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Seward's True Folly: American Diplomacy and Strategy During "Our Little War with the Heathens," Korea, 1871

Ian Murray
University of Pennsylvania, ijmurray@sas.upenn.edu

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Seward's True Folly: American Diplomacy and Strategy During "Our Little War with the Heathens," Korea, 1871
From June 10 to June 12, 1871, American amphibious forces engaged in a forty-eight hour battle with the Chosŏn dynasty of Korea. Though trivialized in the New York Herald under the headline of “Our Little War With the Heathens,” the affair inflicted more casualties on Asian peoples than any other American military action until the Philippine uprising of 1899. A fleet boasting five Americans warships set sail for Korea on May 16th with eighty pieces of cannon and 1,230 men aboard, under the command of Rear Admiral John Rodgers. The expedition pursued a diplomatic mission—the opening of Korea to international commercial trade—entrusted to United States Minister to China Frederick Low. However, the expedition secured authorization from the State Department to impose their aims by force if necessary. On May 31, the Americans reached Ganghwa Island in the estuary of the Han River. Korean soldiers stationed at fortresses lining the river bend at Sondolmok fired upon the westerners. Homer Crane Blake, Captain and Commander of the USS Alaska, describes the outbreak of hostilities in a letter written on June 2.

As we came up abreast, a single shot, apparently from a musket or pistol, was fired from near the standard, and instantly, from the fort and masked batteries along the face of the hill, they opened a heavy fire upon the ships and boats, which was promptly returned from all the vessels, and which soon drove them from the guns, they retreating to the ravines.

The Americans drew back, demanding an apology from the prefect of Ganghwa Island. With none forthcoming, the Americans launched a counter-offensive upon the expiration of a ten-day ultimatum. The Americans’ superior firepower generated a large discrepancy in casualties. The United States razed three Korean fortresses—Ch’oji, Kwangsong and Tokjin—killing 350 Koreans while suffering only three fatalities of their own. On June 12th, the Americans departed from Korea, citing the lopsided death toll as evidence of an overwhelming victory. On July 17th, the New York Times celebrated the “Speedy and Effective Punishment of the Barbarians.”
However, the Korean Government celebrated the American withdrawal as a great victory and a vindication of their time-honored policy of seclusion.

At face value, the events related above can be interpreted in numerous ways. For example, Neoconservatives and Liberal internationalists might herald the initiative as a laudable effort to bring the benefits of international exchange to a people subjugated by a backward regime. On the other hand, revisionists and anti-interventionists might view America’s acts as a shameful example of cruel, imperialistic and self-interested gunboat diplomacy. However, when placed in the proper context of American diplomacy in the Far East, the American Invasion of Korea proves virtually indistinguishable in terms of ideology from such widely heralded American triumphs as the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia and Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan in 1853. To demonstrate this fact, this paper endeavors to construct a complete narrative of the American Invasion, furnishing the above events with their proper setting, story line, and resolution. In doing so, the true nature of the invasion comes to light: an attempt to carry on established American traditions sabotaged by woeful tactics and flawed geopolitical assessments.


**American Diplomacy in the Far East**

In the nation’s infancy, a number of worrying prospects confronted American statesmen. First, if America became enmeshed in Europe’s wars of imperialism, the requisite military mobilization would infringe on the domestic liberty for which colonial patriots had so vehemently struggled, as these conflicts could transpire on American soil. Second, forging alliances
The *Empress of China* at Mart’s Jetty, Port Pirie, 1876. The first American ship to open trade with China, the *Empress of China* set sail from New York for Canton in 1784.
with the more potent nations of Europe would require American statesmen to adopt alien causes. Furthermore, an America open to foreign alliance would be subject to European courtship, begetting factionalism within the Union. George Washington, with significant editorial input from Alexander Hamilton, addressed each of these concerns in his 1796 Farewell Address, proclaiming that “nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated.”

In this way, George Washington enshrined the American ideal of maintaining unilateral commercial relations with all states, “regardless of their form of government or the extent of their imperialism.”

In 1784, America began the process of forging such unilateral commercial relationships in the Far East. On August 28, the Empress of China, a refitted privateer from the Revolutionary War docked in Canton, marking the start of a tradition that would come to be known as the “Old China Trade.” A close-knit group of New England merchants dominated this trade, motivated more by their enterprising spirit than by any demand for Chinese goods in America. Due to the remoteness of the Far East and the small percentage of the American population concerned with its affairs, the State Department rarely meddled in Sino-American relations at this early stage. As a result, historians such as Tyler Dennett assert that American activity in Asia prior to 1840 was void of political significance. Edward D. Graham, however, considers such a judgment “arguable.” In reality, the Government’s hands-off approach to Far Eastern affairs during the early 19th century contributed greatly to the development of a diplomatic policy in the Pacific centered on commercial interests. As Washington initially left early merchants to their own devices, they inevitably followed their capitalistic self-interest when making on-the-spot decisions. By the sum of these decisions, New England merchants forged a tradition of seeking equal trade agreements and extraterritoriality. This model, Dennett agrees, became the modus operandi adopted by the State Department in the second half of the century.

