced with the task of documenting a particular event, must choose what sources to consult and which testimonies to include. As much as these eye-witnesses agree with the authors, there are surely other accounts which might give opposing views. For example, in the investigation carried out by the Inter-allied Commission of Enquiry during the summer of 1919 concerning the Greek massacres in Smyrna many people were interviewed, but even then it was still clear that people’s descriptions of the atrocities were biased depending on their background:

It [the Commission] held forty-six meetings, hearing 175 witnesses from all nationalities, and visiting Smyrna, Aydin, Nazilli, Odemish, Menemen, Manisa, Ayvali, and Girova in the Italian zone. Its investigations had ranged widely, and in the frequent cases where Greeks and Turks gave contradictory testimony, it had tried to ensure reliability by hearing French, English and Italian witnesses. This was the only possible procedure. But, as Venizelos later pointed out, it did not guarantee the truth; for ‘many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality’. This was especially true of the Italians. [Smith 1973:112]

Smith’s *Ionian Vision* is one of the most credible sources I have found. He does not sugar-coat the atrocities, nor does he omit details in favor of one side or another. Despite mentioning that everyone interviewed had their own agenda, and therefore the investigation
could have been swayed by people’s political views, Smith highlights the fact that the Greeks were indeed found guilty. Taking together all of the collected testimonies, the commission found the Greeks responsible for the incidents which followed the landing as well as the atrocities committed in the interior during the Greek advance. They also characterized the Greek occupation to have “assumed all forms of annexation” (Smith 1973:112). The Commission concluded that if the military occupation truly had as its sole purpose the maintenance of security and public welfare, then it should have been the Allied troops rather than the Greeks who occupied the area. Moreover, they stated that if the Greeks continued the occupation, it should have only been after the Peace Conference resolved the complete and definite annexation of the country to Greece (Smith 1973:112).

Unlike the Greek historians, who tend to lay scores of guilt on the Turks and gloss over the vicious actions of the Greeks, Turkish historians do not resort to the finger-pointing game. This war was viewed as the Turkish War of Independence, and as such the key protagonist is Mustafa Kemal, the father of the modern Turkish Republic. The most ‘neutral’ historian of Turkish history is, in my opinion, Bernard Lewis, who simply left out both the Greek landing at Smyrna and the Turkish return to Smyrna from his book The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Because these atrocities had such profound effects on the population of Turkey, particularly in regard to their future relations with Greece, the reversal of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Treaty of Lausanne and its effects, it seems odd that they were completely omitted. Ahmad also remains silent. He mentions that the Greek landing at Izmir (Smyrna) was the catalyst that launched the national resistance under Kemal, but nothing more. Later, in describing the Kemalist regime, he jumps from the establishment of Kemal’s Republican People’s Party to
1923, and then quickly glosses over the Lausanne Treaty to later events. The silence is as striking as if they both had said 'it never happened'.

Shaw sides noticeably with the Turks. The first of the Greek atrocities are documented in Samsun in the Black Sea region in March 1919. According to Shaw, the landing of British forces at Samsun led the Greeks to revolt and turn against their Muslim neighbors in the hopes of founding a new state for Greece (1977:329). He also writes:

The Allied forces entered the Ottoman Empire [after armistice] with an unshakeable belief in the truth of their own propaganda, that the Turks had slaughtered millions of Christians for no reason whatsoever, forfeiting their right to rule even themselves and demonstrating once again the essential superiority of Western civilization over that of Islam. [1977:129]

In his description of the Greek atrocities, there is no mention of Turkish resistance, matter-of-factly, "The landing was followed by a general slaughter of the Turkish population. Greek mobs roamed the streets, looting and killing, with those Turks who escaped being arrested by the Allied authorities" (1977:342). According to Shaw, the Greek atrocities are just part of the larger set of injustices against the Muslims of Turkey by the West. The atrocities of 1919-1922 are described by Shaw as the victimization of the Turks. Even in describing the Turkish occupation of Smyrna, which signaled their victory in the War of Independence, Shaw still manages to turn the Turks into victims of the West:

On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of the city. It spread rapidly through gasoline-soaked buildings while the Turkish army's efforts to extinguish it were stymied by the discovery that all the city's fire hoses had been cut and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day as many as 25,000 buildings were burned and half the great city destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestions, quickly taken up by the
Western press, that the victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire. Actual culpability has never been proved. [1977:363, emphasis added]

The first question that springs to mind is, ‘why were all of the buildings soaked with gasoline?’ Although it seems that Shaw is trying to make the argument that the Turks would not have burned the city because it was an important historical city, it must also be noted that Smyrna was also notoriously called ‘Infidel Izmir’ because of the dominant non-Muslim population (Clogg 1992:97). Moreover, the only quarters to survive were the Jewish and Muslim districts, whose residents notably both supported the Nationalist regime.

The whole war reeks of revenge. The Greeks came to Smyrna with nationalistic aspirations, the Megali Idea materialized. There was clearly tension rising between the Christians and Muslims of the city, particularly because of the success and dominance of the Christians economically. During the Young Turks regime, the government had sought to stabilize the balance of power between Muslims and non-Muslims, and surely the Muslims did take advantage to lash out in some instances. However, the Christians, content in the privileges and autonomy inherent in the millet system, felt persecuted when these rights were taken away under the new Constitution.

The country had been ravaged by continuous wars with Europe, Russia, the Balkans, and then the World War. No doubt people were mentally and emotionally battered. The whole situation was a recipe for disaster: the pomp and circumstance surrounding the Greek occupation, the Christian persecutions, plus the animosity and bitterness that accompanied the First World War, which pitted Greeks against Turks. Moreover, once the news reached the Turkish population that their country would essentially be divided as the spoils of war among the
Western Christian nations of Europe, without any consultation with the sultanate, it was just too much. The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks and the announcement of the Treaty of Sèvres fueled the entire country to band together and rise up to reclaim their homeland. Regardless of the casualties that are part of every war, the Turkish War of Independence was truly a remarkable victory for the Turks. In a matter of three years they managed to reclaim nearly all of Asia Minor and establish an autonomous government free from foreign influence.

The Greeks, however, found themselves in the middle of a war isolated and abandoned by their fair-weather friends in Europe. France, Italy, and Britain used the re-election of King Constantine and the reestablishment of the Royalist government in Greece as a pretense to cut off all aid. Greece was left alone in the middle of Anatolia to fight the Turks and enforce — by herself — the Treaty of Sèvres, which had been drawn up by the Allies. It was a hopeless cause, exacerbated by the dissension of Italy and France who established treaties with the Turks, supplying them with arms and munitions, which they then used against the Greeks. Russia, Greece’s old ally and Orthodox Christian brother, hoping the new Turkish nation would go Communist, also supplied the Turks with massive amounts of artillery. By the time the Greeks were ready to surrender and retreat, the Turks had built up a significant army with plenty of arms and ammunition to completely wipe out the weary Greek forces. Consequently, when peace was suggested in March 1922 Kemal refused.

The last stage of the war was chaotic as the defeated Greek army retreated west to the sea, followed in huge masses by the Ottoman Christians. The Muslims, who had had to deal with the terror of the Greek army as they made their way eastward, raping and pillaging, now had their turn. As the Greek army retreated, the Muslims rose up and along with Kemal’s forces ravaged the countryside slaughtering their Christian neighbors, who only months before had
turned on them as well. Hence a huge wave of Greek Orthodox Christians followed the Greek army to the sea: “In an indescribable state of fear, man, woman and child left their homes *en masse* and fled to different ports of Anatolia ‘converging in a terrified mob on the city of Smyrna, where they hoped either to get protection or to be evacuated’” (Pentzopoulos 1962:46).

What is known in Greek history as the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ began in those final days of war in Smyrna in September 1922. To fully understand the atrocities which occurred, one should really examine the events from a psychological rather than historical point of view. The historians try to find historical causes for the violence, and attempt to describe how these events unfolded. However, the violence is more the manifestation of a combination of war-weariness and mob-psychology. These two groups of people, the Greeks and the Turks, had been at odds since the Greek Revolution in 1821 – a century of rising hostility.

Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire, beginning in 1699 with the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Turks had been at war almost constantly and watched her borders retreat until there was literally nothing left under the Treaty of Sévres and the Mandate System. The West was viewed by the Turks as the enemy who had purposefully interfered in the affairs of the Empire and who were eager to see its demise with territorial and economic gains for themselves. The Greeks, while nowhere near as powerful as The Great Powers of Britain, France, and Italy, were still favored above Turkéy. Much of this has to do with religious intolerance against Islam, and the valorization of Greek history in the philhellenic movement of the Western intelligentsia. The Greeks were able to declare their independence from the Ottoman Empire, and acquire enough territory and foreign support to go from a mere province in the Empire to a formidable force that could eventually take over all of Asia Minor. With the support of Britain, Greece had a considerable advantage over Turkey.
The people of Turkey were fed up with being manipulated and abused by the Western Powers. They were angry at past legislation, much of it ushered in through the pressure of the Great Powers, particularly Britain, which had allowed Christians to gain significant advantages over the predominantly Muslim population. The Turks were tired of war, and not happy with the reversal in the balance of power that had left them dominated by their Christian neighbors and minorities. According to Shaw, shortly after Allied occupation, “Turks and other Muslims were replaced by Christians in most of the local governments as well as in the railroads and other public utilities” (1977:329). It seemed clear that the aim of the Western Powers was not only to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, but also to reconstruct in its place a number of autonomous new nations ruled by Christian governments. What had once been a great Islamic Empire would be completely annihilated. Ahmad poignantly sums up the dilemma:

For their part, the Ottomans were in an anomalous position, a defeated imperial people who had no ‘homeland’ to retreat to. The Spaniards had retreated to Spain, the British to Britain, etc. But where could the Ottomans go? They had come as Turkic tribes from inner and Central Asia and had established a foothold in Asia Minor in 1071, just five years after the Norman invasion of Britain. They were regarded by Europe as conquerors who had come out of Asia and occupied lands in Europe, Asia Minor and the Arab world with no right to be there. They had been driven out of Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and from the Arab provinces during the First World War. They held Asia Minor, or Anatolia, but that land was contested by other peoples – the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Kurds. The Ottomans believed that Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ applied to them, both as Muslims and Turks as well, and they therefore enjoyed the right of self-determination in territory where they were in a majority. But that was not the case. [2003:78-79]
When the Turks entered Smyrna in September 1922, the city where the ‘Greek Terror’ had begun, they returned as victors. Everyone was riled up by the victory and by feelings of revenge. The wounds of oppression and violence left by the Greeks were still fresh. Things clearly got out of hand, and the result was the massacre 30,000 Greek and Armenian Christians (Clogg 1992:97).

In order to set the grounds for the Lausanne Treaty, it is important to have a general idea of the violence that occurred in Asia Minor between 1919 and 1922, particularly, the two massacres at Smyrna. What follows can barely be called an objective history. It is merely a laying of everything out on the table: taking into account the atrocities on both sides, the political elements, and weeding out the sources whose depictions lead too far one way or the other. I have tried to keep the details minimal, despite the copious amounts of ‘eye-witness’ accounts available in various sources. In doing so, I hope that the reader may come to gain a somewhat objective understanding of these significant events.

The Greek Atrocities in Smyrna

On May 14, 1919 Allied detachments landed to take possession of the Smyrna forts, and announced to the Turkish Vali that the next day the city would be under Greek occupation. Captain Mavroudis, Greece’s representative in Smyrna since the armistice, called together all of the leaders of the Greek community and announced the news that the Greek army was on its way. The word spread rapidly. That night several thousand Turks gathered together and held a protest. According to Smith, during the night, “several hundred prisoners, mostly Turks, were permitted to escape from the prisons, with the complicity of the Turkish authorities and the
Italian major who headed the allied prison control” (1973:88). Some of these escaped convicts also succeeded in getting a hold of arms from a depot near the barracks.

On the morning of May 15, thousands of Greeks converged on the seafront to meet the Greek troops as they entered the bay. It was a festive occasion; the Megali Idea had become a reality. No one doubted that the occupation would be permanent and that Smyrna would soon be annexed to Greece. Upon the arrival of the Greek troops, they were ceremonially blessed by the Archbishop Chrysostomos. As planned, the Allied forces handed over control of the forts to the Greeks, giving them complete control on land. The Greek troops then marched to their respective assignments throughout the city. The route of one troop of Evzones happened to pass the Konak (Government House) and the barracks where the regular Turkish troops were confined. Just as the regiment passed the barracks, someone fired a shot.

Chaos was unleashed. The Greek troops opened fire on the Turkish barracks “for over half an hour” until the Turks finally came out, “holding up their hands in surrender” (Smith 1973:89). The Greeks rounded up all of the Turkish soldiers and led them to the Patris, which served as a prison ship. Along the way, they physically abused the Turkish soldiers; some were shot outright or bayoneted. The crowd of Greek civilians following the troops also abused the soldiers. When they reached the port, the violence increased, and the Turkish soldiers were forced to shout “Long live Vertizelos!” and “Long live Greece!” Finally, they were escorted aboard the prison ship.

Meanwhile, anarchy and violence had broken out all over the city. Bands of civilians took advantage of the disorder to rob and loot the Turkish houses and shops. The ruckus continued into the next day with little attempt to restore order. According to Smith, during the first day, “the Turks suffered 300 to 400 casualties, killed and wounded, and the Greeks about
100, including two Evzones among the killed” (1973:90). It was not long before the chaos spread to the surrounding villages and towns. The extension of the occupation was accompanied by “massacres and excesses on the part of both Turks and Greeks” (Smith 1973:91). Smith also alludes to “horrible scenes on the 29-30 May” in Aydin (1973:92).

Back in Smyrna, Aristeidis Stergiadis was appointed Greek high commissioner, and set about to restore law and order. The “main offenders,” likely the members of the Evzones troop which initiated the brutality against the Turks, were court-martialed and “sternly punished” (Smith 1973:92).

Turkish War of Independence

Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal was busy mobilizing the Muslims and organizing the resistance against the Allied and Greek occupation. All over Anatolia local notables began to organize ‘Defense of Rights Associations’. One of the first of these organizations was founded in Trebzon in order to oppose the establishment of the Greek Republic of the Pontus. The Greeks in this region had begun to revolt as early as March of 1919 when they rose up and “slaughtered their Muslim neighbors in the hope of founding the new state” (Shaw 1962:329).

At first, local Turks attempted to explain to the occupying authorities that their areas were predominantly Turkish, and therefore had no need to be under Mandate control. However, when their protests were ignored they “assumed local authority and organized their own resistance forces” known as the National Forces, which ranged from “roving guerrilla bands to regular volunteer militias” (Shaw 1962:341). This was truly a movement of the people, as Turks from every profession, and even women and children, banded together to fight the occupying forces. Kemal spent much of this first phase of the war spreading the message of Turkish
resistance throughout Anatolia and “writing to the local resistance forces and governors suggesting ways that they might resist the Greeks” (Shaw 1962:343).

During a series of conferences between June and September 1919, Kemal and other local nationalist leaders gathered together to construct the framework of what later became the National Pact, a document which expressed the will of the Turkish people to regain full national integrity and independence. The National Pact was adopted during the last Ottoman Parliament on February 17, 1920. Ahmad notes that the terms Türk and millet were also discussed during these last meetings, and that Parliament “arrived at the consensus that the term Türk included all the different Muslim elements; some even included Ottoman Jews within the term Türk!” (2003:81). Perhaps this latter inclusion was due to the fact that the Christians (Greeks and Armenians) were fighting their own wars of independence against the Turks, and only the Ottoman Jews as a community had chosen to side with the Nationalists.

The second major phase of the Turkish War of Independence began in March 1920 when Kemal declared that the Representative Committee in Ankara (created in August 1919) was the only lawful government of Turkey, and that the Turkish nation was now establishing its own Parliament in Ankara, the Grand National Assembly. On January 20, 1921 the Assembly passed the first Constitution of the new Turkish nation, the Law of Fundamental Organization. Among the other initial legislation passed by the Assembly was the declaration that all treaties, contracts, or other obligations signed by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920 were null and void. This would therefore include the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Istanbul government in August which renounced all claims to ‘non-Turkish’ territory. According to the treaty, the kingdom of the Hijaz and Armenia would both become independent. Syria would become a mandate of France, and Mesopotamia, along with Palestine, would become British mandates. Smyrna and
its hinterland would be administered by Greece for five years, after which a plebiscite was to be held. The Dodecanese and Rhodes would go to Italy, while Thrace and the remainder of the Turkish islands in the Aegean would go to Greece. The Straits were to be internationalized and the adjoining territory demilitarized. Istanbul and the strip of territory to the Chatalja lines would be Turkish, along with the remainder of Anatolia. Another important law passed by the Assembly was the National Treason Law, “which essentially condemned to death anyone who betrayed the nation” (Shaw 1973:351).

Along with the Nationalist forces based in Ankara, various other private armies were forming all over the country. The most famous was the Green Army whose mission was to evict European imperialism. Other groups had similar missions, basically to remove the occupying forces and develop a new form of government. While many agreed on the former, they all disagreed concerning the latter; they all sought different types of governments for the new country. Due to the proliferation of these armies, the Nationalist armies were forced to engage in a Civil War while fighting the Greeks as well.

While the Greek forces had been able to gain considerable headway in their occupation of the interior of Anatolia, the events of March 1920 signaled the end of Greek success. In a freak accident, King Alexander died of blood poisoning after he was bitten by his pet monkey. This meant that the elections in November would put Venizelos against the ex-King Constantine, Alexander’s father. In an unexpected upset, Venizelos’s party only managed to secure 124 out of the 370 seats in parliament, and King Constantine returned to the throne. Tired of war, the Powers used the return of the Royalist government as an excuse to withdraw their support of the Greek campaign in Asia Minor. Soon after, both France and Italy made peace agreements with the Nationalist government in Ankara and agreed to supply them with arms and munitions. At
the same time, Russia was also courting the new government with military supplies, in the hopes that the new regime would go Communist.

The Greek army pressed on (Figure 6), determined to win the war, and thereby enforce the Treaty of Sèvres, completing the Greek dream of the Megali Idea. The Turks won the First and Second Battles of the İnönü, but each time were unable to finish off their opponents due to lack of men and supplies, so they were forced to fall back. The key Greek victory came on July 13, 1921 when the Greek army succeeded in hitting the Turkish left flank, cutting its communications with Ankara. The Turkish army was in retreat, and the Greek army continued their advance toward Ankara on August 13. However, the Greeks got tied up at Haymana, 40 km south of the new capital, and suffered a terrible defeat. By September 13 the Greeks had retreated. The Turkish forces were still not strong enough to follow up the victory, and remained in Ankara for another year.

By 1922 the Greeks were war weary from over eight years of war. They found themselves deep in Anatolia, "without supplies or reinforcements, unsupported by allies, waging a conventional war against guerrilla forces, and led by a Prime Minister who was on record against the very expedition he now desperately urged the newly appointed General Staff to win at all costs" (Douluş 1977:21). Finally, in March Greece declared their willingness to accept an armistice that "would have entailed the evacuation of Asia Minor and a modification of the frontiers in Eastern Thrace" (Pentzopoulos 1962:45). However, by this time the Nationalist forces were reorganized, rearmed, and ready to fight. The Turks rejected the armistice and in August began the Great Offensive. Moving westward, they succeeded in defeating the Greek army, who now fled toward Smyrna: "Thousands of Greek soldiers and peasants flooded into Izmir from all over Anatolia and were loaded on Allied transport ships for shipment back to
Greece” (Shaw 1977:363). In the meantime, as the Turkish army passed through the villages on the way to the sea, “Thousands of civilians – mainly Greeks and Armenians – were wounded, maimed, or killed, women were assaulted, houses looted and burned” (Hirschon 1989:9).

The Turkish Atrocities in Smyrna

As the news of Greek defeat spread to Smyrna, the end became clear. Tension steadily began to increase in the city as trains pulled up in the railway stations carrying wounded soldiers and “frightened refugees clutching what they had been able to carry with them” (Smith 1973:300). In anticipation of the Turks arrival the Powers sent ships to protect their own anchored in the harbor. Troops arrived by boat from Thrace to help act as a ‘screen’ against the Turks, but oddly many did not disembark: “The contagion of defeatism and broken morale had crossed the water and infected these troops from Thrace with the spirit of mutiny” (Smith 1973:301). As the Turks approached, the streams of refugees flowing into Smyrna increased; thousands upon thousands of refugees flooded the coastal towns. Small boats sailed daily between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands loaded with refugees and their belongings. Slowly the Greek civil and military authorities evacuated the city, as well as the Greek war ships, which sailed down the coast to evacuate the Greek army. The Christians of Smyrna were left alone, with only ships of the Powers in the harbor behind them.

The Turkish troops arrived in a relatively orderly fashion during the afternoon of September 9, 1922. The trooped entered the city upon horseback with rifles and sabers: “sturdy looking fellows passing by in perfect order” noted the American consul George Horton (cited in Smith 1973:306). However, the situation began to deteriorate that evening, and quickly escalated the next morning, Sunday. While the Turkish police kept order in the main streets, “in
the back streets, Turkish civilians and later Turkish troops were taking their revenge for three years of humiliation by the Greeks” (Smith 1973:306). The Turkish commander arrived in the city with a list of Greeks and Armenians who had been deemed traitors during the Greek occupation. That day the men were collected, court-martialed, and shot. When the Turks entered the Armenian quarter to collect arms, the Armenians resisted. The “impenishable hatred between Armenian and Turk” resulted in “horrible incidents of carnage” as thousands of Armenians were killed (Smith 1973:306-7). The most shocking aspect of the massacres was the lack of response by the foreigners. In April of 1921 the Powers had declared neutrality, and those forces that remained were there purely to protect their own. Thus, the foreign troops did not resort to violence, even as the number of casualties steadily increased. By the end of September 10, 1,000-2,000 people had lost their lives (Smith 1973:307).

The death of the Archbishop Chrysostomos is steeped in legend. What is known is that on the eve of September 9 the archbishop was escorted to the Government House and brought before Nureddin Paşa, commander of the Turkish 1st Army. Most likely Chrysostomos was charged with treason for encouraging the nationalist Greek cause and for supporting the Asia Minor Defense League. He was released, and fell into the hands of a large crowd of Muslims that had gathered outside. They physically abused him and brought him to a barber shop. Before he died, his face was horribly mutilated by knives, and it is rumored that he was finally shot to death out of pity.

On Wednesday, September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter. According to Smith, an American woman testifies that she saw the Turks go from house to house with gasoline cans, and then saw the houses burst into flames immediately after. Shaw, as noted above, holds that it has never been proven that the Turks started the fire. Regardless, a fire
started, and the Armenian, Greek, and ‘Frankish’ or European quarters were almost entirely destroyed, leaving only the Muslim and Jewish quarters. Throughout the night the fire continued to ravage the city, and thousands upon thousands of refugees swarmed down upon the waterfront. The people became trapped between the burning city and the sea, and many drowned in their attempt to escape (Hirschon 1989:9) (Figure 7). The ‘eye-witness’ accounts of the horrors, are like that of any great fire: people screaming, people burning, and thick clouds of smoke. It is estimated that about 30,000 Greeks and Armenians perished during the Turkish occupation of Smyrna (Clogg 1992:97). The war was basically over, and on September 14 the Greek army and its fleet sailed away from Asia Minor.

Meanwhile, the Greek refugees remained in Smyrna in the throngs of violence and religious tension. Civilian casualties remained high. While women and children were allowed to escape, many of the men between ages 15 to 45 were detained and sent into the interior to serve in the labor battalion: “many were sent on forced marches, or died of disease and malnutrition, and the active male population was decimated” (Hirschon 2003a:5). It is estimated that between September 1922 and the conclusion of a preliminary peace agreement in January 1923, over one million refugees arrived in Greece, many with nothing other than the clothes on their back (Hirschon 2003a:6). From a Greek perspective, “All the sacrifices of a decade were wasted, all the dreams of centuries were seen to be delusions” (Doulis 1977:22). The defeat of the Greek army and the burning of Smyrna signaled the end of Hellenism in Asia Minor, and the triumph of an independent Turkish nation.
IV. THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

Precedents and Particulars

On November 20, 1922 the League of Nations and the new Nationalist government of Turkey convened in Lausanne Switzerland to draw up a peace agreement to "bring to a final close the state of war which [had] existed in the East since 1914." The Treaty signaled an end to the Megali Idea, as all of Greece's claims in Asia Minor were returned to Turkey, and nearly all of the Greeks of Asia Minor were compelled to leave the country.

Eighteen legal documents were created during the conference. Two of them, the Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and the Turkish-Greek Agreement on the Extradition of Civil Hostages and on the Exchange of Prisoners of War, were signed in January of 1923 between Greece and Turkey. The remaining sixteen pieces of legislation were not finalized until six months later, in July of 1923.

The main peace treaty was signed by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (Yugoslavia), and Turkey, and recognized the current borders of the modern Republic of Turkey. Turkey recovered Eastern Thrace, the Aegean islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the entrance of the Dardanelles, a strip along the Syrian border, the Smyrna district, and the internationalized Zone of the Straits. In return, Turkey renounced all claims to its former Arab provinces and recognized British possession of Cyprus and Italian possession of the Dodecanese. It was a great victory for the Turks, who were finally granted full sovereignty over all of their territory. The foreign zones of influence and capitulations created in the Treaty of Sèvres were also abolished.
The most significant result of the Lausanne Conference was by far the Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, signed by Venizelos and Ismet Pasha on January 30, 1923. This also included an agreement for the restitution of interned civilians (Greek men in the Turkish labor battalions) and prisoners of war. The key aspects of this exchange were that it was mandatory and final. There was no choice among the inhabitants of the two countries whether or not they wanted to leave, nor were they allowed to return. According to Article 7, the emigrants lost the nationality of the country from which they emigrated, and acquired the nationality of the new country upon arrival. The compulsory population exchange was the first of its kind in international policy, and was based on precedents of voluntary population exchanges. In some ways, the exchange was viewed as an ‘unmixing’ of peoples, who through past population movements had turned Anatolia into an amalgam of different cultures and religions, living in their own semi-autonomous groups.

The mixing essentially began during the Ottoman conquest, when sultans ordered whole villages of Turks to move from the interior of Anatolia to the newly conquered lands. Moreover, after the fall of Constantinople, groups of people from all over the empire were required to move to the capital in order to help in its rebuilding and ensure its prosperity. Later, as the Ottoman borders began to shrink through continuous war, Muslim refugees from the conquered lands returned to the heart of the empire, Anatolia.

The 1913 Treaty of Constantinople between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire set a precedent as one of the earliest efforts to ‘unmix’ populations in order to ease tensions between states. The treaty included a protocol for the reciprocal and voluntary exchange of Bulgarian and Turkish populations. However, what is notable about this exchange, and what would characterized later exchanges, was that by the time the protocol was signed, a mass
transfer of populations had already occurred and the agreement covered only a small number of the remaining inhabitants. The Muslims had already fled the areas where Bulgaria had invaded Turkey during the First Balkan War, and the Bulgarian minority had fled Eastern Thrace and Adrianople when they were recovered by the Turks after the end of the Second Balkan War.

The Greeks signed a similar treaty with Bulgaria in 1919, which approved a Convention Respecting the Reciprocal Emigration of their Racial Minorities. Article 56 of the Treaty of Neuilly, between the Allied and Associated powers and Bulgaria provided another exchange of minorities between the two states. Approximately 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria, while 53,000 Bulgarians left Greece (Pentzopoulos 1962:60). However, despite the difference in numbers, a considerable number of Bulgarians did not emigrate (about 82,000 people). This left Western Macedonia still in the hands of a foreign majority, and led to issues in land claims later on.

During the Balkan Wars and in the early years of the First World War, Ottoman Greeks were systematically deported from contested areas in the Balkans and the west coast of Asia Minor. This forced migration was carried out in the name of national security. The plan was adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress between 1913-1914, and within a few months, “150,000 Greeks were forced to leave the western coast of Asia Minor and find refuge in Greece, while another 50,000 were systematically deported in the arid and sparsely inhabited areas of central Anatolia” (Pentzopoulos 1962:54). In their place, Muslims from the Balkan countries immigrated “as a response to the propaganda invitation addressed to them by the Young Turks” (Koufa and Svolopoulos 1991:284). Negotiations between the Greek and Ottoman governments regarding these expulsions and deportations began in early 1914. The Turkish Minister at Athens and Venizelos discussed an exchange of the Greek rural population in the Smyrna district and the Muslims of Macedonia.
This proposal was favorable received by the Greek government, anxious, on the one side, to end the unilateral Turkish expulsions and deportations of Greeks and the confiscation of their properties and, on the other side, to avoid eventual hostile clashes with the Muslim emigrants voluntarily establishing themselves in the regions of western Anatolia, from which the Greeks were massively and forcibly displaced by the Ottoman government. [Koufä and Svolopoulos 1991:284]

If the Treaty of Sèvres had been enforced, there were also stipulations regarding the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations under Part IV, regarding the protection of minorities. According to Article 143, within six months Greece and Turkey would have to enter into a special arrangement “relating to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the populations of Turkish and Greek race in the territories transferred to Greece and remaining Turkish respectively.” In addition, according to Article 149, “All laws, decrees, regulations and circulars” issued by the Ottoman government and containing “abrogations, restrictions or amendments” of the rights of minorities were to be considered null and void. Therefore, those Greeks who were expelled beginning in January 1914 were entitled to return and to have their confiscated property restored.

The January Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations resembled the above precedents in many basic ways. However, it was drastically different in its compulsory nature, which resulted in the “ruthless disregard of elementary human rights and lack of humanitarianism” (Koufä and Svolopoulos 1991:287). The notion of a compulsory exchange was suggested by Venizelos in a letter to Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations’ High Commissioner for refugees on October 13, 1922:
Two weeks ago, the Ankara government’s Minister for the Interior announced that the Turks were determined not to put up any longer with the Greeks’ presence on Ottoman soil. At the forthcoming conference, I shall therefore propose compulsory recourse to the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. Winter is approaching, and this will make the problem of housing the refugees even harder to solve than that of feeding them. I make so bold as to beg you to take all possible steps to ensure that the refugees begin to move before peace is signed. In view of the fact that there are some 350,000 Turks at present in Greece, and since they could be assigned the houses and land abandoned by the Christians of Asia Minor or those that are now being abandoned by the Christians of Thrace, it would thus be possible to ensure homes for a corresponding number of Greek refugees.ii

During the Convention, however, Venizelos also made the argument that the Greeks of Turkey should be allowed to stay, and that the Greeks who had been expelled or had taken refuge in Greece should be allowed to return to their homes. Ismet Pasha, representing the Ankara government, pointed out that these minorities could be used as “weapons in the hands of foreigners, capable of being utilized for subversive purposes.”iii The Christian minorities had always been the main pretext on which the Allied Powers interfered in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, e.g. the Mandate System after the First World War. In addition, the Turks were already aware that the peace treaty toward which they were working would also include a section titled Protection of Minorities (Part IV). Moreover, the Turks had not forgotten about the treasonous acts of the Greek Patriarch and the Greek minority in forming the Asia Minor Defense League and helping the Greek army during the Turkish War of Independence. It was clear that the Greek millet could no longer be trusted. Moreover, they could easily stage another revolt, especially now that so many of them were concentrated within the Smyrna district.
It was also apparent that Ottomanism had been unsuccessful in creating homogenized and loyal citizens, and that the main obstacle had been the minority populations. They adamantly refused to give up the privileges granted under the millet system that had allowed them to keep their religious and cultural traditions, as well as maintain their own judicial courts and private schools taught in their own languages. It was clear to the Turkish delegates that the only way to create a stable nation, free from foreign intervention, was to remove the national minorities. Assimilation had failed to eliminate these heterogeneous groups, and therefore the next measure was by force.\textsuperscript{iv} The massacres and deportations of the Armenians are testament to how much the Turks did succeed in this method.

The Turks also managed to reduce the Greek population significantly through deportation, massacres, and the labor battalions, creating an unstable political climate which induced many to emigrate. By the end of 1922, the Greek population had been successfully reduced in Asia Minor from 1.6 million to approximately 500,000 (Barutciski 2003:28). The rest would have to be rid of through diplomacy. In reference to the minority protection laws, Oran notes that “ridding Turkey of as many Rums [Greek Orthodox Christians] as possible (the most significant non-Muslim minority) would minimize the potential recourse being sought to these rights” (2003:99). Thus, it was the ultimate plan of the Nationalist government to create an ethnically homogenous nation, which meant the eradication of the Greek minority.

Although one of the key aspects of the exchange was its compulsory nature, by 1923 this seemed a moot point. Like the voluntary population exchange between Bulgaria and the Ottoman government in 1913, a significant amount of emigration, at least of Greeks from Turkey, had already occurred. Thus, whether the exchange was deemed voluntary or compulsory hardly mattered as far as its implementation. As Barutciski notes, “Rather, the issue
of a compulsory or voluntary exchange affects the crucial question of whether the expellees are permitted or encouraged to return to the areas they have escaped” (2003:29). The Greeks who had fled Asia Minor with the intent to return to their homes after the conclusion of the peace agreement became permanent exiles. According to Article 1, all emigrants “shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Governments.” Neither government allowed minorities of the other country within its borders until after 1930. Both countries viewed the return of the minorities as a direct threat to political stability.

Although Lord Curzon is often quoted as calling the compulsory exchange “a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come,” he also noted that “these hardships, great though they may be, will be less than the hardships which will result for these same populations if nothing is done.” It was ascertained by the Great Powers that the violence and massacres, which had broken out all over Anatolia as a result of the Greek invasion and subsequent Turkish War of Independence, would continue if the two groups were not separated. Indeed, those who were exempt from the exchange and stayed behind did not fair much better than their banished coreligionists.

Defining who would be included in the exchange led to a number of other problems. While Venizelos was willing to admit the defeat of the Megali Idea – the removal of Hellenism from Asia Minor – he could not accept the loss of Constantinople, synonymous with the expulsion of the Greeks from Istanbul. He argued strongly on the grounds that the Greek population of Istanbul would increase the number of refugees so greatly that Greece would feel obliged to ask the United States to increase her immigration quota. The United States had already accepted large numbers of Greek refugees, both directly and indirectly from Turkey.
Venizelos would not compromise on this matter. In return, the Muslims of Western Thrace were also exempt from the exchange. According to Oran, “with the exclusion of the Istanbul Rums from the exchange now inevitable, it seemed that Turkey, which deplored the idea of having to keep them, was seeking to create a symmetry in the region by counter-balancing them with the Muslim Turks of Western Thrace” (2003:100). Moreover, Muslim Turks formed a majority in this region, and it seemed likely that within a few years a plebiscite could vote for its complete annexation to Turkey.

In the final Peace Treaty signed in July 1923, Article 14 also exempted from the exchange the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) at the mouth of the Dardanelles. These islands were inhabited by a majority of about 9,000 Greeks. According to the Treaty they were supposed to “enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Muslim population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of persons and property.” vii However, this directive was never enacted.

