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The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement

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The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement

Abstract
This study attempts a theoretical explanation for the United States' leadership on NATO enlargement, under the past three administrations.

Keywords
NATO, security, Clinton, Bush, Social Sciences, Political Science, Alex Weisiger, Weisiger, Alex
The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement

By Jack Zarin-Rosenfeld

Political Science Honors Thesis
Advisor: Professor Alex Weisiger
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The future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was up in the air at the end of the Cold War. As an alliance formed to provide collective defense against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO needed to define a new mission in order to continue as a meaningful actor in international politics. The prerogatives of the United States, as the main military muscle behind NATO, were particularly crucial. Yet there was uncertainty as to whether the U.S. would continue to guarantee security even to existing alliance members, let alone whether NATO would provide a security umbrella to new members.¹

Nearly two decades later, by 2008, NATO had grown by ten members. NATO enlarged to include three new members in 1997, and again in 2002 to include seven more. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty now bounds the United States to come to the defense of former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics. The scope of NATO-protected territory has approached Russian borders. Not a bystander to this process, the U.S. has rather led the charge to enlarge from within NATO. The major question of this study, then, is why the U.S. extended security guarantees to new members and consistently pushed for NATO enlargement under the last three presidential administrations. To answer the question, I will test three types of theoretical perspectives – international relations, U.S. strategy, and republican security theory – against my own empirical history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement. I will compare the enlargement predictions offered by these different perspectives with the motivations of U.S. policymakers.

The paper starts with a discussion of the different theoretical perspectives I will use, and their predictions for enlargement. Theories in international relations aim to describe the general behavior of all states. The constructivist perspective in particular offers guidance on enlargement policy, and will be the only IR theory that is sufficiently consistent with the broad outlines of the

history to merit closer analysis in the empirical section. Competing perspectives on U.S. strategy aim to describe the specific foreign policy behavior of the United States, using detailed examinations of domestic coalitions. From this camp, the cooperative security perspective and the primacy perspective each predict NATO enlargement, and thus are explored within my own account of enlargement. Finally, the republican-security perspective aims to describe the security behavior of republican governments. I will argue that this last perspective offers the best explanation for U.S. support for NATO enlargement.

Following the theoretical discussion, I turn to my own account of the U.S. push for NATO enlargement. I detail how the theoretical concepts of republican security theory fit in with the empirical history of enlargement. I argue that policymaker statements used republican security concepts in justifying enlargement, and that U.S. policies strived to achieve objectives central to republican security theory. In detailing the history of NATO enlargement from an American perspective, I show how these patterns have spanned three Presidents since the Cold War, and answer why there has been continuous support for NATO enlargement from three, in many ways very different, administrations.

The next section introduces the theoretical perspectives I will use in my examination of U.S. support for NATO enlargement.

I. Theoretical Perspectives

*International Relations*

The major theories of international relations are used to explain and predict the general behavior of states in the international system, including behavior regarding interstate alliances.
Here I will briefly outline three dominant theories – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism – and what each theory predicts about U.S. support for NATO enlargement.

Neorealism posits a system of competitive states in anarchy, where each state seeks to survive and grow its relative power. The structural condition of anarchy acts as the largest constraint on state behavior, demanding a self-preservation policy.\(^2\) For these reasons, neorealists expect cooperation between states to be very rare and very hard to achieve. Competition for relative power gains crowds out cooperation. Alliances will only form when an external, third party threat outweighs the risks of cooperation, which include worries about relative gains, lack of autonomy and lack of trust.\(^3\)

The downfall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact looked like the end of NATO to many neorealists.\(^4\) The lack of a major threat meant either the dissolution of NATO or, at best, maintenance of the status quo in terms of membership. Considering the high relative gains that a country like Poland or Estonia receives when NATO guarantees its security, and the possibility that enlargement could mean more confrontation with Russia without offsetting benefits, realists would have a hard time arguing that their theory offers the most explanatory perspective on the U.S. preference for NATO enlargement. Though I will rule out neorealism as an adequate theory for explaining the policy, and do not test its main theoretical concepts later in my take on the history of enlargement, there is one specific realist response that deserves attention. That realist argument sees NATO enlargement as a means towards power gains relative to Russia, expanding

\(^2\) See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)
\(^3\) For a realist take on alliances, see John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.
NATO from Western Europe all the way up to Russian borders in an attempt to take over the old Soviet “sphere of influence.” I will later argue that this take on NATO enlargement does not adequately account for all of the other security motivations driving U.S. support.

Multiple studies that have pointed out neorealism’s difficulties in accounting for NATO enlargement also provide a more hopeful, but ultimately unsatisfying answer on whether a neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps explain U.S. policy to expand NATO. Though neoliberal institutionalism is certainly not contradicted by NATO’s persistence and enlargement, these studies show it does little in offering a specific answer for why it happened.

Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the “complex interdependence” and potential for cooperation among states, as a response to the dire forecast of neorealists. According to this theory, states worry more about maximizing their absolute gains rather than relative gains, and thus see more potential that realists would predict for international cooperation via institutions. Rather than the realist focus on balance of power, neoliberals argue states hold a “balance of interests” without a specific hierarchy. When states share areas of common interest, neoliberal institutionalists expect states to compromise and cooperate through institutions, in order to reap gains that would be unavailable without cooperation.

In his discussion of neoliberal institutionalism’s views on relations after the Cold War, Robert Keohane argues that the theory would expect “NATO to use its organizational resources

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6 For example, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).
to persist, by changing its tasks.’’ There is no reason why the defeat of the Soviet Union would prevent Western institutions from continuing to provide states with opportunities for mutual absolute gains. NATO’s persistence, as well as its enlargement, does not contradict the theory to any degree. But as a systemic theory of international relations, neoliberal institutionalism does not seek to describe any particular conception of state interests. Without a prediction of these interests, there can be no real explanation for their evolution, and thus while NATO’s continuation fits with neoliberal institutionalism the theory can only predict so much: NATO will continue if its members continue to share undetermined common interests.

As for NATO enlargement specifically, the problem of undefined state interests is still an obstacle. And while the theory justifies U.S. belief that an institution such as NATO could affect non-members’ interests in a way to qualify them for later membership, the emphasis on economic-interdependence and sunk costs as the major reasons for institutional continuity certainly seems to weaken neoliberalism’s explanatory power for why the U.S. would advocate integrating a small country into NATO, for what is likely to be a higher economic cost.

The theory is not of significant use in answering the puzzle of this study. As my empirical history of NATO enlargement policy later shows, I believe there was a fundamental and consistent interest driving U.S. policymakers on this issue that can be explained using a different theoretical perspective, and therefore I rule out neoliberal institutionalism as a possible explanation.

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9 Ibid., 287.
The constructivist perspective on international relations views state behavior and interactions through the lens of subjective identities. The focus on structural forces of anarchy, so prominent in neorealism, is flipped on its head by the constructivist view that “anarchy is what states make of it.”\textsuperscript{11} The focus for constructivism is on shared values and identities, not anarchy or material interests. States do not have simply “a national interest”, but rather a variety of relations and interests with other states that come about through social interaction, constructed by the actors themselves – “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.”\textsuperscript{12} From this perspective, socially constructed interests give significance to the anarchical relations between states and distribution of power among them, not the other way around as in the realist formulation.

For constructivists, institutions represent relatively stable sets of identities and interests.\textsuperscript{13} Even when they are formalized by rules, institutions still ultimately represent a cognitive “collective knowledge,” such that when institutions persist constructivists expect the fundamental reason to be because of shared common values. Importantly, this shared value need not be cooperative – mutual recognition that two states are “enemies” represents a shared social identity, and can form a “self-help” or “competitive” institutional relationship.\textsuperscript{14} State relationships, most importantly for this study, can also be “cooperative,” in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived, to a certain degree, as the responsibility of the entire collective. Depending on how well developed these collective and

\textsuperscript{12} Wendt (1992), 397.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 399.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 399-400.
cooperative identities are, security institutions can range from the limited joint action all the way to the “full blown form seen in ‘cooperative security’ arrangements.”\textsuperscript{15}

The constructivist focus on shared meanings makes collective action through institutions less dependent on the presence of active threats, and also helps restructure conceptions of state objectives in terms of shared norms rather than relative power.\textsuperscript{16} The constructivist answer on whether NATO would continue at all after the disappearance of the Soviet threat is essentially the same as the neoliberal answer: perhaps it won’t, but certainly it will if allies “have reasons independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another.”\textsuperscript{17} But through its insistence on identities independent of power gains, constructivism offers a more specific answer than previous theories: NATO continued after the Cold War because of the allies’ shared values of democracy, markets, and liberal principles of sovereignty.

NATO enlargement specifically can be viewed as an attempt to further the institutionalization of these shared meanings to so-called “bad apples,” states that do not share them yet – a social process that constructivism accounts for far more effectively than either previous IR theory.\textsuperscript{18} The multitude of values-based argument for enlargement that U.S. policymakers offered confirms this perspective as a viable one.\textsuperscript{19} For these reasons, constructivism appears highly consistent with U.S. policy to expand NATO after the Cold War, and it receives a more detailed testing in the empirical history of enlargement later on.

Constructivism predicts that a state is granted NATO membership “if it reliably shares the liberal values and multilateralist norms of the Western community…[and if] the faster it

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 400-401.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 401.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 408.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 409.
\textsuperscript{19} Schimmelfennig (1998), 223-225.
internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member.” Later I conclude that although constructivism is highly useful, this prediction does not offer a theoretically satisfying explanation for why the U.S. chose the specific states it did through each round of enlargement, and why others were left out.

**Competing U.S. Strategies**

An alternative method for explaining U.S. policy on NATO enlargement is to focus in specifically on perspectives on American grand strategy. These perspectives focus more on competing foreign policy coalitions in the domestic debate, in contrast to the IR theory explanations of state behavior that treat states as unitary actors. The competing strategy perspectives that I use here are based on Barry Posen and Andrew Ross’ influential 1996 article “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” The authors posit four different major security strategies that are present in the American public debate after the Cold War. They do so by summarizing strategies’ respective views on the main purpose of U.S. security policy, the fragility and tractability of the international environment, the preferred policy means, and a host of relevant, specific policy questions.

The first strategy, neo-isolationism, has the narrowest view of American interests abroad. With the end of the Cold War this strategy argues for a pullback of American international activity. It argues that “the United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order;” the very attempts at such a mission endanger our security at home.

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20 Ibid., 216.
22 Posen and Ross (96/97), 7-9.
23 Ibid., 13.
Terrorist attacks and great power conflicts would not occur if the U.S. did not meddle militarily abroad. Most importantly for this study, neo-isolationism calls for an abandonment of the NATO alliance, not its enlargement. The isolationist perspective is clearly inconsistent with historical developments and thus need not be considered further.

Selective engagement focuses on what its advocates see as the greatest threat to American security: a war between big, industrial countries. Because the U.S. has historically found it necessary to involve itself in great power wars, and because these conflicts are presumed to be the most likely scenario of large-scale uses of force, U.S. security policy must center its attention on balancing powerful nations such that major conflicts never break out. Interstate conflicts, and explicitly not intrastate or ethnic conflicts, are the vital sources of insecurity that America need attend to. Interventions that are not in the interest of preventing great power wars only use up precious domestic political capital that may later be lacking when a true conflict needs attention. This entails a regional focus, specifically on Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East – areas that include great powers and/or contain specific regional characteristics that could serve to spark a great power war, as with oil in the Middle East. Finally, advocates of selective engagement advocates favor the Cold War status quo in NATO policy. NATO should continue to act as a collective defense alliance for its current members, ensuring stability only in that region. All NATO enlargement would serve to do, from this perspective, is exacerbate tensions with Russia and China. Once again, I rule out selective engagement here and do not test it further in my empirical examination.

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24 Ibid., 12-14.
25 Ibid., 20-22.
Cooperative security argues for the broadest conception of American national security interests, and entails the biggest mission in terms of scope and resources. This strategy expands selective engagement’s focus on interstate conflicts to include intrastate conflicts as well. The position of the United States according to these advocates is one of high “strategic interdependence”: wars in one place are likely to spread, the use of WMD will beget more use, ethnic cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. In other words, it is in the direct interest of the U.S. to root out numerous large and small conflicts that, if left to simmer, would draw American military intervention at a later and more volatile time. Because a variety of conflicts threaten American security, U.S. cooperative security policy should focus on strengthening regional and global international institutions to both directly counter violent conflicts and to deter future ones. International institutions are preferred because their geographic scope and multi-national military capability offer the greatest chance of a credible deterrent to conflict. Additionally, military action by international institutions inevitably has more legitimacy – and thus will cause less global backlash – than unilateral or ad-hoc coalition military action.

A deep patchwork of global and regional international institutions, for cooperative security advocates, would serve to foster cooperation in a variety of policy sectors where democracies can reap mutual gains – “diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” all have a place. The ultimate goal is the creation of an international system that integrates Russia, China, and other potential great power rivals, and therefore these institutions should not seek to create new tensions either. For these reasons, the cooperative security strategy calls for an enlarged and transformed (as in, Russia-friendly) NATO, to act as a major regional security

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26 Ibid., 23.
27 Ibid., 25.
28 Ibid., 27.
Cooperative security is broadly consistent with a policy of enlarging NATO, and so I discuss it later in my empirical history of enlargement. There, I show commonly cited advocates of cooperative security were found to argue both for and against NATO enlargement, and conclude that the perspective offers too broad a set of policy objectives to be the most explanatory of NATO enlargement.