America’s relationship with the Far East evolved towards the middle of the 19th century largely as a function of both technological and political phenomena. The development of the clipper ship and the steamship greatly enhanced the efficiency of maritime trade. The acquisition of California in 1848 gave the United States a Pacific port. Finally, the decision of Great Britain that same year to nullify the last vestiges of the Navigation Acts granted Americans equal commercial rights within the British Isles. These conditions produced a
golden age of American maritime activity, with the high point coming in 1855 when American shipping totaled 5,212,000 tons. American Exports to China, which had totaled only about $2 million in the 1840s, rose to nearly $9 million in the 1860s. The increasing significance of Pacific trade spurred the American Government into action on the Far Eastern front. The Government’s policy, as presaged by the activities of the New England merchants during the “Old China Trade,” focused on earning most-favored-nation privileges from East Asian governments. The State Department also favored the preservation and territorial integrity of sovereign nations such as China and Japan, partly from an ideological distaste for colonialism, but mostly to prevent European spheres of influence from interfering with American economic opportunities.

The realities of East Asian diplomacy, however, obligated Americans to compromise these principles in day-to-day operations. According to John K. Fairbank, “The idea of the American diplomatic approach to China as independent of the British, less imperialistic, more friendly and egalitarian and yet enterprising and decisive…does not fit with the British diplomatic records.” Americans constituted only one small element of large foreign community in China. In 1836, only nine of the fifty-five foreign firms operating in Canton were American. The foreign community as a whole was in turn subsidiary to the Chinese ruling class. Britons adapted much more easily to the social ideals of the ruling class, often causing Americans to embrace Anglo-American collaboration under British leadership. All in all, Fairbank concludes, “the American in China was obliged to be a democrat manqué, a ruler with qualms of conscience, in a world he never made but found seductively enjoyable.”

Though commonly frustrated by routine activities, the State Department was nevertheless able to institute American tradition through the negotiation of grand commercial treaties with major Far Eastern nations. In 1832, Andrew Jackson sent Edmund Roberts on a voyage to negotiate commercial agreements with Siam, Hué, and Japan. He achieved his aim in the first country, failed in the second, and perished en route to the third. In 1839, Martin Van Buren authorized Captain Charles Wilkes to explore the Pacific. According to Thomas McCormick, the mission helped the United States become “the most knowledgeable power in the world as far as the great Pacific basin was concerned.” On December 1842, President John Tyler extended the Monroe Doctrine to the Hawaiian Islands, publicly denouncing any attempt at their colonization.

British victory in the First Opium War inspired the first truly significant American diplomatic action in East Asia. Through the 1842 Treaty of
Nanking, Britain captured Hong Kong and four other Chinese ports, as well as authority over Chinese tariffs and customs rates. New England merchants, injured by an economic depression from which America was just beginning to recover, recognized the need to ensure the continued commercial privileges in China. They put pressure on Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who in turn employed Caleb Cushing as the first U.S. minister to China. In a letter drafted on May 8, 1843, Webster charged Cushing to negotiate a commercial treaty with Middle Kingdom, securing “the entry of American ships and cargoes into these ports on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by English merchants.” This letter formally inaugurated the American tradition of insisting upon most-favored-nation treatment. Americans celebrated their new “special relationship,” being the first anti-imperialist power to forge an agreement with China. The Treaty of Wanghia, signed in 1844, fulfilled all of Webster’s objectives, including the guarantee of extraterritorial rights for American merchants in China. By this time, however, Webster was no longer at the reins of the State Department. Both he and his successor Abel P. Upshur had since relinquished the post of Secretary of State, leaving the position to former Vice President John C. Calhoun.

After seven years out of the State Department, five of which he spent in the Senate, Webster returned to his old position in the Cabinet of Millard Fillmore. Again, Webster took action in the Far East, this time turning his attention to the staunchly isolationist regime in Japan. Americans salivated at the promise of lucrative Japanese trade, which was forbidden by ancient Japanese laws that Americans found loathsome and unnatural. Webster hoped to end Japan’s deviant resistance to foreign trade—on American terms of course. This meant most-favored-nation status. He also he wished to protect shipwrecked Americans, who had often received brutal welcomes upon washing up on Japanese shores. Finally, he planned to establish coaling stations in Japan to facilitate more efficient passage of steamships from California to China.