While Article 1 defined the emigrants on the basis of religion - “Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion” and the “Greek nationals of the Moslem religion” – it also introduced new issues, because not all Greeks in Turkey were Greek Orthodox, nor were all Muslims in Greece Turks. Thus, the unmentioned exceptions included any Ottoman Greeks that had converted to Islam, as well as the Pomaks (Albanian Muslims) and Gypsies (Muslims of Romany ethnic origin) of Greece. Using religion as the main cause for exemption produced problems in Crete, where most of the Muslims identified nationally and ethnically with Greece rather than Turkey. However, due to their questionable affiliation, they too were included in the exchange.
Moreover, there were even exceptions to the exemptions. According to Article 2, only the Greeks who were “established before 30th October 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912” were considered inhabitants of Constantinople and exempt from the exchange. Unfortunately, the Turks’ definition of ‘established’ differed from the Greeks’ notion of ‘established’. For the Turks ‘established’ meant that those residents intended to live there permanently. A Turkish law enacted in August 1914 “provided for the fulfillment of certain formalities of registration by all persons leaving their place of origin in order to establish a domicile in another place” (Koufa and Svolopoulos 1991:291). Therefore, even if Greeks had settled in the city before October 30, 1918, but hadn’t registered with the State, they were still subject to the exchange. On the other hand, the Greek government interpreted ‘established’ simply as residing in the city. In October 1924, Turkish authorities arrested and interned for evacuation 4,452 Greeks from Istanbul, “a considerable number of whom were clearly not subject to the exchange terms” (Koufa and Svolopoulos 1991:292). The Greek government appealed to the League of Nations in protest. Despite the conclusion of the Permanent Court of International Justice that the non-exchangeable Greeks were indeed those residing in the city with the intention to remain for an extended period – regardless of Turkish legislation; Greek expulsions from Istanbul continued until 1930.

Articles 8 through 14 dealt with the transport of emigrants and the liquidation of their immovable property. Article 11 outlined the establishment of a Mixed Commission consisting of two members from Greece, two members from Turkey, and another three members chosen by the Council of the League of Nations, which would supervise and facilitate the emigration as well as carry out the liquidation of the movable and immovable property. Once the Mixed Commission had accounted for and appraised all immovable property, it would then belong to
the government on whose territory it was situated, and the previous owner would receive a declaration stating the sum due to him. These funds would in turn become a debt from the government, for example Turkey for the Greek emigrants’ properties. According to Article 14, when the liquidation was completed, “if the sums of money due to both sides correspond, the accounts relating thereto shall be balanced.”

Although it seemed to work on paper, the actual execution of this plan was much more complicated. Firstly, nothing on the side of the Greek refugees was conducted in an orderly fashion. In addition, many of the directives were not followed according to the treaty. Article 16 stated that the two governments “undertake mutually that no pressure direct or indirect shall be exercised on the populations which are to be exchanged with a view to making them leave their homes or abandoned their property before the date fixed for their departure.” However, the nature of the departures of the two minorities was quite different. The political climate on the west coast of Asia Minor continued to be tense and volatile, and thousands of Greek refugees left daily following the burning of Smyrna in September 1922. According to Pentzopoulous:

The Turks left under the most favorable circumstances, in peacetime and in a methodical fashion, not having experienced the tragedy of war and carrying with them their moveable property. Their lot was considered very fortunate and enviable indeed, compared to the turbulent exodus of the Christian families which, mourning the loss of close relatives and separated from their male members detained in Asia Minor, arrived in Greece hungry, sick and on the verge of mental breakdown. [1962:69]

Furthermore, even though Article 8 stated that emigrants “shall be free to take away with them or to arrange for the transport of their moveable property of every kind, without being liable on this account to the payment of any export or import duty or any other tax,” many
Greecs had already left before the population exchange with hardly any moveable property other than the clothes on their backs. Furthermore, the houses which they had abandoned had been razed during the war or were already occupied by Muslim refugees from the Balkan Wars and other poor locals. Despite that, Article 10 did contain a clause in reference to these Greek emigrants. It stated that they too should be paid for the movable and immovable property left behind, “independently of all measures of any kind whatever, which...have resulted in any restriction on rights of ownership over the property in question, such as the confiscation force sale, etc.” However, it ultimately did not work out this way, and the Greek refugees received no compensation in connection with their lost property.

The Mixed Commission was a failure. There were too many emigrants and too much property for the Commission to handle. By the end of September, over a million Greeks had left Turkey. The number of Greek refugees continued to escalate, so that by the time the treaty was signed in January of 1923, only 150-200,000 Greeks remained behind, most of them concentrated in the Black Sea and interior regions. Although it my have been feasible to handle this small number, the Commission was also responsible for the earlier refugees as well. According to Pentzopoulous:

…the Asia Minor catastrophe had befallen with such rapidity and under such tragic circumstances that, in spite of the refugee stations that were established on the mainland in order to list the immigrants, many uprooted persons, frantically trying to escape death, never went through them and were never recorded as having arrived in the country. [1962:96]

The respective debts accrued by the two nations were not settled until 1930, at the Ankara Convention. Attempting international reconciliation, Venizelos and Ataturk signed a treaty replacing the Lausanne Convention’s elaborate compensation mechanism and effectively
transferred all remaining property to the government of the country in which it was located. However, the properties of the Asia Minor Greeks were valued less than those of the Muslim Turks. Thus, although the treaty normalized relations between the two states, it was at the price of considerable concessions from Greece.

**Demography and Population Figures**

One of the most contested issues surrounding the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne was demography. In order to justify that Greece should acquire Smyrna and the surrounding district of Aydin, Venizelos presented the Council at the Paris Peace Conference with two “censuses.” The first was referred to as the “Greek Patriarchate Statistics of 1912” and the other as the “Turkish Official Statistics of 1910.” These statistics contradicted Ottoman statistics for this same period, in that the former list nearly as twice as many Greeks in the area as the Ottoman statistics did (Figure 8).

While the Anatolian population was estimated and documented by people outside the Ottoman government, none of these records are very accurate. According to McCarthy, this is because “only the Ottomans were in a position to have counted their people,” and therefore their records should be privileged as the most accurate (1983:3). The Ottoman population data was recorded by registrars in each province, although the accuracy of these records varied from region to region. The records show the most accuracy in provinces where the authority of the central government was the strongest. Thus, the following population statistics are credible, since many Greeks lived mainly on the west coast and Black Sea regions, areas where the Ottoman government was particularly active due to their economic importance to the empire. Moreover, because accurate records were needed for conscription, which up until the First World
War only applied to Muslims, the records for the Muslim population is “on the whole better registered than non-Muslims” (McCarthey 1983:7).

As noted above, Ottoman Anatolia was filled with a mixture of different peoples due to a series of population movements which began during the expansion of the early empire. As the Ottomans lost concessions to Russia, Austria and Greece, over 2 million Muslims fled to the interior of Anatolia for safety and security (Keyder 2003:42). The Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913 served as a “critical turning point in a spreading climate of instability in the wider region” (Hirschon 2003a:4). In the period between 1885 and 1914, the population of Anatolia remained relatively stable, despite a war with Italy and the Balkan Wars. In fact, the population increased from 17,375,225 to 18,520,016 (Figure 9), particularly due to the influx of Muslim refugees from the Balkans, which accounted for approximately 2,500,000 people (McCarthey 1980:192-193). During this time, the Turkish treasury assumed the financial responsibility of housing, feeding, and settling the refugees. Many mosques and medresses in Istanbul were turned into shelters to accommodate them all.

While Muslim refugees were immigrating to Anatolia, Greeks and other Christians were emigrating. Between 1885 and 1914, the Ottoman Empire lost about ¼ of its Greek population, about 600,038 people (Figure 9), along with almost all of its Bulgarian population, causing the Muslim proportion to rise from 72 to 81 percent (McCarthey 1980:194). While the Greek population as a whole decreased, the major centers of Greek life – the west coast and the Black Sea regions – continued to increase (Figure 10). Some of this increase was caused by violence in the interior of Anatolia and other areas, and the Greeks moved to these regions for protection and security in numbers. As shown in Table 1, between 1885 and 1914, the Greek population
increased on the west coast of Asia Minor in the provinces of Aydin and Izmit, as well as in the Black Sea province of Trebizond.

Moreover, it is evident that despite the overall growth in the Greek cultural centers during this time, these populations were still unstable, as people moved to the coasts for safety and then subsequently emigrated or worse died due to Ottoman persecution. If you look at the population statistics from 1911-1912 in these same areas (Table 2), it becomes clear that they also experienced a significant decrease in population between 1912 and 1914 (Table 1). Also, with the beginning of the First World War in 1914, non-Muslim residents in strategic areas, such as the coasts and border provinces were relocated to the interior of Anatolia. The number of Greeks in the interior districts like Eskişehir, Kars and Kayseri also began to increase as a result of the labor battalions (Table 1).

With the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the outbreak of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922, many Muslims relocated to the interior, while a reverse flow of Greeks and other Christians sought refuge in the west. According to Lord Curzon's statistics, the Greek population of Asia Minor prior to the First World War was about 1.6 million (1.7 million in Ottoman statistics). By the end of 1922 this number had been reduced to approximately 500,000 (Barutciski 2003:28). The Muslim population also suffered considerable losses. Between September 1911 and September 1922, the empire had fought in five wars. Between 1914 and 1923 20% of the entire Anatolian population died (McCarthy 1983:118).
Preamble from the Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923.


v Taken from Koufa and Svolopoulos 1991:281.


vii Article 14, Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923.
V. THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE

The population exchange between Greece and Turkey had everlasting effects upon both countries. It was a time of political upheaval for Greece, and a time of military triumph and liberation for Turkey. “Centuries-old multiethnic coexistence was suddenly terminated and forced to cede to the harsh realities of exclusion that result from the creation of mono-national states” (Barutciski 2003:24). Ottoman Greeks became Greek citizens, and Muslim Turks became Turkish citizens. As Oran notes, “Forcibly displaced people everywhere share the experience of dislocation, of loss of home and place” (2003:20). Even though the homes which grounded the refugees’ old sense of identity were lost through the population exchange, memories of these homelands continued to resonate throughout the imaginations of the displaced refugees.

However, as new ethnically homogenized nation-states, the two countries overall suffered in very different ways. The significance of the Smyrna massacres and the Greco-Turkish War was completely opposite for the two countries. For Greece, the events symbolized the defeat of the Megali Idea, the destruction of the last remnants of the Hellenism in Asia Minor, and laid bare deep wounds dating back to 1453. “Now, almost exactly a century after its Revolution, its ideals, or its illusions, were utterly destroyed” (Douliis 1977:24). For Turkey, it symbolized the long awaited freedom from the Great Powers and interference of Western agendas. The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sèvres, and Turkey felt that it had finally regained the recognition and power which had been eroded over the long period of Ottoman decline. The Turks emerged triumphant with a – somewhat – ethnically united people, ready to rise up from the ashes and establish an independent, modern nation-state.
The population exchange was a short-term answer to issues centuries in the making, and would result in long-term ramifications. Neither country was prepared for the long-term economic, political, cultural and social adjustments they would have to make to accommodate the new populations and reform their war-torn nations. Greece had to deal with a huge influx of refugees, while Turkey, nearly six times the size of Greece, had to deal with a major population loss. Greece was thrown into a large-scale humanitarian emergency and faced problems of overpopulation, fiscal bankruptcy, along with “unparalleled human suffering and degradation” (Doulios 1977:43). With the loss of a considerable portion of its mercantile class, bourgeoisie and elite, Turkey was forced to rebuild, essentially from scratch, its entire social, economic and political structures. This population loss was Greece’s gain, and in exchange Turkey received mostly farmers and peasants from Macedonia, who were then placed in an ad hoc manner ineffectively throughout Anatolia in strange new climates and agricultural environments.

One of the major differences was the way in which the refugees coped with these new conditions. While the Asia Minor Greeks clung to the refugee identity and participated in the sorrow experienced by the Greek nation over the great ‘Catastrophe’, the Turkish émigrés fell into the shadows of a new nationalist nation bent on Turkification and modernization. As human suffering occurred on both sides of the Aegean, it is perhaps this asymmetry which is the most significant in the immigrant experience. In 2004, descendants of the Asia Minor refugees still carry with them the stories of their lost homeland, while in Turkey historians and anthropologists are just beginning to uncover the effect on the Muslim refugees.
Immediate Effects on the Greek Population 1923-1930

Settlement

According to the official records of the Mixed Commission, the number of Greeks who were transferred after 1923 was 189,916, while the number of exchanged Muslims was 355,635. Accurate figures of exactly how many Greeks emigrated from Turkey is impossible to ascertain. Numbers range from a documented 900,000 to an estimated 1.5 million. The most well-documented estimate is given by McCarthy who suggests that approximately 850,000 Greeks came directly to Greece, while another 66,000 fled to Europe and the United States. These 916,000 refugees were "the remains of the Anatolian Greek community, which had numbered 1,222,491 in 1912 [according to Ottoman sources] (not including 24,842 Greeks in Southern, Syrian sections of Haleb Vilâyeti)" (McCarthy 1983:133). Thus, approximately 313,491 or 25% of the Greek population of Asia Minor perished.

Whether between 1 million or 1.2 million, at a time when the total population of Greece was only around 5 million people, this represented a massive increase of 25%. Thus, essentially every fifth person you met on the street would have been a refugee. Consequently, this had an enormous effect on population dynamics, on top of the principal issue of settlement. On the other hand, Greece's Muslim population decreased from about 20% to 6% between 1920 and 1928 (Hirschon 2003b:15). However, the vacated properties of the expelled Muslims were only enough to house a small percent of the refugees. As a result, the Greek government created an ad hoc agency called the Refugee Relief Fund (RRF) to help deal with the refugee crisis. In addition to the Greek refugees, another 50,000 Armenians had also sought refuge in Greece, adding to the chaos which ensued following the September defeat and the January treaty (Pentzopoulos 1962:76).
Even before the official exchange, in the fall of 1922, Nansen, a delegate from the League of Nations, reported over that 750,000 homeless people, mostly women and children, were in desperate need of relief aid. In October 1922 Venizelos appealed internationally for financial and humanitarian assistance. Soon the American Red Cross responded and the Near East Relief Organization was formed. The first year was particularly brutal, as thousands of shocked and destitute people arrived daily at the harbors of Greek islands and the mainland. Most received minimal shelter, food and medical care thanks to the relief organizations. However, before the peace treaty, most were under the impression that their hapless situation would only be temporary. “The winter of 1922-23 was harrowing; hundreds of thousands of incapacitated people helplessly awaited events, and for many, only the hope of their imminent return sustained them” (Hirschon 1989:36).

Once it became evident that the émigrés were going to be permanent Greek citizens, the first reactions were frustration and despair. People from the islands slowly began to make their way into the major cities on the mainland like Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika, searching for friends and relatives from whom they had been separated. According to Hirschon, “For that period the immense scale of the disruption was unique, so great that, even in the 1970s, the Greek Red Cross broadcast daily messages for relatives seeking those with whom contact had been lost fifty years before” (1989:1).

The death rate following the winter of 1923 was very high due to extreme deprivation and bitter cold, resulting in a rate of about 6,000 deaths per month in the first nine months after the influx (Hirschon 1989:37). In the first years, between 1923 and 1925 the proportion of births to deaths was 1:3, and in some parts of the country about 20% of the refugees died within the first year. In a statement before the Council of the League of Nations, Dr. Nansen reported that
between September 1922 and July 1923 “up to 70,000 [refugees] died of disease and weakness owing to malnutrition” and that “during the last months of 1923 the mortality rate among the refugee population was 45 percent.”

According to a Refugee Census conducted by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Relief in April 1923, there were about 786,431 refugees – 351,313 men and 435,118 women. On the whole, the majority of refugees during the first years were women, children, and the elderly. “According to Turkish sources, 125,000 men in the military age bracket were drafted in the labor battalions in Anatolia, returning to Greece much later” (Pentzopoulos 1962:100). Due to civilian casualties in the labor battalions, 23.6% of the female refugee population were widows (Pentzopoulos 1962:101).

By 1928, there were approximately 1,221,849 refugees, among which there was considerable diversity (Figure 11). In addition to the Greek refugees fleeing the violence in Smyrna, a 1928 census records 230,000 refugees from Eastern Thrace, and another 15,000 from the Caucuses, due to the Russian-Turkish campaigns and the Bolshevik Revolution. Despite their special exempt status, another 38,000 left Constantinople as well due to the new oppressive Nationalist Policies.

Because of the emergency conditions and the lack of information about the incoming refugees, the RRF placed many urban families in the abandoned Muslim houses in rural Macedonia. Kontogiorgi accuses Venizelos of regarding the Asia Minor refugees as a “human resource that could be used for the benefit of Greece’s security in Hellénizing Macedonia and Western Thrace, thereby consolidating the northern and north-eastern borders of Greece” (2003:65). These plots of land were distributed between both the refugees and landless native peasants.
The Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) was established under the auspices of the League of Nations and continued in operation between December 1923 and December 1930. By the time the RSC arrived in Greece, the Greek government had already settled about 72,581 families in Macedonia and surrounding regions. Many of the abandoned Muslim houses were filled with two or more families, who may or may not have had agricultural experience, and lacked the proper agricultural tools for farming. The RFF had also built 5,023 houses concentrated in the outskirts of Athens and Piraeus (Pentzopoulos 1962:103).

The RSC took over the responsibility from the RFF of settling the refugees throughout the country. The RSC was made up of four members: two from the Greek government, one from the League of Nations, and one from America who chaired the organization and served as a representative of the relief organizations, like the Red Cross, which had already contributed to the care of the Greek refugees. Like the RFF, the RSC had no statistical data concerning the number of refugees, nor about the amount of land available. The Commission was internationally funded, predominantly through loans, which over the course of its six years totaled about £19 million.

From the very beginning, the RSC was aware that they did not possess enough funds. Therefore, despite the predominantly urban character of most of the refugees, the Commission concentrated on agricultural settlement with the hopes of establishing self-sufficient and productive refugee communities. Moreover, they hoped to stimulate the production of foodstuffs which could then be used to feed the ever-increasing influx of new refugees.

In terms of the rural settlements, the RSC was quite successful. Over 500,000 refugees and landless farmers settled in a total of 1,381 settlements, consisting of both new and existing villages. However, only 65% of the approximately 1.4 million acres were arable. The RSC
also organized a cadastral survey extending over 2 million acres, including 60,000 houses along with livestock, seed, and agricultural tools and machinery (Kontogiorgi 2003:66). The RSC also helped out with public works, constructing local roads, bridges, as well as works for water supply, drainage and irrigation. In addition, the RSC provided the rural communities with medical clinics and built schools for the children.

Unfortunately while 86.35% of the total budget was spent on the rural areas, this only provided for 46% of the refugee population. The other 64% of the refugees settled in urban areas, which received only 13.7% of the funding. In the cities, the RSC made shelter rather than economic self-sufficiency its main priority. The Commission built low-cost permanent housing and some community facilities. Each refugee quarter in Athens was given a clinic, schools, and the foundation of a water supply system. When the RSC disband in 1930, these minimal facilities slowly began to deteriorate, leaving many of the refugees in a state of urban squalor. When the Greek Ministry of Social Welfare took over in 1930, there still remained over 30,000 urban families in need of permanent housing and over 12,000 housing units needed in the rural areas (Hirschon 1989:42). Even in 1940 the refugee housing program was still far from complete. Over 16,000 more residences were still required (Hirschon 1989:43). The housing problem was incessant in many of the urban areas and persisted even into the 1970s. Furthermore, “the chaotic experience of providing accommodation under emergency conditions formatively marked town planning practices in Greece and effectively institutionalized ad hoc approaches which have blighted the urban landscapes to the present day” (Hirschon 2003b:16)
Economy

Before the Asia Minor refugees even arrived in Greece, the country was struggling with internal political issues, debts and weariness from ten years of war. The cost of mobilization and the Asia Minor invasion left Greece in desperate need of foreign assistance beginning in 1920. This was in stark contrast to the environment many of the Greek refugees had left. Most had come from major cities and had comprised the more educated, wealthier group of Ottoman society. Upon arrival in Greece they found themselves in a whole new situation. Hunger, poverty and disease ran rampant in the refugee quarters. Living in makeshift tin barracks, destitute and in a state of psychological shock, the health of many rapidly deteriorated resulting in high death rates.

In the first years economic advancement was particularly difficult since the majority of the population consisted of women and children. Nevertheless they joined the workforce, doing unskilled labor for very low wages. Desperation and abject poverty drove few refugees to immoral or illegal activities like prostitution, beggary, and stealing. Economic advancement was further handicapped by the fact that since the children were working, they had no time for education. This resulted in a class of poor, uneducated men and women. They were viewed with disdain by the autochthonous Greeks, and as a result had a hard time marrying outside of the refugee group.

However, the majority of Greek refugees after 1923 were artisans, traders, and businessmen. Greece gained economically through new skills and industries like textiles and carpet manufacturing, ceramics, metal work, and silk production. Some refugees were able to utilize their trade connections in Western Europe, and competed successfully in business, taking over the domestic market. The autochthonous Greeks reacted with jealously and hostility as a
number of them were driven out of business. The Asia Minor Greeks felt socially isolated. However, for some, as their material conditions improved, and they achieved prosperous economic positions, they slowly assimilated. For the rest, their lot seemed hapless, and feelings of hopelessness and isolation affected the refugees’ perception of their disadvantages in social, economic and political terms, as well as their overall integration into Greek society.

Friction between the native and refugee populations was particularly tense in the rural areas. The government had distributed the houses evacuated by the Muslims between both the local peasants as well as the refugees. The local peasants received 20% of the houses; a portion which the refugees felt was unfair since these concessions had come at the price of the Lausanne Treaty and their consequent exile (Pentzopoulos 1962:209). However, the native population felt that they had more of a right, as they had been in a state of need prior to the refugees’ arrival, and this was their homeland.

In addition to conflict among the populace, the Asia Minor refugees also caused major upheaval nationally since the cost of providing for them contributed to the country’s bankruptcy and continuing economic crises. The funds used by the Refugee Settlement Commission were only loans, and thus they had to be paid back – approximately £2.9 million per year (Aktar 2003:80). In addition, all of Greece’s financial matters were now under the eye of the International Financial Commission, established in 1898 to protect foreign lenders.

Despite the push for the refugees in rural areas to become self-sufficient, Greece still did not have enough food for the nation. Home production was not keeping up. Between 1922 and 1928 Greece still had to import over half of the wheat and flour she consumed and between 1/6-1/3 of all other cereal grains (Kontogiorgi 2003:68). As a result of this dependency on foreign investment and aid, Greek politics would be dominated by outside interference for a long time to
come. According to Douli, Greece became a minor nation, dependent on the disposition of the Major Powers, and "a pawn in their struggles, unable to chart its own progress in history" (1977:5).

Social Adjustment

The exchange of populations had a tremendous impact on Greek society. For the first time, Helladic Greece and Hellenism were almost identical (Douli 1977:6). While the Muslim Turks and the Bulgars had constituted relatively significant minority populations following the Balkan Wars, by 1928 Greece was 93.8% Greek (Figure 12) and 99.2% Greek Orthodox Christian (Pentzopoulos 1962:129;200).

However, the cost of this consolidation of Hellenism in the form of a nation state was the loss of an entire empire. Both autochthonous Greeks and Asia Minor Greeks had hoped for the fulfillment of the Megali Idea, but more importantly for the Asia Minor Greeks, this dream was also connected with one of liberation from Turkish rule. The defeat in Asia Minor was a national sorrow. George Theotokas, a Greek novelist and playwright, wrote in The Free Spirit (1929) that the young men of 1910-1920 had been a sacrificed generation:

Perhaps the best of them, those who today could have been our intellectual leaders, fell in Macedonia and Asia Minor before they could show their abilities. The moral impact of the defeat was and remains overwhelming. Not only their abilities, but also their ideals and self-confidence were lost to us in the port of Smyrna. From then until today our country has lived without grand and noble sentiments, without the need to surpass itself, without any exaltation... I have no desire to criticize them. It is natural for men who have seen all their
struggles and their dreams humiliated in the Disgrace of 1922 to expect nothing from the future.\textsuperscript{xi}

This kind of despair characterized the overall national sentiment in the years following the ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’ and the subsequent population exchange. The Asia Minor refugees were forced to forget their homeland, their hopes of liberation, and the return of Byzantine Hellenism.

All of Greece’s hopes and dreams had ended in misfortune:

Instead of increasing her boundaries to embrace the site of Hellenic colonies, Hellenic civilization, the Byzantine Empire, and four centuries of expectant servitude, Greece was compelled to receive within boundaries created for her by the whims of history the last hunted remnants of Hellenism in Asia Minor. [Doulis 1977:23]

It was the most important historical event for the Greek people since the fall of Constantinople. After the population exchange, unredeemed Greece ceased to exist. The wealth and culture of old Byzantium was wiped out by death and expulsion. The Greek defeat of 1922 was already hard to bear, but then the sorrow was intensified by the eradication of the Greek people from a land which many felt was rightfully theirs. Taken together, the events of 1922-1923 left the Greek people suffering from an ideological, social, and emotional dislocation that would change the course forever of modern Greek civilization (Doulis 1977:42).

When the refugees first arrived in Greece, they were met with pity and feelings of a shared brotherhood by the native Greeks. But soon, the burden of accommodating the refugee population changed this attitude to one of hostility. The refugees were called names like ‘Turkish seeds’ (\textit{tourkosporoi}), ‘baptized in yogurt’ (\textit{viaourtovaptismenoi}) and ‘Orientals’ (\textit{anatolites}) (Hirschon 2003b:19). For the local Greeks, the refugees represented “an Anatolian corruption of Greekness, a Turkified version of themselves, polluted by Turkish language,
Levantine mercantilism, and oriental customs, characteristics many thought they had shed long before” (Pappas 1999:353). Moreover, the refugees were not simply Greeks living in Asia Minor; the Greek Orthodox millet had always been a very diverse group of people. They differed in wealth, education, language, dialect, and regional cultural patterns. Instead of bringing together the nation as one ethnically homogenized entity, the refugees contributed significantly to its cultural diversity. Moreover, these differences helped to create a separate ‘refugee identity’ placing a cultural divide between themselves and the autochthonous Greeks.

The refugees not only went through a harrowing experience in Asia Minor where they faced persecution and violence, but also a psychological struggle as well which they faced upon arrival in Greece. They felt uprooted from their homes, and their mentality was characterized by an array of opposing forces:

...a feeling of helplessness and, at the same time, a masochistic complacency for being utterly destitute; an expression of gratitude for the received assistance followed by a cynical observation that the given relief should have been more substantial; an alternating interchange of pessimism and optimism, of submission and arrogance, of threat and fear.

[Pentzopoulos 1962:201]

In the first years they had no permanent homes, many could not support themselves economically. They had watched a fortune accrued over several lifetimes disappear overnight as they became permanent exiles upon the signing of the Convention on January 30, 1923. Everything was uncertain.

By 1927 many had adjusted somewhat to the new environment and were eking out a living. Still, their old lives retained a sort of nostalgic mystique which they continued to yearn for, particularly since the majority were never able to regain their previous social status and

99
lifestyles. Many considered their stay in Greece as provisional, and the question constantly asked to the RSC was whether they would be permitted to return to Turkey. As new generations were born in Greece and grew up considering it their only home, a new notion of permanent settlement spread amongst the refugee communities – but the past was never forgotten.

When Hirschon conducted her fieldwork in Kokkinia, a refugee district on the outskirts of Athens, in the 1970s, the notion of a ‘refugee identity’ was still pervasive. The inhabitants of Kokkinia referred to themselves as refugees (prósphyges) or Asia Minor people (Mikrasiátes). Moreover, “not only the original refugees, survivors of the exodus, used these terms, but also younger people of the second and even third generation, born in the locality or elsewhere in Greece” (Hirschon 1989:4). Over the fifty years, their long-term marginal and disadvantaged position in Greek society, as well as the millet identity inherited from their former position in the Ottoman Empire, perpetuated cultural and psychological boundaries.

The ‘refugee identity’ was formed particularly in relation to the collective memories of the refugee populations. It was “shaped by embodied and embedded narratives located in particular places and times” (Carter et al. 1993:x). This recreation of the past is common for people who have been brutally separated from their previous lives, to the point where the memorialization of the past becomes compulsive (Bowman 1993:83). The collective memory built from common recollections of the Ottoman past served to emphasize a separate identity. While Greece had been “created, cradled, and nurtured in Western arms,” the Asia Minor Greeks saw themselves as part of an Eastern tradition that looked to Constantinople rather than Athens as the center of culture (Hirschon 1989:8). The Asia Minor Greeks had not experienced to the same extent the renaissance of Classical Greek culture, and were still ideologically attached to Byzantium, with the hope of its eventual restoration and the return of ‘the Polis’.
The ‘refugee identity’ was not only one of division, but also unity. Despite their varied backgrounds, their common social status as Greek Orthodox Christians bonded them together, and also emphasized their similarities to the autochthonous Greeks. In the Ottoman Empire the Asia Minor Greeks had all been part of the Rum millet, governed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moreover, while many spoke different languages, some Turkish – the language of the Muslim enemy – their identification with the Church also served to assure the autochthonous Greeks that they too were Orthodox Christians. In addition, though many of the refugees were peasants from the interior of Anatolia, the majority had belonged to the upper echelons of Ottoman society. Together they looked with disdain on the local Greeks, whom they referred to as “Vlachs,” essentially shepherds or country bumpkins. In contrast to the high society they had left and bustling urban life, the local Greeks seemed uncultured, rough and boorish.

Politics and Identity

A major reason, perhaps for the continuation of this identity was that it also entailed a sense of entitlement. The refugees felt that since they had literally sacrificed everything they had, they were entitled to preferential treatment, in that things should be made easier for them in order to aid in their regaining what they had lost. However, everyone was suffering, and after the foreign relief programs ended, there were no more hand outs to give. It was up to the Greek government to restore a sense of economic and political stability.

While the Treaty of Lausanne made Turkey responsible for the payment for the lost property and valuables of the Asia Minor Greeks, the Ankara Convention of 1930 settled the debt at the expense of the Greek government. All debts were cancelled, making it now the
responsibility of the respective governments to attend to the payments due to their refugees. The Ankara Convention was a slap in the face to refugees all over Greece. Firstly, Greece negotiated the settlement by valuing the Asia Minor properties at far less than those of the Muslim Turks. Secondly, Greece was already so far in debt from the wars and the settlement programs that it had no money to give the refugees. Greece essentially relieved Turkey of all responsibility, and gave the refugees nothing, no payment in connection with their losses. The negative experiences of the refugee community following the Ankara convention, served to reinforce their sense of segregation from the rest of the Greek populace.

This attempt at international peace resulted in internal factionalism with Greece. The refugees felt completely betrayed. Those who once supported the liberal Venizelist party quickly switched sides and became Communist. The next decades were filled with political disarray. The military dictatorship of Metaxas in 1936 was followed by Nazi occupation, and then a bitter civil war from 1944-1949. Most refugees sided with the Communists during the civil war, perpetuating the divisions within Greek society. Whether or not they had been Communists, years later descendents of the Asia Minor refugees were still referred to as ‘dirty communists’ and ‘wretched refugees’ (Hirschon 1989:48).

**Immediate Effects on the Turkish Population 1923-1930**

While Greece was overwhelmed by the influx of refugees, Turkey on the other hand, suffered a considerable population loss. The number of incoming Muslims was 355,635, which in a population of about 13.5 million represented under 4% of the population (Hirschon 2003b:15). Their impact on society was not considerable. Refugees from the Balkan Wars had
posed much more of a national concern, as noted above, causing serious housing problems prior to the exchange.

Rather than gaining a new population, Turkey lost about 2 million non-Muslim minorities through mortality and displacement: “this drastic loss meant that while 20 percent of the population – or one in five persons – was non-Muslim before 1923, after the war this proportion had gone down to 2.5 percent, or one in forty” (Hirschon 2003b:15). The country had become ethnically homogenized. In addition, 2.5 million Muslims died in the period of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, representing nearly 18% of the Muslim population (McCarthy 1983:133). Overall, between 1906 and 1927, the Turkey’s population dropped considerably, from 15 million to 13.6 million. This population loss was not only due to war, soldier and civilian casualties, but also due to conditions brought on by the war – scarcity, famine, and disease.

However, this loss of population, while damaging to the economy, reduced the possibility of foreign intervention in Turkey’s domestic affairs. It also served to homogenize the country along ethnic and religious lines, giving Turkey the foundation upon which to build a nation-state similar to those of the West.

Settlement

The Muslim Turks who left Greece were faced with many of the same difficulties as their Asia Minor counterparts – feelings of dislocation and being uprooted from their homeland. However, unlike the chaotic departure which the Greeks endured, the Muslim refugees did not begin leaving Greece until December 1923, and the major influx did not take place until later, mostly during the first eight months of 1924 (Aktar 2003:85). While many were calmly able to
collect their things and sell off their immovable property in an orderly fashion, they were still pressured by the incoming refugees. Greece needed their land to house the refugees, and even before their official departure the Greek state confiscated some of the Muslims' property and distributed it among the local peasants and incoming refugees (Aktar 2003:85).

While they may have had an easier time in their departure, what awaited the refugees in Turkey was not so pleasant. When they landed in Anatolia, they received only limited health assistance from the Turkish Red Crescent, because unlike Greece, Turkey received no international assistance. Moreover, because of the major time gap between the Greek exodus and the Muslim arrival, many of the abandoned properties in Asia Minor had already been pillaged. Housing was already an issue, and people all over Anatolia were suffering from the effects of war. In addition, many of the houses had been appropriated by the Turkish government, and sold through public auction or through leases to locals, army officers, and state employees. Most of the houses given to the refugees were nothing more than bare walls, the nicer ones already being occupied by the local poor. In the East, where the impact of the war and dislocation was felt the most, whole villages remain completely empty even today.

Disorganization characterized the Muslim settlement as well. In November 1923 the Turkish Parliament established the Ministry of Reconstruction, Exchange and Settlement to deal with the incoming refugees. Communities and families were broken up, leaving the refugees not only uprooted and homeless, but without any social networks. Like the RFF and RSC, the Turkish Ministry had no idea of the previous occupations of the refugees. Thus, even though most of them had been agriculturalists, the agricultural conditions in which they found themselves were not suited to their previous farming experience. Tobacco producers were resettled in regions where tobacco production was impossible, and wheat producers were forced
to take over estates with olive groves. As a result, the Muslim farmers destroyed much of the land in their failed attempts to grow inappropriate crops, exacerbating the degeneration of agricultural and natural resources begun during the war.

**Economy**

Turkey had lost a major portion of its mercantile class, since finance and commerce had been handled predominantly by the Christian *millet*. What they gained in return were more farmers who lacked the farming expertise of the old Christian population. The export of agricultural goods like tobacco, sultanas, cotton, dried figs, and hazelnuts, which had constituted 60% of the Turkish revenue, was hit significantly (Aktar 2003:90). The loss of the Christian minorities left huge gaps in the social and economic structure of the country. Turkey essentially had to create a brand new bureaucracy.

A newly emerging Turkish bourgeoisie and urban artisans stepped up to fill the positions left by the Greeks. However, most of these positions did not come cheaply; they were given out as favors by the new nationalist government. Instead of creating an independent merchant class, those who filled the commercial vacuum were highly dependent upon the state, and many lacked the skills and commercial expertise of the previous group. In the years after the Lausanne Treaty, the nationalist government sought to build the infrastructure, such as railways, mines, dams, industry, etc., which private capital was too poor to invest in. The government essentially subsidized the private sector, contributing to its growth. Mustafa Kemal even invested his own money in the newly founded Business Bank of Turkey (Ahmad 2003:89).

In November 1929, British Ambassador Sir George Clerk called the newly formed Turkish firms “incompetent,” and stated that the Turks had “neither the patience, the experience
nor the temperament to build up their fortunes slowly in the same way as their Christian predecessors.