The final strategy, primacy, rests on the principle that a preponderance of U.S. power internationally is the only path to eventual world peace. While primacy advocates agree with selective engagement that great power wars are the biggest threat, they prefer to avoid this possibility through the continued build-up of American military and economic power, not through the selective balancing of powerful states. Present and future great powers, primacy suggests, will be deterred from posing threats to the U.S. because the cost would be existentially high, and other actors will welcome this particular form “benign hegemony” for its stability and predictability. While committed to liberal principles like cooperative security, the primacy strategy is more judicious with U.S. commitments because national autonomy of action needs to always be maintained. International institutions can be useful if they promote a system of international law, democracy, and markets that entrenches the current unipolar structure of global power, or even “if the façade of multilateralism renders the rule of an extraordinary power more palatable to ordinary powers.”

29 Ibid., 24, 27.
30 Ibid., 32.
31 Ibid., 34.
The primacy strategy is highly consistent with the evidence of a U.S. push for NATO’s post-Cold War relevancy, so as to preclude developments that may “undermine the role of NATO, and therefore the role of the United States, in European security affairs.” Viewing NATO enlargement as a hedge against Russian aggression, and a method of integrating Central and Eastern European states into the security wing of Western institutions, the primacy perspective appears broadly consistent with the history, and merits greater attention later in the empirical section. There I will argue that, although consistent, primacy does not offer a sufficient explanation for the process of NATO enlargement, either its speed or its particular progression.

Both cooperative security and primacy are each individually helpful in explaining NATO enlargement policy, but for different administrations. A theoretical explanation that accounts for the continuity of NATO enlargement policy throughout different presidencies, then, would seem to have more explanatory power than either of these two competing strategy perspectives.

Republican Security Theory

The final perspective I will test is the republican security theory perspective, from Daniel Deudney’s book *Bounding Power.* Deudney’s work shows how theorists in republican polities – based on political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government constitutionalism – have reacted to changing material contexts in the international system throughout history. In clarifying the most important “problematiques” and solutions offered in this wide-ranging historical debate, Deudney constructs a coherent “republican security theory” that attempts to grapple with the basic and ever-present question of what “political arrangements are necessary

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32 Ibid., 34.
34 Deudney (2007), 2.
for security.” Here I will discuss the central theoretical concepts of republican security theory: violence interdependence, anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union. I will also touch on Deudney’s account of how these concepts relate to the history of American security policy generally conceived.

Republican security theory posits only two possible restraints on the use of violence, or solutions to insecurity: limits imposed by material contexts, both geographical and technological, or limits imposed by socially constructed political structures. A key republican security insight is that these two limits on insecurity are “interactive”: limitations imposed by material contexts change over time, which in turn alters the kinds of political structures necessary to confront insecurity that material limitations can no longer control. The oceans did not need governance before technology made navies possible, just as nuclear arms control regimes were not necessary until the creation of nuclear weapons. Historically, as new forms of destruction, transportation and communication emerge, so too has the necessity for new types of political restraints.

Republican security theorists have focused most on one material variable, which Deudney labels violence interdependence, simply his term for the basic capacity of actors to commit violence upon one another. Measuring the degree of capabilities among actors based only on empirical evaluations of geography and technology, violence interdependence has “profound implications for security that are independent of the distribution (or balance) of power” among the actors themselves. Looking back through history, the major implication for security arises from the fact that violence interdependence has grown across both space and time,

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35 Ibid., 27.
36 Ibid., 27.
37 Ibid., 27-28.
38 Ibid., 18.
39 Ibid., 35.
driven primarily by technological change.\(^{40}\) Because material and social-political restraints are interactive, republican security theorists hold that these vast changes in violence interdependence – from bows and arrows to nuclear weapons – have \textit{demanded} the need for new and bigger forms of political arrangements.

When a new generation of technology causes a shift in degree of violence interdependence, a transformation occurs from “second anarchy,” where the levels of violence are essentially tolerable, to “first anarchy,” where material changes in technology render the existing forms of political authority insufficient for human survival.\(^{41}\) For example before the Industrial Revolution, the European state system was competitive but in second anarchy. It was only with the new capabilities of violence at the turn of the century that anarchy proved intolerable – and unsurprisingly what followed were major world wars and attempts at creating larger forms of political structures, first through domination than through institution building.\(^{42}\) This major claim about the relationship between anarchy and violence interdependence – “that actors in first anarchies require substantive government for security, while actors in second anarchies do not” – is one of the two pillars of republican security theory: \textit{the anarchy-interdependence problematique}.\(^{43}\)

While republican security theorists advocated the need for larger scales of governance to match larger scales of violence, they also forwarded a core insight about the quality of new governance: a hierarchical new government can be just as potent a source of insecurity as the state of first anarchy it was meant to mitigate, because a centralization of unchecked power does

\[^{40}\text{Ibid.}, 37.\]
\[^{41}\text{Ibid.}, 36.\]
\[^{42}\text{Ibid.}, 39.\]
\[^{43}\text{Ibid.}, 36.\]
not provide “adequate restraint upon the application of violence to human bodies.”44 This major claim about the similarity between anarchy and hierarchy – that both are intolerable to security when unrestrained by material or political constraints – is the second pillar of republican security theory: the hierarchy-restraint problematique.45

The anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint concepts essentially posit two primary interests for theorists of republican security – survival, and the republican characteristics of political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government. While these republican features may have inherent moral value, it is important to note that republican security theorists were most concerned with the practical, security-based value in these constraints on government. So while these theorists see the need to extend the scope of government in order to mitigate anarchy, they also insist on constraining that new power in order to avoid hierarchical arrangements and illiberal concentrations of power. As Deudney puts it, republican security calls for negarchy, in which anarchy and hierarchy are both negated through actors “authoritatively ordered by relations of mutual restraint,” not by subordination or lack of authority.46 These mutual restraints are republican in nature, and so the concept of negarchy is simply Deudney’s way of arguing that republicanism has historically been a security arrangement, in addition to being a manifestation of normative liberal values. The dual aversion to anarchy and hierarchy is what makes the set of foreign policy concerns and practices “distinctive to republics.”47

Theorists in republics throughout history have advocated a particular strategy of negarchy, cobinding, in which republics join together with other republics in various forms of

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44 Ibid., 31.
46 Ibid., 48.
47 Ibid., 55.
Specifically, cobinding occurs through *interstate unions* that “entail the delegation of specified authorities to international organs.” 49

Republics have both strong incentives and strong capabilities to cobind for the sake of security. The stronger incentives come from the republican sensitivity to hierarchical tendencies in responding to first anarchy, a sensitivity that interstate unions alleviate because they “make less necessary the centralization of authority, and thus less likely the deformation of domestic republican forms.” 50 If Republic A is highly violence-interdependent with Republic B, for instance, both states will have a better chance of maintaining their domestic republican character if they opt to share and restrain their combined power in an international institution – as an expression of each state’s sovereignty, but also as a limitation on their autonomy internationally.

Cobinding is preferable to attempts at isolation or domination, both of which serve to reinforce domestic hierarchy and potentially produce intolerable insecurity. Luckily republics also have the greatest ability to cobind, because “the structure of such unions extends their fundamental constitutional arrangements.” 51 In other words a mutual fear of anarchy and hierarchy is more likely to result in a mutual cooperation characterized by neither. For contemporary international politics and republican security theory, common examples of interstate unions are international arms control regimes or collective defense organizations. 52

Now that the major theoretical components of republican security theory have been laid out, it is important to highlight how they relate to the history of American security policy. Deudney argues that the American founding itself was a republican alternative to the European

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48 Ibid., 57.
49 Ibid., 53.
50 Ibid., 58.
51 Ibid., 58.
52 Ibid., 252-254 for Deudney on the importance of arms control to republican security theory.
system of hierarchical units operating in anarchy. As a decentralized federation of states, the American system gave its members the size and security viability previously only available to hierarchies, but within a distinctly republican form. The industrial and nuclear revolutions catapulted violence interdependence to a continental and then global level, ensuring that republican security theorists continued to inform foreign policy debates and the behavior of republican governments during that time. For example, advocates of republican security theory during the industrial revolution, most prominently H.G. Wells, predicted that material-contextual changes and growing violence interdependence would force a union of Western liberal democracies, particularly between a European Union and America.

Most importantly for this study, republican security theory heavily informed American policymakers during the 20th century. During the last century, a consensus in American security policy emerged that started from the anarchy-interdependence rationale as it applied to Europe. American security policy since World War I has, argues Deudney, assumed that “rising levels of interdependence, especially of violence, produced by the industrial and nuclear revolutions have made isolationism impossible and internationalism necessary for the survival of limited government.” The heavy pivot in U.S. security policy towards “making the world safe for democracy,” started by Woodrow Wilson, was aimed at both aggregating power between republics in order to respond to external anarchy, and trying to influence states in the international system into becoming republics. Alliances with other republics and the addition of new republics avoided the need to bunker up into a garrison state or attempt to secure European

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53 Ibid., Ch 6, “The Philadelphian System.”
54 Ibid., Ch. 7-9
55 Ibid., 272.
56 Ibid., 186.
57 Ibid., 186.
sources of insecurity by unilateral force. Both strategies of isolation and domination would result in the corruption of the U.S. republican character for the sake of security.\(^{58}\)

The level of violence interdependence with Europe over the past century, from a U.S. perspective, has necessitated “cobinding for the survival of the U.S. constitution.” This was the core logic informing a variety of cooperative U.S. policies with European republics during the 20\(^{th}\) century, resulting in a large web of interstate unions in many policy areas.\(^{59}\) As the dominant military power in the NATO alliance, the U.S. has played a crucial role in European unification for the sake of both U.S. homeland security and the security of European republics.\(^{60}\) Thus, the formation of NATO and its activity during the Cold War was heavily informed by republican security, as it represents part of a union between Western liberal democracies under American auspices that “clearly sits along the main axis of republican security theory.”\(^{61}\) In the table below, I summarize the relevant republican security concepts and how they have generally appeared in U.S. foreign policy:

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 186, 188.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., 187-188.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., 232.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., 241.
Table 1. Republican Security Theory Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence interdependence</td>
<td>The capacity of actors to commit violence upon one another, determined by new spatial and destructive material capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy-interdependence</td>
<td>Ungoverned spaces of anarchy require new forms of government when a worse degree of violence interdependence is introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint</td>
<td>Insecurity can arise from centralization of power, just as much as from anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobinding</td>
<td>Interstate unions in which republics consolidate governing authority in an institution, but decentralize it through the application of mutual constraints</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Republican Security Theory Concepts in U.S. Foreign Policy:
- **Anarchy-Interdependence**: Decrease the instances of out of control violence and conflict because it is necessary in a world of high violence interdependence
- **Hierarchy-Restraint**: Prevent the U.S. from becoming isolationist garrison state
- **Hierarchy-Restraint**: Prevent the U.S. from becoming hegemonic state
- **Cobinding**: Alliances with other republics
  - eg. NATO
  - Requires protecting and encouraging republican governments internationally

It is important to note that republican security theory is a set of functionality, rather than functionalist, arguments. It is made up of claims about which arrangements are best in meeting some goal or purpose, rather than claiming that outcomes emerge because they met some goal or purpose. The arguments of republican thinkers like Wells – providing the theoretical precursor to American internationalism generally conceived – did “not maintain that a European and then a global consolidation will happen, but that it must happen to achieve security.”

It is my claim then that U.S. officials who crafted NATO enlargement policy were in essence acting as republican-security theorists, like the functionality thinkers Deudney focuses on in his writing. Of course it makes sense that policymakers would think in functionality terms, but I am claiming that the consistent pattern in U.S. enlargement thinking over eighteen years – that three administration’s worth of policymakers used the same republican-security rationales and methods when it came to NATO enlargement – actually makes republican-security theory an

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62 Deudney, 60.
effective explanation of U.S. support of NATO enlargement. By showing that the enlargement policy emerged as a republican security initiative in practice, in other words, I will use republican security theoretical concepts to offer theory-based justifications for why the U.S. pursued the policy that it did. In the next section, I outline the general contours of republican security theory’s relationship to NATO enlargement, and offer my empirical history of NATO enlargement as evidence of that relationship.

II. The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement

The Argument

My basic argument is that NATO enlargement, an American initiative, followed the republican security agenda of American internationalism. It sought “to populate the international system with republics and to abridge international anarchy” in Europe. As Deudney writes, this agenda measures success “by the extent to which the United States is situated in a nonanarchical international system populated by republican states.” Therefore U.S. policies that seek (a) to expand the space in which the U.S. does not have to respond to major levels of violence, (b) to increase the number of republican governments internationally, or (c) to contain violent conflict in areas of weak governance, all aim to achieve republican security objectives.