To this end, Webster (who died before the mission was launched) sent Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853 with a sizeable fleet of steamships. Perry carried with him a letter from Millard Fillmore, proposing to the Emperor of Japan “that the United States and Japan should live in friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other.” As Webster’s directions to Cushing had a decade earlier, Fillmore’s letter stressed the mutual benefits of the arrangement, imploring, “If your imperial majesty were so far to change the ancient laws as to allow a free trade between the two countries it would be extremely beneficial to both.” Perry sought
to demonstrate the technological prowess of America, both through his fleet and through gifts such as a miniature railroad and Japan’s first telegraph. Japanese cooperation was hesitant but ultimately forthcoming; Townshend Harris eventually secured the opening of five major ports and affirmed American extraterritoriality rights in Japan in 1858. For the time being, however, there was no talk of a “special relationship.” In a spirit they would later apply to Korea, Americans believed that they were “civilizing” Japan. In the words of Willie P. Mangum, a Whig Senator from North Carolina, “You have to deal with barbarians as barbarians.”

Few Americans have had as decided an impact on their nation’s relations with East Asia as William H. Seward, who took control of the State Department in the 1860s. He assumed the role of Secretary of State under President Abraham Lincoln March 5, 1861. He would retain this position under Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, the last chapter of a prominent political life. Born in Orange Country, New York on May 16, 1801, he served as both Governor and Senator for his home state for a combined 22 years. He was even considered the frontrunner for the Republican nomination for President in 1860, prior to being eclipsed by Lincoln. Seward vigorously advocated the pursuit of American interests in Asia, considering the Pacific Ocean the “chief theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.” While still a member of the Senate, he demonstrated this attitude by putting aside his deep-seated opinion against slavery to support Californian statehood. He did not envision American activity in the Pacific sphere as military or imperial, but rather as a mutually beneficial exchange of goods and ideas. He assumed that this genre of American intervention would be greeted by Far Eastern nations as a desirable alternative to violent European conquest, asking, “If they could be roused and invigorated now, would they spare their European oppressors and spite their American benefactors?”

His most visible contribution to the American cause in the Pacific was the purchase of Alaska from Russia, concluded in 1867, which acquired the moniker “Seward’s Folly.”

Seward insisted on the protection of Americans and their property in China, but remained cautious to avoid disrespecting Chinese rights. On August 14, 1865, he affirmed that, “the Government of the United States is not disposed to be technical or exacting in its intercourse with the Chinese Government, but will deal with it in entire frankness, cordiality, and friendship.” With regard to Japan, however, Seward proved more callous and skeptical. Seward seemed to operate on the assumption that Japan was incessantly plotting to shirk its treaty obligations. He believed that American commercial rights in
Japan were vulnerable, and that the expulsion of foreigners was imminent. Seward’s mistrust of the Japanese generated an unstable state of affairs when coupled with his willingness to employ the use of force. According to Tyler Dennett, “Seward, more than any Secretary of State before or since his day, was favorably disposed toward a “gun-boat diplomacy.” For instance, on the night of December 5, 1860, Henry Heusken, a Dutch translator in the service of United States Consul-General to Japan Townshend Harris, was assassinated by a handful of masked assailants. In response, Seward, who took office the following March, proposed a joint naval demonstration against Japan to the foreign offices of France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia.

Officially, Korea in the 1860s was a part of the Sadae order, a sinocentric and Confucian international system that governed certain areas of East Asia. The order prescribed a hierarchical, anti-egalitarian society based on the ideology of 道—individual morality and harmony between the ruler and the ruled. This principle applied to international relations within the order. Therefore, Imperial China’s Zongli Yamen, the government entity charged with foreign affairs, handled the official diplomatic activity of its obedient vassal states such as Korea. However, according to Tyler Dennett, China’s chokehold on Korea was not so severe. In fact, China repeatedly insisted in diplomatic communication with foreign nations that Korea was administratively independent. They even refused to accept any responsibility for Korean destruction or injury of foreign life and property. China essentially pursued a “dog-in-the-manger policy.” They did not want Korea, but they did not want Korea to come under the shadow of any other power, nor did they relish the idea of Korean independence.” In 1863, the teenage King Gojong assumed Korea’s throne. Power rested in the hands of his father and regent Daewongun until the King reached adulthood in 1873. Daewongun staunchly advocated isolationism, as well as the persecution of Western missionaries. Koreans considered all Westerners “barbarians,” as did most East Asian peoples. This category, of course, included Americans.

On the eve of engagement with Korea, American diplomacy, imbued with the goals of securing most-favored-nation status and extraterritorial rights in East Asia, sat in the hands of Secretary of State William H. Seward, who deeply mistrusted isolationist regimes and held no reservations about employing force to ensure their compliance with international free trade. Korea, with Daewongun as the head of state, also had a resolute diplomatic policy: staunch isolationism. On top of all this, despite having developed a friendly commercial relationship with China, America could not rely on the mediating
influence of the Middle Kingdom. China in the 1860s wished neither to manage the administration of Korea nor take any responsibility for Korea’s quarrels.