However, by the mid 1930's Turkish factories were producing textiles, sugar, paper and cement among other things. Foreign-owned enterprises were purchased by the state and nationalized, creating a national market. Turkey was not only able to increase its agricultural output enough to feed itself, but was also able to export some of its produce to Europe. In addition, it became self-sufficient in raw materials like wool, cotton, and coal. While Greece was falling farther and farther into debt, Turkey was maintaining political sovereignty and developing a self-sufficient nation.

Social Adjustment

The Muslim refugees, called *muhacirs* or 'migrants', faced some issues in assimilating to the Turkish nationalist culture. Many spoke languages other than Turkish, like Greek or Albanian, and were treated with suspicion by the government and local population. As Aktar notes, “Instead of an imagined community they hoped would be similar to their own, they encountered, in their view, a group of people from a rural background, speaking foreign languages and with very different lifestyles” (2003:88). The Muslim refugees were called 'half infidels' by the local Turks (Hirschon 2003b:20). Hamdulla Suphi Bey, an ardent nationalist, in a speech before the Turkish Parliament expressed his distrust of the new refugees:

They settled the Greek-speaking masses right across the sea from the islands. A grave mistake! Soon, when peace truly reigns and relations between the islands and our shores pick up and Greek islanders and the Greek-speaking masses reestablish contact, then it will be impossible ever to eradicate this foreign language.
The years after the exchange were characterized by silence. The nationalist agenda of turkification had gripped the entire nation, and there was considerable pressure for everyone to blend in, differences were “excluded from the public sphere and forced into the shadows of the private” (Carter et al. 1993:ix). Only recently have Turkish scholars begun to retrace the experiences of the refugees. Köker and Keskiner reveal that the muhacirs also felt an acute loss of homeland. They missed the wealth and large expanses of land that they had possessed before the exchange. Most remembered their fathers or grandfathers saying “One day, we will return” (Köker and Keskiner 2003:203). As Baudrillard points out, in all refugees, “when the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes full meaning.”xxiv The refugees wished to return, and even some of their descendents still long to go back, but feel that they can’t because “[Now] those are the lands of the infidels” (Köker and Keskiner 2003:203).

Conclusions

While both countries dealt with the influx of refugees differently, both populations were forced to cope with an abrupt move, and a loss of homeland. They were forced into new lands, took on new nationalities, but lost their sense of belonging and struggled to find a new identity. Many refugees became obsessed with the past; hiding in memories of nostalgia in order to cope with the chaos and disorder that surrounded them in the present.

Both Greece and Turkey thought that they were gaining homogenized nation-states with the expulsion of the minorities and influx of their ‘unredeemed’ co-religionists. However, these new populations were not easily accommodated or fully assimilated into the host nations. Lewis poignantly notes, “What took place was not an exchange of Greeks and Turks, but rather an exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims. …this was no repatriation at all,
but two deportations into exile – of Christian Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to Turkey” (2002:355). As a result, the two nations struggled to impose their own national identity upon the refugees, while at the same time the refugees struggled to accept the loss of their old identity. In the case of the Greek refugees, this struggle resulted in the formation of a completely separate ‘refugee identity’ which persists over eighty years later.
VI. THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND

While the refugees may have suffered in being forced to leave their homeland and readjust to a new environment, those who stayed behind did not fare much better. The entire country around them changed, became ethnically homogenized, leaving them as the last remnants of an unwanted minority. They were never considered citizens in their own countries and were forced to live a separate life apart from the ethnic majority, one often characterized by harassment and persecution.

Despite regulations in the Lausanne Treaty ordering the fair treatment of minorities, violation began as soon as the document was signed. The problem was that there was no effective mechanism for ensuring that these regulations would be observed. Both Greece and Turkey tried to rid themselves of the remaining minorities by making life for them as difficult as possible. The remaining minorities were considered an alien element, accepted on paper as a necessary evil. In truth, they were seen as a threat, “a Trojan horse left behind by the other side” to rise up during later conflicts of irredentism (Oran 2003:110). The overall treatment of the remaining minorities varied over the decades depending on larger geopolitical and international issues, like Cyprus, as well as internal political interests (Hirschon 2003b:18).

Oran blames the poor judgment of the Allied and Associated powers, which helped to draw up the Treaty of Lausanne, for the suffering of the religious minorities. They should have known that allowing these minorities to remain in two strategically important areas (the Evros province of Greece contiguous to the Turkish border, and on the Turkish islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada at the mouth of the Dardanelles), was not conducive to their security and fair treatment (Oran 2003:110). They became pawns in international relations. If one country
mistreated its minorities, the other would do likewise in retaliation. Even today the minorities continue to pay for international conflicts between Greece and Turkey.

The Experiences of the Greek Orthodox in Turkey

Turkey wanted to be rid completely of its national minorities. The years during the Ottoman decline had shown that their presence could easily serve as a pretext for foreign intervention, and the new Republic was eager to assert its independency. The new Nationalist policies and the implementation of Turkification made many of the old privileges enjoyed by the Rum millet impossible.

According to the ‘Rules Concerning the Rum Patriarchate’ established in 1862, the Turkish administration had the right to take part in the election of the patriarchate. After the exchange in 1923, they issued a special decree that only a Rum born in Turkey could be eligible for the office of the Patriarch. Those who were in charge of electing the Patriarch also had to be of Turkish citizenship. However, in 1971 they closed down the Halki School of Theology, making it impossible to educate the Orthodox clergy in Turkey. Consequently, the Patriarchate is on the road to extinction. Today there remain a little over 20 bishops with Turkish citizenship who could fulfill this requirement, and many are in their late seventies and eighties (Alexandris 2003:122).

In general, the Greek population in Constantinople significantly declined after Lausanne, despite their exemption status. Of the 110,000 Greeks exempted from the exchange 2/3 were Ottoman citizens and the other 1/3 owned Greek passports. Although grouped together as a single religious group, ethnically the Turkish citizens were referred to as Rums, while those of Greek nationality were called Yunanlis or Istanbul Hellenes. Shortly after the exchange, wary of
the new Nationalist policies, many Greeks quietly wrapped up all of their business affairs, and
moved to Greece.

The Kemalist nationalists viewed the Greeks as an “unwelcome remnant of the Ottoman
Empire and as agents of Pan-Hellenism.” Turkification was sweeping the nation, and Turk
became synonymous with Muslim, while non-Muslim was equivalent to non-Turk. In the wake
of the fascist success of Germany in Russia, the Turkish government passed the notorious
Wealth Tax (Varlik Vergisi) in 1942. The goal was to raise around $360 million US from
businesses that had profited during the war. However, the exorbitant tax was assessed according
to the taxpayer’s religion rather than wealth. As a result the bulk of religious prejudice, the bulk
of the tax was placed almost exclusively on the Christians and Jews. Many were forced to sell
their assets, which were then purchased by members of the rising Muslim bourgeoisie at prices
well below their market values. Tens of thousands of non-Muslims left the country. Those who
could not afford to pay the tax were sent to labor camps in eastern Anatolia. In September 1943
the victims in the labor camps were pardoned, and in 1944 the tax was annulled.

With the beginning of the Cyprus crisis, the Greeks became the national scapegoat.
Hostilities escalated, culminating in government-sponsored riots on September 5-6, 1955. In
1964, the Turkish government denounced the Ankara Convention of 1930, and about 13,000
Greek citizens working in the country with residence permits were forced to leave (Oran
had been expelled and their assets in Turkey frozen” (2003:119).

As the political climate became more tense, more Greeks left Constantinople. Between
1964 and 1967 approximately 40,000 Rums emigrated from Turkey (Alexandris 2003:119). By
1975 the number of Greeks in Constantinople had declined to under 10,000. Today there remain
less than 2,500 Greeks in Constantinople, most of which are senior citizens (Oran 2003:101). Men of the younger generations who did not wish to serve in the Turkish army married and moved to Greece. Many Greeks only retain vacation homes there, bringing the population up to 5,000 in the summer months.

Although the islands of Imbros and Tenedos were supposed to have their own special administrative organization composed of local Greeks, according to Article 14 of the Lausanne Treaty, this organization never materialized. In 1927 the entire population of Imbros was exclusively Greek, numbering around 6,762 while the Greeks also formed a majority on the smaller island of Tenedos with its 1,631 inhabitants (Alexandris 2003:120).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s the Turkish government implemented a series of legal and administrative restrictions regarding Greek education and cultural matters. They also began a program of expropriating the property of the Greek islanders.iii Many were forced to find refuge in Greece, western Europe, the United States and Australia. From 1923 to 1992 the Greek population on the two islands dropped from 9,000 to a mere 500.iv

**The Experiences of the Muslim Turks in Greece**

From the very beginning of the exchange, Greece realized that they could use the incoming refugees from Asia Minor to secure an ethnic majority in the border provinces. Thus, the province of Evros on the Turkish border was systematically emptied of its Muslim-Turkish population. Moreover, as the Greek refugees crossed the border from Eastern Thrace, they were able to freely seize the Muslims’ property and livestock without any opposition from local authorities. A number of Muslims living close to the border abandoned their land and moved to Turkey. The Muslims of Western Thrace, who had once constituted a majority (129,120
Muslims to 33,910 Greeks) and held 84% of the land, became a peasant minority holding between 20-40% of the land (Oran 2003:106). The plebiscite that the Turkish government had hoped for would never materialize.

Like the Turks, the Greek government did not honor the Articles regarding the protection of minorities. Moreover, within the first decade after the exchange, so many Greeks had left Turkey that “there was no longer the same incentive for Greece to treat its Muslim-Turkish minority equitably” (Oran 2003:104). After the coup d’etat of the colonels in 1967, the state of the Muslim-Turkish minority began to deteriorate. All schools and associations with the word ‘Turkish’ were forbidden and had to be called ‘Muslim’. Later, in 1987, three of the minority’s major cultural associations, the Xanthi Turkish Union, the Komotini Turkish Youth Union, and the Western Thrace Turkish Teachers’ Union, were closed down because they were using the word Turkish to describe their members, which included all different types of Greek Muslims. The government reasoned that by uniting the Thracian Muslims under the designation ‘Turkish’ these groups were dangerous to public order.

Education for the minority was also restricted depending on the nature of Greek-Turkish relations. In 1951 a ‘Culture Agreement’ between the two countries sanctioned the exchange of teachers for the minority schools. There was also an effort made to purify the school textbooks of defamation against the respective countries. Turkish primary schools were allowed to teach in their own language as well. However, in 1984 the Ministry of Education demanded that all secondary schools take their exams in Greek, even for the Turkish-medium courses. As a result of this abrupt change, many Turkish students failed to get adequate scores needed to attend university. Consequently, many Muslim-Turkish families began sending their children to
Turkey for their education. The majority did not return to Greece, particularly because Greece does not recognize university diplomas obtained in Turkey.

The Muslim-Turkish minority also faced restrictions on their religious freedom. According to Law No. 2345/1920 the religious leaders of the Muslim-Turkish community were to be elected by the Muslim community itself. Perhaps because of the restrictions placed on the Patriarchate in Turkey, this law was never applied. Instead, between 1923 and 1990, the muftis were chosen by the Muslim leadership, but officially endorsed and appointed by the Greek Minister of National Education and Religious Affairs. In the 1980s the Muslims began to protest this practice, calling the muftis ‘the Mufti of the Christians’ (Oran 2003:105). As a result, the Greek government created the Mufti law (1920/1990), which allowed a committee of Muslim clergymen and laymen to submit a list of qualified persons for the job. After consultation with the Greek authorities, one was appointed for a ten-year term. Of course, the Greek government favored those applicants who were strongly opposed to fundamentalism, fearing an uprising of political Islam in Thrace. In opposition to new law, two muftis were hand picked by the Muslim community in Komotini and Xanthi and elected by a show of hands. The Greek courts convicted the two renegade muftis of usurping the authority of the officially sanctioned muftis. This case attracted international attention and the European Court of Human Rights, while not affirming the legal status of the renegade muftis, denounced the actions of the Greek government.

Despite harassment and persecution, many Muslim Turks chose to remain in Greece due to the favorable economic conditions and the political instability of Turkey throughout recent history. In addition, many of the Muslim Turks are peasants and farmers, who lack the mobility of the merchant Greeks of Turkey. Despite this, Greece still made efforts to eradicate the population by enacting a law called Article 19 in 1955 concerning Greek citizenship. The
Article stated that a person of “non-Greek ethnic origin” traveling abroad “without the intention of returning” could be deprived of citizenship, without the right to an appeal. From 1985 onward Greek police at the borders began crossing out ‘including return’ on the Muslim-Turkish passports. Since many of them were illiterate, it was not until they attempted to return to Greece that they realized they had lost their citizenship. Under pressure from the European Union, Article 19 was repealed in 1998. However, those who were exiled were still not allowed to return. It is estimated that since 1923, approximately 400,000 Muslim Turks have left Western Thrace, possibly 10,000 of which were the result of Article 19 (Oran 2003:107, 106).


VII. RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST

The history of conflict between Greece and Turkey has left an enduring mark on their cultures. In their most formative stages, during the creation of their respective nation-states, each was involved in political struggle with the other. The collective memory of these political struggles in turn, affected their new national identities. In order to understand why the conflicts between Greece and Turkey have perpetuated themselves into the 21st century, it is necessary to understand how nationalism and collective memory has contributed to the formation of ethnic boundaries and narrow views of history, aggravating cultural tensions past and present.

Nationalism

According to Gellner, nationalism is "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1983:1). In this definition, cultural homogeneity becomes a definitive element of a nation. In addition, nationalism requires the formation of a high literate culture which it then blankets over the population, creating a "pervasive false consciousness" (Gellner 1983:124). Using pre-existing historically inherited cultures, it creates a one of its own invention, often modified beyond all recognition. While nationalist ideology claims to draw this culture from the folk, it in fact imposes this culture upon the masses, creating an anonymous society characterized by homogenous cultural traits. This mass society is bound together by recognized mutual rights and duties to each other by virtue of their shared membership in it. According to Anderson, a nation is an 'imagined' political community: "It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation never know most
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991:6, original emphasis).

Nationalism as a phenomenon is inherent in a certain set of social conditions, and Gellner argues that these conditions only prevail in the modern world. Indeed, the majority of today’s nation-states were born between 1800 and 1975. The developments which laid the foundation for the emergence of nationalism, according to Anderson, were the decay of cosmology, the development of print culture, and the collapse of dynastic rule. Through the decay of cosmology, man began to distinguish between the origins of the world and the origins of men, developing a sense of history. Through novels, newspapers, and dictionaries, particular vernaculars flourished, making language a source of group identity among the reading publics. Moreover, the spread of literacy during the Reformation simultaneously ‘mobilized’ men’s minds for political purposes (Anderson 1991:40). Lastly, the collapse of dynastic rule destroyed the old legitimacy of the divinely-ordained realm, allowing for the introduction of the notions of sovereignty and autonomous groups.

Nationalism creates ethnic boundaries and defines its own culture through an opposition to an ‘Other’. As Salecl notes, “with all nationalism, national identification with ‘our kind’ is based on the fantasy of an enemy” (1993:102). In creating a national identity, one struggles against an ‘Other’ whose “project is perceived to be the obliteration of the self and its community” (Bowman 1993:83). The formation of ethnic boundaries, involving the incorporation of some and the exclusion of others, bases its decision on a common culture and social system, which is the nationalist ideology. Before the formation of nation-states, ethnic boundaries are primarily social in nature and may or may not have territorial counterparts. This was one of the key issues that prompted the population exchange between Greece and Turkey.
The ethnic boundaries between the two peoples, pre-Lausanne, were overlapping, with Muslims scattered over the Greek islands and the northeastern provinces, and the Greek Orthodox Christians scattered throughout Anatolia and concentrated on its coasts. As Gellner notes, a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogenous (congruent with ethnic boundaries), “if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals” (1983:2). The implementation of the nationalist principle and the imposition of homogeneity is “very frequently a most painful experience” (Gellner 1983:40). The period of transition to nationalism was filled with violence and conflict for both Greece and Turkey.

After the separation, ethnic boundaries aligned with territorial boundaries. Barth notes that the formation of ethnic boundaries, leads to “a dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group” and “implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest” (1969:15). This is exactly what happened between Greece and Turkey – a loss of common ground.

**Collective Memory**

Collective memory, “the integration of various different personal pasts into a single common past that all members of a community come to remember collectively,” plays a formative role in the development of nationalist ideology and national identity (Misztal 2003:11). The collective memory of the Greek Revolutionary War of 1820 and the Turkish War of Independence of 1919-1922 became institutionalized through cultural means, like commemorations, ceremonies, festivals and rites. People draw meaning from this shared past, and in this way it becomes part of a culture’s ‘meaning-making apparatus’. Collective memory
reflects the past and shapes the present by providing people with understandings and symbolic frameworks which enable them to make sense of the world. In trying to understand the current conflicts between Greece and Turkey, many look at the past as a “mirror in which we search for an explanation to the present-day problems” (Misztal 2003:13).

Collective memory is more than historical knowledge; it is an “experience, mediated by representation of the past, that enacts and gives substance to a group’s identity” (Misztal 2003:15). The collective memory of past events binds the society who shares the meaning and impact of those past events. The continuity of the nation also relies on a vision of a ‘suitable past’, the ‘invented’ nationalist history. Nationalist movements propagate ideology affirming the identification with the nation state by invoking shared memories. They attempt to shape societal aspirations for a shared destiny by employing collective memories to establish a sense of continuity with the ‘golden ages’ of the past. Thus, Greece associated itself with the Hellenic civilization of Athens, while Turkey traced its ancestors back to the great cultures of the Sumerians and the Hittites.

At the same time as nationalist movements are engaged in the collective memory of a nationalist history, they are also in the process of selectively forgetting:

[A]s nations need to establish their representation in the past, their memories are created in tandem with forgetting; to remember everything could bring a threat to national cohesion and self-image. Forgetting is a necessary component in the construction of memory just as the writing of a historical narrative necessarily involves the elimination of certain elements. [Misztal 2003:17]

Schools and textbooks become important vehicles through which societies transmit an idealized past and promote ideas of a national identity and unity. Because events such as the Greek and
Turkish atrocities at Smyrna could harm social cohesion, these events are often omitted from the ‘official histories’. The past becomes a social construction, shaped by concerns of the present governments.

Greek Nationalism

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries the values and ideas of the Enlightenment entered south-eastern Europe via Greek language literature. At that time, the Balkans were a politically unified society under Ottoman rule, bonded to their fellow neighbors through membership in the Christian millet and by the tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy. The new literature produced in Greek under the influence of the Enlightenment introduced for the first time the concept of distinct ethnic identity. As early as the 1780s, the Greek author Demetrios Katartzis began using the Greek word for nation, ethnos. He argued that the Greek vernacular was equal to that of Classical Greek, superior to any other language, and the ideal medium for communication. He also promoted the use of the literature in the vernacular for use in the education of ‘the nation’.

The foundation of Greek nationalism was laid by the young Greek intellectuals who traveled to Europe for their education and were influenced by the philhellenism of the West. They set about to debarbarize the modern Greek culture, which seemed to pale in comparison to their glorious Hellenic past. Adamantios Koraes urged, “We are the descendents of Greeks… we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it.”

The 19th century became a “golden age of vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litérateurs” (Anderson 1991:9). Between 1800 and 1850, three distinct literary languages formed in the northern Balkans: Slovene, Serbo-Croat, and Bulgarian. The lexicographers were spreading not only language but also the nationalistic ideals from the
Enlightenment. As Naim points out, "The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to
invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they
understood." iii

Hellas, the achievements of Ancient Greece in knowledge, philosophy and art, became
the symbol of Greek cultural superiority. The Western perception encountered in the European
universities of what Greece should be was highly influential on the formation of the Greek
national identity leading up to the Revolution of 1820. Indeed, the Greek Independence
Movement was not only supported by the Western liberal intellectuals, but many actually
participated in the battles as well. They came to Greece driven by the nostalgia of a glorified
past with heroes like Homer, Socrates and Agamemnon. According to Volkan and Itzkowitz,
"They were inspired also by the Romantic movement and fiercely opposed the Ottoman Empire
which they saw as the symbol of Oriental Despotism" (1994:85).

The involvement of the philhellenic West also led to a "further crystallization of anti-
Turk sentiment... and confused identity among the Greeks" (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994:87). As
the Greeks searched for the elements which would define their identity, they placed the discarded
artifacts of their cultural history onto their perception of the Turks. Because of the history of
interaction between the two cultures, the wars as well as the shared cultural heritage, the Turks
became a 'suitable target'. "A target is a more effective storage place for projected elements if
there are similarities between those who project and those who receive their projections"
(Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994:88). Along with the Turks, the other Orthodox Christians and the
Latin Christians also served as the principal 'Others' of the Greeks in their definition of national
Rather than a flourishing civilization reminiscent of the Hellenic past, what the western European intelligentsia found upon arrival in Greece was a land predominantly full of peasants, farmers, and fishermen. Greek intellectuals struggled to find a common ground between their glorified past and the reality of present. The resulting national identity established a continuum of Greek life from Hellenic through the Byzantine, a heritage of continuous superiority. History, folklore, and archaeology were used to mobilize this 'history thesis', that modern Greeks were direct descendants of the ancient Greeks. The criteria for identification with the Greek nation fluctuated among the following three traits: Greek language, Greek cultural practices, and Greek Orthodox religion. The beginnings of the _Megali Idea_ can be found in the following definition of Greek identity from a children's geography textbook in 1907:

Greeks are those who speak Turkish but profess the Christian religion of their ancestors.

Greeks are also the Greek speaking Muslims of Asia Minor, who lost their ancestral religion but kept their ancestral tongue. As far as the inhabitants of Asia Minor, who are Muslims and speak Turkish, are concerned, only reliable historical evidence or anthropological studies can prove their Greek descent and their distinctions from the non-Greek Muslims.\(^v\)

Basically, all of Asia Minor was essentially Greek. This definition identified a large population of 'unredeemed' Greeks which the new nation hoped to incorporate through later irredentist pursuits.

The mechanisms for cultivating national identity included the establishment of an educational system, the spread of the Greek language, and the institution of the Greek consulates and vice-consulates. Greece developed a network of elementary schools all over the territory of independent Greece with the major objective of establishing a new state ideology. In some towns these schools were supplemented by intermediate or "Hellenic" schools which also taught
Ancient Greek. Education flourished in the new kingdom. The number of schools expanded from 71 in 1830 to 1172 in 1879, an increase of 1650% (Kitromilides 1989:38). The format of the education was primarily to teach Greek language, the rudiments of general literacy along with practical knowledge and skills applicable to the predominantly agricultural economy of Greece. The curriculum of the new schools cemented the national identity in the minds of the newly liberated Greeks as well as the 'unredeemed'.

The University of Athens became a "stronghold of the ideology behind the current Greek nationalism, disseminating the new Greekness outside the Greek state" (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994:83). Students entering from outside the Greek kingdom were admitted with special leniency. The two main objectives of the university were to train personnel to staff the new institutions of the state and to transmit Western culture and the ideas of Hellenism to the East. Over time, the system of national education expanded to incorporate much of the Greek-speaking Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire into the value system of Greek nationalism. The spread of Greek education beyond the borders of the new Greek state "amounted to the expanding of the symbolic frontiers of Greek nationality through incorporating into it social groups which by virtue of their language or religion could be taught to identify with the broad ‘imagined community’ of the Greek nation" (Kitromilides 1989:44).

Following the educational models imported from the Greek kingdom, the Asia Minor Greeks maintained schools and supported the spread of education for their own social, economic and cultural purposes. Many of the schools were run by the Orthodox Church, which under the millet system was allowed a considerable amount of autonomy in managing the educational affairs of its people. Education promoted economic advancement as well as the development of a conscious ethnic identity. However, the social and economic advancement also set them apart
more sharply from other nationalities within Ottoman society, increasing the potential for intercommunal tension, jealousy, and resentment (Augustinos 1992:211). At the same time, during the 1830s and 40s, the Greek consulates and the vice-consulates of Asia Minor were busy distributing citizenship to local Greeks, as long as they claimed some form of participation in the Greek Revolution. The consulates injected the local communities with Greek nationalism by suggesting that they too could be incorporated within the new Greek state.

Gellner classifies the nationalism which spread amongst the Asia Minor Greeks as diaspora nationalism, claiming that it was the persecution by the Ottomans that provided the impetus for the nationalist movement. The Ottoman Empire only had an interest in protecting the minority so long as it performed its bidding, keeping the economy going through trade and providing services to the sultan as translators and various other civil jobs. However, the combination of economic advancement and cultural identifiability lead to their persecution. According to Gellner, "because of the minority's visibility and wealth, it [the Ottoman Empire] could buy off a great deal of discontent in the wider population by dispossessing and persecuting it" (1983:106).

The collective memory of the Asia Minor Greeks contributed to the formation of their own identity within the Greek nation, and was particularly significant due to its traumatic character. According to Miszfel, "Traumas, representing the extremities of human experience, are the occasions on which collective memories are most intensively engaged... Trauma changes the nature of remembering as it makes such memories particularly vivid, intrusive, uncontrollable, persistent, and somatic" (2003:139; 142). While these memories of trauma were banished to the private realm of Turkish official history, they came to the fore as part of the legacy of atrocities and persecutions committed by the Turks in the Greek memory.
After the Lausanne Treaty, nationalistic pride in Hellenism and belief in the *Megali Idea* were destroyed. The only solace was that now Greece was truly a homogenous nation-state. With the fixing of Greece’s boundaries, the content of Greek nationalism transformed from an open concept of Greek identity, to ‘exclusivism’ based on ethnic as opposed to cultural criteria. “Whereas state ideology had reflected a generosity towards potential converts and a tolerance for ethnic varieties during the irredentist years, the inter-war state pursued its mission by recourse to a narrow and distant view of history” (Veremis 2003:58). An exclusive relationship with classical antiquity and ideological purity became the two legitimizing elements of Greekness.

Greek nationalistic ideology was remarkably successful in its ability to “effectively socialize” populations as diverse and widespread as the Ionian Island, eastern Aegean, western Thrace, and Crete. The Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek educational system were the main institutions responsible for disseminating these beliefs, contributing to the ideological cohesion of the nation. Currently, all educational programs and their respective syllabi are controlled by the Ministry of Education. The system of textbook production in Greece is one of the most centralized in Europe, faithfully reproducing official state curriculum (Avdelia 2000:244). Children in Greece and in Greek schools in the diaspora communities are presented with a vision of Greece as a unified and unchanging entity, directly connected with the glorified Hellenic past. “By retelling a ‘national narrative’ that evokes a common past and common cultural traits, school systems reproduce a romantic conception of the nation-state as a ‘natural entity’” (Avdelia 2000:239-240).

Any ‘official history’ involves the emphasis of what educational authorities deem historically important, as well as the suppression, omission, or de-emphasis of events they deem unimportant or potentially damaging to the national identity. For the primary school curriculum,
the "main purpose of the history courses is the development of national consciousness, ethical conduct, and citizenship" (Avdela 2000:243). This national consciousness creates a narrow lens through which the national history is viewed as 'the truth'.

In addition, textbooks create "a coherent and constantly reiterated image of the national 'self', which also becomes the standard by which various national 'Others' are defined" (Avdela 2000:245). Greeks are portrayed as 'full of virtue and talent' and 'superior both spiritually and militarily', while Bulgarians and Turks are portrayed as hostile and inferior. The Greek national identity bases its claims of superiority by virtue of its continuity with the past and the influence of the early Greek civilization on Western civilization. Through the establishment of this continuity, the Greeks became heir to a culture universally recognized as the cradle of Western civilization. This "symbolic burden of the past" is an important feature of the Greek national identity, and also serves as the "yardstick" by which everything else is measured (Avdela 2000:247).

The nationalist history is also defensive and strengthens the ethnic boundaries between Greece and its neighbors by documenting their repeated threat of expansionist activity onto Greek soil. "This threat comes mainly from Turks, who represent the age-old danger and emerge as the inverse image of the national self" (Avdela 2000:248).

**Turkish Nationalism**

Although the major nationalistic drive began much earlier in Greece, ideas of the Enlightenment had penetrated the Ottoman Empire by the mid 19th century. Turkish nationalism took various forms, beginning with Ottomanism, then transforming into Turkification, and
finally Kemalism, the most successful and permanent of the three. Interestingly, Deringil draws several similarities between the Greeks’ and the Turks’ development of nationalistic ideals:

Yet, if one had to identify a case of extreme similarity to the Turkish nationalist experience in the manner of a society’s handling of its past, it would be that of Greece. It is ironic that two peoples casting themselves in the role of historic rivals should have such parallel approaches to their national historiography. [1998:182]

The weight of the past is a major influence on the present identities of the two nations. Both movements were pioneered by small groups of intellectual elites. Both countries began their search for identity by rejecting the immediate past – the Byzantine and Ottoman cultures – in favor of a purer national identity linked with great ancient civilizations – Classical and Hellenic Greece and the Sumerians and Hittites of the Central Asian steppe. Both national ideologies emphasize an official ‘politically correct’ history created and disseminated by the central government, documenting legacies of glory and full of convenient omissions.

The development of a unique nationalistic ideology began long before the Turkish War of Independence of 1919-1920. It began in the mid 19th century under the reforms of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and Abdülhamid II, who ushered in a series of westernizing reforms in military, government and education. Young Ottomans began attending European universities and academies in increasing numbers and were inevitably affected by the new ideas they encountered there. One of the leaders of the early nationalist movement was Ahmed Paşa, a Speaker in the first Ottoman Parliament. He stressed that Turks and the Turkish language were not only Ottoman, but also connected to an ancient past spanning across Asia and the Pacific. These ideas lay the foundation for the political idea of Turanianism and pan-Turanianism, the political and cultural unification of all the Turkic, Tatar, and Uralic peoples
living in Turkey and across Eurasia. Another influential intellectual of the 19th century was Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa, whose famous work *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* published in 1869 argued that Turkish was a main root language which had preceded and influenced the ancient languages of Greek and Latin. By 1876, Turkish had been declared the official language of the state.

The Young Ottomans were dedicated to the union of the Ottoman Empire with Ottomanism, requiring loyalty to the Empire and to the Ottoman dynasty. This early nationalism involved an enforced process of Turkification. The millet systems slowly lost their autonomy and were integrated into the dominant Islamic legal system and required to learn Turkish. Ottomanism also involved loyalty to the Empire and to the Ottoman dynasty.

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dead. The common sentiment was one of frustration and defeat: “For centuries the Turkish people had squandered their energies and their blood in the useless struggle to conquer and defend alien lands and peoples” (Lewis 2002:353).

Now it was time to concentrate on ‘Turkey for the Turks’. Pan-Turanianism was abandoned as the Turkish intelligentsia shifted their focus away from such vast schemes of Islamic and Turanian unity and more towards the defense and reconstruction of their native homeland, Anatolia.

The new nationalism, which began to take shape during the parliamentary debates on the exchange and population settlement following the War of Independence, stressed a clean break with the corrupt Ottoman past. However, as Deringil has argued, the notion that the Turkish Republic started out ‘tabula rasa’ is only “a collection of half-truths,” since much of the foundation had been laid by the CUP, whose members included nearly all of the Kemalists including Mustafa Kemal himself (1998:184). Moreover, CUP membership had been
widespread among the Ottoman intelligentsia; the same people who would later help develop the notion of Turkism and Kemalism.

Following the victory of the War of Independence, Turkey had to completely restructure its political system. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) abolished the sultanate in November of 1922 before entering into negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne. On July 24, 1923 the Treaty was signed, recognizing Turkey as a sovereign state. In October, Turkey was declared a Republic, the capital was officially moved to Ankara, and Kemal was elected president of the new nation. In March of 1924 the GNA abolished the caliphate and sent the remaining members of the Ottoman dynasty into exile. The Turkish government was now free of all religious elements. With his political opposition defeated, Kemal unveiled his statue in Istanbul in 1926, “an iconoclastic gesture in a predominantly Islamic society where the representation of the human form was looked upon as sinful” (Ahmad 2003:87).

Although these changes seem quite radical for a new nation, which less than ten years before had been an Islamic Empire, Kemal’s program of modernization and secularization was merely the last push in a series of reforms begun by the CUP. Volkan and Itzkowitz note that at this historical turning point, the population was forced to adapt to drastic changes, which in turn, enabled them to postpone mourning over the loss of an empire and their Ottoman identity (1994:117). In general, the new nation was full of excitement and placed their hopes on the shoulders of their charismatic leader Mustafa Kemal.

The years between 1923 and Kemal’s death in 1938 were filled with a series of reforms that completely reshaped the nation. In 1925 the Fez was banned and the ‘Hat Law’ passed, encouraging Turks to wear only European-style hats. In 1928, the reference to Islam as the ‘religion of the state’ was removed from the constitution and the Roman alphabet replaced the
Perso-Arabic script, severing the new nation religiously, culturally, and intellectually from the Ottoman past. The language reform was particularly significant, raising literacy rates from 5% to 80%, and strengthening print media as a method of disseminating the new nationalist ideology. Women were given significant rights in the new reforms. Kemal discouraged veils for women, just as he had the fez, and in 1926 a new secular civil code gave women the same civil rights as men. In 1930, the state also gave women to vote in local elections. While some claimed that he was merely changing surface appearances (clothing, the alphabet, etc.), Kemal "cared far more deeply about cultural matters than about social and economic problems. . . . culture consists of a set of symbols, and in the context of his time and place, externals had profound symbolic meaning."  

Turkish nationalism was essentially a transformation of elite discourse into state ideology. However, the elite, confident that their reforms were for the good of the nation, made no real attempt to explain the program of modernization and secularization. Reforms were moving at a rapid pace with little thought as to how they would be accepted among the general public. Everything was becoming westernized. Sharia was repealed and replaced seemingly overnight by imported Western European laws. The caliphate was abolished; Islam was no longer the religion of the state. Arabic, the script of the Qur'an, was no longer being learned by the new generations as it was replaced with the Roman alphabet, and the Christian calendar was also introduced. In addition, a considerable number of German Jews found refuge in Turkey and aided in the modernization process by making significant contributions to the creation of a Western university system. Kemal sought to eliminate the influence of religion on state authority completely, as well as sever the ties of the Ottoman Islamic past.
The ‘Menemen incident’ in December 1930 “exposed the shallow rootless character of the reforms” (Ahmad 2003:88). A Dervish sheikh in the provincial town of Menemen in western Anatolia had gained a popular following by demanding restoration of the Sharia and the caliphate. While many Muslims willingly accepted modes of westernization in dealing with the material world, they also believed that when it came to everyday life, “their own moral and social values were superior to those of the West” (Ahmad 1993:230). Excitement and agitation intensified, and when a reserve officer arrived to investigate the situation, the Sheikh captured the man and beheaded him in front of a crowd of supporters. The incident sent shock waves through the new administration, and made it clear that reforms would not take root on their own; they would require a guiding ideology that would win the allegiance of the masses and be powerful enough to take the place of religion.

The new ideology, called Kemalism, was launched at the third party congress in May 1931. Kemalism consisted of six ‘fundamental and unchanging principles’: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism. These six principles became the six arrows on the emblem of the Republican People’s Party (Figure 13), and were later incorporated into the constitution in 1937. Republicanism emphasized the elimination of the Ottoman dynasty, and its replacement with the new sovereign Turkish nation-state, which would be republican in form.