The empirical section of this paper intends to show how these three general objectives are embedded into the U.S. effort to enlarge NATO. The empirical section is a chronological history, but republican security concepts appear and reappear over time. What follows is a broad

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64 Ibid., 187.
discussion of the ways in which republican security concepts occur throughout the history of NATO enlargement.

First, general republican security concepts in U.S. foreign policy (see Table 1) are shown in a variety of quotations and arguments made by government officials in the two Bush and Clinton administrations. I cite instances of the three Presidents and top policymakers outlining a particular view of U.S. violence interdependence, as it existed after the Cold War. These remarks focus mostly on the possibility of ethnic and nationalist violence in the now autonomous area of former Soviet states, spilling over into Western Europe or escalating to an intolerable level of destruction requiring a large-scale American response, as well as material analyses of weapons and capabilities of destruction. In referencing this new source of violence interdependence, U.S. policymakers are seen arguing that U.S. security would be better off if these new dangerous areas of insecurity were mitigated or contained. They argue that preventing escalating conflict and anarchy in these areas should be paramount in U.S. security policy. These examples constitute evidence of the anarchy-interdependence rationale in NATO enlargement policy. The hierarchy-restraint rationale appears in the history of NATO enlargement through administration arguments about the undesirability of an isolationist or hegemonic foreign policy, in response to this new source of anarchy-interdependence.

Next, the republican security concept of cobinding through interstate union is shown to be central to U.S. policy on NATO after the Cold War. I argue that the U.S., in pushing for the maintenance of NATO as the primary security actor in Europe, strengthened an interstate union in which it could have influential say over what sources of insecurity most necessitated a response, while still benefiting from the advantages of alliance over isolation and unilateralism. This can be conceptualized in republican security as a strategy of cobinding that relies on a
specifically-American view of violence interdependence, in that the U.S. desired the most say in directing security policy in Europe.

In ensuring that NATO remained relevant in the nineties, U.S. officials also positioned NATO as an important vehicle for cooperation with non-NATO members, particularly former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Russia. This is seen initially in the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) under the first Bush administration, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) programs launched in the early years of Clinton’s first term. Both of these initiatives paved the way for NATO enlargement, acting as an intermediate step towards new cobinding relationships with countries that later became NATO members. I show how these programs aimed to guide the implementation of republican constraints in non-NATO states – specifically civil-military relations and controls over defense forces – as well as to add to NATO’s capability responding to acute instabilities outside of NATO territories, or “out-of-area.” I claim these policies goals meant to contribute to the general republican security objectives of influencing the number of states characterized by republican government in the international system, and containing violent conflict in areas of weak governance.

NATO enlargement itself was hinted at by the first Bush administration, announced and implemented by the Clinton administration, and continued by the second Bush administration. I show how the prospect of NATO membership was consistently used to increase the incentives for republican constraints on new governments within European states (again in defense force constraints and civil-military relations), to foster cooperative security practices among aspirant members, and to boost the incentives for upgrading military capabilities and interoperability with NATO forces. Through this use of membership as a carrot, I argue the prospect of NATO
enlargement was meant to help each republican security objective – growing the space in which the U.S. would not have to respond to large-scale violence, supporting the installation of new republican governments internationally, and building capacity to contain violence in areas of weak governance.

Finally, I claim the two actual rounds of NATO enlargement were motivated by republican security objectives. Granting the collective defense guarantee to a new NATO member was meant to protect the advances in democratic governance and military capability achieved by that country, as a prerequisite to membership. By using the dual criteria of “republican constraints” and “military capability,” each enlargement decision aimed to decrease the likelihood that NATO would have to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and to increase the capability of NATO to respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of the new member state. These twin benefits encapsulate what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described as “the productive paradox at NATO's heart: By extending solemn security guarantees, we actually reduce the chance that our troops will again be called to fight in Europe.”

NATO enlargement, I argue, intended to serve all three republican security objectives: increase the space in which the U.S. need never respond to a major conflict, increase the number of republican government populating the international system, and increase the ability of NATO to respond to out-of-area conflicts. This organizational setup is summarized in the table below. Following that is the empirical section tracing the history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement.

Table 2. Republican Security Theory in NATO Enlargement

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Republican Security Objectives of NATO Enlargement:

- Extend the space in which the U.S. does not have to face major, violent conflicts
- Support and protect the emergence of new republican states internationally
- Mitigate violent conflicts in areas of weak governance

Evidence:

- Republican security concepts in U.S. and NATO statements and policies
- Republican security objectives of NATO enlargement in U.S. and NATO policy

Organization of the Enlargement History

Since 1990, NATO has had two complete rounds of enlargement. In 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join the alliance. Five years later, in 2002, seven more states were invited into NATO – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. In both instances, the decisions of American policymakers were the driving force behind enlargement, and the following empirical section traces the motivations of these policymakers and the choices they made regarding enlargement. Within the section, I hope to show how U.S. policymakers were motivated by republican security theory.

The first Bush administration did not officially enlarge NATO, but made important decisions that both paved the way for future enlargement and carried with them heavy republican security influences. The push for NATO’s relevancy and primacy in Europe after the Cold War, and the establishment of cooperative institutions between NATO and non-NATO members focusing most on republican constraints on defense forces, are the two major policy decisions to note in this administration. The former ensured the U.S. could most influence responses to acute instances of anarchy-interdependence, yet still do so through interstate union rather than unilateral force. The latter aimed to enhance the republican character of new states, and help contribute to NATO’s ability to respond to out-of-area spaces of anarchy.

The Clinton administration committed the United States to lead on NATO enlargement, and oversaw the first round that admitted three new members in 1997. There are three major
Clinton policies that receive attention. First, the setup of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 made the military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO members operational, paving the way for enlargement but also, in itself, aiming to influence the number of republican states internationally and add to NATO’s capability to respond out-of-area. Next, the actual decision to push for NATO enlargement was driven by analyses of violence interdependence, and aimed at extending the space in which the U.S. would never have to respond to major conflicts. Using NATO membership as a carrot to motivate reform in non-republican states was meant to increase the number of republican governments internationally. Finally, the decisions on which members to admit into NATO in the first round of enlargement are used to show the explanatory power of republican security theory relative to the constructivist, realist, and primacy perspectives on enlargement.

Republican Security Theory in George H.W. Bush’s NATO Policy

During the last decade of the Cold War there was a growing feeling in the United States, particularly in the Congress, that too much of the U.S. defense budget was going towards maintaining a military presence in Europe, through NATO. As George H.W. Bush entered office, there was political pressure to reduce American troop commitments and cajole European allies to build up a “European pillar” of NATO. The fall of the Berlin Wall in May 1989 gave even more ammunition to the advocates for a reduced troop presence. 66 During the next few years, a debate grew among NATO allies over the future relevancy of the alliance in European security. The debate focused most on future American leadership, an autonomous Western European defense

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arm pushed mainly by France and a newly unified Germany\textsuperscript{67}, and other European security organizations that included the Soviet Union and former Soviet territories.\textsuperscript{68} The Bush administration pushed for a policy of NATO primacy among European security organizations and a continued American leadership role in the alliance, in addition to dropping hints at the future possibility of enlargement. Throughout, the administration followed republican security logic.

The summer and fall of 1990, as it became clear that the Warsaw Pact would cease to exist in any organized form, was the first period when NATO enlargement seemed like an actual possibility. Around this time, officials in Washington began to consider enlargement as a follow-up to NATO-Warsaw relations that were signaled over the summer.\textsuperscript{69} Although President Bush ruled out official membership in the near-term, he refused to rule it out forever, indicating that it was Warsaw state preferences delaying considerations of membership.\textsuperscript{70}

In analyzing potential security relationships between the U.S. and the increasingly unpredictable nature of Warsaw Pact territories, Bush administration officials pushed NATO to use the anarchy-interdependence rationale to define new policies. The NATO summit in London in June 1990 resulted in a declaration of principles that justified the new “hand of friendship”

\textsuperscript{67} Although I do not examine German reunification into NATO here, negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over East Germany were later claimed by the Russians to have precluded any NATO enlargement east of Germany. While this remains a point of contention, at the very least U.S. officials consciously avoided being locked into an agreement that would make later enlargement impossible, further strengthening the notion that enlargement seeds were planted by the first Bush administration. See James Goldgeier, \textit{Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO}, (Brookings Institute: Washington D.C., 1999), 15-16.


offer to Warsaw states with the claim that “in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours.” \(^{71}\) The NATO communiqué released a few months later after a meeting of defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, described the new forms of violence interdependence since the Soviet demise as arising “principally not from the likelihood of deliberate aggression…but rather as unforeseeable consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of rapid and widespread political, social and economic transformation,” specifically “from instability in East and Central Europe.” \(^{72}\)

During this same period, administration officials sought to make sure that Americans did not grow too isolationist and wary about committing tax dollars abroad. Yet they also hoped that security policies and the use of force in these new anarchic territories would continue to operate through the successful republican union of NATO. In this way the hierarchy-restraint rationale began to come through, as U.S. officials had to argue against the tendency to fall into only “garrison state” defense spending, and simultaneously against the tendency to project U.S. power unilaterally – both of which could corrupt American domestic forms in the long-term.

Right after the Berlin Wall fell Bush administration officials spurned isolationism and immediately asserted that the U.S. was going to coordinate its defense posture, including any force withdrawals, within NATO and not unilaterally. \(^{73}\) Speaking with reporters after the London summit in June 1990, President Bush pushed back against growing domestic concerns over the fiscal cost of internationalism, saying that he felt a “U.S. force presence in Europe is

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\(^{73}\) Douglas (2008), 58-59.
stabilizing and very, very important,” and that he viewed it as his “responsibility to make clear to the American taxpayer why it is in our interest to help keep the peace.”\textsuperscript{74} Months later when the Gulf War was showing European allies that they still needed a robust U.S. presence to maintain stability, American officials tried to use the example as a way to avoid similar hegemonic projections of power in the future. As an American official said at the time, “we keep telling the Europeans that we don’t want to act alone…we’d be happy if they did more.”\textsuperscript{75}

As 1991 started, American officials had established their hierarchy-restraint preference for no isolationism and no unilateral hegemony. A NATO ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, taking place in June of 1991, was an important step forward for the transformative changes to the alliance, pushed by the U.S. the previous summer in London. As European allies agreed to fund a rapid-reaction force that could respond to new types of insecurities and spaces of anarchy, U.S. officials had to make sure that this force remained under NATO auspices so as to not contribute to the alliance’s decline and irrelevance.\textsuperscript{76} Such a development would box the U.S. out of contributing heavily to security stability in and near Europe, and thus was unacceptable from an American anarchy-interdependence perspective.

Accordingly, the NATO communiqué following the June ’91 Ministerial meeting stated the need to “enhance the role and responsibility” of European allies; it also pointed out that conflict in the Persian Gulf highlighted the need for NATO to develop out-of-area capabilities – by showing that “in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological

\textsuperscript{74}“President's News Conference,” \textit{Public Papers of the President}, July 6, 1990.
advances” outside conflicts can have “direct security implications.” In his remarks at the meeting, Secretary of State Jim Baker reiterated that one of America’s “key goals must be to ensure that NATO remain the principal venue” for all policy debates involving the security of alliance members.\textsuperscript{78} The genuine effort to push allies to spend more on defense and peacekeeping forces within NATO represented a U.S. desire to maintain influence in European security arrangements, but to lessen the already-heavy security burden that the U.S. felt during the Cold War (an aversion to unilateral hegemonic preponderance). The hierarchy-restraint aversion to isolationism and hegemony, because of fears regarding U.S. domestic forms, greatly informed this U.S. push for continued NATO relevance.

The most important development from that June 1991 meeting, as it relates to this study, was the stronger cooperative signals NATO sent to Central and Eastern European states. Again emphasizing that NATO member “security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe,” NATO allies agreed that “the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies…are therefore of direct and material concern.”\textsuperscript{79} This was a clear indication that, at least theoretically, the U.S. would support NATO going out-of-area to ensure the security of non-members.\textsuperscript{80} In August of 1991, a Pentagon working group drafted a detailed scenario in which the U.S. and its NATO allies would come to the defense of a smaller Baltic

\textsuperscript{80} Friedman, June 7, 1991, \textit{New York Times}
country (Lithuania, in this case) and the Polish border, in the face of threat from an “expansionist authoritarian government” in Moscow.\(^81\)

Central to this initial outreach was, crucially, intensified contacts and “familiarization” between NATO and non-NATO military and civilian leaders.\(^82\) This suggested that the most urgent aspect of consolidating “democratic societies” was making sure that there were republican constraints on the use of force in these new countries. This was a practice the Clinton administration would embrace full stop with its enlargement policy. It is also a policy fully informed by the republican security insight on the insecurity of hierarchical government, and the solution of cobinding through republican restraint as the best means of security.