The French Invasion of Korea

America was not the first western nation to attempt to engage Korea diplomatically in the late 19th century. Indeed, France cast the initial stone to rouse Korea from its hibernation on the international stage. Like other contemporaneous European states, 19th century France exploited legal positivism to codify a diplomacy based on Eurocentrism. Europeans classified international actors into three categories: civilized states, who were to be treated as full subjects of the law; semi-civilized states, who were to be exploited via asymmetrical treaties; and barbarians, who were to be exploited by invasion and occupation. Korea belonged firmly in the third category. The European mechanism for establishing relations with this category of nations was predatory imperialism, a model in which private enterprise (legitimate or otherwise) and missionary expeditions paved the way for state participation. Accordingly, the earliest French presence in Korea arrived in the form of Catholic missionaries. At first, these missionaries profited from existing Confucian rites to ease the natives’ transition from traditional “barbarism” to enlightened Catholicism. However, the Vatican suppressed this opportunistic behavior in 1742, when Pope Benedict XIV issued an edict outlawing both the veneration of Confucius and the worship of one’s ancestors. This measure strained relations between Korea and the French missionaries therein, notably inspiring the state-sanctioned execution of 300 Catholics in 1801. Tensions flared once more in 1866, when the Korean government deemed Catholicism irreconcilable with the Confucian political order (the former declaring all men equal before God), and authorized the repression of Catholic activity on the peninsula. For France, the most salient consequence of this declaration was the execution of nine French priests.

The French response was retaliation. In a letter home to his parents sent from Ning-Po, China, French quartermaster Eugène Masson defended his nation’s reprisal with the following simple explanation: “It was necessary to find these Korean gentlemen to teach them that they don’t have the right to treat our compatriots in such a manner.” However, pure vengeance was not the sole motive for French action. At least one implicated Frenchman, Minister to China Henri de Bellonet, perceived the Korean calamity as a grand opportunity. He revealed his ulterior geopolitical motives in a letter to E.D. Lhuys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs:
Rear Admiral John Rodgers confers with other officers on board the USS *Colorado* during the American expedition, June 1871
I am not going to make a long explanation about the advantages of making Chosun a colony or simply put in the position of being under the protection of our Emperor. It is enough just to glance at the map to see that it is useful to send troops to this country, in case of the complications which might arise between China and Japan in the future.”

Without requesting the proper authorization, Bellonet sent a highly inflammatory dispatch to the Zongli Yamen on July 13, 1866. Its contents amount to a declaration of war against Korea on behalf of the Emperor, egregiously over-reaching his jurisdiction. In a few days our military forces are to march to the conquest of Chosun, and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone, has now the right and power to dispose, according to his good pleasure, of the country and of the vacant throne.

Bellonet’s actions enraged Rear Admiral Pierre Gustave Roze, Commander of the French Far East Squadron. Roze expressed his fury to Justin, comte de Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of the Navy, complaining that China would certainly forward Bellonet’s bluster to the Koreans, giving them ample time to prepare their defenses. Indeed, China did warn Korea of the planned French aggression on August 16. Furthermore, Roze protested that Bellonet had stepped on his toes. Since France had not established diplomatic relations with Korea, the military should have primary jurisdiction in Korean affairs. Chasseloup-Laubat feared conflict, insecure about France’s incomplete knowledge of Korean coastal geography. Roze, however, had already sailed his fleet, carrying about 1,000 men, into Korean waters.

In his aforementioned letter to his parents, quartermaster Eugène Masson again displays his penchant for poetic simplicity when discussing the nature of the Roze expedition. He sums up the experience in the following manner: “During our journey, we passed ourselves off as children of the moon, but a short distance from the capital the Koreans probably found that the children of the moon penetrated too far into their interior.”

The French occupied Kanggot fortress on Kanghwa Island on October 14, proceeding to occupy the office of the Island’s magistrate on the 16th. On October 26, three French soldiers perished in a skirmish at Munsu Mountain fortress. November 10 saw the most dramatic action of the expedition. Yang Honsu led a corps of professional hunters in an ambush of the French garrison at Chondung Temple, slaying thirty-two French soldiers while suffering only one casualty.
In his study of the Five Years’ Crisis, Kim Yongkoo notes that this battle represented “One of the few instances in the colonialist history of Europe in which European soldiers were defeated in non-European territory.”

The victory sufficed to encourage a withdrawal of the French presence. Roze intended the retreat to be temporary, as suggested by Masson’s letter:

We left Korea to spend the winter in China because we did not have a large enough force to occupy the entire power, it is probable that if the King is not overthrown by next spring, we shall return with superior force sent to us from France.

The French never returned to Korea. The failure of Roze’s expedition greatly embarrassed France in the eyes of international public opinion. The French government directed its anger at Roze and Bellonet, both having engaged in decisive action in the absence of any clear instructions from Paris. On November 11, 1866, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Lionel, Marquis de Moustier reproached Bellonet, writing, “I am very seriously shocked by your belief that you could carry out any actions which suited your own personal agenda though no such authority had been granted you.”