The Nationalism in Kemalism was authoritarian in nature and emphasized unity and collectivity of purpose, deriving from the new ethnic unity of the nation. According to Keyder, “The exchange of populations of 1923, together with the Armenian deaths and deportations during the First World War, can be argued to have constituted the most important factor in defining the new Turkish entity” (2003:39). Unlike the ‘diaspora nationalism’ of Greece, or the
traditional forms of nationalism which had gained their independence from a colonial presence, Turkey was in a unique situation. The battles with Greece between 1919 and 1922 had been perceived as war against an external aggressor, and the West, which had traditionally been the enemy, was now turned into a paradigm for emulation. Unable to gaze outward for an ‘Other’ against whom they could define themselves, the Turks were forced to focus within the bounds of their new nation for sources of identity.

Kemal provided the historical foundation for this identity with the National History Thesis. What the nascent nation-state sorely needed was a dose of patriotism, stressing loyalty to the sovereign Republic of Turkey. Kemal created this patriotism by destroying all other ties – Ottomanism and Islamism. Like his predecessors, Kemal looked to the historians to legitimize his new Turkish ideology. The Ottoman Historical Society was replaced by the new Turkish Historical Society. Founded in 1930, its purpose was to “serve as the medium of state policy for the imposition of certain historical theories” (Lewis 2002:359). One of the more influential theories was the famous ‘National History Thesis’ evolved after 1931, which argued that the Turks had populated all of Eurasia after their migrations from Central Asia and were responsible for many of the great civilizations of the ancient world. This “mixture of truth, half-truth, and error was proclaimed as official doctrine, and teams of researchers set to work to ‘prove’ its various propositions” (Lewis 2002:359). Opposition or skepticism was not an option in the new nationalist atmosphere of the early Republic. In 1938, Atatürk declared: “The [Turkish] history thesis has developed. It is necessary to walk and study continuously on this thesis. There can be some unbelievers. These resemble enemies; do not pay attention to them.”

However, the wars and population exchange had ethnically ‘cleansed’ the Anatolian landscape of non-Muslims, resulting in the emergence of ethnic nationalism. The country would
forever struggle between two interpretations of nationalism: Kemal’s, which was based principally on residence within the new boundaries of the Turkish nation, and the ethnic and linguistic interpretation that identified Muslim with Turk, and non-Muslim as simply a Turkish citizen.

The third principle of Kemalism, populism, represented power in the hands of the people and emphasized equal rights for all. However, the remaining non-Muslim minorities were always treated as second class citizens on the fringes of the new national community. There was no real place for them in the emerging ethnic nationalism and they became outsiders in their own homeland. Statism, the principle wherein the state assisted private enterprise was phenomenally successful. Within a decade after the population exchange, the rising Muslim bourgeoisie had taken over the previous markets dominated by the Christians, and was becoming economically self-sufficient. Secularism seemed to go hand in hand with Western modes of modernization. Also, 2.7% of the population remained non-Muslim, and the focus of the new Republic was not to be religion, but loyalty to the nation. The new Kemalist government hoped that by passing secular reforms they would also promote national unity, and dampen the religious hostilities of the past. A symbol of these hopes was Aya Sofia, an Orthodox Christian church turned into a mosque after the fall of Constantinople, which in 1935 the state restored as a museum. The sixth principle, Revolutionism asserted that nation was an ever evolving entity. This principle was in keeping with the needs of the 20th century where revolution and reform were constantly taking place all over the world. Revolutionism was a commitment to keep up with these changes.

Along with the new ideology, Kemal also imbued the nation with a much needed dose of self-esteem. His incredibly charismatic nature and the success of his radical reforms turned him into a demigod of the nation. In 1926 after the law requiring all Turkish citizens to take last
names, the Grand National Assembly bestowed the last name Ataturk, meaning ‘Father Turk’, upon Mustafa Kemal. Like a father, Ataturk had sought to mold his people with Kemalism in order to develop a strong independent nation. Ataturk famous expressions like “One Turk is equal to the world!” and “Turk! Be proud! Work and trust!” along with his own heightened self-esteem made the new nation feel confident that they were truly an illustrious nation with a strong leader and a promising future.

In the midst of this forward-looking nationalist wave, the troubles and tensions of the past were easily forgotten, as well as systematically erased from national history. The hundreds of thousands of refugees in Greece served as an ever-present reminder of the tragedies of 1919 to 1922. In Turkey, the expulsion, deportations, massacre and exchange of the Christian minorities were “covered up both in official discourse and in the national psyche” (Keyder 2003:48). History textbooks conveniently omitted the Greeks and there was no discussion of demographic composition of Anatolia prior to the Republic. Keyder suggests that “the silence” concerning the massacres and subsequent population exchange “may have been all the more necessary because of the material benefits that had accrued to the state following the physical removal of these ethnic minorities (2003:48). Kemal’s foreign policy of maintaining the status quo also encouraged the nation to focus principally on itself rather than rivals of the past. In fact, the new ethnic nationalism, emphasizing Turkic roots in the Central Asian steppe, was so inward looking that many of the coastal towns which had been predominantly Greek before the exchange, remained relatively until the 1960’s (Keyder 2003:50).

Like the Greeks, the national history of Turkey served as the unchallenged foundation of their identity. It too attempted to establish a continuum from the most ancient civilizations to the present Turkish Republic. According to ‘official history’ Anatolia had always been the land of
the Turks, and the 'reconquest' after the 11th century was merely 'reclamation'. Yet, the physical landscape while devoid of past populations still holds their historical monuments and vestiges of their diverse cultures. This has resulted in a "particularly schizophrenic existence for modern Turkey and especially the identity of its inhabitants" (Keyder 2003:51). Moreover, despite the significant impact of Kemalism, the loss of the Islamic traditions through the rapid wave of secular reforms "may be compared to a violent swing of a pendulum, which of course has swung back: that now Islam is an integral part of the national feeling cannot be denied" (Cornell 2001:31).

**Conclusion**

After the population exchange the two countries set about strengthening their nationalist ideologies in the face of their newly 'cleansed' homogenous populations. However, as soon as they had begun to establish some semblance of stability internally, chaos unleashed itself on the world once again during World War II. Greece is hit hardest, first occupied by German troops, and then divided in a vicious civil war. Beginning in 1954 when Greece brought the Cyprus question to the United Nations, the main issue between the two countries has been Cyprus. In efforts to strengthen their own political positions, memories of the past have been reconstructed, creating unfavorable cultural stereotypes of the 'Other'. The nationalist backgrounds of the two nations, along with the manipulation of social remembering by the central governments have played active roles in the perpetuation of hostilities between the two countries. In the last and final chapter, we will examine the modern Greek and Turkish identities in 2004, and how these identities are shaped by memories of the past.


VIII. PRESENT IDENTITIES AND PERPETUATED CONFLICTS

Collective Memory and Identity

Memory of the past is a crucial dynamic in our ability to make sense of our present circumstances. While it is an individual who remembers, as a whole memory is intersubjectively constituted because our memories exist and our shaped by what we have shared with others. All memories are of an intersubjective past, a past lived in relation to other people. Collective memory, as noted earlier, is "the representation of the past, both that shared by a group and that which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future" (Misztal 2003:7). Collective memory allows us to create identities, both on the individual and social levels. Our present identities and contexts in turn, also shape how we reconstruct the past. Thus, the content of memory is "subject to time as it changes with every new identity and every new present, so memory and temporality cannot be detached from each other" (Misztal 2003:14).

Our social identity is an expression of collective experience which associates us with particular group. The collective memory of the group binds it together, giving it a sense of its past as well as defining its aspirations for the future. Collective memories thus form collective identities which imply notions of a delimited and homogenous group, who share an emotional sense of belonging and solidarity with fellow group members. Memory is called upon to legitimate our present identities, because "the core meaning of any individual or group identity is seen as sustained by remembering" (Misztal 2003:133). As there are boundaries which define the group as a cohesive unit, this identity is also experienced as a difference from people outside these boundaries.
According to Zerubavel, “cognitive battles over memory” typically occur between social ‘camps’ rather than simply between individuals (1997:12). Major changes in the way we reconstruct the past usually correspond to transformations that affect entire communities of memory. A community of memory may be a family, an ethnic group, or an entire nation. Misztal suggests that the nation is the “main mnemonic community, for its continuity relies on the vision of a suitable past and a believable future” (2003:17). Thus Greeks and the Turks remember as part of their mnemonic communities, and internalize the common traditions and social representations of their respective nations. Social memory is one of the key aspects in personal and political relations since both conflict and cooperation are dependent on it. Memory may be used to close boundaries of ethnic, national or other identities by accepting some versions of the past as ‘the truth’. In the national histories of Greece and Turkey, ‘the truth’ is politically constructed, and can be used both to elevate the status of a nation, as well as tear down that of its rivals, aggravating past and present conflicts.

In today’s society, collective memory is increasingly shaped by specialized institutions, such as schools and mass media. “The growing number of ideas, assumptions, and knowledges that structure the relationship of individuals and groups to the immediate as well as the more distant past is formed, interpreted and preserved by public institutions” (Misztal 2003:20). Today, mass media has become one of the most important vehicles in the construction of collective memories. With the internet, satellite television, and innumerable circulated newspapers, magazines, and bulletins, people’s sense of the past can potentially be influenced by an infinitely larger number of perspectives outside of its social group than ever before. Perhaps this is not such a bad thing. A person’s sense of the past, which was once constituted predominantly through a relatively uniform oral tradition, is now shaped by an abundance of
different points of view, and people are given the option of examining the past outside of their nationalist histories.

Over the course of the 2003 to 2004 school year, I engaged in a number of discussions with people of Greek and Turkish descent, concerning their ethnic background and stories they had been told about Greek and Turkish relations. Below is an analysis of these testimonies. Full transcriptions of each of these interviews may be found in the appendix.

Present Identities and Personal Testimonies

When I asked Etta how she would describe what it meant to be Turkish, she began by describing the size of the country and the regional variety of cultures. “But the average Turkish person,” she said, “is very nationalistic, like very very nationalistic…” She also thinks Turkey is “very committed to its history and traditions.” Part of reconstructing the past is through the commemoration of various national holidays during the year. One of the most important holidays, in any nation, is its Independence Day. Turkish Independence Day is October 29. Notably this neither the date of the Turk’s victory at Smyrna (September 9-13), nor the date of the Lausanne Treaty (July 23), which recognized the borders of modern Turkey. October 29, 1923 is the date Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Mustafa Kemal was elected as president. There are celebrations in every city, especially in Ankara. School children perform small plays illustrating the significance of the day. Everywhere people sing, carrying flags and flames, and at night there are fireworks and other celebrations.

Similarly, national holidays also play an important role in the constructing the Greek national identity. Maia, who lives in a Greek section of Brooklyn, talked to me about the
meaning and importance of the annual Greek Pride Parade. The Greek Pride Parade takes place every year, right around Greek Independence Day (March 25), on 5th Avenue in New York City:

A lot of people come from Greece, the soldiers, who dress up all formal, you know, they march and then all the churches and the high schools and the public high schools... They have floats, and Miss Chios, Miss Independence, things like that. So it's like a whole Greek pride celebration type thing. And in general, they chant.

They chant nationalistic slogans. "I feel that with the adults, there are definitely political issues," she said. "I feel that with the younger kids who do sing these little cheers, I think they just do it because it's a catchy little phrase. But I don't really think that they think about what it means."

So from a very young age children are engulfed in the symbolism of Greek identity. Overall, she said, "I think it [the parade] has a lot to do with Greek culture and Greek traditions and things like that. Just the dress, people dress up in costume if they want. The flags, just a lot of like pride for one's country."

Similarly, the holiday plays performed by young children also served to reconstruct the past. Nicole recalls:

I remember we did one play, and it was one when the girls had to wear the girl costumes and the guys had to wear the soldier costumes. And the premise of the story was that the men were being hauled off to war against the Turks, and the women were left helpless, and rather than be ravaged by the invading Turks they all danced on a cliff and jumped off. We had to dance around on the stage in a circle and then jump off.

Although she can not remember the name of the play, the physical act of throwing herself off the stage has left quite an impression. These parades and commemorations, common to both
cultures contribute not only to build a national identity, but also aid in the formation of perceptions of the ‘Other’.

During my discussion with Onan, he defined his identity, by describing what the Turks are not: “[W]e are not Arab. We are like Turks and we are totally different.” Moreover, “Ottomans are not Turks, they’re supposedly Turkish and Muslim, but they are not really Turks, and they have lots and lost of … Western blood…Because nearly all of the mothers and wives of the sultans are Westerners.” In addition, the “coupling” of Ottomans with Turks, he calls “the big ‘Western invention’” and identifies the Turks as the agriculturalists of central Anatolia. This view of national identity is very much in line with the early nationalist ideology of Kemal, which stressed a break from the Ottoman past. Turks are viewed as the people who have continually inhabited Anatolia, while the Ottomans are perceived an extraneous population with Western blood.

Another key aspect of the Turkish identity is self-confidence. “We have some kind of self confidence of Turks towards Greeks,” Onan said. “[W]e never believe, I think that they can actually come and conquer some of the islands, or Anatolia itself.” Basically, whatever issues Turkey may have with Greece, Onan is confident that the Turks are not very worried about them, because they believe that they will always win. “[W]e never see Greeks as a big threat, to be frank.” Moreover, the legacy of Turkish supremacy outlined in the national history supports this view: “In history it was always the Ottomans and later Turkish people who are more politically stronger than the Greek side because they have more population and generally, well before they were an empire, and it’s a lot larger country. So the Greeks, for them, apparently we were the rulers…they were ruled; we are the rulers. So they are having the uprising as the minorities and we always feel like the majority.” Etta also expressed a similar view: “You know Greeks always
lived under some empire so they have like something…” implying that they have a chip on their shoulder. In this view, the Turks have always been a strong nation, while the Greeks have always been a weak one. The Turks assert that do not feel threatened in their political or social disagreements with the Greeks, because they know they are stronger. The centuries of Ottoman decline and misrule are omitted, as are all other signs of weakness and defeat.

While both Eta and Onan are Turkish citizens, born and raised in Turkey, Maia, Nick, Nicole and Ioanni are second generation Greek Americans. This means that their parents moved to United States and they were born here as American citizens. Although Kourvetaris has observed that an individual’s ‘Greekness’, defined as nationality, language, family, kinship, and traditions, declines in the later generations, the ties to Greece in these second generation Greeks still remained very strong. Maia’s identity is highly influenced by the Greek religious and cultural structures in her life. “My neighborhood in New York is very Greek,” she said. “I live in Bay Side, and the church is right by my house… I was always brought up in the Greek culture and the Greek Church, and things like that.” The Greek Orthodox Church is a major source of Greek identity in the diaspora, organizing youth groups, Sunday schools, and Greek schools for the learning of Greek language and culture. In participating in these institutions, Greek Americans are able to keep their cultural heritage alive.

When I talked about Greek and Turkish relations, one of the first things many of the interviewees discussed was the history that they had learned in school. As noted earlier, these histories are political and social constructions. Often, they praise one culture, while degrading their rivals. This is perhaps true of both Greek and Turkish history taught in Turkish high schools, and Greek schools in America.
Etta recalled what she had learned about the Greeks in high school:

The Ottoman Empire was very tolerable to all of the minorities, including Greeks, and they were allowed to practice their own religion and traditions. And they could have their like Greek education or whatever, but after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and after the First World War all of the European countries tried to take advantage of Turkey – going into the cities, burning, raping… but Ataturk, the leader of Turkey, he engineered a group of Young Turks as they were called and they were against the Ottoman empire actually… so they didn’t accept the treaties that the Ottoman Empire signed before. So they fought against Greeks and they kicked them out of the country.

There is no mention of the persecutions of the Greeks which occurred in the later periods of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Greeks and powers of the west are characterized as manipulative and violent.

Because these histories are taken as ‘the truth’ it makes discussions between the two cultures difficult. Etta acknowledged that “the history that we are taught at high school, in Greece or in Turkey is not objective at all.” However, she struggles in trying to talk about history with her Greek friends at Penn.

For example, my Greek friends here do not know anything about the Independence War of Turkey… like they haven’t even heard about it before and I don’t know about the stories that … Greeks were suffering under the Ottoman Empire, [that] they weren’t allowed to practice religion… Like that’s what my [Greek] friends tell me, I don’t believe them. I don’t accept what they tell me.

The deletions and omissions in their national histories make it difficult to negotiate a common view of the past.
In Greek school the students are required to take Greek culture classes. Nicole noted that
she was aware that the histories were perhaps biased, but that this was the case with all history.
American history type books will give you... the American-hero story of America and the
Greek books are the same thing. When it was Turkish wars they would make it like the
Greeks suffered and they had to do this and that... We're Greeks, so we're not going to make
ourselves the guilty party.

She later noted, “I guess they kind of brainwash you. You know what it is: Greek culture.
Every year they highlight it, you have to read the same stuff over and over again.” These
nationalist histories promote the respective cultures as blameless and their rivals as
characteristically evil. This sort of perception has lead to cultural stereotypes of the ‘Other’ and
a blatant and recognized hatred between the two countries. Moreover, since these histories are
learned, the perceptions and stereotypes are also learned and become ingrained in the way that
people view the ‘Other’.

**Perpetuated Conflicts**

I found it remarkable how nonchalant my interviewees were in discussing the open hatred
between the two cultures. “So the Greeks and the Turks, they don’t like each other,” Etta said.
When I asked her if she remembered when she first found out about these tensions, she said, “I
was taught it at school actually, in high school when I was taking history classes.” At the same
time though, she gets frustrated in trying to talk to her Greek friends because she feels “They are
all concentrated on Turkey and the wars with Turkey and [that] the Turks... hated them.” Onan
also noted, “The Turkish people have come to the realization that Greek people actually think
badly about Turkish people.” They not only have issues with the Turkish government, but “that the Greek people hate us too, which I think has some truth in it.”

My Uncle Peter summed up the relations between the Greeks and Turks quite succinctly: “it’s just that there is a hatred between the two countries. Period.” The Greek Americans whom I interviewed traced their hatred of the Turks back to Greek school. Maia reveals that “the connotation [in reference to the Turks] of the teachers and the people I was exposed to in Greek school, it was always negative.” “It was always like you know ‘we were their slaves for 300 years’ … ‘They [the Turks] were barbarous, they were just not a good people,’ and that’s like the impression that I was given when I was growing up.” She continues, “We just always got the like “Turks are evil.” These cultural stereotypes were reinforced by the retelling of horrific tales of violence committed by the Turks against the Greeks: “they raped women, they would violently rape them and like cut off their breasts and things like that. Just awful, awful things.” These shocking images no doubt can leave quite an impression on young school children. “Well we were all younger and we all were just kind of brought up in believing that they’re just an evil group of people” Maia said. “They were just so barbarous, like barbarians basically. That’s like the word that I hear over and over when they refer to them.” Peter makes a similar statement about the Turks, “They’re barbarians; they killed people. They didn’t consider life, a Greek life as a human being.”

While the Greeks develop a learned hostility towards the Turks based on the atrocities of the past, the Turks do not harbor the same kind of hostilities towards the Greeks. According to Onan:

The Greeks are always in the news so you know we talk about Greeks, but we never talk about Greeks in a personal manner, always in a political manner. There is really nothing
between the people; it is the governments that have trouble. This is the big phrase that my parents always tell me…the feelings are not towards individual Greek people or the Greek people, but rather the governments, politics. While hostilities between the two countries are acknowledged by both Onan and Etta, they also feel that the Greeks have a much more deep seated hatred towards the Turks. “I believe an average person in Turkey wouldn’t hate Greeks now, but I’m pretty sure that an average person in Greece would hate Turks,” said Etta. Onan makes a similar statement: “it’s not that I think that we don’t have anything against Greeks, I think we do. But I think that the Greeks have a more stronger feeling against Turkish people.”

Memories of Violence

Misztal argues that “trauma change the nature of remembering as it makes such memories particularly vivid, intrusive, uncontrollable, persistent and somatic.” Notably, while the Greeks included the memories of violence as part of their history curriculum, Turkish national history is characteristically marked by an absence of documented violence. The most painful stories however, are the not the general propaganda taught in the schools, but the lesser shared stories, the private stories that are passed down orally between generations. “These stories are not talked about in great detail. They are painful stories,” said Thalia in prefacing her story of the Greek population exchange.

My grandfather, he and his family like many others, were forced to leave their homes behind, left with just the clothes on their back. They managed to escape to the shore where they were put on small boats. A lot of people, you know and only so many can fit, so some had to hang onto the outside in the water. Many people didn’t make it. They had to hold on to the
outside of the boat to escape captivity and murder... There were two uncles, [her mother’s uncles] and one aunt. One uncle was taken hostage and never seen again. He left behind three children. My grandfather was able to take two [couple of years apart around the same age] to the island of Kos. The other child hid in the woods for 40 days just eating berries and ... a type of grain you feed to pigs... He waited and he was trying to find passage over...He was only twelve... All agreed to meet on the island [Kos] ... My grandfather’s two brothers were taken hostage for 1 year. One lost his foot and the other his toe, from freezer burns [frostbite]. They had no shoes on from running, they were taken away, they were made to walk in snow and do hard labor, both had frost bites, one leg was amputated, other toes lost: because so bad. It is the same thing with all the families. They all left everything behind, making it to mainland or islands with just the clothes on backs.

Nicole told me a story about her grandfather whose village was attacked by the Turks. “He was a teenager and when they invaded the village he needed to hide out in a hollowed out tree log for a few days until they passed over him. So he could get out of the way.” However, this was also a painful story. “He didn’t even tell me that,” she said. “My dad told me.”

Etta also recalled a story told by her father: “when the Greeks tried to conquer the village of his friend’s parents and they killed all his grand mom’s friends and his grandma was threatened by the Greeks but she survived somehow...” When I asked her how old she was when her father told her this story, she replied that it was only recently. After she began dating a Greek boy, her father told her the story, perhaps as a deterrent. She concluded by saying, “Our people don’t really talk about it [the population exchange and the violence], like they don’t care much... it was in the past so there’s nothing to do about it anymore, and the Turks got what they wanted, so that’s good.” Perhaps because they were the victors and the strong image of Turkey
in the national history, these stories are played down. Regardless, during the Turkish War of Independence and the Greek campaign into Anatolia, there were many atrocities on both sides. After the population exchange the physical presence of the suffering refugees was an irremovable reminder of the past horrors suffered by the Greek people. These memories of violence became part of the Greek history, while they were played down or completely omitted from Turkish history.

**Disparate Histories**

The unique way in which Greece and Turkey have reconstructed history has led to very different versions of past events. The treatment of the Greek minority in population in Constantinople after the Lausanne Treaty is an example of these differences. The Greeks maintain that the Turks persecuted them and drove them from the country by making life as difficult as possible. However, the Turks maintain that the Greeks were very happy, economically well off, and left the country on their volition.

Peter’s entire family was from Constantinople, they were part of the exempt populations who were allowed to stay after 1923. He recalls an unstable time, with persecution and prejudice against the Greeks:

[T]he way that I get the story, is that they were thrown out. More or less, it was a hatred for the Greeks. And if you didn’t leave they made it bad for you... It was a definite hate for each other... My dad left Turkey I think, the way I understand, when he was 17 or 18 years old. His parents told him to leave and um we went to Athens, and then his parents came right after that. The animosity, which to this day, if you talk to that generation is a definite, uh... hate, whatever Turkey, whatever Turks do is no good... All these people said they were
persecuted. They couldn't go to church; they closed the churches down. Ah. Now they come to Greece and today you talk to any Greek and you don’t even mention Turkey to them. No way. And its something that was imbedded I guess from father-son, daughter, uh generation after generation...

Onan tells a completely different story concerning the Greeks who were allowed to remain in Constantinople:

And the remaining Rums, remaining Greeks and the remaining Jewish people are very rich today. But what happens is that, after the Lausanne [Treaty], they are forced to move from their land, many of them... It’s a weird situation because you know some people have their own nationalistic feeling and they go back, some of them removed. But in fact, just after Lausanne [Treaty], really nobody moved. Turkish people come back to Turkey, because they don’t feel all right because Greece is not kind of safe, this is my opinion of course. But Greek people were happy. They didn’t move. What happens is that in the late 20’s after Ataturk’s reign actually, in Turkey, actually what they call valik vergisi, which means ‘wealth tax’... So he [Inönü] basically put this thing, and it is like the accepted tax for minorities. ...you pay the tax or you go and work for the government in a very, very, uh, bad places, like in railroads...labor camps. So nobody wants to do it so they escape, basically. A lot of people escape, leave the country, you know, they sell all of their estates and everything, get the money and escape... I don’t know how many died in the labor camps, or if anybody died. But I assume that they died because they are normal: fat, heavy, merchants, who supposedly deal with gold, I don’t know.
Onan claims that many of the Greeks left Constantinople for purely financial reasons, rather than the threat of persecution. In his mind, they had very good lives in Turkey and were very happy. Even today, he claims:

I never heard anything negative about the people who are living in Turkey. On the contrary, they are very supportive of Turkey. They think that it is a very peaceful land and stuff like that. But they always kind of have their hearts broken because of the events in the 20’s and 30’s. ...you know because they have had their grandparents die in a labor camp, or their cousins left the country. So there is this whole thing going on and there are not many left.

It is true that many have voluntarily moved away, however, many left after their assets had been frozen by the Turkish government and they were unable to make a living. Also many left after the government sponsored anti-Greek riots of 1955, protesting Greek actions in Cyprus.

Changing Perspectives

Cyprus is one of the main causes of the perpetuated hostilities between Greeks and Turks. While conflicts with other countries have come and gone, hostilities between Greece and Turkey seem never-ending. “The fact that it’s still going on [with Turkey], that has an impact,” said Nicole. When I asked if she thought it would end soon, she replied:

It’ll stop as soon as Turkey stops. Now, it’s like a power struggle, it’s like anybody, nobody is going to step down because then it makes you the loser... At this point it’s not even the Greeks. It’s both of them obviously, I mean, at this point nobody’s stepping down. It’s like, ‘Well we’ve come this far, why stop now?’ Nobody’s going to walk away.

Onan also talked about the role of Cyprus in hurting relations between the two countries. Because of the past issues over Cyprus, many Turks have come to view Greeks as a “small
spoiled kid.” “Like they’re always crying, and they use the father, the European Union,” in order to get what they want. The great powers of the West have also played a dominant role in instigating conflicts between the two nations.

However, Maia seemed more positive about the future. In addition, she has abandoned many of the prejudices learned from Greek school. When I asked her what changed, she said, “I don’t know, well just my perspectives on things. Like once you start hitting junior/senior year in high school they start giving you the other sides of the stories, it’s not just one-sided any more.”

Etta similarly has learned a lot about some of the missing pieces in Turkish history from her Greek friends, and vice versa. The more they interact, the more they realize how similar their cultures are. “I think that both cultures have their oral histories,” said Onan. Furthermore, “cross cultural dialogue is an important thing to resolve all of this... and the oral histories are probably the key to it.”

The more Greeks and Turks talk to one another about their view of the past, and the more people are opened up to more interpretations of history, the easier it will be to do away with cultural stereotypes and past hostilities.

\footnote{All names have been changed.}
CONCLUSIONS

The history of relations between Greece and Turkey has not always been peaceful. In order to understand their present conflicts, it is necessary to understand their past. The Greek Orthodox populations were able to sustain and develop their cultural heritage under the Ottoman Empire because of the autonomy granted through the millet system. Orthodox Christians and Muslims lived together in peace for many years up until the decline of the Empire.

The Greeks were aided in their fight for independence by the Great Powers of the West who have always looked kindly upon the Greek people. The West not only influenced the development of the Greek national identity, incorporating the greatness of the Hellenic past, but also influenced the Greeks aversion to the Muslim Turks. Labeled the 'Sick Man of Europe' the Western Christians banded together against the Ottoman Empire, and made plans to dismantle it piece by piece, for their own political and territorial gains. Greece became a pawn in the hands of the West; the sole army responsible for enforcing the Treaty of Sevres.

Economic gains and the emergence of a Greek national identity among the Ottoman Greeks, made them an easy target for Ottoman frustrations. As the Christians of the Empire were excelling at trade and international business, the Muslims were falling behind economically and the Ottoman government was forced to financially support a huge number of refugees arriving in Anatolia as a result of the Balkan Wars.

By the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence, both Grèece and Turkey had been engaged in nearly ten years of warfare against various polities. The populations of both nations were suffering financially, as well as psychologically. They were war-weary, and religious
tensions ran high. The Smyrna massacres testify to the mob-mentality which overcame both the invading Greeks, as well as the Turks, resulting in the death of millions.

The compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey resulted in more than a physical separation of peoples. The events of violence and political conflict between Greeks and Turks became imbedded in their respective nationalistic retellings of history and left an indelible mark on their respective cultures. The formation of strict ethnic boundaries, aligned with new territorial borders created a psychological chasm between the new nations blocking out contrary historical discourse, as fewer and fewer people were willing to engage in cross-cultural discussions. Two groups that had shared so much history watched their former lives be erased, as they were exiled from their homelands, separated their roots and all ties to their past. The collective memory of the Greek refugees aided in the creation of an identity, separate from the autochthonous. However, these memories were made up of nostalgia for their past lives as well as memories of violence and terror.

Moreover, the Greek Orthodox Church and Greek educational systems in both Greece and the diaspora have been remarkably successful in disseminating Greek nationalistic ideology, which stresses a unique view of the past, where the Turks are portrayed as evil barbarians. The Turkish national history conveniently leaves out much of the violence and ethnic conflicts of the past, aggravating frustrations among the Greeks. As the two cultures become isolated by deep-rooted ethnic boundaries, nationalistic views of history gain precedence in place of any empirical knowledge of the 'Other'. Cultural perceptions turn into ignorant stereotypes, reinforcing hostilities between the two nations.

Children growing up after 1923 developed a learned aversion for the other culture. The holes left in the histories of the two nations fueled hostilities, particularly those of Greeks against
Turks. Today, people of Greek and Turkish descent struggle in their attempt to discuss their common pasts, particularly because of the stark contrast in historical accounts. Specifically, the Greek collective memory commemorated and preserved through Greek history classes and textbooks serves to pass down stories of conflict and violence, as well as cultural stereotypes about the Turkish people.

While the aversion toward Turks has been kept alive in Greece and in the American diaspora, it is slowly dulling as the events become more removed and people are exposed to new interpretations of history. In general, the memories of Greek violence against the Turks are not remembered as vividly in Turkish history. One of the major causes in the continuation of hostilities between the two nations is the issue of Cyprus, which seems to legitimize the Greek and Turkish nationalistic views of history. Cultural stereotypes and pride fuels the Cyprus issue, as neither one is willing to negotiate with the 'barbarians' or the 'spoiled child'.

In sum, the forced population exchange between the two peoples has resulted in not only a physical but also a psychological separation. The national histories and oral traditions have served to solidify cultural boundaries. While the two nations have certainly been engaged in political conflict over the past century, it is primarily the lack of cross-cultural communication which has served to fuel their mutual aversion and future conflicts.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS</th>
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<td>300,188</td>
<td>446,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas province</td>
<td>765,558</td>
<td>939,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK SEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamoru</td>
<td>929,300</td>
<td>737,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon province</td>
<td>357,288</td>
<td>921,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST COAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin province</td>
<td>1,499,323</td>
<td>2,490,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biga district</td>
<td>99,468</td>
<td>149,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüdavendigãr province</td>
<td>1,132,763</td>
<td>474,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmit district</td>
<td>113,417</td>
<td>226,859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Total Muslim and Greek Populations in Provinces, 1885 and 1914 (adapted from McCarthy 1980:198-199).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS</th>
<th>MUSLIMS 1911-1912</th>
<th>MUSLIMS 1914</th>
<th>GREEK ORTHODOX 1911-1912</th>
<th>GREEK ORTHODOX 1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASTERN ANATOLIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis province</td>
<td>408,703</td>
<td>309,999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir province</td>
<td>598,985</td>
<td>493,101</td>
<td>2,355</td>
<td>1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezurum province</td>
<td>604,338</td>
<td>573,297</td>
<td>5,811</td>
<td>4,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van province</td>
<td>315,322</td>
<td>179,680</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL ANATOLIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana province</td>
<td>573,256</td>
<td>341,903</td>
<td>14,825</td>
<td>8,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara province</td>
<td>1,263,199</td>
<td>877,285</td>
<td>53,452</td>
<td>20,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya province</td>
<td>1,542,331</td>
<td>750,712</td>
<td>121,812</td>
<td>35,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamuretülaziz province</td>
<td>564,164</td>
<td>446,379</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas province</td>
<td>1,196,300</td>
<td>939,735</td>
<td>90,149</td>
<td>75,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BLACK SEA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>846,726</td>
<td>737,302</td>
<td>24,069</td>
<td>20,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon province</td>
<td>914,592</td>
<td>921,128</td>
<td>160,427</td>
<td>161,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST COAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın province</td>
<td>1,734,179</td>
<td>1,249,067</td>
<td>384,732</td>
<td>299,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biga district</td>
<td>165,508</td>
<td>(149,903)</td>
<td>9,441</td>
<td>(8,541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüdavendigar province</td>
<td>535,654</td>
<td>474,114</td>
<td>87,605</td>
<td>74,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmit district</td>
<td>271,751</td>
<td>226,859</td>
<td>47,973</td>
<td>40,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Total Populations in Anatolia by Province and Millet, 1911-1912 (McCarthey 1983:110; 1980:198-199).
FIGURES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Races</th>
<th>1913 Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1920* Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1928 Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>4,176,000</td>
<td>86.63</td>
<td>4,470,000</td>
<td>80.75</td>
<td>5,822,000</td>
<td>93.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>770,000</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgars</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Jews</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,820,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>5,536,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>6,205,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures include Eastern Thrace but not Smyrna.

Figure 12. Ethnological Composition of the Population of Greece (Pentzopoulos 1962:128).
Figure 1. Scene from the Battle Defending Constantinople, Paris 1499.
Figure 2. Expansion of the Ottoman Empire (Houghton Mifflin Company 2001).
Figure 3. Massacre of Chios
Oil on canvas; 4.17 x 3.54 m; Musée du Louvre, Paris.
Figure 4. The Geography of the Nationals Schism: 'Old' and 'New' Greece in 1916/1917 (Clogg 1992:92).
Figure 5. Schematic map of Lloyd George’s proposal for a Turkish settlement, as it took shape in the discussion on May 14, 1919 (Baker 1922:193).
Figure 6. Greek Invasion of Asia Minor, 1919-22 (Clogg 1992:99).
Figure 7. Refugees crowded on the waterfront at Smyrna on Sept. 13, 1922 after fire had devastated much of the Greek, Armenian, and European quarters of the city. A few minutes after photo taken the heavily overloaded boat on the left capsized.

