9-6-2012

Recusancy and Regicide: the Flawed Strategy of the Jesuit Mission in Elizabethan England

Carolyn Vinnicombe
University of Pennsylvania, cvinn@wharton.upenn.edu

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol19/iss2/3
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recusancy and Regicide: the Flawed Strategy of the Jesuit Mission in Elizabethan England

This journal article is available in Penn History Review: http://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol19/iss2/3
In pursuing their goals of reviving the religious zeal of the English Catholic community by converting them to religious opposition in the later sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries, the drivers of the Jesuit mission in England, under the guidance of the Jesuit Robert Persons, failed. They did so not because Catholic doctrine lacked appeal in protestant Elizabethan England, but because their conversion strategy was wholly unsuited to the political realities of the times. Instead, the aggregate effects of the Church’s clerical infighting over the issues of conformity and disputation as a conversion device, failure to understand the practical needs of the average Catholic, and Person’s ill-fated political plotting polarized the English against the Jesuits and created a religious and political environment so toxic that it cannibalized the mission’s own conversion efforts. Though the Jesuits saw later success with the publication of their non-polemic spiritual texts, they never succeeded in gaining back the ground they lost as a result of their catastrophic early strategy.

I: Recusancy

The issue of conformity to the Elizabethan Settlement of 1569 presented a dilemma without an absolute solution for the English Catholic community. When Pope Pius V’s Regans in Excelsis of 1570, excommunicated the queen, and prompted her regime to mandate attendance at protestant services, it left English Catholics floundering to find traction on the plane of religious devotion. Could they still call themselves Catholics if they yielded to the state and attended protestant services, but maintained Catholicism in their hearts, or were only those who defied the state and refused to attend services worthy of the “Catholic” label and, indeed, salvation? This was a question for which neither the laity nor the Church had a clear answer.

Recusants, or those who refused to attend protestant services, were
acknowledged by the Catholic Church to be the highest, most noble sort of Catholics. The question that drove a wedge through the Church was whether all laymen and women should be held to the same standard. Catholics like cardinal William Allen stressed that the Church should harbor empathy for the English Catholics’ “excessive troubles, pains and perils” as a result of the recusancy laws and use “great compassion and mercifullness towards the laity especially as for mere fear or saving their family... [that they] are so fare fallen as to come sometimes to their churches or be present at the time of their service.” Others, such as Catholic priest and protestant polemist Thomas Bell, went a step beyond Allen’s toleration of sporadic conformity and asserted that it was permissible for Catholics regularly to attend protestant services. He asserted: “Good people, I am come hither not for any liking I have of any sacraments, service, or sermons accustomably used in this place, or to exhibit any reverence for the same, but only to give a sign of my allegiance and true loyalty to my prince.” Bell and the subscribers to his philosophy asserted that it was possible to be a true Catholic and a loyal subject in Elizabethan England and maintained that political loyalties could exist outside the realm of religious persuasion. The Jesuit Henry Garnet supported this view by asserting that attending protestant services to keep out of jail was permissible and that there wasn’t a single priest in England who “disagrees in this point from his reverend and worthy fellows.” Sadly for the English Catholic community, this was not the case.

Robert Persons and his Jesuit contemporaries in England committed themselves to eradicating outward conformity and “church papistry” by “maintain[ing] that staunch recusancy was that only stance conscientious Catholic lay people could safely adopt.” In direct contrast to Allen and Bell, Persons affirmed that all Catholics should, in fact, be held to the standard of the recusants and celebrated recusant gentry willing to risk arrest rather than compromise their faith: “It was even lately proposed to certain noblemen to come, if it were only once a year, to church, making, it they pleased, a previous protestation that they came not to approve of their religion, or doctrines, but only to show an outward obedience to the Queen; and yet all most constantly
in England; and, secondly, to bring back to it whoever may have strayed from it either through ignorance or at the instigation of others.”