Two outcomes of the French failure in Korea would have a significant impact on American diplomacy in the Far East. First, Korean morale soared in the wake of the departed would-be colonists. Stone tablets were erected, furnished with the inscription, “Not to fight back when invaded by Western barbarians is to invite further attacks. Selling the country out in peace negotiations is the greatest danger to guard against.”

A dispatch was sent to high-ranking officials in the Government that would seem to pose an ominous threat to America’s ultimate designs in Korea: “If we are unable to endure our strife and have to make a treaty with foreigners, it would be an act of betrayal to our country.”

Second, Admiral Roze brought back from Korea intelligence that the Koreans had burned an American vessel, the *General Sherman*, apparently slaughtering its entire crew.

**The General Sherman and Korean-American Tension**

As was the case for the French, individual action preceded calculated American intervention, in this case piracy. On September 5, 1866, the U.S. merchant ship *General Sherman* was set ablaze by Korean artillery under the orders of Pak Kyusu, Governor of P’yongan Province. It is vital to note that the American government did not ascertain the full details of the incident for approximately two decades, although the correct chronology is maintained below. The *General Sherman* was owned by an American, W.B. Preston, but had
been hired by a British firm, Messrs. Meadows and Company, to transport commercial freight and arms. The ship set sail from Chefoo, China en route to Korea for the purported purpose of conducting trade. In reality, the motives behind the expedition were far more dastardly, involving the looting of royal tombs in the vicinity of P’yongyang. The *General Sherman*’s Captain Page was American, while the Manager of commodities, George Hogarth, and the translator, Robert Jermain Thomas, were both British. On August 27th, the expedition kidnapped Pak’s Military Aide, Yi Hyonik. Four days later, cannon fire from the *General Sherman* felled 12 Korean soldiers and civilians. The sum of these offensive actions roused Pak to retaliation, bringing a fiery end to what the United States assumed to be a legitimate trading mission.

Upon returning to China from Korea in October of 1866, Admiral Roze relayed his limited intelligence of the destruction of the *General Sherman* incident to E.T. Sanford, the American consul in Chefoo. Sanford dutifully notified Anson Burlingame, the American Minister to China. Burlingame passed along the information to three recipients. The first was Prince Kung of China, who insisted that the relationship between China and Korea was purely ceremonial, disavowing Chinese responsibility for Korean diplomatic conduct. The second was Admiral Henry H. Bell, Commander of the Asiatic Squadron of the United States’ Navy. The third was Secretary of State William H. Seward, to whom Burlingame wrote on December 15, 1866.

The Navy responded first, by virtue of the fact that Burlingame’s letter did not have to travel as far to reach Bell as it did to reach Seward. Admiral Bell sent Robert W. Shufeldt with the USS *Wachusett* to investigate the fate of the *General Sherman*. Shufeldt carried with him a letter to the King, and met with an official from the city of Haeju on January 29, 1867. The official behaved arrogantly, but insisted that he had no information concerning the incident, even after Shufeldt threatened violent retaliation. Shufeldt departed from Korea without gaining any useful information, though he did develop a suspicion that the crew of the *General Sherman* may have been responsible for its own demise. During his journey, Shufeldt took the liberty of examining Port Hamilton, a small group of islands off the southern coast of Korea. He supposed that these islands could be strategically useful, comparing them to Gibraltar. He suggested that the United States could seize the islands and “operate upon the Southern coast of Corea until that government is forced to acknowledge at least its responsibility to foreigners.”

Needless to say, the mysterious destruction of an American merchant ship deeply troubled the State Department. Upon receiving Burlingame’s
dispatch, William Seward immediately drew up plans for a proposed joint invasion of the peninsula in cooperation with France, who he assumed would be itching for retribution after the defeat of Admiral Roze. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, however, espoused cautious prudence, urging the State Department to launch a thorough investigation of the incident rather than engage in rash retaliation. Burlingame likewise sought to temper the Secretary of State’s aggression when he initially notified Seward of the General Sherman incident, writing:

If my advice can have weight, it will be that our presence there should rather restrain than promote aggression, and serve to limit the action to such satisfaction only as great and civilized nations should, under the circumstances, have from the ignorant and weak.33

Nevertheless, Seward plowed forward, proposing his strategy to J.F.G. Berthémy, the French Minister to the United States, on March 2, 1867. Berthémy favored the proposal, citing its potential to repair Franco-American relations, cancel out the failure of the previous year’s expedition, open Korea to foreign trade and investment, and stymie Russian expansionist designs in the Far East. Such an alliance would have wedded the efforts of two nations with radically different priorities in the region. According to Boleslaw Szczesniak, For France the expedition to Korea was a kind of imperialistic punishment for the loss of French property and life—especially since France even considered the annexation of Korea—while for America it was a method of cooperative participation in opening the “hermit nation” for peaceful reasons.”34

Berthémy’s government, however, declined the proposal, for reasons which cannot be comprehended without some knowledge of contemporaneous French geopolitics.

