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Penn History Review
Journal of Undergraduate Historians
Volume 23, Issue 2 Fall 2016

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Founded in 1991, the Penn History Review is a journal for undergraduate historical research. Published twice a year through the Department of History, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the Review is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration. For more information about submissions, please contact us at phrsubmissions@gmail.com.

Funding for this magazine provided by the Department of History, University of Pennsylvania.

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Contents:
Letter from the Editor........................................................6

The Age of Infrastructure: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Progressive Civil Religion
Joseph Kiernan.................................................................10

Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation: Implications of Using Public Schools to House the Polio Vaccine Field Trial of 1954
Will Schupmann...............................................................61

The Emerging Storm: Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement, 1934-1935
Otto Kienitz.................................................................87

“Indianizing the Confederacy”: Understandings of War Cruelty During the American Civil War and the Sioux Uprising of 1862
Zachary Brown, Stanford University.................................115
After another challenging yet enriching cycle, it is with tremendous excitement that, on behalf of the Editorial Board, I present the newest edition of the *Penn History Review*.

As I conclude my term as Editor-in-Chief of the *Penn History Review*, I cannot help but reflect upon my time with great fondness. I first joined the Editorial Board in the spring of 2014. Since then, I have read many submissions, collaborated with numerous editors, and edited undergraduate history papers that range from the elegant to the provocative. The amount of knowledge I have gained about history, the publication process, and ultimately, about myself, has been invaluable. Without a doubt, the reason why my tenure on the Editorial Board has been so positive rests upon the core tenet of the *Penn History Review*: publishing the finest original and scholarly history essays. In doing so, one can share the perspective of an author’s academic passion, and, more specifically, for focused and well-researched topics. This issue of the *Penn History Review* is no exception.

The first article in this issue is *The Age of Infrastructure: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Progressive Civil Religion*, by Joseph Kiernan. This piece highlights the political career of Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, who was considered a leader of the progressive civil religion in the United States during the mid-twentieth century. While the author provides a synopsis of Norris’ entire political career, the paper focuses on the zenith of Senator Norris’ work, highlighting the admirable and determined spirit with which he championed the inception of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Consequently, the reader will appreciate the titanic amount of “red tape” Norris grappled with to achieve his vision for the United States, and how the Nebraskan Senator carved a legacy for himself in the country, both literally and
Letter from the Editor

figuratively.

Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation: Implications of Using Public Schools to House the Polio Vaccine Field Trial of 1954, written by Will Schupmann, is the second article included in this issue. This work highlights the controversy surrounding the mass field trial overseen by the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) for young school children in an effort to combat the life-threatening disease, poliomyelitis (polio). Specifically, the NFIP opted to administer Jonas Salk’s new and promising vaccine for polio in public schools, yet this decision, in conjunction with other choices by the NFIP, had an important impact regarding how the public perceived the field trial. Thus, the reader will be surprised to learn how and why the NFIP was successful in implementing its widespread inoculation program and, more broadly, about the implications of hosting a mass field trial in public schools.

The third paper is entitled The Emerging Storm: Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement, 1934-1935, by Otto Kienitz. The paper begins by introducing Sir Percy Loraine, who in 1934 became Britain’s new Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey. After examining the geopolitical landscape of the interwar era, the author describes the diplomatic, economic, and security challenges faced by Loraine in the British Ambassador’s attempt to recommence a mutually steadfast and respectful relationship between Britain and Turkey. By revealing the private conversations and meetings between Loraine and various Turkish officials to the reader, the author not only underscores the strenuous and lethargic process of this diplomacy in general, but also emphasizes the success, impact, and significance of Loraine’s ambassadorial endeavors in particular.

The final scholarly essay featured is “Indianizing the Confederacy”: Understandings of War Cruelty During the American Civil War and the Sioux Uprising of 1862, written by Zachary Brown of Stanford University. After defining the characteristics of
the phenomenon known as “Indian war,” this paper explores how the northern press pinned these negative traits to their adversaries in the South and the Minnesota Frontier during the early- to mid-1860s. Although the northern media’s decision seemed to transpire as a consequence of extreme and often hyperbolized instances, these accusations persuaded and unified a horrified and appalled audience. Ultimately, therefore, the reader will grasp the power and impact of the northern press during this tumultuous and sanguinary era, especially regarding how propaganda connected and influenced the Union’s perception of its enemy combatants.

Publishing a scholarly journal requires a team effort, thus the Editorial Board would also like to extend its sincere thanks to Dr. Siyen Fei, Undergraduate Chair of the History Department, and to Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Undergraduate Advisor of the History Department. Their advice, encouragement, and promotion of the *Penn History Review* demonstrates the support and commitment of the History Department in publishing outstanding original and scholarly work written by undergraduate students. Also, the Editorial Board would like to express its gratitude for both the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania and at other schools across the United States who advertised this publication to students, as well as to the students who submitted work for consideration. Finally, the Editorial Board wishes a heartfelt thank you to the University of Pennsylvania for providing a platform to augment and to enhance the field of history with unique academic texts.

On a more personal note, I would like to thank the members of the Editorial Board for their efforts, enthusiasm, and dedication to publishing this issue of the *Penn History Review*. In particular, it is with great pleasure to have added three new members to our Editorial Board—Isabel Gendler, Emma Hetrick, and Cristina Urquidi; they are assets to our team. Lastly, I want to offer my appreciation to my friends and family, whose
motivation and support has been immeasurable.

Congratulations to all of the editors and authors who have contributed to this Fall 2016 Issue of the *Penn History Review*!

Aaron C. Mandelbaum
*Editor-in-Chief*
Propaganda Poster from the Second World War
Celebrating the Force and Magnitude of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Ten Years After its Inception
INTRODUCTION

During the 1930s, simmering progressivism erupted into furious activity, initiating the Age of Infrastructure in the United States of America (U.S.). After decades of piecemeal development of roads and railways at the hands of states and private corporations, Washington, D.C. took command. Gone were the railroad cabals of Charles Crocker, James J. Hill, Mark Hopkins, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius Vanderbilt. Now, economic crisis and rural poverty had galvanized unprecedented popular support for government intervention. Under the guidance of ideological heavyweights, the federal government seized the reins of infrastructure development in the United States, fusing decades of stewing resentment of corporate greed with a New Deal checkbook. Commissions, rather than corporations, laid asphalt, hung wire, bridged valleys, and dammed rivers. It was an era in which men of a singular, unstoppable vision—David Lilienthal, George W. Norris, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—acquired the means to substantiate their dreams.
Thus, this is the story of Senator George W. Norris, a Republican from Nebraska, who fought to expand government to an unprecedented level in his crusade against poverty and injustice. The bane of the imperious Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL), Norris took on distinguished industrialist Henry Ford and won. Norris also challenged his own political party with his unyielding beliefs, leaving a legacy of concrete and light.

In his devotion to the progressive cause, Norris earned no shortage of foes. Consequently, this is also the story of his opponent, a Democrat-turned-Republican named Wendell Willkie of Indiana, who fought Norris and the Senator’s creation, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in an effort to protect free enterprise from government coercion. Willkie, armed with a passion that earned him national notoriety and widespread respect, sought to check the excesses of the “progressive civil religion of infrastructure” when its adherents, empowered by the government, began to infringe on the fundamental values of freedom. The TVA survives as an enduring symbol of the New Deal, but its roots reached deeper than the Executive Branch’s campaign against the blight of the Great Depression (1929-1939).

The progressive civil religion did not emerge *ex nihilo* in the tempestuous first hundred days of the New Deal. Its origins were older, growing in the Great Plains among disaffected farmers and in the parlors of Boston’s Brahmins. Its adherents ranged from the Protestant Nebraskans who sent George W. Norris to Congress for almost forty years, even when he committed the most egregious of political heresies, to the social reforming elite of Manhattan, who handed a young, brilliant civil servant named Robert Moses the power to reshape their world. The progressive civil religion took many shapes such as, *inter alia*, the campaigns of trustbusters and yellow journalists to curb corporate power, the conservationism of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, and Social Security. However, in doing so, the New Deal empowered a unique strain of the ecumenical progressive civil
religion: a progressive crusade for infrastructure. This was the faith of Norris, mixing agrarian nationalism, progressivism, and populism with a deep distrust of capitalism and an unrelenting confidence in the altruistic potential of government. This radical denomination, the constant frustration of internationalists and free marketers, was built on a core belief that the government’s role was not only to moderate and to regulate the excesses of American capitalists, but also to serve as the egalitarian vanguard of a better, fairer society.

In the pursuit of its agenda, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration handed the instruments of state to men such as Norris to build infrastructure for the American people and to engineer a new society. When unchecked, the progressive civil religion led down a dark road to paternalism and arrogant trampling of core American economic freedoms. At its worst, the progressive civil religion of infrastructure was a self-righteous crusade for a moral, just society that denigrated the folly of individualism and the American belief in productive self-advancement. However, when moderated by legitimate criticism and motivated by unflagging commitment to the national need, this liberal creed could master the natural power of the United States for the common good, and uplift millions to the American Dream. Its prophets seized upon a unique moment in American history, carving the physical scripture of this populist faith into the land for posterity.

THE ROAD TO MUSCLE SHOALS

The series of events that led to the birth of the TVA began far across the Pacific Ocean in the tense summer months of 1914. The spiraling diplomatic crisis in Europe spurred tensions that reverberated throughout the Kaiser’s Pacific possessions. As war threatened to break out across Europe, German Vice-Admiral Maximillian Reichsgraf von Spee, on tour with the battleships SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau en route
to Truk in Micronesia, contemplated the options for his fleet, the German East Asian Cruiser Squadron. Should the pressures of the summer erupt into armed conflict, Germany would have limited naval resources abroad to defend its Pacific possessions.

The Triple Entente Powers, especially Britain and her bilateral ally Japan, had relative naval superiority in the Asian Pacific Rim. Ultimately, when the July Crisis degraded into the inception of the First World War (1914-1918) in August, Spee opted to sail towards South America, seeking neutral colliers and plotting a path back towards the Fatherland. British and American naval strategists eyed Spee’s voyage with concern as the Germans cruised toward Cape Horn, Chile. Although the East Asian flotilla faced defeat at the hands of the British Royal Navy off the Falkland Islands, the German escapades in the Pacific, combined with the privateering cruiser SMS *Emden*’s activities near British India, unnerved the Triple Entente Powers.

The German naval presence off the Chilean coast raised concerns in the United States, a neutral but nervous power. At the time, Chile was the major exporter of nitrates to the U.S., critical for producing fertilizers and explosives, both resources of profound strategic importance. In the arid northern reaches of the long littoral country, huge nitrate deposits at Antofagasta and Tarapacá attracted foreign firms from Britain, Germany, and the United States to harvest this vital ingredient for modern agriculture and weaponry.

With the advent of hostilities, the Germans, now cut off from global trade by the British blockade, developed nitrogen fixation methods (the Haber process) to produce sufficient materiel domestically. The German innovations and German investments in hydroelectric energy to power the nitrate production ensured a steady supply of shells for Krupp guns in northern France. They also helped feed the hungry Reich, where the agricultural output per acre outpaced most peer countries. The United States, however, had no reserve supply of nitrates, was still reliant on Chilean imports. In a time of global war and
commerce raiding, the sea lines of communication to Tarapacá seemed more vulnerable than ever.

As the specter of armed conflict loomed, American military planners fretted over the nitrate problem. On December 27, 1915, Brigadier General Crozier, the U.S. Army Chief of Ordnance, called for the development of air-made nitrate production in the United States. With the potential for U.S. involvement rising, the United States’ dependency on Chile for critical munitions became a political issue. German privateering and heightened submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean demonstrated how hostile maritime activity could interdict trade, potentially debilitating American military preparedness.\(^7\)

On June 3, 1916, in response to the mounting likelihood of war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act (NDA), a comprehensive bill to reorganize and modernize the armed forces of the United States.\(^8\) The nitrate issue was a component of the broad legislative initiative. Under pressure from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, where business interests and impoverished southerners backed the construction of a dam and a nitrate plant along the Tennessee River, Senator Oscar Underwood (D-AL) fought to include Section 124 in the NDA, the “Nitrate Supply.” Section 124 “empowered” the President to “determine the best, cheapest, and most available means for the production of nitrates…upon any…river” and authorized the Executive “to construct, maintain, and operate…dams, locks, improvements to navigation, power houses…for the generation of [electricity]” and “the production of nitrates.”\(^9\) Muscle Shoals, positioned along the mighty Tennessee River, was an ideal location. The federally-run project would direct millions of federal dollars into the needy region and jumpstart an industrial awakening in a significant portion of the sleepy South.

In the early twentieth century, the Tennessee Valley had not shared in the economic prosperity brought by industrialization. The region, following the river from its sources in western Virginia and North Carolina, snaked from the highlands of East
Tennessee past Knoxville and Chattanooga down into northern Alabama and Mississippi before turning northward back through West Tennessee to join the Ohio River near Paducah, Kentucky. Unlike the rich metallurgical mecca of the upper Ohio River and the Great Lakes region, the Tennessee Valley was dependent on a faltering agricultural base. From the late nineteenth century to the 1920s and 1930s, the size of farms diminished and the number of tenant farmers tripled as population growth and productivity stagnated. Thus, for socioeconomic as well as military reasons, Muscle Shoals seemed an ideal location for the Section 124 nitrate plant and accompanying hydroelectric dam.

When word of the site’s selection reached northern Alabama, thousands flocked to the Muscle Shoals/Florence area, looking for work. Frantic construction on the dam and nitrate plant proceeded as demand for fertilizer and munitions skyrocketed with the deployment of American forces to the Western Front in Belgium and France. However, the end of the war and the return to normalcy ushered in congressional attempts to rein in wartime spending, including cutting the Muscle Shoals initiative. By March 1920, fiscal conservatives sank an appropriations package to continue work on the project, stalling construction indefinitely. The partially-completed facility would remain dormant while national business and political forces battled to see who would control the fate of Muscle Shoals and the Tennessee Valley’s development. On one side, the greatest industrialist of the country would seek to build a new Detroit on the Tennessee River. On the other, a mustachioed lawyer from McCook, Nebraska, would seek to stop him.

THE PROPHET FROM NEBRASKA

They called him a “son of the wild jackass,” a “radical,” a socialist, and a scourge sent to Washington, D.C. for Nebraska’s political schadenfreude. They also called him the “Fighting Liberal,” the “pillar of the New Deal,” and “an uncompromising
The Age of Infrastructure

foe of special privilege.”¹⁴ Future President John F. Kennedy eulogized him in Profiles in Courage (1955). Businessmen damned his liberal tendencies. Presidents of his own political party vetoed his bills and presidents of the other political party supported his reelection. The people of Nebraska chose him to represent them for forty years. To his admirers, he represented them and Americans everywhere, and he fought with an unbridled intensity to defend their democratic rights, to afford them economic opportunity, and to uplift them out of poverty.¹⁵ For his defiance, his leadership, and his uncompromising empathy, George W. Norris is remembered as one of the greatest populist senators in American history.

George W. Norris,
Senator from Nebraska and
Leader of the Progressive Civil Religion
He was also the legislative champion of a faith, the progressive civil religion of infrastructure. Acquainted with the trials of farmers scratching a living out of the Nebraska prairie and the ruinous consequences of capitalist speculation, Norris maintained a deep compassion for the rural poor and a loathing for the capitalist industrialists. His devotion to populist progressivism bordered on zealotry. On politics and religion, Norris once wrote, “True love for humanity is an unselfish desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of all the people comprising the government. I think religion is the same thing.”

He would attack economic problems with ideological ferocity throughout his long career on the national stage.

Nebraskans elected Norris to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1902. At first, Norris played a quiet role in Congress, serving as a dutiful Republican. However, after five years in the House, his indignation towards the dictatorial management style of Speaker Joseph Cannon grew and so did his penchant for legislative rebellion. In his autobiography, *Fighting Liberal* (1945), Norris reflected, “I doubt if any Speaker in the history of Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon was.” Norris, therefore, decided that it was time to curtail the Speaker’s power. In May 1908, he challenged Cannon over the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, diving into a pool of scandal that rocked the nation.

Specifically, Gifford Pinchot, a favorite of conservationist progressives and hand-picked by President Theodore Roosevelt as the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, came into conflict with President William Howard Taft’s Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger. Before leaving office, Roosevelt had announced that waterpower was for the “public interest” and directed Pinchot to reserve federal lands for hydroelectric purposes. However, this led to a series of escalating, and highly public, rhetorical brawls between Pinchot and Ballinger once the new Taft administration had settled in. When this conflict began to divide Congress, Cannon backed Ballinger and the White House,
who thought that Pinchot’s efforts were a conservationist bridge too far. Conversely, Norris backed the hardline progressive Pinchot. Eventually, Taft sacked Pinchot in January 1910, but Norris had led an effective revolt against the Speaker by aligning the progressives as a united front. The Ballinger-Pinchot controversy widened the divisions between the progressives, led by Theodore Roosevelt, and the conservatives, generally aligned with Taft. Furthermore, the controversy helped to break the back of Cannon’s stranglehold on the House, giving Norris a starring role as an insurgent progressive who was willing and able to challenge the powers of his own political party to advance his agenda and defend his values. In hindsight, this would not be the last time that hydropower elicited Norris to revolt.

After his successful transition to the U.S. Senate in the 1912 elections, Norris decided, once again, to buck the GOP in support of Pinchot. In Pennsylvania’s 1914 U.S. Senate race, Norris travelled to the state and campaigned for Pinchot against the sitting Republican, Senator Boies Penrose. Interviewed by The New York Times a few weeks before the election, Norris remarked, “As a Republican Senator I consider it a duty to my conscience, to decent citizenship, and populist government to oppose with all my power the re-election of Penrose.” Although Pinchot failed to defeat Penrose, Norris returned to Washington, D.C. and began developing his position on natural resources. He became a vigorous supporter of the Raker Act of 1913 to allow San Francisco to create a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, and a spirited opponent of the private corporations which sought to “protect” the Valley from reservoir development so they could inhibit public control.

Beyond the sphere of progressive domestic policy, Norris achieved fame and infamy for his positions on the rising tensions with Germany. A first-term member of the U.S. Senate, he garnered harsh criticism for his unyielding opposition to American involvement in the First World War. For example, he went on to vote against the declaration of war in April
Additionally, feeling that his ensuing actions incited his constituents, Norris proposed a special recall election in March 1917 so the people could reassess their support for him after he torpedoed an armed ship bill in the Senate through a filibuster. The state committee denied his request for a recall, sparing him the public’s wrath. Norris, despite negative prognostications from journalists and political pundits, fared well in the Republican primary the next year and secured a victory in the 1918 general election against Governor John H. Morehead.