When formally blessing the Young Catholic Men’s Club, headed by Person’s lay assistant George Gilbert, on April 14, 1580, Pope Gregory XIII wrote that these “subseminaries… conductors, companions, and comforters of priests… lay brothers… [were to] struggle abroad and bring in game”, and whose business it was “not to argue, but to pry in corners to get men to entertain conference of the priests or inveigle youth to fly overseas to the seminaries.”

Contrary to the instructions of the Pope and the Father General, Persons and his fellow missionary, the Jesuit Edmund Campion, favored the conversion strategy of disputation, often overlooking its dubious efficacy. Rather than yield to Gregory XIII’s command to avoid argument, Persons was said to have “[spoken] so boldly to the papists, to deprive Queene Elizabeth of her scepter.”

Though George Gilbert conceded, “the heretical spirit is so much given to pride that few of them are converted by argument;” he instructs missionaries to use disputation to convert those “heretics through ignorance… [who are] quite easily converted.”

This obstinate adherence to the disputation strategy reveals the rigidity of Persons and Campion as well as the ominous rifts between them and the pontificate. Despite the reservations Gilbert expressed about disputation, Campion asserted, “I know perfectly well that no one protestant, nor all the protestants living, nor any sect of our adversaries (however they face men down in pulpits and overrule us in their kingdom of grammarians and unlearned ears) can maintain their doctrine in disputation”

In the coming months, however, Campion would find himself arrested, tortured, and brutally executed because of his aggressive disputation strategy that yielded largely unquantifiable results. Perhaps there was some wisdom behind the pontificate’s instructions to steer clear of polemic disputation – a no-win conversion strategy.

After his lay colleague Thomas Pounde of Belmont published Campion’s *The great bragge and challenge of M. Champion a Iesuite* in 1581, Campion wrote to the Father General, “there will never want in England men that will have care for their own salvation, nor such
Portraits of Robert Persons (left, 1546-1610), Cardinal William Allen (right, 1532-1594), and Henry Garnet (below, 1555-1606). Garnet was subsequently executed for his role in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605.
refused.”

By creating factions within the Church over the issue of conformity, Bell, Garnet, and Persons effectively weakened the Catholic position by driving a wedge through its core, thereby generating confusion for its members. These divisions at the top of the church hierarchy trickled down and manifested themselves in divisions within the English Catholic community. Once-united families, such as the Brownes and Darells, severed ties with each other over one or the other’s loyalty or disloyalty to the Jesuit position. They then, via patronage networks, disseminated their differing opinions to the common Catholics, thereby increasing confusion and decreasing commitment to Catholicism in this time of trial. What the English Catholics needed most from their Church was a solid authority on what was right and wrong; it failed them on this account.

This clerical infighting became so powerful that it transcended questions of lay persuasion and manifested itself in divisions in the body of the Church itself. As the Jesuit William Wright lamented to his colleague Henry Garnet in 1596, Catholic priests often became frustrated with the Church’s rigidity on the issue of conformity as they attempted to help the church appeal to broader audiences and received “nothing but infamy and detrations” from their clerical peers in return. Too often, attempts at debate over the issue or “undiscreet proceedings… [had been] the ruin of many… [and] a cause of many Protestants.” Catholic priests sometimes found themselves driven to such frustration that they left the Church altogether. While there is no evidence to suggest that this phenomenon was widespread, its occurrence suggests that the Jesuits’ rigidity on the issue of conformity drove some away from the Church, thereby accomplishing the opposite of what the missionaries intended.

Clerical infighting also extended from the issue of conformity to the issue of conversion strategy. In a letter to Allen, the Jesuit Father General Everard Mercurian expressly instructed him that the English missionaries were to avoid disputation with Protestants whenever possible, “unless necessity force them.” Rather, they were to “advance in the faith and in our Catholic religion all who are found to be Catholics
as shall advance other men’s, neither shall this church fail so long as priests and pastors shall be found for their sheep, rage man or devil never so much.” Campion believed that a devoted Catholic clergy would be enough to ensure the missions’ success. While no one would doubt the priests’ dedication, it is clear that devotion would not be enough to convert the papists; they needed an effective strategy in order to succeed. The central weaknesses of polemic disputation as a conversion strategy are that its fails to produce any sort of absolute authority on contested issues and that it caters to academics, not average laymen.

