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Volume 7 Number 1 Winter 1981
A Sociovidistic Approach to Children's Filmmaking: The Philadelphia Project
Richard Chalfen

Introduction
During the summer of 1966 I had the good fortune to work as a research assistant to Sol Worth and John Adair on their National Science Foundation project entitled "The Use of Film in Cross-Cultural Communications." During that time I had the rare opportunity of introducing filmmaking technology to selected members of non-Western society—the Navajo—and, subsequently, to observe the production of six Navajo-made documentary films. Impressed by the unexplored research potential of this approach, I began to organize a sequence of film communication projects in Philadelphia. Between 1967 and 1979 I worked with eight groups of lower- and middle-class teenagers, a women’s liberation group, a politically active lesbian group, a sample of middle-class home moviemakers, and most recently, a sample of Polavision users.

In 1970 Sol and John asked me to write a report of comparative research findings for inclusion in their book on the Navajo Project. That paper, originally entitled “Socio-Documentary Filmmaking in an Urban Setting,” appeared as Chapter 15 in Through Navajo Eyes—An Exploration in Film Communication and Anthropology (1972). The purpose of that chapter was, first, to provide comparative data on utilizing a particular research method grounded in ethnographic and participant observation techniques; and, second, to compare examples of film communication across several groups of teenagers from different sociocultural backgrounds. The need arose to explain how Worth’s “bio-documentary” techniques—originally developed from work with graduate students enrolled in a documentary film workshop (Worth 1963, 1965) and later used in the Navajo Project—could be applied to groups of teenage novice filmmakers. In addition further evidence was sought regarding the speculation that the first use of 16mm filmmaking technology neutralized different social and cultural variables in the production of filmic symbolic forms.

The following article is intended as a clarification, expansion, and updating of several points made in Through Navajo Eyes.

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Literature on Children’s Filmmaking
In 1972 we reported an enormous growth in the frequency and variety of teenage filmmaking projects across the country. Settings for these projects include elementary schools, high schools, storefront centers, settlement houses, church clubs, various workshops, mental health clinics, art centers, detention homes, and jails, among others. Given this diversity in settings, we also find considerable variety in teaching techniques, in relationships between adults as instructors and young people as students and in the motivations, objectives, expectations, and rewards of different personnel.

In a recent review of the literature on children’s filmmaking, Aristarco (1980) outlines three predominant categories of activity. A variety of reports have been published on filmmaking projects in primary and secondary schools (e.g., Brasso 1974; Carrico 1969; Cukin 1966; Hilton 1973; Hodgkinson 1964; Kohl 1975; Reinecke 1974). Another collection of publications reports on movies made by workshops and film clubs in different communities and neighborhoods (e.g., Anderson 1969; Bigby 1968; Larson 1966, 1969; Lidstone and McIntosh 1970; Peavy 1969; Robbin 1966). A third category of writing describes films produced as part of structured research projects (e.g., Achtenberg 1967; Chalfen 1974; Chalfen and Haley 1971; Norlin 1966; Sutton-Smith 1977, 1979; Evans et al. 1979).

Two characteristics of this literature limit the possibilities of its use in communications research. There appears to be a reluctance for or disinterest in writing detailed reports of individual projects—successful ones as well as unsuccessful ones—that include descriptive information on social and cultural context. Second, few observers attempt to concentrate on similarities and/or differences in filmmaking experiences and films produced by similar or different groups of teenagers. Generalizations regarding all teenagers are more common than comparative statements. In short, interesting research questions regarding the production of symbolic forms in differing sociocultural contexts have been generally ignored. Interest in the successful production of teenage movies has eclipsed any sustained inquiry into how film works as a mode of film communication for young people.

With these general limitations in mind, I want to include several unusual comments that relate to the research described in this article. Several reports contain insightful hints of social and cultural variation in the production and interpretation of teenage-made films. In one, John Bigby described the results of a third-grade teacher who had her students use cameras in Harlem in 1965:

The thing I can’t forget about those movies, made by eight-year-old black children, is their awful vision... I remember crossed steel everywhere. The folding gates across store windows, the metal fences around the schoolyards... the physical barriers everywhere... Those Harlem filmmakers showed me, in flickering images on the wall of a real slum
school with real rats, why I was afraid... I keep wondering what over-privileged kids could see with an 8mm camera. [1968:20-21]

David Mallery in his chapter on "The Young Film Makers Explosion" says that some people seeing films made by young people were:

impressed by how technically polished they were. Others spoke of the creativity, imagination, and reflection of young people's background, personalities and concerns shown in the films and in the conversations [about the films]. Still others worried over a kind of "we"-and-"they" division between middle-class students with their film and the slum students with theirs. [1968:23]

Mallery goes on to say parenthetically:

There continues to be a lot of talk and study about some of the noticeable differences in the action, subject matter, and the styles of the films made by young people in the ghettos and those made in the "advantaged" schools and areas. [Ibid.]

However, in spite of the fact that Mallery mentions this "interest and study," he gives no reference to any such work in what is otherwise a well documented and referenced publication.

In two separate newspaper reports of Rodger Larson's work with the "Movie Bus" on the Lower East Side of New York, a correlation is suggested between the class or the socioeconomic status of the filmmakers and the films they produce. Larson is quoted as saying:

The films that come out of poor areas are often about fights... In the middle class, they're very narcissistic: at fifteen or sixteen if a girl makes a film the camera lingers lovingly on a girl; if a boy is behind the camera the camera lingers lovingly on a boy. And the upper class, those films aren't about people; they're abstract, the people are symbols. [Roddick 1967:2]

But again there was no comparative follow-up to these observations. And in another write-up of the University Settlement House work with Larson:

The teenagers at Montefiore are mostly middle class on the economic scale, some decidedly upperclass, and the concerns and interests differ markedly, naturally enough, from those of the University Settlement group. Here again the film titles—"Only a Dream"; "Yesterday's"; "Arabesque"—are indicative of the content, in these cases more introspective and hooked on "poetic" images than their counterparts downtown. [O'Connor 1967]

In another brief article about films made in primary and secondary schools, Paul Carrico remarks that in "inner-city schools they [student-made films] tend to be about people interacting with other people. Affluent students make more abstract films replete with alienation and protest" (1969:16).

Infrequent observations of this kind beg many important questions relevant to a sociocultural approach to communication research. The need arises to examine carefully how film communication is organized and works for different groups of people. If adolescents are making different kinds of film that are provoking positive and negative reactions, can any generalizations be made to account for the likes and dislikes, the similarities and dissimilarities? Are different patterns of film communication involved? What are the different groups relating to, and reacting to, when asked to see and evaluate a film? Are non-overlapping social contexts involving class, race, and sex structuring the production and interpretation of the film communication? Exploration of these questions is facilitated by using a structured plan of observation described in the following pages.

A Sociovidistic Perspective

Several instructive differences exist between the way Worth and Adair chose to discuss the Navajo materials and the methods of description and analysis operationalized for the Philadelphia research. Both projects utilized a codes-in-context approach to visual communication (Worth and Adair 1972:139, 233). While Worth emphasized the level of film code (especially observed encoding habits and conventions), I explored the use of a structured approach to code context. This difference is better understood by clarifying and comparing notions of "vidistics" and "sociovidistics."

In 1966, while reviewing the problematic conceptualization and status of film as "language," Worth proposed the notion of vidistics:

Vidistics in this early state is concerned, first, with the determination and description of those visual elements relevant to the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with the determination of the rules, laws and logic of visual relationship that help a viewer to infer meaning from an Image-Event, and the interaction of Image-Events in sequence. Film as if it were language, as studied vidistically, is thus thought of as the study of specified elements, elements in sequence, operations on those elements, and cognitive representations of them that act as a mediating agent in a communications process between human beings—between a filmmaker and a viewer—between a creator and a re-creator. [1966:331]
It is apparent that Worth used a vidistic formulation when he organized the Navajo Project and when he analyzed the results: "We have decided to build our analysis around a presentation of differences between our films and the Navajo films on the level of code" (1972:141; emphasis added). Worth concentrated on several vidistic elements: (1) narrative style, (2) syntactic organization and "sequencing of events and units of eventing," (3) cultural, perceptual, and cognitive restrictions influencing organization and structure, and (4) relationships between film structure and verbal language structure (1972:140). Thus a continuity was maintained that emphasized encoding and decoding as cognitive activity, rule-like sequence of visual units, and speculative relationships between culturally structured communicative codes.

Whereas Worth found cognitive and syntactic features of the code most fruitful for comparative analysis, research described in this report stresses the social-dimensions of the vidistic formulation, hence the term "sociovidistics." Sociovidistics is understood as the systematic description and analysis of visual (pictorial) symbolic forms as embedded in a process of social communication. Sociovidistics suggests that the production, use, and interpretation of pictorial forms is studied as a social process, operating in social contexts—a process that is determined by, and identified as, culturally structured behavior. Borrowing from Byers and Worth, sociovidistics studies the entire cultural enterprise of people constructing and producing pictorial forms, becoming symbolically represented in pictorial forms, and using, viewing, and interpreting pictorial forms. Furthermore, specific attention is given to the social and psychological functions related to code use and to the dynamics of implication and inference that operate between image-makers and image-viewers.

The thrust of reformulating certain vidistic principles was to clarify how specific contextual features constitute a useful model of description and analysis of filmmaking activity—activity that constitutes film as a symbolic form of visual communication. Sociovidistic theory implicitly asserts that the patterning of pictorial forms of visual communication must go beyond discovering laws of "grammar" or conventions of syntactic structure to understand the relationship of pictorial imagery to social life. While sociovidistics has been suggested as a term for an area of research that integrates concerns in vidistics, visual communication, and cultural anthropology, the "ethnography of pictorial communication" designates a particular mode of inquiry devoted to explicating the patterned organization of pictorial and sociocultural domains.

A sociovidistic scheme of description serves as a guide for doing ethnographies of pictorial (in this case, film) communication. By use of ongoing research in sociolinguistics, specifically the ethnography of speaking (Hymes 1964, 1972), parallels were developed between speech events and film communication events. In the latter it becomes necessary to study four kinds of events: (1) planning events, (2) filming events (which necessarily include the two subcategories of "on-camera" events and "behind-camera" events), (3) editing events, and (4) exhibition events. In turn, each of these communication events should be cross-referenced with a series of "components." Whereas Hymes has suggested as many as sixteen components relevant to speech events (1972:58-65), only five have proved useful for film communication: (1) participants, (2) topics, (3) settings, (4) message form, and (5) code. Cross-referencing these events and components produces a type of sociovidistic etic grid (Chalfen 1974:10-16). Formulation and use of this grid force a recognition and consideration of relationships between contextual features that otherwise remain unproblematic. The sociovidistic framework provides a means of producing systematic descriptions and comparisons of visual communication—across a variety of pictorial forms, across different photographic and filmic genres, and across production and use of images in different cultures. Specific examples of how this framework can be applied to children's "sociodocumentary" filmmaking is the subject of the following pages.

The Philadelphia Project: Sociodocumentary Research Design

The research was designed, in part, to be compatible with previous fieldwork by Worth and Adair (1972) and with similar efforts by Worth and his students (1964, 1965; Achtenberg 1967). The basic similarity of these projects is that research subjects were taught, observed, and interviewed as they produced 16mm films about themselves for the first time. Care was taken to standardize procedures and specify research conditions to facilitate future studies for additional comparative findings.

Subjects for the project were selected according to a pattern of social characteristics. Eight groups of five 14- to 16-year-olds were invited "to make a movie." Although each group came from different neighborhoods, all subjects lived within the city limits of Philadelphia. Each group was a "natural" group—members were neighborhood friends who socialized together for various leisure activities. In addition, all the selected groups had easy access to one of the buildings of the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic. Since groups of people were making a film together, the term "sociodocumentary" has been used instead of "bio-documentary" (Worth and Adair 1972:231-232).
Initially I attempted to contact a sample of subjectgroups that conformed to a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ experimental paradigm. Using independent variables of social class, ethnicity, and sex, I wanted to compare the filmmaking behavior of middle-class vs. lower-class teenagers, blacks vs. whites, and males vs. females. However, not all the required groups could be contacted.

**Observational Methods and Technical Specifications**

Data on events, activities, and behavior occurring as part of each filmmaking project was recorded by several methods. (1) A written journal of relevant observations was maintained for each project. (2) Tape recordings were made of nearly all 225 sessions and have subsequently been totally or selectively transcribed. (3) 35mm black-and-white still photographs were regularly taken at different phases of each group's project. (4) A film log was organized to record each piece of film shot by each subject in each project; thus each shot was identified and cataloged by cameraman, description of content, length and type of shot, and so on. (5) In addition, 35mm black-and-white still negatives and prints were made from representative 16mm frames of each practice shot made by each filmmaking group. Contact sheets of these negatives were then inserted into the film log for further identification.

All the sociodocumentary filmmakers worked with the same pieces of professional 16mm filmmaking equipment. All subjects used Bell and Howell Filmo 70 DH and DR triple lens turret cameras equipped with Angenieux lenses of 75mm, 25mm, and 10mm focal length; Norwood Seconic light meters and a Quick Set tripod. A 50-foot tape measure was available for correct focus settings. All the filmmakers used the same equipment to edit their 16mm workprints, specifically, Griswold splicers, Zeiss Moviscop viewers, and Moviola rewinds. Sound recordings were made on ¼-inch magnetic tape with a Sony 800 recorder. The black-and-white film stock was a standard Kodak Plus X (ASA 125) and 4X (ASA 500) negative film. Film processing was done in both New York and Philadelphia laboratories, thereby facilitating the return of rushes in less than a week. All filmmaking subjects also learned to use a Kodak Pageant projector to screen their rushes and edited workprints.

**The Emergence of Three Sociodidactic Patterns**

When the results of the eight sociodocumentary film projects were examined by use of the sociodidactic framework, three distinct patterns of behavior emerged. Two of these patterns will be described as 'stable' and one as 'unstable.' Summaries of the films produced by each group are given in the Appendix.

Patterns of filmmaking behavior were labeled stable when subjects appeared to develop a consistent strategy for making a movie. The filmmakers, as a group, maintained a similar and consistent way of working throughout the moviemaking process. They reported consistent attitudes toward shooting, editing, and showing their films. These filmmakers seldom changed their choices of appropriate subject matter from their initial practice footage through the completion of the project.

**Introductory Procedures**

All subjects were introduced to sociodocumentary filmmaking in the same manner. Identical instructions, methods, and equipment were used with each participating group. The standardized schedule of activities and operating procedures consisted of four sections: (1) introductory/practice sessions, (2) film planning sessions, (3) film production sessions, which included filming and editing, and (4) film exhibition sessions.

The first section consisted of seven meetings which were more standardized than the others. According to a verbal contract-agreement each group was invited to learn 16mm filmmaking and produce a movie on any topic of their choosing in exchange for letting us (in this case, Jay Haley and myself) do research on their filmmaking behavior. As a group they had to choose (1) what the film was about, (2) where to shoot (any location was permissible within a 15-minute driving radius of our regular meeting place), (3) who (if anyone) and/or what (if anything) was to be in the film, (4) the production personnel, (5) the length, and (6) an appropriate sound track. Each subject was required to have a parent sign a legally drawn release form for their participation either in a movie or in the making of a movie.

The first seven sessions were devoted to introducing the general idea of the project, to demonstrating the filmmaking equipment, having subjects practice their filming in both indoor and outdoor conditions, viewing practice rushes, and discussing ideas for their film. At the conclusion of the seventh session the group was informed that they could start their cooperative production whenever they felt ready. Subjects were reminded that their film was to be a cooperative effort; group agreements were important. They understood that I could help only with technical matters. A time limit of 6 months was stressed.

According to the research design, the second and third sections of the project began after the seventh session. The group worked at conceiving, developing, or changing their film ideas, shooting film, viewing rushes, editing, and recording a sound track.

When the group agreed that their film was complete, there was a recess in the regular meeting schedule while the film laboratories made A and B rolls, transferred the sound to an optical track, and made the first answer print. The filmmaking group was then reconvened for the fourth set of sessions which consisted of screening their finished film and viewing other project-made films.
### Table 1
**Tabular Summary of Filmmaking Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Number</th>
<th>Stable Pattern I</th>
<th>Stable Pattern II</th>
<th>Stable Pattern III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sessions in Each Project</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Sessions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filming Sessions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing Sessions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibiting Sessions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice Footage</td>
<td>200'</td>
<td>200'</td>
<td>300'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Footage</td>
<td>600'</td>
<td>700'</td>
<td>300'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Final Film (min./sec.)</td>
<td>478'</td>
<td>271'</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting Ratio</td>
<td>1:1.3</td>
<td>1:1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2
**Comparative Times (Number of Sessions) Devoted to Each Event by Each Film Group**

**Stable Pattern I**
- Group 1
- Group 2
- Group 3

**Stable Pattern II**
- Group 4
- Group 5

**Unstable Pattern III**
- Group 6
- Group 7
- Group 8

*Completed practice footage only*
In contrast, the unstable pattern is characterized by "shifting behavior." Behavioral shifts occurred in several ways: filmmaking subjects drastically changed their choices of appropriate subject matter or camera technique after they viewed their practice rushes. In another instance, the filmmakers might decide to start over after filming several hundred feet of film. Examples of other inconsistencies were observed more frequently in the filmmaking of the unstable groups than the stable ones.

Characteristics of Stable Pattern I (SP I) emerged from three projects comprised of black lower-class groups—one group consisted of all girls, two groups, all boys (groups 1, 2, and 3 in Tables 1 and 2). In marked contrast, characteristics defining Stable Pattern II (SP II) developed from observations and analysis of two white middle-class groups—one male, the other female (groups 4 and 5 in Tables 1 and 2). In contradistinction to these two stable yet contrasting patterns, an Unstable Pattern (USP III) of sociodidactic behavior emerged from three other groups in the project (groups 6, 7 and 8 in Tables 1 and 2). Subjects in this third pattern came from black middle-class and white lower-class backgrounds.

A summary of quantitative data associated with each sociodidactic pattern and each filmmaking group appears in Table 1. A schematic representation of comparative event activity is found in Table 2. Discussion of selected points in Tables 1 and 2 and descriptive summaries of SP I and SP II will be presented next. Characteristics of Unstable Pattern III will be described later.

**Stable Pattern I: Characteristics of Black Lower-Class Filmmaking**

(a) Stable Pattern I is characterized by devoting more time to planning than any other event. During the planning sessions, group members tended to ask more questions related to social aspects of the project than to technical (camera-related) ones. In addition, many topics other than filmmaking were discussed. Members of SP I groups found it difficult to mutually agree on any single film idea during their planning sessions. One idea was accepted by the group after one member wrote an outline or script for a film.

(b) Stable Pattern I filmmakers tried to finish planning their movies before they did any filming. Planning for SP I groups included a lot of preparation for shooting, such as deciding who would be allowed to act in specific roles, who could watch their filmmaking, what everybody should wear, how a room (or set) should be decorated, and similar questions.

(c) The second most time-consuming event, and the event of most interest to SP I filmmakers, was filming. Members of these groups spent more time filming than either editing or exhibiting.

(d) The filming emphasis for these groups was on their on-camera rather than behind-camera activity. They competed for on-camera appearances, which usually took the form of acting in short sequences, scenes, or skits. Their acted performances were often rehearsed and often directed by the author of the script. For groups in SP I, making a movie meant being-aware, a movie. They tended to deemphasize behind-camera activity.

(e) In addition, the SP I groups shot much less film than other groups. They tried to photograph their subject matter only once and to shoot their film in the order prescribed by the scripted story line. Members of these groups tended not to experiment with the filmmaking equipment.

(f) Stable Pattern I groups did not like to edit their footage. They spent less time in editing than in planning or filming. One or two of the group members (in contrast to other patterns described below) did most of the cutting and splicing which was predetermined by the shooting plan and the story line.

(g) Exhibition events in Stable Pattern I received the least amount of attention.

In characterizing the components of Stable Pattern I, participants will be described first. These filmmakers were self-selected from larger social groupings (gangs and clubs), and the groups tended to enlarge beyond a five-member group as the project progressed. However, the general behavior of the participants changed in different events. For instance, all group members tried to participate equally when they were being filmed (on-camera activity). However, individual group members had to perform tasks related to planning, behind-camera filming, and editing.

In addition, SP I members generally insisted on having certain contemporary "familiars" involved in their film and filmmaking; only their group members and selected friends, who temporarily joined their extended group, could be in their movie. Non-group-affiliated people and strangers were kept out of their footage. They also chose audiences of familiar people to see their films.

Stable Pattern I groups selected local and familiar settings for their films. They preferred to film in places where they were known (but not in their own homes) and in places where they frequently socialized. SP I filmmakers consistently selected familiar urban-residential environments as shooting locations. These filmmakers consistently filmed topics, themes, and activities that involved showing themselves doing the familiar things that they liked to do on a day-to-day basis. A regularly recurring set of activities included acted skits of fighting, drinking, dancing, forms of competition, and sports activity.
In terms of message form, SP I subjects preferred to work from a script (girls more than boys) and to record realistic and familiar versions of common events in their lives. Their films contained a story line which consisted of short episodes with distinguishable or logical beginnings and ends. These films take their forms from theater and their content from street life. SP I filmmakers preferred to make films as visual records that documented and glorified their lifestyles.

Code characteristics of the Stable Pattern I groups deemphasized the manipulation of cinematic units. Most of their original footage remained unedited in their finished films. Sequences of action contained few cuts, and there was a minimal amount of time and space manipulation or alteration. These filmmakers wanted sound and image to match and hence they attempted sync-sound filming. Finally, these films were characterized by very low shooting ratios.

The following photographs have been taken from individual frames of 16 mm film shot during practice sessions.

**Illustrations 1-12**

Fighting, dancing, smoking, and drinking were chosen as high-priority activities for on-camera performance by SP I groups. In all of these examples, the teenagers chose to film themselves, resulting in a meta-message of "look-at-me." In contrast, neither of the white middle-class groups selected these kinds of on-camera topics.

1. Scenes of the filmmakers fighting with one another appeared in practice and final films made by all three SP I groups—male and female.

2. Related to fighting ability, demonstrations of strength—specifically muscle-flexing—were filmed by members of Group 2 (females) and Group 3 (males).
The two male SP I groups (Groups 1 and 3) enthusiastically filmed long scenes of themselves in several types of sports activity. Scenes included football, basketball, track events, and Ping-Pong. Competition between group members both for athletic superiority and for the best on-camera performance were very common. In contrast, neither SP II group filmed sports activity, though the female group shot scenes of a football game between teams from the police department and a local rock radio station.

Some form of dancing was filmed by all three SP I groups. Importance was given to "center stage" performance and the demonstration of dance style.
Demonstration of smoking style was another form of favored on-camera activity. Smoking appeared as another informal kind of competition between group members.

Drinking and acting drunk played central roles in both final films produced by SP I groups. Scenes of group drinking were closely tied to partying and fighting. In contrast, these activities were absent from SP II-made films.

When SP I filmmaking groups had to decide where they wanted to shoot their practice films, they immediately chose a familiar neighborhood environment. Graffiti-covered walls in these areas often included names of the filmmakers. In contrast, the SP II groups preferred simply to shoot their films where they regularly met.
Stable Pattern II: Characteristics of White Middle-Class Filmmaking

(a) Stable Pattern II filmmakers spent nearly equal amounts of time in planning, filming, and editing. Their planning was characterized by lengthy and "heavy" discussions and controlled arguments regarding ways to make a movie. They tended to ask a lot of technical questions on the potential and limitations of the filmmaking equipment. Members of these groups found it difficult to settle on one idea for their film during their planning sessions. They preferred not to let one group member decide what the film would be about. SP II filmmakers were hesitant to commit themselves to one idea in any kind of written form.

(b) Stable Pattern II groups were very anxious to begin shooting; they did not feel that their films had to be completely outlined before beginning to use the cameras.

(c) For these filmmakers, less time was spent in filming than in either planning or editing.

(d) Stable Pattern II filming events were characterized by an avoidance of on-camera appearances. These filmmakers seldom put themselves in the movie. The majority of their filming attention was paid to behind-camera activity; they competed for use of the camera and sought praise for getting the "neatest" shots. SP II filmmakers emphasized testing the abilities of the camera and attended to image composition much more than any of the other groups. For groups in SP II, making a movie meant conceiving, shooting, and editing the movie and not being in the movie. They tended to deemphasize on-camera activity.

(e) In addition, the SP II groups tended to shoot much more film than SP I groups. These filmmakers tended to shoot a lot of film of the same subject matter, knowing that anything could be eliminated; they looked forward to the editing process.

(f) In Stable Pattern II, editing was treated as a very important event. There was a sense that this is where films were really made. Cutting and splicing was done by each group member in equal amounts. Slightly more time was spent in editing than filming and slightly less time than planning.

(g) Stable Patterns I and II are similar in that exhibition events received the least amount of attention.

In characterizing the components of Stable Pattern II, further contrast is seen to the behavior pattern outlined for Stable Pattern I. In terms of participants, the size of the SP II groups remained constant at four members instead of enlarging beyond five people.

None of these subjects were members of larger groups such as neighborhood gangs or social clubs. All group members generally contributed equally to planning, behind-camera filming, and editing events. On-camera appearances by these filmmakers were very infrequent and much shorter than performances in Stable Pattern I. When these groups needed people in their films, they readily filmed strangers. In exhibition events, these filmmakers preferred audiences of strangers who would objectively evaluate their films rather than audiences of familiar friends and relatives.

Stable Pattern II filmmakers selected primarily rural and nonresidential settings within the urban confines of the project. They displayed no desire to produce their film in local and/or familiar settings. Filming provided an impetus to visit and explore new locations.

Topics, themes, and activities selected by these groups usually involved nature, animal life, and, in some cases, inanimate objects. A recurring set of topics included sunlit leaves, branches, trees, birds, rivers or streams, and the like. SP II subjects never filmed themselves doing what they would "naturally" do. Their film themes involved their feelings about some subject of personal concern.

In terms of a message form, there was some reluctance to outline their film on paper (boys more than girls). There was no urgency in this matter since they felt that the film could be "made" in their editing sessions. SP II filmmakers gave little thought to the need for a storyline. Visually, the films contained few logical or distinguishable beginnings or ends. These filmmakers emphasized producing an original form for their movie; they preferred to make a film as visual art, that is, as an aesthetically pleasing, original, and intellectual statement.

Code characteristics of SP II movies included a lot of shot manipulation and frequent editing. These films contain many jump cuts, unnatural time and space juxtapositions, and sound tracks that are relatively independent of their visual tracks. High shooting ratios also characterize these movies.
Comparative Analysis of Event-Component Relationships

Having stated the existence of two distinct and contrasting stable patterns (and before describing the unstable pattern), we can now examine sources and details of these findings. Specific examples of qualitative data will be explained using the sociovidistic framework of communication events and components. The richest sources of data are found in the pattern of X-marked cells in Table 3.

Ideally each of these important cells (relationships) would be examined for further similarities and differences that constitute the sociovidistic patterns under discussion. For the purpose of this abbreviated report, however, only examples of selected relationships will be discussed. Since both subcategories of Filming Events have emerged as very important events, being significantly related to four out of five components, the following discussion will be limited to these relationships.

In the following analysis no attempt will be made to isolate the importance of individual sociocultural variables. Groups of varying sociocultural composition were used in part to provide a variety of examples of a film communication process. Data collected from this research simply do not bear the weight of a more rigorous analysis of individual variables such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and/or sex.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filming on-camera</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filming behind-camera</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibiting</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Description, comparison and analysis of data comprising cell numbers 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, and 19 can be found in Chapter 7 of Film as Visual Communication: A Sociovidistic Study of Filmmaking (Chalfen 1974).
Frames taken from the practice films made by the white middle-class girls' group show a marked avoidance of human activity. More attention is given to image composition and finding unusual views, which, in turn, constitutes a "look-at-me-see" perspective. Scenes of nature and objects became important parts of their final film entitled *God*.

When the SP II girls filmed people (only occasionally themselves) they would keep a person surrounded by scenery. The relationship of the person to the environment was more important than just the appearance of the person. In addition, they liked to film unknown people who were unaware of being photographed.
Illustrations 21-28
The other SP II group (white middle-class males) demonstrated a similar pattern of choices when making their outside practice films.

21-24 Scenes from nature, architectural elements, and "interesting" objects were favorite on-camera subject matter. Scenes similar to these play an important role in their final film, entitled WPGF-M1. In contrast, SP I filmmakers never considered any of these topics.
In conjunction with finding unusual views, SP II teenagers sought to create unusual views by testing and manipulating the abilities of the camera. Shooting with the camera on an angle or changing the speed of the motor was done by both SP II groups in both practice and final films. In contrast, SP I groups were more interested in "straight" views.

In most of the SP II practice footage, people tend to appear very small within the overall frame; backs of people are as likely to be seen as fronts. In contrast to the SP I results, the filmmakers are never seen as a group in the film. In the male SP II film we again see a person set in a particular environment. This contrasts with the SP I tendency to concentrate on just the person.
Filming as a Communication Event

As previously suggested, Filming as an event is too large a unit to work with. To report that a group emphasized "filming" ignores characteristics that potentially distinguish examples of a film communication process. Subcategories of "on-camera filming" and "behind-camera filming" immediately become relevant.

Stable Pattern I groups emphasized both the planning and the on-camera division of filming, whereas Stable Pattern II groups much preferred behind-camera filming activity as well as editing. SP I and SP II groups consistently emphasize different events in the film communication process. The recurrence and significant implications of this finding shall be discussed frequently in this analysis.

Further clarification and differentiation of filming behaviors associated with on-camera and behind-camera events are outlined in Figures 1 and 2.