The collapse of the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 renewed questions over NATO’s future existence, all of which came to a head at a major NATO Summit in Rome attended by President Bush himself, in early November 1991. For the first time in twenty-four years, the alliance released a “New Strategic Concept” that built upon the signals sent the previous year and a half. It was the most comprehensive statement of new violence interdependence that had been offered yet by NATO allies. In defending its claim that “the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity,” the document highlighted instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe that “could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance,” the dangers of “proliferation of weapons technologies…including weapons of mass destruction,” and the continued existence of Soviet nuclear weapons.\(^83\)

\(^{82}\) Friedman, June 7, 1991, *New York Times*  
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm
With the alliance essentially backing the U.S. notions of violence and anarchy-interdependence, the Rome Summit also marked the success of Bush’s push for NATO primacy, which was informed by an American need to balance violence interdependence with hierarchy-restraint’s need for cobinding. At the summit, even France and Germany made it clear to the U.S. that its role as alliance leader, and the alliance’s primacy in European security, would not be challenged.84

The Rome Summit also formalized the cooperation signaled in Copenhagen, with the creation of a council in which former Warsaw and Soviet states could consult with NATO. In a way this was related to U.S. support of NATO’s primacy, as it ensured that NATO cooperation and future membership was more important and would outpace new memberships into the European Union.85 Named the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991, the council was most focused on installing republican constraints on domestic militaries. Though Bush thought it too soon to offer formal NATO memberships at the Rome Summit, he touted a key feature of the liaison program – helping former Warsaw Pact states “change their military apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a free people.”86 In explicitly trying to enhance the republican character of these non-NATO members, this new council represented the first step in applying a hierarchy-restraint rationale and cobinding strategy as it applied specifically to new countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. was trying to increase the number of republican governments, capable of effective interstate unions, throughout Europe.

85 The EU-first proposal was labeled “Royal Road,” and was offered, and then rejected by the U.S., as an explicit alternative to a NATO-first proposal made by Secretary of State Baker. See Solomon (1997), 21.
As the Bush administration closed out its final year in office, the creation of the NACC had put NATO enlargement squarely on the table. Administration officials took conflicting positions, with some thinking it would provide the most stable security environment (Cheney, Secretary of State Lawrence Eaglesburg) and others thinking instability in Russia meant enlargement now was too soon (Baker, and President Bush). U.S. NATO ambassador William Taft perhaps summed up the consensus administration position best on July 13, 1992, when he said membership offers “could come within the next decade, perhaps soon,” but that the NACC itself was not a step towards that membership.

By the fall of 1992 and Bill Clinton’s election, the grounds of the debate were shifting: NATO would retain its primacy, but now the question was to what extent NATO should cooperate with its new expansive partner body, the NACC, and how quickly that cooperation should outpace potential NATO memberships with safer, more republican states within the council. Though the Bush administration did not enlarge NATO, the alliance’s future role was fairly secure and enlargement was a policy question now forced upon the next administration. Bush administration arguments for why NATO had to remain relevant and one day expand, and why American leadership in the alliance was still necessary, were driven by anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques, and aimed to achieve republican interstate unions.

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Anarchy-Interdependence and Hierarchy-Restraint in the Clinton Administration

Early in the Clinton administration, high-level foreign policy officials confirmed their agreement with core republican security insights about U.S. security policy after the Cold War. Starting with the President himself, only weeks after entering office Clinton made it clear that violence interdependence in Europe was very strong and in need of cobinding. The fear of escalating violence was apparent at a February 10th, 1993 town hall meeting in Detroit. Answering a question about the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton responded that “we’ve got to try to contain” conflicts like this – to avoid ethnic cleansing from becoming a valid principle at the end of the Cold War, and because problems “could spread to other republics and nations near there.” Clinton also mentioned that, because of the high likelihood of spreading conflicts in Europe, it was “no accident that World War I started in this area.” In pushing for multilateral efforts at peacekeeping, Clinton showed his support for the hierarchy-restraint aversion to isolationism and hegemony, saying that while he did “not believe that the military of the United States should get involved unilaterally there now,” the U.S. was going to take a “much more aggressive position” and in doing so “we have to work with these other countries.”

Secretary of State Warren Christopher also gave explicit support to republican security concepts a month into the new administration, in a speech to NATO allies in Brussels on February 26, 1993. Christopher’s anarchy-interdependence logic came through in his description of the “new dangers” that have arisen since the Berlin Wall fell: “ethnic antagonisms and splintering nations” spawning violence, and global threats of “arms proliferation, environmental

90 Ibid.
degradation, and rapid population growth.” 91 All of these new dangers along with lessons from the last “turbulent century,” according to Christopher, only further underscored a core truth “that our security is indivisible and that our dreams and destiny are linked.” The hierarchy-restraint logic of American multilateralism was also evident in Christopher’s claim that, despite the desire of some Americans to withdrawal heavily from Europe, “America’s commitment to Europe’s security is undiminished and unwavering” and that the best way for that commitment to take form was through the “continuing need for NATO as a guarantor of collective defense…by a thriving transatlantic partnership.” 92 Finally, months later in June 1993, Christopher echoed the anarchy-interdependence logic once again, calling the West’s failure to act in the Balkans “missed opportunities” and hoping that allies “learn that we must work together earlier to help prevent conflicts before they erupt.” 93

Madeline Albright, future Secretary of State and an advocate of NATO enlargement, encapsulated the entire republican security agenda for American internationalism in a speech she gave in 1994 as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Albright spoke of the globe as “far smaller now” than it was at the start of the century, specifically because of material-contextual factors contributing to acute interdependence: “weapons cost less but can destroy more at further range. Borders provide little protection…economies are interdependent. Populations…are highly mobile. And images of heroism and horror are transmitted instantly and constantly to and from every corner of the earth.” 94 In particular the degree of uncertainty and instability in former

92 Ibid.
Soviet territories meant the possibility that “current conflicts spread” and “other regional powers could be drawn in.” Albright’s belief in the hierarchy-restraint aversion to American isolationism was also clear when she criticized “some in Congress who either would pull the plug altogether” and “those who suggest that America’s challenges at home justify turning away from responsibilities abroad.” Her aversion to hegemony’s corruption of domestic forms came through in her claim that there were no more important issues than whether the U.S. will be “forced to fight big wars because we failed to prevent small ones, or “will have to resume a military buildup because of setbacks in Moscow or because nuclear weapons have fallen into the wrong hands.”

Finally, as the earliest and most senior official who supported NATO enlargement, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake also showed heavy republican security influences in his foreign policy views. In an October 1993 speech that sought to define a grand vision for Clinton’s foreign policy, Lake reiterated what Deudney calls the essential republican security insight of Woodrow Wilson: “[Wilson] understood that our own security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes,” and thus he understood that to survive international anarchy you needed, above all, to install republics. Lake pointed to the measure of violence interdependence when he argued that attempts at consolidating market democracies should be targeted at “places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference…with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies.” Perhaps in a nod to debate within the administration over enlargement, Lake also said U.S. efforts “must be demand-driven – they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.”

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95 Ibid.
He pointed to countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a “clear example, given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe.”

*The Choice to Enlarge and Republican Constraints on Violence*

Seeing as how crucial administration officials offered republican security diagnoses and solutions early on, it is no surprise that those logics carried through as the policy process for NATO enlargement got underway. Christopher’s February 1993 speech, referenced above, showed that Clinton policy on NATO started at pretty much the identical point as the Bush administration had left it. The speech “essentially recyc[ed] ideas” pushed in 1991 and 1992 about the need to operationalize the NATO-NACC relationship for peacekeeping and out-of-area missions. In this way Clinton’s NATO policy started with the republican security influences discussed in the first Bush administration.

But that April, Clinton was struck by the desire of Central European leaders to join NATO, and seemed to consider NATO enlargement from that point on. Along with another Christopher speech to NATO allies in June calling for an official NATO summit in January 1994, the April incident got the ball rolling on an interagency workgroup that would construct a comprehensive U.S. policy on the new NATO. This was the formal start of a debate within the administration that would take six months to resolve. It focused on the extent to which NATO should cooperate primarily with all European states that wanted to partner (though not necessarily join), versus giving clear signals and guidance to those who wanted to join NATO on a “fast-track.”

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97 Ibid.
98 Goldgeier (1999), 22.
In June 1993, it was fairly clear that Clinton supported enlargement sooner rather than later. At the start of the interagency meetings, it was announced that Clinton and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake both thought NATO expansion was good idea.\textsuperscript{100} When asked at a June 17, 1993 press conference whether he thought NATO was dead because of its inaction in Bosnia, Clinton retorted that “the clearest example I know to give you that NATO is not dead was provided by the leaders of all the Eastern European countries” – the leaders Clinton had met with earlier in April, all of whom “said their number one priority was to get into NATO.”\textsuperscript{101} When the reporter continued to ask what enemy NATO would expand against, Clinton argued for the material-contextual factor of violence interdependence as all that was necessary – that “all kinds of possible problems” were worth protecting against, “from terrorism, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from yet unforeseen developments in countries around NATO.”\textsuperscript{102} Though it would be years before the policy was implemented, even this early Clinton was arguing that the effect of the membership carrot for non-NATO states was a clear example of why NATO should continue, and that the material-contextual conditions around the world \textit{in themselves} constituted a good enough reason to enlarge NATO in the future.

The interagency debate resulted in an eventual consensus on what Clinton would say at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. A lot of effort from the Pentagon’s end was figuring out how to make the diplomatic links created by the NACC operational. The result was officially rolled out during Clinton’s January trip to Europe: an American initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP) that involved all NACC countries (including Russia) in new bilateral relationships with NATO. The inclusiveness of the NACC was present, but the bilateral aspect

\textsuperscript{100} Goldgeier (1999), 23-24.
\textsuperscript{101} “The President’s News Conference,” \textit{Public Papers of the President of the United States}, June 17, 1993.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
made sure that NATO retained autonomous decision-making when it came to PfP matters. More importantly, the structure of cooperation was geared towards self-differentiation, in which states that wanted to prove themselves worthy of NATO security had the opportunity through more active participation.¹⁰³

The PfP certainly had its intellectual roots in NATO policy from the Bush administration.¹⁰⁴ It carried through the republican security roots as well, specifically in that the means of self-differentiation were geared towards installing domestic republican constraints in these new states. The view from the Pentagon was that “if any institutions had the power to block reform in former communist states, it would be the militaries,” and that the PfP could prove invaluable “if these militaries had incentives to cooperate with the West rather than oppose it.”¹⁰⁵ The objectives of the PfP were most clearly linked to republican restraints on the domestic use of force – transparency and democratic control of defense forces specifically – which came directly from the hierarchy-restraint insight that severe state centralization of defense and military forces is intolerable to security.¹⁰⁶

In addition, the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) at the Brussels summit added an instrumental element to participation in the PfP. Arising “from the changing security situation in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to peace and stability,” the CJTF sought to establish interoperability between NATO and non-NATO members for the purpose of small, rapid reaction forces seeking to quell escalating

¹⁰³ Goldgeier (1999), 41.
¹⁰⁴ At least three different U.S. officials conceptualized a PfP-type arrangement before Clinton came into office. See Solomon (1998), 19-20, 27. And Goldgeier (1999), 25.
¹⁰⁵ Goldgeier (1999), 56.
conflicts or humanitarian disasters. The combined effect of the PfP and the CJTF was to establish a behavior regime in which states that made the most progress militarily and politically not only signaled themselves out for possible NATO membership, but simultaneously contributed to capability of NATO military actions. In this way, the PfP and the CJTF were geared towards the republican security objectives of installing the number of republican governments internationally, and mitigating spaces of intense anarchy-interdependence through out-of-area operations.

Without a concrete reason to self-differentiate it was unclear what exactly was supposed to motivate states to participate heavily in the PfP. This is why U.S. policymakers also decided to give a vague but clear nod to NATO enlargement during the January Brussels summit. At a press conference with leaders of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, President Clinton insisted that the PfP was not a “permanent holding room,” but rather that the cooperation program “changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.”

In one of his clearest statements infused with republican security logic, Clinton argued that the U.S. commitment “derives from more than our shared values and our admiration for your efforts. It also derives from our own security concerns. Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United States.”

Furthering this security over values logic, Clinton also defended the decision “not to immediately issue security guarantees…without knowing in any way, shape, or form whether the reciprocal obligations of NATO could be met by new members.”

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109 Ibid.
The confirmation of eventual NATO enlargement in January represented a partial victory for those U.S. officials who were pushing for the fastest timeline for new memberships. These policymakers were concerned that the PfP, if it seemed like the closest any state would get to NATO security, would dampen the incentive for reform in new states. Unsurprisingly, administration officials who most heavily pushed enlargement during 1993 and 1994 also showed heavy republican security influences, especially in their desire to sharpen the incentives for democratic controls over defense forces by dangling the carrot of NATO membership.

Stephen Flanagan, a policy planning staffer in the State Department who had also worked for the Bush administration, was a major player in convincing Secretary Christopher to support a nod to enlargement at the Brussels summit.\(^{110}\) He also had forwarded his idea for NATO enlargement before Clinton had even taken office, and used republican security concepts to make his case. In opposing analysts who argued for a containment (i.e. avoidance) of instability in Central and Eastern Europe, Flanagan called such a policy “shortsighted, impracticable, and morally indefensible” because, above all, it would be “difficult to insulate Western Europe form these emerging instabilities.”\(^{111}\) In other words it was not the fundamental desire to spread Western values that should guide enlargement, but rather the very simple fact that the West must spread its values if it wanted to protection from inevitably spiraling and growing conflicts on its borders – a clear nod to anarchy-interdependence. As an effort to respond to these growing instabilities, Flanagan proposed a mix of democratic, geostrategic and political criteria that could


guide the criteria for new membership, “offered on the basis of the degree to which a given society had completed its transformation.”