Though Persons and Campion believed that Catholicism could triumph over Protestantism in any debate, their opponents felt the same about Protestantism. Since both sides were utterly convinced of the rightness of their arguments, neither would make any concessions. In forming their arguments, both Catholic and Protestant polemists drew upon highly-disputed patristic texts as the foundation of their arguments. As the Catholic polemicist William Rainolds noted, this strategy yielded “no kind of stay or assurance, no matter of certaintie or steadfastness… no order to forme to conclude and resolve of anything” because no one except the patristic authors could draw absolute truths from them.

Persons and Campion attempted to create a larger authority by triumphing over Protestantism in disputation, but this conversion platform was too weak to yield success. In order for disputation to work, it required a (preferably weak) response from the other side. Debate, therefore, placed the Jesuits in a feeble position of over-reliance on their opponents. For example, when Persons wrote A Treatise of the Three Conversions of England from 1603 to 1604 as a rebuttal to John Foxe’s works, it went unanswered.

Additionally, the practicalities of engaging in polemical debate invited damage from the other side. One must note the tremendous amount of time and effort exerted to produce a reply in these debates. In the lag period between replies, either side could untruthfully claim success by asserting the superiority of its argument. In some cases, protestants declared victory by saying their logic “could not be answered.”

In
other cases, Catholics also claimed polemical victories on the grounds of unanswered disputation: Thomas Bell wrote that papists’ “silence in not answering my... bookes, hath reclaimed many a man from their popish faction”\(^{16}\). Such assertions suggest the absence of any clear footing from which either side could declare victory in polemic disputation.

Perhaps the greatest reason for the weakness of the Jesuits’ conversion strategy was, however, that Queen Elizabeth had forbidden public disputation about Catholic doctrine. The regime felt that uncontrolled polemic undermined the government’s authority, expressed in the *Book of Common Prayer*; therefore, it considered such activities dangerous. Campion’s *Ten Reasons* (1581) and Person’s *Brief Discours* (1580) naively addressed Elizabeth and her Council directly, reminding them that they had forbidden disputation and soliciting permission to engage in open debate in the Queen’s presence! As Joseph Rickaby notes in the translator’s preface to Jesuit scholar John H. Pollen’s edition of Campion’s *Ten Reasons*, the “Protestant answer to the Ten Reasons was not given in the Divinity School at Oxford. It was the rack in the Tower, and the gibbet at Tyburn; and that answer was returned ere the year was out.”\(^{17}\) In short, the regime shattered Persons and Campion’s ill-conceived vision of the mission’s success through debate in a state-sponsored academic forum. The fact that the Jesuits did not follow the pontificate’s instructions became a problem that grew exponentially; Pollen notes that, as time went on, “[i]nstead of the Jesuits being expected to confine their ministrations more or less exclusively to their co-religionists, the great public began to look for disputations and challenges to disputation as an integral, perhaps a leading feature of the Jesuits’ missionary work.”\(^{18}\) This association became a cancer in the side of the mission as the ineptitude of the Jesuit strategy became increasingly apparent.

II: **Regicide**

Despite the Jesuits’ painstaking conversion efforts, their success remained minimal. Though Persons and his peers continually boasted of the so-called *multitudes* converted, there is little hard evidence to
support this figure. On the whole, the disputation strategy appears to have failed to change the laymen’s minds from Protestantism. The Jesuits entirely failed to place themselves in the shoes of the everyday Catholic; it follows that without understanding their hearts and minds, they had no hope of winning them.

Beginning with the disastrous Regnans in Excelsis bull in 1570, and following with the Jesuits’ strategic misteps in the subsequent decades, the Church systematically alienated its English laity. The Regnans ignited the regime’s hysterical fear of the Jesuits and instigated its painting them as “English Fugitiues [who] were doersome and excit[ed] strangers to war against their Prince and Countrey.” To the regime, the Jesuits sought to fill the authoritative gap of the monarch they sought to depose and operated “to no other purpose than to increase affection and courage of their owne people, to affright and terrific others; and by this means, to seduce and with-draw them from that love and loyaltie which they ought to their Soueraigne Princesse and Countrey, Queene Elizabeth.” It appears that the Church may have followed up on the Jesuits’ insistence that one cannot be a loyal Catholic and a loyal subject by provoking the regime to make it illegal to attempt it.