The non-overlapping patterns of behaviors illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are most striking and perhaps most significant in establishing two stable but different sociovidistic patterns. The on-camera/behind-camera distinction highlights a series of differences that are masked when we merely study "filming." To say that one group likes filming more than another raises more questions than it answers. "Wanting to make a movie" can mean different things to different people; the distinction and associated findings illustrate this point quite well.

By preferring to be and, in some cases, insisting on being on-camera, subjects are expressing a need to be the symbolic material of a filmic communication; emphasis is placed on using one's physical self to encode information. To be on-camera means that images of one's physical self will directly be the center of attention and discussion at a later time. Value is placed on how well one manipulates one's on-camera presentation as the visually symbolic material.

---

Figure 1
On-Camera Filming Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SP I</th>
<th>SP II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attention and desire to perform on-camera</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Need for rehearsals</td>
<td>x [F]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attention to &quot;acting&quot;</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Emergence of a &quot;director&quot;</td>
<td>x [F]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Attempt to synchronize dialogue while on-camera</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(F) indicates that females were more likely than males to engage in the specific behavior listed.

Figure 2
Behind-Camera Filming Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SP I</th>
<th>SP II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attention and desire to use and operate camera and/or equipment</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attention to manipulating and/or testing abilities of camera</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Need for retakes</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Compete to get &quot;best&quot; or &quot;neatest&quot; shots</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By preferring, on the other hand, to be behind-camera, and only infrequently on-camera, subjects are expressing a need to manipulate a different set of symbolic materials in filmic communication. Subjects became very selective in their filming of specific bits and pieces of the environment; they also chose to manipulate the recording of the visual material in terms of distorting motion, action, focus, horizontal and vertical axes, and so on. Emphasis was placed on encoding technique and manipulating information in an "artistic" manner. Value was placed on what one could do with the recorded images rather than as the recorded image.

Being black, being poor, and wanting to appear on-camera in contrast to being white, middle class, and not wanting to appear on-camera are important when we consider the unexamined claim that our young people are a "visual generation" (McLuhan 1964; Youngblood 1970) and that visual communication is a more natural mode than a verbal one ( Arnheim 1969). My research findings indicate that, in actuality, not all sectors of the population feel this way.

**On-Camera Filming Events and Components**

Cell 6 in Table 3 represents the interaction of on-camera filming and the component "participants." A comparison of behavioral characteristics that characterize this interaction appears in Figure 3.

The clearest distinctions between Stable Patterns I and II are seen in items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8. The black lower-class groups thoroughly enjoyed performing on-camera, and extra people joined the group for this activity. The consistent tendency of these groups was to film people, but not any group of people. They restricted the on-camera participants mainly to themselves; occasionally, their close friends and Chalfen were included.

There were many indications of the Stable Pattern I preference to appear on-camera. During one of the introductory sessions, the following discussions took place with the group of SP I girls.

- **Chalfen:** And then you've got to figure out who might be in it—who will be in the film.
- **Haley:** You pick the people in it.
- **TM:** Me, I want to be in it (a couple of the other girls say, "Me, too.").
- **VW:** All five of us want to be in, everybody wants to be in it... if you make it you gotta be in it.

And later in the same session:

- **VW:** Like I said before, somebody gives a dance and we invite the people, a party rather and show how they (different couples) met...
- **Haley:** Well are you gonna throw a dance and let them meet this way?
- **VW:** Uh huh. A play dance—just with us in it and a few other people but they're not going to be in it, just some other people for background. We gonna be in it the most, right?

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>SP I</th>
<th>SP II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original size of group enlarged during and because of on-camera filming</td>
<td></td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original size of group remained the same</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to consistently put people in the film</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of filmmakers themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of peer group friends</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of parents and/or adult relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Chalfen—project director</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of outsiders, people personally unknown to filmmakers</td>
<td></td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An unexpected dimension of filmmaking behavior emerges to differentiate the two patterns. Differences for findings on the use of local and familiar vs. nonlocal and unfamiliar settings (see Figure 4) and the use of known and familiar vs. unknown and unfamiliar on-camera participants (see Figure 5) appear to be consistent for Pattern I and Pattern II groups respectively.

Referring to Cell 8, while the different subject-filmmakers could have filmed almost any set of topics, activities, or events, it appears that five of the eight groups did not select a vastly divergent array of subject matter. The data indicate that topic selections of the five groups can be neatly arranged into two relatively uniform patterns, which, in turn, correspond to two socially defined filmmaking contexts. Thus the existence of two stable sociodidastic patterns is further strengthened.

The first four items listed for Cell 8 in Figure 5 are closely related to findings reported for Cell 6, which represented the relationship of "participants" and "on-camera filming." In the latter instance, we were asking "who" appeared in the sociodocumentary films; in Cell 8, when people are listed as a topic, we are more concerned with "how" people are shown and the context of human activity. However, the component "topics" is not restricted to people.

The white middle-class groups did not emphasize putting themselves in the movie; they preferred to film unknown people when they required some form of human activity. Thus, Stable Pattern I is characterized by the filming of the filmmakers themselves and their friends, whereas SP II filmmakers infrequently filmed themselves, never filmed their friends, and preferred to shoot unknown people.

Cells 7 and 8 in Table 3 are collapsed cells representing the relationships of both "on-camera" and "behind-camera" filming events with the "settings" component (Cell 7) and with the "topics" component (Cell 8). These cells are integrated because the setting or location of one event almost always coincided with the setting or location of the other event. A similar overlap was noticed for the topic component.

Additional differences between SP I and SP II are evident when we examine the data for Cells 7 and 8. Summarizing the data for Cell 7 we see that SP I groups were more likely to select a local and familiar setting in their neighborhood but not so intimate a zone as their own homes. In contrast, SP II groups tended to ignore both their homes and neighborhoods in favor of quasi-rural settings that were usually some distance from their neighborhoods.
The last component relevant to on-camera filming events, in a sociodocumentary context, is "message form." The general concern of this event-component relationship (represented in Cell 9) is how the subject matter, as arranged in front of an operating motion picture camera, becomes the message form of the film itself. This information contrasts with appropriate data for Cell 12, which examines how the message form may be structured by behind-camera activity, in which cases the visual content of a film is more a result of camera manipulation than the stream of behavior that occurred in front of the camera.

Characteristics of Cell 9 are outlined in Figure 6.

While Cell 9 is not very rich in data, the distinctions between items 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the findings for item 5 are particularly important, though not too surprising.

In light of earlier findings for Cells 6 and 8 (see Figures 3 and 5), and the next findings for Cell 11 (Figure 7), it is logical that we see Stable Pattern I filmmakers preferring to use the presence and activity of their own bodies as the focal point of their message forms. In many respects, these young people are metaphorically asking to be looked at for the integrity and importance of themselves. In this sense, the meta-message of this message form is "look at me."

In contrast to this perspective, for the white middle-class filmmakers, the focal point of scenes using people (who were usually not the filmmakers) was a juxtaposition of people within a specific environment. In most cases, this was a "found" relationship rather than a staged one. Thus, the meta-message of these message forms is "look at me see."

**Behind-Camera Filming Events and Components**

It appears that behind-camera filming events are equally as important as on-camera events but for quite different reasons. Both types of filming events have four relevant component interactions, and, as previously noted, two cells are "held" in common. Relevant relationships shall be discussed in analysis of Cells 11 and 12.

Cell 11 represents the relationship between the "participants" component and "behind-camera" filming events. The general concern is who was involved in the use of the camera and related filming apparatus, and the behavior of the group while this event took place.

Findings for Cell 11 are important in further presenting evidence for the two stable but different patterns of sociovidistic behavior. Whereas SP I groups enlarged during filming events, it was obvious that the interest and enthusiasm was for on-camera participation and not behind-camera participation (see item 1, Figure 3). It became clear that the interest of SP II groups was more
concentrated on behind-camera filming, but they did not allow extra people to come to their sessions for this reason (see item 1, Figure 7).

Items 2 and 3 of Figure 7 illustrate an interesting reciprocal relationship between filming attitudes expressed by subject-filmmakers from the two stable patterns. Members of the black lower-class groups hoped that someone in the group would take over the technical matters and want to do the actual filming. Use of the equipment was a low-priority activity when compared to an opportunity to be on-camera (see Figure 3). The excitement of "making a movie" did not include an enthusiasm for behind-camera activity after the initial learning and practice were completed.

One answer to the disinterest in filming appears in item 5; these groups asked Chalfen to film the movie for them. But while SP I groups would ask Chalfen to use the camera, neither they nor any other group in the research asked an outsider to shoot their movie (see item 4).

Characteristic behavior of SP II for Cell 11 sharply contrasts with attitudes and behavior that have been outlined for SP I. Instead of having difficulty getting any one group member to do the shooting, members of the white middle-class groups insisted that each person have an equal opportunity to use the equipment and to film in his or her preferred manner. There was an implicit agreement that behind-camera duties were to be shared equally; one group member could not become "number-one cameraman."

For Stable Pattern II groups, behind-camera filming was a high-priority activity in "making a movie." Field notes from the 11th session of the boys' group read as follows.

One point was very striking to me today. In terms of what I have called "the shooting event" [now called "behind-camera filming events"], it is very clear that the emphasis of these boys is on what the camera does and what the shot looks like. There is a lot of value placed on shooting and composing the images. At times, I saw all 4 boys behind the camera, huddled, trying to see how it was going to look. . . . This is just opposite from the black filmmakers who each demanded to be in the footage, and often neglected to leave someone to shoot the film.

| Figure 6 | Cell 9 Event Component: On-Camera Filming—Message Form |
| Characteristics | SP I | SP II |
| 1 | Presentation of self (usually the filmmakers) as message form | X |  |
| 2 | Rehearsals of on-camera presence | X |  |
| 3 | Use of costumes, makeup, props, etc. | X |  |
| 4 | Focus of attention is behavior of person(s) on-camera | X |  |
| 5 | Focus of attention is relationship between people and surroundings that appear on-camera |  | X |

| Figure 7 | Cell 11 Event-Component: Behind-Camera Filming—Participants |
| Characteristics | SP I | SP II |
| 1 | Original size of group enlarges because of behind-camera filming |  | X |
| 2 | Attitude: Any group member does filming | X |  |
| 3 | Attitude: Every group member does filming |  | X |
| 4 | Outsider asked to do filming |  |  |
| 5 | Chalfen asked to do filming |  | X |
Later in my notes from the same session:

There was an emphasis placed on finding the best shot. Remarks included: "Oh, that's pretty . . . shoot it! . . . Chuck's got one . . . No, Dave's is better . . . ." Again the emphasis was on getting the camera to do neat shots. This was really in the form of excitement. Whereas I used to have trouble keeping everybody interested in what was going on while only one person could use the camera at a time (Pattern I groups), these boys were always finding things to check up on or in looking for the next shot. At one point I heard "the setting-up staff" mentioned. They were in charge of the camera placement, f-stop and the focus. Each one [member of the group] would check the shot. A lot of cooperation indeed.

It is very significant that SP II groups stressed the "recording" aspects of moviemaking rather than "being recorded." The meta-message of their film communication, expressed as "look at me see," is again evident. The second important event-component included in behind-camera filming is represented by Cell 12. In the relationship of "message form" and "behind-camera" filming, we are concerned with how the message form of the film is primarily structured by specific ways of using the camera. Behavioral characteristics of this relationship are outlined in Figure 8.

Findings for Cell 12 reaffirm several SP I-SP II differences and are internally consistent with findings reported for other cells. Stable Pattern I groups were more likely to produce a story line, and their behind-camera activity chronologically followed time sequences according to the story line. Stable Pattern II groups, less likely to develop a story line, preferred to film different "sections" or "scenes" of their films according to needed settings that were easily accessible and convenient. Thus, SP II groups favored shooting their film out of sequence, if a sequence had been determined during planning.

SP I and SP II differences found for items 3 and 4 are a logical extension of attitudes toward filming reported in both Cells 6 and 11 (Figures 3 and 7). The groups that attended more to on-camera performance (SP I) tended to simplify the use of the camera by using it primarily as a recording or copying device (see items 3 and 7). For these groups, individual shots were frequently the length of a full camera wind and contained scenes of pre-arranged, and often rehearsed, settings and/or sequences of acting (see item 5).

Stable Pattern II groups, on the other hand, in attending to behind-camera activity, tended to elaborate and exploit the camera's potential. In doing so, they preferred to make short shots, sometimes as brief as a few frames, which were frequently composed as still life images. In collecting sequences of these short shots, the camera was also used to distort the imagery by changing the speed of the camera, changing the focus, or running the camera on its side or upside-down (see item 8).

Findings reported in Figure 8 allow us to extend our thinking on the SP II preference for manipulating units of symbolic material. Findings reported in response to questions raised by this event-component offer visible manifestations of this preference as well as a comparative paradigm of opposite behavior characteristic of SP I filmmaking.
Unstable Pattern III (USP III)

It remains to reapply the sociovidistic framework to examine the filmmaking projects of three other groups that now comprise Unstable Pattern III. Subjects in these groups come from black middle-class and white lower-class backgrounds (groups 6, 7, and 8 in Tables 1 and 2). Groups have been included in USP III because distinct changes were observed in their filmmaking process and not because all the changes were the same. For instance, the subjects could change their choice of shooting locations, themes, or topics for the film; they could reorganize themselves for shooting, acting, or editing the film; or they could rewrite and reshoot sequences of action.

In retrospect, it appears that the three USP III groups either “borrowed” traits or shifted between traits identified as characteristic of either Stable Pattern I or Stable Pattern II. Relatively few new behavioral traits were introduced in the analysis of USP III. Specific examples will make this clearer. Analyzed event-component relationships will again be limited to activities associated with filming events.

USP III Filming Events and Components

Several relevant examples of behavioral shifts occurred during the filming events of the black middle-class girls’ group (see Group 8, Tables 1 and 2). On-camera and behind-camera behavior changed during the making of their practice films. The four girls began their outside practice footage by enthusiastically shooting nearly all 200 feet of film on scenes of themselves in short on-camera skits. Many scenes included themselves posing and looking directly at the camera. In terms of the behavioral characteristics outlined for Cell 6 (see Figure 3), this group exhibited a strong tendency to film people, using themselves as participants in on-camera events. They also filmed Chalfen but generally avoided filming people who were unknown and/or outside the film group (see items 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Figure 3). According to these results, this group initially conformed to the sociovidistic behavior of Stable Pattern I.

However, when the rushes of this practice film were first seen, the girls were quietly upset. They were unhappy with what they saw, and two girls were noticeably embarrassed. After their second session of practice shooting, the girls verbalized a dislike for being in the movie so much of the time:

Chalfen: Well, listen, I think you liked this 200 feet better than that first 200 feet.
CM: You know why? . . . We weren’t really, we weren’t in it as much as the other one, we were really in that one.
Chalfen: Yeah, that’s true, you’re not in this one as much.
CM: Well we were . . . But, everything but the faces.

The second practice footage made by this group looks very unlike their first efforts. People appear much less frequently, and there are only a few full body shots of members of the film group. Face-camera interactions are almost totally absent. This time, the girls tended not to use themselves as on-camera participants and were more willing to film outsiders or just headless bodies when they needed humans on-camera (see items 3, 4, and 8 of Figures 3 and 9). This remarkable change in the relationship between participants and on-camera events now conforms much more to characteristics of Stable Pattern II. This set of changes is illustrated in the right-hand columns of Figure 9.

In other words, the filmmaking behavior of this USP III group, initially conforming to characteristics of the black lower-class groups, shifted toward the behavioral pattern characteristics of the white middle-class groups.

A shift in just the opposite direction was observed for another Unstable Pattern III group comprised of white lower-class girls (see Group 7, Tables 1 and 2). In their first practice footage, shot in a large park near a creek, they avoided filming each other as appropriate on-camera participants. Instead they used the telephoto lens to film people in different parts of the park. Their on-camera subjects neither knew the filmmakers nor were known by the filmmakers. The girls quickly penned over a vast area of trees, hills, parkland, and buildings across a street in order to film a mounted park guard, two young boys playing near a drain pipe, four people sitting under a tree smoking, and other people walking dogs or driving by in cars and busses.

In terms of behavioral items listed in Figure 3, it is significant that most of their on-camera participants were unknown people. Members of the film group were initially reluctant to be filmed and kept ducking away from the camera. This USP III group was first like SP II groups for item 2 (the size of the group remained the same), item 4 (they did not tend to film themselves), and item 8 (they did film unknown people). These girls were also like SP I groups only in item 3, the tendency to consistently put people in the movie.

However, this pattern of behavior significantly changed later in the same afternoon when the girls continued shooting their second 100 feet of outside practice film. They asked me to drive them to a local cemetery. Again, they concentrated their filming on people. This time, however, they almost exclusively filmed themselves in various on-camera skits. When the girls later saw the rushes of this footage they verbalized their shift in behavior.
In the first practice film made by Group 8 (black middle-class girls) the teenagers enjoyed using themselves as on-camera participants—in scenes of group dancing, modeling, hamming for the camera, and short dramatic skits. Their first tendencies were to produce a Stable Pattern I model of moviemaking.

The second practice film shot by Group 8 contained very few shots of group members posing for the camera. This time they much preferred to film interior scenery, objects, designs, and only body parts rather than whole people. They also began to manipulate the camera—creating slow motion and trick photography. Their changes were producing a version of Stable Pattern II, characteristic of white middle-class filmmaking.

Illustrations 29-34
Unstable Pattern III is characterized by distinct shifts and observable changes in filmmaking behavior.
You know what was funny about it? In the beginning we just all filmin' all of our—everything, and then . . . at the end of it it's all us, and all people. That was funny; in the beginning was all about buildings and stuff, and at the end it was all people in it. Why did we do that? . . . I think we were bashful at the beginning . . . . That's what I think we should do with the movie, film people, because when you just film scenery I don't like it. Do you?

Referring to Figures 3 and 10, these girls changed their behavior to conform more to a Stable Pattern I set of characteristics, specifically in item 1 (they continued consistently to film people), item 4 (they now almost exclusively filmed themselves), and item 8 (they ignored unknown people). The girls also made several shots of Chalfen (see item 7), in conformance with behavior observed for all the film groups. These changes are illustrated in Figure 10.

---

**Figure 9**
Cell & Event-Component: On-Camera Filming—Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Stable Patterns I</th>
<th>Stable Patterns II</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III 1st time*</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III 2nd time*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Original size of group enlarged during and because of on-camera filming</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Original size of group remained the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Tendency to consistently put people in the film</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Use of the filmmakers themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Use of peer group friends</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Use of parents/or adult relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Use of Chalfen—project director</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Use of outsiders, people personally unknown to filmmakers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refers to first 200 feet of practice filming
†Refers to second 200 feet of practice filming

---

**Figure 10**
Cell & Event-Component: On-Camera Filming—Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Stable Patterns I</th>
<th>Stable Patterns II</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III 1st time*</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III 2nd time*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Original size of group enlarged during and because of on-camera filming</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Original size of group remained the same</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Tendency to consistently put people in the film</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Use of filmmakers themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Use of peer group friends</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Use of parents and/or adult relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Use of Chalfen—project director</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Use of outsiders, people personally unknown to filmmakers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refers to first 100 feet of first practice filming
†Refers to second 100 feet of first practice filming
‡Refers to second session of 200 feet of practice filming
Illustrations 35-44
Another Unstable Pattern III group (white lower-class females) appeared to shift toward behavior characteristic of Stable Pattern I.

35-39 Group 7 filmmakers chose to make their first practice film in a large open park known as Cobbs Creek. While surrounded by trees, grass, and open space, they sought out instances of human activity. Instead of filming objects of nature, they focused their cameras on unknown people—a mounted policeman, several boys playing in a creek area, three people smoking while sitting next to a tree, a man on the sidewalk, and the driver and occupants of a bus.
Later practice filming conformed to behavior described for their second roll of outside shooting. The majority of their footage again showed people, and the filmmakers themselves were most frequently seen. However, they also filmed anyone and everyone (including Chalfen) who came into the area where they were shooting. In this latter behavior, these girls shared the SP II tendency to film unknown "outsiders" (see item 8, Figure 10).

Even within sessions devoted to practice filming, a change in preference for on-camera participation has been observed. Though the sociovidistic behavior of this lower-socioeconomic white group drew on characteristics of the two Stable Patterns, the observed shift located this group's preferences much closer to the pattern established for the lower-class way of making a movie.

It is expected that sociovidistic behavior is coordinated across cells; shifts found in one cell should be related to, and expected from, shifts found in other cells. With reference to the first Unstable Pattern III group (black middle-class girls) relevant relationships between filming events and topics (Cell 8) and message form (Cell 9) deserve attention.

A very noticeable change in choice of appropriate film topics occurred between the first and second practice sessions. These girls initially filmed only themselves performing on-camera skits. These skits included activities such as synchronized dancing, modeling clothes, and scenes of gun-dueling and a melodramatic farewell. In terms of findings for Cell 8 (see Figure 5), their behavior conformed to Stable Pattern I for items 1 and 3 and also included the dancing activity listed in item 7.

However, after the girls viewed this footage, and during the second practice filming, they radically altered their on-camera presence and their choice of appropriate on-camera activities and topics. As previously mentioned, people in general and the filmmakers in particular appear much less frequently. There was some attempt to catch people in natural behaviors, unaware of an operating camera. Much more attention was paid to inanimate objects such as doors, books, elevator buttons and numbers, toilets, Kotex dispensers, sculpture, a water fountain, coffee and cookie machines, and patterns of dots on a wall. Again, with specific reference to items 2, 4, and 9 in Figure 5, the shift has been in the direction of SP II as illustrated in Figure 11.

The last example of shifting behavior to be described for the black middle-class film group involves the relationship of filming and message form. Findings presented in Figures 6 and 8, for Cells 9 and 12 respectively, indicate that Stable Pattern I groups tended to present themselves and their actions as the message form. The focus of attention was the behavior of someone (usually a member of the film group) while on-camera. It should be clear that these characteristics accurately describe the behavior of this Unstable Pattern III group, as illustrated in Figure 12.

Illustration 40

However, while we notice that findings in Cell 9 are more relevant to Pattern I, characteristics of Cell 12, the relationship of behind-camera events and message form, are more relevant to Pattern II. As outlined in Figure 13, the filmmakers in the black middle-class group changed their filming attentions to manipulating the camera and testing its potential in purposefully altering the message form. Emphasis shifted away from a total preoccupation with what happened in front of the camera and using the camera primarily as a recording device. These girls began to explore using the camera to manipulate and possibly distort imagery as well as collect it (see items 4 and 8 of Figures 8 and 13).

In the second 200 feet of practice, several behind-camera skits were attempted that resembled behind-camera performance of the white middle-class boys' group. Thus for several additional items, the changes noticed in the analysis of Cells 9 and 12 again indicate a shift for the black middle-class girls toward Stable Pattern II sociovidistic behavior.

The patterned changes of the black middle-class group has clearly put them closer to a white middle-class way of making a movie than to the pattern established by the black lower-class groups. It is very tempting to speculate on parallel findings on social mobility and changes in sociovidistic behavior. While this topic deserves additional attention, it is not the central theme of this report.
The girls in Group 7 dramatically changed their choices during the second practice shooting. Choosing to film in a cemetery, they decided to film themselves while smoking, and while dancing in short skits, and they enjoyed mugging for the camera. These changes produced a version of Stable Pattern I filmmaking, characteristic of lower-socioeconomic-class teenagers.

Hints of Collaborative Evidence

Since completing the Philadelphia Project, considerable time has been given to locating and examining potential sources of comparable data. A search has been made for examples of teenage filmmaking that might confirm or negate results from Philadelphia. I have profited greatly from discussions with Rodger Larson, Brian Sutton-Smith, Tony Hodgkinson, Rick Weise, Maureen Gaffney, Sven Norlin, DeeDee Halleck, Kit Laybourne, and Bob Aristarco—all of whom are professionally concerned with children’s filmmaking. In almost all cases teenage films have been produced under different circumstances; different teaching methods, motivations, and expectations have guided other projects. While almost everyone could offer some form of anecdotal contribution in general agreement, few specific examples could be produced and directly related to the sociovisistic findings reported in this paper.

The most interesting example of similar results may be found in a film entitled Young Filmmakers (1968). This film documents the “World’s First Conference of Young Filmmakers” organized by John Culkin. Approximately one quarter through the film a narrator asks the following questions: “If a man is suddenly given a new voice, what would he say? With new eyes, what would he look at?” We wanted an answer in our context (of children’s filmmaking). The narrator continues: “So we chose two groups of very dissimilar boys and gave each the chance to make an instant movie in the same limited environment.” The first group of four upper-middle-class white teenagers came from a private school in suburban Philadelphia. These boys had learned basic filmmaking in their school’s media course and had made two films before this experience. The other group consisted of five black and Puerto Rican teenagers from the Lower East Side of New York. Four members were high school drop-outs. They had learned filmmaking at the University Set-
### Figure 11
Cell 8 Event-Component: Filming—Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Stable Patterns</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Frequent appearance of people in films</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Avoidance of using people in films</td>
<td></td>
<td>x (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Use of people acting and aware of an operating camera</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Use of people seen in &quot;natural&quot; behaviors unaware of operating camera</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Frequent attention to sports activity</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Frequent attention to fighting activity</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Frequent scenes of dancing, drinking and/or smoking</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Frequent use of scenes of nature and animals</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Frequent appearance of inanimate objects</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(M) indicates male tendency

¹Refers to first 200 feet of practice filming

²Refers to second 200 feet of practice filming

### Figure 12
Cell 9 Event-Component: On-Camera Filming—Message Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Stable Patterns</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Presentation of self (usually the filmmakers) as message form</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rehearsals of on-camera presence</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Use of costumes, make-up, props, etc.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Focus of attention is behavior of person(s) on-camera</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Focus of attention is relationship between people and surroundings that appear on-camera.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 13
Cell 12 Event-Component: Behind-Camera Filming—Message Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Stable Patterns</th>
<th>Unstable Pattern III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tendency to shoot film in the sequence prescribed by script or outline</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tendency to shoot film &quot;out of sequence&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Simple use of camera technology</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Elaborated use of camera's abilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Preference for long camera takes of fabricated scenes</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Preference for short camera takes of &quot;natural&quot; scenes</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Camera used to produce a record or copy of reality</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Camera used to collect, distort and manipulate imagery</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refers to first 200 feet of practice filming

¹Refers to second 200 feet of practice filming
tlement Club, a federally funded project directed by Rodger Larson (Roddick 1967; O'Conner 1967) and had cooperated on the production of several films. Both groups were given 16mm cameras and film stock and were asked to make a film using the same spaces in a hotel. The young filmmakers were given half an hour to plan their film and one hour to shoot it. Each group worked independently, and presumably neither group knew what the other was doing.

Results of this informal experiment strongly resemble several findings presented in this report. The New York teenagers made a gangland-type film which featured the misadventures of two "businessmen" trying to see "the boss" about a $1 million "investment." Following an organized story line set to the theme music from Goldfinger, these filmmakers chose to include themselves in every scene. Their characterizations of unusual types required actors to dress up and to "act up" for on-camera performances.

In contrast, the private school teenagers from Philadelphia produced more of an abstract movie "about" the production of a film. Accompanied by music from a Moog synthesizer, this film consists of many sequences of isolated objects (e.g., a script, desk, camera, reels of films, synchronizer, tape recorder, pieces of sculpture, water fountain, newspaper headline) shot in short takes and edited into a quickly paced montage. The filmmakers or any form of human activity are almost never seen. The film ends by having a film box—presumably the completed film—placed in an elevator.

The material presented in Young Filmmakers demonstrates considerable overlap with the sociovidistic results discussed in this report. Two groups of teenagers from different sociocultural backgrounds produced distinctively different kinds of films.\(^\text{10}\) We are given independently produced examples and evidence for the existence of several key characteristics of Stable Patterns I and II as they emerged from the sociodocumentary research projects in Philadelphia. Preferences for on-camera vs. behind-camera performance were maintained; contrasting patterns of topics, message form, and code appear once again.

For instance, both groups independently decided to include an elevator scene in each film. When the elevator doors open in the New Yorkers' film, we see two members of the group dressed as gangster "toughs." The other filmmaking group chose to shoot the same elevator by using a point-of-view camera technique. This scene includes interior details of the elevator and adjacent office; however no people are in these shots. In this comparative example, characteristics of Stable Pattern I are illustrated by the lower-socioeconomic-class teenagers' preferences for on-camera performance and for using themselves as centers of attention. In contrast, Stable Pattern II preferences for behind-camera activity, reluctance to be "in" the movie, and a look-at-me-see meta-message are evident in the middle-class film production. In addition, other choices involving story line, use of inanimate objects, editing techniques, and synchronized sound further differentiate the two Stable Patterns.

In summary, many questions remain regarding the generalizability of these findings. It is very difficult to find comparable examples of nondirective projects—projects that allow a freedom of indigenous expression with respect to both content and form.

**Conclusions**

Primary objectives of the Philadelphia Project were to apply sociodocumentary methods to generate comparative examples of teenage film communication and to observe the influence of social and cultural factors in several examples of film production. The purpose of this report has been to demonstrate the systematic application of a sociovidistic scheme of description and analysis to the products and processes of teenage film communication.

The research demonstrated that film communication can be studied through a series of event-component relationships; the proposed sociovidistic scheme has provided us with a productive tool for discovering patterns of similar and different behaviors across several filmmaking projects.

In turn, research findings have produced a better understanding of the variable nature of a film communication process. The process looks quite different when different culturally defined groups organize film communication for the first time. It is not surprising to find that all teenage subjects could learn to use 16mm professional filmmaking equipment with considerable ease and confidence. It is perhaps more relevant to understand that while all groups of young people were intellectually and physically capable of making movies, not all groups wanted to participate in moviemaking in the same way, and some groups did not want to participate at all.