(Clogg 1992:98)
Greek Population of Anatolia According to "Greek Patriarchate" and "Turkish Official" Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Greek Patriarchate</th>
<th>Turkish Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul (Asia)</td>
<td>74,457</td>
<td>70,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmit</td>
<td>73,134</td>
<td>78,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın (İzmir)</td>
<td>622,810</td>
<td>622,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>278,421</td>
<td>274,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>87,021</td>
<td>85,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>45,873</td>
<td>54,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>353,533</td>
<td>351,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>99,376</td>
<td>98,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>24,919</td>
<td>18,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>90,208</td>
<td>88,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berga</td>
<td>32,830</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,782,562</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,777,146</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Greek Population Statistics Presented by Venizelos to the Paris Peace Conference (McCarthy 1983:91).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>12,585,950</td>
<td>15,044,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>2,929,776</td>
<td>1,729,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Gregorian</td>
<td>598,807</td>
<td>1,161,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>184,139</td>
<td>187,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>150,166</td>
<td>130,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Exarchate</td>
<td>818,962</td>
<td>14,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>36,229</td>
<td>65,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latins</td>
<td>18,240</td>
<td>24,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monophysites</td>
<td>22,598</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim Gypsies</td>
<td>9,153</td>
<td>11,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suyani</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>4,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedani</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>13,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqubi</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>6,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meronite</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>47,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saranian</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nestorian</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>6,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yafti</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>6,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>7,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qmaq</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scbian</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlach</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franks</td>
<td>235,690</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,375,225</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,520,016</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Grand Totals of Population in 1885 and 1914 (McCarthy 1980:197).
Figure 10. Division of Ottoman Anatolia into Provinces, 1895 (McCarthy 1983:3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Total Before the Disaster</th>
<th>Total After the Disaster</th>
<th>Before the Disaster</th>
<th>After the Disaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia Minor</td>
<td>616,935</td>
<td>37,728</td>
<td>556,125</td>
<td>113,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>850,633</td>
<td>27,077</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontus</td>
<td>185,345</td>
<td>15,518</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>53,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>49,027</td>
<td>25,977</td>
<td>43,027</td>
<td>57,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>47,091</td>
<td>16,877</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantinople</td>
<td>31,415</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>21,015</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>11,455</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>10,311</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>4,014</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodecanese</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roumana</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,231,849</td>
<td>151,396</td>
<td>1,069,957</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. Tables adapted from the 1928 census, showing makeup of refugee population and arrival date relative to the ‘Asia Minor Disaster’ (Pentzopoulos 1962:99, from Statistical Annual of Greece 1930:41).
Figure 13. Flag of the Republican People's Party
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

Because the idea for this project was formulated during my semester abroad in Greece and subsequent expedition in Turkey, my first real “interviews” began with the people I came into contact with under these circumstances. In Greece, I struggled to learn the Greek language as I was thrown into dinner table conversations and long rides in the car and on the bus with my Greek friend Spiro and his Greek-speaking family. Even though I am half-Greek, on my mother’s side, and a Greek Orthodox Christian, I was still considered *xeni* (foreign) by Spiro’s family because I was not fluent in the Greek language. As I was often told, “there are two things that make someone Greek: Orthodox Christianity, and Greek language.” Thus, I was treated as someone who needed to ‘learn’ what it meant to be Greek. In Greek and broken English, the topics of discussion were frequently geared toward history and politics. It is through those conversations that I first encountered the deep seated animosity that Greeks feel toward Turks. I heard stories about the years under Ottoman domination, the glories of the Revolution, and the horror of the massacres in Asia Minor.

My experience in Turkey was also one of language immersion. I was working on an underwater archaeological project in the Black Sea. After finishing my work aboard the ship, I disembarked at Sinop, a peninsular city on the southern coast of the Black Sea. I spent several days there, exploring the historic port city on my own and helping the project’s Turkish translator, Güzel, run errands. I was told, “The worst thing you can be in Turkey is either Greek or Russian.” Having been amply warned by my Greek American friends back home that I ‘better watch myself’, and other nonsense about my security as a young Greek woman traveling in Turkey, I was at first apprehensive about discussing my Greek background. The topic eventually
came up, and the lack of response was more startling than a negative reaction might have been, particularly because I had so prepared myself to handle the latter. Nevertheless, the lack of response made me probe for one and I began discussing with Güzel her opinions about Greeks and the history of relations between the two countries. The seat of the animosity seemed to be found in certain historical events, like the Greek Invasion of Turkey.

After leaving Sinop, I traveled eleven hours by bus to Istanbul. The trip itself was quite an experience. With no bathroom on the bus, everyone was compelled to disembark at random rest stations along the way. In this way, I ended up talking with random people in my Turk-glish in order mediate my way around each new stop searching for bathrooms, food, and cigarettes.

I stayed in Istanbul for about four days before returning to America. Essentially traveling alone, I befriended the hotel clerk, Orhan, who was around my age. We spent much of the four days together, traveling the city, visiting the sites, as well as smoking, drinking coffee, and having long conversations. Greek and Turkish relations were often the subject of some of our deepest discussions. I suppose I was fascinated because of 'all the hype' I had received preceding my trip to Turkey, and was trying to understand what it was all about. Orhan’s stories about the history of events between Greece and Turkey were remarkably different from the ones I had heard from Spiro’s family and the people working at the college in Athens. From Orhan, I learned about the atrocities and reckless political endeavors of the Greeks.

When I returned to the United States, the first people I turned to for answers were my family. I wanted to understand where this animosity between the two cultures came from and why it persisted, even after some of the most terrible events were long over. As the notion of a thesis developed, my family members were the first people I formally interviewed. While I had a large pool of Greek friends and family members to consult on the issue, I did not have any
close Turkish friends. This was due to the fact that the first Turkish people I met where those I had talked to in Turkey. As a result, my friends at school helped out by putting me into contact with their Turkish friends. Everyone with whom I spoke, both in general discussion and recorded interviews, was introduced through friends and family. As a result, the conversations were always very informal, even with the tape recorder. We often met in casual settings like Starbuck’s or Houston Hall, the student center.

I enjoyed the relaxed and personal nature of the discussions. This personal connection allowed me to easily ask probing questions about Greeks and Turks. In addition, the people I interviewed were also relaxed, and didn’t seem to hold back sharing their opinions, positive or negative. In an endeavor of larger proportions and with a wider social network, perhaps I could have selected people based on different criteria, such as age or their family’s background in relation to the population exchange. However, due to constraints in my social network, I talked with whomever I could.

The age of the interviewees ranged from 18 to 75. Their cultural backgrounds varied. I spoke with people of full citizenship in the respective countries, as well as second generation Greek and Turkish Americans. The interviews were not set to end at a predetermined time, and so their length varied from twenty minutes to four hours. Everyone whom I recorded was extremely open and often told me to contact them again for more information or for more contacts, which I often did.

As noted before, we met in casual public settings. I tried to make the place we met neutral so as to not seem invasive, particularly with people who I only knew through friends. No one requested anonymity, but at the same time no one requested that their name be used either. Even though I clearly stated that I would be transcribing the interviews and using them in this
paper, I still feel that what we shared in many of the discussions was of a semi-private nature, and therefore the names in the transcribed interviews have been changed.

The emotions during the interviews were usually pretty tame. Some occasionally became heated, particularly when discussing the injustices and atrocities committed against the Greeks. A lot of the people also expressed the frustration they felt when trying to talk to people of the other culture. They felt like they weren’t being understood, or they were talking past each other.

Notes from the un-taped conversations were written down in a journal that I kept during the two semesters. The recorded conversations were painstakingly transcribed by computer into Word documents, usually within weeks of the interview. When I first transcribed the interviews, I included every “like” “um” and “I mean.” However, I ended up taking a number of these space fillers out because they detracted from the content. At the same time, I did try to stay as accurate to the person’s tone and style of speech.

All of the interviews were conducted in English, and the following versions are therefore direct transcriptions. My questions are written in italics to put the statements into context. Bracketed words and phrases are to clarify meaning, mostly due to the informality of speech, where head nodding and non-verbal forms of communication are not caught on tape. Moreover, people generally do not speak as formally as they write. The bracketed words and phrases try to fill in the gaps where someone jumped topics, stopping in the middle of sentences. Bracketed sentences in italics are my interpretation or summary of what the person has said, beyond what might naturally be implied in the language (an omitted word or phrase).
INTERVIEWS

TURKISH

ETTA

Etta is a junior in the College at the University of Pennsylvania. She was born in a little village outside of Istanbul. She is 21 and studying Economics and German. She is currently dating a Greek boy, and her father is not happy about it.

So the Greeks and the Turks, they don’t like each other. And in high school, what I learned was, the Ottoman Empire was very tolerable to all of the minorities, including Greeks, and they were allowed to practice their own religions and traditions. And they could have their like Greek education or whatever, but after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and after the First World War all of the European countries tried to take advantage of Turkey – going into the cities, burning, raping, blah blah blah um but Ataturk, the leader of Turkey, he engineered a group of Young Turks, as they were called, and they were against the Ottoman empire actually. Yeah, so they didn’t accept the treaties that the Ottoman Empire signed before. So they fought against Greeks and they kicked them out of the country. And actually before I came here [to our interview that evening] I read something saying that the ones who couldn’t survive in the sea were killed in Turkey on the Western coast or something like that and I had never heard of something like this before. And what I hear from my parents, from my grandparents, actually Turks don’t care as much as Greeks do. You know Greeks always lived under some empire so they have like something... [a chip on their shoulder].

And I believe that the history that we are taught at high school, in Greece or in Turkey, is not objective at all. For example, my Greek friends here do not know anything about the Independence War of Turkey. Like when... [fuzzy] out of the country, like they haven’t even heard about it before and I don’t know about the stories that um Greeks were suffering under the Ottoman Empire, and stuff, they weren’t allowed to practice religion and stuff like that. Like that’s what my [Greek] friends tell me, I don’t believe them. I don’t accept what they tell me.

And my father, he wasn’t from Istanbul, he was from another city in Anatolia. And he always tells me stories about it because he had many Greek friends in Germany when he studied there and he wasn’t really treated well by them. So anyway he always tells me the story of when the Greeks tried to conquer the village of his friend’s parents and they killed all his grand mom’s friends and his grandma was threatened by the Greeks but she survived somehow... You know how these stories always grow and grow and grow and you don’t really know if it’s true or not.

*Where exactly was your father from?*

He’s from Izmit, it’s right next to Istanbul.

And I also have a summer house in the western coast of Turkey and everything is Greek there like the architecture, the people, the music, they even play Greek music in the restaurants for Turkish people, and they really like Greek culture. And because Greeks living in Turkey, we call “Rums.” And I looked it up in the dictionary and it says like “Greeks living in Muslim land”
or something like that… I don’t know. And the Greeks living in Turkey call themselves Rums too. So, I hear stories from them and they are always like warmer towards Turkish people, because they like Turks, and they have been living with Turks for centuries and centuries, and they are happy about living in Turkey. But other than that, I know all my Greek friends here [at Penn] they are extremely prejudice against Turkey. And when my [Greek] boyfriend came to Turkey in the summer, he was really shocked, you know because he hears the Greek music playing, people speaking Greek with him, and he was like ‘Ok, we are really prejudice against you’

_Is religion a factor? Agia Sophia etc. I heard that many of the Greek churches in Turkey were destroyed._

No no, that’s actually not true. There are many many churches in Istanbul, especially, and also in the western and southern parts of Turkey.

_Are they active?_

Yes. And the head of the Greek Church is Greek. They are free to practice anything they want.

_What did your father say when you started dating your Greek boyfriend?_

First he wasn’t very happy. I mean he doesn’t usually like boyfriends but this one, this one was different of course. And my father is very nationalistic, and he comes from a more traditional culture than my mom because he’s not from Istanbul; he’s from a more traditional city. So also religion wise, he is only scared about the future, about like marriage and stuff like that. But now he is ok. My mom met my boyfriend and she liked him and she probably tells my father that he’s a nice guy, and stuff, and now they’re ok.

_Do you remember when you first found out about the tension between the two cultures?_

I was taught it at school actually, in high school when I was taking history classes. But it wasn’t like “Greeks are our enemies,” they were just mentioning some treaties and saying that Turks were … it wasn’t in favor of Turks and stuff like that, and all the European countries tried to take advantage of Turkey, and that kind of stuff. But I was always like personally very interested in Greek culture. And I went to a German high school in Turkey so I, all my teachers and most of my friends were German in high school, so I had a different perspective than some of the other Turkish people, like the regular Turkish schools. And like I was interested in Greek mythology and stuff like that.

_Is religion a factor? Or is more about politics and war?_

I think it is the war that is an issue, not the religion because Turkey is not like a radically Islamic country… And there are people from every European country basically, not everywhere in Turkey, but in the Western part, in Istanbul.
When did you hear about the stories of violence?

I only heard it after I got the Greek boyfriend. Our people don’t really talk about it, like they don’t care much. Like it was in the past so there’s nothing to do about it anymore, and the Turks got what they wanted, so that’s good.

Growing up any stories?

No.

What do you think are people’s generalization about Greek people?

Whenever I get into discussion with my Greek friends, I get so upset because they really don’t know anything about Turkey. They don’t even know their own history. They talk about the Hellenistic period and they don’t know when it happened they were like “was it before Christ, after Christ?” I really, I don’t believe that in Greece history, like history that is taught in high schools is very successful. They have huge history and like a great civilization but they don’t really know much about it. They are all concentrated on Turkey and the wars with Turkey and the ‘Turks’... I don’t know, hated them and stuff like that. But other than that, today I believe an average person in Turkey wouldn’t hate Greeks now, but I’m pretty sure that an average person in Greece would hate Turks.

How would you explain what it means to be a Turkish person?

Turkey is a very big country. There are many different cultures in Turkey. Like the northern culture is different from the southern culture, the eastern culture is way different from the western culture. But an average Turkish person is very nationalistic, like very very nationalistic, and religious, but not like radical Islam. Like I think Turkey is trying to practice a more moderate way of religion and now women became to have more rights as compared to before. And families are very important in Turkey. As Greeks are, Turks also have big big families. Everybody is in everybody else’s business, stuff like that. And they are very helpful to each other and to neighbors. And I don’t believe Turkey is liberal. Like if you talk about Istanbul, it is very liberal, it is very westernized, but outside it is very different.

There’s this big gap between the poor and the rich. There is not a big middle class, I believe. And like if you go to a club inside like everyone’s in mini skirts and bikinis and stuff like that, but you cannot step outside with mini skirt, like it would be a suicide. Seriously. Nobody would like, you know, kill you or something, but they would talk after you; they would bother you.

Other than that... um as I said the western part of Turkey I believe is like mostly Greeks, not Turkish. And there are many non-Turkish cultures living in it, like Germans and many Greeks And there are like series of streets in Istanbul and there are 8 -10 churches on the street and two or three mosques. And I think it’s very committed to its history and traditions and we also have holidays throughout the whole year.
Nationalistic holidays, like the Liberation of the Republic, I don’t know, Independence Day and stuff like that. But also religious holidays. And the food is like one of the most important things in Turkey. And like when I cook with my Greek boyfriend like all the foods, the names are all Turkish. Because they add an ‘i’ at the end of the word and it becomes... Well first, they had a meaning in Turkish for example – dolma. It means “stuffed.” It has a meaning in Turkish [whereas it only means the food in Greek]. But the cultures, the countries, lived together, so I don’t know who discovered what so... um. And I believe the music is very similar.

**ONAN**

Onan is a graduate student in Anthropology. He was born in a city outside of Istanbul, and recently moved to the United States for graduate school.

I grew up in Turkey, in a small town near Istanbul, and I went to Istanbul at the age of 15. Although it is a very conservative place, the small town, and generally conservative places are linked to extremetatorialism or other extreme ... [trails off] so it is not the case for the Greek context, for the feelings against Greeks. I never, the Greeks are always in the news so you know we talk about Greeks, but we never talk about Greeks in a personal manner, always in a political manner. There is really nothing between the people; it is the governments that have trouble. This is the big phrase that my parents always tell me [“it is the governments that have trouble”]. But with the Cyprus event, which I kind of witnessed a little bit later, we call it “Terror”, “The Greek Terror” or in the TV and everything. But apparently like both sides were killing each other, and when the army, the Turkish army, went into Cyprus, when – I am narrating from my mother or father, I didn’t know that, I wasn’t born yet, so um, they tell me you know – they didn’t do the correct thing, because otherwise they come to the other village... This is what they think. But there was nothing really... the feelings are not towards individual Greek people or the Greek people, but rather the governments, politics. Later on, I don’t think this changed much.

The Turkish people care about Greek people, or many of them, at least my cultural peers let’s say. They don’t care about Greek people, but they care about the politics. They think the whole Cyprus issue is very important, and they think we are rivals also. They think that we and Greeks are rivals. And I think that that phrase has changed in the last ten years. The Turkish people have come to the realization that Greek people actually think badly about Turkish people. So it is not anymore just the government, but also that the Greek people hate us too, which I think has some truth in it. But overall, the whole issue there is an interesting thing; that Byzantium, although it is kind of our heritage– that is what I think, because Istanbul is you know always thought to be Greek and it is seen in the movies... There is this B-type of Turkish movies, a lot of them, and... [Talks about how the hero in the B-movies is always a Muslim and the evil emperor is always a Greek, etc. In the end, the Muslim hero ends up killing all of the evil Greeks.]

Ok so there’s this thing, among friends, that they actually tell me about: “Well, he’s half-Greek,” or something like that, in a negative way. The Rums are... I’ve never been exposed to Rums until I was 15/16... So ok, this is my childhood basically, this is what I perceive, and the first time there is really not a big discussion about this thing. It’s not a big thing. The Armenians are
bigger, for instance, or our relationship with the EU is bigger, or our relationship with... I think there is more anti-nect Semitism, but more anti-Arab kind of thing, rather than anti-Greek kind of thing. This is my opinion.

Why anti-Arab?

Because we are not Arab. We are like Turks and we are totally different. And Arabs were the first, even before the Greeks, to basically rebel against the Ottomans – the whole Laurence of Arabia thing. But now, like coming to my opinion, my real opinion, that there is this whole argument that the Ottoman past its there, and we don’t care. We have some kind of self-confidence of Turks towards Greeks. I think that it has some kind of, we never believe, I think, that they can actually come and conquer some of the islands, or Anatolia itself. But the islands are interesting because I think that the biggest thing that we still cannot believe is that we lost islands in Lausanne [Treaty], the Aegean islands. So Greeks are naturally having trouble with [this], because they were occupied basically, they have been invaded by the Turkish... for 400 years, which is I think, maybe more, which is a long time. It’s at least that because I know tha: in 1600 it [Greece] is already occupied. So I think it is a while. But there wasn’t any problem before hand, because you know Ottomans in principle, are not very ... the millet system... and you know the whole thing going on over there, the different tax system. What happens though, in the later periods, in the fall of the empire, of course it becomes tense, and the whole, what is coupled with the fall of the empire, you know like the whole economic and technological going down, the ideology is not ‘hot’ any more let’s say. The whole Ottoman ideology and empire and nationalism come into the scene, you know come in from France, Portugal, and Spain, and all these Western European countries. And Greece is not an exception there, like with many other countries they kind of rebel against it. And then because it is falling down they need to get strict political and military... And there are lots of wars going on: Balkan War, Russian War, down there all the struggle with the Arabs in the Middle East. And Ottomans become more and more harsh in their interaction with other people, people in Greece. You know Ataturk himself was born in Salonica for instance. The land is an Ottoman land rather than a Greek land. He paved the way for Turkish ideals. So our descendents... I think that, both cultures have their oral histories, like you very correctly point out, the cross cultural dialogue is an important thing to resolve all of this thing, and the oral histories are probably the key to it, because what happened in the exchange program is not only the Greeks basically removed, but a lot of Turks. And there are no records of it, which is why nobody knows it. And then of course, I am sure there were lots of nasty things going down. It’s kind of natural, because you had a fight, and at that point everybody hates each other, basically, politically, individually, and then you have to move from one land, and you were living there, and you had to move...

What did you hear about the people who were forced to leave the coastal areas?

Well the minorities are in a very good shape in the Ottoman Empire, generally, especially after the 19th century. Anc still in Istanbul everybody was happy. It’s a big city, like there’s jobs, and nobody you know, it’s very... I think there’s at least 100,000 Armenians, 200,000 Greeks, and maybe 300,000 Jews were living there, along with ... I don’t know how many Turks or how many Arabs. But it’s already like a metropolitan: you know, multi-lingual, multi-religious, nobody cares actually. And you know strictly Istanbul [this strictly applies to Istanbul]. And
or like money basically. So they left the country; they took their money and they left the country. There was this huge migration. Especially it is promoted mainly by the tax. I know that after the tax then everybody left. And I don't know the recourse, it is never, it is still in the archives of course. I don't know how many died in the labor camps, or if anybody died. But I assume that they died because they are normal: fat, heavy, merchants, who supposedly deal with gold, I don't know. Uh, and they, you know.

Now the Turks I think are getting better and better at this, because I don't know the Greek side, what they are thinking. But there are movies showing actually what happened in the labor camps, claiming ourselves [as guilty]. So there are a couple of them. These are recent things. They don't have anybody who is shooting the old style, this B-kind of movie, that you know we go and kill all the Greeks or anything. And people are becoming, it is maybe my multicultural [background]... again, because you know my parents are all university graduates, my friends are all like that, so this is maybe that. But there is this huge thing that none of the people are looking at very rationally, or at least my parents and my family, that you know, "Huh, if we do this, you know they will do that, so we cannot get into the European Union, so it is better that we should do that." You know the whole political thing. But I also know people that see Greeks all the time like a small spoiled kid kind of thing. Like they're always crying, and they're always trying to bully you and say to you or claim their rights on the islands or Cyprus and they use the father, the European Union, for it, kind of thing. The whole Cyprus issue is another thing.

*What about Greek and Turkish relations in the past?*

The big story about the whole thing, the big myth about the Greek evilness is that when they retreat, which we learn in the schools, that they raped everybody, and they raped, they killed, they killed the children; they killed whatever. And I'm sure that that happened, but it happened in all the wars. If you're losing a battle, and you're suffering, and your friends are dying - it's the same in the Vietnam or its same ... So apparently this is a big thing, in schools. But my parents are always, I don't know, like "you shouldn't be racist" "you shouldn't be da da da" but this is my parents. But I don't know, like I said it's certain social stratum. There is this whole thing that if you are half-Christian, it's not a good thing... If like somebody in the past raped your grandmother and then you become like half-Greek or something like that. So this is like a big insult. And there is this huge thing that they are Turks anyway. That is because apparently when we first conquered Greece we supposedly, they don't admit it, but supposedly like all the Turkish soldiers raped Greeks, and then... I know you can check out by the way the forum, the internet forums; that is how I got that information. I never like, this is not from my childhood, by the way - the Turkish people raped Greeks and that is why all Greeks are Turkish, kind of argument. There are many many forums; you can make a Google search. It is all very unbelievable. It is all about like how Turks go and raped all Greek women available, or existed on the earth. That is why there is no Greek DNA left, or something. As a matter of fact, biological anthropology, which I do, shows that they are genetically the same, but anyways. I think it is impossible, these guys are living together for maybe 10,000 years or something.

So and religion is very important. The whole thing is that because we have so much trouble with Christians we are like Ottoman... of Christians, uh religion basically. Islam is antithesis for so long of Christianity. And Turks are symbolically attached to the Ottomans. Well Ottomans,
well apparently what they always see them [themselves] as Turks. It is important to make a distinction between Ottomans and Turks, because there is a huge thing going on that Ottomans have sayings like “Never ride a donkey of the Turks because you will get diseases,” or something, and the Turks have sayings at that time, like 200 years ago, “Never trust Ottomans or otherwise you will,” you know, “they will get all your money,” kind of thing. So Ottomans, they identify themselves as different. I don’t know who in hell is Ottomans. I think that they’re the ... living in Istanbul, like maybe all the big cities, Salonica, Smyrna (Izmir), or you know the government, the pashas. But you know being a Christian; the whole Christian identity comes like the, in 19th century in Greece. And it was a thing, because they become immediate rivals with the Ottomans; the Ottomans ride a lot on Islam for their own identity. What I’m coming at is in my childhood and in general in Turkey is still going on that being a Christian can be a negative thing. People think that Christians hate Turks; Turks think that Christians hate Turks.

*Even Christians living in Turkey now?*

Yeah, but it’s a kind of different thing there. [I am talking about] foreign Christians - the Greek Christians or the European Christians. The Greeks are frustrated with of course, the Greater Christian world. The Greek Orthodox Church is not happy as you see the, if you are following the news, both the Greek head of the Greek Orthodox Church, the patriarch, both are making amazing speeches saying that “Turks are evil, they were always evil.”

The imam, in the beginning and sometimes in the prayers after, he talks about what is going on. And it was kind of furious against, not Greeks – we never see Greeks as a big threat, to be frank. But whole Christian world and sometimes some kind of extreme imam will do it and they have their own audience. But normally this is regulated by the State - all speech.

*So everything that is said in the mosques is regulated by the government?*

Exactly. So religion is so tame, that’s the exact word, tame, in Turkey. So it doesn’t really have an individual voice.

[ Talks about the translation of the Koran to Turkish, and then back to Arabic for prayers, but the speeches of the imams remained in Turkish.]

Ataturk was a wild man. He was very harsh in his, like he had a very specific image of Turkey and he applied it with great accuracy and great, how can I say, strength. He killed people who didn’t wear hats or he imprisoned them or... So everybody stops wearing the fez, you know, the fez? And then they start wearing hats one day. They changed the alphabet in like 2 months! Everything changes in 2 months. So it’s very interesting, or the whole um dating system. So my overall view of this thing is that there is a difference in political power between the two countries, and in history that was the case. In history it was always the Ottomans and later Turkish people who are more politically stronger than the Greek side because they have more population and generally, well before they were an empire, and it’s a lot larger country. So the Greeks, for them, apparently we were the rulers. I mean the Turks, the Ottomans were the rulers. So they were ruled; we are the rulers. So they are having the uprising as the minorities and we always feel like the majority... So the thing is that our, it’s not that thing that we don’t have...
they were very rich. I mean because, Turks by definition for some reason, I don’t know the merchants, I don’t know what is the name for it, the guilds, all of the guilds are controlled by minorities. And like all the merchants are Greeks and they were very rich. And the remaining Rums, remaining Greeks and the remaining Jewish people are very rich today. But what happens is that, after the Lausanne [Treaty], they are forced to move from their land, many of them. I don’t know if it is really... It’s a weird situation because you know some people have their own nationalistic feeling and they go back, some of them removed. But in fact, just after Lausanne [Treaty], really nobody moved. Turkish people come back to Turkey, because they don’t feel all right because Greece is not kind of safe, this is my opinion of course. But Greek people were happy. They didn’t move. What happens is that in the late 20’s after Ataturk’s reign actually, in Turkey, actually what they call vallik vergisi, which means ‘wealth tax’. So, this is İnönü, he is the second big name, but he was a general, and he became prime minister and then became president. I don’t think that Ataturk ever became a prime minister actually. Head of the state, I don’t know what you call it in English. So he [İnönü] basically put this thing, and it is like the accepted tax for minorities. It was before WWII, and also the depression times. I think it is before the depression, I think so, but I am not sure. So but, this man, what happens is that you pay the tax or you go and work for the government in a very, very, uh, bad places, like in railroads...

*Like labor camps.*

Exactly, labor camps So nobody wants to do it so they escape, basically. A lot of people escape, leave the country, you know, they sell all of their estates and everything, get the money and escape. This includes everybody, including Jewish people. They later come back, the Jewish ones, after and during the WWII, but that’s another issue. So it is kind of interesting because there was nothing – before that, you know, everything was fine, and there were a lot of Greek people living in the country. And this is coupled with a couple of incidents, because the Turks became very poor. After the Ottomans fall down and the... because they were agriculturalists; they were all agriculturalists. And Ottomans are not Turks, they’re supposedly Turkish and Muslim, but they are not really Turks, and they have lots and lots of um, how can I say, Western blood, if this is the right word, or is it, how do they call it? Because nearly all of the mothers and wives of the sultans are Westerners. They are like German; they took them from Austria, Hungary, England... they are from, I don’t know, Balkans... because the whole thing, they are white skin, yada yada yada. And the Ottomans do not identify themselves as Turkish. It is a big misconception, coupling the Ottomans with Turks, the big ‘Western invention’. Turks, especially in central Anatolia, are agriculturalists and always were. But now, after Ataturk, they become the people that are actually governing their own country. And what happens is that they really want to have some power but they didn’t, because they didn’t have any land, they didn’t have very much land... The rich people are all minorities and it becomes very unstable. And there is some kind of uprising ending up in the killing of two people, but it is still like a big thing because it was a very stable country for so many years. Turks are blaming minorities for all of the bad-goings-on or whatever, and then they killed two minorities. And this shows lots of shock. They were I think Greek. So there is this whole hostility towards, you know it is rising. And it is coupled with the government’s policy, the whole tax thing, which you know makes it very uneasy for the minorities to stay in there because they don’t have any security over their lives and they don’t have any security over their estates.
anything against Greeks, I think we do. But I think that Greeks have a more stronger feeling against Turkish people than the Turkish people [have against Greeks].

*Have you ever been to Greece?*

I have not. No.

*Would you ever go?*

Yeah, of course. I’m not; well you know personally, I really don’t identify myself as Turkish.

*Talking about nationalism of Greece* It is interesting to see that the Greeks did not find it. They did not find it themselves. The whole idea of nation and the whole idea of great Greek culture comes from the Western Europe, not Greece itself. What happens is that the Turks are exposed; the Ottomans expose the Greek people because Byzantium, they identify themselves with Byzantium, the Greek people. And they [Greeks] think Constantinople was a Greek land and should now be a Greek land. Many people, not many, but some people, extreme nationalists or Pan-Hellenic people think. Yah so, what happens… it comes after the Renaissance with the whole revival of Greek culture and Greek art in Western Europe, Italy, and France, the capitals of the Renaissance. So they come in and coupled with the idea of nationalism, which is a medieval thing, embodied with the 17-18th century, this whole French Revolution thing, comes down to Greece. So they need to identify themselves in a different way in the setting of the Ottoman Empire, who were the colonizers. But they were living with the colonizers for 300-400 years before that so, it’s a kind of a weird thing. So I think that Greece has a lot of Turkish population as well as Turkey or Anatolia has a lot of Greek population at the time… I know that there are at least a couple of hundred villages that are created in Anatolia for the Turks of Greece who came back during the population exchange. Or they emptied Greek villages. Because many people during the population exchange after the Lausanne Treaty, were not the urban Greeks. The urban Greeks were rich and merchants and they were fine. The villages, mainly those were the ones who left. Mainly, afterwards, after the tax thingy, then the merchants left.

*So after the Lausanne Treaty none of the Greek merchants left, only the villagers?*

In central Anatolia. Not east, I don’t think many. But there are many villages in eastern Anatolia. I know a particular village that was a Greek village, and they left in 1920 which is on the Western side, near Izmir, Smyrna, or what is the Greek word for it? Ok. So there is this city, 8,7,000 years old by the way, Smyrna is. It’s an old, old city. It’s older than Istanbul or Athens. Anyways, so I think religion is an important factor, but I think why Greeks take their whole idea of Turks is through their revolutionary war. And it becomes part of their identity, so it is very hard to get it off the back. This is I think why, part of the reason why, Greeks have very troubled opinions against Turkish people. But Turks on the other hand, I can’t say that they don’t have any opinions against them, but I think that, this is my impression, maybe I am particularly biased towards the Turkish side as they are my kin, [but Turkish people do not harbor the same kind of resentment].
Turkey is a much larger country than Greece. And maybe the numbers of Muslims who went back to Turkey were not as large as the numbers of Greeks who went back to Greece. If so do you think that the visual and physical presence of the refugees has something to do with it? Also, do you know if anything happened to the Muslim people who were trying to leave Greece?

I don’t know. I really don’t know the answers of these questions. But I know that apparently after the revolutionary war, I think it’s like 19th century, the Greek [Revolutionary War]. After that, the tension is becoming more and more and more tense. And after a while, the Turkish people themselves, especially after the whole Turkish discourse – because at the same time, in the empire, there is this whole Turkish thing going up, like growing, you know “We are a Turkish Empire, we are a Turkish Empire.” And “We have to go east, and you know culturize all of the Turkish land” which is like Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, all the way to Korea. And so what happens is that they become, slowly, steadily...

So steadily, after the Revolutionary War, both Greeks and Turks, their interactions become more and more tense. And in the 20’s after the Republic is established, the whole Turkish discourse is going on. And people become “We are Turkish, we are the owner of this land,” you know, “Why you guys are rich?” So it starts this kind of hatred kind of thing, which is partly economical I think. And there is a whole history of war, and Greece was already hating the Turks, I mean the Greek Greeks. I never heard anything negative about the people who are living in Turkey. On the contrary, they are very supportive of Turkey. They think that it is a very peaceful land and stuff like that. But they always kind of have their hearts broken because of the events in the 20’s and 30’s. They have their own – I know that because I have interacted, I have many friends from Turkish Greeks. Although they don’t hate Turks per se, I mean they really like the country, the place, but the guys have their heart broken you know because they have had their grandparents die in a labor camp, or their cousins left the country. So there is this whole thing going on and there are not many left. I think there is 100,000 Greeks left and it was really... Numbers would be very interesting because I know the Greeks are very careful about calculating, or researching, how many Greeks actually came back in. But we do not know how many Turks came back in. And I don’t know. And it is maybe really little, and that is why we don’t know. Or it is maybe just a huge number that is in the archives.
GREEK

MAIA

Maia is a freshman in the College at the University of Pennsylvania. She is originally from Queens, NY and is 18 years old. We are both 'sisters' in a sorority at Penn, and are good friends as well.

Basically, my parents are from Chios and they both grew up there. My father, well back then it was a popular thing that the guys when they were in their teens they would sail on boats and go to other countries. So he went to the States and he liked it. He came back to Greece and he met my mother and they got married. And then they both came to New York, and that's where we live. And I was born in America, but because my parents grew up in Greece they are very cultural and they're very... they stick to their roots and everything. Their perspectives coincide with their upbringing.

In terms of me, I went to public school, but I also went to Greek school, afternoon school, so I was very much... My neighborhood in New York is very Greek. I live in Bay Side, and the church is right by my house, and it's like the biggest Greek Church. I was always brought up in the Greek culture and the Greek Church, and things like that.

In terms of Turkish relations, at least from when I was a little girl, like I mean how much did I know? Not much, but there was always like that stereotypical you know, "Greeks, we don't like the Turkish people." And like, that's kind of how it was ingrained. From at least in terms of Greek school with the Oxi Day... not Oxi Day, the other thing... There are several nationalistic Greek Holidays which she mixes up.] Well at least the Turkish slavery day... Oxi day? Anyway, the connotation of the teachers and the people that I was exposed to in Greek school, it was always negative. It was always like you know "we were their slaves for 300 years" and things like that. "They were barbarous, they were just not a good people," and that's like the impression that I was given when I was growing up. But clearly, now relations are a lot different. And like even, I mean ridiculous things when I was little, like I'd be out shopping with my aunt and I'd want to buy a sweater and it'd say "Made in Turkey" and I wouldn't be able to [buy it]. Things like that. But like, I mean now at least, well now I think we're pretty cool in terms of the countries. And my mother, she's you know, "things have changed." And although Greeks will always be like "Oh yeah, the Turks are sneaky" and things like that, but I think that it's kind of died down a lot.

What about Cyprus?

I feel like that will never really die down just because it's never going to really going to be settled. At least no one will ever really be happy about it. Every year I go to the Greek parade, and every year what do they chant? Exo i Turkia apo tin Kyprio ["Kick the Turks out of Cyprus"] like every single year. Like the same thing over and over and over; it never changes. But I mean, Greeks will always think Cyprus is theirs and the Turks will always think that it's theirs. So in terms of that, I don't think it's going to die down, and I definitely think it's going to be something that will kind of always keep that barrier between us.
What stories were you told about the population exchange?