In such a political environment, what incentive did the Jesuits give Catholics to act on their religious convictions and expose themselves to arrest in the name of the Church? What the Jesuits should have taken to heart was that conversion to Catholicism came in two parts: abandonment of heresy and a positive exercise of will to join the Church. Without clear authority on theological right and wrong (that which disputation failed to provide), the laymen could not be expected to sum up the will to engage in recusancy. While there are some examples of vehement recusants in this period, their commitment to the church appears to be atypical, and their example to be one that would be unfair to expect of the average layman. In 1593, Sir Thomas Tresham, of the Northamptonshire gentry, endured immense fines and multiple periods in horrendous English prisons, but saw his “triple apprenticeship… in direst adversity” as preferable to “…the everlasting fire [with] continual weeping and gnashing of teeth” that
church papists (who lacked the recusants’ stiff backbones) were sure to endure. While the threat of eternal damnation has always proven to be a highly-effective motivational tool for conversion to Catholicism, it was not an argument that Persons or his contemporaries appear to have often employed; therefore, though Tresham’s convictions have been shared by many throughout history, it seems they were not typical of Englishmen in this period.

In his letters, Persons maintains that many “boys and women boldly profess the faith before the judge, and refuse to make the slightest confession, even at the threat of death” and claims, “…We heard that, one month since [the publishing of Campion’s Bragge] more than fifty thousand names of persons who refused to go to heretical churches were reported. Many more, I fancy, have been discovered since.” Too often, historians take Persons’ letters at face value, writing, “Everywhere the missionaries and especially the Jesuits went they were greeted with rapture… and released, importuned with requests for sermons… and released only with great reluctance.” While there is no evidence to necessarily disprove Person’s claims, there is none to prove the numbers he cites either.

Historians must avoid a narrow definition of recusancy, instead giving way to “nonconformity” as a broad, umbrella term, under which many actions and motivations may fall. As Michael Questier explains, “Catholics, faced with the requirement that they should conform according to the law, could, by manipulating the grey areas in the law, and by moving between recusancy and church papistry, play the same sort of political games with the local and national state which Protestants engaged in when they experimented with the limits of conformity.” The danger in relying on theological explanations for nonconformity is that Elizabeth’s recusancy laws were based on political ideas; therefore, those accused under their jurisdiction employed political, not religious, defenses. While one accused recusant escaped prosecution by citing an insatiable appetite for oysters during church services at the village tavern, others, perhaps more tactfully, utilized the claim of “malice” in the recusancy laws to defend themselves. In one notable case in 1615, the court of the Star Chamber put down Yorkshire JP Sir
Thomas Posthumous Hoby’s claims of Yorkshire gentry impeding his recusancy proceedings. Here, the state limited the legal reach of the JPs in light of the gentry’s cries of malice. Similarly, in 1592, Robert Clitherow argued that he was the victim of malicious prosecution and had been “injuriously indicted and condemned as a recusant at the lewd suggestion and procurement of some bad persons.” Other cases show examples of Catholics escaping prosecution for recusancy by claiming to be conformed papists: in 1586, Robert Lovell of East Haring in Norfolk, “made a speech...how he had long lived in blindness and that now God had opened his eyes so that he saw his errors where in he had lived so long.”

Despite the gentry’s willingness to make such moral compromises in the wake of political persecution, the missionaries and their lay patrons maintained their abhorrence of such actions. Layman George Gilbert writes, “These men have no other recourse but a number of feeble excuses, namely that God sees their good intention, that they believe in the Catholic faith and have a hatred for heresy, and they hope that they will be held excused in as much as they cannot live in any other way owing to the strict laws and persecution.” While many noblemen from England’s leading families (members of the Vauxs, Fitzherberts, Throckmortons, and Brownes, to name a few) served as soldiers on the front lines of the Jesuit cause in Gilbert’s Young Catholic Men’s Club, the weakness of the Jesuit’s disputation strategy and the Pope’s incendiary Regnans made such men anomalies, rather than representative of the norm in the English Catholic community.