Perhaps the most substantial and provocative finding of the Philadelphia Project has been the emergence of two distinctly different patterns of sociovidistic behavior. Young people from two unlike subcultures have produced two unlike but stable patterns of film communication. Specifically, filmmaking subjects from black and lower-socioeconomic backgrounds preferred to use and manipulate themselves and familiar aspects of their immediate environment in their symbolic communication. In contrast, the white and more affluent subjects preferred to use and manipulate (more than record) images of unfamiliar things and people, other than themselves, found in areas away from their familiar environment. This finding has several interesting relationships to work done on the importance of class and ethnic variables.
The ethno-class differences, suggested by the separation of Pattern I and Pattern II behaviors, have many implications for future inquiry. For instance, there may exist a direct relationship between a preference for manipulating symbolic events and a feeling for control over one's environment. It is also suggested that a desire and ability to actually explore and manipulate an environment of natural events may be correlated with a preference to explore and manipulate symbolic events.

The findings for Unstable Pattern III further emphasize the importance of the "social class" variable. When films were made by anomalous groups (from black middle-class and white lower-class backgrounds), the sociovidistic shifts seemed to be controlled by the class variable. The black middle-class group of girls tended to act more like the white middle-class groups of Stable Pattern II, and the white lower-class groups shifted their behavior to conform more to the black lower-class Pattern I.

Further implications of this study are related to the development and demonstrated application of the sociovidistic scheme of analysis. Investigators now have a theoretical and analytical foundation for future work. However, the appropriateness or usefulness of this scheme of events and components for other film genres and other codes and modes of pictorial communication remains problematic for the moment.

Notes
1 These comments are not offered as negative criticism of many interesting projects and articles on children's filmmaking. It is acknowledged that projects, articles, and reports are produced for many reasons satisfying different needs, questions and audiences. This report does not include filmmaking projects done outside the United States.
2 This is not to say that Worth and Adair paid no attention to context or had no plan for describing context. They list six "areas of context": (1) the learning situation, (2) the choice of Navajo students, (3) the students' choice of actors for their films, (4) their choice of film subjects or themes, (5) their method of working (technical and perceptual), and (6) the interrelation of their filmmaking and their community (1972:139-140). The point here is that the sociovidistic scheme incorporates and realigns these six areas within a framework more directly related to another communicative modality, namely, speech.
3 Further explanation of these points will appear in a forthcoming paper by the author entitled: "From Verbal to Visual: Sociolinguistics, Vidistics and Sociovidistics." In future discussions it may prove useful to distinguish Worth's predominant interests as "psychovidistic" from work described in this report as sociovidistic. With specific reference to children's filmmaking, see Sutton-Smith (1977, 1979) for examples of the former, and Chalifen (1974) and Chalifen and Haley (1971) for the latter.
4 I am, in part, making certain paraphrases from the work of Dell Hymes (1974:83) and Bauman and Sherzer (1974:6), substituting visual terms for linguistic/verbal references.
5 The project was supported by a three-year research grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (No. S-R01-MH17521) entitled "Exploring Social Perception with Film." The grant was administered by the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic where I worked as a Research Associate between 1967 and 1972.

6 I am fully aware that the terms "social class," "middle class," and "lower class" have had precise meanings for different social scientists. When the adjectives "lower" or "middle" accompany the use of "social class," they are meant in a relative frame of reference. Thus some groups were "higher" or "lower" relative to other groups in the study. No invidious comparisons are implied.
7 Jay Haley was Director of Research at the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic. He served as chief consultant on the NIMH research grant.
8 The Minnewaska Symposium on Child-Made Films provided an excellent opportunity to examine results of many alternative filmmaking programs for young people (Challen 1977; Covert and McBride 1977; Shapiro 1977).
9 This 25-minute black-and-white film was produced by David Hoffman as part of his work for Public Broadcast Laboratory. The conference, which attracted 740 young filmmakers and 500 teachers, was held in New York's Park Sheraton Hotel. Young Filmmakers may be rented from Brandon Films.
10 In the last section of Young Filmmakers, the two groups of teenagers discussed their films after seeing both productions. They questioned why they didn't make the same kind of film. One black teenager from the Lower East Side presented a cogent explanation: "I have not had the same experiences [as the white upper-middle class teenagers] ... They take stuff and make it into life. To me, this is like a dream; I don't know what it is to them. If I had the time to sit back and look around and put things together, I could make a wonderful thing. I know they have time for this—I don't have time—I don't have so much feel for that. I make a film of the first thing that comes to my head, and what I know—how people carry on. And that's what I think will catch the audience's attention."

In contrast, a spokesman for the upper-middle-class Philadelphia group explained: "We were making the film today as an experiment. We were not trying to prove any points, not that there's no point in terms of moral or underlying social meaning. The point is that the visual imagery was supposed to create some idea."

11 To my knowledge, three studies have used the sociovidistic scheme, namely Musello's work on snapshot communication (1980), Intinito's (1979) proposal for studying the production of television documentaries, and Aristarco's fieldwork on children's filmmaking (1980). At the time of this writing results of the Aristarco project are not complete.

Appendix: Summary of Sociodocumentary Films

Stable Pattern I: Black Lower-Class Groups

Group 1. The first group of boys produced a 13-minute film titled What We Do on Saturdays Our Spare Time. In their outside practice footage, shot in a local parking lot, the boys filmed themselves playing football, fighting, acting drunk, and getting fresh with two girls. A lot of posing for the camera characterizes these shots. Practicing inside a settlement house, they filmed themselves playing Ping-Pong, dancing, and being interviewed.

Their sociodocumentary film is about what they like to do as a group on a typical Saturday. We see them playing Ping-Pong and enjoying themselves in the recreation basement of the settlement house. The film shows the group walking upstairs and out the front door. While walking to a parking lot two blocks away, they window-shop, check a telephone box for forgotten change, and buy french fries. The major portion of their film is devoted to scenes of playing football. In the middle of the game, an argument develops into a mass fight scene.
The boys make amends and continue to play football. Later, they leave the parking lot, to reappear, staggering in a drunken manner. Fighting again erupts, followed by another truce. In the end, the boys leave the parking lot, presumably on their way home. The film’s sound track consists of an interview by the boys (on why they like having a film club) and a jazz piece titled “Moejoe.”

Group 2. The second group to make a film was a girls’ club called the “Soul Sisters.” They produced a 7½-minute film titled Don’t Make a Good Girl Go Bad. In their practice footage, the girls concentrated on filming themselves in scenes of dancing and fighting; other forms of competitive behavior include flexing their arm muscles and cigarette smoking. The girls were not interested in using the camera or in editing activities.

The story line of their finished film involves a conflict between an adolescent unwed mother and her mother. After an argument and several mutual insults, the daughter slaps her mother and is thrown out of their home. The unwed daughter and her infant child then visit a girlfriend’s apartment and are invited to stay as long as needed. The girls in the apartment celebrate the arrival of their new roommate with a party. An adequate supply of liquor, cigarettes, and drugs are enjoyed as the girls appear in scenes of dancing, drinking, smoking, swearing, etc. Eventually the party evolves into a drunken brawl. When one of the girls tries to get additional drugs, she is discovered by the police. The police raid the party and jail all the girls except the unwed mother and her baby. The elder mother then enters the apartment and takes away her granddaughter. The daughter gets up from lying drunk on the couch and follows her mother out the door to end the film. (For a more complete account of this project, see Chalfen and Haley 1971.)

Group 3. A group of black teenage boys called the “Nobleteens” comprised the third filmmaking group. In their outside practice shooting, these boys emphasized the filming of themselves playing basketball, standing in front of a graffiti-laden wall, and in scenes of hamming for the camera. For their inside practice, they again shot scenes of themselves fighting and of the mugging and robbing of an adult drunk. Although the boys had ideas of making a film of their street life, no major film was produced.

Stable Pattern II: White Middle-Class Groups

Group 4. In the first project with middle-class teenagers, a group of boys produced a 7-minute film titled WPFG-M1. Practicing outside, these boys concentrated on filming buildings, brick walls, cement surfaces, bushes, trees, pipes, lampposts, etc. They infrequently filmed themselves, using slow motion and pixilated motion techniques. Their inside practice footage shows clocks, desks, chairs, corridors, coat hangers, and IBM machines.

WPFG-M1 is a quickly paced film which starts with a scene of a sun rising accompanied by the theme music from Kubrick’s 2001. A series of intercut short shots of a dog, of lettering that reads “I AM ME,” etc., lead into many scenes of animal life (such as ducks, birds, swans, butterflies, a rabbit, etc.), filmed in heavily foliated surroundings of streams, ponds, and the like. The boys are seen in very short scenes of battling a peanut with an extended tripod and dancing in pixilated motion. Some shots are as short as two and three frames and occasionally are edited upside-down. The film ends as one of the boys gives an obscene finger gesture to the camera.

Group 5. The fifth group in the project was a group of girls, who made a 14-minute film titled God. These girls devoted equal parts of their outside practice to filming other people (only occasionally themselves), fountains, buildings, and foliage. For their inside practice, they filmed short skits which involved smoking and drugs. Among the film skits are intercut shots of humans and animal life by filming people walking through the park (“faces reacting to the camera”), young children playing on a park bench, dogs running, playing and mating, etc. They filmed themselves several times and regretted they had not brought a football with them.

Although no final film was produced, they suggested subjects such as parts of their everyday lives, especially when they were doing something bad or illegal; staging a football game in a trolley car; and making a “geographical film” at a university biology pond.

Unstable Pattern III

Group 6. A group of white lower-class boys from southwest Philadelphia comprised the next group. Outside practice filming was done in a neighborhood park. They concentrated on forms of human and animal life by filming people walking through the park (“faces reacting to the camera”), young children playing on a park bench, dogs running, playing and mating, etc. They filmed themselves several times and regretted they had not brought a football with them.

Although no final film was produced, they suggested subjects such as parts of their everyday lives, especially when they were doing something bad or illegal; staging a football game in a trolley car; and making a “geographical film” at a university biology pond.

Group 7. The next film project was completed by a group of white lower-class girls who made a 39-minute film titled The Life of Man. Outside practice footage was shot at Cobbs Creek and a local cemetery. They mainly shot people (kids playing, a park guard on horseback, people in passing buses and cars), and they filmed themselves in short skits. They duplicated this behavior when they practiced filming indoors.

The Life of Man begins with the Biblical past as Adam accepts and bites into an apple from Eve. A 4-year-old boy and girl are heard to say “...sugar and spice and everything nice, that’s what little girls are made of!” and “...snakes and snails and puppy dog’s tails, that’s what little boys are made of.” The following shots show us infants in hospital beds and in cribs at home; young children are shown as happy and sad. Other young children are shown sitting on sidewalks and smoking followed by a shot of a youngster studying. Scenes that follow include adolescents dancing, jumping rope, and taking drugs.

As the film progresses we are shown examples of good and bad parents, people loafing and others at work, and then burns on Skid Row. The film ends with an old lady dying in her rocking chair followed by a cemetery scene with a man (Chaffen) kneeling and praying in front of a grave-stone. Each section of the film, which usually consists of only one scene, is accompanied by a different piece of music; the film ends in silence when the cemetery scene appears.

Group 8. The last filmmaking project involved a group of black middle-class girls. This group concentrated on shooting short dramatic and humorous skits for their outside practice. More often than not, they chose to film themselves in dancing and modeling poses. There were several attempts at trick photography in terms of having people appear and disappear from one frame of the film to the next. For their inside practice, they chose to film other people as well as themselves in a library, a bathroom, and on an elevator. Again the emphasis was on performing humorous extemporaneous skits. The camera was again used to make people appear and disappear quickly, and there were several slow- and fast-motion shots.

Before these girls decided not to produce a film as a group, they struggled with agreeing on such suggested topics as a film about children, something about their school life, or the problems of a polluted environment.
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Decoding the Worlds of Television
Leona Jaglom and Howard Gardner

Introduction

Nearly all American children watch countless hours of television, even in their earliest years. The activity of television viewing may appear at first thought to be simple and straightforward—the child sits in front of the television set, watches, listens, and understands. In fact, however, the process behind this watching and listening turns out to be quite complex and, as yet, little understood. Just as learning to read or speak requires the development of a multitude of symbol-using capacities, so, too, does acquiring the ability to interpret, understand, and draw inferences from television programming (Wolf 1979; Worth 1974; Worth and Gross 1974).

Far from awakening one day with a full vocabulary of words with which to communicate, children progress gradually through a series of developmental stages in their acquisition of language. Similarly, they must gradually acquire methods of mastering the communications of the television world. To achieve this mastery, children must accomplish two principal tasks. They must establish television’s symbolic status, that is, its relation to their world of daily experience; and they must sort its various elements—such as types of programming—classifying them and organizing them into a coherent medium of communication.

Consider some of the problems faced by the young child bent on decoding television. To begin with, its ever-changing images and sounds are beyond the child’s control. He cannot manipulate or reexamine particularly interesting characters, objects, or events, for they are contained within a box and separated from him by a piece of glass. Yet the objects, characters, and events often appear so similar to those which actually exist around the child that the two forms may at first seem indistinguishable. For this reason, it is possible that the child may have difficulty acknowledging the symbolic status of television (Worth and Gross 1974). The child may confuse events on television with natural events, attempt to act directly upon them, and thus imbue them instead with “existential meaning.”

In order to master the world of television, he must explore the images and sounds which emerge from it and eventually recognize their various relationships to his own experience, to worlds or symbol systems with which he is already familiar. As Nelson Goodman aptly states, “Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is re-making” (Goodman 1978). The child must establish the fact that television is, in fact, a world of its own, one which contains elements that relate directly to the “real” world, others that are completely fantastic and exist only in the world of television, and still others that combine both real and fantastic elements. He must determine the nature of the boundary or, as we have come to term it, the membrane between the two worlds, the extent of its permeability, impermeability, or semipermeability.

In addition to establishing the fact that (and the manner in which) television transmits its various symbol systems, a newcomer must also learn to decode the inner workings of this medium, its organization and its format. To a sophisticated viewer, the world of television is a neatly packaged, clearly organized, simple and convenient form of entertainment. This viewer is able to choose exactly which shows he wishes to watch, to turn the set on for these shows alone, and to be attentive to the degree that he desires. This control and the choices made by a sophisticated viewer are dependent, however, upon the construction of a complex classification system or, in Sol Worth’s words, a series of “conventions for ordering the universe” (1974) of television.

The television world is comprised of many types of fare, each of which has identifying features that must be learned and that differentiate one type of fare from another. For example, commercials interrupt other types of fare (such as cartoons or situation comedies), featuring music, familiar jingles, sudden increases in volume, and/or lettering across the screen. Narrative cartoons are distinguished from most other types of shows in that they are animated and often very fast-paced. News shows have characteristic “factual” information: they often begin with a logo and an anchorperson seated behind a desk and feature shots for weather, sports, and commentary. Some shows are intended for children, some for adults. Some shows are comedies designed to make people laugh, while others are thrillers meant to frighten people. Still others are educational, providing accurate information about the “real” world or about other symbol systems (e.g., music or art).

Given our knowledge of symbolic capacities in young children, it is at best implausible to assume that a child with no exposure to the medium possesses the innate cognitive structures necessary for assimilating its diverse images and sounds. Rather, it is more likely that a child will progress through a series of developmental phases in determining the proper relationship between television and the real world and in classifying appropriately the communications of television, including show types with their individual visual and audio features (Bruner, Olver, and Greenfield 1966; Gardner and Wolf 1979; Piaget 1952, 1954; Vygotsky 1962; Wolf and Gardner, forthcoming).

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**Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses**

In a longitudinal study of early television competence, we examined the development of preschoolers' television viewing skills and the processes of change which underlie their growing sophistication in understanding the symbol system it embodies. In particular, children's comments regarding the relationship between television and real life and their associations between the two realms were analyzed. Furthermore, we examined the development of preschool children's understanding of the relationship between various types of television fare and their ability to establish categories to distinguish these types, to group shows according to common characteristics or features, to recognize their beginnings and endings, and to learn the time schedules of various shows.

Following examples of earlier work cited above, we followed three subjects intensively over a 3-year period, from the time they were 2 years old to the time they were 5. In addition, nine other subjects were monitored in a less regular and less formal way. Though this additional group broadens our sample, three well-studied cases do not of course constitute an adequate sample, and therefore any generalizations must be considered tentative.

In this effort, we have found it particularly helpful to invoke the image of "membranes." As we see it, the child must take the relatively undifferentiated experiences of televised and daily life and, over the course of several years, construct a set of membranes: membranes which define the relationship between what is shown on television and what occurs in the realm of daily mundane experience; and membranes which define the relationship between the various types of programs and program features which populate the several channels of television.

We favor the term "membrane" over the more conventional usage of "category" and "boundary" for two reasons. First, many of the distinctions which obtain in the area of television viewing are much less rigidly defined than conventional and long-standing categories, and indeed change quite rapidly across television seasons. Second, the way in which children's own concepts of television fare shift are reminiscent of different types of organic membranes: sometimes impermeable, sometimes completely permeable, and, eventually, semi-permeable in nature.

**Expectations**

Clearly, the development of children's abilities to perceive the membranes which organize the inner world transmitted on television and which separate this world from the real world relates to the development of their more general abilities to classify and form categories. Children's emerging abilities to classify objects, people, and words have been studied in depth (Denney 1974; Kagan, Moss, and Sigel 1963; Rosch et al. 1976; Rossi and Rossi 1965; and references cited above).

In accordance with the earlier literature, we expected only an incipient ability to categorize at age 2. Children can categorize to some extent at the level of the basic object, that is, they will term a passing object "cat" rather than using the superordinate term "animal" or the subordinate terms "Siamese" or "tabby cat"; and they show a tendency to ferret out prototypical exemplars from a category. However, categorization at other than basic object level proves beyond their reach. There is a strong predilection for thematic or functional classifications rather than abstract or hierarchical ones, and there is considerable tendency to either overgeneralize or undergeneralize the extension of categorical labels. Little capacity is shown for multiple or dual classification. During the preschool years, increasingly fine precision attends the application of labels, but other immature tendencies endure well into the school years.

We expected that the classification of the television world in terms of adult perceived categories would present difficulties for preschoolers: our subjects would therefore vacillate between overly broad and overly rigid categorical distinctions. For example, cartoons might be defined initially by a young child as any show involving one of the child's preferred characters, regardless of whether that character was animated or not; alternatively, cartoons might be defined as only those shows on which characters chase each other. These definitions are equally erroneous in that both exclude the crucial element of the visual appearance of cartoons—their animation.

Certain categories were expected to be beyond the grasp of our 5-year-olds, owing to the abstract concepts entailed in their definition, such as producer intent or designated target audience. For example, adult shows are not only those shows watched by the child's parents, as a young child might believe, but any show designed for viewing by an adult audience.

Our expectations could not be—and were not—drawn solely from developmental research on classification, however. Television is a medium which differs significantly from the world of physical objects of language. It presents an unusual if not unique set of stimuli—a conglomeration of several different symbol systems including language, music, and movement and a variety of visual forms such as animation, drawing, puppetry, and live-action, not to mention numerous special effects. As a result, children's processing capacities may be tested to a greater extent by television than by traditional media, and
they also may be tested in different ways—for example, in terms of the reality status of different segments.

Adding to the difficult task of decoding the television world is the fact that television is a novel medium. It is so new, in fact, that our culture has not yet invented ways of presenting it or teaching its structure to children. Therefore, much more so than in the case of traditional media (such as books), the child is left to his own devices in making sense of television. Both the difficulty and the novelty of television lead to the hypothesis that it may offer particularly daunting challenges to the young child’s classificatory powers.

Fortunately, a small body of research has begun to accumulate on children’s processing of, and understanding of, television during the opening years of life. The attention of young children has been related both to formal features of programs (Watkins et al. 1980) and to certain cues which signal the imminent appearance of semantically digestible materials (Collins et al. 1979; Newcomb and Collins 1979). It is this body of research, in combination with the more general developmental findings cited above, that indicates the hypotheses which have guided our research.

We hypothesized that, initially, children will make no distinctions between what they see on television and events in their daily world. Similarly, they will fail to appreciate distinctions among kinds of television programs and the boundaries or beginnings and endings which separate those programs from one another. We expected that, rather than making distinctions, children will primarily make connections between television and real life and between various types of programming. Membranes organizing the television world and separating it from real life will be perceived as permeable, if perceived at all.

The appreciation of differences between television and real life and between types of shows was expected to emerge later, with the most obvious and straightforward differences to be noted first. For example, children might distinguish cartoons before Sesame Street because their visual appearance or animation is so strikingly and consistently different from that of other shows. The Sesame Street format and appearance, on the other hand, changes often within one show and from show to show. In addition to this “simplicity” hypothesis, we expected the age at which children distinguish one type of show from another to be determined by their preference for and exposure to a certain type of show. In establishing categories of program types and in noting differences between the world presented on television and their daily experiences, children should adhere closely to their newly formed conception of membranes and to apply this conception very rigidly. Characters will be considered show-specific and unable to cross show boundaries to appear on other shows. Children will also perceive characters as unreal and unrelated to real people. Membranes both between television and real life and within the world of television will be perceived as impermeable or firm, and similarities will be overlooked.

Finally, with increased exposure to and experience with television, children should demonstrate the more complex capacity to note both similarities and differences, to establish more flexible categories of program types, to accept the fact that certain programs might fall into more than one category, that characters might be able to appear on more than one show, and that certain television characters comprise a combination of real and fantastic elements. The membranes of television will be perceived ultimately as flexible in their permeability—at times permeable, at other impermeable, and at still others, semipermeable.

This ultimate conception is quite complex and very possibly beyond the grasp of the preoperational child. It involves considering more than one element at a time, thus overcoming the concentration on one element which dominates this age or stage of development. It is possible, however, that the repetitive nature of television, in conjunction with the great amount of exposure to the medium which young children receive, will facilitate the development of their understanding of its symbolic status and its organization as well as their ability to decode the symbol systems it conveys.

The Study

Population

Subjects were three first-born children from middle- and lower-middle-class families living in a suburb of Boston. They belonged to high-viewing households where little or no regulation of television took place and where the television was often on for most of the day. Subjects were 2 years old when the study began and 5 years old when data collection was completed.

Methods

The majority of the data were collected at biweekly home visits to the subjects. These visits were conducted by the same experimenter for two years and by a different experimenter (trained by the first) during the third year of data collection. The experimenter brought a variety of play materials to home visits in order to ascertain the child’s competence in various skills relevant to the television medium. Among the areas examined were the abilities to discriminate among program types, to relate television content to real life experience, to recognize and recall character names and attributes, and to sequence story material (Jaglom, Wilder, and Fagre 1979; Robinson, Jaglom, and Wilder 1980; Vibbert, Jaglom, and Wilder 1980).
Tasks were designed to probe children's abilities in these various areas. For example, photographs of television fare were presented to the children and they were asked to place together the ones that "belong together," or, sometimes more specifically, to put "all the cartoons/commercials/news/kids' shows/etc. together." In this way, it is possible to uncover children's notions about a particular category and their ability to discriminate between various program types. Another frequently administered task consisted of a guessing game in which the child and experimenter alternated hiding television characters behind their backs, providing each other with clues regarding the character's attributes and guessing which character was hidden. In addition, information on the ways a televised segment was processed was obtained by asking children to order individual photographs from a single television bit or story. Symbolic or "pretense" play proved to be another revealing vehicle. The experimenter provided the necessary props for re-creating a scene viewed on television but little information as to how the story actually progressed. The child's reenactment was then studied for its verisimilitude to the televised segment and for the information it provided about the child's concept of specific characters, their prototypical behaviors and attributes, and of the format or sequence of television content in general (e.g., how television bits or shows begin and end, the fact that stories are often interrupted by commercials). During all biweekly visits, children's television program preferences were noted, and one-half hour of the child's natural television viewing was observed.

A supplementary method of data collection consisted of the viewing of videotapes of various types of television fare on a quarterly basis. Children were brought into the Media Center at the Harvard Graduate School of Education and were shown the tapes in a comfortable and natural setting. Presentation of these tapes to the population of subjects provided a systematic way of determining how children's understanding and experience of, and reaction to, the same types of television fare changed over the course of development. All sessions, both home visits and videotape sessions, were recorded on an audio cassette tape recorder. Children's viewing of videotapes was additionally recorded on videotape in order to preserve facial and physical reactions to various types of fare. Typed verbatim transcripts were kept of all sessions.

A final method of data collection relied on the parents' cooperative efforts as coresearchers. Parents participated in biweekly interviews with the experimenter and kept diaries of their children's television-related comments and experiences.

Television–Real Life Associations: Establishing Television's Symbolic Status

Analysis

All instances in which children related television content to real life experience, as well as all instances in which real life experience was related to television content, were extracted from transcripts of home visits and videotape sessions and also from parent diaries. The majority of associations were made spontaneously, though some were prompted by the parents' or experimenter's questions.

The children's associations were classified in terms of their directionality. An association made while viewing, from the television to the real world, was labeled a Television–Real Life (hereafter TV-RL) Association. An association made in the context of daily experience and related to content previously viewed on television was labeled a Real Life–Television (hereafter RL-TV) Association. TV-RL associations were recorded by both parents and the experimenter, while RL-TV associations, owing to their unpredictable nature, were recorded primarily by parents. The data were scrutinized and associations grouped into descriptive categories or types characterizing their various qualities. Associations were then examined at 6-month intervals for the frequency of the various categories described below. Some of these types of associations lend themselves to nonverbal association (e.g., noticing Similarities or imitation), while others are necessarily verbal (e.g., Statements of Representation or Differences).

Types of Associations. Two major types of associations were established: Investigating Similarities and Investigating Differences. Within these major categories were several subcategories. For example, in Investigating Similarities children made Over-generalizations which indicate a belief that televised events are identical to and have immediate and direct influence upon the child's own life and, concurrently, that the child can directly influence televised events. One such Over-generalization was a child's fear that a frightening television character was in his room. They also made Statements of Similarity, linking an object, event, or character in one world to a similar one in the other, but not necessarily indicating a belief that the two are identical. For example, one child saw a rubber duck in real life and associated it with one on Sesame Street saying, "Rubber ducky, just like Ernie's."

Children also applied information gained in one realm to similar situations in the other (Application); imitated or reproduced television situations (imitation); identified with television characters by linking themselves with those characters (Identification); made requests for televised objects, indicating an understanding that those objects exist and are available in the real world (Requests); and finally, made Statements of Representation, recognizing the fact that television programming sometimes
actually represents or provides information about real world events. In Investigating Differences between the two realms, children were found to make Statements of Differences, such as "That's a monster, that's just make-believe," recognizing that some characters or situations exist only on television and are not reproducible in the real world. They also asked questions about differences such as "Why is it night on TV and day here?" to help them determine the relationship between television and daily experience or to clarify an uncertainty about this relationship. They combined Similarities and Differences, recognizing similarities between situations or people in the two worlds but simultaneously recognizing discrepancies between those situations or people: making statements such as "I have a cat like the one on TV, but my cat doesn't talk." Finally, children over-differentiated between television and real life, overlooking all similarities and insisting that nothing on television is real or relates to the real world.

These categories of associations capture the fact that children are actively concerned with the nature of the membrane between the televised and real worlds. Children investigate similarities between the two (stressing the membrane as permeable), the differences between the two (stressing the membrane as impermeable), and the occasions on which there exist both similarities and

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differences (a membrane which we label semipermeable). Additionally, there are times when children magnify the reality status of television content in order to make it seem more like their own experience and perhaps easier to assimilate. They even attempt to act upon events occurring within a television set, overlooking the fact that there is an actual glass boundary separating the two worlds. At other times they perceive this boundary as so complete that they ignore all similarities, deny them even when they are readily apparent, and dismiss any possibility of transfer between the two realms.

Results

Each association category was examined in terms of the age at which it occurred most frequently both as a TV-RL association and as an RL-TV association. The frequency of occurrence of a particular type of association was computed yearly as a percentage of the total number of that type of association made across all three years. For example, 72 percent of all Over-generalizations occurred during the period from age 2:0 to age 2:11 as TV-RL associations, while only 12 percent occurred between 3:0 and 3:11 and 16 percent occurred between 4:0 and 4:11. Statements of Representation, however, occurred primarily (65 percent) during the children's fifth year (4:0 to 4:11), while only 7 percent occurred between ages 2:0 and 2:11 and only 28 percent occurred between ages 3:0 and 3:11. Detailed percentages may be obtained from a recent Project Zero report (Jaglom, Wilder, and Fagre 1979). A summary of the trends uncovered can be found in Table 1. In what follows we will review the principal trends by age.

1. Age two years to three years. Children were surprisingly competent and gave examples of most of the kinds of TV-RL associations in their third year of life. They acknowledged the frequent permeability of the membrane between the two worlds as well as noticing the times at which this same membrane was impermeable owing to lack of correspondence between television and real life. Nonetheless, there were a number of signs of incomplete understanding. For example, children made Over-generalizations. While exploring the similarities and differences between the two realms they often perceived parallels between them where parallels did not exist, indicating a belief that the two worlds are identical and denying television content's status as a symbol system. RL-TV associations were fewer than TV-RL associations (2:1 ratio) and did not necessarily follow the same patterns of frequency with age. Between the ages of 2 and 3 years, the majority of RL-TV Over-generalizations occurred, and, as with TV-RL associations, this type dropped off, though less sharply, after the age of 3 years. Increasingly, children went beyond simple statements of correspondence to import information from televised into real life situations.

2. Age three to four years. Children continued to make the types of associations which emerged at age 2 during the period from age 3:0 to 3:11. No new types appeared at this age, and Over-generalizations declined greatly in frequency. At this age children did begin to imitate and identify with television characters as RL-TV associations or when the television set was off and not serving as a direct stimulus. They performed whole scenes of television shows such as Gilligan's Island, Batman, and The Six-Million Dollar Man, indicating a fascination with these characters and a need to test out their roles and abilities in real life.