Overall, Norris’ first term in the U.S. Senate was eventful. His ardor for progressive causes and occasional self-righteousness were emblematic of the maverick career he would continue for the next three decades. Senator Norris came to be a standard-bearer for a distinctly populist, radical progressive civil religion, a new national faith that placed great confidence in the government’s ability to solve the ills of mankind. Historian William Leuchtenburg described the progressive belief structure as relying on the “Hamiltonian concept of positive government” where actions were judged by “results achieved” rather than “means employed.” Focusing on American foreign policy, Leuchtenburg linked progressivism to imperialism. Although he was certainly a hardline progressive, Norris was no imperialist. His international viewpoint evoked William Jennings Bryan rather than Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson.

Norris’ introspective progressive civil religion foreshadowed the spirit of the 1930s. For him, the United States could afford little of the burdens of colonial investment when its own citizens cried out for relief. During his career, he did not just advocate for progressivism—labor rights, agricultural aid, and more direct democracy—he lived a progressive life of action seeking to solve problems through political means. His eternal focus was on the promotion of the national welfare, often through his preferred policy bailiwick of agricultural and infrastructural policies. Cautious of foreign entanglements and disconnected from the progressive elites of the coasts,
Norris united a robust faith in domestic progressivism with agrarian populism. Although he had supported Wilson’s liberal domestic policies, Norris’ strident opposition to the First World War defined his dichotomous civil religion—staunch domestic progressivism and national introversion. Fundamentally, Norris sought the transformation of the regulatory liberal state to an activist national government. He sought to turn pen strokes into shovel-ready projects. He felt that the government must do what private industry did not do—provide for the people. Norris’ determination was unwavering despite consistent political setbacks, partially the result of his stubbornness. The Classical Liberal zeitgeist of the 1920s ensured that he was Norris, the Republican renegade. The progressive revolution of the 1930s, the New Deal, put him on the front lines to build what he believed in—the TVA.

FORD VERSUS NORRIS

On July 8, 1921, George W. Norris’ campaign for the TVA began. With the federal funding drought stunting the Muscle Shoals project, auto magnate Henry Ford submitted a proposal to acquire the nitrate plant and dam system through a deal in which his company would operate the facility. This offer included a one hundred year “lease on the Wilson Dam, the No. 3 dam and electric installation, when complete.”28 For southerners, the Ford proposal appeared ideal. The project would be completed and Ford would industrialize the Tennessee Valley, supposedly bringing with him the high-paying manufacturing jobs that had provided for thousands of families throughout the Midwest. Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce in President Warren G. Harding’s administration, voiced his support and admitted that “whatever may be the result, Mr. Ford’s offer does prove what the public associations [of the region] have contended, that the completion of the project has a commercial value.”29 The offer, however, required congressional action for approval first.
The Age of Infrastructure

As the nitrate plant fell within the purview of agricultural management, the Ford deal bill, S.3420, was sent to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Its chairman was Senator George W. Norris. The Ford offer and the Muscle Shoals issue became the subjects of a lengthy series of hearings in the Committee throughout 1922. The bill’s consideration was complicated by the presence of competing business interests which sought to take Muscle Shoals for themselves. Furthermore, the ambiguous contractual language in the bill obfuscated its potential ramifications. This led to a series of complicated discussions peppered with civil engineering technicalities. Norris, however, came prepared.

The testimony from the committee hearings on the bill reveals the strong support from a number of influential southerners for the proposed deal, especially the Alabama delegation. It also illustrates Norris’ position on the appropriate role for private corporations and moneyed interests in the production of nitrates and, more importantly, electricity. Hearings began on February 16, 1922, when a delegation from Tennessee led by Governor Alf Taylor arrived to testify. Taylor, highly supportive of the Ford offer, commenced his address to the Committee with the following statement, in which he cited renown inventor Thomas Edison:

[Edison] said in my presence that it was impossible to conceive the immensity of the power that could be produced by that plant when completed, and that the benefits to be derived to the country at large were also inconceivable, and that Henry Ford was the man to take hold and operate it when it was completed, because he was an honest man, and a man of splendid judgment, and a man who had succeeded, and a man who had the money.

Curiously, Taylor’s speech continued with a broad appeal against sectionalism and particularism. Perhaps aware of the geographic
diversity of the sixteen committee members and knowing that the economic benefit of the development would be concentrated in the northern Alabama area, only relevant to Senators Pat Harrison (D-MS) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-AL), Taylor adopted a nationwide tone, remarking that “what is good for one section of this Union is good for every section.” The memories of the Civil War were still fresh in the minds of many. Taylor understood that to promote regional infrastructural development, a national justification had to be made. When Norris attempted to advance his own legislation, he would take this lesson to heart.

Later that day, the Committee heard from Robert Campbell, a business organizer from Johnson City, Tennessee. Attempting to elucidate the motivation for Ford’s interest in the project and the bill’s ambiguous language concerning the requirement to actually produce nitrates, the Committee pressed Mr. Campbell on what he considered to be the industrialist’s intentions. Campbell, scrambling for answers, stated, “Mr. Ford’s ambitions can not [sic] any longer demand money. He must want to... build a monument.” Unsatisfied, the Committee members asked Campbell whether, under the proposed statute, Ford would be barred from transitioning to a more profitable industry as profits from fertilizer production were capped at eight percent. Campbell responded, “I trust Mr. Ford... You have to trust somebody.” Senator John W. Harreld (R-OK), suspicious of Ford’s motives, noted that the project was not “altruism.” Norris, who in June of the previous year had proposed the creation of a “Federal Farmer’s Export Financing Corporation” to buy crops from farmers for international resale, agreed with Harreld’s sentiments. It would later become clear that in those cases where a key national interest was concerned, Norris would prefer to inject altruism through the government rather than entrusting a private citizen, such as Henry Ford, to do so instead.

After a brief hiatus, the hearings resumed on April 10, 1922. Once again, the witness, this time Senator Underwood from Alabama, argued that Ford was pursuing the deal for
altruistic reasons. Underwood, who had a clear and compelling interest in facilitating the industrialization of the Muscle Shoals area through Ford’s proposal, opined with saccharine hyperbole. After lambasting opponents of the deal, Underwood orated that “[Ford] is prepared to do a great patriotic act for the people of the United States by limiting the amount of his profits and producing fertilizer for them as cheaply as possible.”

When the President of the Alabama Power Company, Thomas W. Martin, came to testify on April 11 and April 18, Chairman Norris asked why Alabama power customers faced such high prices and massive discrepancies in kilowatt prices. Norris noted that “there is something wrong if [Alabama municipalities] pay you for their electricity less than a cent and sell it to their people for 12 cents.” Martin provided a series of evasive answers, to which Norris provided the counterexample of the low prices enjoyed by electricity customers in Ontario, Canada, where the government ran the power system. Ontario Hydro, which relied on extensive hydroelectric installations along the Niagara River, would become a model for Norris as he conducted independent research on the viability of a government-run power generation and distribution corporation.

By May 1, Norris’ patience for Fordists and corporate envoys was wearing thin. William B. Mayo, Chief Engineer of the Ford Motor Company, arrived to testify before the Committee. Norris, unsatisfied with the ambiguity of answers on Ford’s ultimate intentions for the plant and dams, was concerned that the industrialist would exploit the contract’s loopholes to dupe the government. After an endless series of inane prevarications from Mayo, Norris’ tolerance expired and he interjected, “I have been wondering, Mr. Mayo, why is it that, representing Mr. Ford, you are not willing to take the committee and the Congress into your full confidence and let them know just exactly what you expect to do with this power if you get it.” Norris continued with his critical rhetoric against private, corporate infrastructure improvements. The ongoing testimonials failed to allay his
fears that once Henry Ford died, the company would repurpose the nitrate facility. Questioning the chairman of the Tennessee River Improvement Association Executive Committee, J.W. Worthington, Norris expressed his irritation that businessmen expected the government to grant Ford a carte blanche and trust that his motives aligned with the public interest. Norris remarked, “But [Ford] is not the only man in the country that is good, although he may be one of the best of them.”

Considering Muscle Shoals a matter of national importance, Norris sparred with Worthington, alleging that it was the government’s role to protect the people from Ford. Worthington shot back at the Chairman, quipping, “The people of this country don’t want to be saved.” With that incendiary remark, Worthington touched upon a major component of Norris’ progressive American civil religion. Norris believed that the people needed protection from the profit-driven capitalist class, including Henry Ford, who would use any opportunity to price, gouge, profiteer, or pilfer. To that end, Norris maintained a conviction that it was the government’s role to intervene or preempt to safeguard the public welfare. Conservatives would probably have agreed with Worthington, portraying Norris as self-righteous. But the exchange with Worthington revealed the Nebraska Senator’s faith that Norris knew what the people needed even if they did not, for he knew how to protect them from the dangers of antidemocratic capitalist elites, and he knew that government must be the shield. These convictions undergirded Norris’ political philosophy.

A *New York Times* article from May 10, 1922, captured Norris’ opposition to the Ford deal. Norris remarked that he would permit “no corporation” to take over the Muscle Shoals properties and felt that the bill included an “unconscionable contract.” Agreeing with a statement from the Merchant’s Association on a prior Ford offer to the Secretary of War, Norris believed that a deal with a corporation on Muscle Shoals would represent a major loss for the government.
May 6, Norris once again lost his temper in an interaction with a business representative from the Air Nitrates Corporation. Expressing similar sentiments to his comments in April, Norris remarked:

You haven’t any assurance that this corporation will benefit the people one iota, and you cannot demonstrate it or show it, and that is where the curse comes in. It will be just like any other corporation. It will be owned by somebody else and will be manipulated just the same as the International Harvester Co. has been manipulated and is being manipulated right now, and the farmer will not be helped any.\footnote{49}

With a keen interest in the benefits of hydropower and cheap fertilizer for American farmers, Norris saw Muscle Shoals as an opportunity to replenish the ruined soils of the impoverished Tennessee Valley and to give the people access to affordable electricity. Residents and business interests in the region were eager for the government to complete the dam project for energy generation and navigation purposes. However, the cagy testimony of the parade of corporate officials and the weakness of the government position in S.3420 convinced Norris that it must be Washington, D.C., not Wall Street, to assume leadership at Muscle Shoals. Therefore, Norris launched his own effort, proposing a government-controlled corporation.

Throughout the hearings, Norris blamed pro-Ford propaganda for the strong public support for the bill’s passage. Norris’ opposition to the Ford proposal earned him many enemies throughout the South, where he was burned in effigy for halting development along the Tennessee River.\footnote{50} Senators Charles McNary (R-OR) and Norris clashed with their Democratic colleagues, Alabamians Heflin and Underwood, in a continuous war of words.\footnote{51} The tensions did not abate during the following years. Heflin called Norris’ 1924 Muscle Shoals
Residents of the region were furious with Norris. However, the Teapot Dome Scandal galvanized public outrage at the apparent collusion of government and private companies to ravage national natural resources. On July 15, 1922, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry rejected the Ford proposal by a vote of nine to seven. The Committee also halted Norris’ government-controlled proposal by a vote of nine to five. Both proposals later went to the Senate floor as minority reports.

Throughout the entirety of the Muscle Shoals debate, Norris couched his arguments and opinions in his progressive civil religious attitude. Once, he remarked that government was a “religion that does not consider the conditions which exist beyond the grave but confines its consideration to happiness in this life.” For Norris, the problem with corporate leadership in matters of national interest returned to the initial point established by Senator Harreld: altruism. The Nebraskan Senator held a deep suspicion of business motives, as shown by his intense interrogation of corporate witnesses, and believed, rightfully or not, that any “damn corporation” would exploit the government and the people in the pursuit of profit, regardless of the consequences.

After the hearings and aware of the economic situation facing the region, Norris envisioned a vanguard role for the government in the Tennessee Valley. The 1920s would be marked by his repeated attempts to push his legislative proposals, the forerunners to the TVA, through Congress and into law. Always a renegade, Norris would take on the succession of presidents of his own political party to realize this vision.

THE REPUBLICAN REBEL

In June 1925, George F. Milton, a reporter for The Independent, described the Tennessee Valley as “the Ruhr of America,” an allusion to the heartland of German industrial
strength. However, unlike its German counterpart, the Tennessee Valley languished in poverty and underdevelopment. Also, unlike the Ruhr, the Tennessee Valley, which Milton projected to be “the very heart of industrial America,” still had not resolved the political impediments to its economic salvation. The Wilson Dam in Muscle Shoals was completed that year, but the hydroelectric, fertilizer, and progressive (Norris) interests had opposing views on what to do with its electricity. As Milton attests, the people understood that “the Tennessee River is rightly a national institution,” and Norris thought that national institutions should be controlled by their owners, the citizens of the United States.

Throughout the 1920s, Norris waged a successful legislative war of attrition against conservative adversaries to gain public control of Muscle Shoals. Not only did Norris fight for a comprehensive, government-led effort, but he also campaigned to derail Senator Underwood’s attempts to pass legislation that merely focused on fertilizer production. Furthermore, in December 1924, Norris denounced President Calvin Coolidge’s alleged attempt to cede Muscle Shoals to the “water power trust.” He argued that the President’s intent was to deliver to Wall Street “a concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome [Scandal] look like a pinhead.” In doing so though, Norris’ attacks spawned strange political bedfellows as Underwood the Southern Democrat allied with Coolidge the Massachusetts Republican against Norris the progressive Nebraska Republican. For Norris, party loyalty meant nothing compared to the national imperative of economic development at Muscle Shoals. Also, to Coolidge’s chagrin, Norris had backed independent Robert “Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr. over Coolidge in the presidential election of 1924, which surely did not endear the Senator to the new President. Underwood subsequently defended Coolidge and branded Norris as a “Populist” demagogue. Although they were defeated, Coolidge and Underwood would exact vengeance when Norris’ own proposals reached the Senate floor soon afterward.
Norris introduced a proto-TVA bill, S.J. Res. 2147, in January 1926, but it died in committee. However, in December 1927, Norris’ succeeding bill, S.J. Res. 46 or the “Morin-Norris resolution,” which provided “for the completion of Dam. No. 2 at Muscle Shoals and the steam plant at Nitrate Plant No. 2,” was passed by Congress. In a scathing attack, The Washington Post labeled the Morin-Norris bill as “communism, pure and simple” and “essentially un-American.” Unsurprisingly, Coolidge exercised a pocket veto to kill the legislation in June 1928. In response, Norris launched a furious assault against Coolidge, threatening to break up the Republican Party and organize a third-party Farmer-Progressive ticket to challenge the Republican establishment in the year’s general election. This proved the depth of Norris’ devotion to pro-farmer, progressive policies. Not only did he animadvert the President as a stooge of the “power trust,” but he also discussed a full-scale rebellion against his own political party’s administration and the party leadership itself. Were Norris a marginalized radical, these actions may have seemed less unusual. However, he enjoyed respect and legislative support throughout Congress, which made his defiance all the more exceptional. For Norris, the call of his civil faith was too strong to bow to Coolidge, or to any non-progressive president.

In 1928, Norris broke party ranks again and endorsed New York Democratic Governor Al Smith for the presidency. Although Smith’s “wet,” Catholic background proved unpopular with Nebraskans, Norris believed that the Governor’s compassion for the common people warranted his support over the free marketeering Republican challenger, Secretary Herbert Hoover. However, Hoover’s victory ensured another unfriendly conservative White House for Norris. With the new president assuming office in May 1929 though, Norris tried to gain support for his government-control effort again with a new legislative bill, S.J. Res. 49. Indeed, the people of the Tennessee Valley had grown tired of the government’s vacillation on the Muscle Shoals project. As Congress turned the dam and nitrate system
into a political football, the farmers and businessmen of the
region wished for some form of action. Even the “communist”
government-operated proposal floated by Norris, therefore, was
gaining traction.

Reporting on the situation in the Deep South from
Florence, Alabama, journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote,
“Inoculation against the idea of ‘government in business’ goes
far and deep, particularly in regions like [the Tennessee Valley],
where government does not fulfill even the humblest citizen’s
ideal of efficiency or honesty.”68 As the woe of the Great
Depression deepened, the people of the Tennessee Valley looked
to Washington, D.C. for a “second reconstruction.” Recording
the local reaction to the new legislation, McCormick observed,
“A few days after the second passage of the Norris resolution
declaring that Muscle Shoals shall be owned and operated by
the government, the valley is once more stirred by the hope
of action as by a fresh wind from the north.”69 With broad
legislative support, Norris’ bill passed Congress and headed
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Hoover’s desk.70

Like his Republican predecessor, President Hoover,
standing adamant against federal control, vetoed the bill. The
President commented that opposition to Norris’ agenda
“appears to be cause for denunciation as being in league with
the power companies.”71 A few days prior, Norris had alleged
that the power trust sought to manipulate the U.S. government
and appropriate her resources, hinting that Hoover was caught
in its corporate enchantment. Lambasting the utilities, Norris
stated, “What is the raw material of this monopoly? It is the
rivers and the brooks that flow from the mountains to the sea.
Is it not true that the people own these natural resources?”72
Not only did Norris believe that the power trust exerted undue
monopolistic influence, but he also felt that it could coerce the
media to do its bidding. When asked for a comparative example
of a private versus public system, Norris usually referred to
the Canadian public versus American private prices along the
Niagara River. However, analyzing Ontario Hydro, journalist Thomas Woodlock of *The Wall Street Journal* excoriated public-operated power in a November 1930 article alleging that private plants were more economical than public ones.\(^7^3\) The ferocity of journalistic opposition to government-led Tennessee Valley proposals tended to lend some credence to the Senator’s statements that corporate power interests were colluding with the media to halt public expansions.

Hoover’s veto infuriated Southern Democrats and Midwestern Progressives who stood against the pro-Hoover Northeastern Republicans. The Senate attempted an override, but fell six votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to do so with forty-nine votes for and thirty-four votes against.\(^7^4\) Authoring a long, detailed explanation for his veto, Hoover suggested that Alabama and Tennessee could collaborate to develop the Tennessee Valley. He did, however, voice support for the construction of the Cove Creek (later Norris) Dam on the Clinch River for flood regulation.\(^7^5\) Hoover felt that he needed
to delineate between the appropriate realms of government and private operations. In his justification, the President remarked, “I hesitate to contemplate the future of our institutions, of our government and of our country if the preoccupation of its officials is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal opportunity, but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That is not liberalism, it is degeneration.”