In January of 1862, France, along with Spain and Britain, had sent a fleet to Mexico in an effort to compel President Benito Juarez to resume interest payment on national debts. The Spanish and British soon realized that Napoleon III’s true aim was to conquer Mexico, and chose to withdraw their forces in April. France suffered an initial setback at the Battle of Puebla on May 5, but rallied with a string of victories culminating in the capture of Mexico City on June 7, 1863. On April 10, 1864, Archduke Maximilian Ferdinand of the Royal House of Austria signed the Treaty of Miramar, accepting his appointment to the Mexican throne. This deed incurred the
wrath of the United States, whose Congress unanimously passed a resolution opposing a Mexican monarchy. The following spring, the tide began to turn against the French. On April 11, the army of the Mexican Republic won battles at Tacambaro and Michoacan. As the American Civil War drew to a close, the United States sent 50,000 troops to the Mexican border to threaten the French and furnish the Republican army with supplies. In February of 1866, the United States blockaded French shipments of reinforcements and demanded a French withdrawal, to which Napoleon III complied on May 31. On June 19, 1867, the Republican forces executed Maximilian I and restored Benito Juarez to the Mexican presidency.

In the throes of the Mexican calamity, France’s Second Empire could not afford to suffer any additional humiliations in the international theater. Accordingly, when Admiral Roze withdrew from Korea in November of 1866, the French government profited from the remoteness of the conflict to simply claim victory. After initially admonishing Roze and Bellonet in diplomatic correspondence, the French Government ultimately rewarded each man’s initiative with promotion. Bellonet bade adieu to the Pacific and settled into a more comfortable position as Minister to Sweden. Roze inherited the role of Acting Viceroy of Indochina, later ascending to a highly influential position as Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet. This stunning act of revisionism on the part of the French spared the Emperor the bother of further activity in Korea. Claiming that French objectives had been thoroughly satisfied, the French declined to take part in Seward’s joint invasion.

The French refusal ushered in a year of cautious inaction. The stalemate was broken in March 1868 when Yu Wentai, a Chinese national who had abandoned the voyage of the General Sherman, informed a U.S. consul in China that four crewmembers of the General Sherman remained alive in Korea. Furthermore, Yu believed that two of the survivors were Chinese nationals. Yu claimed to have received this information from a Korean named Kim Chap’yong. Samuel Wells Williams, acting as Minister to China while Burlingame turned his attention to the negotiations of the Burlingame Treaty, sent a letter to Prince Kung on March 3, imploring China to assist America’s investigations. On March 9, the Prince upheld China’s laissez faire policy toward Korean affairs, replying: “Although Chosun is in one sense a dependency of China, her authorities are now engaged in eradicating western religion and forbidding its exercise, and their proceedings in this matter are carried on by themselves just as they please.” China did, however, issue a request that Korea return any surviving crewmembers.
Forced to act without Chinese assistance, the Navy dispatched Captain John C. Febiger and the USS *Shenandoah* to Korea, in search of information and survivors. Febiger first met with Kim Chap’yong, who denied having provided Yu Wentai with any information. Febiger’s mission, however, was far more successful than Shufeldt’s. Korea received the captain far more warmly, and on April 30 the Korean Council of the State ruled that Febiger was entitled to a letter of explanation from Pak Kyusu, governor of Hwanghae province. Pak himself was largely responsible for the change in Korea’s attitude. A respected and forward-thinking scholar, he educated many of the intellectuals who would later found the reform-minded Enlightenment Party. Pak supported engaging American in negotiations as early as 1866. According to Kim Yongkoo, he “transcended Korean experience and glimpsed the true nature of Western society before Korea became actively involved in it.”

He believed that the Korean Government had dealt inappropriately with Shufeldt, and encouraged Koreans to welcome Captain Febiger. In his letter, Pak praises the moral standards of the United States, but also accurately depicts the violent nature of the *General Sherman* excursion and justifies the Korean response. He expresses the bewilderment of Koreans at American indignation, explaining that the crew of the *General Sherman* “came into our country without permission and caused complications, and now you are blaming us for that incident and we do not understand your intention in doing so.”

When the letter was forwarded to Shufeldt, he praised its construction and trusted its contents, reporting, “The letter was so statesman-like in its character and bore such intrinsic evidence of the truth of its statements that both Captain Febiger and I were convinced that the attack on the General Sherman was made by an unauthorized mob under strong provocation.”