3. Age four to five years. The majority of children's Statements of Representation, all statements regarding both Similarities and Differences, and all Over-differentiations occurred between the ages of 4:0 and 4:11. In addition, children's first RL-TV Requests occurred at this age. Thus, 4-year-olds asked for objects they had seen advertised on television but which were not present at the time they made the request. They were also able to make statements such as "I have one of those [a cat] but mine doesn't talk" (Kathy, 4:5), and "The things on the news are real, they really happen" (John, 4:11). These types of statements indicate an understanding that television may actually represent or provide information about the real world, and a recognition of situations in which certain elements may correspond to real life situations while others may not correspond to real life in any way. In making Over-differentiations, children demonstrated an emerging belief that nothing on television is real or relates to real life.

Discussion

Certain general trends characterize our findings regarding the development of children's understanding of the symbolic status of television. TV-RL associations emerge consistently earlier than RL-TV associations, and they occur twice as frequently as well. This finding may be explained by the fact that when a TV-RL association is made, the stimulus for the association is immediately present, while for RL-TV associations, the television material must be internalized and the child must have a mental representation of it. In addition, the greater frequency of TV-RL associations than RL-TV associations may be illuminated by a consideration of Goodman's (1978) notion of worldmaking. If, as he suggests, world-making starts from worlds already available, then the fact that children are more concerned with comparing television to the real world rather than with comparing their daily experiences to television content is not surprising, as the child has had much less experience with the television world than with his own world. It is instructive, however, that even with the accumulation of many viewing hours, daily experience remains the point of reference for determining the status of television content.
Borrowing from linguistic theory, we can say that television continues to be the “marked” world while real life is “unmarked” (Clark 1973). At least in our population, television never acquires so dominant a position that daily experience begins to be compared to television content for determination of its reality status.

From the very first, children are aware that correspondence exists between the two worlds, that the membrane between them is permeable at times, and that in exploring the world of television, certain aspects of the real world may be useful. Concurrently, children this young are aware of instances marked by a lack of correspondence between the two worlds and realize that television content may exist in a different form in the real world or may not exist at all. Thus, they are aware that the membrane may also be impermeable at times and real experience may not be useful in understanding television at these times. We see an active and continuing effort to sort out the various contents of television and to relate them to information known in the “real” world. In Piaget’s terms (1954), there are perpetual efforts at assimilation and accommodation: the child seeks to assimilate televised information to the categories with which he cognitively processes daily experience, or, alternatively, to accommodate television information so that it becomes more readily congruent with knowledge gained in real world experiences.

Nonetheless, the children initially are confused about the actual relationship between events and objects that exist on both sides of the boundary. This confusion is emphasized in the Over-generalizations which characterize this age. Children indicate a belief that the two spheres are identical, not separate and self-contained. The membrane is perceived, at these times, as fully permeable; the glass screen and electronic images of the television world are overlooked. Television’s status as a conveyor of a symbol system and a world with an order and meaning of its own has not yet been established fully in the child’s mind.

At the same time, however, children appear to be testing their belief in the similarities between the two worlds by assuming the roles of television characters and making statements about wanting to be like them. For example, one child, while watching The Three Stooges, began throwing punches at his mother just as the three stooges were doing to each other. Children seem to be determining whether they can take on some of the characteristics of television personalities, or whether the boundary between the two worlds is too rigid and the characters totally unreal. In sum, the child between the ages of 2 and 3 is aware of the membrane but is more impressed with its permeability than its impermeability. He even perceives parallels, points of permeability, and direct relationships which do not exist.

By age 3, children have realized that they cannot influence events occurring within the television set, and although some fears of television content persist and may even magnify, children have, for the most part, realized that events or characters visible on television cannot immediately affect them. Over-generalizations fade; the boundary between the two worlds has at least provisionally been formed; the lack of immediate, direct, total correspondence between the two worlds has been recognized; “communicational meaning” has been attributed to television content.

At this age children also begin to make statements indicating identification with television personalities and to imitate television characters outside the television context. For example, they act out whole scenes from their favorite shows without having seen the show that day. They discover that some similarities exist between television and their own lives or personalities, that some characteristics may exist or be reproduced in the real world, but that others are fantastic and do not exist across the membrane. A lack of direct stimulus may explain why these types of statements and role-modeling cluster a year later for RL-TV associations than for TV-RL associations. Without television as a direct stimulus, the child must internalize the character roles and personalities in order to emulate their behaviors. Such internalization requires considerable mental representation and seems more sophisticated a function than simply copying behaviors straight off the screen.

At age 4, children begin perceiving subtleties in the relationship between television and daily experience. They start to understand some of the ways in which the two worlds actually relate, how the permeable and impermeable parts of the membrane combine, and how content in one realm may have direct influence upon or applicability to the corresponding content in the other realm. These more sophisticated perceptions are indicated by the appearance of statements introducing both Similarities and Differences and Statements of Representation, such as “the news tells what’s really happening in the city.”

Concurrently, however, a new problem arises for children at age 4. They have developed a rule with which they override this newly acquired understanding of the membrane’s permeability: “Nothing on television is real,” regardless of the extent to which it parallels real life. This appearance of Over-differentiation at age 4½ indicates two things: first, that the 4-year-old’s definition of the word “real” differs from that of an adult; and second, that this definition involves an awareness of a boundary which radically separates television from a mundane perception of reality and the real world. This total rejection of any relation between the “real” and the “representational” world is reminiscent of the tendency among children of a somewhat older age to reject any kind of figurative language or nonrepresentational graphic depiction in favor of literal descriptions (Gardner and Winner, forthcoming).
Development of a Classification System: Establishing Membranes within the Television World

Analysis

All instances in which children attempted to classify or distinguish between types of television content were extracted from the transcripts. This information included spontaneous remarks made by the subjects while watching television or playing with television-related toys as well as their responses to probes made by the experimenter. These structured probes by the experimenter were of two types. The first involved a task situation in which children were asked to sort piles of photographs of television fare into specific groups, or to re-create various types of television action with props inside the wooden television frame. In the second structured situation, the experimenter asked questions regarding the specific shows being watched during the particular session.

All statements, bits of information, or items pertaining to categories used by adults to classify the elements of the television world were first grouped according to the specific categories to which they pertained. These categories were cartoons, advertisements, news, shows designed for viewing by adults, those designed for viewing by children, and a subcategory of children’s shows, *Sesame Street*. This last subcategory was included because many of the children’s first attempts at classification were found to revolve around the identification of *Sesame Street* segments.

Data were examined in 6-month intervals. In the first step of analysis, we examined the ages at which each of the three children mastered the specific adult-perceived program categories as well as the average age of mastery across all three children. Next, we turned our attention to the process by which these categories are created: we investigated children’s recognition of show beginnings, endings, and interruptions, their knowledge of show scheduling, their understanding of character-show connections, and their use of various cues (e.g., theme songs, station logos) in classifying the television world. These abilities were believed to be important markers in the task of sorting out the seemingly ceaseless and disorderly progression of images across the television screen.

Children’s abilities to separate shows into categories were traced by use of strict definitions of program types. These types were defined by their content and explicit purpose independent of their visual appearance and formats. For example, an animated advertisement may look like a cartoon, but its content indicates that it is an advertisement as well. Conversely, cartoons and other children’s programs often share the same intent but differ in form.

The fact that two program types may be classified in two words is an understandable source of confusion to children, as Piaget’s work on the intersection of classes has documented (Inhelder and Piaget 1964). Items indicating such confusion were labeled “duals.” As described below, items were considered to demonstrate correct understanding of program type or incorrect understanding, or they were considered to be “dual” in nature (see examples below). Understanding was incorrect when any part of a statement or action violated the commonly accepted definition of a category; correct when it corresponded to the commonly accepted notion of that category; “dual correct” (dc) when children focused on the content of a show rather than or in conjunction with its visual appearance (e.g., an animated advertisement is an advertisement even though it looks like a cartoon); and “dual incorrect” (di) when the visual appearance of the show or show characters took precedence over the content of the show (e.g., since Flip Wilson or Fonzie is on *Sesame Street*, it is not *Sesame Street*).

The child received credit for category recognition when judgments about this category were consistently greater than 75 percent correct. Independent judges obtained reliability of 92.5 percent in the correct, incorrect, and dual assignment of items. Final scores were agreed upon through discussion of individual items.

It should be noted that classification tasks were especially important in uncovering the point at which children seemed to distinguish correctly the program categories. In this task, children were given five to nine pictures from television shows and were asked either to free-sort them or to make piles of specific categories. Many of the children’s category judgments were also made spontaneously, as can be seen in the examples given below (Note: i = incorrect, c = correct):

**News example** (c): Child says “That’s the news,” having heard only the news audio from the television screen. The picture had not come in yet. (Donny, 4:6)

**Children’s-show example** (i): Child labels all the shows he watches “kids’ shows” and he watches some adult shows such as soaps and news. (Donny, 2:11)

**Sesame Street example** (i): Child says that only the bits with puppets are *Sesame Street* and denies that anything else is on *Sesame Street*. (Kathy, 2:1; Donny, 2:11)

**Sesame Street example** (c): Child identifies all *Sesame Street* bits on videotape which consist of gamut of types of television fare. (Donny, 4:6)
Category Acquisition

1. Results. The 6-month interval during which each child consistently began to distinguish each category correctly more than 75 percent of the time is presented in Table 2. The average 6-month interval across all three children during which each category was correctly distinguished from the others is given as well. In addition, the ages at which dual items were consistently identified in terms of show content or intent as opposed to visual appearance are indicated for each child in Table 3. The two predominant dual situations were cases in which animated advertisements were compared with cartoons and those in which animated Sesame Street bits were confused with cartoons. Kathy also demonstrated some confusion when characters from other shows appeared on Sesame Street. At these times, Kathy denied the fact that the show was Sesame Street until she reached age 4:5 when she consistently took content into account over visual or character appearance.

Table 2
Age of Acquisition of Principal Program Distinctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Age of Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Although Donny obtained 75% during this interval, he exhibited confusion between news shows and ads during the 4:7 to 4:11 interval.

Table 3
Age at which Dual Items Are Correctly Classified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Dual</th>
<th>John</th>
<th>Kathy</th>
<th>Donny</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animated Advertisements vs. Cartoons</td>
<td>4:6</td>
<td>4:2</td>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>4:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animated &quot;Sesame Street&quot; vs. Cartoons</td>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>4:2</td>
<td>4:2½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Discussion. When the three children's ages of acquisition are averaged, advertisements constitute the first category acquired. There are several possible explanations for the early mastery of this category. First, exposure may play a large role. Unless there are children who watch only public broadcasting, all children are exposed to many advertisements regardless of their specific program preferences. Second, appeal may be an important factor in that many advertisements, especially those broadcast during children's programs, are designed expressly to appeal to children. Their fast pace and short length or formal features may capture children's attention, and their overall format may stand out for children, making a boundary separating them from other show types easier to distinguish (Lorch, Anderson, and Levin 1979; Watkins et al. 1980).

Finally, it is possible that the disruptive nature of advertisements may stand out for children in that they interrupt their shows and cause their favorite characters to
disappear temporarily from the screen. In our observations of the subjects of this study we have found that, in their second year, the disappearance of characters is a source of consternation. Children become very upset and sometimes even cry when their favorite television personalities leave the screen. Advertisements may then be identified easily by children as the disruptive part of television which causes shows and their favorite personalities to vanish. Any one of these explanations or a combination of them may explain the fact that the boundary separating advertisements from other television shows is the first boundary to be established and perceived by children in their attempt to organize the world of television.

The order in which the children acquired the cartoon and *Sesame Street* categories conforms to the “exposure” hypothesis described above. John and Donny both distinguished cartoons before they did *Sesame Street*, while Kathy distinguished *Sesame Street* before she did cartoons. John and Donny also both watched an enormous number of hours of cartoons from the time they were 2 years old, and though they did watch *Sesame Street* quite regularly, the total number of *Sesame Street* hours did not even approach the number of cartoon hours. Kathy, on the other hand, was not allowed to watch cartoons until she was over 3 years old, while from the age of 2 she watched *Sesame Street* religiously and loved it. The exposure hypothesis would thus, at least partially, account for the order of acquisition of these two categories or boundaries. Format and visual appearance may also play an important role here. Cartoons are animated and their visual appearance may also play an important role here. Any deviation from a show’s regular hours did not even approach the number of cartoon hours. Kathy, on the other hand, was not allowed to watch cartoons until she was over 3 years old, while from the age of 2 she watched *Sesame Street* religiously and loved it. The exposure hypothesis would thus, at least partially, account for the order of acquisition of these two categories or boundaries. Format and visual appearance may also play an important role here. Cartoons are animated and their visual appearance is radically different from that of any other type of show. Thus, cartoons would be more easily distinguishable in that children would need only glance at the screen or at a picture of a show, attend to its visual features, identify it as animated, and label it a cartoon.

The salience of the visual appearance of cartoons for young children is supported by the fact that in the majority of the dual items children consistently labeled a show a cartoon until they were 4:0, regardless of the category in which the animated item actually belonged (*Sesame Street*, advertisements, or cartoons). The visual appearance was salient for all three children, although the content or information provided within that visual and/or audio format was secondary and often even ignored. Furthermore, the fact that *Sesame Street* was acquired later than cartoons may be explained by its use of a magazine format incorporating segments with diverse visual formats and character types. Although children may watch this show regularly from a very early age, it is not surprising that they have difficulty identifying its many different elements as being part of a single show. Indeed, the specific bits on *Sesame Street* may be viewed as instances of readily learnable “basic objects,” while the overall category of *Sesame Street* represents the “more difficult to learn” superordinate category (Rosch et al. 1976).

The categories of children’s and adult shows are acquired relatively late. Furthermore, when acquired, these categories are defined egocentrically as “shows I watch” and “shows Mommy and Daddy watch.” Both these findings are instructive since, as will be seen shortly, children do not grasp abstract concepts such as producer’s intent or target audience until past the age of 4. They seem unable to transcend their personal experiences to consider the motives or intentions of such remote figures as the producers of programs. In addition, children’s and adult shows may be thought of as “superordinate categories,” ones which contain heterogeneous mixtures of all the shows designed for and watched by either children or adults. In the first few years of attempting to sort out the confusing elements of the television world, children are concentrating on making distinctions between shows. It follows, then, that children are initially more aware of the obvious differences between shows such as *Happy Days* and The *Flinstones* (e.g., nonanimated vs. animated) and have difficulty grouping them on the basis of the relative abstract similarity which obtains among children’s shows.

The exposure hypothesis would appear to account for the late acquisition of the news category. All children had an open aversion to watching the news; they avoided it at all costs. This implies that they must have recognized it when it came on the screen, since they were consistent in their statements of dislike. When shown pictures of various types of programming, however, children often could not identify the news shows and demonstrated confusion between news shows and commercials. Perhaps, while viewing, children were so quick to turn away from news shows that they did not absorb their entire format. The evidence indicates that children also did not fully absorb news content until age 4:5, at which point they were able to describe its purpose and its relationship to the real world.

Other Findings

1. Television characters. Television characters appear to play a large role in the development of children’s understanding of the organization of the television world. Changes in children’s perceptions of television personalities as organizing elements are described below.

   (a) Two to three years. Children appear to be quite confused about the status of television characters during this year of development, but characters appear to play a large role in the 2-year-old’s conception of the world of television. Any deviation from a show’s regular cast bewilders the child and causes him to question
even a very familiar show's identity. Prototypical and preferred characters were focused on in identifying specific shows. Concurrently, and somewhat paradoxically, children's conceptions of individual shows and the boundaries between them are very insecure, and characters are perceived as being independent of their shows. They are believed to be able to appear on any channel at any time, roaming throughout television-land. Thus Roosevelt Franklin, a Sesame Street character, can appear on Mister Rogers, a child would say, but if this were to occur, the same child might very well deny that the show was, in fact, Mister Rogers.

(b) Three to four years. Our evidence suggests that, by this time, characters are perceived as belonging to specific programs. Donny, at 3:5, for example, correctly listed the characters in The Flintstones and Family Affair, and when he saw Big Bird and Grover on a game show at 3:2, John assured his mother that they would return to Sesame Street. Indeed, shows are now identified not only by attractive characters but by other elements (e.g., format, content) as well.

(c) Four to five years. There appear to be several elements of confusion for the 4- and 5-year-olds bent on exploring links between characters and their shows. First, most television characters do belong to specific shows and children appear to have grasped this fact by age 4. Television characters are, however, all on film and therefore potentially can be filmed on any show, on any channel, and with any other characters. This is where children encounter difficulties. By age 4 they know that characters are primarily associated with one show, but they often encounter televised situations in which a character appears on a show other than his own. Unaware of the technology and mechanics behind television production, they have trouble recognizing the flexible, manipulable link between characters and their shows and are hesitant to suggest that such situations—a character appearing on several shows—can occur. These situations violate their newly formed boundaries between programs and program types.

2. Producer's intent / target audiences. We have seen that by age 5, children have acquired several categories in which to organize the many types of television fare. The data suggest, however, that although boundaries may be established between certain types of programming, the various purposes or intentions of television production teams may not be understood. Advertisements may be the first correctly distinguished category, but as late as age 5, children do not appear to understand that their primary purpose is selling products. Children make requests for advertised products as early as age 3, yet when asked what advertisements do, children say that they "do nothing" (Donny, 5:2), and that they are "for no one and for nothing" (John, 4:6). Although children occasionally demonstrate some understanding of the intent of commercials—"want you to eat them [Hershey's chocolate]" (John, 4:9), or they "tell you what you can get and what's on" (Donny, 4:3)—there are as many examples which clearly indicate a lack of such understanding—"Ads do not want you to buy anything" (Kathy, 4:10) and "You can't get those cookies" (John, 5:1). This denial of the selling motive may reflect or mimic parental statements that all advertised products are not necessarily available to children, but it may also reflect a genuine misunderstanding.

The purpose of previews, a special type of advertisement which attempts to sell television programming, seems to be grasped by children earlier than the purpose of normal advertisements for goods and services. Children are able to explain the fact that previews tell you what a show will be about and when it will be on by late in their third year. The early understanding of this particular type of advertisement may be accounted for by the fact that children's television viewing is directly affected by them. Somewhat fancifully, we might regard previews as hypotheses which are confirmed by subsequent data (Kagan, Kearsley, and Zelazo 1978). A preview announces a show, the show appears, at which point the previews cease to appear. This is a straightforward, identifiable sequence of events. Moreover, while most ads suggest behaviors to be carried out in the external world, previews stand out as an instruction to carry out a television-specific behavior.

Children appear to understand the purpose of the news at the same time that they master the category. By age 4:5, children relate the news to the real world and appear to understand its role—providing information about the real world. For example, Donny, at 4:7, said that the news "tells real city life, the weather, dangerous things like cigarettes" and John, at 4:5, said that the news is about "real guys, the weather. It's a real show."

As late as age 5, children define the children's and adult show categories according to what they watch and what their parents watch. Although application of this classification may often lead to a correct classification, it is egocentric and does not take the producer's intent into account; at other times, therefore, use of this definition leads to incorrect categorizations. For example, if a child watches soap operas with his mother every day, he will put soap operas into both the children's and the adult show categories, even though soap operas are not intended for children but solely for adult audiences.

These findings suggest that, while children may, by the age of 4, organize the world of television in terms of certain program categories, they use concrete elements such as costumes or locations to define these categories. More abstract concepts, such as the producer's intent and target audience, and superordinate categories, such as children's or adult shows, are more difficult for children and are only begun to be comprehended after age 4.
3. Temporal organization of television. Within this category data were included that indicated children's knowledge of television schedules in terms of the sequences of shows, relevance to their own lives, or personal schedules (e.g., Sesame Street is on during dinner) as well as their recognition of the beginnings, endings, and interruptions (e.g., commercial breaks) of shows.

(a) Two to three years. During this year, children's conception of television's temporal organization is quite undeveloped. Television shows are perceived as continuously available throughout the day, and show endings are often not recognized and are confused with commercial breaks. In addition, children are concerned with the disappearance of characters from the screen. They appear to reassure themselves by mimicking television language such as "They'll be right back" when shows are over as well as when they are interrupted by commercials.

Eventually, children between the ages of 2 and 3 do begin to master the sequence in which their favorite shows appear, but this knowledge is mostly limited to that small number of shows which they watch most frequently.

(b) Three to four years. At this age, children still appear quite confused as to the timing and beginnings and endings of television shows. Children still have difficulty accepting the fact that they cannot control this medium, that the timing and availability of their favorite fare is completely out of their hands and even out of the hands of their parents. They have not fully identified television as a conveyer of symbol systems, a separate world with its own rules and schedules, and, indeed, as a symbol scheme in its own right.

Concurrently, however, children begin to decode some of those rules. They recognize the beginnings and endings of their favorite shows, especially when a theme song is played, providing them with a clear cue. They begin to expand their knowledge of show schedules by associating particular shows with general time of day. They note previews which inform viewers of scheduling changes and begin to make comments such as "They're coming back" only at such appropriate times as during commercial breaks. Just as children are beginning to establish categories for and boundaries between types of television fare during this year, they are also beginning to recognize temporal boundaries and rules which organize and regulate the television world.

(c) Four to five years. Children display far more knowledge of television scheduling during this year. They are able to make distinctions between shows which are on every day (e.g., the news), those which are not (e.g., basketball), and specials which take the place of regularly scheduled shows and are on only rarely. They are often able to state the specific days and times at which various programs are broadcast.

Children have also incorporated the mutually exclusive relationship between advertisements and shows, making statements such as "when shows come off, ads come on" (Donny, 4:4; John, 4:6). Concurrently, they correctly identify those commercials which interrupt a program and those which signal the end of one program and the beginning of another. Children have become consistently correct in their recognition of show beginnings and endings, expanding the cues they use from songs alone to include logos, station signals, credits, and advertisements.

By the age of 5, children have become quite sophisticated in their comprehension of the temporal organization of the television world. They have been exposed to a great deal of television fare and have, with considerable success, unraveled the confusion of show segments, interruptions, and the connections between show times and real world times and events. They have established boundaries not only between television and real life and between various show types, but between elements within those show types as well. They have successfully begun to decode the symbol scheme of television, acquiring an understanding of its temporal rules and organization.

Conclusions: The Emergence of Membranes

Our guiding assumption, that children with little exposure to television would lack the cognitive structures necessary for assimilating its diverse images and sounds, has proved useful. As with the development of other symbolic capacities, such as language or storytelling, children appear to progress through a series of developmental stages in determining both television's relationship to their own world and the organizational system employed by the medium. Given the nature of this study, we have examined this development in terms of the changes which occur during each year of a 3-year period. As a means of recapitulating our findings, we present here the phases of development observed during these 3 years.

PHASE I Television's Initial Potency: The Lack of Boundaries

The 2-year-old experiences a great deal of confusion around the world of television. The images and sounds emerging from this box are new and chaotic. Yet the television is clearly a forceful, stimulating part of the child's daily life. It may often even be considered a member of the family. As such, it demands respect and, ultimately, understanding.
Of course, television is merely a physical object, not a literal family member. Its relation to daily life is complex, however. Sol Worth stated, "It should be obvious that, just as pictures are not simple mirrors of what is out there, neither are they artifacts which have no relation whatsoever to what they are pictures of" (1980). To the 2-year-old, this concept is not quite so obvious. Children of this age are actively attempting to determine television's role in their home, its relation to the real world. They see a box with some buttons and a piece of glass, containing many kinds of people, objects, and events. Some of these types of people, objects, and situations they have seen before, and they comment upon that fact. Others they have never seen before and comment on them as well. In their attempt to determine television's reality status, children of this age appear to be more aware of the similarities than of the differences between the two worlds. Often they perceive similarities where they do not actually exist. Children are attracted to the characters on television and perceive them as readily accessible to provide laps on which to sit, to receive kisses, and to accept help from the viewer in solving problems with which they are faced.

Even at this early stage children are beginning to become aware of a boundary, or membrane, between themselves and the world presented on television. At this time, however, the membrane is viewed as primarily permeable rather than impermeable. In fact, children of this age often behave in ways which indicate that they at times question the very existence of that boundary. Television is not yet understood to be a conveyor of symbol systems, and its characters are perceived as real life people, not as electronic images out of their viewers' reaches and control.

The boundaries which organize the inner world of television are perceived no more clearly than those separating television from real life. The various types of programming are not distinguished from one another, television shows are believed to be available at any hour that the child wants to see them, show beginnings and endings are not recognized, television characters are considered able to appear on any show, at any time, and their disappearance from the screen disturbs children greatly. Not only is the television world viewed as part of the child's own world, but its contents are viewed as a mélange without any organization and under the control of children and their parents.

This phase is thus characterized by a lack of boundaries. Television's symbolic status has not been established, and its symbolic status has not been decoded. As children acquire greater experience with this medium, however, they discover that their attempt to influence it directly is unsuccessful and they are forced to reorganize their conception of it. Near the end of this first phase of development and during the next year, children begin to recognize that there are separate television shows, that they can be identified most easily by their characters, and that the sequence in which they appear is consistent. These findings conform to claims in the classification research that children as young as age 2 have acquired rudimentary classification abilities (Goldberg, Perlmutter, and Myers 1974; Ricciuti 1965). Inasmuch as the programs and symbolic codes of television can be quite confusing, this is a remarkable achievement.

**PHASE II The Symbol System Established: Decoding Begins**

Between the ages of 3 and 4 years, children recognize the fact that the television world is in fact separate from their own. Its events do not actually exist in reality; they cannot be acted upon directly. Rather, they have communicational significance. Television presents a separate world with its own rules and organization. But this world does at times relate to experiences children have encountered in real life, and its organizational system parallels certain systems of organization they have encountered previously.

Children acknowledge that there are events on television similar to those in real life. The membrane between the two worlds is permeable at these times. The televised events often symbolize or communicate real world events. Children learn that there are other events which never occur in real life. At these times the membrane is viewed as impermeable.

Children also learn that people have developed a language to help describe television's inner organization. They begin to acquire definitions of some of the words of this language—advertisements, cartoons, *Sesame Street*—and come to understand that these words serve to impose boundaries within the television world. As used by the children, these first classifications seem to reflect immediately perceptible features (Denney and Acito 1975; Rossi and Rossi 1965). For a time, children perceive the boundaries between classes as rigid. A show can be in one category or another and a character can be on one show or another, never in or on more than one. As children begin to decode the rules of this symbolic system, they adhere to them strictly, consider one element at a time, and are loath to acknowledge exceptions.

Yet, although children have begun to decode television's structure, they still remain confused about many aspects. For instance, they still have difficulty recognizing show beginnings and endings, finding it difficult and frustrating to accept the lack of control of this aspect of the medium.
PHASE III  The Subtleties of Television's Symbolic Status: Emergence of Flexible Categorizing

During the year spanning age 4 to age 5, children accumulate evidence that their cognitive schema is too rigid: as a result, they relax the boundary between the worlds of television and daily reality. They recognize the membrane as a filter, having both permeable and impermeable components. A televised event may refer in part to a real world event, but in part it may deviate from anything possible in real life.

Consider John's response to seeing Donald Duck on television at age 4:10. He said that Donald Duck was like his family's ducks, but his family's are a different color and real. Donny at 4:11 sees a school on television and comments on its relationship to his own school, but says, "Mine isn't like this one, mine has toys." Such instances document the ability of children to overcome, to some extent, the centration which characterizes this age and to examine two aspects of a televised presentation at one time. Their mental representations of televised objects, people, and events may now involve more than a single element.

Along with their more sophisticated conception of television's reality status, children between the ages of 4 and 5 advance in their understanding of its structure as well. More categories of program types are established—news, children's shows, and adult shows—and the scheduling of shows is more clearly understood. Children seem to relinquish finally the notion of controlling the timing of shows and recognize the various cues which represent boundaries between or beginnings and endings of individual programs.

Work for the Future

Our preschoolers have come a long way from their initial perception of television as an extension of real life and as an amalgam of confusing images. They have established certain subtleties of its relation to their own world, and they have at least partially mastered the modes of organization built into it. Despite the hypothesized greater difficulty in making sense of the world of television, in contrast to the natural or social world, our subjects display principles of cognitive development which have been reported by investigators of other domains. That is, in defining a line between what is symbolized on television and what is encountered in daily experience, the children pass through the same steps they pass through in coming to understand other kinds of mediated presentations (Gardner 1973). And, in effecting distinctions among the dizzying multiplicity of shows presented on television, children once again exhibit the basic tendencies to classify reported by previous investigators.

Nonetheless, the unique nature of television, and the special problems it poses, are noticeable in children's early viewing experiences and will continue to be felt in a number of areas. To begin with, children need to acquire some degree of understanding of the technology behind television. This understanding will enable them to comprehend better the flexible link between characters and their shows and the ability of characters to appear on more than one show. It will also enable them to understand better the role of production teams, that they are the ones who control the programs and the characters on them. At the same time, they will acquire an understanding of the concepts of producer's intent and target audiences—the fact that the people who make the films projected on television also design those films to be watched by certain types of people.

As children's ability to classify continues to develop, and as this meshes with greater understanding of the nature of the medium, they will be able to evolve a more sophisticated classification system, that conceived by the makers of television. They will distinguish between shows designed to make people laugh (comedies); shows designed to frighten people (thrillers); those designed to teach (educational shows and documentaries); and those designed to entertain (serials, dramas, etc.). Children will also be expected to become more flexible in their perception of these categories, to recognize that certain programs may fall into more than one category and that exceptions to the definitions of categories may exist. Such understandings will allow children to apprehend shows in the manner in which they were intended and thereby to avoid potentially misleading confusions between, for example, documentaries and fictionalized history, or between children's shows and satires of children's shows. Much recent work suggests that youngsters (and even adults) may adhere to these confusions unless they are explicitly tutored about the lines that separate potentially interchangeable kinds of shows (Gardner, in press).