Though businessmen and conservatives viewed Norris’ Muscle Shoals proposals as “degeneration,” the winds of political change were blowing across the United States. The serious economic crisis was plunging millions into poverty. In particular, the rural poor faced the brunt of the Great Depression, a calamity widely pinned to the excessive greed and speculation of Wall Street financiers. As demands for government assistance increased, allegations of socialistic planning decreased. Furthermore, the need for basic necessities, which increasingly included the provision of electricity, aligned with the progressive ethos that in matters of national interest, the moral imperative of the ends justified the unilateralism of the means. Seeing it as a modern necessity, Norris viewed electricity as “the breath of life of the machine age” and “essential to human activity.” Economic Liberals such as Hoover, Coolidge, and later, Wendell Willkie saw electric power as a force of progress, granted to the country through the vibrancy of American capitalism and competition. Norris saw power as tantamount to a civil right.

PROGRESSIVISM EMPOWERED

Fresh off his victory over President Herbert Hoover in the presidential election of 1932, President-Elect Franklin D. Roosevelt travelled to Alabama in January 1933 to tour Muscle Shoals. He delivered an informal speech on January 21 in Montgomery to a crowd that included the Governor of Alabama. Roosevelt fused reverence for Alabama’s past with his progressive vision for the country. His message was clear. Standing in the
“birthplace of the Confederacy,” Roosevelt outlined a bold future for the stagnating, suffering South, painting a future of “better opportunities and better places for living for millions” of people through “planning.”

As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver a furious volley of ambitious New Deal legislation in the spring of 1933 after his inauguration, Norris worked to bring his dream to fruition. Collaborating with Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) in the House of Representatives, Norris developed S.J. 1272, known as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933. According to S.J. 1272, the TVA was to be governed by a board of commissioners selected by presidential appointment. In addition to ordering the operation of experimental plants and laboratories for fertilizer production, the bill authorized the TVA to “produce, distribute, and sell electric power.”

A New York Times article on the bill captured the novelty and revolutionary nature of the TVA proposal:

The 1933 edition of the Norris bill for the development of Muscle Shoals follows the original model, with the TVA tacked on. Cheap fertilizer for the farmer, cheap light and power for the housewife. They are to be sought by putting government, directly, into the fertilizer and utility business, on almost a cosmic scale. The power plants are to be made a weapon in the war on the ‘Power Trust.’

Norris, who had faced recalcitrant Republican opposition during the 1920s, only received support from Roosevelt, whom Norris had supported in the presidential election of 1932. In April and May 1933, President Roosevelt worked to speed the TVA bill to passage. In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt spoke in the language of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure, calling for the “return to the spirit and vision of the pioneer” through government “planning.” He preached that it was time
for the United States to create “a corporation clothed with the power of Government...for the general social and economic welfare of the Nation.”

Where there was no hope, government would provide. Where there was no altruism, government would provide. The message from Roosevelt to an audience of millions of unemployed workers and tenant farmers, therefore, evoked the message that the government was there and ready to provide for and safeguard its constituents.

On May 4, 1933, the TVA bill passed for the seventh and final time with a massive congressional majority. The House versions were less aggressive than Norris’ proposal, giving more room for government partnerships with private firms. The Nebraskan’s bill envisioned a TVA vertically integrated to master the river, derive electricity from dams, and then electrify the countryside. As usual, Norris garnered more Democratic than Republican support for his agenda. His image transformed as he brought his legislative power to bear for the President. Roosevelt needed a torchbearer in the Senate and Norris was a true believer in the New Deal. For Norris, the Roosevelt revolution was an opportunity to restore the power of the people and democratize the progress that conservatives and big businesses thought must come from free enterprise. The TVA was a landmark change. While progressives had sought to regulate corporate greed and bust trusts for decades, progressive government would now replace business in the pursuit of national progress. Thus, Norris the “son of the wild jackass” was now Norris the New Dealer.

Not all citizens and politicians shared the President’s enthusiasm for the TVA or for the unprecedented breadth of Norris’ proposal. An article in The New York Times from April 1933 warned that the TVA should seek to develop the region in conjunction with existing private utilities. Concerned Norris’ proposal was too radical, the article suggested that the House versions provided a more reasonable compromise and consideration of the various interests with stakes in the Tennessee Valley business:
If the Government is to embark on this venture at all, it is earnestly to be hoped that these saving clauses [from the House] will be retained in the bill, and an opportunity thus afforded the new Tennessee Valley Authority to work out its grandiose plans in cooperation with the utilities, rather than in cutthroat competition with them. 85

Despite the article’s hope for “cooperation,” however, the relationship between the TVA and the private utilities would be defined by “cutthroat competition.” In fact, the seriousness of the competition dragged the TVA’s attention from dam-building to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the TVA’s mandate expanded, either through statute, precedent, or unilateral decision-making, the private utilities’ propensity and ability to cooperate diminished, souring and hardening into indignant animosity. Fighting the full force of the Roosevelt administration would prove a herculean feat, but as soon as the TVA started to act, opposition coalesced. Nevertheless, on June 16, 1933, less than a month after President Roosevelt signed the compromise bill, the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated operations. The federal government was officially in the power business. 86

THE TRIUMPH OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Norris’ crusade to create the TVA was the signature campaign of the progressive civil religion of the 1930s. Distrustful of corporations, skeptical of state cooperation, and concerned for many of the impoverished farmers of rural Tennessee and Alabama, the Nebraska Senator laced his statements and speeches with the language of progressivism. It was the faith of the Age of Infrastructure. No longer content to check the excesses and injustices of the free market, Norris and his colleagues let government lead the way through planning.
The spirit of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure went beyond the legislative birth of the TVA and Norris’ determined efforts—it permeated the form and function of the TVA as it reengineered southern Appalachia.

President Roosevelt appointed a three-man Board of Directors—David Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan, and Harcourt Morgan—to manage the TVA and oversee its ambitious agenda. The TVA’s plans for the region were bold. By the fall of 1944, nine main river dams were completed and generated electricity along the course of the Tennessee River from Fort Loudoun Dam to Kentucky Dam, 628 miles downstream. Incorporating the two existing dams on the Tennessee River, Wilson and Hales Bar, the TVA built the remainder of the main river dams as well as a number of fossil fuel power plants, a plethora of bridges, and numerous smaller electricity-generating and storage dams along the river’s tributaries. The TVA tamed the river through the creation of massive reservoirs covering thousands of acres and enabled navigation from Knoxville to the Gulf of Mexico. Norris Dam, renamed in honor of the Senator, dammed the Clinch River, a tributary of the Tennessee River northeast of Knoxville. Formerly known as the Cove Creek Dam, the Norris Dam was the first line of defense against damaging floods which devastated the Tennessee Valley, the Ohio Valley, and down to the Mississippi River. Apart from local destruction, frequent flooding degraded the already-depleted soil of the Tennessee Valley.

Part of the TVA’s Norris Dam project included the construction of a local settlement, also called Norris. The village, a master-planned community, included communal amenities and modern conveniences. Unlike many works camps of the Great Depression, Norris was designed as a permanent community—the TVA’s model community. Even religious life was reformulated as a modern, ecumenical civil exercise. For example, the secular public school was the designated place of worship for the inhabitants of the village. While the village’s small size and rural
milieu influenced the lack of appropriate facilities, the image of a unified community engaging in a religious exercise fell in-line with the vision of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure. Individual impediments to unity were to be overcome. Every prayer was a civil communion, and every concrete pour was alms for a needy nation. This civil ecumenicalism produced strident critics in the 1930s South. For example, responding to TVA regulations on church construction, a local southern governor admitted that he did not appreciate Norris’ progressive ecumenicalism, identifying such practices with “communism.”

But the TVA did not build a “godless town” in Norris, Tennessee; it built a new universal devotion—the religion of communitarian progress in which all citizens could share material salvation on Earth. In his autobiography, Senator Norris admitted, “religious prejudice is the most deeply imbued prejudice that exists in the human heart.” Thus, the TVA brought the totality of life within the public sphere, engineering egalitarianism through the progressive civil religion of infrastructure.

Much of the TVA’s physical infrastructure also embodied the progressive civil religious ideals of a perfectible society. To link Knoxville to the dam and the village, the TVA built a parkway praised by national critics for its fusion of natural beauty with functionality. Under the TVA, a public work was more than a mere concrete highway or a hydroelectric dam. Aesthetic quality and permanence were key features, designed to maximize the experience and welfare of the people. In every dam’s control room, the words “Built for the People of the United States” were emblazoned in steely letters for all to see. Progressives of the past had sought to cordon off expanses of American wilderness from negative human interference—conserving in the face of capitalist progress. Progressives of the Age of Infrastructure, however, sought to modify the world to suit their design for the people—engineering the alternative to capitalist progress. The architectural style of the dams and other TVA facilities epitomized the forceful modernity that accompanied
this governing philosophy. A mixture of brutalism, elegance, and industrial might defined the TVA dams along the Tennessee River and its tributaries. Art deco motifs graced turbine halls and bold lines defined the concrete hulks slicing into the verdant hills of East Tennessee.

The TVA’s quantitative contributions were as impressive as its buildings. By 1938, the TVA employed 13,000 men and women. By 1941, before the completion of the last several dams, the TVA had 2,000,000 kilowatts of capacity and it had carved out a 650-mile navigation channel along the sinuous Tennessee River. Scholars estimated that by the end of 1943, nearly $722 million government dollars had been invested in navigation, flood control, and power projects for the TVA, amounting to an enormous sum. Millions of southerners drew cheap power from the TVA grid through municipal and community local distributors. Thousands more enjoyed the parks, lakes, and recreational facilities built by the TVA along the winding course of the river. The TVA was more than a development agency. It became the engine for the “arsenal of democracy.”

At one point during the Second World War, the TVA employed 42,000 workers. Its dams provided the energy for aluminum production, vital for the United States’ air forces. It also supplied power to a mysterious government project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Manhattan Project engineers harnessed the TVA’s vast electrical resources to enrich uranium for the United States’ first atomic weapons. The United States government used its investment in the TVA, along with its hydroelectric projects along the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest, to beat ploughshares into swords and defeat fascism. Writing in 1958, author John Kyle reflected on the successes of the TVA’s new society. Describing its developmental achievements and international fame, Kyle explained, “To many people the world over, the Tennessee Valley Authority represents the highest achievement of American democracy.”
The Age of Infrastructure

Propaganda Poster from the Second World War
Flaunting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Tennessee Valley Authority
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN TURMOIL

The TVA’s flurry of construction did not sate Norris’ appetite for progressive development. He set his sights on larger quarry: the Mississippi River Valley. In December 1935, Norris, extrapolating from a former plan for a “Missouri Valley Authority,” sought to cover half the country under the aegis of a gargantuan government corporation. By 1937, his dreams were even more expansive. Delivering a statement at the White House Executive Office, Norris declared that “he was planning to introduce a bill authorizing creation of an agency to build throughout the country a system of flood control and power plants similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.” Unfortunately for Senator Norris though, his bill and his dream of a national TVA-esque agency died in the Senate. Still, this disappointment would prove the least of his worries. The enemies of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure were coalescing.

Throughout the 1930s, private system after private system sold out to the local municipalities and to the TVA—for example, Tennessee Public Service Co., Tennessee Light & Power Co., West Tennessee Power & Light Co., and Tennessee Electric Power Co. all sold off operations to the TVA. While these acquisitions expanded the TVA’s ability to reach underserved populations, its imperious behavior provoked intense backlash from utility companies. The adoption of the TVA model in other states was also faltering. Plans for a New York TVA-esque agency along the St. Lawrence River were derailed by inadequate funding measures and lack of congressional support. Meanwhile, Norris’ former secretary and Comptroller General J.R. McCarl had “sharply questioned some of [the] TVA’s purchasing methods.” On the defensive, therefore, the Nebraska Senator played his favorite political card by accusing McCarl of allegiances to the “power-trust.”

Norris, responding to these problems and other constant challenges to the TVA’s rather limited statutory authority,
The Age of Infrastructure

proposed a bill to grant the TVA the explicit prerogative to “buy up private power facilities for resale to communities wanting a public power source.” His legislation also sought to double the TVA’s bond issuing capacity. The TVA leadership attempted to secure this statutory authorization for an expansion to TVA powers in the spring of 1935. But, to its frustration, the TVA Board found the House Military Affairs Committee, the committee overseeing the TVA, to be less than compliant with their wishes. The Committee tabled the House version of Norris’ bill, supported by original TVA sponsor and committee chairman John Jackson McSwain (D-SC).

As the dams rose on the Tennessee River, the nation’s attention and criticism turned to the TVA. In 1936, however, 120,000 high school debate students answered the question: “Resolved, that all electric utilities should be governmentally owned.” Herbert Corey, the journalist covering the event, made no secret of his position on that matter, although he wrapped his bias in a thin veil of manufactured impartiality: “public ownership as a policy has failed in the Americas. It might be a necessity in the backward European countries where the people have lacked the intelligence and the enterprise on which industrial advancement is based.” The rampant bias on both sides of the TVA issue reflected how deeply ingrained the public versus private power ownership issue was in the American political consciousness of the 1930s.

Businessmen involved in the coal business were also concerned by the TVAs’s activities. Senator Norris, unreserved in his criticism of capitalist complaints, unleashed his usual indictments that businessmen were interfering in the national pilgrimage to public power. During the original struggle for the TVAs’s passage, John L. Lewis, a coal executive, became one of Norris’ targets. The Senator alleged, “Mr. Lewis’ attitude simply demonstrated that any man who stands in the way of human progress and seeks to prevent the use of technological improvements is standing in his own way and blocking his
own progress.” Norris did not elaborate on who was granted the power to define “human progress.” Throughout the Age of Infrastructure, Norris and his compatriots were completely convinced that their opinions were irreproachably correct and moral. Then, they married this unwavering confidence with technocratic implementation. Victory, not compromise, was the goal. Understandably, this recalcitrant orthodoxy generated problems. The opposition to the TVA was not limited to errant journalists soapboxing through public interest pieces or corporate representatives. A serious and determined resistance to the TVA’s encroachment emerged. Nevertheless, one of the TVA’s greatest challenges was endogenous. Something was rotten in Knoxville.

The TVA’s triumvirate leadership began to disintegrate. The problems had begun shortly after the foundation of the TVA in 1933, though it took several years for the severity of the dissention to permeate the public sphere. Chairman Arthur Morgan clashed with his fellow board members David Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan over significant executive decisions. What had been a private struggle, especially between Chairman Morgan and Lilienthal, devolved into a public rhetorical brawl when Chairman Morgan levied indictments of mismanagement and negligence against Lilienthal. For example, Chairman Morgan accused Lilienthal of mishandling the negotiations with Alcoa over the Fontana Dam in North Carolina. Still, this was only one case in a succession of outlandish accusations in which Chairman Morgan publically directed towards Lilienthal. After the Chairman interfered unreasonably in another spat known as the Berry marble issue, Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan wrote to President Roosevelt requesting that Arthur Morgan resign. However, Roosevelt, the only significant check on the Chairman’s power, did nothing.

Eventually, Arthur Morgan forced the President’s hand. After demanding a congressional investigation into the activities of the other board members and suspicious TVA actions, Roosevelt sacked Chairman Morgan in March 1938.
The defamations continued during the subsequent investigation. Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan alleged that Arthur Morgan had tried to “sabotage” the TVA as an agent of the power trust. Arthur Morgan shot back, making a series of charges including “mismanagement of the power program, conspiracy, and subservience to…special interests.” Throughout the summer of 1938, Lilienthal parried attacks from Arthur Morgan and the press, referring to the Chairman as “reckless, unreliable, and erratic.”

The “TVA Scandal” wrought havoc, distracting from the completion of TVA priorities and fueling the agency’s critics. Arthur Morgan launched a messy lawsuit only to be defeated in the courts, further sullying his already-tainted image. Although the scandal abated, the series of events tarnished the TVA’s administrative record. Confidence in the governance of appointed experts, thought to be immune to the petty politicking of Congress and the underhanded tactics of the business elites, was shaken. The Morgan crisis reminded Norris and the radical New Dealers of an unpleasant reality. Many men, not just Henry Ford, were driven by avarice and a lust for the aggregation of power. Business, especially in the unregulated 1920s, was bluntly motivated by profit, much to Norris’ disgust. However, despite what Norris would have liked to have thought, government was no monolith of unending altruism. It, like business, was composed of men who sought to exercise a vision and the means to power.

The strife between Arthur Morgan and his two comrades illustrated how personal and petty concerns could derail the holy project of the TVA. As the agency made great strides in raising dams along the rivers and stringing transmission lines along country roads, the TVA was bogged down in politics and hearings, eventually necessitating intervention from the President. Norris had handed the Board an immense amount of institutional power backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. The Morgan crisis proved that although the TVA
could reshape the countryside to suit man’s desires, it could not, even with its noble mandate, reshape those desires. It also demonstrated that the TVA, with its unusually long nine-year appointments for Board members, was as corruptible as any other government institution.

**WENDELL WILLKIE’S WAR**

Chairman Arthur Morgan, though troublesome, was not the greatest foe the TVA faced during the 1930s. The TVA’s rapid expansion had generated enemies, and the power utilities grew increasingly concerned, especially as Norris proposed ever-bolder plans for a nationwide TVA-esque agency that would replace private power corporations. Throughout its early years, the TVA interacted with Commonwealth & Southern Corporation (C&S), a major U.S. utility holding company, and its dynamic, articulate president, Wendell Willkie. Concerned by government’s entry into the electricity market, Willkie proved more than a match for Lilienthal in Knoxville and Norris in Washington, D.C. as they fought over the future of energy in the United States. Willkie challenged the fullest expression of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure, seeking to check the excesses of the New Deal to preserve the competitive system that he and others felt was so central to the United States’ economic success and culture of individual liberty.

In modern times, Wendell Willkie is best remembered as the Republican challenger to Roosevelt in the presidential election of 1940. That election was notable because Roosevelt broke with the Washingtonian tradition and marched towards an unprecedented third term in office with a healthy lead in votes. However, Willkie was no stooge of the Republican establishment, nor was he a conservative purist. He was a dynamic, eloquent candidate and the most potent foe of the TVA. Willkie was no politician either; he was hardly even a Republican, having been a Democrat until 1939. He was a business executive, trained as an
attorney, and eminently successful at his work. Promoted from counsel to president of the influential C&S in 1933, Willkie was positioned to take control of the company just as the TVA began organizing. More specifically, Willkie assumed authority when the TVA was poised to develop electricity systems in a region where the C&S already had a significant subsidiary presence.