Although not part of the government, defense experts Ronald Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Richard Kugler wrote a paper in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, entitled “Building a New NATO,” that Warren Christopher claimed had an important influence on U.S. enlargement policy. Again anarchy-interdependence played a large role in the analysis. The three analysts argued that “unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories” in unstable and conflict-filled nations had left a situation in which actors were now “capable of inflicting immense violence on the others.” The collapse of the Soviet Union caused “ideological mobilization alongside a security vacuum” that greatly enhanced the risks of “spillover” and larger state conflicts, making this new large zone of instability directly relevant to the security of NATO allies. The focus on a clear, conditional criteria for membership – focusing on democratic norms, civil-military controls, and minority rights – meant that “NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Central Europe without undue risk of embroiling NATO’s existing members in new ethnic of intra-regional conflicts.”

Other officials in the administration made similar arguments for the need to use the carrot of NATO membership as a tool to, as Deudney’s formulation has it, “install republics” in the international system. Specifically, it was clear by the time of PfP rollout that “the introduction of civilian control of the military [would] most clearly be linked to the prospect of NATO

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116 Ibid., 35-36.
117 Goldgeier (1999), 31-32, for other officials making arguments similar to Flanagan’s.
member’s” (emphasis added). Again, this desire to entrench republican constraints in new territories striving to join NATO was directly informed by the republican security concept of cobinding. As a solution to the problems of anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint, interstate unions are only viable between republics, and thus require the republican security objective of installing republican governments through the international system.

1994 consisted mainly of debates over the speed and clarity by which the administration was going to pursue NATO enlargement. Within the Clinton administration, amid bureaucratic changes favorable to enlargement advocates, officials like Richard Holbrooke and Anthony Lake jumped on Clinton’s enlargement statements from the January 1994 Europe trip and the President’s seeming embrace that June of timetables and membership criteria soon. By the end of the year it was clear throughout the entire administration and to the public that the President favored enlargement, and the questions that now remained were when to enlarge and what states would be included. On December 1, 1994, Secretary of State Christopher announced in a speech to NATO allies in Brussels that the U.S. now supported formal “internal deliberations on expansion and, in 1995, to discuss with Partners the obligations and implications of membership.” Though there was still much detail to be filled in on the “how” of enlargement, specifics on the ways new members would integrate operationally with NATO – the civil-military relations, defense force constraints, and democratic practices highlighted in the PfP –

118 Schimmelfennig (1998), 227.  
119 Goldgeier (1999), Chapter 3, “Push to Enlarge,” details these staff changes and the President’s June 1994 comments that pushed the policy process forward within the administration.  
had already made the broad outlines of “how” NATO would integrate quite clear.

While the administration was busy dealing with the fallout from the enlargement announcement regarding the bilateral relationship with Russia, in addition to the worsening situation in Bosnia, enlargement slowed but was not abandoned in 1995 and 1996. January 1995 began to see the emergence of the formal NATO-Russia council as a “parallel track” to enlargement policy – as a way to ensure enlargement occurred soon without creating irreconcilable riffs between the West and Russia.122 In June 1995, Russia was convinced to join the Partnership for Peace, leaving an opening for the administration to push ahead with enlargement.

Policy during 1995 solidified the republican security logic of NATO enlargement by making central the incentives for democratic reforms. In August 1995 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott published what amounted to the most up-to-date administration defense of NATO enlargement. Talbott described a major requirement for potential members as “full civilian control of the military… [that] armed forces must be professional, apolitical, and committed to…defensive purposes alone.”123 This included, according to Talbott, “parliamentary oversight of military affairs, and… civilians [in] senior defense positions.” Most importantly, Talbott wrote future members must “remain fully and irreversibly committed to such structures and principles.” It was in this consolidation of reform, followed by the NATO protection of these reforms, that Talbott saw “an expanded NATO [as] likely to extend the area in which conflicts like the one in the Balkans simply do not happen.”124 The republican security objectives of

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124 Ibid.
expanding the space in which major violent conflicts do not occur and installing more republican
governments internationally are clear here.

The “Study on NATO Enlargement” released in September 1995 finally set in stone the
republican security logic that U.S. policymakers had been pushing. The very first contribution of
enlargement, according to the study, was the “support of democratic reforms, including civilian
and democratic control over the military.” Also important was the increased “transparency in
defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies.” Unsurprisingly, the
touted benefits of enlargement closely mimicked the general criteria spelled out in the study for
accepting new members, which included heavy emphasis on the military activities of prospective
members. Both benefits and criteria were fully informed by the hierarchy-restraint concept
from republican security, which sees grave sources of insecurity in centralized and undemocratic
military practices, and aimed to install republican governments in Eastern Europe.

In addition, the Study on Enlargement “sought to leverage the lure of membership to
encourage the resolution of long-standing ethnic and border disputes,” making the resolution of
such issues an important factor in membership decisions. This aspect of the study was geared
towards the republican security objectives of expanding the space in which major conflicts don’t
occur because of NATO protection, and boosting NATO’s capability to respond to out-of-area
conflicts.

126 Ibid.
127 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” Ch. 5, para. 72-78.
Perhaps the most important part of the September 1995 study was what it didn’t do: there was no explicit, rigid checklist of criteria for membership. The point was to ensure that NATO would never be completely locked in to granting membership to a state that met all the requirements in the study. The specific list of countries that were going to join NATO in its first round of enlargement, then, would remain unclear until concrete invitations were handed out. For the next year and a half, the administration would be fairly adamant on the importance of not specifically naming the “who” aspect of enlargement. The reason given was that any concrete list of who was going to join and who was not would only serve to dilute the very mechanism of incentives that NATO enlargement was supposed to produce. If the PfP began to look like the closest place most states would get to NATO, so the argument went, what was the incentive for working harder and better at the PfP activities?

This combination of PfP and NATO membership as a carrot instigated a variety of workshops and seminars focused most on defense and political reforms. A few years later, in 1997 alone, there were 63 different works on defense reform of civil-military relations held through the PfP. Though the results of these programs are debatable, there is little doubt that the intention of policymakers was to influence the number of republican governments populating the international system, a clear objective of republican security theory.

The rest of 1995 and 1996 consisted mainly of reasons to delay the enlargement decisions. Russian anger over enlargement, combined with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s shaky reelection prospects forced Clinton to drag his feet on enlargement. The violence in

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129 Goldgeier (1999), 95.
132 For a summary of the different political conditions in 1996 versus 1994, see Goldgeier (1999), 106-107.
Bosnia also served as a psychological block on enlargement, only lifted with the signing of the Dayton Accords. Finally, by the fall of 1996, the U.S. was ready to push forward with enlargement. The plan was to announce the invited members at the NATO Summit in Madrid in the summer of 1997.

*The Decision in Madrid*

Based on the general criteria for NATO membership – laid out implicitly during the Bush administration and the first two years of Clinton’s term, then explicitly in the 1995 Enlargement Study – the only choice faced by U.S. policymakers in the spring of 1997 was whether to recommend three or five countries for NATO enlargement. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia were the realistic possibilities.

From the view of U.S. policymakers, there were more advantages to a small enlargement, at least generally. First, smaller enlargement would cause less tension in the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship by drawing out the eventual question of Baltic state NATO memberships, a sore point in Moscow. It would also cost fewer U.S. dollars, making the necessary Senate ratification more likely. Finally, such a small round could potentially act as a signal that numerous rounds were coming in the future, which would act to keep the domestic reform incentive strong. The general logic was given a name, coined by Ronald Asmus, now working for the State Department: “Small is Beautiful, Plus Robust Open Door.”

As the most advanced politically and militarily, plus the closest to Western Europe geographically, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the clear and obvious candidates.

The real question was whether to include Slovenia and/or Romania in the first round of enlargement. The majority of NATO members, led by France and Italy, supported a five state first round.\textsuperscript{134}

In June of 1997, only a month before the NATO summit in Madrid scheduled to announce the invited countries, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the U.S. decision to NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels: the U.S. would support inviting only three new countries in Madrid. Slovenia and Romania would have to wait for the next round of enlargement. Already inclined to pursue a smaller enlargement, the Clinton administration decided against including Romania in the first round because of its shortfall in political and economic reforms.\textsuperscript{135} The President laid out the Romania rationale in an interview with European journalists a few days before the Madrid summit – while the three invited members “have already been through the ups and downs” politically and economically, Romanian reform had only really taken hold for a year, and Clinton decided on the need to “give them a couple of years to stabilize their democracy, to develop their economy.”\textsuperscript{136}

Slovenia was a harder choice. There was fairly widespread agreement that Slovenia’s political progress and socialization was clearly not reason to exclude it, as it was with Romania. Even the Pentagon included Slovenia in their cost calculations for enlargement based on this assumption. Additionally Slovenia offered the geostrategic advantage of contiguity with Hungary, and Slovenia’s inclusion, it was argued, would set a great example for other former

Yugoslavian states that there were in fact rewards to be reaped from the PfP process. But the Slovenia military was very small, and its lack of military infrastructure, as well as the evident Hungarian contribution to Bosnia peacekeeping without it, made the “contiguity to Hungary” for argument less convincing. Administration officials confirmed that it was indeed the lack of effective military capability that pushed Slovenia out of the first round.

The choice to exclude Slovenia ultimately required instrumental calculations on the part of the administration and NATO. Clinton, in defending the choice for a three-state enlargement before the Madrid Summit, emphasized the military considerations for membership. The President argued that NATO “is primarily a military alliance,” and that it was “quite important on principle that we not admit anyone until we’re absolutely sure that their democracy is stable and that they are militarily capable… We have to remember, this alliance is the most successful alliance in history because it’s had military as well as political integrity.”

Testing Perspectives on 1997 Enlargement

It is at this point that I return to the theoretical perspectives introduced at the beginning of the paper. Here I will test the primacy perspective, the constructivist perspective, the specific realist argument, and the cooperative security perspective against the history of NATO enlargement. I also lay out how the republican security perspective on the membership criteria

used by U.S. policymakers leading up to Madrid reveals it to be the most explanatory perspective on NATO enlargement.

Primacy is fairly consistent with U.S. NATO policy for the first half of the nineties. It accurately predicts the effort by U.S. policymakers since the Cold War to work for the maintenance of NATO’s preeminent role in Europe, as a way to ensure that U.S. power is still felt throughout the continent. It also is consistent with the effort to integrate Central and Eastern Europeans countries into the multilateral institutions of the West.\(^\text{141}\) Although advocates of primacy argued for NATO enlargement as a kind of “neo-containment” aimed solely at the Russians, it also seemed clear at the time that these same advocates saw very little actual, current threat coming from Moscow.\(^\text{142}\) Combine that with the fact that primacy advocates wanted a broader and more ambitious agenda for NATO enlargement than the administration was following, and it seems the primacy perspective has a deeper explanation for NATO enlargement than Russia: “the desire to anchor the U.S. in a diplomatic enterprise that will preserve and widen its involvement in European and international affairs, simply because this is viewed as an unalloyed good in its own right.”\(^\text{143}\) The primacy perspective, in other words, views enlargement as a stalking horse, “nothing more than the adaptation of a politically familiar vehicle to the task of preserving U.S. primacy.”\(^\text{144}\) As for a prediction, then, a primacy perspective expects that the U.S. would support the largest and widest NATO enlargement that it could practically achieve.

It is at this point that I rule out the primacy perspective as the best explanation for U.S. policy on NATO enlargement. Rather than a calculated attempt at spreading the preponderance of U.S. power as far and wide as possible throughout Europe, enlargement policy was a much

\(^{141}\) Posen and Ross (1996), 34.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 36, 38.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 39.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 39.
more cautious affair. If the Russians were not a real threat, as primacy advocates seemed to argue, what was stopping the U.S. from immediately granting NATO memberships to the Baltic states? That would only serve to further the scope and influence of U.S. power preponderance, without the short-term risk of Russian intransigence. The primacy perspective would also not predict the exclusion of Slovenia and Romania from NATO based on a detailed judgment of those countries’ democratic reforms and military – if a country was that close to membership, a primacy advocate would surely just admit it, and allow U.S. muscle to provide the protection as the country caught up to NATO standards. With its “stalking horse” account of NATO enlargement, primacy simply comes up short in explaining the cautious and instrumental-based enlargement decisions by the Clinton administration.

Constructivism is also convincing on NATO enlargement policy up to this point. Unlike other IR theories, the constructivist argument on enlargement would be directly contradicted by a history in which NATO opted not to include countries that shared its values. The fact that NATO opened its doors starting in 1994 and clearly put democratic norms and values forward as general criteria by which to judge potential future members is precisely what a constructivist perspective would predict. Furthermore, the “socialization” process built into enlargement policy is highly consistent with constructivism – using NATO membership as “an incentive to further pursue democratic reform and consolidation of the transformation of their domestic systems,” and to spread the norms of multilateral international law. Regarding the actual decision of what countries are allowed into NATO, constructivism also offers a useful prediction: the countries that are fastest to internalize the values and norms shared by NATO allies are the countries that join.