The logic behind Persons and Gilbert’s focus on converting the gentry was that their family ties and patronage networks would produce a trickle-down effect that would disseminate the Catholic reinvigoration throughout England. There is, however, no quantifiable evidence to show that this plan came to fruition. Rather than serve as a unifying factor of noble families, the Jesuits often became a wedge between their members. For example, though Francis Browne served as a fervent supporter of the Jesuits in the Young Catholic Men’s Club, Anthony Browne, the first Viscount Montague, publicly subscribed Thomas Bells’ persuasion by serving on Elizabeth’s Council and maintaining his
Engraving of Edmund Campion, SJ (1540-1581). The British Library.
dual allegiance to his Church and his monarch.26

Such examples suggest that polemic disputations did not provide strong enough motivations for English Catholics fully to commit to nonconformity, as Persons wished them to. Only after his flight from England following Campion’s execution did Persons finally give English Catholics what they needed, a clear authority over the chaotic polemic doctrinal disputes, and begin to see his mission as “[clearing] the matter [of conformity]... and the negative party fully established to the confusion of heresy and edification of all foreign nations.”27

Persons himself finally acknowledged, in his Christian Directory, that polemics “help they little oftentimes to good lyfe, but rather do fill the heades of men with a spirite of contradiction and contention.” Persons published this work “to then ende our countrye men might have some one sufficient direction for the matters of life and spirit, among so manye books of controversies” and the results were staggering.28 Spy reports in the year 1584 record that the spiritual text was “as much sought for, of the protestanttes as papists.”29 In 1584, future archpriest George Birkhead wrote, “both because its batter was new to us and also on account of its special object, viz., the reformation of sinful life, it... has borne immense fruit; the number of conversions of heretics to the faith by reading can scarcely be believed.”30 The Annual Letter of the English Mission references the continuation of this success in 1607 by citing the “many who have fallen away [who] have been restored... by means of the... reading of spiritual books and treatises concerning religion.” The news from England on February 6, 1610 reads that no less than “Cecil [had been] moved to read [Persons’] work... saying that... Parsons was a learned theologian.” 31 The fact that Person’s late spiritual texts evoked such a response from so serious a soldier of Protestantism speaks volumes about their wide-reaching appeal and Person’s own persuasive abilities.

The success of Gregory Martin’s 1582 Discoverie of the manifold corruptions of the Holy Scriptures by the heretikes of our daies, etc speaks to the efficacy of this improved conversion strategy by illustrating that its success was not confined to Person’s personal skill as a polemist. A letter from the College at Rheims states that that “[g]reat complaints
[were] made by the Privy Council against the University of Oxford on account of the numbers who leave the College and are supposed to take refuge with [them]; this wonderfully gravel[ed] [the Council].” Despite the successes of the Jesuit scriptural texts, however, the damage incurred by the disastrous polemic disputations had already been dealt and proved to be largely irreparable. After his visit with Persons in Rome in 1606, Tobias Matthew, archbishop of York, spoke to this reality: “[Persons] did work so powerfully… upon my understanding… that, if I had not willfully drawn the curtain between it and my will… I am half persuaded that perhaps I might have departed thence… a true Catholic.” It seems sufficient to say that the Jesuits never succeeded in understanding and fulfilling the needs of the English Catholic community to the point where its members could generate the necessary will to enact a positive move towards a recusant commitment to the Catholic Church.