Ironically, Willkie, a registered Democrat at the time and a regular attendee of national party conventions, became the champion of the anti-TVA movement. He stood against a Republican, Senator Norris, who stridently backed every New Deal proposal and fought for the TVA on every occasion. Norris’ progressive faith, which previously had confounded partisanship, and Willkie’s defense of economic liberty, made for strange alliances. Over the course of the 1930s, Willkie would force Norris to shield the TVA, at the public podium and in the Capitol. The Nebraskan had fought for more than decade to tame the Tennessee River for the people of the United States. Now, he would have to fight to keep it.
The TVA entered negotiations with C&S in 1933 to discuss a *modus vivendi*. In January 1934, C&S and the TVA reached a settlement in which the TVA agreed not to enter certain areas nor take C&S customers until a few months after the completion of the Norris Dam. Much to the consternation of C&S, the TVA immediately sped up construction of the dam. Meanwhile, the TVA also strung transmission lines around cities currently served by utility companies and offered economic incentives for those municipalities to switch service to TVA power.\(^{112}\) Willkie strongly opposed the double standards which he felt were applied to the TVA. He argued that if the TVA was subjected to the same “requirements binding private utilities,” it could not survive in the marketplace. Beyond general complaints of unfairness, Willkie’s primary concern was the TVA’s creeping mandate. Congress tried to set limits on the scope of its powers in the 1935 bills through amendments in the appropriations package. However, the New Deal legislators had intervened, stripping out provisions that would have required audits, prohibited the sale of surplus power under cost, and prevented the duplication of transmission lines.\(^{113}\) Willkie, therefore, delivered a forceful condemnation of this interference.\(^{114}\)

In 1935, Willkie railed against the TVA “yardstick” concept, a means to test the fairness of electricity rates, and other TVA “frantic activity” that he viewed as designed to erode private utilities through unfair practices.\(^{115}\) President Roosevelt had first invoked the “yardstick” concept during his campaign in the presidential election of 1932 as a means through which the TVA could check the ability of private operators to raise prices, similar to the discussions on rates that were seen in the Muscle Shoals hearings in 1922.\(^{116}\) Indeed, the “yardstick” concept was not included in the original TVA legislation, which troubled Willkie and other private operators. They felt that the TVA, afforded government advantages, would be a privileged competitor that would gradually encroach on their businesses. This was a correct assumption. Additionally, Willkie assumed that the trend of
subsidizing consumers “at the expense of taxpayers” through government intervention would, if not restrained, threaten the entirety of the U.S. utility market.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, many private operators believed that the “yardstick” concept was less of a means of protecting consumers and more of a ploy to bludgeon control of power systems into government hands. To be sure, Roosevelt admitted in 1934 that “where the private interest and this public interest conflict, the public interest must prevail.”\textsuperscript{118} Electric power had become the cynosure of debate over the TVA.

Corporate apprehensions about the growth of the TVA’s mandate and intentions were substantiated by the difference between the focus of the authorizing legislation—the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933—which provided for the precedent-supported government regulation of rivers for navigation and flood control, and the apparent driving focus of the TVA, supplanting private power utilities. Electric power generation and transmission had been secondary elements of an April 1933 Senate Committee report for the TVA bill. The clear intention of the bill was for flood control and navigation in the Tennessee Valley as well as the production of fertilizers at Muscle Shoals. In fact, the report only mentions electric power in Clause Five.\textsuperscript{119} When one reflects upon the original intent of the National Defense Act of 1916, the scope of the transformation is even broader. Muscle Shoals began as an effort to produce critical nitrate for U.S. farmers and for the war effort during the First World War. The electric power was a means to produce that nitrate. By 1933, however, the project had evolved into a federal power scheme. This exercise of federal prerogative was supported with little if any precedent.

Willkie blamed overzealous New Dealers for the TVA’s alleged overreaching. He released a statement in January 1938 alleging that the TVA was as much an effort to neuter the private utility industry as it was to build infrastructure for the impoverished people of the Tennessee Valley:
There was no utility problem in the Tennessee Valley until the Federal Government created it. As soon as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed in June 1933, however, the Federal Government began to flood the Tennessee Valley with both money and propaganda on behalf of the government power projects. The government built dams, power plants, and transmission lines.

Willkie, hoping to reach a workable arrangement with the TVA that protected the core interests of C&S, had been willing to negotiate with Lilienthal in the early days of TVA activities. As political scientist C. Herman Pritchett notes, “Several times during this period[,] Willkie, president of Commonwealth & Southern, met with Lilienthal, power director of the T.V.A., and presented suggestions for a division of areas between the two agencies.” However, Lilienthal was unwilling to negotiate, believing that the accommodation of the private power interests was “contrary to the provisions of the T.V.A. statute.” Whether demanding hard territorial limits on TVA activities from Roosevelt, litigating against the TVA over competition issues, or speaking to the American people with “a fluency and eloquence,” Willkie defended the principles of American free enterprise against the power of the popular progressive civil religion. Willkie’s national prominence opened his path to challenge Roosevelt in the presidential election of 1940, by which time he finally changed his registration to Republican.

Willkie’s war and the TVA’s internal challenges tempered the scope of Norris’ ambitions for government-operated utilities. Willkie reminded the American people that while the government could advance the public good, it could also advance it beyond appropriate, constitutional boundaries. The political intransigence of the Muscle Shoals project in the 1920s suffocated development in the Tennessee Valley. For the farmers
of Alabama and Tennessee, Congress moved too slowly. The TVA marched forward at a breakneck pace, erecting dams and electrifying counties. For some, the TVA was moving too quickly and without consideration for the consequences of its actions.

Some critics of Norris’ proposals had warned of creeping socialism or bureaucratic planners run amok. Vehement opposition to government operations in the Tennessee Valley only served to prove the progressives’ point—the profit motive had corrupted every echelon of society. Willkie’s strategic criticisms and trust-building efforts were far more constructive. He served as a necessary and natural check on the TVA. When it erred, Willkie pointed it out. When it ran roughshod over business interests, he illuminated the transgressions and offered proposals. Willkie tempered the excesses of the progressive civil religion of infrastructure. His efforts established a tenable middle ground between Norris’ dreams of the total nationalization of utilities and the laissez-faire economics that epitomized the former Coolidge administration. Through that mediation, the nation achieved a workable coexistence between government-led progress and individual-led progress. The TVA stands as a unique institution in the United States. Norris failed to realize his dream of public power nationwide. However, the TVA survived the 1930s, remaining as a robust experiment that provided cheap power and good jobs to the people of the Tennessee Valley.

**THE AGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE**

The Age of Infrastructure witnessed some of the greatest public achievements in the United States. The TVA brought power to the people, bringing a vision of hope to one of the country’s poorest regions. It proved that government would not forget the most vulnerable Americans. Its successes represented the epitome of Norris’ populist progressivism—government, as a vanguard, would build a better society through the provision of economic empowerment. The TVA was a
national effort, transcending the sectionalism of pettier politics. Its foremost advocates included a plutocratic president from the Hudson River Valley and an agrarian populist senator from the Great Plains. For Norris, the United States was at its best when it led by example. This informed his isolationist tendencies and his commitment to communitarian modernism. Writing in 1944, Norris expressed a hope for a brave, new future of American politics:

But so long as an unselfish leadership remains for [the American people’s] guidance—a leadership untainted by corrupting personal ambition—a leadership inspired by the simple strength that oozes from the soil and the humble ranks of the poor—and at time is enriched and fortified enormously by the support and voice of those who wear purple robes of great wealth—I am sure America can continue to be the bright beacon toward which the eyes of the world’s oppressed and downtrodden will turn for inspiration and hope.\[124\]

The greatest tragedy of Norris’ career was the dearth of Americans who could provide the “unselfish leadership” he desired. The destructive squabbling of the TVA triumvirs proved that even the people’s technocracy was susceptible to the baser demons of human nature.

The TVA’s troubles paled compared to exploitations of progressivism by men of truly unbridled “personal ambition.” For them, the ends always justified the means and the Age of Infrastructure created unparalleled methods for the materialization of their vision. Under a banner of social reform and modernity, city planner Robert Moses, another great builder of public works, obtained unprecedented and unchecked power in New York. As he built an administrative empire, he cultivated and greedily protected his autonomous authority from any encroachment. Exploiting the ascendancy of public investment
in infrastructure and justifying his actions under the broad umbrella of societal progress, Moses bludgeoned any opponent who sought, like Norris’ Willkie, to moderate his activities. With imperious arrogance, Moses once remarked, “There are people who like things as they are…They cannot be permitted to stand in the way of progress.” As he flattened poor and minority neighborhoods to build titanic highways, Moses meant this statement in its most literal sense. Either the people would move or he would move them.

The TVA’s failings and Robert Moses’ autocracy revealed the dangers inherent to the progressive civil religion of infrastructure. Intention, regardless of its moral rationalization, did not guarantee purely altruistic governance. The overarching theme of this political faith was a profound confidence, bordering on arrogance, that the progressive powerbrokers knew what was best for the people. Unwavering faith in the righteousness of one’s opinions translated into wholesale, uncompromising implementation and a flawed belief that one could reengineer society to conform to their idea of a democratic utopia. Institutions of merit without checks became the realms of the bureaucratic oligarchy.

In forming the model of the United States’ constitutional representative republic, James Madison recognized that government would need to check private ambitions for the safety of the body politic. Progressives, including Woodrow Wilson, thought this cautious conservative form of government obsolete for the modern age. Norris did worry about the ambitions of men such as Henry Ford or the “power trusters,” but he equated the threat with unbridled industrial capitalism, not an overzealous government. Norris failed to recognize how his own works, however well-intentioned, created new, and often thoroughly undemocratic, avenues for the individual pursuit of power at the public’s expense. Sadly for this “gentle knight of American democracy,” his endless compassion for the plight of the poor was tainted by his own naïveté.
Despite these setbacks, Norris’ contributions to building American democracy were monumental. During the 1920s, his national perspective and resolute integrity reinforced the people’s faith in their government in an era of regionalism and endless scandals. In the 1930s, his ideology formed the rock upon which the New Deal was formed. Working hand-in-hand with President Roosevelt, Norris used an economic crisis to direct Americans’ attention to people whose Great Depression began decades earlier through a systematic pattern of neglect, underinvestment, and environmental degradation. Through his determination, Norris took a weapon of war, the Muscle Shoals project, and converted it into an instrument for the public welfare. Fittingly, the TVA would work to protect American democracy through a renewal of equality and its defense against the forces of fascism. Senator Norris’ strain of progressivism shunned individualism while embracing communitarianism. It substantiated massive increases in federal authority while illuminating the darkest of valleys. The TVA was the public church for a new civil religion: a nationalist, equalitarian, and materialist crusade for the betterment of the people. Norris’ sermon was that the government’s responsibility was the promotion of “happiness in this life” for all people, nationwide. His mission lives on in the rivers he mastered, the farms he electrified, and the futures he “Built for the People of the United States.”
The Age of Infrastructure

Note: All newspapers are drawn from ProQuest Historical Newspapers or American Periodicals databases.

2 The term “faith” is used because it couches Senator Norris’ language about his ideology in highly-religious terminology. Furthermore, “faith” emphasizes how Norris’ ideological and infrastructural agenda was heavily predicated upon an almost spiritual devotion to progressive principles.
6 “A Lesson from Germany: She Has Developed Her Water Power and Used It to Obtain Nitrates from the Air,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1915, 19.
9 U.S. Congress, 64th Congress, Session I, Chapter 134, “An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,” June 3, 1916, Section 124, 215.
10 Downs, Transforming the South, 18.
11 Ibid., 21.
12 Ibid., 23.
14 “Death Takes Former U.S. Sen. George W. Norris: Veteran of 40 Years in Congress ‘Fathered’ T.V.A. and Sponsored Lame Duck Amendment,” Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1944, 2. The quote “uncompromising foe of special privilege” is drawn from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s remarks upon hearing of the passing of Senator Norris.
15 George W. Norris was instrumental in the establishment of Nebraska’s unicameral legislature.
16 Norris, Fighting Liberal, 405.
17 Norman L. Zucker, George W. Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy
The Age of Infrastructure


Norris, Fighting Liberal, 111.


Ibid., 632.

Zucker, George W. Norris, 10.


Zucker, George W. Norris, 115.

Norris, Fighting Liberal, 191.

Ibid., 181.


Ibid., 2.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Muscle Shoals: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: Part One, 67th Congress, 2nd session, February 16, April 10, April 12, and April 13, 1922.

“Ibid., February 16, 1922, 4.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 14.

Zucker, George W. Norris, 88.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Muscle Shoals: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: Part One, 67th Congress, 2nd session, April 10, 1922, 20.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Muscle Shoals:
The Age of Infrastructure

Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: Part Two, 67th Congress, 2nd session, April 19, 1922, 190.

Ibid., April 18, 1922, 145.

Ibid., April 19, 1922, 183.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, *Muscle Shoals: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: Part Two*, 67th Congress, 2nd session, May 1, 1922, 278.

Ibid., 276.

Ibid., May 4, 1922, 320.


Ibid., 341.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, *Muscle Shoals: Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: Part Three*, 67th Congress, 2nd session, May 6, 1922, 497.

Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, 256.

“Norris Attacks Ford Shoals Plan: Says He Opposes ‘Selling Something That Cost People $106,000,000 for $5,000,000,’” *Washington Post*, June 18, 1922, 3; Senator Charles McNary would serve as Wendell Willkie’s running-mate in the presidential election of 1940.

Zucker, *George W. Norris*, 120.

Ibid., 119.

“Reject Ford Offer for Muscle Shoals: Senate Agriculture Committee Also Votes Against All Other Proposals,” *New York Times*, July 16, 1922, 1.

Ibid., 1.


“Norris Shows Anger Over Ford’s Offer: Senator Declares Muscle Shoals Lease Could Be Sold at 1,000 Per Cent. Advance,” *New York Times*, May 10, 1922, 8Y.


Ibid., 631.

“Coolidge Attacked on Muscle Shoals: Norris in Senate Charges that
The Age of Infrastructure


61 Zucker, *George W. Norris*, 120.


65 Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, 250.


68 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Great Dam of Controversy: Muscle Shoals Has Become a Political Issue Rather Than a Power Site, and While the Debate Rages the Giant Plant in the Valley of the Tennessee Waits, Like a Champing Mastodon,” *New York Times*, April 20, 1930, 70.

69 Ibid., 70.


76 “Veto on Muscle Shoals Is Sustained in Senate; Vote Kills Norris Plan: Decision Upholds Hoover,” *New York Times*, March 4, 1931, 1. Sixteen Republicans and thirty-two Democrats voted to override, while thirty-one Republicans and three Democrats voted to sustain.


78 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Informal Extemporaneous Remarks at
Montgomery, Alabama on Muscle Shoals Inspection Trip,” Public Papers of the Presidents, January 21, 1933.
82 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on the Tennessee Valley Authority,” Public Papers of the Presidents, January, 15, 1940.
87 Ibid., 35.
91 Norris, Fighting Liberal, 406.
93 Owen, The Tennessee Valley Authority, 39.
94 Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority, 140-142.
95 Ibid., 84.
99 Zucker, George W. Norris, 124.
100 Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority, 71-72.
102 “McCaw Branded A Power Truster For TVA Attack: Bitten by Presidential


106 Herbert Corey, “And May the Best: Man Win…” *Nation’s Business* 24, no. 11 (November 1936), 20.

107 Pritchett, *The Tennessee Valley Authority*, 200. The Berry marble issue concerned a Tennessee landowner and future U.S. Senator George Berry (D-TN), who alleged that the TVA needed to compensate him for damage to his valuable marble deposits.


118 “Roosevelt Plans to Use TVA as a ‘Yardstick’ in Controlling Utilities: Vast
The Age of Infrastructure


121 Pritchett, *The Tennessee Valley Authority*, 69.

122 Ibid., 69.


126 Ibid., 483-484.

127 Zucker, *George W. Norris*.

Images:


Page 39: “Out of Water Power...Comes Air Power. This is a TVA War Job,” poster, circa 1942-1943, National Archives and Records Administration, via Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Out_of_water_power..._comes_air_power..._This_is_a__TVA_war_job..._-_NARA..._-_534833.jpg (accessed December 23, 2016).

Page 45: “Wendell Willkie (cropped),” portrait, March 30, 1940, Library of
The Age of Infrastructure

In 1954, schoolchildren all across the United States participated in one of the largest medical experiments in history. Organized and carried out in public schools by the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, the field trial tested the safety and efficacy of Jonas Salk’s vaccine for poliomyelitis (polio). The trial’s success was celebrated as a stunning and revolutionary triumph of science and medicine; just two years before, Americans had faced the largest epidemic of polio on record, permanently paralyzing twenty-one thousand individuals, but the trial’s success signaled an end to this era.¹

The story of polio in the United States is well told; there is a great deal of scholarship on the history of polio, the experience of living with the disease, the advent of Salk’s vaccine, and the success and legacy of the field trial.² This paper, however, adds to the scholarship by providing a critical perspective on the role of public schools in shaping public perceptions of and participation in the trial. There has been no discussion to date on how schools as institutions played a significant part in human experimentation in the twentieth century.

Polio, and its defeat, is as thoroughly embedded in the history of American culture as it is in the history of medicine and public health. As historians James Colgrove and Daniel Wilson state, the image of a quadriplegic child dependent on the iconic “iron lung” respirator was deeply ingrained in the American conscious and prompted parents to keep their children away
from public playgrounds, swimming pools, and movie theaters during the summertime.\(^3\) The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP, known as the March of Dimes today) was crucial in making the disease a media sensation year after year and drumming up public support and funding for the development of a vaccine.\(^4\) In addition, the fact that polio prevailed—on epidemic proportions—in such a scientifically advanced nation as the United States also motivated the quest for a vaccine.

