The Emerging Storm: Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement, 1934-1935

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In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England traced the historic route of St. Paul the Apostle, only this time in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of the rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express, steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of Ankara in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the morning of January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled between the alleyways on the steep slopes of the old town.1 This man was Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year before and now was slated to take charge of the British Embassy in Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of Anatolia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the railway station.2

Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks of the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Persia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern strongmen like Reza Khan of Iran (with whom he negotiated in Tehran as Head of Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his diary: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know, too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.”3 A note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of the diplomat’s
will contained the following posthumous praise for the British Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct of affairs was based on his belief that it is ‘men’ that count—not machines—in the order of human affairs; his achievements, his trials which were those of his country, and how he set about overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of his beliefs.”

During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic of Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of Sir Percy Loraine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial and geopolitical interests in the security of the Mediterranean Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of the nascent Turkish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious response on the part of the status quo powers threatened by the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and
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Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of interwar diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s experience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while working between London and Ankara during the early years of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of European diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.

THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE

The signing of the defensive Balkan Pact between Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934, was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of the Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “demands and interests of the smaller states” in mind. Turkey took the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “neutral-bloc” against the carving of the peninsula into spheres of external influence. Because Ankara still remained at odds with the four Great Powers over a number of territorial disputes, Turkish policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of the regional countries and diluting great power control in the Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “organize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more menacing threat to the stability of the Mediterranean Basin.

Ever since the conclusion of the Mosul Crisis in 1926,
British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly dwindling. Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of Bulgaria’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question of Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits) to the fore. As Ambassador Loraine noted in a telegraph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras had reasoned, “If nations rearmed, Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept different treatment.” Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearmament required Turkey to revisit the status of the demilitarized Turkish Straits. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most unpleasant impression.”

The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bulgaria. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bulgarians, and the Turkish government interpreted this development as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident dragoman James Morgan reported on the deliberations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly of June 1934. He described Turkish Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:

In the light of events which have recently created a stir in Turkey, such as the speeches of Signor Mussolini about possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of Italian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden decision to increase the credits for national defense with Turkey’s distrust and dislike of Italy.
In front of the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending to affairs at the League of Nations in Geneva, referenced Mussolini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled, “Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations of Italians.” The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric of the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is probable that mistrust of Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer relation with the United Kingdom.” Loraine noticed that Italian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested interests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s bellicosity—and the timidity of the Balkan Pact given the omission of Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.

No event is more telling of Turkey’s drift toward rapprochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild evening on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon in a long dispatch a few days later. After a banquet at the Ankara Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of whom Loraine knew well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited the Ambassador to join their game of poker. Loraine accepted the offer and was inundated with a game of cards that crept on and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obviously cast down all barriers of formality, and, without any loss of dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and comrade.” Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up the chips at the end of the game so as to resolve any diplomatic differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for Loraine...
Lorraine to stay behind.

The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if Loraine imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate” and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did not give me the impression of a man who left many things to chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent impression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of the friendly intentions of His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further mused, “It was not merely a question of the Turkey of today, but also of the Turkey of tomorrow...[and thus there was] no reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.” However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend...Russia.” Aware of this apprehensive sentiment maintained by Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambassador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied, “If the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines, then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations between Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted ways, Atatürk added “that if England really desired this on her part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of Persia and the Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if we were
united!” Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of the living legend of Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête diplomacy on behalf of the British Crown, but the mystique tied to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each evening one of the hotel clerks would send a list of those present in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya, and he would then make his way to the Hotel if there was anyone he wanted to see.”

One of President Atatürk’s modern biographers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:

The Gazi was the fount of new ideas and the arbiter of disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table. In one of his many stories about his parties, he asked one of his guests, ‘Tell me what goes best with *raki*?’ ‘Roasted chick peas (*leblebi*),’ the guest replied, knowing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ responded Mustafa Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to *raki* is good conversation.’

Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Britain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy directives of His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically, to the designs of the Secretary of State in London. Tensions often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapprochement should take. One such endeavor was to bring British economic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged (but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in
the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933, the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with Turkey that represented the zenith of Turco-Soviet cooperation in the interwar period. Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of engineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched by parallel commitments to secularization and the development of cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collaboration.” Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet understanding in terms of self-styled anti-Westernism grounded in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the European periphery. Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature of this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the burgeoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule. By the time Ambassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relationship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931, bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s new policy of state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered with the support of the Soviet economy, which was one of the few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of production remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving around state-run holding companies such as Eribank (mining)
and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.\textsuperscript{26}

Soviet economic support was waning by the end of 1934, just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the country toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935, definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of international politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”\textsuperscript{27} While the Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.

However, while the geopolitics of Europe were pushing the Turks toward the British, the \textit{etatist} policies of Turkish Minister of Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid-1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of Overseas Trade. British merchants were still operating under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impetus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of payments with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal demand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to free their frozen credits.”\textsuperscript{28} Because the British refused to acquiesce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, one of Loraine’s principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.\textsuperscript{30}
In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the possibility of manipulating the British Mandate of Palestine for additional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present position is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of stuff from Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a significant trade imbalance that, if ameliorated, could right the scales of Turkish commercial policy to make way for more British exports. Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of Trade in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”

Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey, Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflating the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and London. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelmingly impressed with the necessity of protecting their interests,” the Ambassador wrote. Eventually, between Loraine’s diplomatic efforts and the work of Colonel Woods in London, Britain signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with tariff concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation. Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the anticipated “sign of support” President Atatürk had beseeched from the Ambassador over their game of cards in June 1934; a year afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.

Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers an overview of British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy substantiating the sliver of opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Turkey’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with Britain. Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov-
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ernement remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating commercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of a British naval offer; and the looming nationalization of the Anglo-French Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations throughout much of the 1930s. Part of the debate regarding the Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank of England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish historian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of England] unsuccessfully opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationalization, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer financial ties with Turkey.”

Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore generally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of England. His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial agreements and export credits) as “part of the strategy securing Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”

Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of 1934, but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relationship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket Ankara on New Year’s Day of 1935. A little over a week later, Loraine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the Anatolian highlands in pursuit of the latest news from London.

SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE

Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing reality of Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides the translation of a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from October 1934, which warned of impending Italian military action in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and international conditions emerged.” Loraine was more skepti-
cal of Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending, “The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.” Still, in spite of Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of five Italian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February 10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sovereignty of Abyssinia and the maintenance of the status quo in the region.

It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of the League of Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of whom served as Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in late 1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in December about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives abroad informed of what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns me is the time lag.” The British Ambassador was acting in a precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent information from the League of Nations was critical to maintaining the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian aggression to call for the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits—this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of Italian re-fortification of the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of western Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish remilitarization of the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament
clauses within the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and of Locarno (1925)— thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position: Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request. Loraine was caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London and Ankara.

On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of the responses of Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:

Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as they could possibly be with those of the United Kingdom; that any diminution of British naval influence in the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United Kingdom as the only possibly effective champion of peace and security in the Mediterranean, and henceforth [sic] of Turkish national security interests in those waters; that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the conversion of the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that Turkey in this matter, in view of the convincing proofs she has given of her entirely pacific and peace-making policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her own wider interests no less well than those of Turkey, however minor her interests may appear by comparison with ours. Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly favored an immediate resolution of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis,
followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.” Instead, Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the stability of the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwarted quickly by disagreements among all of the powers involved. In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such roles in the Mediterranean” once news of Nazi Germany’s rear-mament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain. Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of a multilateral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions of the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report on Turkey for 1935, “In view of the increasing gravity of the dispute between Italy and the League of Nations, and of the ensuing friendly collaboration of His Majesty’s Government and Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their purpose, were content to let the question of the Straits sleep until a more propitious day should dawn.”

Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to re-evaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It [is] the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a fleet [has] the last word.” While the British were enthusiastic toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the “champions of world wide disarmament.” Therefore, Britain was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur-
key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions of remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office document from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The prospect of a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”48

Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four submarines between 1936 and 1937.49 Britain was already alarmed by Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politicians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of Hitler’s orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula.50 To prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty increased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensuing years.

The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By mistake, the Turkish General Staff learned that Britain recently had sold a number of warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when the Turkish General Staff requested to buy one million pounds in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again undermined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a reduced number of aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda of the bankers in London.51 Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of British commercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of maintaining a favorable balance of trade was rejected outright by the Turkish government. Thus, even in terms of geopolitical security, Britain “could not put the rapprochement between the two countries
onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine.52

What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the realization of an informal multilateral Mediterranean security pact that worked both in and around the League of Nations. The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia together in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on Italy via the League of Nations’ Committee of Eighteen, guaranteeing each other mutual support in the case of further Italian aggression.53 The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criticized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its commitments to the League of Nations, “which were no secret at all.”54 Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led security agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of the Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was secured within a constellation of advantageous relationships. Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was the attitude of France and Britain toward Italy. The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Mediterranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration in the development of Anglo-Turkish relations.

Therefore, by the end of 1935, Britain was facing a strategic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out of London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hitler’s satellite.”55 These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would
“soon revert to his former role of ‘good European.’”\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Turkey—the joint command of the British military was reluctant to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of sanctions from the League of Nations and London’s trust in collective security “have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of war.”\textsuperscript{57} Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack of adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive if Italy became hostile, regardless of the number of British allies there.”\textsuperscript{58} 

Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by

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Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom (center), and British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey, on September 5, 1936.
two maxims of strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Government took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general European war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial defense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments: “the defense of the Far East, the defense of India, and obligations in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.” An aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodecanese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi German designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution of the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from Mussolini” if Britain deployed its forces elsewhere. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of the few British statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Europe. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain control of the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of food and oil supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.

While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939 in the face of war, the strategic calculus of the British navy in the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this approach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of the entire Eastern Mediterranean. With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya, and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of Islam” in the Middle
East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score of Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin. Nevertheless, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Lo- raine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-to-eye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements at the League of Nations in Geneva concerning the status of the Turkish Straits in the face of the burgeoning threat to peace on the European continent.

**IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT**

At a dinner party in the summer of 1937, Loraine imparted to his guests: “The duty of the diplomat is not so much to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if war is inevitable, his country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.” Keeping the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of diplomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as the study of diplomatic discontinuities during times of war. The story of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934 and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of their advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) policymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British thus delayed the signing of any substantial written agreement with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis instead. The British strategy of appeasement in the Mediterranean Basin finally fell apart in the face of Italy’s invasion of Albania in April 1939. Therefore, by the time of the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939, the European state system had already begun to unravel past the point of no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey
sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Republic had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the Second World War (1939-1945).

Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it possible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Britain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and the United States of America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away from the small nations of Europe. However, such an assessment is more complicated if one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Aid Agreement of May 12, 1938 as a defensive corollary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in 1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in Turkey as a guarantor of Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula, both before and after the Munich Conference.

Without completely turning toward counterfactual history, the fate of Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality, signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet ‘betrayal’ of the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in alignment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and subsequently pressured to bow out of the Anglo-French-Turkish
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His Majesty King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom (center left) alongside Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (center right) in Istanbul in 1936. Their first meeting was orchestrated by British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine, indicating the success of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement.

Treaty of 1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to the details of Loraine’s game of cards on June 17, 1934, the span of Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel… friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble on Nazi Germany in 1939.

Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should not be discounted, especially in terms of the decision for further appeasement at the Munich Conference of 1938. The wishful thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of the small nations of Europe should be measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, interests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean between the inception of Anglo-Turkish rap-
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prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940.\textsuperscript{66} Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of his diplomatic mission in Turkey:

[If the observer needed] any proof...of the efficacy of the British lines of policy...shall we not find it in the fact that the Turkish Republic, many of whose men fought against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army of one million men mobilized for three years to oppose any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her liberty.\textsuperscript{67}

In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a diplomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called, “the excellence of [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which] might better be called the rarest of all qualities: wisdom.”\textsuperscript{68} As one of Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of 1937 exclaimed, “If the pendulum [of Turkish policy] was now swinging over to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting efforts of the Ambassador had set it in motion.”\textsuperscript{69} Nonetheless, the momentum of Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of war; for alongside Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of poker or diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
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1 Howard Robertson, “New Angora,” *The Times*, Issue 47935 (March 5, 1938), 13-14.
4 The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 1011/238, *The Late Sir Percy Loraine*, 3-4.
5 Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle-Power Activism in the 1930s,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 3 (July 2005), 445.
6 Ibid., 445.
7 Ibid., 447.
8 Esra S. Degerli, “Balkan Pact and Turkey,” *Journal of International Social Research* 2, no. 6 (Winter 2009), 143.
9 The technicalities of the British Mandate established by the League of Nations in 1920 caused a dispute with the Republic of Turkey over the control of the oil-rich province of Mosul in northern Iraq. The settlement of the disagreement was reached in 1926 and was lauded for “demonstrat[ing] the great value of using an able and experienced resident ambassador in an important negotiation. On the local level it had underlined the value of negotiating face to face in Ankara, and the practical value for Britain of having its own building in the new capital.” See Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey*, 151-152.
10 The Turkish Straits comprise the Strait of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Strait of the Dardanelles. They are an important causeway connecting and regulating passage into and out of the Aegean Sea, an embayment of the northern Mediterranean Sea, from the Black Sea. As a result, the Turkish Straits are arguably the most valuable geopolitical resource of the Anatolian Peninsula because they connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean in the West; and through the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in the East. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the major regional powers, including the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic, routinely fought with the Great Powers, principally Britain and Russia, over the military and legal control of the Turkish Straits.
11 FO E 2874/1345/44, Loraine to Simon (May 6, 1934) – British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA), Vol. 33, Doc. 92, 113.
13 James Morgan was the dragoman at the British Embassy in Ankara having served as a chargé d’affaires in Turkey since before the First World War.
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(1914-1918). A dragoman was a resident expert, or Turkish speaking “oriental secretary,” housed at the British Embassy in Turkey who served several indispensable roles, especially during Ottoman rule. The duties of communication, translation, intelligence gathering, and political advising made the dragoman the right-hand man of the British Ambassador, providing “continuity and local expertise” to the British Embassy in Turkey. See Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 141.