III: ENGLISH JESUITS

Just as the missionaries disobeyed the pontificate in their use of polemic disputation, they strayed from Vatican instructions on the issue of politics. Implicit in Gregory XIII’s instructions for Persons and George Gilbert to avoid arguments with Protestants were his instructions not to entangle the mission in English politics. Persons outwardly conveyed an image of obedience to these commands in his letters, writing to Elizabeth’s Council: “For we have been sent by men who have practically no knowledge of your secular conditions here, and so far is it from being their wish to be involved in them, that… they have banned all conversation about your politics and have been unwilling to listen to any who made mention of them.” For this reason, he claims, “I know not what unholy plots in our peaceful kingdom; for there is nothing less our aim.” Beyond Person’s questionable claim of the pope’s ignorance on English matters of state, this assertion reveals an outright lie on Person’s part.

While it is true that the pontificate instructed him to keep out of political affairs whenever possible, it would be entirely incorrect to take his letters at face value and believe he heeded these instructions.
Despite his having taken a vow of obedience to the Pope and the Father General, Person’s other correspondence reveal his significant support of treasonous plots against Elizabeth. In a 1584 letter to Fr. Persons, Mary, Queen of Scots writes, “I pray you to let him [the Prince of Parma] understand that sith that it hath pleased the King of Spayne, my good brother, to make a special choise of him to have from henceforth the whole charge and menaging of the enterprise propounded for the re-establishment of this state”, implying that she solicited, through Persons, the help of Philip II in her attempt to claim the English throne. As if this were not enough proof of Persons’ complicity in her plots, she continues, “I remytt unto you to geve thankes [to Philip] for the sendinge of 12,000 crownes I have asked for.”

Persons’ letters also reveal the intertwined nature of his conversion efforts and treasonous tendencies. In his letter to the Rector of the English College in Rome in 1580, he applauds Francis and Thomas Throckmorton, of the same Throckmortons who filled the ranks of Gilbert’s Young Catholic Men’s Club, as the finest examples of nonconformist Catholics in the gentry. Francis Throckmorton’s planning of, and eventual execution for, the 1584 Throckmorton plot (involving an Spanish invasion of England in the name of Mary, Queen of Scots) suggest that Person’s correspondence with Mary and relationship with the Throckmortons may indicate his complicity in the matter.

In addition to legitimizing the state’s anti-Jesuit hysteria, Person’s failure to obey the pontificate on the issue of English politics rendered the mission increasingly less appealing to all Englishmen. Persons wholly miscalculated his actions in the realm of English politics and failed to see that he was digging his own grave. In time, he succeeded in creating an environment so toxic that even several of his allies abandoned him. Foley wrote that “Adam Squier, son-in-law of Bishop Aylmer… whose protection George Gilbert had purchased for Father Persons, declared himself unable to carry out his agreement, because of the quarrels in which it involved for the bishop, and the danger it exposed him to from the Council.”
Rather than unite the English Catholics around the Church, Persons’ poor political calculations pushed them away and disinclined them to make the positive choice to join the Church. In short, his deviance from the pontificate’s instructions polarized the Church on the extreme end of the political and religion spectrum and distanced the country’s population away from its ranks. Though the Colleges reported occasional bouts of enrolling English seminarians in the decades following the mission, the numbers pale in comparison to those seen before its inception. These figures suggest that the Jesuits’ strategy failed them. While it is impossible to know what could have been, and perhaps naïve to think the Jesuits could have reversed the Reformation, the evidence suggests that the results for the English Catholic community could have been dramatically different had Persons and his followers’ strategy adhered to papal instructions.

8 Knox, *Letter and Memorials*, p. 84-85
9 Foley Records Volume III Series V-VIII, p. 627
13 Foley Records Volume III Series V-VIII p. 673
17 Campion, Edmund. *Ten reasons, proposed to his adversaries for disputation in the name of the faith and presented to the illustrious members of our universities. The Catholic Library. London: Manresa Press , 1914.
p.137.
19 William Camden *Annales* p. 415
20 *Historical Manuscripts Commision, Various Collections* (vol. 3, 1904). 942D G795 v.55
25 Gilbert, George. “A way to deal with persons…” (see footnote 12)
31 Foley *Records* Volume VII Part II p.983
34 Catholic Record Society *Letter and Memorials of Father Robert Persons, S.J.* v. 39 p.38
36 (see footnote 22)
37 Foley *Records* Volume III Series V-VIII p.674