The use of public schools in hosting the field trial in

In this cartoon commissioned in 1943 by the U.S. Office of War Information, the girl’s struggle with infantile paralysis (polio) is likened to the country’s struggle in the Second World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that fighting against polio—including participating in the vaccine’s trial—assumed a nationalistic tone. Furthermore, the cartoon attempts to instill an intense fear of the disease in the viewer through depicting polio as monstrous.
1954 is significant because while it was common for non-experimental vaccines to be administered in public spaces such as schools and community centers, human experimentation was, for the most part, carried out in clinical settings. Few historians have examined the role of schools in the field trial, and practically no one has questioned the implications of using schools as opposed to clinical settings for human experimentation. In fact, despite public schools having been used multiple times throughout the early- to mid-twentieth century as loci for human experimentation, historians of bioethical issues have not examined this phenomenon either. The most closely related scholarship in the history of bioethics is perhaps the work examining the use of institutionalized children (children living in orphanages or asylums), prisoners, and college and university students as research subjects in the twentieth century.

Thus, this paper sheds light on the implications of using public schools as loci for the polio vaccine field trial. Indeed, the use of public schools made the experiment appear more akin to a mass vaccination campaign rather than what it truly was: a field trial testing the vaccine’s safety and efficacy.

The paper begins by exploring why, despite the fact that an explosion of experimentation following the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945 occurred almost exclusively in hospitals, schools were used nonetheless as sites for the polio vaccine trial. It then describes how the use of public schools altered perceptions of and participation in the trial. Conducting the trial in a school setting as opposed to a clinical setting prevented parents from making an informed decision on whether to allow their children to participate because there was a dearth of adequate information about its experimental nature. Moreover, the use of public schools contributed to the nationalistic perception that families had a moral obligation to participate for the utility of one’s community and country. Furthermore, the public nature of schools caused parents to make their decisions based in part on what others, such as their neighbors and friends, were choosing.
to do. And finally, the authority inherent to schools and school officials in local communities legitimized the trial as something students should take part in. In effect, schools as public spaces have connotations and significations quite different from those of hospitals and doctors’ offices, and these distinctions influenced the perceptions of the polio field trial and should continue to inform our understanding of research ethics.

**CLINICAL SETTINGS AS CONVENTIONAL SPACES FOR EXPERIMENTATION**

The rise to prominence of biomedicine and the medical profession during the early- to mid-twentieth century resulted in a concomitant increase in human subjects research, and the clinical setting became the primary location in which cases of experimentation took place. During the early decades of the twentieth century, research units were established in existing hospitals, and new, research-specific hospitals were built. As historian Susan Lederer notes, clinical research was such an integral part of the medical profession and of the hospital setting by this time that clinical investigators argued that “patients actually received better care [in research hospitals] than patients in a hospital where research was not a priority.” Indeed, Lederer writes that Rufus Cole, Director of the Hospital of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1927, asserted that “the rich and the poor… rushed to fill the available [research] hospital beds, because they had learned that the best medical care was available in institutions where patients were studied scientifically.”

Historian David Rothman concurs that research hospitals were where the explosion of human experimentation occurred. He states, “Subjects were now more likely to be a group of patients in a particular hospital rather than neighbors or kin.” Physicians regularly administered new drugs to sick patients in research hospitals who were looking for anything with “therapeutic potential.”

Given the prevalence of human subjects research carried
out in hospitals during the early- to mid-twentieth century, it is surprising that schools served as a site of experimentation. An explanation may be found in how the public viewed the role of schools in children’s health and how there was an existing relationship between schools and vaccination campaigns.

SCHOOLS AS EXISTING SITES FOR MEDICAL CARE AND EDUCATION

Beyond providing a large, convenient supply of participants, public schools were perceived as a logical space in which to carry out the polio vaccine field trial because they played a significant role in the health care of children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Medical and cultural historian Richard Meckel describes how urban primary schools were directly involved in monitoring and improving the health of schoolchildren from around 1870 until the beginning of the Great Depression in the late 1920s. Despite the fact that around the 1930s schools shifted away from medical provision, schools remained active as guardians of children’s health in the mid-twentieth century, offering students health education and acting as intermediaries between children and community health services. In fact, schools played an important role in children’s health when it came to polio in particular.

The role of schools and teachers in children’s health in the 1930s is apparent from an article entitled, “Responsibility of the Teacher for Child Health,” published in 1937 in the journal *Childhood Education*, the self-described “Magazine for Teachers of Young Children.” The author states:

Adequate health care for children represents a combination of family and community interests and responsibilities. The home is the center of the child’s life and the parents chiefly determine what provision is made for the health of the family. However, those responsible for ed-
ucation of the child outside the home must of necessity share in supporting and continuing this provision. This can best be done in close rapport with the family, with family-health workers, and with other specialists in the field of child health—pediatricians, nutritionists, mental hygienists, and dentists.\textsuperscript{14}

Ensuring that a community’s children were in proper health was a collaborative effort among parents, teachers, and health care providers. It is telling that the article describes students as under the “care” of their teacher, not merely the instruction.\textsuperscript{15} Teachers were charged with including in their students’ education health behaviors that either reinforced what was being taught at home or, more notably, supplemented or corrected what was being taught at home. The author writes, “[The] responsibility devolves upon the teacher for continuing the health direction and guidance initiated in the home, and, sometimes for helping children to establish in the school health attitudes and practices that will stimulate parents to make more adequate health provision in the homes.”\textsuperscript{16} In other words, public schools were an opportunity for the state or for the community to actually educate parents \textit{in addition to} children on the health behaviors they should be carrying out at home. Furthermore, teachers were instructed to “informally” observe for signs of poor health in their interactions with students, which, given the frequency with which they saw their students, was seen as a practical measure teachers should take. Teachers would subsequently participate in “joint health conference[s]” with a physician, each student, the child’s parents, and the school nurse.\textsuperscript{17}

The responsibilities of teachers in 1937 were similar to those of teachers about a decade later, when polio epidemics were most severe.\textsuperscript{18} An article entitled “If Polio Comes” that was published in the \textit{National Education Association Journal} in 1950 outlines what the role of teachers should be in the nation’s fight against polio.\textsuperscript{19} The essay aimed to educate teachers about the
disease and point them to additional literature available from the NFIP (including *A Highschool [sic] Unit on Poliomyelitis*) so that teachers could “clear away misconceptions” of the disease in “science classes and in contacts with parents.” Therefore, just as in 1937, teachers were educated in the practices parents could implement at home and were expected to help disseminate this information. Teachers were also instructed to look out for symptoms of the disease and to notify parents and physicians of any findings:

> Only the teacher, aside from parents, can make a daily check on the individual child. Even the parent does not see a child with quite the same perspective as the teacher. This does not mean the teacher can replace a doctor or school nurse—it is recommended that post polio patients have a physical examination every six months for a year or more. But the teacher has the advantage of seeing children daily at work and play in the school…The watchful eye of a teacher who has been alerted to these signals can be the first to detect a slight limp, an unsteadiness of hand, or a change in posture.

Further, polio was a visible disease in part because its chronic nature meant that many of the children who were infected still attended school (or returned after a period of time). In effect, teachers and students alike knew first-hand what the disease “looked like,” and it became something they experienced in school. For example, *Our Schools*, a publication of the West Virginia Education Association, discussed how teachers and students had a responsibility to help children infected by polio restore the convalescent’s sense of self-confidence and to “prevent [the inflicted children from] developing an inferiority complex and a feeling of disability.” Thus, schools played a significant role in children’s health in the decades before the polio field trial, and they also served as sources of authority and information on
polio. In effect, it may have been perceived as logical that schools served as spaces in which polio was defeated.

As government-owned institutions and centers for communities, public schools also served as sites for mass vaccination campaigns run by city health departments throughout the twentieth century. For example, schools were among the locations such campaigns targeted to immunize susceptible children against diphtheria during the 1920s. In fact, newspaper articles from this decade report the use of schools for vaccination campaigns in cities all over the country, including Long Beach, California; Newburgh, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and Washington, D. C. Vaccination campaigns against smallpox were also located in public schools. An article from The Los Angeles Times in 1951 describes that the annual drive planned to visit 105 schools and vaccinate about 35,000 students. In addition to serving as sites for vaccination campaigns, many public schools required that their students receive vaccinations in order to attend. This requirement was deemed constitutional in 1922 as a result of the United States Supreme Court ruling of Zucht v. King. In this way, schools were not only seen as existing sites for medical care and education, but the youngest members of the public were also accustomed to receiving vaccinations in schools as well as for schools.

Lastly, schools may have been perceived as the appropriate space in which to carry out the field trial because the experiment was testing a vaccine, not a medical procedure or pharmaceutical drug. In other words, hospitals served as the primary sites for human experimentation, and these trials were conducted on sick patients who enrolled in the research projects with the hope of—as Rothman describes it—“therapeutic potential.” Vaccines, however, were understood as a preventive measure that healthy individuals could partake in to remain out of the hospital. The manner in which the public during this time period understood vaccines in relation to human experimentation is worth further exploration.
While public schools appeared to be the most logical space in which to carry out the trial, what follows is a description of the implications of using schools on the public’s perception of and participation in the trial.

**SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION ON THE FIELD TRIAL**

Carrying out the trial in schools as opposed to clinical settings caused the media, the NFIP, and schools to be parents’ primary sources of information, not physicians. In effect, it is questionable as to what extent parents’ decisions in agreeing to participate in the trial were adequately informed. While there was a great deal of information available to parents to help them make their decisions, these sources were primarily journalistic accounts of the trial or, essentially, propaganda from the NFIP. A 1958 study entitled, “Parental Reactions to Communications on the 1954 Polio Vaccine Tests,” examined the sources of information parents received and concluded that beginning in 1953, newspapers and magazines regularly contained educational articles written by journalists with titles such as “D-day Against Polio,” “Mass Polio Tests,” “The Fight on Polio,” “Tracking the Killer,” “The Great Test,” “Polio: At Last the End of the Crippler,” “Closing in on Polio,” “Vaccine Safety,” and “Polio Pioneers.” In addition, children brought home from school a letter from Basil O’Connor, President of the NFIP, explaining the importance of participating in the trial; a leaflet explaining the nature of the vaccine and the trial; and a consent form which was to be filled out and returned to school.

Based on these newspaper and magazine articles, not surprisingly, the objectives of the trial were fairly ambiguous. Officially, the NFIP stated that the vaccine had already been proven safe and that the field trial was merely validating its efficacy. To be sure, Salk had performed a number of successful though small-scale trials throughout the early 1950s to test his potential vac-
cine, including at the D.T. Watson Home for Crippled Children and at the Polk State School. Given how rare and geographically variable polio was, however, a large trial lending enough statistical power was still needed to prove the vaccine’s success definitively. Indeed, an article published in *Parent’s Magazine* in 1954 describes how trials carried out among both monkeys and humans showed that the vaccine was safe and stimulated antibody production, but “at least 500,000 children must [still] be vaccinated in order to procure reliable evidence on the effectiveness of the vaccine.”

However, some articles diverged from the NFIP’s official stance that the experiment was testing the vaccine’s efficacy, claiming that the vaccine’s efficacy had already been proven. For example, an article published in *Better Homes and Gardens* in 1954 asserts that the vaccine has already been proven effective: “The Salk triple vaccine…has proved safe and effective against all three strains in some 5,000 preliminary tests.” Similarly, an article published in *School Life* states that the vaccine “has already been tested for safety and effectiveness, first in studies with laboratory animals and then with nearly 700 individuals.” Oddly though, the same article contradicts this assertion, conceding, “Whether the vaccine is highly effective, moderately effective, or ineffective will be proved conclusively through the forthcoming mass tests with children.” The lack of agreement and clarity in describing the scientific objectives of the field trial proves that the trial’s experimental nature was not adequately captured in the information parents received and processed.

In addition to the ambiguity concerning the trial’s objectives, the information parents received did not adequately describe legitimate safety concerns that physicians and researchers who were familiar with the production of the vaccine had possessed. Indeed, many doctors, including Albert Sabin who went on to produce the orally administered version of the polio vaccine, thought that Salk’s vaccine was not ready to be used on a mass scale. Their concerns originated from the difficulty
some pharmaceutical companies had in inactivating the virus; in fact, Cutter Laboratories unsuccessfully inactivated the virus during production for widespread use in 1955, unintentionally causing hundreds of children to become infected with the disease. Nevertheless, there was no mention of the various safety concerns related to the vaccine’s production in these articles or in the material sent home from the public schools.

Furthermore, there was some doubt as to whether parents even understood the full extent of the information sent out from the schools and the NFIP. A study featured in the article “Parental Reactions to Communications” assessed, “The reading ease’ score placed the N.F.I.P. printed materials in the ‘difficult’ reading category comparable to textbook materials used in colleges.” Since over one-third of the mothers in the study had less than a high-school education though, the study surmised, “It seems safe to infer that many of them must have had a great deal of difficulty in reading and understanding the printed materials sent to them from the schools.” The study also suggested that the sources of information that the schools and the NFIP relied upon were “middle-class oriented,” indicating that parents of a high socioeconomic status were more likely to allow their children to participate in the trial. Even so, 43 percent of parents of low socioeconomic status gave consent for their children to receive the vaccine, suggesting that there were still many parents who may not have adequately understood the information they received about the trial.

These sources were crucial though, since they were largely what parents based their decisions on; most parents did not talk about the trial with their family physicians, who, like Albert Sabin, may have been less biased and more alert to the fact that there were legitimate discernable concerns relating to the experiment. A study entitled, “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation of Children in Polio Vaccine Trials,” interviewed mothers in 1954 during the week after consent forms were sent back to their children’s school but before the start of the trial, asking where
the mothers learned about the trial and why they decided to allow their children to participate in it or not. The study found that 41 percent of mothers who gave consent had discussed the trial with a doctor or nurse; 61 percent had discussed the trial with friends, relatives, or neighbors; 15 percent had discussed the trial with school personnel; and 28 percent of mothers discussed the trial with no one. Evidently, not only did less than half of the mothers who gave consent talk with doctors about the trial, but most mothers were more likely to talk with their friends, relatives, or neighbors instead. This finding is perhaps not surprising given the fact that the trial was conducted at schools rather than in hospitals or doctors’ offices. Conducting the trial in schools forced parents to have to seek out more legitimate information from their family physicians independently, which they would have done only if they did not believe the information presented in the media and sent from the schools was adequate. In fact, almost 30 percent of mothers who gave consent talked with no one, suggesting that almost a third of consenting mothers were satisfied with what they read and heard from the media and from their children’s school.

Orientation meetings conducted by each community’s department of health did provide parents with additional information and an opportunity to ask questions to medical authorities. Indeed, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study found that “among parents who had initially been undecided, those who attended an orientation session at one of the schools were significantly more likely subsequently to give consent than were parents who did not attend.” However, the meetings were led by health officials presumably supportive of the trial and were held in public settings and in large groups, which perhaps prohibited some parents from asking questions because they were less inclined or comfortable to do so in such a setting. Moreover, the group setting most likely influenced some parents to participate through the “bandwagon effect.” Orientation meetings also prohibited a more personalized discussion of how a parent’s
child would be affected by participating in the trial. Thus, it is worth noting that only one-third of parents who gave consent attended these orientation meetings.

The carrying out of Salk’s field trial in schools rather than in clinical settings compromised the degree to which parents were able to make informed decisions as to whether to allow their children to participate in the trial. The information they received was primarily from the media, the NFIP, and schools, which did not fully capture the experimental nature of the field trial. In this way, the lack of unbiased and complete information made the trial appear as more of a mass vaccination campaign than as a mass human experiment.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS ENGENDERING OBLIGATORY PARTICIPATION

The use of public schools as loci for the trial also transformed the act of participating into a community deed or obligation. That is, the trial became perceived as a community event in which all members of the public came together and played their part in fighting against a childhood disease. Polio in particular brought communities together, perhaps more so than any other disease of the time; not only did the disease disproportionately affect young children and was potentially deadly, but it also ravaged the United States at a time of intense nationalism. This perception of the trial, which public schools had a hand in generating, had the effect of subtly coercing families to participate.

The celebration and spectacle that coincided with the trial contributed to the perception that participating in the trial was a communal or nationalistic act. Historian Jane Smith discusses how children and parents lined up in schools and were given the vaccine (or the placebo) one by one, as the media took pictures and onlookers smiled in wonder:

Whether the clinics were set up in the auditorium, class-
room, gym, or on the open lawn, the photographers took the same pictures: the line of children waiting to get their shots; the wide-eyed little cowboy sandwiched between a nurse who held his shoulders and a doctor who pricked his arm; the brave little girl who grinned at the needle; and then the group of proud survivors, broad smiles stretching the cheeks that still glistened with tears, each right hand pointing to the left upper arm to show where the magic shot had been given.\textsuperscript{41}

In many ways, participating in the trial could be considered as a display of solidarity with one’s community, since people were literally standing in line \textit{together} to play a role in finding a cure to polio. The intense nationalism of the epoch also caused members of the public to view participating in the trial as an obligation for the nation’s wellbeing; just as individuals were called upon to shoulder their part in the onerous war effort during the

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{teacher_message.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{A teacher’s message for her students regarding their historic role in the fight against polio.}
Second World War nearly a decade earlier, individuals were now called upon to assume their part in the name of scientific advancement. In an image now iconic of the polio trial, a teacher stands in front of her students next to a blackboard which has written on it: “Making History. We are among the first children ever to be given Polio shots. So we are really making History today. We are lucky.” This image suggests that the teacher assumed that everyone in the class was participating in the trial. It also demonstrates how children were told that it was a privilege to participate in the trial—just as the consent form mailed home to parents was in fact a “request to participate form”—and that teachers perceived participating as a classroom responsibility to “make history.” Another iconic image used for propaganda purposes by the NFIP shows children who had already received the vaccine lined up with their “Polio Pioneer” certificates, which were produced and distributed by the NFIP. The image is another demonstration of how much community spirit participation in the trial involved.

This idea of partaking in the trial as a community effort is also not so subtly expressed in the media and from the NFIP. A number of scholars have noted how the NFIP marketed par-
participation as a moral deed; Basil O’Connor, President of the NFIP, stated in his letter to parents that the success of the trial depended on their cooperation. Furthermore, many newspaper and magazine articles emphasized the vast number of volunteers who were coming together to help carry out the trials; the “No more polio after ’54?” article describes:

…country health officers, medical societies, mayors and selectmen, newspaper-radio-TV executives, the Foundation’s 3,100 chapters, P.T.A.s [Parent-Teacher Associations], other civic and community groups—in fact, every agency that could educate or activate—were drawn into the program.

In size and detailed planning—right down to trailers for the local theater and buses to take the children to the vaccine clinics—there’s never been anything quite like it before!