In addition, children will develop the ability to make more sophisticated distinctions between reality and fantasy. They will acquire an awareness of varying levels of reality, the contrast between surface reality and underlying psychological reality, the ambiguous reality statuses of characters such as superheroes, and the concept of stagedness—the fact that certain content is presented specifically for television and is rehearsed, scripted, and nonspontaneous. Indeed, such reality-fantasy distinctions in older children have been documented by Morrison, Kelly, and Gardner (1980).

The agenda for the ultimate mastery of television remains formidable. All the same, the attainments during the first few years are so staggering that the ultimate mastery of these distinctions falls within the purview of every normal individual.
Acknowledgments

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We would like to thank the children and parents involved in the project for their cooperation, help, and enthusiasm. We also owe thanks to other members of Project Zero—Cindy Char, Anitra Fagre, David Fernie, Hope Kelly, Laurene Meringoff, Shari Robinson, Martha Vibbert, and Paula Wilder—for their help with the study.

Note

1 By use of this method of scoring, certain objective information was lost. For example, children might have a different set of definitions, or they might have an internally consistent way of classifying which differs from the classification system used by adults. Though aware of this possibility, we felt it would be more useful to employ an objective format in scoring. Given this decision, adult definitions of these program types appeared the most consistent.

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Photographs of the Piegan by Roland Reed' (Photo Essay)

Editor's Introduction: Jay Ruby

By the end of the nineteenth century the era of photographic exploration gave way to a period of photographic documentation. We were becoming aware that our natural resources, physical and human, were being irrevocably altered by the advance of civilization. Through the photographs of William Henry Jackson and the other explorer photographers we had discovered the beauty of the West and were now concerned for its preservation.

As western expansion caused us to come into increasingly less hostile contact with Native Americans, some people began to view them not as savages to exterminated, or if possible converted to a civilized state, but as remnants of a "vanishing race" whose style of life must be recorded and preserved before it goes away.

Journalists, novelists, anthropologists, and photographers all shared in the desire to do salvage ethnography, to find the last remaining person who could recall the good old days, to collect the art and artifacts for museums, and to obtain photographic images of their nobility.

During the first quarter of this century dozens of people devoted their lives and fortunes to making a photographic record of the Native American. Many of these images are lost forever; most are scarcely known, and only a very few have been subjected to any rigorous study. While most people are aware of the work of Edward Curtis, virtually no one knows the photographs of Roland Reed. A glance at the images reproduced here makes a strong case for the idea that popularity and obscurity are often due more to the whim of history and happenstance than the merits of the works. Curtis traveled in influential circles and obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars from men like J. Pierpont Morgan to support his work. Consequently, he was able to produce a monumental study. Reed had no support outside of his own savings and the revenue from the sale of his photographs. Most of his photographs were never published in any form.

Roland Reed was born of Scottish ancestry in 1864 in a log cabin on his parent's farm in the Fox River Valley in Wisconsin. A trail used by the Menominee Indians to travel from Lake Poygan to Fond du Lac ran close to his home. In the notes which have survived with his photographs Reed wrote about his early experiences with Native Americans.

A band of Menominies lived on the north shore of Lake Poygan directly across from my home. In the spring of 1871, my schoolteacher and two of his pupils—boys about sixteen years old—took a canoe and went across the lake to gather some evergreens to decorate the schoolroom. Returning, their overloaded canoe overturned and the teacher was drowned. When nearly exhausted, [the boys] were discovered by three Indians who brought them ashore, made some hot broth for them, and then dug a hole deep in a haystack where they stayed the night. This the Indians did to bring back their circulation and warm them up. I knew these Indians well, especially one called Thundercloud who was chief of this band and who, after the rescue of the boys, became the hero of my boyhood days. Undoubtedly, this incident stimulated in me a regard for the Indian which has grown with the years.

Reed left home at an early age to seek the adventures and fortunes that many Americans believed existed "out there" somewhere. He traveled and worked in Canada, the Midwest, and the Southwest. By now his interest in Indian life had grown.

I don't know why, but no trip I could plan satisfied me unless it led into Indian country.

By 1890 Reed began to make crayon and pencil drawings, mainly portraits of Indians and landscapes. None of these sketches has survived. But we do know that he made these drawings along the route of the Great Northern Railroad and that the Blackfeet people of Montana were among his earliest subjects. Dissatisfied with his own artistry, Reed contemplated the possibility of using a camera.

If I could master this seemingly easy way of making pictures, I would have no trouble in getting all the Indian pictures I wanted.

In 1893 Reed became an apprentice to Daniel Dutro, Civil War veteran, prospector, and traveling photographer. For the next four years Reed and Dutro traveled together from town to town doing portrait work and selling some photographs of Indians to the News Department of the Great Northern Railroad.

Reed left Dutro in 1897 to photograph the Alaskan Gold Rush. In addition to covering the event for Associated Press, Reed attempted to photograph Indians in Alaska. However, they did not appeal to him.

They made such a poor impression on me that I left for the states on the first ship south in the spring without making any pictures worthwhile.

Jay Ruby is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Temple University and Co-Editor of Studies in Visual Communication.
Roland Reed (date unknown).

Reed returned to the States and in 1890 founded a photographic studio in Bemidji, Minnesota (later he also opened one in Ortonville) near the Ojibway people. Reed's portrait business prospered and enabled him to pursue on a part-time basis the photographing of some Ojibway. Reed recounts his early attempts at gaining rapport after an initial rejection.

"I stayed on thinking something would happen to soften their distaste for me, and it did at last.

"One morning two small girls came in and asked if I would take a picture of their brother who was sick—maybe dying." Reed went with them to their camp and photographed the little boy, but the next day he left for Bemidji. It was several months before he made a second trip to the Ponemah village—carrying a print of the Indian lad. As soon as the father of the boy learned he was back, he approached Reed, asking if he had brought a picture of his son. Reed handed the print to him. The Indian walked away with the picture and stood for some time with his back to Reed, looking at it. Then he returned to the photographer and asked the cost of the portrait. Reed replied by asking about the boy. The child was dead, he learned. Reed quietly told the father that he was glad he had been able to make the picture in time and that it was a gift. He wrote: "That fine old father gave me his hand, and from that time on, I was welcome to any part of Cross Lake Point."

[Johnston 1979:]

By 1907 the conflict between earning a living photographing the middle class of small towns in Minnesota and documenting the rapidly changing traditions of the American Indian became unbearable. Reed closed his studio and devoted the remainder of his life to producing a photographic record of Indian life. Using an 11 by 14 glass-plate camera Reed photographed the Chippewa or Ojibway, the Blackfeet (Piegans and Blood divisions), the Cheyenne, the Crow, the Navajo, and the Hopi.
Reed was not a prolific photographer. According to Johnston "his first three years among the Indians produced scarcely a score of negative. Reed considered a dozen superior photographs a worthwhile reward for a year's effort" (1979:56).

Reed did gain some recognition for one picture, "The Pottery Maker" (Hopi) by winning a gold medal in 1915 at the Panama-California Exposition. Between his savings, and the monies received from the sale of his Indian photographs to the National Geographic (the only authorized publication source for his work), Reed was able to survive with some integrity. According to Johnston, he once refused an offer of $15,000 from an advertising firm for 200 of his negatives (1979:56).

Apparently Reed planned to publish a volume of his Indian photographs. His plans for the book together with any diaries, journals, or extensive field notes have not survived. We have only his photographs, negatives, a few letters, and some brief notes to reconstruct his life and work.

It is not certain exactly how Reed worked, but in a letter he describes some of his procedures:

In approaching the Indian for the purpose of taking his picture, it is necessary to respect his stoicism and reticence which have so often been the despair of the amateur photographer. A friend once characterized my method of attack as indicative of Chinese patience, book-agent persistence, and Arab subtlety. In going into a new tribe with photographic paraphernalia, although I hire ponies and guides, I never once suggest the object of my visit.

When the Indians, out of curiosity, at last inquire about my work, I reply casually, "Oh, when I'm at home, I'm a picture-taking man." Perhaps within a few days an Indian will ask, "You say you are a picture-taking man. Could you make our pictures?" My reply is non-committal—"I don't know. Perhaps." "Would you try?" "Sometime, when I feel like making pictures." Further time elapses; apparently the picture-taking man has forgotten all about making pictures until an Indian friend reminds him of his promise. Then the time for picture-making has arrived.

And in a rare note Reed describes the actual taking of a particular photograph in 1908.

The two Chippewas, in full hunting regalia, were monotonously paddling a canoe back and forth over the blue waters of a lake in northern Minnesota. I had the bow Indian stolidly discharging an arrow at a certain buoy each time the birchbark passed it. "More life to it, Yellow Face," I cried. "You wouldn't shoot a deer in that fashion!" "I'm not shooting a deer," he replied, "I am shooting a tree." "Imagine a deer," I rejoined. "Think you see a deer swimming, trying to get away. How can I see a deer when there is no deer?" he quietly came back at me.

To this there was no answer. The afternoon light was growing yellow but the shadows and reflections in the shining lake were at their best. I had been paying these fellows a regular wage for three days in an effort to get this one picture. Suddenly I drew out a handful of silver dollars and stuck them targetwise in the crevices of the tree bark. "Make one more round, Yellow Face, while the light lasts," I shouted. "Shoot at these silver dollars as you pass the buoy. Every one you knock down is yours." On the next round the archer's eyes blazed with a savage light; his body quivered with all of the thrill of the hunt as he centered five silver dollars with seven whizzing shafts. When it was over the air still hummed with the twang of his bowstring, and I was out five dollars, but I had one of the very few animated Indian photographs in existence.

By 1932 Reed concluded "that it was no longer possible to obtain authentic Indian pictures, the Indians' historic costumes and accoutrements had all been sold to tourists, and few examples of pure racial types were still alive" (Johnston 1979:54).

After his death in 1934 Reed's collection was given to his cousin Roy E. Williams, who used it in lectures to school children. Recently the entire collection was acquired by the Kramer Gallery in St. Paul, Minnesota. They are currently in the process of conserving the collection and making it available to the public.

The photographs contained in this essay were selected from the 70-odd negatives that remain of Reed's work among the Chippewa, the Cheyenne, and especially the Piegan and Blood divisions of the Blackfeet tribe. While the Piegan were among the first Indians that Reed sketched, these photographs as far as we can ascertain have never been published before now.
The Piegan and other Blackfeet people live in Montana and Alberta, Canada. Traditionally they were nomadic hunters and gatherers, living in tipis; they follow the buffalo as their main subsistence source (Ewers 1958). The hunting band was the basic economic, political, and social unit. Men were organized into warrior and medicine societies. Small-scale raiding between bands was endemic since it provided young men with a chance to demonstrate their generosity, bravery, wisdom, and skill—the basic values of the culture. Their religious system revolved around the personal acquisition of a guardian spirit and supernatural power through ceremonies like the Sun Dance. In short, the Blackfeet fulfill most of our popular images of what an Indian should be.

By 1787, when a Hudson's Bay trader, David Thompson, spent a winter with the Piegan (Glover 1962: 48), they had already obtained horses, guns, metal, and smallpox from indirect contact with Europeans. For the next hundred years the Blackfeet used the "gifts" of civilization to hunt and roam the Northern Plains. After two unsuccessful hunting seasons in 1883–1884 the Blackfeet came to the United States government agency, which had been established in 1855, to ask for assistance. Ewers (1958: 293–294) estimates that in the winter of 1883–1884 one quarter of all Piegans died from starvation.

In 1888 the Blackfeet signed a treaty relinquishing most of their lands and agreed to settle on a reservation in exchange for $150,000 in goods and services to be given to them over a 10-year period. For the next 50 years the United States government instituted a series of unsuccessful projects designed to turn these nomadic hunters into cattle raisers and farmers.

In 1890 the Holy Family Mission school opened. Christianity rapidly replaced the traditional religion. Blackfeet children were forbidden to speak their own language in school (U.S. Commission for Indian Affairs 1893: 14). Other aspects of their culture were actually outlawed. "Sun dances, Indian mourning, Indian medicine, beating of the tom-tom, gambling, wearing of Indian costumes . . . selling, trading, exchanging or giving away anything issued to them have been prohibited, while other less pernicious practices, such as horse-racing, face-painting, etc., are discouraged" (U.S. Commission for Indian Affairs 1894: 159).

When Reed photographed the Piegan in 1908 he obviously reconstructed (or, to be more accurate, constructed). His interest in portraits and landscapes where a few people stand in very formal poses may be both an aesthetic choice and a pragmatic decision based upon the absence of traditional ceremonial or social life. With the aid of elderly people who had lived the "old" life, Reed constructed his version of these people. He has left us with an important resource. His photographs speak of the complex collaboration between the photographed and the photographer, each conspiring with the other to produce an image that satisfies their notion of what life used to be.

Acknowledgments

The material for this article was taken from Johnston (1979), McFee (1972), and Roland Reed's notes and letters. I wish to thank Leon Kramer of the Kramer Gallery for his permission to publish Reed's photographs and for his cooperation and assistance.

Note

1 All photographs accompanying this article are reproduced courtesy of Kramer Gallery, St. Paul, Minn. Copyright © 1908–1913 by Roland Reed. Copyright © 1977 under U.C.C. by Kramer Gallery.

References

- Johnston, Patricia Condon 1979 The Indian Photographs of Roland Reed. American West.
Figure 1  *Buffalo Hump.*
Cheyenne.

Figure 2  *At the Spring.*
Chippewa.
Figure 3  *The Fisherman.*
Chippewa.

Figure 4  Unidentified.
Piegan male.
Figure 5  Unidentified. Piegan woman.
Figure 6  Curley Bear.  
Piegán.

Figure 7  Elderly  
Blackfeet. Piegán.

Figure 8  Meditation.  
Piegán.
Figure 9  Watching the Herd. Piegan.

Figure 10  Unidentified. Piegan male.
Figure 11  The Water Hole. Piegan.

Figure 12  Blizzard.
Figure 13  Up the Cutbank, Piegan.
Figure 14  The Horns.  Piegan.

Figure 15  Yellow Plume.  Piegan medicine man.
Figure 16  **Powwow.**
Piegan.

Figure 17  **Song of the Canyon.** Piegan.
Performance and Reality: Interpretation of Observed Behavior in Dreams, Hysteria, and Hypnosis

Aaron Honori Katcher

The themes of this paper arose within a long series of conversations with Sol Worth. The talks were informal, a part of long, rambling walks through the University of Pennsylvania campus. These talks were a continuing seminar introducing me to ideas about the way in which we extract meaning from the visual world. The most recurrent theme was the therapeutic dream, the dream that becomes the focus of the patient’s and the analyst’s inquiry. Investigation of the dream brought us to the unconscious mind was assumed to be the origin of a particular event, as in the case of dreams. Questions of intent led to considerations of situations in which there was a problem in distinguishing simulated emotion or behavior from “real behavior,” problems inherent to the understanding of feigned illness in hysteria, the behavior of confidence men and spies, and even the behavior of the hypnotized subject. Unfortunately Worth’s death left me with only our notes for an initial paper, and I had to develop our once mutual thoughts alone and uncertainly in a novel field of inquiry. Regretfully I must take responsibility for the argument inherent in this paper, and hope that some of the value of the dialogue that preceded this effort remains.

The Therapeutic Dream

The therapeutic dream is a construction of the patient and his or her analyst, and has in its initial and final telling only a tenuous relationship to the psychic events that occurred simultaneously with periods of rapid eye movements on the night previous to the therapeutic hour.

Since the dream is constructed as a communication by both the analyst and the patient, it appears to have little necessary relationship to the psychophysiological events we recognize as a “dream.” What then is the proper interpretive strategy for understanding the meaning of a dream? One appropriate to a communication such as a patient narrating a dream to an analyst and augmenting that narrative with his associative memories? Or one appropriate to a psychobiological event like a subject being awakened after a period of rapid eye movement sleep in a laboratory, and asked to rapidly recount his dream to a recorder? This question was important to Worth, because of his differentiation between strategies used to decipher interactive events and communications (Worth and Gross 1974). Communication was defined by Worth as a class of events in which the observer made an assumption that there was an intent to communicate. Such communications were deciphered by the use of inferential strategies, dependent upon the context, structure, or grammar of the entire event. Natural events, signs, or interactions were deciphered by the use of attribution, that is, recognition of invariant rather than context-dependent meanings of individual elements of the event.

Communication therefore is defined as a social process, within a context, in which signs are produced and transmitted, perceived and treated as messages, from which meaning can be inferred.

Let us review briefly some of the terms we have introduced earlier and place them within the context of communication. The concept of articulation and interpretation must be seen as relevant to both the production and transmission of signs as well as to the perception and subsequent treatment of them. While the perception and subsequent treatment of symbolic events might be thought of as acts of interpretation, and production and transmission seen as acts of articulation, they can most fruitfully be seen as parts of a process which could be called articulation/interpretation. This process will be further explained as being similar to what we are calling implication/inference.

We will subsequently argue that the implication/inference process cannot take place without an assumption of intention on both the part of the articulator and as well as the interpreter. [Worth and Gross 1974]

Dreams trouble us not only because they seem like unintended events, forced upon us by the operation of some part of our brain quite different from that which rules our conscious state, but yet must be shaped into some kind of clearly intended narrative to be studied; they also are problematical in their interpretation because they are essentially pictures which must be interpreted as narrative, as verbal descriptions. We tell others our dreams; we do not draw them for others. Worth argued that there were important distinctions between pictorial art and verbal communication. In “Pictures Can’t Say Ain’t” he stated:

... pictures and speech are different precisely because pictures are not a language in the verbal sense. That while words mean primarily or basically because of lexicon and syntax, pictures have no lexicon (in the dictionary sense) nor a syntax in the formal grammatical sense. And yet I am suggesting that we can interpret meaning from pictures. It is clear, however, that if pictures have no grammar in the strict linguistic sense, they have something like it: they have form, structure, conventions and rules. It is clear that even though a theory of correspondence is not sufficient to deal with the truth in pictures, pictures must nonetheless correspond to something. Even the most un- or non-representational painting must refer to something or it would make no sense at all. Although attributional strategies are convenient for the unskilled, no picture maker likes to think his picture is totally up for grabs. Earlier I suggested that the strategies we employ to interpret meaning from pictures—that is, how pictures mean—are largely responsible for what pictures mean. I have suggested that if we use attributional strategies, pictures can mean almost anything. . .
If, on the other hand, we use communicational strategies, a particular set of meanings can be developed for pictures as well as for that which we have often defined as art. In general what we imply and infer through pictures are: first, an existential awareness of particular objects, persons, and events that are ordered, patterned, sequenced, and structured so as to imply meaning by the use of specific conventions, codes, schemata, and structures. [Worth 1975]

In this paper I argue that the problem of intent in the interpretation of human behavior is compounded by a difference between the way in which we evaluate words and the way in which we evaluate pictures, like the "pictures" in a dream or the visual records of human behavior such as alteration of body posture, disturbances of movement, facial expression, or the altered appearance of a subject in a deep hypnotic trance. Those aspects of behavior that we see or observe as having no recourse to words are almost always accepted as signs of the operation of an unintentional causal event, a response to an experimental stimulus, with much less suspicion than words would be. Since everyone recognizes that it is not possible to "cause" a sentence, observed behavior is favored over words as evidence of the operation of psychological causality. Moreover, any behavior we observe can, by the simple mechanism of changing the sensitivity of the observing instrument, be reduced to behavior that is clearly unintended. So, for example, the motions of a skilled actor can be reduced to very minute facial flickers with high-speed photography, and these flickers studied as unintentional behavior. Words, however, are clearly and unequivocally distinguishable from the character of the voice or the hand that produces them. Thus human behavior that is observed visually produces the same inherent problem of interpretation as the images of the dream, even though such observed behavior need not be translated into words to make it part of a social process.

We can begin the investigation of how we make assumptions about intent and causality, in giving meaning to dreams and the phenomena of hypnosis and hysteria, by noting that Darwin struggled with the same problem of differentiating intended or willed emotive behavior from innate behavior.

**Intention and Causality**

In *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* Darwin builds a persuasive argument that emotional expression is largely determined by inherited and hence innate patterns of behavior which are not subject to the action of intent or the will. Yet in a very curious passage in his concluding remarks he introduces will, intent, and conscious simulation of emotion:

The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree;... Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds. [Darwin 1965 ed. :365]

Darwin then goes on to quote the first paragraph of Hamlet's soliloquy "Oh, What a Rogue and Peasant Slave Am I." That soliloquy is worth considering in detail because it is concerned with the distinctions between signs and symbolic acts, between caused interactions and intended communications, between stimuli and articulated events, and between responses and interpretations:

Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wan'd;
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!
For Hecuba,
What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba,
That he should weep for her? What would he do,
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have? He would drown the state with tears,
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech;
Make mad the guilty, and appall the free;
Confound the ignorant and amaze indeed,
The very faculties of eyes and ears.
Yet I,
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak
Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause,
And can say nothing;...

Why, what an ass am I! This is most brave,
That I, the son of a dear father murder'd
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell,
Must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words
And fall a-cursing... 

I have heard
That guilty creatures, sitting at a play,
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul that presently
They have proclaim'd their malefactions;
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most miraculous organ. I'll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father
Before mine uncle: I'll observe his looks;
I'll tent him to the quick: If he but blesch,
I know my course... the play's the thing

Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.
[Shakespeare 1965 ed.: 1087]
Hamlet clearly distinguishes between real feeling and the fictitious emotion of the player, emotion which he describes as consciously intended—his soul forced to his own conceit. The intended emotion which excited his wonder is mimicked behavior, not words. Hamlet now wonders at visual displays, "wan'd" visage, tears, and distracted facial expression. He wonders at the change in form or representation worked by the intent of the player. The player’s conceit, that is "intent," changes his usual form.

In the second paragraph, he contrasts the actor’s performance with an imaginary natural or "caused" event. He imagines what would happen if that actor had a true cause for his feeling, or "motive and the cue for passion." That real emotion would then have very large emotional effects on the audience, causing equally real and large responses—the same augmentive effects that Darwin speaks of when he refers to the power of simulated emotion. Hamlet, much like modern psychophysiological investigators, talks of emotion as both stimulus and response. Hamlet describes the effect of intense motivation (the murder of a father) on emotional display and postulates a testable hypothesis which predicts the results of that display on two classes of respondents, the "guilty" and the "free."

Later, the emotive display of the actor charged with "real" motivation is contrasted with his own behavior. He uses that contrast to make a distinction between words and observable behaviors, between lexical and representational events. He chides himself for responding only in words, just as he marveled at the actor’s capacity to respond with a visual display. The contrast between visual events is a critical distinction in Hamlet’s psychobiology, just as it is in modern psychological investigation. Words can never be just natural events; they are always subject to the intent of the speaker (except in certain cases where they were clearly unintended, as in slips of the tongue and other psychopathologies of everyday life). Behavior can always be, Hamlet tells us, either a natural or a performed event. We are quite comfortable in accepting behaviors, visual displays, and pictures as natural events, just as we are always uncomfortable and suspicious when we look at words as signs of causal events or interactions. So Hamlet, like us, suspicious of words, scolds himself for showing emotion "unpacking his heart" not with a change in form or behavior but with words.

In the last paragraph of the soliloquy Hamlet decides to use a play as a stimulus and perform a real psychophysiological experiment of similar structure to the imaginary one described in the second paragraph. Only, the stimulus in this experiment is feigned emotion—a play, a communication—not a caused or motivated emotional response. The play used by Hamlet as a stimulus is a "dumb show," a play without words or a mime performance with only emotional display and representational acts to serve as stimuli. Thus Hamlet stands with the social psychologists who use stooges acting out emotion to cause an emotional response in an uninformed or duped subject.

In his experiment Hamlet assumes, as he did earlier, that the guilty will respond differently from the "free" and that the king, if guilty, will alter his own emotional display, permitting Hamlet, the intent observer, to detect the physiological changes caused by guilt "if he but blench." Hamlet intends to use a play as social psychologists use stooges or as a psychophysiologist such as Lazarus might use a film depicting a subincision ritual (Lazarus 1966:144). The film or the actions of the stooge is used as a stimulus to produce an effect on the audience which is recorded as the outcome of the experiment. In such experiments real or theatrical events can be used interchangeably. A whole or a portion of the film or the play can be used (the king does not wait for the play’s conclusion before leaving). The experimenter does not have to think about the interpretive strategies used by the audience; indeed, most investigators, like Hamlet, attribute an emotional meaning to the subject’s behavior and assume that the subject responds to rather than interprets the film or the stooge’s play. In most modern psychophysiological investigations, films and stooges can be used interchangeably with mechanical stimuli, like painful emotional shock, to produce emotional responses. A film can then be compared to a stimulus like an electric shock: a communication equated with a physical interaction. Hamlet creates the same kind of confusion by using the mime performance as if it were a natural event and constructing a causal chain of stimuli and responses in which the play is the stimulus and the king’s actions the response.

The remainder of this paper will consider the confusions between intended communications and causally related interactions in the study of three related phenomena: dreams, hysteria, and hypnosis. Each of these phenomena can be related by causal interactions to other natural events. Each can be studied as communication. Rarely have investigators considered the utility of alternately making one and then the other assumption, and testing the results of such explorations against one another. All three events are particularly subject to the confusion of communication and interaction because they are essentially events that are seen and described in terms of what is seen. The confusion is inherent in events that are described by sight, by change in form, both because pictures are always edited, and the criteria for such editing usually remain unarticulated, and because anytime form changes, there are some aspects of that change which clearly cannot be shaped by our conscious intent. The paradox is perhaps most familiar in the study of dreams.
Dreams as Visual Events

Dreams are essentially visual events. Dreams with only words do occur, and they have their own eerie character, but they are exceptional and notably in contrast with the almost invariably visual nature of dream life. The logic of dreams is also the logic of pictures. Opposites are combined. The dreamer asleep watches the dreamer awake watching the dreamer murdered. People long dead come alive, and people alive are represented as dead. Night and day occur simultaneously, places change into each other faster than a dissolving cut in a film. Time has no fixed dimension and can be greatly contracted or expanded. Not only are dreams visual events, representations of ourselves and the world around us; they are also events which are anchored to definable physiological events: a particular pattern in the electroencephalogram, rapid back-and-forth movements of the eyes beneath closed eyelids, and a cessation of movement in the rest of the body. Since dreams have such a clearly representational character, and are associated with definable physiological events, they should have the character of signs or caused mental events. Indeed, we recognize a general agreement (no matter what variation there may be in the acceptability of particular theories about the meaning of dreams) that dreams are not intended by the dreamer, that they are in some way forced upon the dreamer, unlike reverie or day-dreaming in which the dreamer, no matter how passive, is a willing accomplice. Dreams come from somewhere else and are not a product of our intentional or volitional consciousness. We recognize their alien character by our continual mystification about their meaning. We may consult a ten-cent dream book or a hundred-dollar-an-hour psychoanalyst, or even a religious prophet without price, but we recognize the wisdom of searching out a hidden meaning.

If dreams seem to be a kind of natural event, the evidence of the working of part of our mind that is free from our own intentions, they should be ideal tools for the study of causal relationships within mental activity. Unfortunately, they are private events, and to be studied, the visual dream must be translated into words. This translation and the subsequent verbal operations used to discern the meaning of the dream permit the operation of intentional behavior to such an extent that we can no longer be sure that the translated dream, or even the dream as represented after the process of translation, still has the character of a natural event. It could just as well be an elegantly constructed performance reflecting the mutual intentions of dreamer and analyst. This ineluctable confusion of cause and intent is not merely the result of the translation of the dream from memories of visual events known only to the dreamer into words that can be shared by dreamer and analyst; it is intensified by the application of the only method we have for decoding dreams; psychoanalytic free association. This method makes the basic assumption that the dream is a disguised wish. The wish is "censored" but not eliminated by the partially aroused ego. The ego censors the wish in such a way that the wish is still represented and hence gratifying to the unconscious organ of the wishing activity, and yet the wish is sufficiently disguised that the anxieties of the ego are not over aroused. With this happy result, both mental organs achieve at least a partial satisfaction and sleep continues. The dream is assumed to be censored in a peculiar fashion: the representation of the wish is replaced by the representations of events or images associated with that wish, but different enough to effect a disguise.

The dream is decoded by searching for associations of the "manifest" dream that will be closer to the hidden wish and permit either the analyst or the patient to reconstruct that wish. To start the decoding process, the dream is broken into fragments and the patient free-associates to these fragments. The first part of this association may lead to the amplification of the verbal detail in which the dream is described, resulting in a change in the dream narrative. Fragments rather than dreams are used in the associative process, following Freud's dictum that a dream is more like a rebus than a poem (in a rebus, the visual representations spelling out the words of the message have no necessary associations with each other; Freud 1961 ed.). The dream is not required to have the unity of image required of a poem.