My grandparents live in Chios. They haven’t really told me stories about it. I mean, like my grandmother grew up in a really poor time during Greece. She worked in a richer family’s home and lived with them for a while like when she was growing up, things like that. But she hasn’t really told me much about any times, in terms of relations with Turkish situations.

Both of my parents left Chios around, my mother was 17 or 18 years old and my father was like 23. My mother was born in like 1961.

What was Greek school like?

Greek school was an interesting time. My Greek school was a full year, an after school Greek school program, and it was a close-knit group of people. I mean the teachers... I mean it was a good school or whatever, but I just always felt, at least when it came to talking about political issues and things like that, it was always a little biased. And I understand why. I mean it’s a private Greek school, like it has to be. [It is a private school, due to the fact that it only admits Greek students. Because of this, the students and faculty feel free to say whatever they like, in terms of biased discourse, since it is only among Greek people.] I just always felt like they never gave the other side of the story. We just always got the like “Turks are evil.” I mean and I can understand that, but things that I was told that they did like to Greek people – they raped women, they would violently rape them and like cut off their breasts and things like that. Just awful, awful things. And there’s like a big thing about the night school, that people would go to night school because the Turks wouldn’t let them go to regular day time school. So they would sneak and go to secret school. The Chrivostoro that’s what they call it. Stories about that and just awful awful things.

I would go to public school and then I would go Mondays and Wednesdays [to Greek school]. And then for 7th and 8th grade it was just on Fridays... Well we were all younger and we all were just kind of brought up in believing that they’re just an evil group of people, at least back then. They were just so barbarous, like barbarians basically. That’s like the word that I hear over and over when they refer to them. And I just think we all bought it. We never really questioned it. I never really found myself asking like “Why? Why would they do this?” Until I got older, like until I was senior in high school, or like a freshman in college.

What changed?

I don’t know, well just my perspectives on things. Like once you start hitting junior/senior year in high school they start giving you the other sides of the stories, it’s not just one-sided any more. And I was just thinking, well I was always brought up with that particular side of the Turkish-Greek relations, and I was always wondering like, “well how do they feel about it?” Like “how do they see it?”
Greek teachers or public school teachers were now giving the other sides of the stories?

History teachers in public schools were doing other things, other topics, but like we were being exposed to more perspectives, more history.

Explain the Greek parade.

It's every year on 5th Avenue in New York City. It's just, a lot of people come from Greece, the soldiers, who dress up all formal, you know, they march and then all the churches and the high schools and the public high schools. Like in my school we had a Greek club, we marched, and then all the private high schools. They have floats, and Miss Chios, Miss Independence, things like that. So it's like a whole Greek pride celebration type thing. And in general, they chant. There are always little songs and cheers, and just one that's quite popular is the one I was telling you about, which means the "Kick the Turks out of Cyprus"... I feel that with the adults, there are definitely political issues. I feel that with the younger kids who do sing these little cheers, I think they just do it because it's a catchy little phrase. But I don't really think that they think about what it means, things like that... I think it [the parade] has a lot to do with Greek culture and Greek traditions and things like that. Just the dress, people dress up in costume if they want. The flags, just a lot of like pride for one's country...

How do you feel about Greek and Turkish relations, personally?

Well, Turkish friend, I have a Turkish friend here and my mother she's very cool about it. I mean it's not like she's not like "Oh you know, not Turks" like definitely they've come to accept that times have changed and political issues right now with us [Greeks] and them [Turks] are not as strained at all. I think we're definitely making peace and figuring things out with them. And I feel that that's reflecting on the attitudes of the people, particularly Greek Americans. I'm not exactly sure how the natives are dealing with it. I mean, there's still stereotypes when you go there, but I definitely think... Like my mother is very accepting of Turkish people I guess, but Turkish boyfriend? Eh... It doesn't even have to do with Turkish. Just, "Non-Greek?" like, "Oh no!"

NICK, NICOLE, AND IOANNI

Nick and Nicole are cousins who live in Brooklyn, NY. They are both 22 years old. Ioanni is a close friend who also lives in Brooklyn and is 24 years old. They all went to the same schools and lived in the same neighborhood since they were very young. They live a very Greek section of Bay Ridge. Nick is a friend of mine from Penn. He graduated from the School of Engineering in 2003. I am also friends with Nicole and Ioanni through Nick. This conversation was taped when we all went out for sushi together in New York, along with another of our friends Paul [Polish-American from Brooklyn].

Nicole: My grandfather lived in a village right across from Turkey, and the Turks invaded it in the 1930s [7] He was a teenager and when they invaded the village he needed to hide out in a hollowed out tree log for a few days until they passed over him. So he could get out of the way. He didn't even tell me that. My dad told me.
Nick: Have you ever heard the expression “Chiotos pano duo duo?” There’s some expression that means - well Chiotos are people from Chios - that people from Chios go two by two. And I think that the joke is that when the Turkish came they... Turkish people used to like ride people from Chios. Like they would make them, they would get on their back and they would ride them and make them... what is that duo duo story?

Ioanni: Like piggy-back?

Nick: Yeah, maybe that’s the story. They would make people from Chios carry them around on their back. They would go two at a time out of the fear that there would be, that they would stumble across a Turkish person.

>In a later conversation with Nick’s parents and grandfather, we discovered that “Chiotos pano duo duo” was for security. The Turks did not ‘ride’ the Greeks of Chios.

Ioanni: They [Turks] would randomly, like whatever area they were occupying, they would go in, and whenever they felt like shooting someone they would.

Nicole: Yeah. I’m sure your [Nick’s] grandfather has stories. Chios is so close to Turkey anyway.

Nick: Yeah, you can like see Turkey from the coast.

*What about the violence that happened when the Greeks invaded Turkey?*

Nick: Yeah, but it was the right thing to do though.

Ioanni: It was retaliation.

Nicole: You know what it is? War is war and everybody does it. And of course whether or not it’s right or wrong morally it doesn’t matter. It’s happening and obviously you’re going to take sides with your own people.

Nick: Yeah, but I’m sure that like your grandfather and parents [to Ioanni] would have been a lot more affected than like my parents would.

>Paul: Where are you from man?

Ioanni: Crete.

Nick: You know, I just heard you [Nicole] say that [about her grandfather] and I was thinking about it for so long, you know what, I tell ya, if I was in a tree trunk for three days there’s like there’s no doubt in my mind that I wouldn’t want to go back and do the same thing to whoever, you know.
Ioanni: For now the only true story that I heard was like my aunt [in Cyprus], who like I said, lost all of her property, her grandparents lost a lot of property, because they [the Turks] just went in, just took over.

_How? Did they just go in and take it?_

Ioanni: Yeah, they just. What they did was they would go town by town and lock people up and just take their houses, storm right into their houses, throw people into the streets, and basically just take everything that they had.

*What about the Greeks in Asia Minor?*

Nicole: Well, I don’t have any relatives from there.

Ioanni: Yeah, I don’t have any recollection of that. I don’t know anyone. They did invade Crete. The only other story I have, is one my father told me, that they invaded Crete, and they didn’t really... They [the Cretans] fought to the teeth f***en everyone who came in there, even with Germany. They [Turks] would go in and people with pitchforks would literally, if you came to the door, they were stabbing you with a pitchfork because you were Turkish. They fought. They really fought against the Turkish, against Germany, against everyone. So, I mean, a lot of Cretan people will have hatred for them because they lost a lot of family members in battle and stuff like that.

*Well the Germans invaded Athens and occupied the Acropolis, but you don’t have the same hatred towards them.*

Nick: Greece gave up. Greece didn’t fight.

Ioanni: Germany lost one of their biggest armies fighting Crete. And they delayed troops from going to, I forgot where it was. But they would literally, people were parachuting in and Cretan people were shooting them down as they were parachuting in. They were stabbing them with pitchforks. But I mean, again, I don’t hate Germans, I don’t hate Turkish people. None of us were really brought up to _hate_ Turkish people.

Nicole: No, it’s not like a raised-with-hate thing. It’s just like “They did this to us, therefore they’re on our sh** list and we were there, so we really don’t like it, and you’re my grandkids so you _really_ shouldn’t like it because they did it to _us_.”

_How much do you think your identity involves having Turkish peoples as the “Other”?_

Nicole: Not even 5%. I think like the opposite of a Greek is anybody without culture. Turks have their own culture, so I wouldn’t really consider it an opposite. Enemy, maybe, opposite, no.

Ioanni: I mean you have that going on in Israel for you know 100 years because “Oh they did this so, we have to get back at this or that.”
Nicole: In terms of how much being anti-Turkish makes you Greek? I don’t think very much at all. Because I think that would be more horrible, to be considered part of your culture, to be factoring …

Nick: If someone said, “Oh, you like Turks? You’re not a true Greek.”?

Ioanni: I don’t think that would be the case. That’s never really the case.

Nick: I’m going to tell my kids that though [laughs]. “You’re no son of mine. Turk-lover.” I mean, really [to Ioanni and Nicole] what would your parents’ reaction be to that?

Ioanni: Like what? If you were like marrying a Turkish girl?

Nick: They would be pissed. They would be pissed. And my parents are very Americanized. My parents are Greek Americans.

Ioanni: Yeah, your parents would probably react to it a lot less than mine would. My parents [who were both born in Greece] would actually shoot me.

Nick: And I know my parents would be pissed.

Nicole: But you know what though? Any Greek wants you to marry a Greek. So, when you marry someone else that’s fine. It’s kind of expected at this point, because it’s just the way it works out living here, you know. But I think to marry a Turk would be like the ultimate, “screw you”.

[Paul: Like the ultimate insult.]

Nick: Yeah. They’d be like “how could you do that?” They’d exorcise [excommunicate] you. They’d kick you out of the family, my family [would].

What do you think Turkish people think about Greek people?


Nick: No I think they’re more… amicable or whatever.

Ioanni: No, don’t say that.

Nicole: I think it works the same way. I think if you’re still there or you were… I mean I’m sure there’s Greek people who are there that are our age and their grandparents told them like a story that you’re looking for like “They walked into my front door at 8 pm and they ransacked…” and that sticks with you. If Turkish kids are getting the same stories, then that’s what sticks with you too.

Ioanni: The thing is, that what we did, the severity isn’t the same.
Nicole: I don’t know. I’m not a historical buff. Tell me, how many, during the stand during which Turkey invaded Greece, how many other countries were they invading?

Nick: I don’t know.

Nicole: None or you don’t know? See, I think that with being invaded by Germany, Germany is invading everybody; so you’re one of the bunch. If Turkey’s going after Greece to be personal, you kinda remember that.

[Paul: I’m sure they invaded other countries. They were going south... Plus it’s not like they had an election to decide whether or not they were going to invade Greece. So like the common person is just like you.]

*Plus the Ottomans are not the same as the Turkish Republic that was established in the 1920’s.*

Nicole: Yeah, but the fact that you have a house that’s on the Turkish side that you can’t get to now? Right now, she [Ioanni’s aunt] has a house on the Turkish side that she can considerably not get to.

*Why? They won’t let her through?*

Ioanni: It’s considerably difficult to get to, they won’t let anyone through.

Nicole: Basically because of her last name and a passport that doesn’t say “Turkish” on it. Basically, at least from what I heard. And you’re talking about years ago, but this is still being perpetuated. Germany and that is over now, and it’s not still around. The fact that it’s still going on [with Turkey], *that* has an impact.

Ioanni: The impact increases more and more over the years as it’s still perpetuated. It wasn’t just like a one time thing.

*Why do you think that the hostilities have continued?*

Nicole: It’ll stop as soon as Turkey stops. Now, it’s like a power struggle, it’s like anybody, nobody is going to step down because then it makes you the loser.


Nicole: At this point it’s not even the Greeks. It’s both of them obviously, I mean, at this point nobody’s stepping down. It’s like, “Well we’ve come this far, why stop now?” Nobody’s going to walk away.

Nick: If they hadn’t taken the border then we wouldn’t be that involved, and we wouldn’t care either.
Nicole: Yeah but what Greek even wants the Turks in there [the island of Cyprus] anyway?

Ioanni: Yeah, I mean they’re fighting over the same land. This is the same thing. These people want their land back. They want what they had back. I mean you’re not going to back away from that.

[They start talking about whose land is whose, and how somebody’s land was always someone else’s before. Asia Minor as Greek and filled with Greek Christians.]

Nicole: Yeah, but having a Greek church in Turkey doesn’t make it Greek.

Nick: I mean I don’t wish ill upon Turkish people. But I tell you that I do get upset when I hear like Turkey’s tourism is going up and like they’re doing really well. Because I feel that Greeks could do just as good except for their stupid mentality. Like they rip off tourists, they’re not like friendly. They have so many beautiful things to see. Turkey is exactly the opposite and they’re like capitalizing on it.

Ioanni: In that case I’d be more upset with Greek people...

[Talk about Greek politics and democratic socialism.]

Sunday school and Greek school?

Nicole: You have to take Greek culture. And American history type books will give you like you know the American hero story of America and the Greek books are the same thing. When it was Turkish wars they would make it like the Greeks suffered and they had to do this and that... Not to say... We’re Greeks, so we’re not going to make ourselves the guilty party.

Ioanni: It’s funny because, we like in general I guess everywhere you go, everyone is like this is your history, but none of it, or what percent of it is really true?

Nicole: I was exposed to it more so in school, from culture classes than from my grandparents sitting me down and telling me stories about it. It’s not the on-going...

Nick: I feel so bad, I forget the day... Oxi Day when the Greeks said no to the Turks? Yeah, so we have a day to celebrate that. I think that’s where it started. February 5th.

Ioanni: The day we finally decided to say no to Turkey.

Nicole: So you have to learn because you have to know why you’re celebrating the holiday. I remember we did one play, and it was one when the girls had to wear the girl costumes and the guys had to wear the soldier costumes. And the premise of the story was that the men were being hauled off to war against the Turks, and the women were left helpless, and rather than be ravaged by the invading Turks they all danced on a cliff and jumped off. We had to dance around on the stage in a circle and then jump off. I don’t remember the name of it though. They would kill themselves.
Nick: Why would they do that?

Nicole: Because their husbands went to war and they were left there with being invaded by Turkish soldiers and rather than be raped or beaten, they killed themselves.

[Start talking about the other things they learned in Greek school.]

We read a lot of poetry. Greek poets writing about the war. I guess they kind of brainwash you. You know what it is: Greek culture. Every year they highlight it, you have to read the same stuff over and over again.

**THALIA**

_Thalita is my mother’s cousin’s sister-in-law. She is 45 years old. She and her brother Tony were born on Kos Island, and moved to America in the 80s. Her mother’s father fled from Turkey. She had been told some stories during her childhood, but couldn’t remember them well, so she had called her mother. Her mother speaks only Greek. Thalita talked on the phone with me for about 45 minutes about what her mother had told her, and also suggested some places where I could go to get more information._

These stories are not talked about in great detail. They are painful stories.

My grandfather, he and his family like many others, were forced to leave their homes behind, left with just the clothes on their back. They managed to escape to the shore where they were put on small boats. A lot of people, you know and only so many can fit, so some had to hang onto the outside in the water. Many people didn’t make it. They had to hold on to the outside of the boat to escape captivity and murder.

There were two uncles, [her mother’s uncles] and one aunt. One uncle was taken hostage and never seen again. He left behind three children. My grandfather was able to take two [couple of years apart around the same age] to the island of Kos.

What happened to the other child?

The other child hid in the woods for 40 days just eating berries and um… what’s the word for it in English… it’s a type of grain you feed to pigs… He waited and he was trying to find passage over… He was only twelve. One had to hide in the forest eating berries for 40 days. All agreed to meet on the island [Kos], grandfather with his brother and sister, and the two children. Finally they made it. Some of brothers went to Samos, Kos, and some made it to Athens.

Whole families were scattered according to whatever boat they got on, depending on how far the boat would make it and what island they could get to… It took them about 10 years to find all of the family members. No phones in those days. Through the Red Cross they began searching for each other. And finally after 10 years they managed to find everyone.
Great Grandfather and grandmother never made it. We never heard from them so we just assume that they were taken, or killed. My grandfather’s two brothers were taken hostage for 1 year. One lost his foot and the other his toe, from freezer burns. They had no shoes on from running, they were taken away, they were made to walk in snow and do hard labor, both had frost bites, one leg was amputated, other toes lost because so bad. It is the same thing with all the families. They all left everything behind, making it to mainland or islands with just the clothes on backs.

*How did they rebuild their lives?*

My grandfather became a farmer, it was what he knew. Little by little saved some money bought some land, and began to rebuild his life. Brothers ended up going to Samos and planted a vineyard and were making wine and stuff like that. Had to start working with people who already had vineyards, you know. But eventually it was all right.

**UNCLE PETER**

*Uncle Peter is my mother’s uncle (my grandfather’s brother-in-law, a.k.a. my great uncle). He is 75. He was born in the United States. However, his father and his father’s family were originally from Constantinople and they all had to leave during the forced migration. He doesn’t remember much, just bits and pieces about what he heard.*

My dad, his family, were all from Constantinople. And I get the story, the way that I get the story, is that they were thrown out. More or less, it was a hatred for the Greeks. And if you didn’t leave they made it bad for you... like eh ah, my God, I don’t know what to say... it was a definite hate for each other.

My dad left Turkey I think, the way I understand, when he was 17 or 18 years old. His parents told him to leave and um we went to Athens, and then his parents came right after that. The animosity, which to this day, if you talk to that generation is a definite, uh... hate, whatever, Turkey, whatever Turks do is no good.

*Violence?*

The way I understand, that’s one of the reasons why my dad and his family I should say left because of the atrocities, the killings and the beatings, and uh the Greeks didn’t have a chance to even... start anything do anything, they were the lower, at the lower end of the family realm I mean in the Turkish the Greeks were the slaves or close to it.

*Led up to it?*

OK, the only thing I can say is what I heard... that uh... They couldn’t walk into a store without somebody giving them a remark, making a remark about them... Um, for me to expand on this thing I would be just what I heard from my dad, my uncle, my aunt... and it was just, they left when they were young too, you know they left at 18-19 so. By young I mean that they had it imbedded in their mind that the Turk was... uh... I know the church; the church without a doubt
... was ... what's the word I want to use? ... There was no church there, course you know the patriarch right now, you know what that's like right? You know that incident... so I don't even have to go into that.

All I was told, nothing written down, was the fact that you walk into a store and they had remarks.

[Break for dinner.]

For example, I know with my ... business... when I told you I was with these old time Greeks who came from Turkey. Directly from Turkey. Again, they were persecuted, like, you know... A Greek did not have a chance in Turkey during that era when everybody left.

Why?

There musta been, I think, there hadda be, I think 300 - 400,000 Greeks, I understand it's less than 50,000 is it, Greeks living in Turkey?

But not to reiterate, all I can say to you is: All these people said they were persecuted. They couldn't go to church; they closed the churches down. Ah. Now they come to Greece and today you talk to any Greek and you don't even mention Turkey to them. No way. And its something that was imbedded I guess from father-son, daughter, uh generation after generation...

Bad stuff?

I can't, I can't tell you what bad stuff. They say they, again, couldn't go into the stores, couldn't uh live where they wanted to live, couldn't go to church when they wanted to go to church. The Orthodoxy uh you know about the patriarch don't you?

No.

Well you know the patriarch's in Constantinople; the Orthodox patriarch.

Even after the Turks took Constantinople they still stayed?

Oh yes! And that is because of world wide... um... the world uh you know was against the Turke throwing them out. That is the seat of the Orthodox religion. They cannot fix the place; they can do no repairs on it. I read an article somewhere where they're uh now saying that they think they can have more freedom. But the patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church has to be from Turkey. Born in, a Greek born in Turkey.

Who mandates that?

Turkey does. They were going to take, they were going to make the uh archbishop years ago from America but Turkey definitely refused that. Turkey said "no way could he uh you know," so. They had a huge halkis, I think a huge monastery, or a school for Greek priests in Turkey.
And they’re trying to open that up again... So honest to goodness, outside of that, not to go over reiterating, this it’s just that there is a hatred between the two countries. Period.

[Talked to him about differing view points between what Turkey says, and what the Greek people say about Turkey, like that they’re barbarians.]

That’s the big, that’s the big, now that you mentioned it, that’s the big thing. They’re barbarians, they killed people. They didn’t consider life, a Greek life as a human being.

[Talking about the Cyprus issue. Talking about a guy he knows.]

These people live right... in fact the one guy is president of the Cypriots against Turkey. I mean uh the stories that you’d hear from them, there’s, I don’t know how many, hundred thousands of Greeks verses Turks there... it’s it’s just a bad situation. I just don’t believe in ah... That’s why I said to you 1st generation, my parents, after them... I can’t think like them. I don’t...

I, first generation here, would tell you what we heard as a child about hating Turkey. I, I just can’t, I couldn’t fathom anything like that, you know that I would sit and hate a certain people because my parents are, their friends’ friends, and uh. In those years I can recall when they used to sit around, and I was just a young, I’m talking about a young-young kid, and they would talk about Turkey. Really, and uh, of course it never bothered me, because I would just say ‘eh’. So that’s what I know about the Turks.

METEA

Metea is my Modern Greek language professor at Penn. She works in the College of General Studies. She was born in Greece and married a Romanian before moving to America. Below is an email she sent me regarding the population exchange:

I have some info regarding your paper and I will forward it to you. I just thought about a neighbor here in Philly, whose father or probably grandfather lived in Krette and left with the exchange of populations. My parents also have a friend that left with the Asia Minor catastrophe when he was a boy and he can tell you some things in Greek -of course- I can’t imagine how you can have an oral history from the Asia Minor catastrophe after so many years!

[The forwarded email:]

Dear Friends,
Click here: Before the Silence
http://www.umd.umich.edu/dept/armenian/bts

It gives me heartfelt pleasure to announce that Dr. Dennis Papazian the Director of Armenian Studies at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, asked me to bring the “Before the Silence” news reports of the Genocides of our people into his University’s website.
Please link up if you can to your own websites. Please be sure to browse through the news reports from 1918 to 1923. I will be adding more news reports on a continuing basis after Christmas and more photographs added as well.

Jubilantly,

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Advocate for Genocides Awareness
of the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks of Asia Minor
APPENDIX C:

CONVENTION CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF GREEK AND TURKISH POPULATIONS

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Greek Government have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1

As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.

These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.

Article 2

The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1:

(a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.

(b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.

All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

Article 3

Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.

The expression "emigrant" in the present Convention includes all physical and juridical persons who have been obliged to emigrate or have emigrated since the 18th October, 1912.

Article 4

All able-bodied men belonging to the Greek population, whose families have already left Turkish territory, and who are now detained in Turkey, shall constitute the first installment of Greeks sent to Greece in accordance with the present Convention.
Article 5

Subject to the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of the present Convention, the rights of property and monetary assets of Greeks in Turkey or Moslems in Greece shall not be prejudiced in consequence of the exchange to be carried out under the present Convention.

Article 6

No obstacle may be placed for any reason whatever in the way of the departure of a person belonging to the populations which are to be exchanged. In the event of an emigrant having received a definite sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence which is not yet definitive, or of his being the object of criminal proceedings, he shall be handed over by the authorities of the prosecuting country to the authorities of the country whither he is going, in order that he may serve his sentence or be brought to trial.

Article 7

The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the territory of the latter country.

Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the two countries and have not yet acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that nationality on the date of the signature of the present Convention.

Article 8

Emigrants shall be free to take away with them or to arrange for the transport of their movable property of every kind, without being liable on this account to the payment of any export or import duty or any other tax.

Similarly, the members of each community (including the personnel of mosques, tekkes, medresses, churches, convents, schools, hospitals, societies, associations and juridical persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave the territory of one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall have the right to take away freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable property belonging to their communities.

The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two countries, upon the recommendation of the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11.

Emigrants who may not be able to take away all or part of their movable property can leave it behind. In that event, the local authorities shall be required to draw up, the emigrant in question being given an opportunity to be heard, an inventory and valuation of the property left by him. Procès-verbaux containing the inventory and the valuation of the movable property left by the emigrant shall be drawn up in four copies, one of which shall be kept by the local authorities, the second transmitted to the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 to serve as the basis for the liquidation provided for by Article 9, the third shall be handed to the Government of the country to which the emigrant is going, and the fourth to the emigrant himself.
Article 9

Immovable property, whether rural or urban, belonging to emigrants, or to the communities mentioned in Article 8, and the movable property left by these emigrants or communities, shall be liquidated in accordance with the following provisions by the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11.

Property situated in the districts to which the compulsory exchange applies and belonging to religious or benevolent institutions of the communities established in a district to which the exchange does not apply, shall likewise be liquidated under the same conditions.

Article 10

The movable and immovable property belonging to persons who have already left the territory of the High Contracting Parties and are considered, in accordance with Article 3 of the present Convention, as being included in the exchange of populations, shall be liquidated in accordance with Article 9. This liquidation shall take place independently of all measures of any kind whatever, which, under the laws passed and the regulations of any kind made in Greece and Turkey since the 18th October, 1912, or in any other way, have resulted in any restriction on rights of ownership over the property in question, such as confiscation forced sale, etc. In the event of the property mentioned in this Article or in Article 9 having been submitted to a measure of this kind, its value shall be fixed by the Commission provided for in Article 11, as if the measures in question had not been applied.

As regards expropriated property, the Mixed Commission shall undertake a fresh valuation of such property, if it has been expropriated since the 18th October, 1912, having previously belonged to persons liable to the exchange of populations in the two countries, and is situated in territories to which the exchange applies. The Commission shall fix for the benefit of the owners such compensation as will repair the injury which the Commission has ascertained. The total amount of this compensation shall be carried to the credit of these owners and to the debit of the Government on whose territory the expropriated property is situated.

In the event of any persons mentioned in Articles 8 and 9 not having received the income from property, the enjoyment of which they have lost in one way or another, the restoration of the amount of this income shall be guaranteed to them on the basis of the average yield of the property before the war, and in accordance with the methods to be laid down by the Mixed Commission.

The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11, when proceeding to the liquidation of Wakf property in Greece and of the rights and interests connected therewith, and to the liquidation of similar foundations belonging to Greeks in Turkey, shall follow the principles laid down in previous Treaties with a view to fully safeguarding the rights and interests of these foundations and of the individuals interested in them.

The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 shall be entrusted with the duty of executing these provisions.

Article 11

Within one month from the coming into force of the present Convention a Mixed Commission shall be set up in Turkey or in Greece consisting of four members representing each of the High Contracting Parties, and of three members chosen by the Council of the League of Nations from among nationals of Powers which did not take part in the war of 1914-1918. The Presidency of the Commission shall be exercised in turn by each of these three neutral members.
The Mixed Commission shall have the right to set up, in such places as it may appear to them necessary, Sub-Commissions working under its order. Each such Sub-Commission shall consist of a Turkish member, a Greek member and a neutral President to be designated by the Mixed Commission. The Mixed Commission shall decide the powers to be delegated to the Sub-Commission.

Article 12

The duties of the Mixed Commission shall be to supervise and facilitate the emigration provided for in the present Convention and to carry out the liquidation of the movable and immovable property for which provision is made in Articles 9 and 10.

The Commission shall settle the methods to be followed as regards the emigration and liquidation mentioned above.

In a general way the Mixed Commission shall have full power to take the measures necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide all questions to which this Convention may give rise.

The decisions of the Mixed Commission shall be taken by a majority.

All disputes relating to property, rights and interests which are to be liquidated shall be settled definitely by the Commission.

Article 13

The Mixed Commission shall have full power to cause the valuation to be made of the movable and immovable property which is to be liquidated under the present Convention, the interested parties being given a hearing or being duly summoned so that they may be heard.

The basis for the valuation of the property to be liquidated shall be the value of the property in gold currency.

Article 14

The Commission shall transmit to the owner concerned a declaration stating the sum due to him in respect of the property of which he has been dispossessed, and such property shall remain at the disposal of the Government on whose territory it is situated.

The total sums due on the basis of these declarations shall constitute a Government debt from the country where the liquidation takes place to the Government of the country to which the emigrant belongs. The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to receive in the country to which he emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind.

Once every six months an account shall be drawn up of the sums due by the respective Governments on the basis of the declarations as above.

When the liquidation is completed, if the sums of money due to both sides correspond, the accounts relating thereto shall be balanced. If a sum remains due from one of the Governments to the other Government after a balance has been struck, the debit balance shall be paid in cash. If the debtor Government requests a postponement in making this payment, the Commission may grant such
postponement, provided that the sum due be paid in three annuities at most. The Commission shall fix the interest to be paid during the period of postponement.

If the sum to be paid is fairly large and requires longer postponement, the debtor Government shall pay in cash a sum to be fixed by the Mixed Commission, up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of the total due, and shall issue in respect of the balance loan certificates bearing such interest as the Mixed Commission may fix, to be paid off within 20 years at most. The debtor Government shall assign to the service of these loans pledges approved by the Commission, which shall be administered and of which the revenues shall be encashed by the International Commission in Greece and by the Council of the Public Debt at Constantinople. In the absence of agreement in regard to these pledges, they shall be selected by the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 15

With a view to facilitating emigration, funds shall be advanced to the Mixed Commission by the States concerned, under conditions laid down by the said Commission.

Article 16

The Turkish and Greek Governments shall come to an agreement with the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 in regard to all questions concerning the notification to be made to persons who are to leave the territory of Turkey and Greece under the present Convention, and concerning the ports to which these persons are to go for the purpose of being transported to the country of their destination.

The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually that no pressure direct or indirect shall be exercised on the populations which are to be exchanged with a view to making them leave their homes or abandon their property before the date fixed for their departure. They likewise undertake to impose on the emigrants who have left or who are to leave the country no special taxes or dues. No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece. This provision shall not be invoked as a motive for preventing the free alienation of property belonging to inhabitants of the said regions which are excepted from the exchange, or the voluntary departure of those among these inhabitants who wish to leave Turkey or Greece.

Article 17

The expenses entailed by the maintenance and working of the Mixed Commission and of the organizations dependent on it shall be borne by the Governments concerned in proportions to be fixed by the Commission.

Article 18

The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in their respective laws such modifications as may be necessary with a view to ensuring the execution of the present Convention.
Article 19

The present Convention shall have the same force and effect as between the High Contracting Parties as if it formed part of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Turkey. It shall come into force immediately after the ratification of the said Treaty by the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose respective full Powers have been found in good and due form, have signed the present Convention.

Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923, in three copies, one of which shall be transmitted to the Greek Government, one to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the third shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, which shall deliver certified copies to the other Powers signatory of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(L.S.) E. K. VENIZELOS
(L.S.) D. CACLAMANOS
(L.S.) ISMET
(L.S.) DR. RIZA NOUR
(L.S.) HASSAN

PROTOCOL

The undersigned Turkish Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized to that effect, declare that, without waiting for the coming into force of the Convention with Greece of even date, relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations, and by way of exception to Article 1 of that Convention, the Turkish Government, on the signature of the Treaty of Peace, will release the able-bodied men referred to in Article 4 of the said Convention, and will provide for their departure.

Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923.

ISMET
DR. RIZA NOUR
HASSAN
APPENDIX D:

TREATY OF PEACE WITH TURKEY SIGNED AT LAUSANNE
JULY 24, 1923
THE CONVENTION RESPECTING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITST AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT LAUSANNE

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROMANIA and the SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE, of the one part, and TURKEY, of the other part;

Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of war which has existed in the East since 1914,

Being anxious to re-establish the relations of friendship and commerce which are essential to the mutual well-being of their respective peoples,

And considering that these relations must be based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of States,

Have decided to conclude a Treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA:
The Right Honorable Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold, Baronet, G.C.M.G., High Commissioner at Constantinople;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:
General Maurice Pelle, Ambassador of France, High Commissioner of the Republic in the East, Grand Officer of the National Order of the Legion of Honour;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY:
The Honorable Marquis Camillo Garroni, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of Italy, High Commissioner at Constantinople, Grand Cross of the Orders of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, and of the Crown of Italy;
M. Giulio Cesare Montagna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Athens, Commander of the Orders of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy;

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN:
Mr. Kentaro Ochiai, Jusammi, First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES:
M. Eleftherios K. Venizelos, formerly President of the Council of Ministers, Grand Cross of the Order of the Savior;
M. Demetrios Caclamanos, Minister Plenipotentiary at London, Commander of the Order of the Savior;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA:
M. Constantine I. Diamandy, Minister Plenipotentiary;
M. Constantine Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS AND THE SLOVENES:
Dr. Miloutine Yovanovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne;

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, OF TURKEY:
Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Adrianople;  
Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Minister for Health and for Public Assistance, Deputy for Sinope;  
Hassan Bey, formerly Minister, Deputy for Trebizond;  
Who, having produced their full powers, found in good and due orm, have agreed as follows:

Lausanne Treaty: Part I

POLITICAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 1.

From the coming into force of the present Treaty, the state of peace will be definitely re-established between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of the one part, and Turkey of the other part, as well as between their respective nationals. Official relations will be resumed on both sides and, in the respective territories, diplomatic and consular representatives will receive, without prejudice to such agreements as may be concluded in the future, treatment in accordance with the general principles of international law.

SECTION I.  
I. TERRITORIAL CLAUSES.

ARTICLE 2.

From the Black Sea to the Aegean the frontier of Turkey is laid down as follows: (I) With Bulgaria:

From the mouth of the River Rezvaya, to the River Maritza, the point of junction of the three frontiers of Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece:

the southern frontier of Bulgaria as at present demarcated;

(2) With Greece:

Thence to the confluence of the Arda and the Marilza:

the course of the Maritza;

then upstream along the Arda, up to a point on that river to be determined on the spot in the immediate neighborhood of the village of Tchorek-Keuy:

the course of the Arda;

thence in a south-easterly direction up to a point on the Maritza, 1 kilom. below Bosna-Keuy:

a roughly straight line leaving in Turkish territory the village of Bosna-Keuy. The village of Tchorek-Keuy shall be assigned to Greece or to Turkey according as the majority of the population shall be found to be Greek or Turkish by the Commission for which provision is made in Article 5, the population which has migrated into this village after the 11th October, 1922, not being taken into account;

thence to the Aegean Sea:
the course of the Maritza.

ARTICLE 3.

From the Mediterranean to the frontier of Persia, the frontier of Turkey is laid down as follows:

(1) With Syria:

The frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921

(2) With Iraq:

The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britisn within nine months.

In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

ARTICLE 4.

The frontiers described by the present Treaty are traced on the one-in-a-million maps attached to the present Treaty. In case of divergence between the text and the map, the text will prevail. [See Introduction.]

ARTICLE 5.

A Boundary Commission will be appointed to trace on the ground the frontier defined in Article 2 (2). This Commission will be composed of representatives of Greece and of Turkey, each Power appointing one representative, and a president chosen by them from the nationals of a third Power.

They shall endeavor in all cases to follow as nearly as possible the descriptions given in the present Treaty, taking into account as far as possible administrative boundaries and local economic interests.

The decision of the Commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the parties concerned.

The expenses of the Commission shall be borne in equal shares by the parties concerned.

ARTICLE 6.

In so far as concerns frontiers defined by a waterway as distinct from its banks, the phrases "course" or "channel" used in the descriptions of the present Treaty signify, as regards non-navigable rivers, the median line of the waterway or of its principal branch, and, as regards navigable rivers, the median line of the principal channel of navigation. It will rest with the Boundary Commission to specify whether the frontier line shall follow any changes of the course or channel which may take place, or whether it shall
be definitely fixed by the position of the course or channel at the time when the present Treaty comes into force.