Therefore, given how greatly the trial was marketed and perceived as a community event and a major contribution to the country’s scientific advancement, even though children were required to present signed consent forms, parents were “softly” coerced into participating as well. In other words, parents were influenced to participate not by force but by a pervasive sense of obligation.

**CONSENT: A PRODUCT OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING**

Conducting the trial in a public space such as schools also caused the decision to participate to be the product of public, not private, decision-making. In other words, because the trial was so large and in such a public setting, entire communities were faced with the decision of whether to participate. Consequently, parents were influenced by their neighbors, friends, and relatives, and it was publicly evident whose children ultimately did partake
in the trial and whose did not. In this sense, the public nature of the trial introduced an additional component of soft coercion to participate, since parents knew that their decision would be known and judged by their community.

As previously mentioned, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study discovered that parents talked with friends, family, and neighbors about participating in the trial more than discussing it with their physicians, which suggests that parents either were influenced by other parents or had influenced others when making their own decisions. Furthermore, given that orientation meetings were formatted as large groups, parents had the opportunity to learn about the trial together and then decide whether to participate together. In fact, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study also found that parents were greatly influenced by the news of what counties around them were doing: in one county in Virginia, the authors write that “the uncertainty facing parents [was] markedly intensified by the fact that several other counties in the immediate area had planned to participate in the vaccine trials but, for reasons relating to the scheduling of the trials, had decided to postpone them indefinitely.”\(^46\) The opposite—being more likely to participate because others were participating—was surely the case as well.

It is also important to recall that, as aforementioned, mass vaccination campaigns had been historically carried out in public spaces such as schools, community centers, or other popular gathering places. For example, New York City health officials carried out an enormous smallpox vaccination campaign in 1947 in response to the presence of a novel case in the city. As a result, about 6.35 million people were vaccinated, and about 1.2 million of them received their vaccinations at locations organized by community organizations or employers. Moreover, companies such as Eastman Kodak, Trans World Airlines, Union Carbide, and Wanamaker’s all brought in city health department physicians to vaccinate their employees, and the department store Lane Bryant offered to house clinics for the public.\(^47\) Giv-
en that the trial was conducted in schools—a similarly public space—this existing association between mass vaccination campaigns and public spaces had the effect of casting the polio field trial as more of a mass vaccination campaign.

**SCHOOLS AS LEGITIMIZERS OF THE FIELD TRIAL**

Lastly, a subtler but still significant effect of conducting the field trial in public schools was that the authority inherent in schools and school officials helped legitimize the trial and give parents reason to participate. As aforementioned, schools were spaces in which health behaviors were taught for the benefit of both parents and children. To reiterate, teachers were instructed to educate children and parents about how polio spread and what preventive measures were needed to be taken at home. In this way, schools espoused a certain degree of authority in a child's health, even though they were not spaces in which doctors practiced. Given this trend of teachers acting as a tacit authority in children's health, when teachers disseminated leaflets and consent forms to children to take home to their parents, it is probable that parents were more inclined to participate in the trial because the trial's information derived from teachers.

Schools and school officials also acted as “gatekeepers” of participation in some instances, either supporting children’s participation in the trial or preventing their participation altogether. For example, in describing how the NFIP selected towns and schools in which to carry out the trial, historian Arnold Monto notes, “Preference was given to jurisdictions with well organized health services as well as to regions where there was expressed interest in participation, especially from school officials, since schools would be the point of access to the children.” On one hand, this statement affirms that some school officials expressed their interest in having the trial carried out in their schools. On the other hand though, Monto’s assertion indicates that there were cases in which school officials did not want
This publication by Polio Prevention, Inc., which was most likely an organization lobbying against the polio vaccine, alerts readers that several school districts, most notably the Los Angeles public schools, decided not to participate in the field trial. Although the legitimacy of this organization is unknown, in actuality, there were health officials worried about the safety of using the vaccine on a wide scale. Moreover, this publication demonstrates that school officials had a great deal of power in influencing public opinion about the vaccine.
their schools participating in the trial. For example, in response to the Cutter Incident of April 1955, Colgrove writes, “Cancel-
lations occurred primarily in [New York City’s] Spanish-speaking
communities, in which press coverage of the incident had been
highly critical, and in schools where the principal was either in-
different or hostile to the vaccine.”49 Regardless, in either case,
school officials had a say in whether the trial was brought to their
schools. Depending on what this decision was, parents of chil-
dren in these schools not only were allowed or denied access to
the vaccine, but they also most likely perceived their administra-
tors’ act of either welcoming or preventing the trial from com-
ing to their school as an endorsement or a rejection of the trial.
In this way, the actions of school administrators also influenced
parents’ participation in the trial.

CONCLUSION

The use of public schools instead of clinical settings as loci for the polio vaccine field trial in 1954 had a significant
impact on how members of the public perceived and understood the nature of the trial. First, carrying out the trial in public
schools prevented parents from making a fully informed decision of whether to allow their children to participate because
parents lacked unambiguous, unbiased, and complete information concerning the experimental nature of the trial. Second,
the use of schools contributed to a sense of communal and nationalistic obligation to participate. Third, the public nature of
these schools caused parents’ decisions to be a product of public rather than private decision-making, as they were influenced
by friends and neighbors and their community at large. Finally, the authority schools held regarding children’s health—and in
the community at large—legitimized the trial. For these reasons, the trial appeared more like a mass vaccination campaign than a
large-scale vaccine experiment.

The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis most
likely chose public schools as loci for the trial because the civic institutions offered a conveniently reachable population that could receive subsequent check-ups in addition to second and third administrations of the vaccine. Moreover, students in the first through third grades (approximately ages six through eight) were the most at-risk cohort of the population to be infected with polio. Admittedly, the NFIP did not choose schools as a means to entice greater participation, but it is important to consider the consequences of carrying out such experimentation in this setting compared to other environments. For example, clinical settings, both functionally and symbolically, served different purposes and have different meanings than schools. Consequently, clinical settings were more appropriate for ensuring that human experimentation was carried out in the most ethical way possible. Indeed, from an ethical perspective, schools fracture the doctor-patient relationship so crucial to medical decision-making, as conversations with physicians normally aid patients in determining the risks and benefits of participating in experimentation. Schools, however, prevent this style of privacy and personalization; in such a public setting, therefore, parents were unable to make a completely voluntary decision as to whether to allow their children to participate in the polio field trial. Without a doubt, understanding how public schools influenced the ethics of the polio vaccine trial will contribute to our knowledge of research ethics and our medical practices in the future.
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation


4 Mass participation in the field trial was due in part to the public’s intense fear of polio that the NFIP helped generate. Indeed, the public feared polio so much that people actively sought the experimental vaccine. A letter from an official of the United Nations International School (UNIS) in New York City to Dr. Leona Baumgartner, the Health Commissioner of New York City, is demonstrative of this point. The official had failed to apply to the city’s Department of Health in a timely fashion, jeopardizing the school’s ability to participate in the field trial. As a result, the official pleaded with Dr. Baumgartner:

As you may know, this School is open to children of United Nations staff members, delegations, specialized agencies, accredited press and also to non United Nations children who live in or in the vicinity of Parkway Village, Jamaica…In view of the special character of our School and its connexion [sic] with the United Nations, I would very much appreciate it if you could see your way to include the UNIS in the current programme.

In other words, the official was so desperate to have UNIS students participate in the field trial (presumably with the consent of the students’ parents as well) that the official tried leveraging the prestige associated with the United Nations to prompt a favorable outcome. Nevertheless, in her response to the letter, Dr. Baumgartner admitted that a great number of other schools and individuals had requested to have their students and children take part in the field trial as well, but unfortunately, she had no control regarding who was
selected to participate in the experiment. See Benjamin Cohen to Dr. Leona Baumgartner, New York, NY, April 20, 1954 and Dr. Leona Baumgartner to Benjamin Cohen, New York, NY, April 28, 1954 in New York City Municipal Archives, Accounts 90-116, Box 294, Folder “Poliomyelitis – Salk Vaccine.”

5 For perhaps the most detailed account available on how schools played a role in the trial, see Smith, *Patenting the Sun*.

6 In the 1920s, New York City public schools were used to test a mass scale diphtheria vaccine, and in the 1960s, schools across the United States were used to test various vaccines for measles and mumps.


9 Ibid., 127.

10 Ibid., 127.


12 Ibid., 25.

13 Schools, particularly those in large cities, were sites of Progressive Era (1890-1920) reforms that provided children with preventive care, medical services, and health education. See Richard Meckel, *Classrooms and Clinics: Urban Schools and the Protection and Promotion of Child Health, 1870-1930* (New


15 Ibid., 403.
16 Ibid., 403.
17 Ibid., 403-404.


20 Ibid., 268.
21 Ibid., 269.
22 Ibid., 269.


27 Ibid., 380.
28 Smith, Patenting the Sun, 139.


32 Ibid.
33 In contrast to Sabin’s version of the vaccine, Salk’s vaccine for polio was via inoculation. See Harry M. Marks, “The 1954 Salk Poliomyelitis Vaccine Field Trial,” *Clinical Trials* 8 (2011), 225.


36 Ibid., 379.

37 Ibid., 381.


39 Ibid., 1531.

40 Ibid., 1531.

41 Smith, *Patenting the Sun*, 267.

42 Ibid., 162-163.


44 Ibid., 515.

45 Lee, “No More Polio After ’54?” 257.

46 Clausen, Deasy, and Seidenfeld, “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation of Their Children in Polio Vaccine Trials,” 1526.


49 The Cutter Incident of April 1955 occurred after the field trial had concluded, but during wide-scale production of the vaccine for mass immunization. Nonetheless, the ability of principals to either welcome or deny health officials’ immunization efforts is notable. See Colgrove, *State of Immunity*, 120.

**Images:**


Page 74: Courtesy of the March of Dimes Foundation.
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation

Page 75: Courtesy of the March of Dimes Foundation.

Page 79: Courtesy of the New York City Municipal Archives, Accounts 90-116, Box 294, Folder “Poliomyelitis – Salk Vaccine.”
In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England traced the historic route of St. Paul the Apostle, only this time in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of the rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express, steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of Ankara in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the morning of January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled between the alleyways on the steep slopes of the old town. This man was Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year before and now was slated to take charge of the British Embassy in Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of Anatolia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the railway station.

Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks of the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Persia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern strongmen like Reza Khan of Iran (with whom he negotiated in Tehran as Head of Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his diary: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know, too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.” A note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of the diplomat’s
will contained the following posthumous praise for the British Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct of affairs was based on his belief that it is ‘men’ that count—not machines—in the order of human affairs; his achievements, his trials which were those of his country, and how he set about overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of his beliefs.”

During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic of Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of Sir Percy Loraine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial and geopolitical interests in the security of the Mediterranean Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of the nascent Turkish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious response on the part of the status quo powers threatened by the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and
The Emerging Storm

Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of interwar diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s experience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while working between London and Ankara during the early years of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of European diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.

THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE

The signing of the defensive Balkan Pact between Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934, was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of the Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “demands and interests of the smaller states” in mind. Turkey took the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “neutral-bloc” against the carving of the peninsula into spheres of external influence. Because Ankara still remained at odds with the four Great Powers over a number of territorial disputes, Turkish policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of the regional countries and diluting great power control in the Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “organize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more menacing threat to the stability of the Mediterranean Basin.

Ever since the conclusion of the Mosul Crisis in 1926,
British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly dwindling.9 Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of Bulgaria’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question of Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits) to the fore.10 As Ambassador Loraine noted in a telegraph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras had reasoned, “If nations rearmed, Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept different treatment.”11 Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearma- ment required Turkey to revisit the status of the demilitarized Turkish Straits. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most unpleasant impression.”12

The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bulgaria. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bulgarians, and the Turkish government interpreted this development as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident drago- man James Morgan reported on the deliberations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly of June 1934.13 He described Turkish Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:

In the light of events which have recently created a stir in Turkey, such as the speeches of Signor Mussolini about possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of Italian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden decision to increase the credits for national defense with Turkey’s distrust and dislike of Italy.14
In front of the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending to affairs at the League of Nations in Geneva, referenced Mussolini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled, “Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations of Italians.” The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric of the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is probable that mistrust of Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer relation with the United Kingdom.” Loraine noticed that Italian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested interests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s bellicosity—and the timidity of the Balkan Pact given the omission of Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.

No event is more telling of Turkey’s drift toward rapprochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild evening on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon in a long dispatch a few days later. After a banquet at the Ankara Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of whom Loraine knew well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited the Ambassador to join their game of poker. Loraine accepted the offer and was inundated with a game of cards that crept on and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obviously cast down all barriers of formality, and, without any loss of dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and comrade.” Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up the chips at the end of the game so as to resolve any diplomatic differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for Loraine to join them for a...
raine to stay behind.

The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if Loraine imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate” and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did not give me the impression of a man who left many things to chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent impression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of the friendly intentions of His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further mused, “It was not merely a question of the Turkey of today, but also of the Turkey of tomorrow…[and thus there was] no reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.” However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend… Russia.” Aware of this apprehensive sentiment maintained by Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambassador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied, “If the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines, then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations between Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted ways, Atatürk added “that if England really desired this on her part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of Persia and the Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if we were
united!”

Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of the living legend of Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête diplomacy on behalf of the British Crown, but the mystique tied to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each evening one of the hotel clerks would send a list of those present in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya, and he would then make his way to the Hotel if there was anyone he wanted to see.”

One of President Atatürk’s modern biographers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:

The Gazi was the fount of new ideas and the arbiter of disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table. In one of his many stories about his parties, he asked one of his guests, “Tell me what goes best with raki?” ‘Roasted chick peas (leblebi),’ the guest replied, knowing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ [responded] Mustafa Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to raki is good conversation.”

Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Britain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy directives of His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically, to the designs of the Secretary of State in London. Tensions often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapprochement should take. One such endeavor was to bring British economic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged (but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in
the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933, the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with Turkey that represented the zenith of Turco-Soviet cooperation in the interwar period. Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of engineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched by parallel commitments to secularization and the development of cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collaboration.” Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet understanding in terms of self-styled anti-Westernism grounded in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the European periphery. Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature of this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the burgeoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule. By the time Ambassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relationship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931, bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s new policy of state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered with the support of the Soviet economy, which was one of the few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of production remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving around state-run holding companies such as Etibank (mining)
and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.\textsuperscript{26}

Soviet economic support was waning by the end of 1934, just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the country toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935, definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of international politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”\textsuperscript{27} While the Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.

However, while the geopolitics of Europe were pushing the Turks toward the British, the \textit{etatist} policies of Turkish Minister of Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid-1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of Overseas Trade. British merchants were still operating under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impetus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of payments with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal demand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to free their frozen credits.”\textsuperscript{28} Because the British refused to acquiesce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, one of Loraine’s principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.\textsuperscript{30}
In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the possibility of manipulating the British Mandate of Palestine for additional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present position is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of stuff from Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a significant trade imbalance that, if ameliorated, could right the scales of Turkish commercial policy to make way for more British exports. Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of Trade in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”

Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey, Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflating the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and London. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelmingly impressed with the necessity of protecting their interests,” the Ambassador wrote. Eventually, between Loraine’s diplomatic efforts and the work of Colonel Woods in London, Britain signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with tariff concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation. Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the anticipated “sign of support” President Atatürk had beseeched from the Ambassador over their game of cards in June 1934; a year afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.

Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers an overview of British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy substantiating the sliver of opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Turkey’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with Britain. Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov-
ernment remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating commercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of a British naval offer; and the looming nationalization of the Anglo-French Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations throughout much of the 1930s. Part of the debate regarding the Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank of England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish historian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of England] unsuccessfully opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationalization, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer financial ties with Turkey.”

Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore generally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of England. His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial agreements and export credits) as “part of the strategy securing Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”

Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of 1934, but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relationship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket Ankara on New Year’s Day of 1935. A little over a week later, Loraine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the Anatolian highlands in pursuit of the latest news from London.

**SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE**

Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing reality of Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides the translation of a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from October 1934, which warned of impending Italian military action in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and international conditions emerged.” Loraine was more skepti-
cal of Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending, “The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.” Still, in spite of Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of five Italian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February 10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sovereignty of Abyssinia and the maintenance of the status quo in the region.

It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of the League of Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of whom served as Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in late 1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in December about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives abroad informed of what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns me is the time lag.” The British Ambassador was acting in a precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent information from the League of Nations was critical to maintaining the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian aggression to call for the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits—this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of Italian re-fortification of the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of western Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish remilitarization of the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament
clauses within the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and of Locarno (1925)—thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position: Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request.\(^ {41}\) Loraine was caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London and Ankara.

On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of the responses of Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:

Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as they could possibly be with those of the United Kingdom; that any diminution of British naval influence in the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United Kingdom as the only possibly effective champion of peace and security in the Mediterranean, and henceforth [sic] of Turkish national security interests in those waters; that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the conversion of the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that Turkey in this matter, in view of the convincing proofs she has given of her entirely pacific and peace-making policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her own wider interests no less well than those of Turkey, however minor her interests may appear by comparison with ours.\(^ {42}\)

Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly favored an immediate resolution of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis,
followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.” Instead, Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the stability of the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwarted quickly by disagreements among all of the powers involved. In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such roles in the Mediterranean” once news of Nazi Germany’s rearmament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain. Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of a multilateral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions of the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report on Turkey for 1935, “In view of the increasing gravity of the dispute between Italy and the League of Nations, and of the ensuing friendly collaboration of His Majesty’s Government and Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their purpose, were content to let the question of the Straits sleep until a more propitious day should dawn.”

Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to reevaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It is the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a fleet has the last word.” While the British were enthusiastic toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the “champions of world wide disarmament.” Therefore, Britain was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur-
The Emerging Storm

key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions of remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office document from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The prospect of a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”

Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four submarines between 1936 and 1937. Britain was already alarmed by Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politicians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of Hitler’s orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula. To prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty increased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensuing years.