Around this time, the State Department again leapt into action, receiving intelligence from Frederick Jenkins, an interpreter with the U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai, suggesting that Korea may be willing to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the predicament. Seward acted swiftly to seize this opportunity, endowing his nephew George, the U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai, with plenipotentiary powers and sending him to Korea “to procure a treaty of amity and commerce as nearly similar in its provisions to those existing between the United States and Japan as may be found practicable and expedient.” In his official instructions, Seward stressed the peaceful nature of the expedition, reminding his nephew “to practise discretion, prudence, and patience, while firmly asserting the dignity and maintaining the demands of the United States” and urging him to reserve force “for ultimate consideration.”
Unfortunately, with the expedition barely underway, it became obvious that Jenkins had swindled the State Department. He was in fact mixed up in an illicit conspiracy, hatched by corrupt French missionary Father Stanislas Féron and German businessman Ernst Oppert. Féron, who had been rescued from Korea by the French invasion, hoped to return to the peninsula to unearth the remains of the biological father of Daewongun. He enlisted the financial support of Frederick Jenkins, who duped the State Department into orchestrating a mission to Korea, an elaborate cover for Féron’s scheme. On July 3, 1868, George Seward sent a dispatch to his uncle, informing him “that the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded to Corea had been engaged in an attempt to take from their tombs the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country for the purpose, it would seem, of holding them for ransom.”

On July 27, 1868, William H. Seward withdrew his instructions. His first two attempts to resolve the General Sherman crisis yielded no progress. Four days later, Wells Williams communicated the results of Febiger’s voyage to the Secretary of State, informing him that the whole crew of the General Sherman had undoubtedly perished, and that “the evidence goes to uphold the presumption that they invoked their sad fate by some rash or violent acts towards the natives.”

In the wake of his failed diplomatic expedition, George Seward called a conference to discuss the Korean crisis with the U.S. Ministers to Japan and China as well as the Commander of the Asian Fleet of the U.S. Navy. It was agreed that simple friendly diplomacy would not be sufficient to discover the fate of the General Sherman and negotiate a commercial treaty with Korea. Seward communicated this opinion to his uncle on October 14, 1868, advising, “that a considerable show of force would probably be needed.” The Consul-General remained upbeat about the prospect of opening Korea, recalling how Commodore Perry’s mission to Japan had shown “that these eastern peoples are not unalterably wedded to old practices and institutions.” The Secretary of State received the report on the 7th of December, and resolved to discuss his nephew’s assessments with Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. However, Andrew Johnson had lost the presidential election to Ulysses S. Grant a month before, and both Welles and Seward relinquished their posts before any such meeting took place.

The American Invasion of Korea

On December 27, 1868, Admiral Henry H. Bell filed a report proposing dramatic military intervention in Korea. In his report, he advocated an
occupation of Seoul, an undertaking that would require more than 2,000 amphibious soldiers as well as regular army reinforcements. He followed Shufeldt’s advice and suggested using Port Hamilton as a launching point for the operation. Finally, he warned against cooperating with colonial powers such as Britain or France. This plan, he explained in a letter to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, “would awe not only Japan and the Court of Peking into profound respect for American views and interests, but would disclose to the world who are the masters of the Pacific.”

In Washington, Ulysses S. Grant selected Hamilton Fish, a former Congressman and Governor of New York, as Seward’s replacement as Secretary of State. In a meeting with his successor, Seward suggested moderating America’s demands in Korea to an agreement protecting the victims of shipwrecks. Fish eventually complied with Seward’s recommendation on April 20, 1870, forwarding these instructions on to the new Minister to China, Frederick Low. Low was encouraged to seek commercial advantages in Korea “should the opportunity seem favorable,” but reminded that “the President principally aims in this mission to secure protection and good treatment to such seamen of the United States as may unhappily be wrecked upon those shores.” Fish instructed Low to gather as much information regarding Korea as possible before setting out. Finally, Fish informed Low that he was to be accompanied by a naval fleet under the command of Admiral John Rogers. However, he cautioned him to “avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor.”

Evidently, the intelligence Low gathered on Korea did not inspire a great degree of confidence regarding his mission. By November of 1870, Low had grown pessimistic about his prospects. He reported to Fish on November 22, “I am not sanguine of favorable results; at the same time the object aimed at is worthy of trial.” He reiterated his doubts in a dispatch written on board the flagship USS *Colorado* in the Harbor of Nagasaki on May 13, 1871, predicting, “I apprehend that all the cunning and sophistry which enter so largely into oriental character will be brought to bear to defeat the object of our visit, and if that fails it is not unlikely that we may be met with a display of force.” Captain McLane Tilton shared Low’s pessimism, writing to his wife on June 4, “My impression at this moment is, that the people will have no intercourse with us, and our journey will be so much love’s labor lost.” He proceeds to express his misgivings regarding the size of the American fleet, doubting the outfit’s prospects “against a populous country containing 10,000,000 of [sic] savages!”
On March 17, 1871, as per his instructions, Low notified the Zongli Yamen of his upcoming excursion to Korea. China again maintained Korea’s diplomatic autonomy. More importantly, they informed Korea of the impending arrival of another American envoy. Daewongun resolved to resist the westerners, heralding Korea as the final stronghold of the Confucian order. A frustrated Pak Kyusu responded to China on April 14, requesting that China persuade the United States to cancel Low’s mission. Pak complained that the General Sherman incident had been resolved and that an agreement protecting shipwrecked sailors would be frivolous. In addition, he argued that Korean trade would not prove profitable for Americans, citing Korea’s inability to satisfy the demands of their own people. Korea’s policy of non-intercourse forbade Pak from sending a similar message to the Americans. As a result, Low and Rodgers assumed they had proclaimed their peaceful intentions, and set sail for Korea.