In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets lying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State.

ARTICLE 7.

The various States concerned undertake to furnish to the Boundary Commission all documents necessary for its task, especially authentic copies of agreements fixing existing or old frontiers, all large scale maps in existence, geodetic cata, surveys completed but unpublished, and information concerning the changes of frontier watercourses. The maps, geodetic data, and surveys, even if unpublished, which are in the possession of the Turkish authorities, must be delivered at Constantinople with the least possible delay from the coming into force of the present Treaty to the President of the Commission.

The States concerned also undertake to instruct the local authorities to communicate to the Commission all documents, especially plans, cadastral and land books, and to furnish on demand all details regarding property, existing economic conditions and other necessary information.

ARTICLE 8.

The various States interested undertake to give every assistance to the Boundary Commission, whether directly or through local authorities, in everything that concerns transport, accommodation, labor, materials (sign posts, boundary pillars) necessary for the accomplishment of its mission.

In particular, the Turkish Government undertakes to furnish, if required, the technical personnel necessary to assist the Boundary Commission in the accomplishment of its duties.

ARTICLE 9.

The various States interested undertake to safeguard the trigonometrical points, signals, posts or frontie: marks erected by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10.

The pillars will be placed so as to be intervisible. They will be numbered, and their position and their number will be noted on a cartographic document.

ARTICLE 11.

The protocols defining the boundary and the maps and documents attached thèreto will be made out in triplicate, of which two copies will be forwarded to the Governments of the limitrophe States, and the third to the Government of the French Republic, which will deliver authentic copies to the Powers who sign the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 12.

The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-14th
November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15.

Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.

ARTICLE 13.

With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria:

(1) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.

(2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.

(3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.

ARTICLE 14.

The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of persons and property. The maintenance of order will be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders.

The agreements which have been, or may be, concluded between Greece and Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.

ARTICLE 15.

Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Soumanto, Kaso (Kasso), Pisopis (Tilos), Maziros (Niayros), Calymnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

ARTICLE 16.

Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.
The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighborly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.

ARTICLE 17.

The renunciation by Turkey of all rights and titles over Egypt and over the Sudan will take effect as from the 5th November, 1914.

ARTICLE 18.

Turkey is released from all undertakings and obligations in regard to the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute, that is to say, the loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894. The annual payments made by Egypt for the service of these loans now forming part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debt, Egypt is freed from all other obligations relating to the Ottoman Public Debt.

ARTICLE 19.

Any questions arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt shall be settled by agreements to be negotiated subsequently in a manner to be determined later between the Powers concerned. The provisions of the present Treaty relating to territories detached from Turkey under the said Treaty will not apply to Egypt.

ARTICLE 20.

Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.

ARTICLE 21.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.

ARTICLE 22.

Without prejudice to the general stipulations of Article 27, Turkey hereby recognizes the definite abolition of all rights and privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith.
2. SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

ARTICLE 23.

The High Contracting Parties are agreed to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war, in the strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosporus, as prescribed in the separate Convention signed this day, regarding the regime of the Straits. This Convention will have the same force and effect in so far as the present High Contracting Parties are concerned as if it formed part of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 24.

The separate Convention signed this day respecting the regime for the frontier described in Article 2 of the present Treaty will have equal force and effect in so far as the present High Contracting Parties are concerned as if it formed part of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 25.

Turkey undertakes to recognize the full force of the Treaties of Peace and additional Conventions concluded by the other Contracting Powers with the Powers who fought on the side of Turkey, and to recognize whatever dispositions have been or may be made concerning the territories of the former German Empire, of Austria, of Hungary and of Bulgaria, and to recognize the new States within their frontiers as there laid down.

ARTICLE 26.

Turkey hereby recognizes and accepts the frontiers of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Czechoslovak State, as these frontiers have been or may be determined by the Treaties referred to in Article 25 or by any supplementary conventions.

ARTICLE 27.

No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish Government or authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of a territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other Powers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a territory detached from Turkey.

It is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are in no way infringed.

ARTICLE 28.

Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect.

ARTICLE 29.

Moroccans, who are French nationals ("ressortissants") and Tunisians shall enjoy in Turkey the same treatment in all respects as other French nationals ("ressortissants").
Natives ("ressortissants") of Libya shall enjoy in Turkey the same treatment in all respects as other Italian nationals ("ressortiss arts").

The stipulations of the present Article in no way prejudge the nationality of persons of Tunisian, Libyan and Moroccan origin established in Turkey.

Reciprocally, in the territories the inhabitants of which benefit by the stipulations of the first and second paragraphs of this Article, Turkish nationals shall benefit by the same treatment as in France and in Italy respectively.

The treatment to which merchandise originating in or destined for the territories, the inhabitants of which benefit from the stipulations of the first paragraph of this Article, shall be subject in Turkey, and, reciprocally, the treatment to which merchandise originating in or destined for Turkey shall be subject in the said territories shall be settled by agreement between the French and Turkish Governments.

SECTION II.
NATIONALITY.
ARTICLE 30.

Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such territory is transferred.

ARTICLE 31.

Persons over eighteen years of age, losing their Turkish nationality and obtaining ipso facto a new nationality under Article 30, shall be entitled within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to opt for Turkish nationality.

ARTICLE 32.

Persons over eighteen years of age, habitually resident in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty, and differing in race from the majority of the population of such territory shall, within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, be entitled to opt for the nationality of one of the States in which the majority of the population is of the same race as the person exercising the right to opt, subject to the consent of that State.

ARTICLE 33.

Persons who have exercised the right to opt in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 must, within the succeeding twelve months, transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted.

They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other State where they had their place of residence before exercising their right to opt.

They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.
ARTICLE 34.

Subject to any agreements which it may be necessary to conclude between the Governments exercising authority in the countries detached from Turkey and the Governments of the countries where the persons concerned are resident, Turkish nationals of over eighteen years of age who are natives of a territory detached from Turkey under the present Treaty, and who on its coming into force are habitually resident abroad, may opt for the nationality of the territory of which they are natives, if they belong by race to the majority of the population of that territory, and subject to the consent of the Government exercising authority therein. This right of option must be exercised within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 35.

The Contracting Powers undertake to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have under the present Treaty, or under the Treaties of Peace concluded with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria or Hungary, or under any Treaty concluded by the said Powers, other than Turkey, or any of them, with Russia, or between themselves, to choose any other nationality which may be open to them.

ARTICLE 36.

For the purposes of the provisions of this Section, the status of a married woman will be governed by that of her husband, and the status of children under eighteen years of age by that of their parents.

SECTION III.
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

ARTICLE 37.

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 38.

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order.

ARTICLE 39.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

ARTICLE 40.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 41.

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

ARTICLE 42.

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of these minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be
granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

ARTICLE 43.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

ARTICLE 44.

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

ARTICLE 45.

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

Lausanne Treaty: Part II
FINANCIAL CLAUSES.
SECTION I.
OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT.
ARTICLE 46.
The Ottoman Public Debt, as defined in the Table annexed to the present Section, shall be distributed under the conditions laid down in the present Section between Turkey, the States in favor of which territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the States to which the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the territory referred to in the last paragraph of the present Article have been attributed, and the States newly created in territories in Asia which are detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty. All the above States shall also participate, under the conditions laid down in the present Section, in the annual charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt from the dates referred to in Article 53.

From the dates laid down in Article 53, Turkey shall not be held in any way whatsoever responsible for the shares of the Debt for which other States are liable.

For the purpose of the distribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, that portion of the territory of Thrace which was under Turkish sovereignty on the 1st August, 1914, and lies outside the boundaries of Turkey as laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty, shall be deemed to be detached from the Ottoman Empire under the said Treaty.

ARTICLE 47.

The Council of the Ottoman Public Debt shall, within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, determine, on the basis laid down by Articles 50 and 51, the amounts of the annuities for the loans referred to in Part A of the Table annexed to the present Section which are payable by each of the States concerned, and shall notify to them this amount.

These States shall be granted an opportunity to send to Constantinople delegates to check the calculations made for this purpose by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

The Council of the Debt shall exercise the functions referred to in Article 134 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria of the 27th November, 1919.

Any disputes which may arise between the parties concerned as to the application of the principles laid down in the present Article shall be referred, not more than one month after the notification referred to in the first paragraph, to an arbitrator whom the Council of the League of Nations will be asked to appoint; this arbitrator shall give his decision within a period of not more than three months. The remuneration of the arbitrator shall be determined by the Council of the League of Nations, and shall, together with the other expenses of the arbitration, be borne by the parties concerned. The decisions of the arbitrator shall be final. The payment of the annuities shall not be suspended by the reference of any disputes to the above-mentioned arbitrator.

ARTICLE 48.

The States, other than Turkey, among which the Ottoman Public Debt, as defined in Part A of the Table annexed to this Section is attributed, shall, within three months from the date on which they are notified, in accordance with Article 47, of their respective shares in the annual charges referred to in that Article, assign to the Council of the Debt adequate security for the payment of their share. If such security is not assigned within the above-mentioned period, or in the case of any disagreement as to the adequacy of the security assigned, any of the Governments signatory to the present Treaty shall be entitled to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations.
The Council of the League of Nations shall be empowered to entrust the collection of the revenues assigned as security to international financial organizations existing in the countries (other than Turkey) among which the Debt is distributed. The decisions of the Council of the League of Nations shall be final.

ARTICLE 49

Within one month from the date of the final determination under Article 47 of the amount of the annuities for which each of the States concerned is liable, a Commission shall meet in Paris to determine the method of carrying out the distribution of the nominal capital of the Ottoman Public Debt as defined in Part A of the Table annexed to this Section. This distribution shall be made in accordance with the proportions adopted for the division of the annuities, and account shall be taken of the terms of the agreements governing the loans and of the provisions of this Section.

The Commission referred to in the first paragraph shall consist of a representative of the Turkish Government, a representative of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, a representative of the debt other than the Unified Debt and the Lotts Turces; each of the Governments concerned shall also be entitled to appoint a representative. All questions in regard to which the Commission may be unable to reach agreement shall be referred to the arbitrator referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 47.

If Turkey shall decide to create new securities in respect of her share, the distribution of the capital of the Ottoman Public Debt shall be made in the first instance as it affects Turkey by a Committee consisting of the representative of the Turkish Government, the representative of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt and the representative of the debt other than the Unified Debt and the Lotts Turces. The new securities shall be delivered to the Commission, which shall ensure their delivery to the bondholders upon such terms as will provide for the release of Turkey from liability and the rights of the bondholders towards the other States which are liable for a share of the Ottoman Public Debt. The securities issued in respect of the share of each State in the Ottoman Public Debt shall be exempt in the territory of the High Contracting Parties from all stamp duties or other taxes which would be involved by such issue.

The payment of the annuities for which each of the States concerned is liable shall not be postponed as a consequence of the provisions of the present Article in regard to the distribution of the nominal capital.

ARTICLE 50.

The distribution of the annual charges referred to in Article 47 and of the nominal capital of the Ottoman Public Debt mentioned in Article 49 shall be effected in the following manner:

(1) The loans prior to the 17th October, 1912, and the annuities of such loans shall be distributed between the Ottoman Empire as it existed after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the Balkan States in favor of which territory was detached from the Ottoman Empire after those wars, and the States to which the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty have been attributed; account shall be taken of the territorial changes which have taken place after the coming into force of the treaties which ended those wars or subsequent treaties.

(2) The residue of the loans for which the Ottoman Empire remained liable after this first distribution and the residue of the annuities of such loans, together with the loans contracted by that Empire between the 17th October, 1912, and the 1st November, 1914, and the annuities of such loans shall be distributed between Turkey, the newly created States in Asia in favor of which a territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty, and the State to which the territory referred to in the last paragraph of Article 46 of the said Treaty has been attributed.
The distribution of the capital shall in the case of each loan be based on the capital amount outstanding at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 51.

The amount of the share in the annual charges of the Ottoman Public Debt for which each State concerned is liable in consequence of the distribution provided for by Article 50 shall be determined as follows:

(1) As regards the distribution provided for by Article 50 (1), in the first place the share of the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 and of the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars, taken together, shall be fixed. The amount of this share shall bear the same proportion to the total sum of the annuities to be distributed in accordance with Article 50 (1) as the average total revenue of the above mentioned islands and territories, taken as a whole, bore to the average total revenue of the Ottoman Empire in the financial years 1910-1911 and 1911-1912, including the proceeds of the customs surtaxes established in 1907.

The amount thus determined shall then be distributed among the States to which the territories referred to in the preceding paragraph have been attributed, and the share for which each of these States will thus be made liable shall bear the same proportion to the total amount so distributed as the average total revenue of the territory attributed to each State bore in the financial years 1910-11 and 1911-12 to the average total revenue of the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars and the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15. In calculating the revenues referred to in this paragraph, customs revenues shall be excluded.

(2) As regards the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty (including the territory referred to in the last paragraph of Article 46), the amount of the share of each State concerned shall bear the same proportion to the total sum of the annuities to be distributed in accordance with Article 50 (2) as the average total revenue of the detached territory (including the proceeds of the Customs surtax established in 1907) for the financial years 1910-11 and 1911-12 bore to the average total revenue of the Ottoman Empire, excluding the territories and islands referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article.

ARTICLE 52.

The advances referred to in Part B of the Table annexed to the present Section shall be distributed between Turkey and the other States referred to in Article 46 under the following conditions:

(1) As regards the advances referred to in the Table which existed on the 17th October, 1912, the capital amount, if any, outstanding at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, together with the interest from the dates mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 53 and the repayments made since those dates, shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 (1) and Article 51 (1).

(2) As regards the amounts for which the Ottoman Empire remains liable after the first distribution and the advances referred to in the Table which were contracted by the said Empire between the 17th October, 1912, and the 1st November, 1914, the capital amount, if any, outstanding at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, together with the interest from the 1st March, 1920, and the repayments made since that date, shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 (2) and Article 51 (2).

The Council of the Ottoman Public Debt shall, within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, determine the amount of the share in these advances for which each of the States concerned is liable, and notify them of such amount.
The sums for which States other than Turkey are liable shall be paid by those States to the Council of the Debt and shall be paid by the Council to the creditors, or credited to the Turkish Government up to the amount paid by Turkey, by way of interest or repayment, for the account of those States.

The payments referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be made by five equal annuities from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Such portion of these payments as is payable to the creditors of the Ottoman Empire shall bear interest at the rates laid down in the contracts governing the advances; the portion to be credited to the Turkish Government shall be paid without interest.

ARTICLE 53.

The annuities for the service of the loans of the Ottoman Public Debt (as defined in Part A of the Table annexed to this Section) due by the States in favor of which a territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars, shall be payable as from the coming into force of the treaties by which the respective territories were transferred to those States. In the case of the islands referred to in Article 12, the annuity shall be payable as from the 1st/14th November, 1913, and, in the case of the islands referred to in Article 15, as from the 17th October, 1912.

The annuities due by the States newly created in territories in Asia detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty, and by the State to which the territory referred to in the last paragraph of Article 46 has been attributed, shall be payable as from the 1st March, 1920.

ARTICLE 54.

The Treasury Bills of 1911, 1912 and 1913 included in Part A of the Table annexed to this Section shall be repaid, with interest at the agreed rate, within ten years from the dates fixed by the contracts.

ARTICLE 55.

The States referred to in Article 46, including Turkey, shall pay to the Ottoman Debt Council the amount of the annuities required for the service of their share of the Ottoman Public Debt (as defined in Part A of the Table annexed to this Section) to the extent that such annuities have remained unpaid as from the dates laid down by Article 53. This payment shall be made, without interest, by means of twenty equal annuities from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The amount of the annuities paid to the Council of the Debt by the States other than Turkey shall, to the extent that they represent payments made by Turkey for the account of those States, be credited to Turkey on account of the areas with which she is debited.

ARTICLE 56.

The Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt shall no longer include delegates of the German, Austrian and Hungarian bondholders.

ARTICLE 57.

Limits of time fixed for the presentation of coupons of or claims for interest upon the loans and advances of the Ottoman Public Debt and the Turkish Loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894 secured on the Egyptian tribute, and the limits of time fixed for the presentation of securities of these loans drawn for repayment,
shall, on the territory of the High Contracting Parties, be considered as having been suspended from the 29th October, 1914, until three months after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ANNEX I TO SECTION I.
Table of the Ottoman Pre-War Public Debt (November 1, 1914).
Part A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Date of Contract</th>
<th>Interest %</th>
<th>Date of Redemption</th>
<th>Bank of Issue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified Debt</td>
<td>1-14.9.1903—8-21.6.1906</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lots turcs</td>
<td>5.1.1870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanie</td>
<td>18-30.4.1890</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tombac priority</td>
<td>26.4-8.5.1893</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank, Deutsche Bank and its group, Including International Bank and two French banks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000,000fr (Oriental Railways)</td>
<td>1-13.3.1894</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%, 1896</td>
<td>29.2-12.3.1896</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs, 1902</td>
<td>17-29.5.1886-28.9-11.10.1902</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>4%, 1903 (Fisheries)</td>
<td>3.10.1888-21.2-6.3.1903.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Deutsche Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad, Series I</td>
<td>20.2-5.3.1903</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Deutsche Bank</td>
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<td>4%, 1904</td>
<td>4-17.9.1903</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>4%, 1901-1905</td>
<td>21.11-4.12.1901-6.11.1903-25.4-8.5.1905</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Imperial Ottoman Bank</td>
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<td>TEDHIZAT-ASKERIE</td>
<td>4-17.4.1905</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Deutsche Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad, Series II</td>
<td>20.5-2.6.1908</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Deutsche Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance</td>
<td>Date of Contract</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Original Nominal Capital £ T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Railway Company</td>
<td>3/16 June, 1908</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighthouse Administration</td>
<td>5/18 August, 1904</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighthouse Administration</td>
<td>5/18 July, 1907</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constanza Cable Company</td>
<td>27/9 October, 1904</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17,335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel Company</td>
<td>Various dates</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan's Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>153,147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deutsche Bank 13/26 August, 1912 5.5 33,000
Lighthouse Administration 3/16 April, 1913 7 500,000
Anatolia Railway Company 23/5 March, 1914 6 200,000

SECTION II.
MISCELLANEOUS CLAUSES.
ARTICLE 58.

Turkey, on the one hand, and the other Contracting Powers (except Greece) on the other hand, reciprocally renounce all pecuniary claims for the loss and damage suffered respectively by Turkey and the said Powers and by their nationals (including juridical persons) between the 1st August, 1914, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as the result of acts of war or measures of requisition, sequestration, disposal or confiscation.

Nevertheless, the above provisions are without prejudice to the provisions of Part III (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.

Turkey renounces in favor of the other Contracting Parties (except Greece) any right in the sums in gold transferred by Germany and Austria under Article 259 (I) of the Treaty of Peace of the 28th June, 1919, with Germany, and under Article 210 (I) of the Treaty of Peace of the 10th September, 1919, with Austria.

The Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt is freed from all liability to make the payments which it was required to make by the Agreement of the 20th June, 1331 (3rd July, 1915) relating to the first issue of Turkish currency notes or by the words inscribed on the back of such notes.

Turkey also agrees not to claim from the British Government or its nationals the repayment of the sums paid for the warships ordered in England by the Ottoman Government which were requisitioned by the British Government in 1914, and renounces all claims in the matter.

ARTICLE 59.

Greece recognizes her obligation to make reparation for the damage caused in Anatolia by the acts of the Greek army or administration which were contrary to the laws of war.

On the other hand, Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and from its consequences, finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek Government.

ARTICLE 60.

The States in favor of which territory was or is detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars or by the present Treaty shall acquire, without payment, all the property and possessions of the Ottoman Empire situated therein.

It is understood that the property and possessions of which the transfer from the Civil List to the State was laid down by the Trades of the 26th August, 1324 (8th September, 1908) and the 20th April, 1325 (2nd May, 1909), and also those which, on the 30th October, 1918, were administered by the Civil List for the benefit of a public service, are included among the property and possessions referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the aforesaid States being subrogated to the Ottoman Empire in regard to the property and possessions in question. The Wakfs created on such property shall be maintained.

The dispute which has arisen between the Greek and Turkish Governments relating to property and possessions which have passed from the Civil List to the State and are situated in territories of the former Ottoman Empire transferred to Greece either after the Balkan wars, or subsequently, shall be referred to an arbitral tribunal at The Hague, in accordance with the special protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-4th November, 1913. The terms of reference shall be settled between the two Governments.

The provisions of this Article will not modify the juridical nature of the property and possessions registered in the name of the Civil List or administered by it, which are not referred to in the second and third paragraphs above.

ARTICLE 61.

The recipients of Turkish civil and military pensions who acquire under the present Treaty the nationality of a State other than Turkey, shall have no claim against the Turkish Government in respect of their pensions.

ARTICLE 62.

Turkey recognizes the transfer of any claims to payment or repayment which Germany, Austria, Bulgaria or Hungary may have against her, in accordance with Article 261 of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, with Germany, and the corresponding articles of the Treaties of Peace of the 10th September, 1919, with Austria; of the 27th November, 1919, with Bulgaria; and of the 4th June, 1920 with Hungary.

The other Contracting Powers agree to release Turkey from the debts for which she is liable on this account.

The claims which Turkey has against Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, are also transferred to the aforesaid Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE 63.

The Turkish Government, in agreement with the other Contracting Powers, hereby releases the German Government from the obligation incurred by it during the war to accept Turkish Government currency notes at a specified rate of exchange in payment for goods to be exported to Turkey from Germany after the war.

Lausanne Treaty: Part III
ECONOMIC CLAUSES.
ARTICLE 64.

In this part, the expression "Allied Powers" means the Contracting Powers other than Turkey.

The term "Allied nationals" includes physical persons, companies and associations of the Contracting Powers other than Turkey, or of a State or territory under the protection of one of the said Powers.
The provisions of this Part relating to "Allied nationals" shall benefit persons who without having the nationality of one of the Allied Powers, have, in consequence of the protection which they in fact enjoyed at the hands of these Powers, received from the Ottoman authorities the same treatment as Allied nationals and have, on this account, been prejudiced.

SECTION I. 
PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS. 
ARTICLE 65.

Property, rights and interests which still exist and can be identified in territories remaining Turkish at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which belong to persons who on the 29th October, 1914, were Allied nationals, shall be immediately restored to the owners in their existing state.

Reciprocally, property, rights and interests which still exist and can be identified in territories subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of the Allied Powers on the 29th October, 1914, or in territories detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars and subject to-day to the sovereignty of any such Power, and which belong to Turkish nationals, shall be immediately restored to the owners in their existing state. The same provision shall apply to property, rights and interests which belong to Turkish nationals in territories detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty, and which may have been subjected to liquidation or any other exceptional measure whatever on the part of the authorities of the Allied Powers.

All property, rights and interests situated in territory detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty, which, after having been subjected by the Ottoman Government to an exceptional war measure, are now in the hands of the Contracting Power exercising authority over the said territory, and which can be identified, shall be restored to their legitimate owners, in their existing state. The same provision shall apply to immovable property which may have been liquidated by the Contracting Power exercising authority over the said territory. All other claims between individuals shall be submitted to the competent local courts.

All disputes relating to the identity or the restitution of property to which a claim is made shall be submitted to the Mixec Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section V of this Part.

ARTICLE 66.

In order to give effect to the provisions of the first and second paragraphs of Article 65 the High Contracting Parties will, by the most rapid procedure, restore the owners to the possession of their property, rights and interests free from any burdens or encumbrances with which such property, rights and interests may have been charged without the consent of the said owners. It will be the duty of the Government of the Power effecting the restitution to provide for the compensation of third parties who may have acquired the property directly or indirectly from the said Government and who may be injured by this restitution. Disputes which may arise in connection with such compensation shall be dealt with by the ordinary courts.

In all other cases it will be open to any third parties who may be injured to take action against whoever is responsible, in order to obtain compensation.

In order to give effect to these provisions all acts of transfer or other exceptional war measures, which the High Contracting Parties may have carried out in respect of enemy property, rights and interests, shall be immediately cancelled and stayed when liquidation has not yet been completed. Owners who make claims
shall be satisfied by the immediate restitution of their property, rights and interests as soon as these shall have been identified.

When at the date of the signature of the present Treaty the property, rights and interests, the restitution of which is provided for in Article 65 have been liquidated by the authorities of one of the High Contracting Parties, that Party shall be discharged from the obligation to restore the said property, rights and interests by payment of the proceeds of the liquidation to the owner. If, on application being made by the owner, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Section V finds that the liquidation was not effected in such conditions as to ensure the realization of a fair price, it will have the power, in default of agreement between the parties, to order the addition to the proceeds of the liquidation of such amount as it shall consider equitable. The said property, rights and interests shall be restored if the payment is not made within two months from the agreement with the owner or from the decision of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal mentioned above.

ARTICLE 67.

Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the one hand, and Turkey on the other hand undertake mutually to facilitate, both by appropriate administrative measures and by the delivery of all documents relating thereto, the search on their territory for, and the restitution of, movable property of every kind taken away, seized or sequestered by their armies or administrations in the territory of Turkey, or in the territory of Greece, Roumania or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State respectively, which are actually within the territories in question.

Such search and restitution will take place also as regards property of the nature referred to above seized or sequestered by German, Austro-Hungarian or Bulgarian armies or administrations in the territory of Greece, Roumania or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, which has been assigned to Turkey or to her nationals, as well as to property seized or sequestered by the Greek, Romanian or Serbian armies in Turkish territory, which has been assigned to Greece, Roumania or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or to their nationals.

Applications relating to such search and restitution must be made within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 68.

Debts arising out of contracts concluded, in districts in Turkey occupied by the Greek army, between the Greek authorities and administrations on the one hand and Turkish nationals on the other, shall be paid by the Greek Government in accordance with the provisions of the said contracts.

ARTICLE 69.

No charge, tax or surtax to which, by virtue of the privileges which they enjoyed on the 1st August, 1914, Allied nationals and their property were not subject, shall be collected from Allied subjects or their property in respect of the financial years earlier than the financial year 1922-23.

If any sums have been collected after the 15th May, 1923, in respect of financial years earlier than the financial year 1922-1923, the amount shall be refunded to the persons concerned, as soon as the present Treaty comes into force.

No claim for repayment shall be made as regards sums encashed before the 15th May, 1923.
ARTICLE 70.

Claims based on Articles 65, 66 and 69 must be lodged with the competent authorities within six months, and, in default of agreement, with the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal within twelve months, from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 71.

The British Empire, France, Italy, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or their nationals having begun claims or suits with regard to their property, rights and interests against the Ottoman Governmen before the 29th October, 1914, the provisions of this Section will not prejudice such claims or suits.

Claims or suits begun against the British, French, Italian, Romanian or Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments by the Ottoman Government or its nationals will similarly not be prejudiced. These claims or suits will be continued against the Turkish Government and against the other Governments mentioned in this Article under the conditions existing before the 29th October, 1914, due regard being had to the abolition of the Capitulations.

ARTICLE 72.

In the territories which remain Turkish by virtue of the present Treaty, property, rights and interests belonging to Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria or to their nationals, which before the coming into force of the present Treaty have been seized or occupied by the Allied Governments, shall remain in the possession of these Governments until the conclusion of arrangements between them and the German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments or their nationals who are concerned. If the aforesaid property, rights and interests have been liquidated, such liquidation is confirmed.

In the territories detached from Turkey under the present Treaty, the Governments exercising authority there shall have power, within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty, to liquidate the property, rights and interests belonging to Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria or to their nationals.

The proceeds of liquidations, whether they have already been carried out or not, shall be paid to the Reparation Commission established by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the States concerned, if the property liquidated belongs to the German, Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian State. In the case of liquidation of private property, the proceeds of liquidation shall be paid to the owners direct.

The provisions of this Article do not apply to Ottoman limited Companies.

The Turkish Government shall be in no way responsible for the measures referred to in the present Article.

SECTION II.

CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS AND JUDGMENTS.

ARTICLE 73.

The following classes of contracts concluded, before the date mentioned in Article 82, between persons who thereafter became enemies as defined in that Article, remain in force subject to the provisions of the contracts and to the stipulations of the present Treaty:
(a) Contracts for the sale of real property, even if all formalities may not have been concluded, provided that delivery did in fact take place before the date on which the parties became enemies as defined in Article 82.

(b) Leases and agreements for leases of land and houses entered into between individuals.

(c) Contracts between individuals regarding the exploitation of mines, forests or agricultural estates.

(d) Contracts of mortgage, pledge or lien.

(e) Contracts constituting companies, excepting "societes en 'nom collectif" which do not constitute, under the law to which they are subject, an entity separate from that of the persons of which they are composed (partnerships).

(f) Contracts, whatever may be their purpose, concluded between individuals or companies and the State, provinces, municipalities or other similar juridical persons charged with administrative functions.

(g) Contracts relating to family status.

(h) Contracts relating to gifts or bounties of any kind whatever.

This Article cannot be invoked in order to give to contracts a validity different from that which they had in themselves when they were concluded.

It does not apply to concessionary contracts.

ARTICLE 74.

Insurance contracts are governed by the provisions of the Annex to this Section.

ARTICLE 75.

Contracts other than those specified in Articles 73 and 74 and other than concessionary contracts, which were entered into between persons who subsequently became enemies, shall be considered as having been annulled as from the date on which the parties became enemies.

Nevertheless, either of the parties to the contract shall have power, within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, to require the execution of the contract, on condition of paying, where the circumstances demand it, to the other party compensation calculated according to the difference between the conditions prevailing at the time when the contract was concluded and those prevailing at the time when its maintenance is required. In default of agreement between the parties, this compensation shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

ARTICLE 76.

The validity of all compromises entered into before the coming into force of the present Treaty between nationals of the Contracting Powers, parties to contracts specified in Articles 73 to 75, particularly those providing for the cancellation, the maintenance, the methods of execution, or the modification of such contracts, including agreements relating to the currency of payment or the rate of exchange, is confirmed.
ARTICLE 77.

Contracts between Allied and Turkish nationals concluded after the 30th October, 1918, remain in force and will be governed by the ordinary law.

Contracts duly concluded with the Constantinople Government between the 30th October, 1918, and the 16th March, 1920, also remain in force and will be governed by the ordinary law.

All contracts and arrangements duly concluded after the 16th March, 1920, with the Constantinople Government concerning territories which remained under the effective control of the said Government, shall be submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for approval, if the parties concerned make application within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Payments made under such contracts shall be duly credited to the party who has made them.

If approval is not granted, the party concerned shall, if the circumstances demand it, be entitled to compensation corresponding to the direct loss which has been actually suffered; such compensation, in default of an amicable agreement, shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

The provisions of this Article are not applicable either to concessionary contracts or to transfers of concessions.

ARTICLE 78.

All disputes which already exist, or may arise within the period of six months mentioned below, relating to contracts, other than concessionary contracts, between parties who subsequently became enemies, shall be determined by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, with the exception of disputes which, in accordance with the laws of neutral Powers are within the competence of the national courts of those Powers. In the latter case, such disputes shall be determined by the said national courts, to the exclusion of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Applications relating to disputes which, under this Article, are within the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, must be presented to the said Tribunal within a period of six months from the date of its establishment.

After the expiration of this period, disputes which have not been submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be determined by the competent courts in accordance with the ordinary law.

The provisions of this Article do not apply to cases in which all the parties to the contract resided in the same country during the war and there freely disposed of their persons and their property, nor to disputes in respect of which judgment was given by a competent court before the date on which the parties became enemies.

ARTICLE 79.

All periods whatever of prescription or limitation of right of action, whether they began to run before or after the outbreak of war, shall be treated, in the territory of the High Contracting Parties so far as regards relations between enemies, as having been suspended from the 29th October, 1914, until the expiration of three months after the coming into force of the present Treaty.
This provision applies, in particular, to periods of time allowed for the presentation of interest or dividend coupons, or for the presentation for payment of securities drawn for redemption or repayable on any other ground.

As regards Roumania, the above-mentioned periods shall be considered as having been suspended as from the 27th August 1916.

ARTICLE 80.

As between enemies no negotiable instrument made before the war shall be deemed to have become invalid by reason only of failure within the required time to present the instrument for acceptance or payment, or to give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to drawers or endorsers, or to protest the instrument, nor by reason of failure to complete any formality during the war.

When the period within which a negotiable instrument should have been presented for acceptance or payment, or within which notice of non-acceptance or non-payment should have been given to the drawers or endorsers, or within which the instrument should have been protested, has expired during the war, and when the party who should have presented or protested the instrument or given notice of non-acceptance or non-payment, has failed to do so during the war, a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty shall be allowed within which the presentation, notice of non-acceptance or non-payment, or protest may be made.

ARTICLE 81.

Sales effected during the war in order to realize pledges or mortgages created before the war as security for debts which have become payable, shall be deemed valid, although it may not have been possible to perform all the formalities required for notifying the debtor, subject to the express right of the said debtor to summon the creditor before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to render accounts, failing which the creditor will be liable to be cast in damages.

It shall be the duty of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to settle the accounts between the parties, to investigate the conditions under which the property pledged or mortgaged was sold, and to order the creditor to make good any loss suffered by the debtor as a result of the sale if the creditor acted in bad faith or if he did not take all steps in his power to avoid having recourse to a sale or to cause the sale to be conducted in such conditions as to ensure the realization of a fair price.

The present provision is applicable only between enemies and does not extend to transactions referred to above which may have been carried out after the 1st May, 1923.

ARTICLE 82.

For the purposes of the present Section, the parties to a contract shall be regarded as enemies from the date on which trading between them became impossible in fact or was prohibited or became unlawful under laws, orders or regulations to which one of the parties was subject.

By way of exception to Articles 73-75, 79 and 80, contracts shall be governed by the ordinary law if they were concluded within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties between enemies (including companies) or their agents, if this territory was an enemy country for one of the contracting parties who remained there during the war and was there able to dispose freely of his person and property.
ARTICLE 83.

The provisions of this Section do not apply between Japan and Turkey; matters dealt with in this Section shall, in both of these countries, be determined in accordance with the local law.

ANNEX.
I. LIFE ASSURANCE.
Paragraph I.

Life assurance contracts entered into between an insurer and a person who subsequently became an enemy shall not be deemed to have been dissolved by the outbreak of war or by the fact of the person becoming an enemy.

Every sum which, during the war, became due upon a contract deemed not to have been dissolved in accordance with the preceding paragraph, shall be recoverable after the war. This sum shall be increased by interest at 5 per cent. per annum from the date of its becoming due up to the day of payment.

If the contract has lapsed during the war, owing to non-payment of premiums or has become void from breach of the conditions of the contract, the assured, or his representatives, or the persons entitled, shall have the right at any moment within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty to claim from the insurer the surrender value of the policy at the date of its lapse or annulation, together with interest at 5 per cent. per annum.

Turkish nationals whose life insurance contracts entered into before the 29th October, 1914, have been cancelled or reduced before the Treaty for non-payment of premiums in accordance with the provisions of the said contracts, shall have the right, within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, if they are still alive, to restore their policies for the whole of the amount assured. For this purpose they must, after having undergone a medical examination by the doctor of the company, the result of which the company considers satisfactory, pay the premiums in arrear with compound interest at 5 per cent.

Paragraph 2.