The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By mistake, the Turkish General Staff learned that Britain recently had sold a number of warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when the Turkish General Staff requested to buy one million pounds in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again undermined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a reduced number of aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda of the bankers in London. Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of British commercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of maintaining a favorable balance of trade was rejected outright by the Turkish government. Thus, even in terms of geopolitical security, Britain “could not put the rapprochement between the two countries
onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine. What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the realization of an informal multilateral Mediterranean security pact that worked both in and around the League of Nations. The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia together in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on Italy via the League of Nations’ Committee of Eighteen, guaranteeing each other mutual support in the case of further Italian aggression. The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criticized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its commitments to the League of Nations, “which were no secret at all.” Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led security agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of the Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was secured within a constellation of advantageous relationships. Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was the attitude of France and Britain toward Italy. The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Mediterranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration in the development of Anglo-Turkish relations. Therefore, by the end of 1935, Britain was facing a strategic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out of London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hitler’s satellite.” These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would
“soon revert to his former role of ‘good European.’”\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Turkey—the joint command of the British military was reluctant to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of sanctions from the League of Nations and London’s trust in collective security “have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of war.”\textsuperscript{57} Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack of adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive if Italy became hostile, regardless of the number of British allies there.”\textsuperscript{58}

Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by

Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom (center), and British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey, on September 5, 1936.
two maxims of strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Government took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general European war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial defense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments: “the defense of the Far East, the defense of India, and obligations in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.” An aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodecanese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi German designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution of the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from Mussolini” if Britain deployed its forces elsewhere. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of the few British statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Europe. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain control of the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of food and oil supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.”

While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939 in the face of war, the strategic calculus of the British navy in the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this approach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of the entire Eastern Mediterranean. With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya, and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of Islam” in the Middle
East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score of Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin.\textsuperscript{63} Nevertheless, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Loraine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-to-eye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements at the League of Nations in Geneva concerning the status of the Turkish Straits in the face of the burgeoning threat to peace on the European continent.

**IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT**

At a dinner party in the summer of 1937, Loraine imparted to his guests: “The duty of the diplomat is not so much to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if war is inevitable, his country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.”\textsuperscript{64} Keeping the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of diplomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as the study of diplomatic discontinuities during times of war. The story of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934 and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of their advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) policymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British thus delayed the signing of any substantial written agreement with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis instead. The British strategy of appeasement in the Mediterranean Basin finally fell apart in the face of Italy’s invasion of Albania in April 1939. Therefore, by the time of the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939, the European state system had already begun to unravel past the point of no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey
sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Republic had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the Second World War (1939-1945).

Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it possible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Britain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and the United States of America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away from the small nations of Europe. However, such an assessment is more complicated if one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Aid Agreement of May 12, 1938 as a defensive corollary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in 1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in Turkey as a guarantor of Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula, both before and after the Munich Conference.

Without completely turning toward counterfactual history, the fate of Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality, signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet ‘betrayal’ of the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in alignment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and subsequently pressured to bow out of the Anglo-French-Turkish
The Emerging Storm

Treaty of 1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to the details of Loraine’s game of cards on June 17, 1934, the span of Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel… friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble on Nazi Germany in 1939.

Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should not be discounted, especially in terms of the decision for further appeasement at the Munich Conference of 1938. The wishful thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of the small nations of Europe should be measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, interests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean between the inception of Anglo-Turkish rap-
prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940. Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of his diplomatic mission in Turkey:

[If the observer needed] any proof...of the efficacy of the British lines of policy...shall we not find it in the fact that the Turkish Republic, many of whose men fought against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army of one million men mobilized for three years to oppose any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her liberty.⁶⁷

In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a diplomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called, “the excellence of [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which] might better be called the rarest of all qualities: wisdom.”⁶⁸ As one of Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of 1937 exclaimed, “If the pendulum [of Turkish policy] was now swinging over to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting efforts of the Ambassador had set it in motion.”⁶⁹ Nonetheless, the momentum of Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of war; for alongside Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of poker or diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
The Emerging Storm

1 Howard Robertson, “New Angora,” *The Times*, Issue 47935 (March 5, 1938), 13-14.
4 The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 1011/238, *The Late Sir Percy Loraine*, 3-4.
5 Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle-Power Activism in the 1930s,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 3 (July 2005), 445.
6 Ibid., 445.
7 Ibid., 447.
8 Esra S. Degerli, “Balkan Pact and Turkey,” *Journal of International Social Research* 2, no. 6 (Winter 2009), 143.
9 The technicalities of the British Mandate established by the League of Nations in 1920 caused a dispute with the Republic of Turkey over the control of the oil-rich province of Mosul in northern Iraq. The settlement of the disagreement was reached in 1926 and was lauded for “demonstrat[ing] the great value of using an able and experienced resident ambassador in an important negotiation. On the local level it had underlined the value of negotiating face to face in Ankara, and the practical value for Britain of having its own building in the new capital.” See Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey*, 151-152.
10 The Turkish Straits comprise the Strait of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Strait of the Dardanelles. They are an important causeway connecting and regulating passage into and out of the Aegean Sea, an embayment of the northern Mediterranean Sea, from the Black Sea. As a result, the Turkish Straits are arguably the most valuable geopolitical resource of the Anatolian Peninsula because they connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean in the West; and through the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in the East. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the major regional powers, including the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic, routinely fought with the Great Powers, principally Britain and Russia, over the military and legal control of the Turkish Straits.
11 FO E 2874/1345/44, Loraine to Simon (May 6, 1934) – British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA), Vol. 33, Doc. 92, 113.
13 James Morgan was the dragoman at the British Embassy in Ankara having served as a *chargé d'affaires* in Turkey since before the First World War.
The Emerging Storm

(1914-1918). A dragoman was a resident expert, or Turkish speaking “oriental secretary,” housed at the British Embassy in Turkey who served several indispensable roles, especially during Ottoman rule. The duties of communication, translation, intelligence gathering, and political advising made the dragoman the right-hand man of the British Ambassador, providing “continuity and local expertise” to the British Embassy in Turkey. See Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 141.


Massimiliano Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 35; Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia 26, 191-192.


“‘The Gazi’ was a title adopted by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the Republic of Turkey. Bestowed upon Atatürk by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1923, the title refers to a Muslim warrior or Islamic war hero.

FO E 4238/4048/44, Loraine to Simon (June 20, 1934) – BDFA, Vol. 33, Doc. 113, 127-129.


The Soviet Union dispatched diplomat and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan to Ankara in 1929; the Turkish Republic sent Prime Minister Ismet İnönü to Moscow in 1932; and the Soviet Union authorized Minister of Defense Kliment Voroshilov to visit Ankara in 1933.

Samuel J. Hirst, “Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 72, no. 1 (2013), 49-52. The film The Heart of Turkey (1934) portrayed both the Soviets and the Turks as revolutionaries emerging from the same revolt against Western imperialism.

Ibid., 39.


The Germans favored a protectionist and micromanaged world trading system of bilateral bartering based upon the establishment of “clearing agreements” in which bulk commodities were traded between countries instead of fluctuating currencies. This system favored Germany’s specialization in industrial exports and offered a means to prop up Turkish agricultural exports. Once the Great Depression (1929-1933) triggered a collapse in world commodity prices in 1930, Turkey also started to favor this system to “trade” its devalued surplus agriculture rather than sell it for a meager price on the flooded world market. This bilateral bartering system, driven by the periodical signing of “clearing agreements” between states, created a strong trading relationship between Germany and Turkey: cereals, tobaccos, fruits, nuts, wool, cotton, and chrome in particular flowed out of Turkey in exchange for German steel, engines, vehicles, and rubber. The great flaw of this trading system, however, was that proposed credits would often become “frozen” in central banks, which waited for new clearing agreements to reopen either the exchange of commodities or the purchase and import of foreign goods to ease the balance of exchange. Because Germany was more economically developed than Turkey, bilateral trade only reinforced Turkish dependence in the long term, even though the barter system benefited Turkish exports in the short term. As Barlas posits, “Extensive German purchases of [Turkish] goods resulted in the accumulation of large frozen balances owed to Turkey by Germany on the clearing account. In fact, the clearing debt was actually a special form of short-term capital import to Germany, in an interest-free form…a kind of forced loan from Turkey which was itself short on capital.” While the German economy benefited from reselling its commodity imports at lower world prices to free up exchange, Turkey was in desperate need of diversifying its trade to “reduce the German monopoly.” Therefore, the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Turkish Clearing Agreement was a successful first step in the right direction for both parties involved, and “Turkish exports to Germany decreased for the first time in 1937.”

30 Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*, 179. Throughout the 1930s, “Turkish exports to Britain were insufficient to pay for Turkish imports from Britain.”
31 See Endnotes 28 and 30.
32 TNA, FO 1011/174, Loraine to Rendel (March 1, 1934).
33 Ibid.
The Treaty of Locarno was an agreement among Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy to stabilize the internal borders of Europe and to approve a number of clauses dictating German demilitarization, anti-revisionism, and the mutual inviolabilities of European borders. The first major breach of the Treaty of Locarno was Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland region in March 1936.

and the French made them almost completely unsuccessful, showcasing the weakness of the multinational body in reacting to international disorder. The sanctions were lifted in June 1936.

56 Ibid., 15.
57 Ibid., 15.
60 Ibid., 11.
61 Salerno, Vital Crossroads, 156.
62 Ibid., 189.
63 Pratt in Dann, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 17.
64 TNA, FO 1011/239, S.F.A. Coles, Diplomat on Horseback: The Last Loraine of Kirkharle, A Literary Portrait… (London: 1965), 17-18. South African novelist Joy Packer described her first meeting with Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine in the summer of 1937 at a dinner party at the British Consulate-General, the so-called Pera House, in Istanbul in her memoir, Pack and Follow (1945).
66 TNA, FO 1011/194, Loraine to Thoroton (February 11, 1938), 1-8.
68 TNA, FO 1011/239, S.F.A. Coles, Diplomat on Horseback, 14.
69 Ibid., 17-18.

Images:

Page 103: “British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) visiting with President Atatürk (left) and King Edward VIII (center),” picture, September 7, 1936, via Cumhuriyet (The Republic).
For much of early American history, the general public’s racially charged preconceptions of “Indian war,” defined by stereotypes of guerrilla fighting and “savage” atrocities such as scalping, were central to how Americans understood the terrors of war. Often forgotten today though, is the prominent role this fear played during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The fear of Indian war allowed for clear, and often intentional, parallels to be discerned by onlookers between the reported natives’ atrocities of the Dakota War (1862) in Minnesota (also known as the Sioux Uprising of 1862) and the concurrent American Civil War. The presence of Native American combatants on Civil War battlefields resulted in the “indianizing” of the Union’s enemy, which ranged from criticisms of the Confederacy’s interest and success in recruiting and employing indigenous support to censures of the tactics and morals maintained by the Confederate military and political leadership in all theatres of the war. The Union’s rhetoric of indianizing the Confederacy also helped to solidify the rumors of southern agents encouraging the Sioux Uprising.

This paper examines how the rhetoric of indianizing the enemy influenced northerners’ understandings of the Civil War and the Dakota War as well as the connections between these armed conflicts. By tying Indian war and its accompanying atrocities to Confederate policies, the northern press purposefully
connected the Dakota War to a pre-existing racial framework of Indian-Confederate convergence that had, particularly in reaction to the Battle of Pea Ridge (March 1862) in the Civil War, emerged earlier. Understanding the connections between these two wars of rebellion provides insight into the psyche of northern civilians in 1862 and offers a unique perspective on the role of Native Americans during the Civil War era.

**INDIANIZING THE ENEMY BEFORE THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR**

The rhetorical strategy of comparing American enemies to the “savagery” of indigenous populations has a long and controversial history as war propaganda dating back to the Colonial Period. During the American War of Independence (1775-1783), revolutionary propagandists accused their British and Loyalist opponents of enabling Indian “savagery”—particularly scalping. Similarly, Tories responded in kind. Immediately following the Battles of Lexington and Concord (April 1775), British General Thomas Gage, then serving as the Royal Governor of Massachusetts, published a broadside in Boston claiming that his forces had found three British “Soldiers on the Ground one of them scalped, his Head much mangled, and his Ears cut off, tho’ not quite dead; a Sight which struck the Soldiers with horror.”¹ The British publication *Scots Magazine* also responded to the incident by describing Americans through racial comparisons to Indian “savages.” The magazine declared that the Americans’ “humanity is written in the indelible characters with the blood of the soldiers scalped and googed [sic] at Lexington.”²

Another famous case is that of Thomas ‘Burnfoot’ Brown. A Loyalist from Georgia, Brown refused to join the revolutionaries’ cause and, subsequently, was captured by the Sons of Liberty. According to Brown’s testimony, he was “o’erpowered, stabbed in many places, my skull fractured
by a blow from a rifle, [and then] I was dragged in a state of insensibility to Augusta. My hair was then chiefly torn up by the roots; what remained stripped off by knives; my head scalped in 3 or 4 different places; my legs tarred and burnt by lighted torches, from which I lost the use of two of my toes.” 

While the veracity of this incident and other reported confrontations of “barbarous” violence is suspect, these dramatic accounts gained popularity and prevalence in the press and demonstrated the extent to which both the British in the metropole and the Loyalists in North America used the racial rhetoric of Indian war to demonize their American adversaries.

While British media charged Americans with Indian savagery, most accusations of barbarianism during the War of Independence came from the revolutionary polemic directed against the British. Arguably the most famous of these rhetorical attacks was the tale of Jane McCrea, the intended bride of a Loyalist lieutenant, who was abducted by Indians allied with the British commander John Burgoyne, and then shot and scalped. In response to the news, General Horatio Gates of the Continental Army sent a letter denouncing Burgoyne to the Second Continental Congress and newspaper outlets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, declaring:

That the savages of America should…mangle and scalp…[is not new]…that the famous lieut. Gen. Burgoyne…should hire the Savages of America to scalp Europeans and the descendants of Europeans; nay more, that he should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed in Europe, until authenticated facts shall, in every Gazette, convince mankind of the truth of the horrid tale. 

Following its publication in Philadelphia, McCrea’s story spread quickly throughout the American Colonies and outraged colonists, inspiring greater support for independence. As a
result, pro-American newspapers began this trend to “indianize” the British. For example, in 1781, Philadelphia’s *Freeman’s Journal* wrote that British support of Native Americans was evidence that they were “the same brutes and savages they were when Julius Caesar invaded … for it is certain their mixture with the Saxons and other foreigners, has done very little toward their civilization.”

Employing racially charged language previously used exclusively against Native Americans, the American press during the War of Independence denounced their British enemies as unredeemable savages who emulated, and even surpassed, the cruelty of their Native American allies.

Americans revived this form of propaganda again during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), as proponents of the war often likened Mexicans to Indian “savages” based on racist concepts of “race-mixing” between the natives and the Spanish colonizers. For example, Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi claimed that “five sixths” of Mexico’s population was of “the mixed races, speaking more than twenty different languages, composed of every poisonous compound of blood and color…[and are] barbarous hordes.” Thus, when reports of Indian violence under Confederate command reached northern civilians during the Civil War, the Union press revived the rhetorical strategy by associating Indian savagery to lambast Confederate forces.

**THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE AND INDIANIZING THE CONFEDERACY**

The most explosive incident of Native American engagement in the main theaters of the Civil War occurred in March 1862 at the Battle of Pea Ridge, near Leetown on the northwest corner of Arkansas. Pea Ridge was the first major battle to feature Indian troops, mostly Cherokee, under the command of Confederate Brigadier General Albert Pike. Indeed, a majority of the Cherokee people, one of the five indigenous nations
known collectively as the Five Civilized Tribes, had allied with the Confederacy after meeting with a delegation led by Pike in the summer of 1861. Nonetheless, Pike, under orders of Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, was pessimistic about the native battalions he commanded. While Van Dorn favorably described Pike’s 2500 native soldiers as “half breed Indians, and good reliable men,” the Brigadier General later claimed that the troops were “entirely undisciplined, mounted chiefly on ponies and armed very indifferently with common rifles and ordinary shotguns.”

Moreover, the militarily inexperienced Pike struggled to control his indigenous battalions once engaged in combat. After taking the Union position at Foster’s Farm during the Battle of Pea Ridge, the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles routed two companies of the Third Iowa Cavalry directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Trimble. Contrary to Pike’s desires, in the ensuing

Plan of the Battlefield of Pea Ridge, near Leetown, Arkansas
chaos, the native troops scalped eight Union soldiers in Trimble’s detachment. Consequently, Colonel Cyrus Bussey, the chief commanding officer of the Third Iowa Cavalry, informed his superior, Samuel R. Curtis, the commander of the Army of the Southwest:

[I] had the dead exhumed, and on personal examination… found that it was a fact beyond dispute that eight of the killed of my command had been scalped…first having fallen in the charge…they were afterwards pierced through the heart and neck with knives by a savage and relentless foe.

While the Union forces under Curtis recovered to win the Battle of Pea Ridge, the incident at Foster’s Farm dominated in the press. Van Dorn tried to repress and excuse the incident, claiming through his Adjutant General Dabney H. Maury that Curtis was “misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians who formed part of [Pike’s] forces having for many years been regarded as civilized people.” Van Dorn also accused Union forces of committing their own atrocities, primarily blaming Germans, the largest ethnic group employed by Union forces, thereby attempting to capitalize on Confederates’ attempts to revive anti-Hessian sentiment first harbored during the War of Independence. In particular, Van Dorn employed the racially charged accusation that captured Confederate soldiers had been “murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans.” However, despite Van Dorn’s allegations Pike felt compelled to write to Curtis personally, expressing horror at the atrocity, and chastised his troops accordingly, issuing an order prohibiting the practice of scalping.

Despite Pike’s efforts to discipline his indigenous troops after the incident, the northern press lambasted the Brigadier General. In the aftermath of Pea Ridge, anti-Confederate propaganda converged on Pike with the racially motivated
rhetoric of Indian War. The most prominent source for this propaganda came from an article in the *New-York Tribune* written by journalist Junius Henri Browne. Browne’s melodramatic account of the battle described Pike as a man “who deserves and will doubtless receive eternal infamy...for inducing savages to [perform] shocking barbarities...[ordering] scalping and robbing...their favorite pastimes...[for] they plundered every wounded, dying and dead Unionist they could find...[murdering those] incapable of resistance.” Browne then emphasized, “the [Confederate] rebels did everything...to excite them into a frenzy giving them large quantities of whiskey and gunpowder a few minutes previous to the commencement of hostilities.”

In an editorial in the *New-York Tribune* a few days later, again Pike was described in terms that resemble a pejorative attack on indigenous warriors:

Pike [is a] ferocious fish...[who] got himself up in good style, war-paint, nose-ring and all...[he] led the Aboriginal Corps of Tomahawkers and Scalpers at the Battle of Pea Ridge...was indicted for playing the part of Squeers, and cruelly beating and starving a boy in his family. He escaped by some hocus-pocus of a law and emigrated to the West, where the violence of his nature has been admirably enhanced...[he] has fought duels enough to qualify...[as] a leader of savages...[he is a] new Pontiac...and betaken himself to the culture of the Great Spirit...[or] Spirits—Whisky being the second. So much for Pike!