The free associations that are linked by the patient to the dream fragments are, of course, free from the conventions of narrative, free from intention, and hence causally related. These associations are assumed to be chains of thoughts or images that are not shaped into any conventional narrative sequence. Images, thoughts, ideas, and words can be linked by any one or more of the thousands of potential criteria for grouping percepts. The patient's associations are expected, with many false starts and diversions, to travel backward over the branching chains of associations to the hidden impulses that generated the dream. Thus after the associative process the dream consists of fragments, each surrounded by its own skein of interconnected chains of associations. This assembly is very much larger than the original dream narrative and, more importantly, very much larger than either the interpretation of the dream fragment offered by the psychiatrist or even the associations actually used to justify the interpretation. Dream images are assumed to be very condensed expressions of a potentially large group of associations available for disguised expression of the dream wish. Dream interpretations are very condensed expressions of a very long list of the patient's associations. This peculiarly symmetrical relationship—between, on one hand, a condensed dream and a large set of potential associations and, on the other, a condensed interpretation and a large set of the patient's actual associations—suggests a change in the name of the ego's dream maker, a change from dream censor to dream editor.
The generation of dreams can be reimagined using the concept of editor. The editor has at its command all the chains of associations that have been built around a certain genera of wish. This is a very large pool of material stretching backward into the far and infantile past, very much larger than the chain of associations that a patient will uncover at any single analytic session devoted to dream analysis. In order to prevent an unacceptable wish from becoming conscious, the operator does not remove material; it searches the large file of related material until it finds images that are at a suitable distance along the chain to permit the disguise of the unacceptable wish but not at too great a distance to represent the wish at all. But using nodes, or places where chains cross, the operator can, by skillful editing, choose associations that are part of many different chains, achieving both condensation and the representation of contradictory or opposing concepts (the wish and its negation).

Another editing process begins as soon as the physiological events of dreaming are over. A sleeper remembers only a few of the many dreams he experiences during a night. Of those that are remembered on waking, only a few are brought to the analyst. In the course of an analysis, perhaps weeks or months go by without dreams being part of the analytic work. Of those dreams that are analyzed, few are analyzed completely; most dream analyses concern themselves with some but not all of the fragments. This condensation was described by Freud in his Introductory Lectures:

These last dreams provide splendid material and are in no respect inferior to those of healthy persons, but the technique of the treatment obliges us to subordinate dream-interpretation to therapeutic purposes and to desist from the attempt to interpret a large number of the dreams as soon as we have extracted from them something of use for the treatment. Again many dreams which occur during the treatment elude full interpretation altogether; since they have their origin in the whole mass of material in the mind which is as yet unknown to us.

The literature of psycho-analysis shows no lack of good and detailed dream-analyses; I myself have published some which formed part of the history of certain pathological cases. Perhaps the best example of a dream interpretation is that published by O. Rank, consisting of the analysis of two mutually related dreams of a young girl. These cover about two pages of print, while the analysis of them runs into 76 pages. [Freud 1943 ed.:163–164]

Some dreams that are analyzed in a satisfying way do not remain in the memory of either the patient or the analyst, and of the ones that do, only a few are recorded for discussion at meetings or published in the psychoanalytic literature. Although millions of analytic hours have passed since the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams, only a few thousand dreams and dream fragments are part of the analytic literature and available to shape our ideas about the interpretation of dreams.

From the natural event of REM sleep and dreaming by the patient to the published dreams which shape our ideas about the meaning of dreams, there is an editing ratio of millions to one. Because of the postulated editing activity within the dreamer, the editing and selective forgetting of dreams by the now-conscious dreamer, and the enormous condensation we have described between the dream in therapy and dreams in published accounts, we have no idea whether the analyst is more like a filmmaker editing his raw documentary footage into a filmic performance or a scientist recording the texture of natural events. The problem is confounded by our ignorance of the conventions and skills used by dream maker, patient, analyst, and editorial board in creating the edited material we are able to read. We cannot separate the laws of dream process from the conventions for analysis of dreams and editing the analytic material. This inability to separate editorial convention from natural law is present any time we edit our pictures of reality from a large set of observations to a small set of illustrations.

For example, home photographs are pictures of the external realities of a person’s life. We would like to use these objective representations of events to describe a historical reality for the families that took those pictures. Any person with a camera and the ability to use it has a potentially infinite number of sights and events that he could record with a “snapshot.” Where a family does accumulate a large number of snapshots, relatively few of these are organized for social presentation. The inherent narrative or meaning within the ones that are organized cannot be understood directly but apparently requires the associations of the person who took the picture, associations which describe the occasion and purpose for taking the picture, and are part of a larger narrative the picture was designed to preserve. Ruby (1976) asserts that the snapshot is an “aide-mémoire” and is linked to a chain of narrative and the conventions for taking home photographs. Convention instructs the editing of visual images into filmic ones, and within that convention particular constellations of events give meaning to the pictures that are taken. Pictures must then be treated like the fragments of a dream, understood through recognition of the conventions of filming and the associations to particular film images.

Just as analysts would like to use dreams to obtain a clear picture of the reality of the internal unconscious, just as social scientists would like to use home photographs to describe the objective realities of social relationships within a family, anthropologists, ethologists, and naturalists would like to use the photographs they take during their investigations to represent the reality of their observations to their readers. However, almost all those illustrative photographs are selected from a large corpus of photographs, and the method of making the selection is never articulated. In a recent review of a book on the life of one species of Japanese fox, the reviewer mentions with admiration that the tens of pictures
in the book were selected from 70,000 photographs the author had taken in the course of his study (Breslin 1980:94). Since the technique of editing pictures to present reality is unarticulated by the observer, we do not know if those editorial processes are as conventional and undefined as the editing which permits the construction of the most unreal and dreamlike representations. When photographs or film are used in this fashion, we are always caught between convention and cause in our search for meaning. The intent of the observer can never be separated from the natural events he observes, and there will always be an unfortunate similarity between the dream and the documentary, or any other technique of representing reality in which pictures are selected to be placed side by side.

**Hysteria and Hypnosis**

Any natural event, even one so far removed from human intention as the explosion of a volcano, can be edited into a sequence of photographs that reflects more of the intent of the photographer and editor than the causal relationships between the components of the event. Yet there are some phenomena in which the confusion of natural event and performance are so ingrained that the audience cannot choose an appropriate strategy for the interpretation of the event. Two such events, hysteria and hypnosis, are intimately related to the dream and the display of human emotion. Freud’s first psychological investigations were explorations in the therapy of hysteria, and in that therapy he first used and then abandoned the use of hypnosis. The associative techniques he used to puzzle out the meaning of hysterical symptoms were later used to analyze the images of dreams.

Both hypnosis and hysteria can be described as simulated, performed, or acted behavior, or, alternatively, as behavior ‘caused’ by unconscious mental processes. Both are in large part dumb show, or mimed behavior, and we recognize their presence by looking at the form or motion of the body rather than the words used by the subject or patient. The hysteric does not tell the physician about his or her symptoms; he or she acts the part with fantastically contorted limbs, paralysis, convulsions, swoons, anaesthesias, blindness, or the inability to walk or talk. The hypnotic subject may not be called upon to speak at all. He or she sits, walks, or acts like a somnambulist, performing the part with anaesthesias, paralysis, floating limbs, rigid limbs, floppy limbs, and actions indicative of positive or negative hallucinations. If the hysterical only complained of aches and pains like a hypochondriac or a malingerer instead of acting out the illness, and if the hypnotized subject only told us he was in trance and generated no novel behavior, we would not believe the hysteric to be diseased and the hypnotic subject to be in an altered state of consciousness. These two phenomena are believable because they are, in large part, acted out. The acting, in the absence of words, permits us to define that behavior as a sign or a natural event and to dispense with the problem of assigning intent to the performance.

**Hysteria**

Charcot, the great nineteenth-century neurologist, brought the study of hysteria into the domain of neurological investigation by differentiating the “functional” convulsions of hysterical epilepsy from the convulsions of true epilepsy, which were associated with pathological change within the brain. The differentiation of real and “imitated” convulsions was made by observing the patient for signs of organic illness and distinguishing them from the signs of functional illness. The functional illness, which was thought to be caused and hence not intentional, was differentiated from malingering or intentional imitation of illness by demonstrating that the signs of hysterical illness could not be imitated by the “normal” individual.

The emphasis on signs, visual demonstrations of illness, rather than on words was the essential characteristic of scientific medicine of the nineteenth century. Charcot exemplified Foucault’s conclusion that the perceptual organization of nineteenth-century medicine centered on the gaze of the clinician:

Clinical experience—that opening up of the concrete individual, for the first time in Western history, to the language of rationality, that major event in the relationship of man to himself and of language to things—was soon taken as a simple conceptualized confrontation of a gaze and a face, or a glance and a silent body; a sort of contract prior to all discourse, free of the burdens of language by which two living individuals are “trapped” in a common but non-reciprocal situation. [Foucault 1975: xv]

Charcot exemplified Foucault’s clinician, and this exemplification was noted by his students and contemporaries, especially Freud:

He was not much given to cogitation, was not of the reflective type, but he had an artistically gifted temperament—as he said himself, he was a visuel, a seer. He himself told us the following about his method of working: he was accustomed to look again and again at things that were incomprehensible to him, to deepen his impression of them day by day, until suddenly understanding of them dawned upon him. [Zilboorg and Henry 1942: 362–364]

Charcot’s interest in the visual extended beyond clinical observation. He was one of the first medical investigators to use photography as part of his research method. He brought Duchenne de Boulogne to the Salpetriere and with Duchenne’s aid established a photographic laboratory. Duchenne published, in 1862, a photo-
graphic study of facial expression, "Mecanisme de la physionomie humaine," which was one of those used by Darwin in illustrating The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Charcot went on to foster the publication of Bourneville and Regnard’s "La grande hystérie; iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière." Charcot himself examined the representations of hysterical illness in art in "Les démoniaques dans l’art," which was succeeded by "Les difformes et les malades dans l’art" (Owen 1971).

The argument I am making about the role of behavioral signs in the interpretation of hysteria can be strengthened by noting Darwin’s use of photographs in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals and his struggle with the problem of intent. He used pictures of madmen and actors, one assumed to be acting unintentionally and the other intentionally. He used pictures, derived from Duchenne, of a real and a simulated smile, to distinguish between intended and inherited behavior. He expressed his conclusions as follows:

We will now consider how far the will and consciousness have come into play in the development of the various movements of expression. As far as we can judge, only a few expressive movements, such as those just referred to, are learnt by each individual; that is, were consciously and voluntarily performed during the early years of life for some definite object or in imitation of others, and then became habitual. The far greater number of the movements of expression, and all the more important ones, are, as we have seen, innate or inherited; and such cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual. [Darwin 1965 ed.: 352]

Although Charcot treated hysteria as a functional neurological disturbance, a true disease, he did recognize that the symptoms and signs were not without purpose, but represented an imitation of illness, and that the patients actively sought treatment for disease. Charcot spoke of a "mania operativea passiva" to describe the avidity of hysterics for surgery. Modern physicians talk of "compensation neurosis," implying that the hysterical symptoms are not only directed at seeking treatment but also at reaping the rewards of disability which is validated by treatment. When psychiatrists speak of hysteria, they recognize that the symptoms are imitations of illness and that the functional disturbance reflects not the anatomical mechanism of a limb or an organ but the patient's "idea" of a limb or an organ. Thus hysterical anaesthesia of the hand does not follow the anatomical pathways of nerves (unless the patient is a physician or a nurse and knows the anatomy of nerves and muscles) but follows the patient’s representation of a hand—the anaesthesia ceasing at the wrist, having the form of a glove. Physicians of Charcot’s time also recognized that hysterical symptoms changed with patients’ ideas about illness and the function of limbs. Now psychiatrists no longer see the grand hysterical seizures that Charcot demonstrated to the medical audiences of the Salpetrière. Modern hysterical symptoms reflect modern ideas about illness. The fact that the patient presents his or her self as a patient seeking help with an illness, and the fact that the patient acts out the illness, constructs the dilemma for the physician. Is it simulation or is it real?

Freud, unlike Charcot, did not study the form of hysterical illness. He treated hysterical symptoms as he later treated dream images. He had the patient translate them into words, then build associations upon those words until the patient put into words the repressed traumatic memory that was the "cause" of the symptoms. The symptoms, caused by unconscious repressed images, ceased being causes when they were translated into words. Freud in his cathartic therapy respected the distinction between words which are intended behavior and images which are signs or natural events. The translation of a repressed image into words deprives that image of its power to "cause."

Hypnosis

From the time of its introduction by Mesmer, hypnosis seems to be a kind of behavior display which is caused by some force exterior to the subject’s will. The behavior of the hypnotic subject as seen and described by the hypnotist or the observer seems to be caused by a force that is normally not operative when the subject is in his normal state. Mesmer believed, or said he believed, that the hypnotic phenomenon was caused by the influence of magnets. He first used real magnets to induce the state, later used objects that were treated by exposure to magnets, and still later developed the idea that living bodies have a kind of magnetic force he called "animal magnetism." He believed that the passage of his hands over the patient caused changes in the magnetic forces within the body, producing the results he observed. His subjects twitched and convulsed upon entering the hypnotic state, a behavior linked in Mesmer’s mind with the twitching of a limb when a nerve is electrically stimulated.

Mesmer’s detractors, however, observed the public performances at which he produced his trances and saw his patients’ behavior in terms of suggestion, acting, and imitation. A royal commission was appointed to decide on the reality of the phenomenon. They proposed sophisticated social psychological experiments in which patients would be blindfolded and unaware of the identity of the person treating them or the object used to treat them. Mesmer refused to be part of these experiments, and the commission made its report without them. They concluded:

The commissioners, having found that the fluid animal magnetism can not be perceived by any of the senses and that it has no effect upon themselves or upon the patients submitted to them; having assured themselves that pressure and contact produce changes that are seldom favorable in
the organic economy and agitations which are always unfavorable, in the imagination; having finally demonstrated by decisive experiments that imagination without magnetism produces convulsions and that magnetism without imagination produces nothing; they have unanimously concluded, on the question of the existence and the utility of magnetism, that there is no proof of its existence, that this fluid without existence is consequently without utility, and that the violent effects observed in public clinics are to be attributed to the touching, to the aroused imagination, and to that mechanical imitation which lead us, in spite of ourselves, to repeat that which strikes our senses. ... touching, and the repeated action of the imagination for the purpose of producing crises can be harmful, that the sight of these crises is likewise dangerous because of the imitation which nature seems to have imposed upon us as a law. ... [Pattie 1967:21]

The causal action of natural events is rejected in favor of imagination and imitation. For them hypnosis was a performance, but a strange kind of performance. Their last sentence in the quoted portion of their text, "imitation which nature seems to have imposed upon us as a law," takes the problem full round, much in the manner of the psychoanalytic definition of hysteria, by proposing that the imitation was not an intended act but an imposition of natural law. They both denied and asserted the naturalness or lawfulness of the performance. This ambivalence about hypnosis still persists and troubles the most sophisticated of the social psychologists who study hypnotic phenomena.

Hypnosis and hysteria were united by Charcot, who used hypnosis both to evoke and to terminate hysterical symptoms and who defined hypnosis as an artificial form of hysteria, a temporary neurosis caused by the hypnotist. The play of hypnosis and hysteria can be illustrated in this account of the hypnosis of a female hysterical, "Greuz":

After this preamble Charcot proceeded to introduce a hysterical girl, "Greuz," who had a left hemianesthesia with full sensibility on the right side. Charcot remarked that she had been subjected to hypnotism on only four or five occasions.

Greuz was put into somnambulism. "Your right hand is paralyzed," said Charcot firmly. Greuz demurred, saying Charcot was mistaken. But Charcot insisted in an accent of authority, and after a few minutes of this discussion, the hand hung flaccidly. All active movement of the arm was abolished, as well as all resistance to passive movements. Very interestingly, the hand, the arm, the shoulder and part of the chest—previously normal—now showed complete anesthesia. The genuineness of the anesthesia was verified by demonstrating to the class that violent torsion of the joints produced no sign of feeling, and that no pain or sensation was evident in Greuz's face on faradizing the nerve trunks of the arm even to the extent of causing violent contraction of the muscles. Charcot now pointed out to the class, with a certain air of justifiable satisfaction, that the symptoms produced artificially under hypnosis in Greuz were in almost all respects identical with those occurring as hysterical symptoms in the previously mentioned patients Pen. and Porcz. [Owen 1971:118–119]

In reading the account of the patient Greuz, it is perhaps too easy to assume that Charcot was being deceived by the patient, especially when we recognize the implications of the statement that the patient had "only" been hypnotized three or four times previously. Yet Charcot was an astute observer, and many of his observations stand as part of our neurological and psychiatric knowledge. To illustrate that hysteria and hypnosis are still entwined phenomena let me cite an example from my own practice. I had been treating a patient with a classic hysterical conversion reaction which in her case consisted of hysterical epileptiform seizures, an ataxic gait, and a speech disturbance. During that time we had slowly withdrawn her medication for epilepsy, which included phenobarbital. The withdrawal of barbiturate medication can cause severe symptoms including tremors, agitation, stereotyped ticklike movements, motor incoordination, convulsions, and, in some instances, a series of convulsions terminating in death. After the last and lowest dose of medication had been stopped, she was well for two days but then was brought at her own request to the local hospital. The resident in charge of admissions called me and informed me that the patient had the classical symptoms of barbiturate withdrawal and that she required hospitalization for remedication. I described the care with which the medication was withdrawn and my diagnosis, conversion hysteria or simulated illness. He then changed his diagnosis from real illness to simulated illness and suggested psychiatric hospitalization. The family then asked me to see the patient. She was brought in by four of her family, hardly able to walk, arms and legs flailing about as she struggled to regain her balance, unable to talk, except in a voice so slurred as to be almost unintelligible, sounding for all the world like a drunk about to lapse into alcoholic coma, and picking and scratching at her skin in the classic manner of someone in barbiturate withdrawal. With her family seated about the consultation room, I ordered her to sit down, told her to fix her eyes on "a spot where the ceiling joins the wall," and began a conventional trance induction suggesting relaxation and "deep" trance. Within thirty seconds all her tremors ceased. She seemed deeply relaxed in another five minutes. I awoke her from the trance; her speech was normal, and she was able to walk out of the room unassisted, with her bewildered relatives following.

What had happened? What was real? What was unconscious behavior? What was conscious? What was intended? What was not? To answer one question, the patient was a nurse who had worked in psychiatric services and therefore had enough information to mimic barbiturate withdrawal symptoms. It was possible for her to "in-
tend” all the behavior she manifested. Given our knowledge of this ability we have to make a decision about the performance or the two performances, the performance as a patient with barbiturate withdrawal symptoms and the performance as a hypnotized subject loosing the symptoms of a hysterical neurosis. The first performance had three separate audiences: the patient at the local hospital, the family, and me. The second had only two, unless the patient is to be counted as both audience and performer. The last parenthetical thought is no simple aside. If one believes that hypnosis is a psychobiological phenomenon, and that the intent is not conscious intent but unconscious intent, then the patient is an audience to her own performance. And the patient expresses the same wonderment as the other audiences and acts as if he or she has been watching an event much the same way as a patient might watch an operation being performed on his or her abdomen through a mirror.

The subjects of Charcot were demonstrated on the stage of amphitheaters with an audience of visiting medical scholars, students, interns, and house staff. The patients were in almost perpetual care in the hospital, were used over and over again in lecture demonstrations, and were trained in other sessions in which subordinate staff would practice the uncovering of the same phenomenon demonstrated by the professor. More importantly, patients were trained for the grand performance by being hypnotized by the house staff to determine if they were of sufficient interest to be displayed at lectures. Apparently Charcot himself, impressed by the visual impact of demonstration, practiced the mimicry of patients’ symptoms and incorporated acted symptoms into his own lecture repertoire.

The three patients used most often by Charcot were trained by the descendants of one school of animal magnetism. They had been trained so well that they exhibited an invariant form of hypnotic behavior—they knew their lines too well, and Charcot made the mistake of confusing an invariant performance for an invariant psychological or psychobiological law. He described rigid stages of hypnosis which were not seen outside the Salpetrière by investigators who did not have the same trained subjects. Janet, a contemporary of Charcot, recognized that Charcot was dealing with trained performers. Janet was able to do so because he could elicit Charcot’s stages of hypnosis from only one subject. That subject was a trained somnambulist used in stage demonstrations and trained for the stage by the same school of animal magnetizers that trained Charcot’s patients (Owen 1971:155).

We now recognize the correctness of Janet’s insights. The stages of hypnosis described by Charcot were well-learned parts of his patients’ performance. Different patients, then and now, have their own performances. There are no apparent “natural laws” governing the behavior of hypnotic subjects, and what a subject believes is part of hypnosis usually becomes a part of his hypnotic performance. We are left agreeing with the conclusions of the commission that investigated Mesmer’s hypnosis: it succeeds more from imitation than from physical force. Yet upon looking at the kinds of behaviors included in these subjects’ repertoires, everyone finds it hard to accept the conclusion that it was all an act with nothing “real” embedded in the performance.

This paradox still plagues the study of hypnosis. Martin Orne (1972) and Theodore Barber (1967) have used exemplary experimental techniques to demonstrate that it is not possible to distinguish people simulating hypnosis from people who are deeply hypnotized. Both kinds of subjects can accomplish the same feats, stiffen limbs, act as if limbs are paralyzed, appear to regress in age, stiffen their bodies so that they can be supported by two chairs and have someone stand on their abdomen, and so on. Trained hypnotists cannot detect the deception, yet simulators always know they are simulating.

These studies leave the investigators with an interesting paradox: If all the events of hypnosis could be simulated by a motivated subject, and if there were nothing “left over” that he could not simulate or include in his repertoire of conscious intended behavior, then hypnosis is nothing more than a social convention, a performance of the subject and the hypnotist for each other and any audience present. Hypnosis defined as a social convention does not require that there be any causal interaction between the behavior of the hypnotist and the “unconscious” or any other portion of the subject’s mind not governed by intent. Without special attributes that could not be simulated, hypnosis might be a useful social convention for anxiety relief or enhancement of memory, but it could not be a kind of psychological interaction indicating causal relationships between social acts and unconscious motivational structures of the subject’s mind.

Barber (1967) has been willing to accept hypnosis as a mere social convention, but Orne (1972) has attempted to find something more than simulation that could be an essential characteristic of the hypnotic state, free from the intent of the subject. His demonstration of essential characteristics of hypnosis is interesting but far from convincing. He arrived at the conclusion that hypnotic subjects use a special kind of logic called trance logic. The following circumstances would be an example.

A subject is told to hallucinate a person sitting in an empty chair. He is then told to sit in that chair. The simulator operating under those commands will sit on the edge of the chair as if he were sharing the chair with another. He indicates that he recognizes the incompatibility of two people occupying the same chair at once. The truly hypnotized subject will sit directly and squarely on the chair. He sees no incompatibility with two people simultaneously occupying the same space at the same time. Trance logic operates in the same way as the unconscious mind. It is capable of asserting both of two in-
compatible statements simultaneously. In trance logic, as in dream and the unconscious, it can rain and not rain at the same time. One can be living and dead at the same time. One can watch one’s self from a distance. The kind of logic called trance logic is not only the logic of the unconscious and the representation of the unconscious called dreams, or the characteristic of the hypnotic state, it is, as we have stated earlier, characteristic of the logic of pictures. The essence of hypnosis seems to be much like the essence of dreams, and both seem to owe some of their character to the ways in which visual images carry meaning.

The psychological investigators who have attempted to see if there is more than simulation in hypnosis have also used new strategies in interpreting their subjects' behavior. In attempting to see if their subjects were ruled by psychological cause and effect, they have attempted to rule out the operation of intent and, specifically, tried to rule out the possibility that the subject is performing for the experimenter. They have tried to determine if the elegant performances they use to "stimulate" their subjects might be perceived as performance by the subject. Their concern is not so much the penetration of their deception, but the prospect that the subject might interpret the performance and define a role for himself. Orne (1972: 399-444) developed the twin ideas of "demand characteristics of the experiment" and "quasi-control," to deal with this process. The demand characteristics of the experiments are those aspects of the experimental performance that indicate the subject’s role or tell the subject how the experimenter wants him to behave. The quasi-control is a set of procedures which are used to determine if the subject is correctly informed about the experimenter’s intent. If the subject knows how he should perform, then the operation of psychological law can never be determined by that experiment. The experimenter is constructing a performance to communicate with a subject, and the subject is performing for the experimenter. Only if the subject cannot guess how he should perform, can the experiment be used to discern psychological reality.

Unfortunately the investigation of intent in the study of hypnosis and other "psychological interactions" is difficult for investigators because they do not wish to study communication and because they are alarmed by the proposition that where there is communication there is no cause and effect. Rosenhan has described the tacit conspiracy in which subjects and experimenters conceal from each other their knowledge that they are performers and audiences:

The term "muted awareness" designates the phenomenon whereby subjects in many experiments sense what is expected of them, sense also that they are not supposed to have this awareness, and behave accordingly. Thus, on brief or unsophisticated inquiry, subjects will often deny that they have "intuited" the main hypotheses of the experiment or that they have understood the purpose of the experimental manipulations. The denial satisfies their need to be "good" subjects and at the same time satisfies the experimenter that he has concealed his biases. Thus, a pact of naivete is established [Orne terms it a pact of ignorance], with both parties sufficiently invested to play their roles well and to retain their secrets. [Rosenhan 1967:487]

We can still wonder with Darwin and Hamlet that simulated emotion embedded in an actor’s performance can change the way in which people behave. We cannot, however, forget that performance and reality are two aspects of any social event, and failure to see the performance as a performance does not construct a reality. This paper has made a simple argument about three troublesome events, dreams, hysteria, and hypnosis. These events cannot be studied as either a performance or a natural event. We increase our knowledge of these phenomena by alternately studying them as if they were intended and as if they were unintended. We must recognize that they are both performance and reality. The necessary logic of these events, which calls for such a dual strategy for interpretation, is in part determined by the logic of visual events: images, pictures, and observations about human behavior that rely on visual impressions. The peculiar character of dreams, hysteria, and hypnosis, and their ability to include such a high order of contradiction, is characteristic of the logic of pictures. In the interpretation of dreams, the ability of dreams to be so allusive and evocative and carry such a high order of meaningful contradiction is augmented by the editorial process that occurs when we construct a dream or an interpretation of a dream. One conclusion which follows from this argument, but which will have to be justified in another paper, is that much of what we feel is peculiar to unconscious thought, and the logic of unconscious thinking, derives from the simple fact that the unconscious thinks in pictures.
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Reviews and Discussion

The National Gallery Presents Ethnographic Art from Oceania

Review Essay by William H. Davenport
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The most ambitious and comprehensive exhibition of ethnographic art from Oceania ever to be presented in the United States—probably the world—was shown at the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., between July 1, 1979, and February 17, 1980. The exhibition, modestly titled "The Art of the Pacific Islands," was ten years in the planning, consisted of well over 400 pieces from the three culture areas—Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia—and was lavishly installed on the concourse of the new East Building. An attempt was made to represent every major local and regional tradition of material culture with aesthetic merit and to include as many objects collected during the initial periods of European exploration as possible. In addition, Douglas Newton, the organizer of the exhibition, tried to include worthy pieces from many private collections that have not been shown or published before.

One of the reasons for producing a major exhibition of Pacific Island art, according to J. Carter Brown, Director of the National Gallery, was to acknowledge that exotic art from the vast reaches of Oceania is as aesthetically interesting and important as better-known traditions from sub-Saharan Africa and the New World. In order to accomplish all these goals, materials were borrowed from 56 museums (many of them national museums) and 28 private collections in 12 countries besides the United States. Only the prestige and resources of the National Gallery of Art could command cooperation and participation on this scale.

What does this exhibition of 400-odd objects represent in relation to the collected materials now in museum and private collections? The totality of Oceanian art is best thought of as divided among several pools of materials. One such pool consists of collections from the central and northern island groups, known as Polynesia and Micronesia, plus a few more islands in the southwest Pacific, known as Melanesia. Because these were the earliest islands or parts of islands to be "discovered" and explored by Europeans, and because the cultures and societies of these islands have been enormously affected—sometimes completely obliterated—by colonialism, the material culture traditions which produced the art are dead. All objects from these societies not preserved in collections have long since disintegrated; nothing more is being produced, unless in recent years there have been self-conscious attempts to revive forgotten skills in order to produce tourist curios or new symbols of cultural identity. In this pool are, perhaps, 10,000 pieces of sufficient aesthetic interest to be considered for inclusion in an exhibition of this sort. About 200 were selected.

A second pool of objects, mainly from the large island of New Guinea plus a few other small islands nearby, all in Melanesia, is much larger and is still growing. The number is increasing as more are being "found" in neglected museum collections and more are being collected from villages that are producing them, because the traditions have not entirely faded, or still have them lying around. There are, perhaps, 40-50,000 objects in this pool from which, again, about 200 were selected for this exhibition. Certainly, one noteworthy success of the exhibition was the selection and presentation of the objects from New Guinea and nearby islands, which, because so many have come to light only in the past few decades, are less well known than those from the pool first described.

Figure 1 Figure, New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, wood and paint, 133 cm. high, collected before 1894, Barbier-Müller Collection, Geneva.

Large displays of carvings such as these were made for a memorial ceremony called malanggan. The ceremony was also an initiation for boys, at which the "secrets" of the carvings were revealed to the initiates. Women and uninitiated persons were not to see the sculpture. The complex compositions were dreamed by the carvers, who use most of the same elements and motifs over and over again without special meanings attached. The ceremony is still celebrated in an abbreviated form and in a Christian context.
A third pool, much smaller than the other two, is composed of archeological specimens. Many are surface finds of unknown date, but a few have been unearthed in stratigraphically controlled excavations. Since field archaeology in the Pacific islands is young and a great deal of development lies ahead, the size of the pool will grow. At present there are only about 100 entire objects and a larger quantity of fragments (mostly pottery) in the pool; 20 examples were displayed in this exhibition.

By way of comparison, the total quantity of art from Pacific island cultures is but a fraction of what has come out of sub-Saharan Africa. And Africa continues to produce. This difference is due to the difference in scale of African and Oceanian societies. A tribe, linguistic group, or political division in black Africa may embrace hundreds of thousands of people, while in Oceania most societies have (or had) populations of only a few thousand, sometimes only a few hundred. Moreover, the smaller the society, the more susceptible it is to disruption from outside influences. Hence, drastic change and devastation of tradition are far more evident in Oceanian societies than in black Africa.