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145 Schimmelfennig (1998), 221.
146 Ibid., 218.
However, although there is much to be said for a values-based reading of enlargement, constructivism has a difficult time accounting for the instrumental rationales behind the decisions made in the spring of 1997. Constructivism is not contradicted by the decision to leave out Romania, since it was justified by a deficit of democratic reforms that represent the values-based perspective of constructivism. Yet, because the liberalization and democratization record meant “the exclusion of Slovenia [could not] be justified on the basis of insufficient socialization…the constructivist explanation does not sufficiently account for the choice of new members.”\footnote{Schimmelfennig (1998), 220.}

Republican security theory does a better job of accounting for these instrumental considerations. In this perspective, the primary objectives for an enlargement decision are the extent to which a membership offer, right now, (a) decreases the likelihood that NATO will have to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and (b) increases the ability of NATO to respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of the new member state. With these objectives in mind, the criteria for a new NATO member are clearly seen as instrumental: “adequate republican constraints” on the domestic government are required, and “adequate military capability” is also required. In other words, the \textit{ideal} outcome for NATO enlargement policy is the situation of states throughout Europe that are characterized by republican government and capable militaries. The tables below summarize the constructivist and republican security perspectives on the 1997 enlargement:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{“Enough” shared identities} & \textbf{“Not enough” shared identities} \\
\hline
NATO offers membership  
- Incorrectly predicts invitation to Slovenia & NATO does not offer membership  
- Correctly predicts no invitation to Romania \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Table 4. Republican Security Perspective on 1997 NATO Enlargement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Enough” republican constraints on domestic military and government</th>
<th>“Capable” military capacity</th>
<th>Lack of “capable” military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO offers membership</td>
<td>Somewhat unlikely NATO offers membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• eg. Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Not enough” republican constraints on domestic military and government</td>
<td>Highly unlikely NATO offers membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• eg. Romania</td>
<td>NATO does not offer membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Admitting a state with too few republican constraints into NATO would increase the likelihood that NATO would have to respond to a crisis within that state. If the new member government is “too anarchical” it will not be able to quell insecurity by itself. If it were “too hierarchical” then, as per the hierarchy-restraint logic, the government would create its own sources of insecurity through the illiberal and concentrated use of power. This would create an undesirable choice for NATO – fight against a NATO ally government, or allow the continued hierarchical use of force that would undoubtedly, in the future, prove untenable from a security perspective. In addition, it is unlikely that a government without republican practices or values would contribute at all to NATO’s efforts to mitigate anarchy in other spaces, through out-of-area operations. Here, the relatively short period of Romanian democratic reforms meant that Romania did not yet meet U.S. requirements for “adequate republican constraints.” In this way the decision to exclude Romania from the first enlargement round is consistent with a republican security perspective.

Granting a NATO security guarantee to a state with too incapable a military, even if it shares democratic values, would mean an increase in the likelihood that NATO is dragged into security crises within the borders of the new member state. Rather than lock itself permanently into protecting the militarily weak government, withholding NATO membership for the time being does nothing to reduce NATO capability in responding to a necessary security crisis within
the state, yet also avoids the possibility of overextending NATO forces for unnecessary security problems because the new member state is too weak to respond (sapping NATO resources that may be needed for acute insecurities in other areas). The added risk that NATO security could spur weaker governments to start unnecessary conflicts (say, with Russia) also is not to be ignored. Finally, it is clear that a new NATO member with inadequate military capacity offers very little contribution to mitigating violence spaces of anarchy elsewhere.

Republican security theory is thus consistent with giving NATO memberships to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. As the most contiguous with Western Europe, hypothetical anarchic space would represent the highest level of anarchy-interdependence for NATO and the U.S. No matter how stable or instable these are, it is still a worthy republican security goal to make sure that they stay as stable as possible in the future. As the most advanced in republican constraints and military capabilities, protecting the regimes in these three countries with NATO security guarantees unquestionably decreases the likelihood of conflict in these states requiring large NATO military adventures or U.S. isolation sometime down the road. Also, because they are the most advanced democratically and capable militarily, these three new members can provide help to NATO in going out-of-area.

Note that the dual criteria of “adequate republican constraints” and “adequate military capability” can be interactive: a more republican or democratic state is inherently less likely to see sources of insecurity or conflicts spark up within their borders, thus lessening the salience of a capable military. This means, no doubt, the “republican constraints” criterion is the more important of the two. However, a threshold of military capability is still necessary in theory regardless of republican character, because the future is unpredictable, capabilities of destruction are high, and even a republican government cannot guarantee that it will not experience severe
internal conflict in the future. NATO, in that case, would prefer the domestic government have capabilities to contribute in controlling a crisis within its borders. Also, of course, NATO would prefer a net-positive contribution to its out-of-area capabilities, though such a contribution is less important.

With this in mind, then, the republican security perspective is consistent with a very close but ultimately instrumental calculation to exclude Slovenia based on its weak military. Although the republican character of Slovenia was not called into question – and to be sure Slovenia was more likely than a stronger but less-republican state to join NATO – its lack of military infrastructure could simply not ensure that NATO was not getting itself into a detrimental relationship, where it would be locked in to managing violence in Slovenia all on its own. The republican security criteria for NATO membership require a combination of republican character and military capability – what the exact extent of each must be for membership changes from state to state. Thus, while the republican security perspective cannot predict that Slovenia would not join NATO in 1997, it does a much better job at explaining why Slovenia was not allowed into NATO than other perspectives. Republican security theory provides the best theoretical description of the decision making process, and the metrics used to make the enlargement decisions.

The fact that Slovenia is so close to the Balkans would perhaps make it a more likely candidate for a NATO enlargement based around violence interdependence, as the republican security perspective posits. Yet the political fact was enlargement could not truly be on the table until a relative peace in the Balkans had been achieved, and the Dayton Accords in 1995 was one of the incidents that allowed enlargement to proceed at a faster pace later in 1997. 148 By the time

148 Goldgeier (1999), 96.
of the Slovenia decision, it was the case that measuring the stability of a potential new NATO member – rather than the extent to which that new member could contribute to the mitigation of international anarchy – was the bigger priority for NATO enlargement. In republican security terms, enlargement policy was putting a bigger emphasis on the expansion of republican governments than it was on the ability to mitigate out-of-area conflicts.

There is also a plausible realist argument to be made at this point: all this talk of violence interdependence was merely a useful excuse for the U.S. to enlarge NATO towards Russian borders, and NATO enlargement is just another instance of one state striving for relative gains over a rival state. This realist perspective is not as convincing as republican security theory, however. First, it relies on an exaggeration of how threatened U.S. policymakers actually were by Russian imperialism in 1994. While its true that some U.S. officials used the argument that enlargement could act as a long term hedge against renewed Russian aggression, these arguments tended to be offered in domestic political settings, and the administration received the most pressure politically from those who wanted to be hawkish on Russia.\textsuperscript{149} Actual U.S. policy was of course far more cooperative with Russia than realists would expect. What is the realist explanation, for instance, of all the NATO-Russian efforts at cooperation and the bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control agreements that were enacted during this time? There isn’t an obvious realist reason why NATO enlargement in particular was used to achieve relative gains over Russia, while a host of other U.S. policies strived towards cooperation and absolute gains. Additionally, as Henry Nau writes, “by realist logic, the countries to defend, because they are most exposed to Russian aggression, are the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus, not Poland,\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{149} For example, see Goldgeier (1999), 127-130.
Hungary, and the Czech Republic."\textsuperscript{150} This particular realist view would predict a “farthest first” enlargement that at least included the Baltic states, instead of the incremental and republican-based choices of the 1997 enlargement.

Finally, the cooperative security perspective is completely consistent with the entirety of Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy. There is little doubt that U.S. policymakers expanded and transformed NATO, as Posen and Ross write, in order to respond to imminent threats, deter those who break the peace, and “to bring the practice of cooperative security to Eastern Europe, to strengthen the web of diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” in the region.\textsuperscript{151}

The main issue with this perspective, however, is that its description of motives is far too broad. To say that the U.S. enlarged an international institution in order to spread the practice of cooperation is to say not much at all. The high level of “strategic interdependence” posited by cooperative security advocates includes the material factor of violence interdependence, but does not signal it out. Therefore, it is unclear why the U.S. would focus on security institutions, versus economic institutions, or legal and political institutions. Cooperative security simply suggests far too broad an agenda.

Consequently, there is some confusion as to whether a cooperative security advocate would in fact support NATO enlargement at all, if that policy were seen as hampering other cooperative security initiatives. Henry Nau, in his writing on foreign policy, argues “internationalists,” his phrase for cooperative security advocates who favor arms control and economic cooperation, “oppose NATO expansion by exaggerating the threat to Russian


\textsuperscript{151} Posen and Ross (1996), 27.
democracy, the adverse impact on liberal forces in Russia.”  

There is no reason, in other words, that a cooperative security advocate would push for NATO enlargement at the expense of relations with Russia.

Nau, Posen and Ross, then, are at a crossroads. Both recognize the existence of the cooperative security camp in U.S. foreign policy, yet there is no agreement over the camp’s view on NATO enlargement. Demonstrating the confusion, cooperative security advocates like Bill Clinton and Madeline Albright supported NATO enlargement, while Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, a fierce advocate for arms control and Russian cooperation, ended up opposing the initiative for fear of its adverse impact on Russian politics.

The republican security perspective puts the central focus on violence interdependence. As a result, it better points to the specific U.S. motivation, using NATO enlargement to prevent spiraling conflicts and arms proliferation throughout Europe, and to install republican governments there in order to avoid these conflicts in the future. Because of the more acute source of violence interdependence in the areas between Western Europe and Russia, rather than from within Russia itself, a republican security perspective expects NATO enlargement to at least move forward slowly even in the face of Russian unrest. Additionally, because the theory points to the need to protect only the most consolidated of republican states with NATO security, republican security offers an explanation for the pattern and incremental nature in the enlargement process. There is no such explanation forthcoming from the cooperative security perspective.

In short, while the cooperative security prospective offers a useful and clear description of the strategy of the Clinton administration regarding institutions generally, it does not offer a

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153 Goldgeier (1999), 104.
sufficient description of the specific motivations put forth by U.S. policymakers as they chose to expand NATO.

*The End of the Clinton Administration*

The rest of Clinton’s presidency, with regards to NATO, consisted mainly of solidifying Senate ratification for enlargement during 1998, and dealing with the bombing campaign in Kosovo during 1999. Yet there were also efforts to make sure that the next round of enlargement, though not to be overseen by Clinton, did not get thrown off track. Starting with the Madrid Declaration, issued in 1997 as NATO announced its first round of invitations, there was an explicit reference to leaving NATO’s door open in order to not discourage aspirants excluded in the first round.\(^{154}\)

This effort to ensure the incentives for reform so crucial to the enlargement policy were not diluted culminated in the spring of 1999. First, at a ceremony for the three new members at the Truman Presidential Library in March, Secretary of State Albright insisted that the nations joining NATO “are the first new members since the Cold War’s end, but they will not be the last. For NATO enlargement is an event, not a process.”\(^{155}\) In her speech, Albright once again spelled out the republican security objectives of enlargement. She described NATO enlargement as “a sign that we have not grown complacent about protecting the security of our citizens” – a security now characterized by threats that are “less predictable…from an aggressive regime, a rampaging faction or a terrorist group…[from] weapons [that] will be more destructive at longer


distances than ever before.” In response to this clear anarchy-interdependence reference, Albright argued NATO enlargement sought expand the zone of peace and security throughout Europe, “to do for Europe’s east what NATO has already helped to do for Europe’s west. Steadily and systematically…erasing without replacing the line drawn in Europe.”

The next month NATO held a summit in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance. Though the event was shrouded by the on-going bombing campaign in Kosovo, there were important republican security measures taken up at the summit, including a strengthening of the republican reform regime that the enlargement process had established. In his address, President Clinton assured non-members that NATO was “remaining open to new members from the Baltics to the Black Sea.”

This promise was made concrete by the creation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – a program setup to provide individual assistance and guidance to all countries wishing to join the alliance. Through reports and a back and forth feedback process between allies and aspirant members, the MAP program focused most on the defense/military field and “a defense planning approach for aspirants.” Nine aspirant states – including the Baltics and the two states who just missed membership the first time around, Romania and Slovenia – began individual MAP programs. It is clear that the MAP setup was meant to strengthen the incentive and the effectiveness of republican constraints on violence in these aspirant countries, making the “assessment process more structured and rigorous” and drawing heavily from the lessons learned.

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
in the first enlargement round. At the same time, it was announced that no new rounds of enlargement were to be considered until 2002. Combined with the MAP and the “open door” statements, it seemed by the end of Clinton’s term that “although the decision to enlarge has been postponed, on paper NATO remain[ed] firmly committed to expansion.”

In the conclusion of his speech at the Washington Summit, President Clinton neatly summed up the core republican security insight driving NATO enlargement:

“Almost 100 years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt said something that could well be applied to a united Europe and to our united transatlantic Alliance today. Of America’s coming of age in the world, he said, ‘We have no choice as to whether we will play a great part in the world. That has been determined for us by fate, by the march of events. The only question is whether we will play it well or ill.’”