It is understood that life assurance contracts in money other than the Turkish pound, entered into before the 29th October, 1914, between companies possessing the nationality of an Allied Power and Turkish nationals, in respect of which the premiums have been paid before and after the 18th November, 1915, or even only before that date, shall be regulated, first, by determining the rights of the assured in accordance with the general conditions of the policy for the period before the 18th November, 1915, in the currency stipulated in the contract at the current rate in its country of origin (for example, every amount stipulated in francs, in gold francs, or in "francs effectifs" will be paid in French francs), secondly, for the period after the 18th November, 1915, in Turkish pounds paper—the Turkish pound being taken at the pre-war par value.

If Turkish nationals whose contracts were entered into in currency other than Turkish currency show that they have continued to pay their premiums since the 18th November, 1915, in the currency stipulated in the contracts, the said contracts shall be settled in the same currency at the current rate in its country of origin, even for the period after the 18th November, 1915.

Turkish nationals whose contracts, entered into before the 29th October, 1914, in currency other than Turkish currency with companies possessing the nationality of an Allied Power are, owing to payment of
Paragraph 3.

As regards insurances in Turkish pounds, settlement shall be made in Turkish pounds paper.

Paragraph 4.

The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 do not apply to policy holders who, by an express agreement, have already settled with the insurance companies the fixation of the value of their policies and the method of payment of their premiums, nor to those whose policies shall have been finally settled at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Paragraph 5.

For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, insurance contracts shall be considered as contracts of life insurance when they depend on the probabilities of human life, combined with the rate of interest, for the calculation of the reciprocal engagement between the two parties.

II. MARINE INSURANCE.

Paragraph 6.

Subject to the provisions therein contained, contracts of marine insurance will not be deemed to have been dissolved where the risk had attached before the parties became enemies, but the policy shall not be deemed to cover losses due to belligerent action by the Power of which the insurer was a national or by the allies of that Power.

III. FIRE AND OTHER INSURANCES.

Paragraph 7.

Subject to the reserve contained in the preceding paragraph, fire insurance contracts and all other forms of insurance contracts are not deemed to be dissolved.

SECTION III.
DEBTS.
ARTICLE 84.

The High Contracting Parties are in agreement in recognizing that debts which were payable before the war or which became payable during the war under contracts entered into before the war, and which remained unpaid owing to the war, must be settled and paid, in accordance with the provisions of the contracts, in the currency agreed upon, at the rate current in its country of origin.
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Annex to Section II of this part, it is agreed that where payments to be made under a pre-war contract are represented by sums collected during the war in whole or in part in a currency other than that mentioned in the said contract, such payments can be made by handing over the sums actually collected, in the currency in which they were collected. This provision shall not affect settlements inconsistent with the foregoing provisions arrived at by voluntary agreement between the parties before the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 85.

The Ottoman Public Debt is by general agreement left outside the scope of this Section and of the other Sections of this Part (Economic Clauses).

SECTION IV. INDUSTRIAL, LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY.

ARTICLE 86.

Subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, rights of industrial, literary and artistic property as they existed on the 1st August, 1914, in accordance with the law of each of the contracting countries, shall be re-established or restored as from the coming into force of the present Treaty in the territories of the High Contracting Parties in favor of the persons entitled to the benefit of them at the moment when the state of war commenced, or of their legal representatives. Equally, rights which, but for the war, could have been acquired during the war, by means of an application legally made for the protection of industrial property or of the publication of a literary or artistic work, shall be recognized and established in favor of those persons who would have been entitled thereto, from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Without prejudice to the rights which are required to be restored in accordance with the above provision, all acts (including the grant of licenses) done by virtue of the special measures taken during the war by a legislative, executive or administrative authority of an Allied Power in regard to the rights of Turkish nationals in respect of industrial, literary or artistic property, shall remain in force and continue to have their full effect. This provision applies mutatis mutandis to corresponding measures taken by Turkish authorities in regard to the rights of the nationals of any Allied Power.

ARTICLE 87.

A minimum of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty shall be granted, without surtax or penalty of any kind, to Turkish nationals in the territory of each of the other Contracting Powers, and to the nationals of these Powers in Turkey, within which they may accomplish any act, fulfill any formality, pay any fees, and generally satisfy any obligation prescribed by the laws and regulations of the respective States for preserving or obtaining or opposing the grant of rights to industrial property which had already been acquired on the 1st August, 1914, or which, but for the war, might have been acquired since that date by means of an application made before or during the war.

Rights to industrial property which have lapsed by reason of any failure to accomplish any act, fulfill any formality, or pay any fees shall be revived, but subject, in the case of patents and designs, to the adoption of such measures as each Power may deem reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights of third parties who have explicated or made use of patents or designs since they had lapsed.

The period from the 1st August, 1914, until the coming into force of the present Treaty shall be excluded in calculating the time within which a patent has to be exploited or a trade-mark or design used, and it is further agreed that no patent, trade-mark or design in force on the 1st August, 1914, shall be subject to
revocation or cancellation by reason only of the failure to exploit such patent or use such trade-mark or
design, for two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 88.

No action shall be brought and no claim made on the one hand by Turkish nationals or persons residing or
carrying on business in Turkey, and on the other hand by nationals of the Allied Powers or persons
residing or carrying on their business in the territory of these Powers, nor by third parties having derived
title during the war from such persons, by reason of any occurrence which has taken place within the
territory of the other party, between the date of the beginning of a state of war and that of the coming into
force of the present Treaty, which might have held to constitute an infringement of rights of industrial
property or rights of literary or artistic property either existing at any time during the war, or revived
under the provisions of Article 86.

Among the occurrences referred to above are included the use by the Governments of the High
Contracting Parties, or by any person acting on their behalf, or with their consent, of rights of industrial,
literary or artistic property, as well as the sale, the offering for sale or the use of products, apparatus, or
any articles whatsoever to which these rights apply.

ARTICLE 89.

Licenses for the use of industrial property, or for the reproduction of literary or artistic works, granted
before the war by or to nationals of the Allied Powers or persons residing in their territories or carrying on
business therein, on the one hand, to or by Turkish nationals on the other hand, shall be considered as
canceled as from the date of the beginning of a state of war between Turkey and the Allied Power
concerned. But in any case, the former beneficiary of a license of this kind shall have the right within a
period of six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty to require from the proprietor of the
rights the grant of a new license; the conditions of which, in default of agreement between the parties,
shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal referred to in Section V of this Part. The Tribunal shall have
the power, where the circumstances demand it, to fix at the same time the amount which it considers fair
payment for the use of the property during the war.

ARTICLE 90

The inhabitants of territories detached from Turkey under the present Treaty shall, notwithstanding this
transfer and the change of nationality consequent thereon, continue in complete enjoyment in Turkey of
all the rights in industrial, literary, and artistic property to which they were entitled under Ottoman law at
the time of transfer.

Rights of industrial, literary and artistic property which are in existence in territories detached from
Turkey under the present Treaty at the time of separation, or which are re-established or restored by the
provisions of Article 86, shall be recognized by the State to which the said territory is transferred, and
shall remain in existence in that territory for the same period of time as that which they would have
enjoyed under Ottoman law.

ARTICLE 91

All grants of patents and registrations of trade-marks, as well as all registrations of transfers or
assignments of patents or trade marks which have been duly made since the 30th October, 1918, by the
Imperial Ottoman Government at Constantinople or elsewhere, shall be submitted to the Turkish
Government and registered, if the parties concerned make an application within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Such registration shall have effect as from the date of the original registration.

SECTION V.
MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL.
ARTICLE 92.

Within three months from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be established between each of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other hand.

Each of these Tribunals shall be composed of three members, two being appointed respectively by each of the Governments concerned, who shall be entitled to designate several persons from whom, according to the case in question, they will choose one to sit as a member of the Tribunal. The president shall be chosen by agreement between the two Governments concerned.

In case of failure to reach agreement within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the president shall be appointed, upon the request of one of the Governments concerned, from among nationals of Powers which remained neutral during the war, by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

If within the said period of two months one of the Governments concerned does not appoint a member to represent it on the Tribunal, the Council of the League of Nations will have power to proceed to the appointment of such member upon the request of the other Government concerned.

If a member of the Tribunal should die or resign or for any reason become unable to perform his duties, he shall be replaced by the method laid down for his appointment, the above period of two months running from the date of death, resignation or inability as duly verified.

ARTICLE 93.

The seat of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals shall be at Constantinople. If the number and character of the cases justify it, the Governments concerned shall be entitled to create in each Tribunal one or more additional Sections, the seat of which shall be in whatever place may be convenient. Each of these Sections shall be composed of a vice-president and two members appointed as laid down in the second, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of Article 92.

Each Government shall appoint one or more agents to represent it before the Tribunal.

If, after three years from the establishment of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, or of one of its Sections, such Tribunal or Section has not finished its work, and if the Power on whose territory such Tribunal or Section has its seat so requests, the seat shall be removed from such territory.

ARTICLE 94.

The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 shall decide all questions within their competence under the present Treaty.
Decisions shall be taken by a majority.

The High Contracting Parties agree to regard the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals as final and conclusive, and to render them binding upon their nationals, and to ensure their enforcement in their respective territories as soon as the decisions of the Tribunals are notified to them, without it being necessary to have them declared executory.

The High Contracting Parties further undertake that their Tribunals and authorities shall directly assist the fixed Arbitral Tribunals in every way that is in their power, particularly as regards the transmission of notices and the collection of evidence.

**ARTICLE 95.**

The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals shall be guided by justice, equity and good faith.

Each Tribunal will determine the language to be used before it, and shall order such translations to be made as are necessary to ensure that the proceedings are completely understood; it will lay down rules and time limits for the procedure to be observed. These rules must be based on the following principles:

1. The procedure shall include the presentation of a memorial and a counter-memorial respectively, with the option of presenting a reply and a rejoinder. If either of the parties asks for leave to present an oral argument he will be permitted to do so; in such case the other party will have the same right.

2. The Tribunal shall have full power to order enquiries, the production of documents, and expert examinations, to make a view, to demand any information, to hear any witnesses and to ask the parties or their representatives for any verbal or written explanations.

3. Subject to any contrary provision in the present Treaty, no claim shall be admitted after the expiry of a period of six months from the establishment of the Tribunal, except upon express authority contained in a decision of the said Tribunal and justified as an exceptional measure by considerations relating to distance or force majeure.

4. It shall be the duty of the Tribunal to hold as many sittings each week as may be needed for the prompt dispatch of its business, except during vacations, which shall not exceed a total of eight weeks a year.

5. Judgment must always be given within at most two months from the end of the hearing, after which the Tribunal will at once proceed to consider its judgment.

6. Oral arguments, if any, shall be heard in public, and in all cases judgment shall be delivered in public.

7. Each Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be entitled to hold sittings elsewhere than in the place where its seat is established, if it considers it advantageous for the dispatch of business.

**ARTICLE 96.**

The Governments concerned shall appoint by agreement a Secretary-General for each Tribunal, and shall each attach to him one or more Secretaries. The Secretary-General and the Secretaries shall be under the
orders of the Tribunal, which with the consent of the Governments concerned shall be entitled to engage any persons whose assistance it may need.

The Secretariat of each Tribunal shall have its offices at Constantinople. The Governments concerned shall have power to establish additional offices in such other places as may be convenient.

Each Tribunal shall keep in its Secretariat the records, papers and documents relating to the cases submitted to it, and upon the completion of its duties it shall deposit them in the archives of the Government of the country where its seat is established. These archives shall always be accessible to the Governments concerned.

ARTICLE 97.

Each Government shall pay the emoluments of the member of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal whom it appoints, as well as those of any agent or secretary appointed by it.

The emoluments of the President and those of the Secretary-General shall be fixed by agreement between the Governments concerned, and these emoluments and the general expenses of the Tribunal shall be paid in equal shares by the two Governments.

ARTICLE 98.

The present section shall not apply to cases between Japan and Turkey, which, according to the terms of the present Treaty, would fall within the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Such cases shall be settled by agreement between the two Governments.

SECTION VI.
TREATIES.
ARTICLE 99.

From the coming into force of the present Treaty and subject to the provisions thereof, the multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements of an economic or technical character enumerated below shall enter again into force between Turkey and those of the other Contracting Powers party thereto:

(1) Conventions of March 14, 1884, of December 1, 1886, and of March 23, 1887, and Final Protocol of July 7, 1887, regarding the protection of submarine cables;

(2) Convention of July 5, 1890, regarding the publication of customs tariffs and the organization of an International Union for the publication of customs tariffs;

(3) Arrangement of December 9, 1907, regarding the creation of the International Office of Public Hygiene at Paris;

(4) Convention of June 7, 1905, regarding the creation of an International Agricultural Institute at Rome;

(5) Convention of July 16, 1863, for the redemption of the toll dues on the Scheldt;
(6) Convention of October 29, 1888, regarding the establishment of a definite arrangement guaranteeing the free use of the Suez Canal, subject to the special stipulations provided for by Article 19 of the present Treaty;

(7) Conventions and Agreements of the Universal Postal Union, including the Conventions and Agreements signed at Madrid on November 30, 1920;

(8) International Telegraphic Conventions signed at St. Petersburgh on July 10-22, 1875; Regulations and Tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraph Conference, Lisbon, June 11, 1908.

**ARTICLE 100.**

Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Conventions or Agreements enumerated below, or to ratify them:

(1) Convention of October 11, 1909, regarding the inter-national circulation of motor cars;

(2) Agreement of May 15, 1886, regarding the sealing of railway trucks subject to customs inspection and Protocol of May 18, 1907;

(3) Convention of September 23, 1910, respecting the unification of certain regulations regarding collisions and salvage at sea;

(4) Convention of December 21, 1904, regarding exemption of hospital ships from dues and charges in ports;

(5) Conventions of May 18, 1904, of May 4, 1910, and of September 30, 1921, regarding the suppression of the White Slave Traffic;

(6) Conventions of May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of obscene publications;

(7) Sanitary Convention of January 17, 1912, Articles 54, 88 and 90 being reserved;

(8) Conventions of November 3, 1881, and April 15, 1889, regarding precautionary measures against phylloxera;

(9) Opium Convention, signed at The Hague, January 23, 1912, and additional Protocol of 1914;

(10) International Radio-Telegraphic Convention of July 5, 1912;

(11) Convention regarding liquor traffic in Africa, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919;


(13) Convention of October 13, 1919, regulating aerial navigation, provided that Turkey obtains, under the Protocol of May 1, 1920, such derogations as her geographical situation may render necessary;

(14) Convention of September 26, 1906, signed at Berne, prohibiting the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.
Turkey further undertakes to take part in the elaboration of new international conventions relating to telegraphy and radio-telegraphy.

Lausanne Treaty: Part IV

COMMUNICATIONS AND SANITARY QUESTIONS.

SECTION I.

COMMUNICATIONS.

ARTICLE 101.

Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Convention and to the Statute respecting the Freedom of Transit adopted by the Conference of Barcelona on the 14th April, 1921, as well as to the Convention and the Statute respecting the regime for waterways of international interest adopted by the said Conference on the 19th April, 1921, and to the supplementary Protocol.

Turkey accordingly undertakes to bring into force the provisions of these Conventions, Statutes and Protocol as from the entry into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 102.

Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Declaration of Barcelona, dated the 20th April, 1921, "recognizing the rights of the flag of States not possessing a sea-board."

ARTICLE 103.

Turkey undertakes to adhere to the recommendations of the Conference of Barcelona, dated the 20th April, 1921, respecting ports placed under an international regime. Turkey will subsequently make known those ports which will be placed under that regime.

ARTICLE 104.

Turkey undertakes to adhere to the recommendations of the Conference of Barcelona, dated the 20th April, 1921, respecting international railways. These recommendations will be brought into force by the Turkish Government on the coming into force of the present Treaty and subject to reciprocity.

ARTICLE 105.

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, Turkey agrees to subscribe to the Conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on October 14, 1890, September 20, 1893, July 16, 1895, June 16, 1898, and September 19, 1906, regarding the transportation of goods by rail.

ARTICLE 106.

When, as a result of the fixing of new frontiers, a railway connection between two parts of the same country crosses another country, or a branch line from one country has its terminus in another, the conditions of working, in so far as concerns the traffic between the two countries, shall, subject to any special arrangements, be laid down in an agreement to be concluded between the railway administrations concerned. If these administrations cannot come to an agreement as to the terms of such agreement, those conditions shall be decided by arbitration.
The establishment of all new frontier stations between Turkey and the neighboring States, as well as the working of the lines between those stations, shall be settled by agreements similarly concluded.

ARTICLE 107

Travelers and goods coming from or destined for Turkey or Greece, and making use in transit of the three sections of the Oriental Railways included between the Greco-Bulgarian frontier and the Greco-Turkish frontier near Kuleli-Burgas, shall not be subject, on account of such transit, to any duty or toll nor to any formality of examination in connection with passports or customs.

A Commissioner, who shall be selected by the Council of the League of Nations, shall ensure that the stipulations of this Article are carried out.

The Greek and Turkish Governments shall each have the right to appoint a representative to be attached to this Commissioner; this representative shall have the duty of drawing the attention of the Commissioner to any question relating to the execution of the above-mentioned stipulations, and shall enjoy all the necessary facilities to enable him to accomplish his task. These representatives shall reach an agreement with the Commissioner as to the number and nature of the subordinate staff which they will require.

It shall be the duty of the said Commissioner to submit, for the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, any question relating to the execution of the said stipulations which he may not have been able to settle. The Greek and Turkish Governments undertake to carry out any decision given by the majority vote of the said Council.

The salary of the said Commissioner, as well as the expenses of his work, shall be borne in equal parts by the Greek and Turkish Governments.

In the event of Turkey constructing later a railway line joining Adrianople to the line between Kuleli-Burgas and Constantinople, the stipulations of this Article shall lapse in so far as concerns transit between the points on the Greco-Turkish frontier lying near Kuleli-Burgas and Bosna-Keuy respectively.

Each of the two interested Powers shall have the right, after five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, to apply to the Council of the League of Nations with a view to deciding whether it is necessary that the control mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the present Article should be maintained. Nevertheless, it remains understood that the stipulations of paragraph I shall remain in force for transit over the two sections of the Oriental Railways between the Greco-Bulgarian frontier and Bosna-Keuy.

ARTICLE 108.

Subject to any special provisions concerning the transfer of ports and railways, whether owned by the Turkish Government or private companies, situated in the territories detached from Turkey under the present Treaty, and similarly subject to any agreements which have been, or may be, concluded between the Contracting Powers relating to the concessionaries and the pensioning of the personnel, the transfer of railways will take place under the following conditions:

(I) The works and installations of all the railroads shall be left complete and in as good condition as possible;
(2) When a railway system possessing its own rolling-stock is situated in its entirety in transferred territory, such stock shall be left complete with the railway, in accordance with the last inventory before the 30th October, 1918;

(3) As regards lines, the administration of which will in virtue of the present Treaty be divided, the distribution of the rolling-stock shall be made by friendly agreement between the administrations taking over the several sections thereof. This agreement shall have regard to the amount of the material registered on those lines in the last inventory before the 30th October, 1918, the length of the track (sidings included) and the nature and amount of the traffic. Failing agreement, the points in dispute shall be settled by arbitration. The arbitral decision shall also, if necessary, specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be left on each section, the conditions of their acceptance and such provisional arrangements as may be judged necessary to ensure for a limited period the current maintenance in existing workshops of the transferred stock;

(4) Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be left under the same conditions as the rolling-stock.

**ARTICLE 109.**

In default of any provisions to the contrary, when as the result of the fixing of a new frontier the hydraulic system (canalization, inundation, irrigation, drainage or similar matters) in a State is dependent on works executed within the territory of another State, or when use is made on the territory of a State, in virtue of pre-war usage, of water or hydraulic power, the source of which is on the territory of another State, an agreement shall be made between the States concerned to safeguard the interests and rights acquired by each of them.

Failing an agreement, the matter shall be regulated by arbitration.

**ARTICLE 110.**

Roumania and Turkey will come to an agreement as to an equitable arrangement for the working conditions of the Constanza-Constantinople cable. Failing agreement, the matter shall be settled by arbitration.

**ARTICLE 111.**

Turkey renounces on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals all rights, titles or privileges of whatsoever nature over the whole or part of such cables as no longer land on her territory.

If the cables or portions thereof transferred under the preceding paragraph are privately owned, the Governments to which this property is transferred will have to indemnify the owners. Failing agreement respecting the amount of indemnity, this amount will be fixed by arbitration.

**ARTICLE 112.**

Turkey will retain the rights of property which she may already possess over those cables of which at least one end remains in Turkish territory.
The exercise of the landing rights of the said cables in non-Turkish territory and their working conditions shall be settled in a friendly manner by the States concerned. Failing agreement, the dispute will be settled by arbitration.

ARTICLE 113.

Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the abolition of foreign post offices in Turkey.

SECTION II.
SANITARY QUESTIONS.
ARTICLE 114.

The Superior Council of Health of Constantinople is abolished. The Turkish Administration is entrusted with the sanitary organization of the coasts and frontiers of Turkey.

ARTICLE 115.

A single sanitary tariff, the dues and conditions of which shall be fair, shall be applied to all ships without distinction between the Turkish flag and foreign flags, and to nationals of foreign Powers under the same conditions as to nationals of Turkey.

ARTICLE 116.

Turkey undertakes to respect entirely the right of the sanitary employees whose services have been terminated to compensation to be appropriated out of the funds of the former Superior Council of Health of Constantinople, and all other rights acquired by employees or former employees of the Council, or their representatives. All questions relating to such rights, to the employment of the reserve funds of the former Superior Council of Health of Constantinople, or to the final liquidation of the former sanitary administration, as well as all other similar or cognate questions, shall be regulated by a Commission ad hoc which shall be composed of a representative of each of the Powers represented on the Superior Council of Health of Constantinople except Germany, Austria and Hungary. In the event of disagreement between the members of the said Commission on a question relating to the above-mentioned liquidation, or the employment of the funds remaining after the liquidation, every Power represented on the Commission shall have the right to bring the matter to the notice of the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE 117.

Turkey and those Powers which are interested in the supervision of the pilgrimages to Jerusalem and to the Hedjaz and the Hedjaz railway shall take such measures as are appropriate in accordance with the provisions of international sanitary conventions. With a view to ensuring complete uniformity in the execution of these measures, these Powers and Turkey shall constitute a Sanitary Coordination Commission for pilgrimages, on which the sanitary service of Turkey and the Maritime Sanitary and Quarantine Council of Egypt shall be represented.

This Commission must obtain the previous consent of the State on whose territory it holds its meeting.

ARTICLE 118.
Reports on the work of the Pilgrimage Coordination Commission shall be addressed to the Health Committee of the League of Nations and to the International Office of Public Health, and also to the Government of each country which is interested in pilgrimages and makes a request therefore. The Commission will give its opinion on every question put to it by the League of Nations, by the International Office of Public Health, or by the interested Governments.

Lausanne Treaty: Part V

PART V.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.
SECTION I.
PRISONERS OF WAR.
ARTICLE 119.

The High Contracting Parties agree to repatriate at once the prisoners of war and interned civilians who are still in their hands.

The exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians detained by Greece and Turkey respectively forms the subject of a separate agreement between those Powers signed at Lausanne on the 30th January, 1923.

ARTICLE 120.

Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated irrespective of the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting trial or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

ARTICLE 121.

The High Contracting Parties agree to give every facility in their respective territories for the search for the missing and the identification of prisoners of war and interned civilians who have expressed their desire not to be repatriated.

ARTICLE 122.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to restore on the coming into force of the present Treaty all articles, money, securities, documents and personal effects of every description which have belonged to prisoners of war or interned civilians and which have been retained.

ARTICLE 123.

The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all repayments of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war captured by their armies.

SECTION II.
GRAVES.
ARTICLE 124.
Without prejudice to the special provisions of Article 126 of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will cause to be respected and maintained within the territories under their authority the cemeteries, graves, ossuaries and memorials of soldiers and sailors who fell in action or died from wounds accident or disease since the 29th October, 1914, as well as of prisoners of war and interned civilians who died in captivity after that date.

The High Contracting Parties will agree to accord in their respective territories all necessary facilities to such Commissions as each Contracting Power may appoint for the purpose of the identification, registration and maintenance of the said cemeteries, ossuaries and graves, and the erection of memorials on their sites. Such Commissions shall not have any military character.

The High Contracting Parties reciprocally undertake, subject to the provisions of their national laws and the requirements of public health, to furnish each other every facility for giving effect to requests that the bodies of such soldiers and sailors may be transferred to their own country.

ARTICLE 125.

The High Contracting Parties further undertake to furnish each other:

(1) A complete list of prisoners of war and interned civilians who have died in captivity, together with all information tending towards their identification.

(2) All information as to the number and position of the graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

ARTICLE 126.

The maintenance of the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials of Turkish soldiers, sailors and prisoners of war who may have died on Romanian territory since the 27th August 1916, as well as all other obligations under Articles 124 and 125 regarding interned civilians, shall form the object of a special arrangement between the Romanian and the Turkish Governments.

ARTICLE 127.

In order to complete the general provisions included in Articles 124 and 125, the Governments of the British Empire, France and Italy on the one hand and the Turkish and Greek Governments on the other agree to the special provisions contained in Articles 128 to 136.

ARTICLE 128.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant to the Governments of the British Empire, France and Italy respectively and in perpetuity the land within the Turkish territory in which are situated the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries or memorials of their soldiers and sailors who fell in action or died of wounds, accident or disease, as well as those of prisoners of war and interned civilians who died in captivity.

The Turkish Government will also grant to those Governments the land which the Commissions provided for in Article 130 shall consider necessary for the establishment of cemeteries for the regrouping of graves, for ossuaries or memorials.
The Turkish Government undertakes further to give free access to these graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials, and if need be to authorize the construction of the necessary roads and pathways.

The Greek Government undertakes to fulfill the same obligations in so far as concerns its territory.

The above provisions shall not affect Turkish or Greek sovereignty over the land thus granted.

ARTICLE 129.

The land to be granted by the Turkish Government will include in particular, as regards the British Empire, the area in the region known as Anzac (Ari Burnu), which is shown on Map No. 3. [See Introduction.] The occupation of the above-mentioned area shall be subject to the following conditions:

(1) This area shall not be applied to any purpose other than that laid down in the present Treaty; consequently it shall not be utilized for any military or commercial object nor for any other object foreign to the purpose mentioned above;

(2) The Turkish Government shall, at all times, have the right to cause this area, including the cemeteries, to be inspected;

(3) The number of civil custodians appointed to look after the cemeteries shall not exceed one custodian to each cemetery. There shall not be any special custodians for the parts of the area lying outside the cemeteries;

(4) No dwelling houses may be erected in the area, either inside or outside the cemeteries, except such as are strictly necessary for the custodians;

(5) On the sea shore of the area no quay, jetty or wharfs may be built to facilitate the landing or embarkation of persons or goods;

(6) Such formalities as may be required may only be fulfilled on the coast inside the Straits and access to the area by the coast on the Aegean Sea shall only be permitted after these formalities have been fulfilled. The Turkish Government agrees that these formalities, which shall be as simple as possible, shall not be, without prejudice to the other stipulations of this Article, more onerous than those imposed on other foreigners entering Turkey, and that they should be fulfilled under conditions tending to avoid all unnecessary delay;

(7) Persons who desire to visit the area must not be armed, and the Turkish Government have the right to see to the enforcement of this strict prohibition;

(8) The Turkish Government must be informed at least a week in advance of the arrival of any party of visitors exceeding 150 persons.

ARTICLE 130.

Each of the British, French and Italian Governments shall appoint a commission, on which the Turkish and Greek Governments will appoint a representative, to which will be entrusted the duty of regulating on the spot questions affecting the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials. The duties of these commissions shall extend particularly to:
(1) the official recognition of the zones where burials have or may have already taken place and the registration of cemeteries, ossuaries, or memorials already existing;

(2) fixing the conditions in which, if necessary, graves may in future be concentrated, and deciding, in conjunction with the Turkish representative in Turkish territory and the Greek representative in Greek territory, the sites of the cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials still to be established, and defining the boundaries of these sites in such a way as shall restrict the land to be occupied within the limits indispensable for the purpose;

(3) communicating to the Turkish and Greek Governments in the name of the respective Governments a final plan of their graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials, whether already established or to be established.

ARTICLE 131.

The Government in whose favor the grant is made undertakes not to employ the land nor to allow it to be employed for any purpose other than that to which it is dedicated. If this land is situated on the coast, the shore may not be employed by the concessionary Government for any military, marine or commercial purpose of whatever nature. The sites of graves and cemeteries which may no longer be used for that purpose and which are not used for the erection of memorials shall be returned to the Turkish or Greek Government.

ARTICLE 132.

Any necessary legislative or administrative measures for the grant to the British, French and Italian Governments respectively of full, exclusive and perpetual use of the land referred to in Articles 128 to 130 shall be taken by the Turkish Government and Greek Government respectively within six months of the date of the notification to be made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 130. If any compulsory acquisition of the land is necessary, it will be effected by and at the cost of the Turkish Government or the Greek Government, as the case may be.

ARTICLE 133.

The British, French and Italian Governments may respectively entrust to such organizations as each of them may deem fit the establishment, arrangement and maintenance of the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials of their nationals. These organizations shall have no military character. They alone shall have the right to undertake the exhumation or removal of bodies necessary for the concentration of graves and establishment of cemeteries and ossuaries, as well as the exhumation and removal of such bodies as the Governments to whom the grant of land is made shall deem it necessary to transfer to their own country.

ARTICLE 134.

The British, French and Italian Governments shall have the right to entrust the maintenance of their graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials in Turkey to custodians appointed from among their own nationals. These custodians shall be recognized by the Turkish authorities and shall receive from them every assistance necessary for the safeguard and protection of these graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials. The custodians shall have no military character, but may be armed for their personal defense with a revolver or automatic pistol.
ARTICLE 135.

The land referred to in Articles 128 to 131 shall not be subjected by Turkey or the Turkish authorities, or by Greece or the Greek authorities, as the case may be, to any form of rent or taxation. Representatives of the British, French or Italian Governments as well as persons desirous of visiting the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials, shall at all times have free access thereto. The Turkish Government and the Greek Government respectively undertake to maintain in perpetuity the roads leading to the said land.

The Turkish Government and the Greek Government respectively undertake to afford to the British, French and Italian Governments all necessary facilities for obtaining a sufficient water supply for the requirements of the staff engaged in the maintenance or protection of the said graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials, and for the irrigation of the land.

ARTICLE 136.

The British, French and Italian Governments undertake to accord to the Turkish Government the benefits of the provisions contained in Articles 128 and 130 to 135 of the present Treaty for the establishment of graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials of Turkish soldiers and sailors existing on the territories under their authority, including the territories detached from Turkey.

SECTION III.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.

ARTICLE 137.

Subject to any agreements concluded between the High Contracting Parties, the decisions taken and orders issued since the 30th October, 1918, until the coming into force of the present Treaty, by or in agreement with the authorities of the Powers who have occupied Constantinople, and concerning the property, rights and interests of their nationals, of foreigners or of Turkish nationals, and the relations of such persons with the authorities of Turkey, shall be regarded as definitive and shall give rise to no claims against the Powers or their authority.

All other claims arising from injury suffered in consequence of any such decisions or orders shall be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

ARTICLE 138.

In judicial matters, the decisions given and orders issued in Turkey from the 30th October, 1918, until the coming into force of the present Treaty by all judges, courts or authorities of the Powers who have occupied Constantinople, or by the Provisional Mixed Judicial Commission established on the 8th December, 1921, as well as the measures taken in execution of such decisions or orders, shall be regarded as definitive, without prejudice, however, to the terms of paragraphs IV and VI of the Amnesty Declaration dated this day.

Nevertheless, in the event of a claim being presented by a private person in respect of damage suffered by him in consequence of a judicial decision in favor of another private person given in a civil matter by a military or police court, this claim shall be brought before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, which may in a proper case, order the payment of compensation or even restitution of the property in question.

ARTICLE 139.
Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents of every kind relating to the civil, judicial or financial administration, or the administration of Wakfs, which are at present in Turkey and are only of interest to the Government of a territory detached from the Ottoman Empire, and reciprocally those in a territory detached from the Ottoman Empire which are only of interest to the Turkish Government, shall reciprocally be restored.

Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents mentioned above which are considered by the Government in whose possession they are as being also of interest to itself, may be retained by that Government, subject to its furnishing on request photographs or certified copies to the Government concerned.

Archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents which have been taken away either from Turkey or from detached territories shall reciprocally be restored in original, in so far as they concern exclusively the territories from which they have been taken.

The expense entailed by these operations shall be paid by the Government applying therefore.

The above stipulations apply in the same manner to the registers relating to real estates or Wakfs in the districts of the former Ottoman Empire transferred to Greece after 1912.

**ARTICLE 140.**

Prizes made during the war between Turkey and the other Contracting Powers prior to the 30th October, 1918, shall give rise to no claim on either side. The same shall apply to seizures effected after that date, for violation of the armistice, by the Powers who have occupied Constantinople.

It is understood that no claim shall be made, either by the Governments of the Powers who have occupied Constantinople or their nationals, or by the Turkish Government or its nationals, respecting small craft of all kinds, vessels of light tonnage, yachts and lighters which any of the said Governments may, between the 29th October, 1914, until the 1st January, 1923, have disposed of in their own harbors or in harbors occupied by them. Nevertheless, this stipulation does not prejudice the terms of paragraph VI of the Amnesty Declaration dated this day, nor the claims which private persons may be able to establish against other private persons in virtue of rights held before the 29th October, 1914.

Vessels under the Turkish flag seized by the Greek forces after the 30th October, 1918, shall be restored to Turkey.

**ARTICLE 141.**

In accordance with Article 25 of the present Treaty, Articles 155, 250 and 440 and Annex III, Part VIII (Reparation) of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, dated the 28th June, 1919, the Turkish Government and its nationals are released from any liability to the German Government or to its nationals in respect of German vessels which were the object during the war of a transfer by the German Government or its nationals to the Ottoman Government or its nationals without the consent of the Allied Governments, and at present in the possession of the latter.

The same shall apply, if necessary, in the relations between Turkey and the other Powers which fought on her side.
ARTICLE 142.

The separate Convention concluded on the 30th January, 1923, between Greece and Turkey, relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations, will have as between these two High Contracting Parties the same force and effect as if it formed part of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 143.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited at Paris.

The Japanese Government will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris when their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

Each of the Signatory Powers will ratify by one single instrument the present Treaty and the other instruments signed by it and mentioned in the Final Act of the Conference of Lausanne, in so far as these require ratification.

A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications shall be drawn up as soon as Turkey, on the one hand, and the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, or any three of them, on the other hand, have deposited the instruments of their ratifications.

From the date of this first procès-verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have thus ratified it. Thereafter it will come into force for the other Powers at the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

As between Greece and Turkey, however, the provisions of Articles 1, 2 (2) and 5-11 inclusive will come into force as soon as the Greek and Turkish Governments have deposited the instruments of their ratifications, even if at that time the procès-verbal referred to above has not yet been drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbaux of the deposit of ratifications.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Lausanne, the 24th July, 1923, in a single copy, which will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the Contracting Powers.

(L.S.) HORACE RUMBOLD.
(L.S.) PELLE.
(L.S.) GARRONI.
(L.S.) G. C. MONTAGNA.
(L.S.) K. OTCHIAI.
(L.S.) E. K. VENISELOS.
(L.S.) D. CAACLAMANOS.
(L.S.) CONSt. DIAMANDY.
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