Obviously, the character of an exhibition is heavily influenced by the knowledge, taste, and purposes of those who put it together. Douglas Newton, Chairman of the Department of Primitive Art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, is a Pacific art specialist who has done field research in New Guinea and also has a distin-

Figure 2  Mask, New Caledonia, northeastern area, wood, 44 cm. high, University Museum, Philadelphia.

This is the face piece only of an elaborate construction of human hair, fiber, and feathers. The masks were used in a ritual which seems to have been directed at ensuring the return of rains and the wet season, and the perpetuation of growing things. New Caledonian cultures were among the very first in the southwest Pacific to succumb to European influences and colonial domination.

Figure 3  Door jamb, New Caledonia, wood, 167 cm. high, collected during the second half of the eighteenth century, Barbiere-Müller Collection, Geneva.

The sacred-men’s houses followed a round plan with conical roofs over which towered a spire. The door was ornamented with massive jambs such as this one, lintels, and threshold figures. The human representations were those of ancestral spirits. In New Caledonia the style of carving varied progressively from north to south; in the south human features were often reduced to geometric shapes.
Figure 4  Suspension hook, Yenshamanggu village, Niyaura latmul people, East Sepik District, Papua New Guinea, wood and paint, 97 cm. high, collected about 1914, University Museum, Philadelphia.

Suspension hooks of this kind are elaborated versions of simpler food hooks used in dwellings. The food hook is basically a rat guard, hung from a rafter, to which food in baskets is hung between meals. The decorated forms, such as this one, are made for use in men’s clubhouses and represent spiritual beings that are also present in the men’s house. The face painting is similar to that used by men in rituals of several kinds that honor the spirits.

Figure 5  Dish, Wuvulu Island, Western Islands, Papua New Guinea, wood, 47 cm. long, University Museum, Philadelphia.

Dishes and bowls for eating, serving, and conveying food, usually prepared as oily puddings, are used in almost every community of coastal New Guinea and the islands of Melanesia. Each society has its distinctive form. The dishes, or bowls, of Wuvulu are famous for their simple, clean lines, which resemble styles found in Micronesia more than those of Melanesian neighbors.

Figure 6  Food pounder, Truk, Caroline Islands, Micronesia, coral, 15 cm. high, made in Romonum 1950–1960, University Museum, Philadelphia.

Pounders, or mashers, are used to reduce cooked staples to a soft consistency. Nearly every island group in Oceania has a distinctive shape or form for such pounders. The four knobs on this one are one kind of ornamentation that also designates one hereditary tradition of the specialists who do such skilled work.

Figure 7  Canoe stem ornament, Truk, Caroline Islands, Micronesia, wood and paint, 42 cm. high, collected 1899–1900, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

Ornaments of this kind were attached to both bow and stern of paddling canoes. They were also used to signal the intent—peaceful or aggressive—of a landing crew as it approached a foreign community. Such stem pieces show very little aesthetic variation. The top figures represent a pair of aquatic birds, beak to beak: if there is any signification to the bottom forms, it is not known. Decorative art in Micronesia is rarely figurative and mostly made up of geometric elements which are not iconographically rich.
guished record of exhibitions and catalogs dealing with his specialty as well as ethnographic areas outside of Oceania. Only with his incomparable knowledge of the great European collections, public and private, could such a splendid show of Melanesian works, especially from New Guinea, have been assembled. With very few limitations on transportation costs and exhibition space, Newton chose many large, even monumental, pieces over other, smaller pieces of the same type that perhaps have equal aesthetic appeal. However, he also carefully included the small and the miniature to show how similar formal concepts could be rendered at any scale.

In an art exhibition that covers the entirety of Pacific cultures and in which sculpture is the dominant medium, Micronesia cannot compete. There is little sculpture from these many small societies where the finest artisanship is to be found in the so-called minor arts of plaiting and weaving. Nevertheless, the fact that Micronesia was included is a credit to the planners who wished to present Oceanian art in its entirety.

Assisting with the Polynesian sections were Dr. Adrienne L. Kaeppler, then a research anthropologist at the Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu, and now at the Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, and Dr. Peter Gathercole, also an anthropologist and Curator at the University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge, England. Both are field researchers and know Polynesian material culture collections around the world. There have been several big and impressive exhibitions of Polynesian art in the past decade, and there are fine permanent and changing exhibitions of it usually to be seen in Honolulu (Kaeppler has done one of these) and London, but the Washington exhibition, bringing together the best and most sensational pieces, both topped anything that went before and matched the dazzling impact of the Melanesian representation.

While it is usually assumed that the works themselves should be the main attraction, the design of this exhibition produced competition. In fact, in some sections the design presented such an overwhelming effect that it was difficult to shut it out in order to concentrate upon one piece or a small grouping of pieces. Movement through the exhibition was along a prescribed course that suggested a tour of the major island groups, region by region. It was a guided tour that commenced with Hawaii in the northern Pacific, as though it were the gateway to Polynesia, and Polynesia had some primacy with respect to the rest of Oceania. From Hawaii one moved south to the Marquesas, followed by Easter Island, the Cook Islands, the Society Islands, and the western Polynesian groups, ending with New Zealand, a zigzag course which made no culture-historical sense, for it was apparently dictated by matters of style and taste of the designers. For each island group a small gallery was constructed, one gallery leading into the next.
The tour of the Polynesian islands was followed by a single display unit of archaeological specimens drawn from all over Oceania. This interlude asks the viewer to ponder aspects of time and cultural evolution.

Underway again, the cruise steered to Melanesia, entering it in the south at New Caledonia and continuing northward with calls at the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and major islands lying off New Guinea. The mood of this sequence was somber, the lighting in higher contrast, the art more dream- and fantasy-like.

A pause again at an array of pieces from Micronesia and some odd-lot cultures of Melanesia and Polynesia which happen to have similar sculptural styles. From this association, I suppose, one is urged to think about both stylistic similarities that span vast reaches of open sea and the problems of the diffusion of art forms.

Figure 8  Head for decorating a sacred flute, Timbunke village, Waliagwi Latmul people, East Sepik District, Papua New Guinea, wood, 32.5 cm. high, collected about 1914, University Museum, Philadelphia.

The sounds of flutes and choirs of flutes made of bamboo were associated with the presence of powerful spirits at certain ceremonies. The flutes themselves were not only sacred but were kept out of the sight of females and uninitiated males. The decorative components, however, were not as sacred as the flutes themselves; hence there are many of them in museum and private collections.

Figure 9  Cult carving, Bahinemo people, Hunstein Mountains, East Sepik District, Papua New Guinea, wood and paint, 108.3 cm. long, Bruce Seaman, Tahiti.

This object was used in a male initiation ceremony in July 1967. The Bahinemo are now Christian and probably no longer celebrate initiations. Characteristic of this area is the "opposed hook" style, the motifs of which in this piece are said to represent birds' beaks and catfish antennae which themselves are representations of natural forces. In other localities nearby, the hooks represent features of the human body.
The final leg of the journey took the viewer to the immense island of New Guinea, which was displayed in a commensurately large gallery with seven display groups, each representing one style region such as the Northwest Coast, Southeast Coast, and the western half, called Irian Jaya, and ending with some closely associated islands off to the southeast. Nearly half the pieces of the exhibition were mounted in this single space. Major groupings were mounted in the center of the gallery so that as one moved about many foreground and background associations presented themselves. From dozens of angles one or several objects could be sighted against groupings of pieces representing different styles. The possibilities of visually aligning and merging forms were almost limitless. The most monumental works of the show were to be found here, and there were also some of the smallest. The effect was a visual kaleidoscope of exotic forms, colors, textures, and compositions—a climactic cacophony of visual experience. Too, the stunning variety of art displayed here conveyed the ethnographic fact that nowhere in the world are so many different languages and distinct cultures to be found distributed over the landscape as there are in New Guinea.

Reflecting on this exhibition, I am struck—troubled, really—by the visual impression it leaves and the knowledge of how very far from the ethnographic reality the objects are when displayed in a great museum of fine arts. In this exhibition objects were grouped according to some facet of style, and a style facet could be any feature such as form, subject, technique, or use. Larger groupings were partitioned off into geographic lots which, with special lighting designed to dramatize the dominant forms and create moods, gave the illusion that these carefully selected specimens really did belong together. Nowhere, however, is there a suggestion of what knowledge or information the pieces conveyed in their ethnographic setting. Even the labels were reduced to a cryptic minimum of information, as though anything said about the work would detract from the display or from the contemplation of the aesthetic experience. One comes away from the exhibition realizing that the design and production of the exhibition were as significant as the objects in it. What about the productions and settings of rituals and beliefs that enveloped the objects in their own cultural settings? An example: a human sculpture from the Asmat area of West New Guinea, labeled “Figure” (Catalog no. 21.8), a seated man with spindly limbs, elbows resting on knees, hands clasped to an open mouth, and a pointed ovoid head ridged by a long curving nose. Has not something very significant been lost by not knowing that such a depiction is an attempt to see the human male as an insect, a praying mantis in fact, whose reproduction cycle symbolizes Asmat ideas about death and life and to which their headhunting practices are linked? Is it also irrelevant to know that the stunning introductory work of the show, a temple image from Hawaii, is not just an anthropomorphic depiction of a god, but a god who was conceived as a direct descendant and embodiment of animate physical forces of the universe, which also gave birth to creatures of the sea, of the land, and humans, and that the image was “born” in a ritual as it was installed at the temple? Most of Oceanian art is depiction of myth, supernatural personality, social and natural processes, and social position, or it signifies the expenditure of skill of the artist as an offering. When works such as those shown at this exhibition are displayed in this way, the viewer is permitted to see only form and style. Yet this is art that, for the most part, is not only representational; it is didactic as it stands as testament to the central beliefs and values of the cultures that produced it.

Every object selected for this exhibition has been through at least two stages of removal from its original context. Initially, at the site where it was made or used, a collector obtained objects that could be bought and carried away with the resources available. Almost always pieces obtained were parts of something more complex—an architectural fragment, a piece of sculpture which was but one object among many used in a ritual—and more often than not the ideological, utilitarian, and didactic aspects were entirely left behind. Thus the great bulk of exotic material culture ending up in museums and private collections are fragments of larger cultural entities. The second selection is made when pieces are picked from collections for the exhibition. Many objects are deemed unworthy of aesthetic consideration because we see no art in them; some pieces from the assemblages are left out because only a part is seen as being aesthetic. What the final selection for an exhibition ends up being is a very small percentage of possible objects selected under our criteria of art, and all are fragments of larger material and ideological wholes. Finally, the works are mounted in an architectural setting and exhibit design created by persons who are interpreters of our contemporary ideas of art. A cultural transformation, not a translation, has occurred. Thus, exotic objects are made to seem familiar to us, because they are presented in a way in which we are accustomed to viewing fine art. We, the viewers, are invited to project our cultural values and knowledge upon them, to compare our impressions with others that we recall from other exhibitions. We are experiencing art, but that experience is derived from knowledge of our culture, not from any culture in the South Seas.

The catalog is every bit as ambitious and spectacular as the exhibition. In it are three essays, by Newton, Gathercole, and Kaeppler, and more than 250 pages devoted to listing the pieces, together with abstracts from documentation about them and black-and-white photographs. In addition there are 13 color plates and 2 additional color photographs used for cover and frontispiece.
The introductory essay, "Continuities and Changes in Western Pacific Art," by Douglas Newton is an attempt to see all the regional art traditions of Melanesia in some historical perspective. In order to do this he gives a very condensed résumé of the current hypotheses about culture history of the western Pacific as drawn from recent archaeological excavations as well as from ethnographic and linguistic distributions. He also discusses historical documents that bear on art. The problem is, there are not many archaeological and historical data on the art—not yet, anyway. It is a fine job of summarizing material that can be interpreted several ways. As an introduction to current scholarly ideas about culture history in the western Pacific it is excellent, and it is well referenced for those who wish to pursue the matter more deeply.

Peter Gathercole's essay, "Polynesian Cultural History," does for Polynesia what Newton does for Melanesia. The important difference, however, is that the culture history of the central Pacific is shorter, less complicated, and far better worked out by archaeologists than it is for the western Pacific islands. Again, this is a very appropriate summary for the exhibition, and Gathercole provides key references to more detailed studies for the reader who wishes to get more deeply involved.

Adrienne L. Kaeppler's essay, "Aspects of Polynesian Aesthetic Traditions," gets close to the heart of the matter: the differences between art and aesthetics from our point of view as contrasted with Polynesian orientations which we think of as aesthetic. One of her most telling points is that material culture—objects, that is—is neither the only nor the most important way in which Polynesians expressed ideas and values about the cosmos and society. This essay is a reminder that art in Pacific island societies, even when defined and presented in terms of our cultural conceptions, is not confined to what can be hung and mounted in a museum gallery. This essay is also a signal contribution to a small but growing literature on comparative aesthetics.

Considering the catalog separately from the exhibition but alongside other art books on the Pacific, this volume deserves special mention. For the person not already familiar with but eager to learn something about Pacific island art it is the best place to begin. It is the only book that will try to place the art objects in the contemporary view of culture history as currently interpreted by archaeologists. Other books will give culture historical backgrounds, but they will be based upon diffusionist and highly subjective methods of historical reconstruction. The considerations of what constitutes style similarities and dissimilarities are well supported by the objects and tend to be explained in less emotional terms than is usual in writings of this kind. There are good maps, the photographs are excellent, and, of course, there is the fact that so many of the pieces are illustrated here for the first time. Unfortunately, some small but glaring errors have crept into the catalog. The editors have assured this reviewer that all have been noted, and in a soon-to-be-published revised edition the errors will be corrected.

On the other hand, an overview as gained in this volume has definite limitations. Only brief mention of the social function of art is made, even though all three authors mention some aspects of it. Similarly, iconological and symbolic aspects are touched on—most cogently by Kaeppler—but they are downplayed in favor of considerations of style. After all, the exhibition was about style and history, and the catalog is the enduring artifact of that effort.

It is well to remember that at the same time the oldest pieces included in this exhibition were being collected and brought to Europe, about two centuries ago, they were considered to be "curiosities," the intriguing productions of savages. They were certainly not art, which could only be produced by civilized peoples. The first systematic collection of ethnographic exotica and scientific specimens also marks the beginning of natural history museums, but it was another century before art museums were founded, and still a few decades more before some artifacts were considered worthy of transfer.
from natural history to art museums. Since then the very concept of art in our culture has undergone such drastic revision that the inclusion of certain artifacts from nonliterate societies among collections of fine art from Europe and Asia is no longer controversial. These changes are linked, too, to our changing conceptions of the nature of man. Two centuries ago primitive peoples were thought to be lesser humans in comparisons with civilized peoples. Now we believe in the universality of human nature, and according to our cultural definition of the nature of man, he/she is, among many things, an aesthetic being, and that is what exhibitions of this kind are associated with persons of high rank and transactions of great social value.

Figure 11  Female figure, Ha'apai Group, Tonga Islands, whale-tooth ivory, 12.7 cm. high, Raymond and Laura Wielgus collection.

Whale ivory figures of humans were made and used in both the Tonga and Fiji Islands, which, although having different cultures and languages, had economic and political relationships before European intrusion into the area. The precise use and significance of the figures is not known, although some seem to have been neck pendants. In both societies whale-tooth ivory was among the most valued materials, and objects made of it were associated with persons of high rank and transactions of great social value.


Reviewed by Robert E. Kraut
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We all know people who seem especially skilled at nonverbal communication, flashing their emotions at will or divining ours even better than we can. The essays in this collection promise to reveal some of their secrets, telling us how to measure who is nonverbally skillful, showing us who they are and how they achieve their skill, and demonstrating the consequences of their skill for social interaction. This book fails to live up to its promises, and I was left doubting the value of the individual difference approach to nonverbal communication that Rosenthal and his fellow authors advocate. My skepticism stems from both the structure of individual differences in nonverbal behavior, which the book reveals, and important limitations in the scope of the book itself.

Friedman’s introductory essay argues that individual differences in nonverbal communication should be thought of as an ability akin to intelligence rather than as a personality trait like extroversion. Abilities can be directly sampled by tests that have intrinsic meaning, while measures of traits require complex and controversial inferences about how items are related to underlying dispositions. In addition, Friedman claims that individual attributes thought of as abilities predict behavior more strongly than do attributes commonly thought of as traits (Mischel 1968).

The rest of this volume belies the simplicity and power which the ability concept tries to bestow on nonverbal skill. If success at nonverbal communication were an ability like intelligence, then one might expect it to have a simple structure like the general factor in intelligence, perhaps with subskills overlaid on the general factor. Unfortunately, nonverbal skill does not appear to be structured so simply. At a minimum one must distinguish between skill at transmitting nonverbal messages (encoding) and at reading them (decoding). Research by DiMatteo and other research reviewed by DePaulo and Rosenthal in the present volume shows that these two dimensions of nonverbal skill are only slightly related (mean \( r = .13 \)).

Even within these two subareas, skills do not appear to be general. It is true that people whose spontaneous expressions of emotions are easy to read also exhibit expressions which are easy to read (Cunningham 1977; Zuckerman et al. 1976). However, success at both encod-
ing and decoding nonverbal messages is extremely sensitive to the dimension or category being portrayed and to the modality about which the judgment is made. For example, in his paper Zuckerman notes that four measures of success at nonverbal encoding are unrelated (median \( r = .05 \)), as are five measures of success at nonverbal decoding (mean \( r = .02 \)). DiMatteo also presents data showing the weak associations of different measures of nonverbal encoding and nonverbal decoding. For example, a person's success at decoding tone of voice depends on how the voices were prepared (mean \( r = .10 \) for content filtered and random-spliced PONS scores). Success at judging the voice stimuli was not strongly correlated with success at judging the face or body (mean \( r = .09 \)).

In summary, while the authors conceive of nonverbal behavior as a skill, with the implication that it is a unitary phenomenon strongly predicting behavior, the data show it to be much more fragmentary. Different ways of measuring nonverbal ability are weakly correlated, and none of the measures strongly predicts behavior. This pattern, similar to that which made Mischel (1968) challenge the validity of the trait concept, also makes me doubt the value of an individual difference approach to nonverbal behavior. To the extent that researchers do find stable individual differences in nonverbal skillfulness, these may be caused by individual differences on an array of dimensions only some of which are traditionally thought of as components of nonverbal communication. The dimensions range from voluntary control of facial musculature to visual acuity to a conscientiousness in completing rating forms.

As I have illustrated, some of the difficulties in the book inhere in the phenomenon of nonverbal abilities. But other problems result from the book's limited scope. The essays are a showpiece for Rosenthal, his students, and his colleagues. Of the seven chapters, Rosenthal or his former students and colleagues wrote six. Only Ross's chapter on nonverbal expressiveness and physiological activity shows clear independence from the Rosenthal modus operandi. Other highly relevant approaches to individual differences in nonverbal skill, including those of Trower, Bryant, and Argyle (1978) and Kagan (e.g., Danish and Kagan 1971), have been completely ignored in this volume.

One consequence of inbred authorship is an over-reliance on a single set of materials for assessing nonverbal abilities. Much of the research reported here is based on Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, and Archer's Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; 1979). In this test of decoding skill, a woman acted out twenty brief scenes that differed in the positivity or negativity of the emotion and the dominance or submission of the relationship being portrayed. These scenes are repeated with different combinations of information available to the decoder: facial expression, bodily movement, and tone of voice. The decoder's task is to guess what scene was being portrayed. Two derivative tests use the PONS material but either combine visual and auditory information inconsistently or shorten viewing times. Five of the six essays which report data rely on the PONS or its derivatives, with varying degrees of importance.

The major deficiency in the PONS is its use of only one actress to enact all the scenes, making highly inconclusive claims, for example, that decoders show a bias toward visual or facial information (p. 211). The authors attribute to perceivers' biases what may be an idiosyncratic feature of this actress's expressive face and dull voice. Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) strongly urged the sampling of stimulus people in their evaluative review of the literature on facial expressions of emotion. The emphasis that Rosenthal and his colleagues place on individual differences in nonverbal skill makes the use of a single stimulus person in their testing materials especially surprising.

As in any collection, the essays here vary in quality. Hall's analysis of sex differences in encoding and decoding nonverbal communication is a very strong piece. She compiled a lot of evidence to demonstrate that women are indeed better than men at both displaying and interpreting nonverbal signs. She then tested the quality of several developmental explanations for this difference. According to an empathy explanation, the sex difference would result from the ability of women to share emotions or moods with others. A femininity explanation credits the sex difference to traditional sex role norms which require nonverbal skill of women. According to a power explanation, women get special benefit from correctly interpreting others' moods and intentions because of their lower status, and, therefore, learn to do it well. Finally, an outsider explanation claims that women get more practice viewing and interpreting nonverbal communication because they are observers of, rather than participants in, most social encounters. None of these factors seems able to account for the sex difference. Indeed, contrary to prediction, greater masculinity and less traditional sex roles lead to more nonverbal skill.

DePaulo and Rosenthal's use of the concept of nonverbal accommodation to account for some of the subtleties of sex differences in nonverbal skill is interesting but less successful. They reason that women, in trying to make social interaction run smoothly, learn to read nonverbal signs meant for public consumption and to make their own behavior easy to read. Their interesting extension is that women's superiority over men in reading nonverbal communication decreases as the cues become more difficult for the sender to control (i.e., women refrain from decoding messages they were not meant to see). While DePaulo and Rosenthal's data are consistent with this hypothesis, they do not seriously consider a major alternative explanation, that nonverbal signs which are difficult to control, like micromomentary facial expressions, are also not informative. Thus women may lose their superiority over men when both become increasingly in-
accurate because the stimulus is uninformative. DePaulo and Rosenthal's failure to do the appropriate analyses to test this alternative (for example, by partialing out overall accuracy or by computing transformations of the original data) is symptomatic of Rosenthal's and his colleagues' general neglect of stimulus information.

Buck's literature review and analysis of individual difference in internal and external responses to emotional stimuli is well done. Other papers in this volume, however, are less successful. For example, the paper by DiMatteo concludes that a physician's success with patients depends in part on his or her nonverbal skill; yet the data for this conclusion are very weak. Zuckerman and Larrance describe new measures of subjects' perceived nonverbal abilities; while they provide an elaborate justification for why these self-perceptions might have importance in their own right, the failure of the self-perception tests to correlate with actual nonverbal success undercut their value.

In summary, this is a book that promises more than it delivers. Its self-appointed task is to show the value of the idiographic approach to the study of nonverbal communication. Despite several excellent and provocative chapters, I was left unconvinced of the value of this enterprise.

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Reviewed by Robert Bates Graber
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This book is an engaging little volume. On the surface, however, it seems never quite to have decided what to be about. On one hand, the reader finds sixty pages devoted mainly to answering affirmatively a very old question: Are facial expressions for human emotions the same in all cultures? On the other hand, one is presented with about eighty pages of heart-warming black-and-white facial expressions (of Woman and Child as well as "Man") in a single village of a single tribe (the Fore of New Guinea). At first glance, one cannot understand how the two sections might have landed between the covers of one book. The sense of incongruity is heightened when one places the sometimes technical and closely argued text in juxtaposition with the tone of the plates and their captions, which are sometimes playful and always informal. Thus, for example, Plate 336 of a photogenic young woman in a crouching position is labeled, "A better view of that tight-lipped embarrassed smile"; and Plates 46 to 52 were not selected to illustrate facial expression but to show the beauty and appeal of these people. Furthermore, not a single one of the plates is specifically cited in the text, yet Ekman assures the reader that the pictures "tell the story of what I found" and are, after all, "the best argument" for the case of cultural universality of facial expressions (p. 12).

But when one finally sees the light, the apparent lack of integration in the book's structure dissipates somewhat, for it turns out that Ekman's research among the Fore—though not the pictures themselves—did play a pivotal role in his argument for universality; and if the claim of universality is valid, then the faces of the Fore—like the faces of any other human beings—are nothing less than perfectly representative of the whole species. Granting the plates this much relevance to the book's thesis, and admitting that they are quite entertaining, I turn to the book's weightier portion: the section entitled "Darwin and Cross-Cultural Studies of Facial Expression."

Ekman begins by summarizing the view of Charles Darwin (1965) on the subject. While Ekman ultimately finds himself squarely in Darwin's camp on the basic issue of universality, he attempts to put a little distance between Darwin and himself. He does so by attributing to Darwin the belief that establishing the cultural universality of facial expressions would prove that "they must be inherited" (p. 93). But, says Ekman,
this last step in Darwin’s thinking can be disputed. Universality increases the likelihood that inheritance determines the form and appearance of facial expressions, but it does not prove an innate basis for facial expression, since there are other explanations available. [ibid.]

Ekman then states that he himself has previously outlined several alternative explanations which could also account for universality, but he offers only the sketchiest description of them. Next, Ekman proceeds to a brief but competent discussion of methodological deficiencies in Darwin’s work, being careful, however, to credit him with originating “judgment studies of the face,” in which observers are asked to interpret emotions depicted in paintings, photographs, or motion pictures. Most of Ekman’s own research has been of this type.

Ekman’s discussion of Darwin illustrates four mixed qualities that recur in the subsequent analysis and that typify its best and worst sides. These are (1) careful explanation of valuable conceptual distinctions (as between the problems of establishing universality and explaining it), (2) an excellent eye for defects in the logic and method of other research in the area, (3) overly cryptic references to his own previous research, and (4) overdrawn battle lines between himself and ostensible opponents.

Did Darwin actually believe, as Ekman implies, that establishing universality would be tantamount to demonstrating biological heredity as the basis of facial expression? Apparently not, for in the very passage cited by Ekman (p. 92), we find Darwin asserting only that universality allows one to “infer with much probability” a hereditary basis. This does not really sound much different from Ekman’s own statement that universality “increases the likelihood” of a panspecific genetic derivation of facial expression. Another respect in which Ekman overstates his disagreement with Darwin concerns the question of whether all facial expressions are universal. In the text, Darwin is portrayed as an extreme advocate of universality; only in a footnote does Ekman admit that Darwin, like himself, does not claim that all facial expressions are universal, only those for certain emotions.

Ekman next identifies the opponents of the universality position: three “extremely influential” behavioral scientists who have asserted that “the existence of universal facial expressions is dubious or disproved” (p. 96). They are Otto Klineberg, Weston La Barre, and Ray Birdwhistell. To make a twelve-page story short, Ekman finds that (1) Klineberg’s data against universality were misinterpreted, (2) La Barre’s were irrelevant, and (3) Birdwhistell’s were never even revealed!

Klineberg’s data consisted of descriptions of facial expressions he located in Chinese literature, anecdotal reports by observers of different cultures, and a 1935 study by J. P. Foley which, according to its author, indicated that undergraduates at Columbia University were unable to correctly identify the emotion underlying facial expressions of chimpanzees. As for the literary and anecdotal evidence, Ekman points out that it is questionable in terms of reliability, accuracy, and generality. Furthermore, even if true it would not suffice to prove the case against universality. This is because cultures differ in the specific conditions (“elicitors”) which evoke a given emotion, and also because they differ in norms (“display rules”) regarding the expected management of facial appearance (p. 97). Thus, were we to find a culture in which people generally exhibited smiling expressions at funerals, it would not necessarily be because smiling in this culture indicated sadness; instead, it may be that the event actually elicits joy among most of those attending—perhaps owing to differing conceptions of death—or that the culture considers it proper to mask the underlying sadness with a happy face. Surely these are cogent concepts which represent a significant contribution to this area of research.

Ekman next attempts a statistical reinterpretation of Foley’s above-mentioned chimpanzee study, but I do not believe that statistically adept readers will find it altogether satisfactory. The technical argument need not be taken up here, however, since, as Ekman himself points out, this whole cross-specific approach is of dubious relevance.

In placing La Barre among the “extremely influential” opponents of universality, Ekman once again, as with Darwin, conjures up a conflict that is more apparent than real. La Barre has indeed been influential as an anthropologist but certainly not as a cultural particularist, as would seem likely from the role in which he is cast by Ekman. In fact, psychoanalytic anthropology, the subdiscipline to which La Barre has made his truly singular contributions, has since its inception been characterized by its insistence on the fundamental significance of cultural similarities or universals, even when this interest was rejected by anthropology as a whole (Roheim 1950:2–3). In the first of his major works, La Barre begins by observing:

Anthropologists now see that we have been so successful in establishing the relativity of culture as to risk throwing away the baby with the bath: the universal similarities of all mankind. [1954:xiii]

One begins to suspect that it was not easy for Ekman to come up with his opponents on the issue of facial-expressive universality when it is found that La Barre himself (1978:289) regards the piece criticized by Ekman as among his least-developed studies in the area of nonverbal communication. This suspicion grows when Ekman himself points out that La Barre’s position is by no means directly opposed to the universality position, but complementary to it:
La Barre was really writing about gesture, not emotional expression, and in that sense does not contradict Darwin, who was more concerned with emotional expression. [p. 102]

At least Ekman manages to put this rather artificial opposition to constructive use, by taking the opportunity to give a summary (p. 102)—all too brief—of a noteworthy classification of nonverbal behavior devised by himself and Wallace Friesen. As in several other places in the book, scholars will be disappointed by the sketchy reference to an intriguing idea developed thoroughly only in a previous and possibly less accessible place. It is therefore important not to be led by the book’s main title into mistaking it for a scientific *magnum opus*; indeed, nearly the whole text is itself reprinted from a brief, previously published summary of Ekman’s research (p. 91). The volume, after all, is primarily a pleasant picture book.