In his advocacy for the spread of a unified and democratic Europe, if only because America had no other choice, Bill Clinton pursued a republican security policy in his leadership on NATO enlargement.

* * *

The second Bush administration oversaw the largest round of NATO enlargement in 2002. I focus on the quick embrace by the Bush team of Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy, as a way to show the continuity of republican security theory thinking between the two presidencies. I then show how September 11th facilitated a wider round of enlargement then expected, which placed a heavier emphasis on mitigating out-of-area anarchies while still fulfilling the two core goals of NATO enlargement – extending the space in which the U.S. does not have to fight major wars, and installing more republican governments in the international system. Republican security theory, with its heavy focus on violence interdependence, is shown

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160 Moore (2007), 60.
to provide a better explanation of post-9/11 enlargement decisions than other theoretical perspectives. Finally, I end with an appraisal of the primacy and cooperative security perspectives, arguing that the continuity of republican security theory throughout enlargement policy suggests it is the superior perspective in looking at NATO enlargement.

*The Embrace of NATO Enlargement in the Second Bush Administration*

As they entered office Bush administration officials laid out a specific view of U.S. security policy and republican security concepts, focusing most on anarchy-interdependence in a new era of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In his first policy speech on NATO, given in Virginia only three weeks into the administration, President Bush signaled his belief in the need for an activist U.S. security policy due to highly mobile and destructive forms of technology. Stating that “transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest,” Bush proceeded to described the “dangers of a new era” that did not dissipate with the Cold War, particularly “the grave threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons” coming from less predictable and more diverse actors.\(^{163}\) In arguing that the U.S. “must confront the threats” posed by weapons on a missile or that come in a shipping container, Bush outlined his view of U.S. anarchy-interdependence.

Other officials shared this view, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Upon entering office he initiated a review of U.S. strategic doctrine resulting in a major shift of emphasis to “21st century hybrid threats, like mass destruction terrorism,” that thrived on the

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\(^{163}\) “Remarks to the Troops at Norfolk Naval Air Station in Norfolk, Virginia,” *Public Papers of the President*, February 13, 2001.
technologies of destruction so central to the concept of violence interdependence.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, an important aspect of the first months of the administration was trying to shape European perceptions of what American officials saw as the real source of extreme violence interdependence – reports even described Rumsfeld as “a modern-day Paul Revere, crisscrossing the continent to warn of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the urgent need to act.”\textsuperscript{165} This specifically American view of anarchy-interdependence would play an important role in formulating NATO enlargement policy after the terrorist attacks on September 11\textsuperscript{th}.

Continuing the republican security logic of his predecessors, Bush showed a clear preference for keeping the U.S. involved in European security through NATO primacy. The response to a proposed European Rapid Reaction Force (EERF), a European Union initiative of 60,000 troops meant for peacekeeping but autonomous from NATO, was the same as it always was. The U.S. supported more European defense spending, but preferred it to be within and complementary to NATO – “as long as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it,” in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell.\textsuperscript{166} Bush aides made it clear that they favored a strong NATO, and began to consider the possibility of rescinding a campaign threat to pullout of U.S. troops from Bosnia peacekeeping, as a way “to protect the American leadership role in NATO and maintain NATO’s priority over the European Union.”\textsuperscript{167} The aversion to isolationism – from the hierarchy-restraint rationale – was evident here.

The EERF and its relation to NATO in terms of authority and autonomy primarily occupied early meetings between Bush, Blair and German Chancellor Schroeder. In both meetings Bush pushed for and received assurances that the EERF would operate only when NATO chose not to, ensuring the primacy of NATO (and thus U.S.) decision-making. But Washington also viewed the EERF as a way to bolster European defense spending that NATO membership had yet to foster, showing the aversion to pure hegemonic and unilateral preponderance. In favoring NATO primacy, U.S. policymakers once again pushed a vehicle for cobinding (a republican security strategy) that would be most responsive to the specific U.S. perception of violence interdependence – which was shifting towards the WMD-focus shown above, and steadily away from European perceptions.

The Bush administration took little time to endorse U.S. policy on NATO enlargement as Clinton left it; consequently, all of the republican security objectives that the enlargement process strived for continued into the Bush presidency. There were early signs of this continuity. First, Secretary Powell, National Security Adviser (NSA) Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy NSA Stephen Hadley were all members of the U.S. Committee on NATO, a nonprofit organization formed in 1996 to support NATO enlargement and push for Senate ratification. Rice again confirmed her support for an open NATO door to eastern European democracies in an article she

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171 Rebecca Moore (2007), 77.
wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in January 2000. During the 2000 campaign, Bush himself pledged support for enlargement, though without filling in details of exactly who or when. Perhaps most importantly, former Clinton official and Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, was hired to be Director for European and Eurasian Affairs on Bush’s National Security Council. As a strong enlargement advocate during the Clinton years, this was an important early signal of Bush’s enlargement policy.

All this pointed to the inevitable. Despite some positions early on that caused rifts between the U.S. and other NATO allies, once in office the Bush administration confirmed support for NATO enlargement quite quickly. Powell, during his Senate confirmation hearings, confirmed that the Bush administration would support NATO enlargement, but offered few specifics. Only a month into the first term, Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put out a joint statement affirming their intention “to admit to [NATO’s] ranks European democracies prepared to assume the responsibilities of membership.” In May 2001, the President responded to a gathering of all the MAP countries by insisting “no country would be left out on grounds of its history or place on the map,” an encouraging sign especially for Baltic states looking to join NATO despite Russian resistance to the idea.

The first major policy statements on enlargement came during Bush’s first Presidential trip to Europe in June 2001. While many issues divided the U.S. and its NATO allies during this

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174 Moore (2007), 77-78.
176 “Joint Statement With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom,” *Public Papers of the President*, February 23, 2001
trip – ranging from the administration’s missile defense plan, to its hard-line on the EERF and NATO primacy, plus other non-security issues like the environment – NATO enlargement continued on a relatively smooth track.\textsuperscript{178} At a press conference with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on June 13, 2001, Bush made it known that he believed “all European democracies” that want to join NATO and meet its standards “should have the opportunity to do so without red lines or outside veto.”\textsuperscript{179} He also confirmed that the U.S. government supported the expansion of NATO specifically because the U.S. “understands not only the history of NATO but the importance for NATO as we go down the road.”

Though the specific list of MAP states to be invited into NATO at the 2002 summit remained murky, two days later Bush signaled U.S. support for a large expansion in his address in Warsaw, Poland. In the speech, the President repeated Clinton’s words when he pointed to democracies “from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that lie in between” as those who deserve the opportunity to join NATO, and argued that in planning the next enlargement NATO leaders “should not calculate how little we can get away with but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.”\textsuperscript{180} In addition to this clear sign that NATO would eventually include former Soviet allies (Romania, Bulgaria) and former Soviet republics (the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), Bush also stated that “the Europe we are building must include Ukraine,” directly pointing to the possibility of a major, non-MAP state joining NATO one day down the road. NATO expansion, the President concluded, “has fulfilled NATO’s promise, and that

\textsuperscript{180} “Address at Warsaw University,” \textit{Public Papers of the President}, June 15, 2001.
promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward.”

The speech in Warsaw finally left no doubt that Bush would continue the republican security objectives for NATO enlargement. The language of the speech, according to administration officials, was consciously designed to deepen the incentives for republican reform in MAP states, by flashing the possibility of a robust enlargement that would both come soon and not be the last round. Unsurprisingly, former Clinton official and Bush NSC staffer Daniel Fried took the lead in drafting the Warsaw speech, indicating the sincerity of the Bush enlargement policy and its “Clintonesque” nature. The next day, after a seemingly successful and pleasant meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, administration officials cheered the fact that Bush had clearly signaled “one day that NATO was expanding – and this meant everyone – and the next day it was all smiles with Putin.”

After the European trip, it was quite clear that “for all the differences between the foreign policies of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, policy toward NATO enlargement has been one area of significant continuity.” In only his first six months in office President Bush decisively backed NATO enlargement, and begun the process of further extending the space in which the U.S. would never have to fight major conflicts. In embracing the MAP process, he continued the incentives for republican reforms that contributed to the installation of republican governments internationally. Both goals were republican security in nature, and both were to be achieved through the policy of robust NATO enlargement.

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181 Ibid.
182 Moore (2007), 76.
183 Moore (2007), 77-78.
185 Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, “NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe’s Integration,” Brookings Policy Brief no. 90 (December 2001), 2.
The show of U.S. support for a big enlargement in June 2001 prompted consideration within the administration over which states to support at the NATO Summit in Prague, scheduled for November 2002. In between, of course, came the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. Within days of the attack, NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which allies pledged to defend any NATO member under attack. The U.S. military operation in Afghanistan and other anti-terror issues meant enlargement was relegated to the background of U.S.-NATO relations for the remainder of 2001.

Yet only a few months into 2002 the administration reaffirmed its support of enlargement. By February it was generally accepted – especially in light of Putin and Russia’s wave of cooperation following 9/11 – that the Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia were going to be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit, while Romania and Bulgaria were yet to receive explicit support from Washington. In March Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith re-committed the U.S. to “an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint defense and operational planning, promotes interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises,” while in May

Bush repeated his Warsaw language by pledging to lay foundations for “a Europe that is whole and free and at peace” and Colin Powell said the U.S. remained hopeful for “a robust round of enlargement at Prague.”

Though U.S. support for NATO enlargement had not changed since 9/11, the perceptions of the security environment clearly had. A variety of policy and rhetorical shifts coming from Washington indicated a newly aggressive and preventive U.S. foreign policy that sought to wage a “war on terror” and defeat the rogue regimes of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea that formed an “axis of evil.” From a republican security perspective, the attacks on September 11th introduced a whole new perception of U.S. violence interdependence, showing the extent to which capabilities of destruction, communication, and transportation could all converge to exert acute insecurity on American soil.

For an administration already inclined to view acute anarchy-interdependence from WMD and anarchic or hierarchic territories outside of Europe – rather than from spiraling ethnic conflicts in Europe that was the focus of policymakers in the early nineties – September 11th altered the way in which policymakers approached the NATO enlargement process in predictable ways. According to a State Department official, the enlargement rationale from Bush’s June ’01 Warsaw still held after 9/11 – “we can’t assume that European history has stopped,” warned the official - but the events of that day also made it clear that a Europe whole and free was important but “no longer enough.”

The Prague Summit now had a dual purpose for American officials. The question of new memberships would be settled, yes. But perhaps more importantly, this was an opportunity to

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188 Deudney (2008), 259-262.
push onto NATO allies the U.S. view that WMD “present as much of an ‘existential threat’…as the Warsaw Pact divisions” and that with the now extreme levels of violence interdependence, “NATO needs to be ready for anything.” Towards that end, Bush officials flipped the agenda of the meeting to focus first on military and security capabilities necessary in a post-September 11th world, and only second on the extension of new memberships. Furthermore, NATO enlargement could now no longer be separated from this increased importance of capabilities.

Throughout 2002, leading up to the fall summit in Prague, administration officials used the new “war on terror” paradigm to assess the criteria of states aspiring to become NATO members. The Pentagon, despite general apathy towards NATO abilities, began a genuine evaluation of the contributions aspirant members could provide to Washington’s new foreign policy. Driving this process in particular was the perceived military and strategic benefits that new NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had recently provided, as well as the realization that aspirant members were taking steps to appear more helpful to Washington in its war on terrorism. Because the U.S. now viewed potential new members as providing “a platform with which to project power,” in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns, these potential benefits also seemed to heighten the opportunity cost of a limited enlargement in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.

“Niche capabilities” became the new buzzword for enlargement criteria. U.S. policymakers saw an opportunity to use NATO membership as a way to develop specific and

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useful military capabilities in new member states, depending on the relative strengths and weaknesses for each members.\textsuperscript{194} This focus on specialized, niche capabilities stemmed from the dilemma the Pentagon faced in “squaring the need for military efficiency with the President’s wish for inclusiveness” in his NATO enlargement policy statements.\textsuperscript{195} By ensuring that each new member could at least contribute something specifically useful in the new security environment, U.S. policymakers could continue the intra-European benefits of NATO enlargement while adding simultaneously to NATO’s out-of-area capabilities. NATO Ambassador Nicholas Burns labeled this “the new, more modern argument for enlargement,” that it provided NATO with new allies “with whom to fight and keep the peace in Europe and beyond.”\textsuperscript{196}

In May 2002, following the pattern of history during the Clinton years, a NATO-Russia Joint Council once again exemplified Moscow’s cooperation and the lack of true risk in admitting the former Soviet republics into NATO.\textsuperscript{197} By September 2002, the decision to invite seven new members into NATO had been reached, the result of “a concerted push by the Bush administration.”\textsuperscript{198} Seven out of the nine countries participating in the MAP program were to be included – leaving out Albania and Macedonia.

The emphasis on domestic republican reforms – so central to republican security theory – was still important to the decision-making. Being a MAP participant did not guarantee membership, first of all, as the cases of Albania and Macedonia show. A certain level of


\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Economist}, “Moment of Truth,” May 2, 2002.