15 Massimiliano Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 35; Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia 26, 191-192.
17 FO E 4238/4048/44, Loraine to Simon (June 20, 1934) – BDFA, Vol. 33, Doc. 113, 127-129.
18 “The Gazi” was a title adopted by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the Republic of Turkey. Bestowed upon Atatürk by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1923, the title refers to a Muslim warrior or Islamic war hero.
19 FO E 4238/4048/44, Loraine to Simon (June 20, 1934) – BDFA, Vol. 33, Doc. 113, 127-129.
22 The Soviet Union dispatched diplomat and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhhan to Ankara in 1929; the Turkish Republic sent Prime Minister Ismet Inönü to Moscow in 1932; and the Soviet Union authorized Minister of Defense Kliment Voroshilov to visit Ankara in 1933.
23 Samuel J. Hirst, “Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 72, no. 1 (2013), 49-52. The film The Heart of Turkey (1934) portrayed both the Soviets and the Turks as revolutionaries emerging from the same revolt against Western imperialism.
25 Ibid., 39.
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macy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 150-154. The Germans favored a protectionist and micromanaged world trading system of bilateral bartering based upon the establishment of “clearing agreements” in which bulk commodities were traded between countries instead of fluctuating currencies. This system favored Germany’s specialization in industrial exports and offered a means to prop up Turkish agricultural exports. Once the Great Depression (1929-1933) triggered a collapse in world commodity prices in 1930, Turkey also started to favor this system to “trade” its devalued surplus agriculture rather than sell it for a meager price on the flooded world market. This bilateral bartering system, driven by the periodical signing of “clearing agreements” between states, created a strong trading relationship between Germany and Turkey: cereals, tobaccos, fruits, nuts, wool, cotton, and chrome in particular flowed out of Turkey in exchange for German steel, engines, vehicles, and rubber. The great flaw of this trading system, however, was that proposed credits would often become “frozen” in central banks, which waited for new clearing agreements to reopen either the exchange of commodities or the purchase and import of foreign goods to ease the balance of exchange. Because Germany was more economically developed than Turkey, bilateral trade only reinforced Turkish dependence in the long term, even though the barter system benefited Turkish exports in the short term. As Barlas posits, “Extensive German purchases of [Turkish] goods resulted in the accumulation of large frozen balances owed to Turkey by Germany on the clearing account. In fact, the clearing debt was actually a special form of short-term capital import to Germany, in an interest-free form…a kind of forced loan from Turkey which was itself short on capital.” While the German economy benefited from reselling its commodity imports at lower world prices to free up exchange, Turkey was in desperate need of diversifying its trade to “reduce the German monopoly.” Therefore, the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Turkish Clearing Agreement was a successful first step in the right direction for both parties involved, and “Turkish exports to Germany decreased for the first time in 1937.”

30 Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, 179. Throughout the 1930s, “Turkish exports to Britain were insufficient to pay for Turkish imports from Britain.”
31 See Endnotes 28 and 30.
32 TNA, FO 1011/174, Loraine to Rendel (March 1, 1934).
33 Ibid.
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37 Ibid., 216.
38 Dilek Barlas and Serhat Guvenc, *Turkey in the Mediterranean During the Interwar Era: The Paradox of Middle Power Diplomacy and Minor Power Naval Policy* (Bloomington, Indiana University Turkish Studies Series, 2010), 195; T. C. Basbakanlik Cumhuriyet Arsivi (BCA) 238/605/2 (October 7, 1934).
40 TNA, FO 1011/177, Loraine to Mounsey (December 30, 1935).
41 The Treaty of Locarno was an agreement among Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy to stabilize the internal borders of Europe and to approve a number of clauses dictating German demilitarization, anti-revisionism, and the mutual inviolabilities of European borders. The first major breach of the Treaty of Locarno was Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland region in March 1936.
43 Barlas and Guvenc, *Turkey in the Mediterranean During the Interwar Era*, 189.
44 Ibid., 193.
50 Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*, 154. Hitler’s strategic war planning also increased the amount of Turkish imports to Nazi Germany: in 1937, the second year of Hitler’s four-year plan, Nazi Germany paid 3.5 million marks for Turkish chrome (52% of Nazi German demand). In fact, imports of chrome increased to 60% of Nazi German demand by 1939.
52 Ibid., 16-17.
53 Ibid., 14-15. The sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy in November 1935 were slow and ineffectual. Divisions between the British
and the French made them almost completely unsuccessful, showcasing the weakness of the multinational body in reacting to international disorder. The sanctions were lifted in June 1936.


56 Ibid., 15.

57 Ibid., 15.


60 Ibid., 11.

61 Salerno, *Vital Crossroads*, 156.

62 Ibid., 189.

63 Pratt in Dann, *The Great Powers in the Middle East*, 17.


66 TNA, FO 1011/194, Loraine to Thoroton (February 11, 1938), 1-8.


69 Ibid., 17-18.

**Images:**


Page 103: “British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) visiting with President Atatürk (left) and King Edward VIII (center),” picture, September 7, 1936, via Cumhuriyet (*The Republic*).