Undoubtedly, Ray Birdwhistell comes off as the most recalcitrantly wrong-headed of the opponents of universality: Ekman (p. 107) declares him a “captive of his own . . . model,” who simply asserts his views without offering any documentation to support them.

Ekman then moves through a systematic critique of research attempting to prove the culture-specific hypothesis. This section is well executed and leads to the following conclusion:

The experiments failed to establish cultural differences because of the limited number of people whose faces were shown, or because of contradictions in the findings within or across studies, or because of the possible presence of blends of two or more emotions in the stimuli. (p. 123)

Finally, Ekman examines research—mostly his own—attempting to demonstrate universality. In literate societies, use of word lists along with photographs of expressions make cross-cultural judgment studies relatively effective. While the results of such studies clearly favored the universality hypothesis, they left open one loophole: the possibility that widely disseminated mass-media portrayals of recent times account for the observed cross-cultural similarity of facial expressions. Ekman knows well how to use his opponents for his own purposes, and at this moment he calls on one in order to heighten the reader’s sense of drama. Of the mass-media argument, he writes:

While this seemed improbable, the argument was made, presumably with some seriousness, by one of the advocates of the view that there are no universal facial expressions of emotion: Birdwhistell. (p. 127)

Thus, the “only way” to seal the case for universality would be to obtain comparable results in a visually isolated, preliterate culture. A note of urgency is injected, since very soon visually isolated peoples will disappear: “This was one of the last chances . . . to settle the question first raised by Darwin” (p. 129). Enter the Fore at last!

After devising emotion-inducing stories (word lists being obviously useless), Ekman found that extremely high percentages of the Fore subjects selected the same picture to illustrate each story as had the members of literate societies. Karl and Eleanor Heider replicated the experiment among the Dani of New Guinea and obtained similar results.

The psychoanalytically oriented reader will find oversimplified Ekman’s assumption that human emotions, in the absence of consciously controlled display rules, will be directly manifest in facial expression. For example, the concept of reaction formation implies that extremely powerful emotions may be effectively masked by a totally unconscious process. In this view, the effect of culture on emotional expression is seen as running far deeper than Ekman seems to recognize. The defense mechanism is erected due not to what people are taught to display but to an unconscious conflict between ego and id over what to feel. While this does not contradict Ekman’s findings, it does suggest that he deals with human emotion at a rather superficial level.

Perhaps the least charitable characterization which could be made of the whole line of research summarized in this book is that it seems a roundabout path to an unremarkable conclusion. Nonetheless, the road from “common sense” to scientific verification is long, and Ekman deserves credit for having clarified and strengthened the case for cultural universality of facial expressions.

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Reviewed by Brent Wilson and Marjorie Wilson
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At the beginning of his important and insightful book, Artful Scribbles, Howard Gardner presents us with some provocative works by children under the age of 7, bearing at least a superficial resemblance (in small black-and-white reproduction) to the work of twentieth-century artists such as Van Doesburg, Pollack, and Klee. The purpose of drawing these parallels is to introduce one of the three major tasks Gardner sets for himself: “toward understanding the meanings and import of children’s drawings,” that is, “the aesthetic status of the work he [the child] produces.” In other words, the author explores the question “Is it art or is it something else?”

The question may be a matter of categories and of children knowing them. An artist friend of ours related this story of his young son’s first experiences with art: The friend, it seemed, maintained a studio in a part of the house that was easily accessible to his son, who was free to come and go as he pleased and to explore the media and processes of art at will. At the time of his son’s emergence into the educational milieu of nursery school and kindergarten, the friend was deeply involved in a style of painting best described as nonobjective, in which areas of color and shapes were paramount. His son would come home from school with the usual bounty of papers, filled with the same amorphous shapes and colors; and our friend began to become concerned at the lack of any propensity on the boy’s part to draw the figure in the manner of his friends and classmates. Time and the example of his friends failed to bring forth, in the school drawings of the boy, the ubiquitous tadpole person or, indeed, any other semblance of a figurative schema. When father and son came finally to a discussion of this perplexing state of affairs, the boy demonstrated that he could easily draw—a man, a house, a tree. Why then, the father puzzled, did the child not bring home paintings like those of his friends? The forthcoming answer should have been apparent. The kinds of things that the father was involved in—the color and the abstract forms—that was “art”; the other—the tadpole, the house, the tree, and the rest—that was “something else.”

We find this analogy to be an important key to the entire premise of the book. We do not wish to dredge up, one more time, the thorny question of “what is art?” but merely to establish, at the outset, the view that one person’s “art” is another person’s “something else.” The addition, then, of a well-placed question mark to the title of Gardner’s book forms the basis for argument with one of the most provocative issues raised by him—Artful Scribbles: Artful? Scribbles.

Gardner uses as a “framework against which to contemplate” this and other “riddles,” “the normal trajectory of development, as achieved by most children in Western culture and quite possibly throughout the world.” It is this framework we also wish to examine in order to review this important addition to the knowledge of children and their graphic productions.

The first task Gardner sets for himself in the pursuit of understanding children’s art is to determine the reasons that it follows its characteristic developmental course. Those who have studied the course of that development have most often described a series of stages through which each child passes; each description neatly slices the whole loaf of graphic development into different stage segments. Luquet’s (1927) slices included Intellectual Realism, where the drawing reflected more what was known than what was seen, and Visual Realism, where an attempt was made to approximate appearances in the phenomenal world. In his age-based system, Burt (1921) charted the path this way: (1) The scribble stage at age 2 or 3; (2) Line at age 4; (3) Descriptive Symbolism at age 5 to 6; (4) Realism at age 7 to 9 or 10; (5) Visual Realism age 10 to 11 or so; (6) Repression, where drawing shows regression or decline, at age 11 to 14; and (7) Artistic Revival at early adolescence, a stage Burt maintained most young people never reached. The systems of Rouma (1912), Lowenfeld (1947), Lark-Horovitz, Lewis, and Luca (1967) also follow the same general schema.

Gardner, however, avoids the trap of naming precise age-based stages and prefers to characterize development as a continuous process with advances made relative to those in other symbol systems; and whereas most students of children’s art have taken into account only innate factors as they chart development, Gardner sensitively illustrates the rapid development of young children under the influence of the media—his son’s Batman series and Steps to a Dollhouse, for example, two of the most insightful segments in the book. Curiously, however, Gardner, like Burt, sees the developmental route not as a steady upward climb but rather as a U-shaped curve. Burt locates his decline at puberty; Gardner locates his at middle childhood. For Gardner, the early scribbling period is followed by an artistic flowering, a period occurring during the preschool and early school years, in which children produce drawings and paintings of great intuitive expressiveness, spontaneity, and inventiveness. In middle childhood, however, this flowering goes into a marked decline, as the child persists in the quest for skills which will allow him/her to render drawings with the precision dictated by the culture. The U curves upward for only a few young people who, intent upon becoming artists, master the cultural conventions
and then go on to regain an "intentional" spontaneity, inventiveness, and expressiveness in place of their earlier intuitive efforts.

Gardner's conception of development requires careful examination. First, what is the nature of the early artistic flowering? Since this "summit" is achieved at the end of the preschool period, it is a time when the work of the child is still highly, but by no means totally, influenced by innate factors. The child tends to use the simplest shapes possible; an innate sense of order and balance predictably allows him/her to create works in which the maximum amount of horizontal/vertical contrast is achieved; the combination of the availability of pots of paint and large brushes or 64 (or more) crayons in a box, to say nothing of the bright, easily manipulated magic marker and the child's inclination for experimentation, produces wonderfully colorful works; children's lack of motor control also contributes to their apparent expressivity, producing lines that often appear to be sensitive and eloquent but are, in reality, merely lines gone awry. Thus these early works, described by Gardner as "colorful, balanced, rhythmic" are certainly all of those things, but are also highly preconventional, and although charming and unconstrained, they are the most predictable (they never have, and never will have, the potential to bring about a new artistic style) and certainly no more or less inventive or expressive than the work of children at other ages. The young boy who was emulating his father's mature efforts was intentionally working within a particular paradigm; but were these children, whose work Gardner cites, even aware of the paradigm? Again we come to the matter of categories. On a recent trip to Spain, every broken window, every graffitied wall, reminded us of the paintings of the Spanish artist Tapies. They were not art, even in the broadest sense, and yet they affected our sensibilities in the way that the artist's work had done. Indeed, Tapies had shown us a way to look at the world. It may be that the early work of young children appears to us artlike and to convey, as Gardner would have it, "something of the range and the vitality associated with artistic mastery" merely because of its similarity to the work of abstract expressionists. These artists have shown us a way to look at children's paintings. In another time and place when another, more realistic or more idiosyncratic art was valued, these early manifestations might be seen in a very different way. In short, Gardner's "flowering" may be no flowering at all, or at best a mid-twentieth-century flowering.

And what of the middle childhood years, during which Gardner sees a decline in "artistic" or "aesthetic" quality in children's work? There is evidence that as young people acquire more competence in some of the more abstract symbol systems—written language, numbers, maps, musical notation, and the like—there is less use of the graphic system. This reduction of graphic activity may even slow the rate of graphic growth. Nevertheless, when children are asked during middle childhood to produce works that require delineation skills, inventiveness, and ability to design, the data show that their mastery increases with age in this span (National Assessment Technical Report, 1978).

So how might we characterize Gardner's view of development? When young children's work bears a superficial resemblance to abstract expressionism, it is considered to have reached a seldom-again-to-be-achieved peak. When middle-childhood graphic work begins to appear tight, more controlled, and conventional, it is considered to be in decline. This is a curious and perhaps biased interpretation of the data. It may be that young people do actually lose something, some flavor in their work, but then again it may simply be the replacing of one flavor for another during the middle years—French vanilla for strawberry marshmallow.

Thus it seems possible that, in spite of the insights that Gardner provides into the developmental path, he might have misread the data or have been working from an incomplete sample of the graphic production of middle-year youngsters. Our own collection of thousands of story drawings from children of all ages shows little of the decline that Gardner cites.

In order to approach the subject of deviations in the characteristic course of development and to ask whether there is a shortcut to graphic development, Gardner looks at a long-standing controversy in children's art—the role of copying in graphic development. Raising the issue of the two ends to which copying may be put—the first, as an end in itself; the second, as the use of bits and pieces culled from the images of others that become the material for one's own inventions—Gardner neatly dispatches the question "to copy or not" and asks, "Is it possible to achieve artistic heights without [emphasis added] a program of copying... by pursuing a strikingly different route?" The search for an answer to this question leads Gardner to examine two extreme cases of seeming graphic "mastery" that appear to have been achieved without the copying or step-by-step building upon and altering of simple graphics characteristic of most children.

The first case he describes is that of the astounding young British child, Nadia; the other, the cave painters of Lascaux. Nadia, although autistic, or perhaps because of her autism, was producing fluent copies of the illustrations in her picture books by the age of 3½. Her drawings contain such an expressive fluidity of line and incredible detail of foreshortening, overlap, and figure orientation that it seems as if the heights of "representational grandeur" reached by this 3-year-old child may be attained by few adults.

It seems to Gardner that both Nadia and the cave painters arrived at mastery in one giant step—by merely copying what was in their mind's eye. Here we think that Gardner, in an attempt to be provocative, ignores some of the most pertinent aspects of Nadia's production. It appears that Nadia was able to hold images in her
mind’s eye with such clarity that she was able to “trace around” those images with a line here and a line there until she arrived at a sort of Xerox machine or cameralike accuracy. Amazing, yes, but sad, too, because it seems that Nadia was little able to form standard graphic programs or routines, or basic conceptions of the parts of the images she drew. In one sense, she did not appear to develop from her earliest drawings (Arneheim 1980); and yet if one looks closely at the remarkable drawings, there is evidence that there was a development of sorts in the pattern of the normally drawing child, evidence that Gardner either ignores or overlooks.

The first drawing of a horse we are shown was drawn by Nadia at 3½. The horse has almond-shaped eyes. By the age of 5 or so, Nadia’s horses, humans, roosters, pelicans, and lions all contain a curious oversized Pop eye consisting of a heavy dot surrounded by a large circle. This seems not to be a product of Nadia’s Xerox-like mental facility, but a typical child’s schema. It is only here that we begin to see the vast gulf between Nadia’s Xerox-like capacities (for copying what she had seen in books) and her ability to form a graphic concept of a simple eye. The same manifestation is evident in the formation of the pea-sized head found in her drawings, both formed by the most basic of graphic configurations—the circle. From this circle stem the normal child’s inventive and creative abilities; in Nadia these abilities were minimal at best. Her Xerox-like copying capabilities were not mastery at all; there was no shortcut to graphic development, merely a dead end.

And what of Gardner’s assertion that cave painters copied from their mind’s eye as Nadia did? Perhaps it is not “tantamount to heresy,” as Gardner himself fears the idea will be viewed, but merely another instance of his blindness to the evidence to be found in the cave paintings. It is not difficult to find in these paintings manifestations of the copying of highly conventional schemata as well as of innately derived features, such as the use of simple forms to achieve graphic ends, the horizontal/vertical orientation of lines and shapes, the exaggeration of parts, and so on. Only the eyes, the pea heads, and a few geometric shapes in some of Nadia’s drawings were thus innately derived. It seems clear to us that the cave painters achieved their mastery in quite ordinary developmental ways, and in ways quite different from most Nadia’s configurations. There seems no general shortcut to a useful graphic mastery. Gardner himself recognizes this as he illustrates the way in which gifted individuals move rapidly through developmental stages.

Perhaps it is in these case studies and in answering the question of the “precise relation between the child’s drawing and other aspects of his mental, social, and emotional development” that the greatest strength of the volume lies. Gardner’s description of individual children are keen and penetrating and, we might even say, exciting. Designated “interludes,” these studies provide a perceptive narrative account of the various ways in which art contributes to the lives of children who choose the graphic symbolic mode. (There is one important note that we must add concerning the quality of the illustrations throughout the book. In a book whose entire premise depends upon visual and aesthetic qualities, it is disappointing, even frustrating, that it is not possible to assess the virtue of its illustrations because the publisher has used inappropriate paper and reproduction processes.) Not only does Gardner understand the necessity of considering the child’s graphic development as it relates to other symbol systems (play, language, and music, for example), but he also continues to view that development throughout childhood and adolescence, in contrast to those who would cease inquiry when the child reaches the age of 6 or 7. In addition, contrary to the position of psychologists and others who have viewed drawing as a window on the contents of children’s minds, as a key to their intellectual growth or as a means of understanding cognitive development, Gardner, in the interest of artistic development, sets himself quite another cognitive task. Our concern will be to judge how well he determines the artistic or aesthetic status of children’s graphic productions, the third major task Gardner undertakes.

In attempting to accomplish the task, he works within Nelson Goodman’s aesthetic theory. Goodman holds that the question “What is art?” is inappropriate, the more appropriate question being “When is art?” Goodman’s answer is that when a work contains “symptoms of the aesthetic” such as (1) repleteness—a knowing exploration of the qualities of the medium, in drawing, for example, the thinness and thickness of lines and shading, and (2) expressiveness—the use of the medium to produce qualities such as happiness, sadness, power, liveliness, and anger—then the conditions for when are at least on the way to being met. Gardner presents studies (Carothers and Gardner 1979) that report that first grade children, given partially completed drawings said to contain repleteness, were unable to reproduce the qualities of repleteness and expressiveness in the drawings, while sixth graders could quite easily. Gardner avoids the error of saying that since sixth graders can produce these features they are capable of creating art. He does imply, however, that they are probably more capable of it than young children are since they can at least reproduce the “symptoms.” And he does use this experimental evidence to call into doubt the assumption that the young child is an artist—a curious and contradictory state of affairs since Gardner implies that the child’s artistic peak occurs years earlier.

Does this mean, paradoxically, that those children whose work is most highly prized for its seeming “aesthetic qualities” are the very ones least capable of willfully producing it? Or is it that Gardner, in adopting Goodman’s notions of the aesthetic, in order to avoid the pitfalls of adopting the popular notion that more realism equals a higher degree of artistry, merely falls into another, equally seductive trap?
Perhaps a more useful approach might have been to adopt the view (Weitz 1966) that it is not possible to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for art; that it is possible only to look at paradigms or "good" cases that are conventionally considered to be art. Thus there are all types of art—high art or fine art, folk art, popular art, comic strip art, tribal art, children's art. Following this line of reasoning, then, it is possible that children's art is, indeed, art, but art of a kind that is quite different from other classes of art.

From this position, it would be possible to observe the child's shift from the paradigm of children's art to that of fine art, comic book art, or some other type of art. Gardner, in fact, presents the work of two teenage brothers, the younger of whom works within the fine-art paradigm. The boys' parents were artists and provided the rare fine-art model, as had our friend in the opening account. The older brother worked within the comic strip paradigm—one that many children in our culture model easily and readily. It seems that Gardner has asked too simple a question regarding the aesthetic and artistic status of children's art. It would seem more appropriate to apply the ideas of expressiveness and repletenss to spontaneous work, work that follows one of several paradigms in the fine- and popular-arts areas. Then the question could be asked: When do children become fine artists or comic strip artists? The answer, it would seem, is not just when they are able to reproduce the expressivity and repletion of those art forms but when they also employ the themes, subject matter, symbols, and compositional conventions of the given paradigm. Children's art is children's art; the question is when does it become some other kind of art?

Gardner is at his best when he speaks from the strength of his interactionist position of artistic development, as he does in the final chapter, where he criticizes those who would provide simple, one-dimensional explanations of development. Notably he singles out for analysis Schaefer-Simmern, who supposed that artistic development or unfolding is a matter of passage through a number of preordained evolutionary stages; and Suzi Gablik, who sees general cultural artistic development in terms of mankind's acquisition of new and hitherto unavailable cognitive competencies. "Gablik sees a parallel between what normal children do and the periods of 'childhood' in our culture." Although Gardner concedes the value and importance of some of the insights from these positions, he proceeds to point out their inadequacies as tools for the explanation of artistic development. Certainly the route to an adequate theory of artistic development has been shown to be an arduous one; it may even be that the necessity for a deep grounding in both psychology and art may put the end beyond the reach of a single individual. This is where, we believe, Gardner's work becomes problematic, where his psychological acumen outweighs his aesthetic perception. Nevertheless his work points the way to a much fuller explanation than has been previously posited.

If Gardner has meant Artful Scribbles to be provocative, it is certainly that, but brilliant and significant as well. It makes a substantial contribution to the still sparse but growing body of literature on children's graphic and artistic development.

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As Allen Sekula (1975) has remarked, photography swings between the two aims of expression and information, or art and documentation, usually seen as mutually exclusive. As expressive art, the photograph works as a self-contained object, generating its own meanings, intended for contemplation and enjoyment on its own terms. As informative documentation, the photograph stands as evidence of how things are and have been, its meanings arising out of its relation to the world of reality. We judge its truth and its ability to help us understand that world. Photographic documents (many of which have, and have been seen to have, considerable artistic value) are made in the worlds of journalism and social science investigation, rather than in worlds of art.

Dorothea Lange spent most of her life making documentary photographs. She made her aims clear in a 1940 statement from which these fragments are excerpted:

Documentary photography records the social scene of our time... man in his relation to mankind... his customs at work, at war, at play, or his round of activities through twenty-four hours of the day, the cycle of the seasons, or the span of a life... his institutions... the manner in which they work... methods of work... a record of change. [p. 37]

She added some more personal and artistic considerations in her later years, but never gave up on these. She thought, too, that photography ought to do some good, help people improve things, help them understand so that they would want to and be able to improve things.

Her work met those goals to a surprising degree—surprising because they are hard goals to meet. Her photographs embodied a serious and deep social understanding of the changes that took place in America from the thirties to the fifties, especially in agricultural America, from, for instance, the feudal organization of tenant farming to the capitalist impersonality of agribusiness. They were effective and integral parts of reports which seem actually to have affected what Congress, state legislatures, and bureaucracies did.

How can photographs embody a social science understanding of anything? It is easy to see that some do, but we have very little serious analysis of how, or, indeed, how we can make our photographs do so. Lange's life and work provide the ideal case for the exploration of what documentary photography is and how it can be effectively done. Karin Ohrn has written a thoroughly researched, wonderfully perceptive account of this life, pointed mainly to the work, the conditions under which it was done, the ingredients that went into it, and the way the resulting images did the job. In this emphasis, it differs from the Meltzer (1978) biography, which is a much more conventional "life." Ohrn has interviewed many people who knew Lange's working methods well and makes effective use of the Lange Collection in the Oakland Museum (so that we see, for example, the contact sheets from which some of Lange's famous images were selected). I will not try to summarize all the author's results here but will simply comment on a few of the things that seemed especially interesting.

How do you learn to think so effectively in social science terms that your photographs actually come out of that understanding instead of having it forced on them afterward? The easy answer, in Lange's case, is that she worked with and then married a social scientist (Paul Taylor, a distinguished agricultural economist). That, of course, is a belittling and trivial answer. But it points to something important: a photographer has to learn to think like a social scientist to get those results, and this does not happen by taking a course in anthropology; the insights of social science must be applied, day in and day out, to the phenomena of social life, ideally in collaboration with someone who can help pinpoint their significance, until, eventually, the visually striking and scientifically significant fuse in one head. Marriage is only accidentally how that is achieved.
Lange’s work makes clear that good results are less a matter of striking single images than of sustained series of images connected by as much text as necessary to make the analytic point clear. (Not that Lange failed to make striking images. The catalog of her posthumous retrospective exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art [Lange 1966] is full of them.) But this poses a serious problem. What format should be used to present sequential imagery and text? When Lange was doing her major work on agriculture, very few photographic books were being published. Even today, I wonder how much of a market there would be for a book that combined serious photographs with a sustained social science analysis, as the Lange-Taylor reports of the thirties seem to have attracted. (The nearest thing to those reports today may be the collaborations of John Berger and Jean Mohr, as in A Seventh Man [1975].) When Lange ceased working for the government, she lost the possibility of using that format and never really found another. Photographers attempting such extended statements since then have usually slighted the analysis Lange considered so crucial, providing, at most, simple date-and-place captions or short quotes from the people in the pictures, so that even full-length books like Frank’s The Americans lack the analytic bite of a Lange image accompanied by one of her extended explanatory captions. Lange ended by treating her work as a file that could be dipped into for this or that purpose, letting the file be the format. But files are not usually as available as Lange’s now are in Oakland, and even if they are, they tend to transfer the analytic job to the file’s user. This lack of standard formats for the presentation of social science photography is perhaps its major problem today.

Finally, Ohrn’s extended comparison of Lange’s and Ansel Adams’s documentation of the World War II relocation of Japanese-Americans demonstrates the differences between an “artistic” approach, in which unacknowledged political commitments work under the surface, and a forthrightly political one. Lange knew what she was doing. Her understanding of the economics and politics of California led her to conclude that the Japanese-American operation was illegitimate. Adams, more naive, thought the internees were doing well, making the best of a tough situation which circumstances had forced on the country. The differences in their photographs, which Ohrn analyzes in detail, are striking.

Their treatment of the environment is a case in point. Not surprisingly, Adams made beautifully composed pictures of people at work under the majestic beauty of the Sierras. Lange, in contrast, made closer-up pictures of the dust and sweat that accompanied that labor, dust that Adams’s faraway views hid. (Ohrn also makes very effective comparisons of Lange with others doing similar work under similar circumstances, with Imogen Cunningham, a portraitist in the twenties, and with Arthur Rothstein and Russell Lee, members of the FSA staff.)

Ohrn has set a high standard for the monographic examination of a photographer. It is an example that needs to be followed by others with respect to such other major figures as, say, Walker Evans, Brassai, and Robert Frank.

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Publish Your Own Photo Book (A Guide to Self-Publishing). Published by Bill Owens, P. O. Box 687, Livermore, CA 94550, 1979. 140 pp. $8.95 (paper).

Reviewed by Ellan Young
S.U.N.Y. at Purchase

Bill Owens was in the enviable position of doing exactly what he wanted for one year—one day each week. This is the time he gave himself to work on the project which culminated in his book Suburbia. In Documentary Photography Owens uses his strategies in producing the work as a way of discussing the field.

For 11 years Owens was a general news photographer for a small-town paper in Livermore, California, a position he considers ideal. It enabled him to have the time and energy to create the books for which he is known. He appreciates the amount of control he had in his assignments, with much more freedom and variety than is ever possible on a large city newspaper—a good point in this reviewer’s experience, although the latter does have more glamour.

The book begins with Owens describing his start on a college newspaper where his pictures of the student riots during the sixties earned him money as well as a valuable portfolio. Next comes some good advice for the aspiring photographer such as this example: "The only way to learn it is to do it. One needs to make all the photographic mistakes—in the streets, in the darkroom and in selling your photographs. The mistakes are a necessary part of learning to 'do' photography professionally." Owens warns against attempting at the beginning of a career to make it as a free-lance photographer, especially outside New York City or Los Angeles. He feels that too often free-lancers drift toward commercial work for the money and never manage to develop a personal style. For those still intent on trying it there is helpful advice here on what types of publications to approach; portfolios; the importance of selling oneself; and the help available when one shares information with colleagues.

Book publishing is also covered. Owens tells exactly what he did to get his first book accepted. His study of suburban lifestyles began close to home with the area he knew best, and he persuaded the city council of Livermore to give him $500 for fifty photographs of historical importance. He worked hard for three weekends and gave the city archival prints for its library files. Toward the end of his year’s self-allotted time he worked every weekend and holidays to get the shots he needed to record his neighbors’ lives. He used his newspaper contacts to get subjects, and he even ran classified ads asking people to cooperate on the project. Straight Arrow Books agreed to publish Suburbia. Five hundred prints were edited to select the one hundred twenty-eight final images. Acknowledging that having a photo book published will never make one rich and famous, Owens rightly stresses the importance to a photographer of being published for the other rewards it brings, such as grants and teaching assignments. It took six more years of work as a small-town news photographer and the publication of two more books (Our Kind of People and Working) before he felt able to leave the paper and continue on a free-lance basis. Owens discloses the hard facts about the economics of photo book publishing. On the first printing, which takes a year or more to sell for most photographic books, the publisher makes less money than the author. Many of these books fail to earn back their production cost. At the end of this chapter Owens’ description of two rushed assignments he did for Newsweek in 1976 brings him back to his original thesis: shooting for a big commercial magazine is no fun. Doing one’s own book with time and only inward pressure is the most rewarding photojournalism.

It is well to study Owens’ ideas on grants since he has been quite successful with them. Still he emphasizes that they really only pay for film and supplies and that his projects are labors of love.

The excellent suggestions offered under the heading “General Rules” may seem obvious when one is reading them, but they are things which can easily be overlooked in the excitement of a shooting session. In the chapters on cameras and lighting Owens proclaims his love for the larger than 35mm format camera, and after such enthusiasm it is tempting to think of running out and buying one of the new 6 x 7 models. Like Bruce Davidson, Owens feels that carrying a heavy camera shows his subjects that he means business and distinguishes him from all the Nikon-toting amateurs. I disagree with him that the medium format is preferable for documentary work in general. For posed portraits in peoples’ homes and in studios, yes, but in the field and in the streets where one is on foot all day even two small 35mm bodies and a couple of lenses weigh heavily on the shoulder. Since 11 x 14 enlargements of good quality can be made from 35mm negatives, and since projectors are standardized to 35mm slides, why make life more difficult with a big camera? Owens acknowledges that a candid photograph usually gives more information and insight than a posed one. It would seem preferable to increase the possibilities of getting this type rather than to decrease them by using a large and noisy camera. For establishing one’s credentials and genuine interest with subjects, and for being admitted to occasions and locations where these desirable pictures are likely to be found, I recommend giving photographs to people whenever possible. From the way Bill Owens talks about his subjects I feel sure that he did this as well on all his projects.
The chapter on lighting is clear and to the point, with more good concrete advice. The book concludes with a list of stock agencies, examples of how to fill out a grant application, and recommendations on photography books and magazines. Altogether there is much valuable material in this book, and it is made more interesting by the feeling the reader gets of Owens’ commitment to his work.

For the photographer struggling to make a living as a pro and interested in documentary work the message here is the importance of setting aside time to photograph what interests you most.

After being thoroughly inspired by Bill Owens’ book on documentary photography a photographer could well decide that he has something to say and that it would be worth the effort to see it through to book form. Owens himself has done this, in Publish Your Own Photo Book (A Guide to Self-Publishing). This book, then, is recommended reading. More than anything else today, a book furthers a photographer’s career, says the author, since the photojournalists of the picture magazines now have too much competition from television. He cites Les Krims as a person whose own special vision plus the will to publish his own books have made him a name in the photographic art world. Owens is bitter about what is considered “art,” but sticks to his guns as one who would rather tell us something about the walls of peoples’ homes than make pretty pictures to hang on those walls.

The book begins with book contracts with publishers—how they should differ when a photo book is involved (since they are written mainly for other types of works). For those who want to try the regular publishing route there are lists of photography book publishers, large trade publishers, and packagers as well as figures concerning production costs. Next is a list of step-by-step rules for publishing one’s own book: lists of good printers, helpful ideas in the form of letters from other self-publishers describing their experiences, and suggestions as to how to go about getting publicity for your book. As a photographer the self-publisher is in a much better position than the regular commercial publisher to know the photographic market place and to find hundreds of newspapers and magazines to review the book.

Also included are an example of a press release, lists of magazines which review books (including foreign ones), and some of the better-known photo critics, and Sunday magazines of large metropolitan newspapers which might publish photo essays from the book. Another chapter covers various avenues of distribution including lists of mail order photo houses, book store chains, small book distributors, book clubs, and museum book stores. Then there are a few pages on book design, tax and legal problems, and terms used in publishing, along with a list of volunteer lawyers for the arts. The book ends with a blow-by-blow account of how this particular book was published.

Bill Owens does everything for the photographer but stake out an original idea for a new book.
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