\textsuperscript{196} Quoted in Moore (2007), 90


adequate domestic governance was still required to join NATO. In addition, the inclusion of Slovakia in the final seven was only confirmed after a parliamentary election there solidified republican norms.\textsuperscript{199} Finally, the seven states invited to join NATO were still required to continue participation in the MAP and to submit timetables for reform that acted as “a mechanism for maintaining NATO’s leverage over the invitees for as long as possible.”\textsuperscript{200} It is inaccurate to characterize this second, robust round of enlargement as driven solely by geostrategic considerations. Thus, the 2002 enlargement certainly aimed towards the republican security objectives of extending the space in Europe in which the U.S. would never have to fight a major war, and of installing and protecting new republican governments.

That the size of enlargement initiated in Prague, however, was bigger than had been expected before September 11 (even after Bush’s Warsaw speech) was born out by administration thinking.\textsuperscript{201} There was undoubtedly a new emphasis on capabilities that had been absent during the Clinton decisions on enlargement. As a senior U.S. official told The Washington Post, "September 11 changed the way we looked at enlargement," in that U.S. policymakers realized they needed “as many allies as we can get" to fight terrorism.\textsuperscript{202} Through their participation in the war in Afghanistan and in other counter-terror measures, the seven new members – including the states thought to lag most behind in terms of democratic reforms, Bulgaria and Romania – displayed that they were worth integrating into NATO and receiving the alliance’s protection.\textsuperscript{203} There is clear evidence, then, that the material-contextual environment

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{200} Moore (2007), 61.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. Also, see Moore (2007), 85-86.
and the new U.S. sense of violence interdependence heavily influenced the 2002 enlargement decisions.

The broad inclusiveness of this second enlargement round led some to believe that it was merely a way for the Bush administration, adamant about forming ad-hoc coalitions, to finally relegate NATO to the status of political club, without strong alliance cohesion or major capabilities. Bush administration officials deny this accusation.\textsuperscript{204} While deepest motivations are difficult to judge, in terms of initiatives taken up at the Prague summit in November 2002 there at least seemed to be a genuine effort to update and modernize NATO into an effective fighting force. Though not formally tied to NATO enlargement policy, a bevy of policies and programs were launched at the Prague Summit that sought to keep NATO relevant as a military alliance, and upgrade its capabilities for fighting terrorism and other threats creating high interdependence. These included a NATO Rapid Response Force, a Partnership Action Plan for terrorism, and a new WMD initiative.\textsuperscript{205}

The incentives for republican constraints on foreign governments was also strengthened by the introduction of the Individual Partner Action Plan, which was designed to enhance cooperation, specifically in the areas of military and democratic practices, between NATO and states that either did not want to commence in the MAP program or were not yet ready. This was deemed a particularly important outreach to Central Asian and Caucasus states that were more strategically vital after September 11\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{206} It also represents a continued effort to influence the

\textsuperscript{204} For German and British concerns, see \textit{Economist}, “A Moment of Truth,” May 2, 2002. For Clinton official concerns and Bush official response, see Moore (2007), 80-81.
\textsuperscript{206} Moore (2007) 62.
installation of republican governments around the globe, an objective of republican security theory.

Republican Security and the 2002 Enlargement Decision

The enlargement decisions leading up to the Prague summit were consistent with republican security theory. In embracing practically all of what the Clinton administration left in their enlargement policy, there is no doubt that the two core republican security objectives of NATO enlargement were still prominent for Bush policymakers. NATO membership was extended to the seven countries in 2002 with the notion that it would contribute to a unified and more stable Europe, in which the United States would never again be forced to partake in major conflicts. By applying the MAP requirements and insisting on their continuity even after invitations had been issued, the objective of influencing and protecting emerging republican regimes throughout the international system also remained a clear priority for NATO enlargement policymakers.

September 11th, however, seemed to heighten the importance given to the last republican security objective – mitigating areas of anarchy-interdependence outside of NATO territory. The centrality of the material factor of violence interdependence is especially helpful here. As Deudney writes, 9/11 renewed debate over the extent to which “deterrence was a way to reconcile the anarchic state system with intense violence interdependence.”207 By suddenly thrusting terrorism and WMDs from “speculative scenarios into primary security threats,” 9/11 essentially pushed the Bush administration towards “a far-reaching post deterrence doctrine,” of

207 Deudney (2008), 261.
which preemptive attack and global power projection played central roles. In this way, the new focus on niche capabilities of aspirant NATO members represented a logical response to the intense levels of violence and anarchy-interdependence introduced into American consciousness after 9/11. Higher degrees of violence interdependence will spur more policies that seek to enlarge the space of republican constraints and mitigate the spaces of anarchy. A more robust enlargement – which in essence is more and wider republican cobinding – is not only consistent with republican security theory but also expected.

The new requirements for NATO membership – with a stronger emphasis on military capabilities but not abandonment of the republican constraints criterion – represented a shift in degree, not content, from the Clinton administration. The fact that U.S. officials felt the “operating environment” was far more Western-oriented than it had been in 1997 suggests that “republican constraints” need not necessarily have improved from where they were in 1997, just maintained. And though the criterion of “republican constraints” was still important (as evidenced by the Romania and Bulgaria membership decisions coming last), there was a new value placed on the “capable military” criterion. The republican security perspective on this round of NATO enlargement is summarized in the table below:

### Table 5. Republican Security Perspective on 2002 NATO Enlargement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Enough” republican constraints on domestic military and government</th>
<th>“Capable” military capacity</th>
<th>Lack of “capable” military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO offers membership</td>
<td>Indeterminate, but likely membership offer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• eg. Slovenia, Baltics</td>
<td>NATO does not offer membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Not enough” republican constraints on domestic military and government</td>
<td>Indeterminate, but possible membership offer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• eg. Romania, Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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208 Ibid., 260.
209 Moore (2007), 82.
The constructivist perspective would clearly have a more difficult timing grappling with the decisions made in 2002. While a constructivist hypothesis on enlargement predicted one more NATO member in 1997 because of its tunnel-focus on “shared values,” the perspective misses the mark by predicting fewer invitations to NATO in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria in particular, with their lackluster political and democratic records, would probably not fit into a constructivist prediction for NATO enlargement. The clear new emphasis on the niche capabilities and strategic value of aspirant members falls outside the constructivist paradigm of values and norms as the sole metric for enlargement decisions.

The specific realist argument that NATO enlargement is just another example of states acting towards relative power gains – in that the policy represented a power grab by the U.S intrusion into Russian spheres of influence – does not seem particularly convincing once again. Though here the realist argument holds far more water than in 1997, essentially because this round of enlargement included the Baltic states, the history does not bear out the realist analysis of security policies being solely for the purpose of relative gains over other states. The laser focus on terrorism and WMD after September 11th, the subsequent Russian cooperation, and the appraisal of NATO members’ in terms of their domestic character and added value to NATO out-of-area operations all do not suggest that U.S. policymakers were most concerned with using NATO enlargement as a means to keep down the Russians. While there may be long-term advantages should Russia ever turn severely expansionist, this was not the primary concern nor central motivation of U.S. policymakers.

Finally, the primacy perspective is consistent with the Bush policy on NATO enlargement. In the wake of September 11th, there is no doubt that the U.S. was using enlargement as a means to project the scope and capacity of American and NATO military
power. That said, the cooperative security motivation of NATO enlargement was less present as compared to the Clinton administration. It is safe to say, looking at other policies pursued by the Bush administration, that policymakers were not embarking on a bold mission to create a global network of overlapping international institutions that would eventually serve to deter major threats to security and foster widespread international cooperation. While the primacy perspective is not useful under Clinton but useful under Bush, the cooperative security perspective is useful for Clinton and not particularly for Bush.

Republican security theory offers a consistent perspective on NATO enlargement across both administrations. Unsurprisingly, perspectives that focus in on particular kinds of U.S. grand strategy inevitably shift in their explanatory power as new administrations come into office. This is not a flaw with the perspectives, only an inherent limitation. Hence I would argue, through its consistency and applicability over time, that republican security theory offers a better explanation for the significant continuity in NATO enlargement policy. The republican security concepts of anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union are all highly visible in arguments from the Clinton and two Bush administrations. NATO enlargement throughout that time was consistently geared towards expanding the space in which the U.S. would not have to face major conflicts, increasing the number of republican governments internationally, and confronting dangerous spaces of weak governance out-of-area.

* * *

It wasn’t until April 2008 that the next round of NATO enlargement was confirmed. This round, likely coming at the alliance’s 60th anniversary in April 2009, will only include the two long-serving MAP states, Albania and Croatia. In the six years since the 2002 enlargement
decision, however, there were a handful of enlargement-related policies worth noting that contributed to the republican security objectives of NATO enlargement.

The Bush administration continued to set its sights on areas of acute anarchy-interdependence, specifically the greater Middle East. Using the Prague summit as a jumping off point, U.S. policymakers urged a broadening in scope and mission of NATO activities, especially in its outreach and activity in the Middle East.²¹⁰ U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns justified the broader scope with anarchy-interdependence rationales, arguing “in an era of globalized threats, no matter where we are in the world, we live downstream, because what happens in one region of the world affects the rest of the world.”²¹¹ While Iraq and Afghanistan focused the outreach, U.S. arguments relied on the violence interdependence felt from those regions – in areas of extreme anarchy that allows for terrorist safe havens, and in areas of extreme hierarchy that allow for rogue regimes and proliferators. The republican security concepts were still present in NATO, even if enlargement was not explicitly on the agenda. As Rebecca Moore writes, “NATO’s outreach to the Middle East constitutes a shift, not in the nature of NATO’s post-Cold War mission, but rather in the scope of its vision…[stemming] ultimately from a recognition that, just as NATO had projected stability to its east during the 1990s, it must now seek to project stability well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.”²¹²

The U.S. also continued to be the main advocate for further NATO enlargement within the alliance. The strategic value of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the wake of September 11th

²¹¹ Burns (2004), “NATO and the Greater Middle East”
²¹² Moore (2007), 122.
supplied the impetus for renewed NATO outreach to these areas. President Bush made the U.S. position on further enlargement clear in April 2008, when he strongly pushed for invitations to Georgia and the Ukraine. Though NATO promised eventual membership to these countries, the allies could not come to an agreement on a timetable or a MAP for either country, with particular resistance coming from Germany due to worries over Russian relations. The result was a compromise holding off any concrete plans, but pledging a return to the issue in December 2008.

After the Russian conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and the deep divisions in Ukrainian government, it seemed even less likely that MAPs for these two countries would be forthcoming. However, in one last-ditch attempt, the Bush administration strongly pushed for NATO offers to both of these countries starting in November 2008 and advocated bypassing the MAP process altogether. With only a month remaining in the Bush administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reached a compromise with NATO allies, whereby the U.S. would support renewed relations with the Russians in exchange for an accelerated process for Georgia and the Ukraine. The NATO relations with these countries would continue in the NATO commissions established in the nineties, rather than actual MAPs. The final decisions on whether and how Georgia and Ukraine would eventually join NATO were left to the incoming Obama administration.

III. Conclusion

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213 Ibid., 116-117.
This study does not attempt to evaluate the efficacy of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement. I have sought only to highlight the articulated motives of U.S. policymakers, as they look the lead on enlargement.

I argued that the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War has been most influenced by republican security theory. To make my argument, I tested perspectives in international relations (particularly constructivism), and perspectives on U.S. strategy (cooperative security and primacy), against the history of NATO enlargement and records and statements of U.S. policymakers. I found that no perspective does as good a job as republican security theory in explaining the objectives and decisions of U.S. policymakers as they sought to enlarge NATO.

I showed how republican security theoretical concepts – anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union – all appeared in the statements and arguments made by administration officials pushing for NATO enlargement. I also showed how the policies of NATO enlargement pursued the three objectives of the republican security agenda of American internationalism: expand the space in which the U.S. no longer faces the potential of major, violent conflicts; strengthen the incentives for and protect the emergence of new republican states in the international system; and contain the most instable and insecure areas of weak governance outside of NATO territory. The Clinton and second Bush administrations in particular, by utilizing the carrot of NATO membership to foster republican reforms and offering NATO membership to those states that were democratically advanced and military capable, sought to fulfill these republican security objectives.

As President Obama takes office, the republican security logic of NATO enlargement still holds. From a republican security perspective, extreme levels of violence interdependence
are here to stay; they are due to material facts on the ground. The need to govern more spaces of anarchy through republican unions will continue to make NATO enlargement, whether this year or in five years, a necessary priority. Here’s predicting that, consistent with republican security theory, President Obama oversees the accession of additional states into NATO during his presidency.

By viewing NATO enlargement as a republican security initiative, it becomes possible to see it, in essence, as a security practice the United States has been implementing since it’s founding. Deudney’s historical reconstruction of republican security theory suggests that the roots go even further into the past than that. Through all of the political and ulterior motivations thrown around in the NATO enlargement debate, nothing can shroud the fact that the United States is now bound to protect the security of twenty-five other republics. NATO enlargement is a continuation of the American founding, a union between small republics for the sake of security, and a continuation of the American tradition of protecting republican governments around the globe. NATO enlargement – whatever one’s opinion of its strategic value or its efficacy – shows the United States doing what it has always done.
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