The sensationalized detail afforded to descriptions of Pike and accusations of Indian treachery, however, were more likely an attempt to distract readers from the vagueness of Browne’s account of the actual fighting:

Desperate but desultory; now here, now there, at one
Journalist Junius Henri Browne’s fraudulent map detailing the “positions” of Union and Confederate forces at the Battle of Pea Ridge
moment on a hill, at the next in a ravine. Skirmishing was visible everywhere and hard hand-to-hand fighting in every quarter of the field. Now advancing, now retreating were our forces; now marching forward, now countermarching; now appearing, now disappearing, but ever moving forward to victory.\textsuperscript{18}

Indeed, in its specificities, Browne’s account of the fighting was fictitious. The journalist’s description of the Confederate position differed from those relayed by other war correspondents, including Browne’s main rival, Thomas Knox of the \textit{New York Herald}, who also claimed to be present at the Battle of Pea Ridge. To be sure, unlike Knox’s account, Browne’s article featured a wildly inaccurate map on which he placed commanders in incorrect locations and claimed that the battle took place in an area four times as large as the actual battlefield. While Knox and fellow reporter William Fayel of the \textit{Daily Missouri Democrat} did verify Browne’s claim that scalping occurred—which was also later confirmed by Union military reports—there was no evidence or corroborating witness to substantiate Browne’s most extraordinary accusation: that Pike’s Indians also attacked and scalped their Confederate allies in the violent frenzy that followed the assault on the Third Iowa Cavalry. These inconsistencies, therefore, support the notion that Browne was not present at Pea Ridge and that the journalist’s account was propagandistic yellow journalism most likely mixed with facts, rumors, hearsay, and self-invented narratives to demonize the Confederates. Still, to the anxious northerners who read Browne’s article, Pike was no better than the savage natives he commanded, despite the fact that the Brigadier General discouraged scalping among his men.\textsuperscript{19}

Meanwhile, Knox’s more accurate account of the battle gained little traction among readers. It would take a month until the \textit{New York Herald} even chastised Browne and the \textit{New-York Tribune} for deceiving the public through “imposture more
flagitious [than] is...conceivable.”

But the resulting war of words between the *New York Herald* and the *New-York Tribune* produced only mild public outcry. In 1862, as a quick end to war appeared increasingly unlikely, anxious northerners were more concerned with demonizing their Confederate enemies than obtaining accurate accounts of a battle in the distant Trans-Mississippi Theater. In fact, by the time the fraudulence of Browne’s account was exposed, it was already being celebrated in Britain as a model of war journalism and being praised by the influential editor of the *New-York Tribune*, Horace Greeley, as a story that “should be placed in every National soldier’s hands.”

Thus, while this one incident conducted by the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles in the Trans-Mississippi Theater occurred far away from the primary focus of the Civil War (the Eastern Theater), it is evident that the sensationalized journalism of Browne helped revive the rhetoric of “savage” Indian violence as a way to describe Confederate enemies. Consequently, as the Dakota War began in the late summer of 1862, the reported horrors of scalping at Pea Ridge was the enduring vision of Indian war maintained by many northerners, making the rumors of a Confederate plot unfolding in Minnesota seem likely.

**THE DAKOTA WAR AND THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1862**

Caused by a host of regional tensions between white settlers—food shortages, treaty violations, and the corruption of government agencies regulating Native American affairs—and exacerbated by the military and financial pressures of the Civil War, the Dakota War in Minnesota was one of the most significant Indian Wars of the nineteenth century. The conflict launched a period of nearly thirty years of intermittent warfare between the United States and the Sioux, often referred to as the Sioux Wars, that did not end until “Siouxan independence came to its final, tragic end on a cold day in December, 1890, in the
Despite its military and causal ties to the Civil War, most Americans regarded the Dakota War as a peripheral event in 1862. Nevertheless, the Dakota War haunted northerners as a powerful symbol of the disastrous setbacks that had plagued the Union war effort throughout the year. Decisive successes in the Western Theater, including at Pea Ridge and Shiloh, did little to assuage anxiety over the ensuing failures of Union forces in the East. The most prominent of these setbacks was the disastrous defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run in August at the hands of General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. The Union defeat was so embarrassing that President Abraham Lincoln relieved the foremost Union commander, Major General John Pope, from his position and reassigned Pope to the Department of the Northwest in Minnesota to command troops in the Dakota War.

Few Americans outside of Minnesota saw the rebellion in the Dakota as a central concern or even understood the Sioux Uprising’s connections to the Civil War. However, the distant conflict emerged as an outlet for northerners to externalize their anxiety as the once unimaginable prospect of Union military collapse seemed increasingly possible with the threat of a Confederate and Indian western front. Northern anxiety about a Confederate and Indian alliance in the West, combined with reports of atrocities from the Minnesota front, resulted in the revival of the rhetoric of Confederate-Indian convergence that had emerged following the Battle of Pea Ridge. Deep-seated fears and stereotypes of Indian war among northerners made it easy for Union magazines and newspapers to connect the Confederacy’s use of “savage” Indian allies at Pea Ridge to the reports of atrocities during the Dakota War.

Indianizing the Confederacy

Massacre at Wounded Knee.”

INDIANIZING THE ENEMY IN THE DAKOTA WAR

Reports of violent atrocities committed by Native
Americans were common during the Dakota War. For example, on August 18, 1862, following a raid by natives on the Schwandt family, August Schwandt, recounted, “the daughter of Mr. Schwandt [August’s sister, Karolina Schwandt Walz], enceinte [pregnant], was cut open, as was learned afterward, the child taken alive from the mother, and nailed to a tree...It struggled some time after the nails were driven through it!”\(^24\) Similarly, a female captive who was living with the Sioux observed, “A boy twelve years of age, whose parents had probably been murdered, fretted and cried a good deal of the time, saying he wanted to go home. The Indians killed him by cutting him into pieces, commencing at his feet and then cutting his legs into small chunks.”\(^25\) While the kind of sensationalized violence typical of this literature reflected real anxieties of white settlers and soldiers on the Minnesota frontier, these and similar reports should be read with skepticism. As Colonel Henry H. Sibley wrote to his wife Sarah, “Do not believe the thousand extravagant reports you hear. People are absolutely crazy with excitement and credit every absurdity.”\(^26\) Nevertheless, these accounts of atrocities all featured grotesque violence and greatly exceeded the brutality of common stereotypes of Indian war, including scalping. But contrary to the popular perception of Indian war at the time, white settlers and soldiers rarely reported scalping performed by Indians during the Dakota War.

Ironically, Union troops and white settlers were responsible for the most well-known scalping incidents during this armed conflict, including the scalping of the famous Sioux leader, Little Crow.\(^27\) During the Dakota War, the state of Minnesota institutionalized a bounty system to encourage scalping of Native Americans. For instance, the *Annual Report of the Adjutant General for 1863*, an account of military activity in Minnesota during the previous year, disclosed that on August 7, 1862, a bounty of $75.00 (approximately $1800 in 2016 dollars) was paid to W.M. Allen for killing a single Sioux warrior, while on August 31, Julius Schmidt received a bounty of $5.00 (approximately $120
in 2016 dollars) for tanning a native’s scalp.28 This state sanction of indiscriminate violence, coupled with a financial incentive, largely normalized the practice of scalping among white troops. In his account of the Battle of New Ulm (August 1862), Colonel Charles Eugene Flandreau, the leading American commander in the engagement, described how without any trepidation “a half breed named Le Blanc lay in the grass as our men advanced, and fired and wounded one of them…[so] a bullet sped after him, and cut the great artery on the shoulder…[Le Blanc] was soon finished, his head cut off and scalped.”29 As whites, rather than natives, were the primary scalpers of the Dakota War, the kind
of stereotypical Native American violence that the Confederates supposedly encouraged at Pea Ridge was conspicuously absent, belying the rumors that the Sioux Uprising was a Confederate orchestrated plot.

Yet, despite their own use of scalping (among other atrocities), northern whites often vilified scalping as a sanguineous and treacherous indigenous practice. Following the Battle of Fort Abercrombie (September 1862), white settler Edgar Wright was found mutilated as his body was “ripped up from the navel to the throat. The heart and liver taken out. The lungs left on the chest, the head cut off scalped and struck in the cavity of the abdomen with the face toward the feet.”30 Additionally, Private William Schultz was found nearby, “with his skull smashed in, and his brains scattered about.”31 But, upon further review, white troops had committed similar actions earlier at New Ulm and Wood Lake (September 1862). Still, these atrocities were not acknowledged, as evidenced by the *St. Cloud Democrat*: the newspaper denounced these acts as uniquely the work of indigenous “savages” and “demons” who sought to use “their most diabolical and ingenious devices of cruelty” against innocent settlers.32

While this hypocrisy was certainly racially motivated, it was also a conscious choice to rationalize the expulsion and mass annihilation of the Sioux. Accounts of scalping during the Dakota War emphasized the innocence of white victims compared to the wickedness of Sioux savagery. The *St. Cloud Democrat* claimed that those scalped at Fort Abercrombie were “void of offense toward their foe, men of unblemished reputation against whom the Indians could have had no memory of wrongs to be revenged.” The newspaper celebrated Wright for being a man with a “high sense of honor and strict integrity” who had kindly befriended the Sioux before they cruelly betrayed him. Minnesota newspapers used the sensationalized accounts of these atrocities to support the conclusion that the Native Americans were malevolent “Hell Hounds” who had to be “swept from
the face of the Earth, old and young, male and female.”

This kind of genocidal anti-native rhetoric remained common in the aftermath of the Sioux Uprising, as evidenced by renown social reformer Harriet E. Bishop, who recalled gory descriptions of violent atrocities committed by the indigenous population and called these acts necessary to ensure that “Indian sympathizers may see the diabolical natures of the foe our State has had to meet. We think it a mock philanthropy which would screen these guilty, unprovoked wretched from merited justice.”

Evidently, scalping, while ironically more commonly used by white soldiers than Native Americans, emerged as a powerful symbol through which Minnesotans encouraged and rationalized the elimination of the Sioux.

When news of these atrocities reached anxious Union audiences in the East, the northern readers were horrified. However, rather than simply demonize the natives like their counterparts in St. Cloud, presses in New York quickly co-opted the rhetoric established in reactions to Pea Ridge to describe the atrocities of the Dakota War. The resulting escalation of the fictitious rumors of a Confederate plot in Minnesota in Union magazines and newspapers reveals the extent to which northern audiences understood the Dakota War through the lens of the Civil War. This can be seen in an infamously cartoon of the Sioux Uprising published by the New York based Harper’s Weekly magazine on September 13, 1862. Published ten days before the decisive defeat of Chief Little Crow and the Sioux forces at the Battle of Wood Lake, which ended the conflict’s main military phase, the cartoon supported the ongoing rumors that the Dakota War, and the “savagery” practiced by the Sioux, was the product of a Confederate plot.

The image, and its accompanying caption, directly connected the Sioux Uprising to a Confederate plot through the long-standing tropes of Indian war that had been recently revived through the press following reactions to the Battle of Pea Ridge. The natives depicted in the image resemble the “subhuman
“I am happy to inform you that, in spite both of blandishments and threats, used in profusion by the agents of the government of the United States, the Indian nations within the confederacy have remained firm in their loyalty and steadfast in the observance of their treaty. 

(The above Extract from JEFF DAVIS’S last Message will serve to explain the News from Minnesota.)”

The scalping scene depicted here does not resemble most accounts of Native American violence reported from the Minnesota Front, and, most likely, was the product of the artist’s preconceived stereotypes of “Indian war.”

and wanton brutes” that Browne in the New-York Tribune had described as fighters for the Confederacy at Pea Ridge: “the appearance of some of the besotted savages was fearful. They lost their sense of caution and fear, and ran with long knives against large odds...with bloody hands and garments...with glittering eyes and horrid scowls, they raged about the field with terrible yells.”35 In fact, even though Browne’s article and the cartoon in Harper’s Weekly depicted the scalping of two distinct defenseless groups—Browne detailed the scalping of wounded soldiers at Pea Ridge, while the the cartoon centered on the scalping of women and infants—it is worth noting that since the Colonial Period, wounded soldiers and women were regarded
as the typical victims of savage physical mutilation. Far from an accurate portrayal of the violence of the Dakota War, however, the *Harper’s Weekly* image, like the Browne’s fraudulent account of the Battle of Pea Ridge, was a reflection of how Americans had reimagined the horrors of Indian war during the Civil War.

While the fear of Indian war had long been a part of the American psyche, its renewed effectiveness stemmed from its ability to indianize, and thereby demonize, Confederate rebels. The *New-York Tribune* described the natives’ behavior at Pea Ridge as unremarkable, with the savages having only “repeated the outrages upon civilized warfare and the shocking barbarities with which our early history has made us familiar.” Similarly, the fact that the Sioux were scalping women and children in the *Harper’s Weekly* image was merely what most American’s had come to expect based on stereotypes of Indian war. Moreover, the caption of the *Harper’s Weekly* cartoon implied that through scalping, the Sioux “have remained firm in their loyalty and steadfast in the observance of their treaty engagements with [the Confederacy].” The presence of a liquor jug labeled “Agent C.S.A. [Confederate States of America]” lying directly behind the violent scene reinforced the notion that the Confederacy encouraged these acts of savage violence. Upon further review, the presence of alcohol in both the denouncement of Pike in the *New-York Tribune* and the cartoon in *Harper’s Weekly* opens up a series of potential interpretations. It may be a reference to the long-standing stereotype of alcoholism among indigenous communities. Alternatively, or perhaps, additionally, the presence of alcohol in these depictions may seek to connect the Confederates to encouraging alcohol use and moral degeneration.

**CONNECTING THE DAKOTA WAR AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR THROUGH INDIANIZATION**

While there is little evidence of Confederate involvement in the Dakota War, the connection drawn between the Confederacy
and the Sioux atrocities would have seemed natural to a northern audience recently exposed to the reports of Native Americans scalping at Pea Ridge. The attempts to associate Indian “savagery” and Confederate political and military policies suggested that the horror of Native American violence was principally a product of Confederate machinations. The accuracy of the accounts was secondary, present only to create a veneer of authenticity. Union critiques of scalping, whether at Pea Ridge or in Minnesota, were primarily a pretense to criticize the Confederacy for enabling and allying with Indian savagery.

The Civil War and the Dakota War, while often viewed by scholars in isolation, appeared intrinsically linked for Union citizens on the home front. Northern propagandists used the racial understandings that underpinned this rhetoric to portray Indian savagery as convergent with the interests and principles of the Confederacy in both politics and military leadership. These sources of anti-Confederate propaganda revived the racial rhetoric of Indian war that had first emerged during the Colonial Period, and served as an outlet for northern anxiety in the face of military defeat in the East and the prospect of a joint Confederate-Indian front in the West.
Indianizing the Confederacy

1 Thomas Gage, *A Circumstantial Account of an Attack that Happened on the 19th of April 1775, on his Majesty's Troops* (Boston: Broadside Printed by John Howe, 1775).


7 Pike’s forces also included members of the Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek.


12 Christian Keller, *Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and Civil War Memory* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 25; Jan H. Brunvand, *American Folklore: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 684. Anti-German propaganda was common in the Confederacy during the Civil War. A popular broadside poem entitled “Battle at Bulls Run” celebrated the Confederate victory at the First Battle of Bull Run and contained the lyrics, “Lee’s coming! Hark, the drumming! Fly you hireling Hessian knaves; He will scourge you, he will purge you, Run you dirty Lincoln slaves.” See the entire song at http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/stocksheets_bsvg501656/#info. In an 1864 volume of the *Southern Literary Review*, a writer using the pseudonym Sigma attempted to capitalize on southerners’ anti-German fear by indicating that the Unionists were trying to export the radical elements of the European Revolutions of 1848, claiming that the Confederates were fighting against the “reddest of all German Red Republicans [who] swarmed down to Washington, [as] a mob of lunatics [and] adopted, in their thirst for the patronage of spoils of party, the uncompromising motto ‘Rule or Ruin.’” Sigma, “Southern Individualism,” *Southern Literary Messenger* 38 (January 1864), 371. For more information on the racially charged relationship


15 Entitled, “THE GREAT BATTLE OF SUGAR CREEK-THE UTTER ROUT OF THE REBELS-TERRIFIC FIGHTING BY UNION FORCES.” Browne called the engagement the Battle of Sugar Creek (an actual nearby location), but it is almost universally referred to as the Battle of Pea Ridge.


17 Referring to Wackford Squeers, the greedy and cruel schoolmaster in Charles Dickens’ novel, *Nicholas Nickleby* (1839); *Ashtabula Weekly Telegraph*, April 5, 1862.


19 Lyde Cullen-Sizer, and Jim Cullen eds., *The Civil War Era: An Anthology of Sources*, 237. Pike’s reputation was ruined and although his troops had achieved their main objectives, the Brigadier General was the scapegoat for the Confederates’ failure at Pea Ridge and, subsequently, resigned his command in disgrace on July 12. Walter Lee Brown, *Life of Albert Pike* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997), 408.


22 The Sioux were aware of the federal government’s vulnerability due to the Civil War and, consequently, were willing to use it to their advantage. As Sioux Chief Big Eagle explained, “A great many of the white men of Minnesota… went to Fort Snelling to be sent south. We understood that the [Confederacy] was getting the best of the fight…[so] it began to be whispered about that now would be a good time to go to war with the whites and get back the lands.” Gary Clayton Anderson, *Through Dakota Eyes* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 2014), 25-26.


Indianizing the Confederacy


27 For example, Big Eagle, a chief and military leader during the Dakota War, reported that following a battle against men under Colonel Sibley’s command, “The whites drove our men out of the ravine by a charge and that ended the battle…we lost fourteen or fifteen men…we carried off no dead bodies… the whites scalped all our dead men—so I have heard.” Anderson, *Through Dakota Eyes*, 237.


30 Fort Abercrombie is located in modern-day Abercrombie, North Dakota, a small city in the southeast corner of the state. *St. Cloud Democrat*, October 2, 1862.


32 *St. Cloud Democrat*, October 2, 1862.

33 Ibid.

34 McConkey, *Dakota War Whoop or Indian Massacres and War in Minnesota of 1862-1863*, 156.


36 Ibid.

Images:


Page 127: “Indian Outrage in the Northwest,” drawing, October 25, 1862,