On May 30, Low met with three Korean officials of uncertain rank on board the USS Colorado. He informed them that he would soon send a surveying team up the Han River. He reiterated his peaceful intentions, promising that no harm would come to the Koreans as long as the American ships were not threatened. On May 31, three more Korean officials, apparently of low rank, approached the American outfit, giving implicit approval for Low’s explorations. However, the surveying party drew fire as it reached the bend in the Han River at Sondolmok.

On June 2, Low fumed to Fish that the Korean attack was “unprovoked and wanton, and without the slightest shadow of excuse.” He declared the Koreans “semi-barbarous and hostile,” However, a Western newspaper in China suggested that the attack was not as gratuitous as Low claimed. The newspaper reported that the Americans had ignored various warning signs, including a demonstration by 2,000 soldiers that “seemed intended to induce the surveying party to retire.” George F. Seward criticized the actions of the fleet, writing to Assistant Secretary of State Bancroft Davis, “I do not know why the surveying should have been pushed forward so rapidly.”

In his June 2 report to the Secretary of State, Low highlighted the American dilemma, ruminating,

The question now is, what is the safe and prudent course to pursue in view of this temporary check, which the Coreans will undoubtedly construe into a defeat of the “barbarians,” but which, according to the recognized rules of civilized warfare, was a complete victory on the part of the naval forces.
This was to become the principal American dilemma with regards to the Invasion of Korea. America had no interest in colonizing or occupying Korea. Indeed, such a course of action would contravene the very principles on which Americans conducted their diplomacy in East Asia. However, the United States had maneuvered its way into a quagmire wherein anything short of total victory would be tantamount to utter defeat.

Low opted to present the Koreans with a ten-day ultimatum, largely as a ploy to delay the conflict until the currents of the Han River turned in America’s favor. If the Koreans did not apologize for their aggression at Sondolmok, they would be subjected to American retaliation. On June 4, Pak Kyusu sent a letter to the American fleet, informing them that Korea simply could not understand their intentions, and imploring the Americans to understand Korean suspicion. During the ten-day interval, a curious system of communication developed. Each night, Koreans affixed messages to a pole erected in the mud flats near where the American fleet was anchored. The Americans would collect these messages each morning. However, none of the messages satisfied Low’s demands. In a last ditch attempt to stave off the attack, the Koreans sent one last letter that was carried to the Americans on board a ship waving a white flag. However, the letter did not contain an apology, and Rodgers ordered his fleet to retaliate.

On June 15, Low summarized his expedition in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, maintaining that he had made every effort to resolve the dispute amicably, and resorted to violence only as a last resort. On September 20, Fish notified Low that the State Department approved of his actions, and that the American people celebrated his victory as a fitting retribution for the destruction of the General Sherman. In his annual message to Congress, President Ulysses S. Grant took credit for Seward’s initiative, revising history as follows:

Prompted by a desire to put an end to the barbarous treatment of our shipwrecked sailors on the Korean coast, I instructed our minister at Peking to endeavor to conclude a convention with Korea for securing the safety and humane treatment of such mariners.

He asserted that the expedition had been “treacherously attacked at a disadvantage,” and celebrated Rodgers’ triumph as having “punished the criminals” and “vindicated the honor of the flag.” He gracefully tiptoed around the fact that the mission had not fulfilled its stated objective, concluding that the “the expedition returned, finding it impracticable under the circumstances to conclude the desired convention.”
Unlike the United States, Korea actually accomplished its goals, provoking an American withdrawal without being forced to abandon its isolationist policies. Daewongun concluded that the American declarations of peaceful intent were pretense, rhetorically asking the Chinese why the Americans, if they meant no ill will, felt the need to furnish their expedition with over 1,000 soldiers. He presumed that the American expedition was nothing more than “a crafty scheme to take advantage of our negligence, and get into the interior.” A survey of the American diplomatic tradition in East Asia and the diplomatic correspondence preceding the conflict disproves this theory. As Gordon H. Chang emphasizes, “the Americans sincerely believed they had come in peace and harbored no malice toward Korea... they were in Korean waters only to raise the barbarous and inferior Koreans to a higher standard of behavior in international relations.” America’s Invasion of Korea was not disingenuous. It was simply a bad idea.

**The Shufeldt Treaty and the Opening of Korea**

Korea’s vindication of her policy of seclusion was short-lived. The Japanese had already fixed their gaze upon the peninsula, fearing Russian expansionism. Between 1869 and 1872, the Japanese launched four missions attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Korea, but Daewongun rebuffed them each time. In 1875, Koreans fired upon a small Japanese ship in Korean waters. The Japanese destroyed four Korean forts in retaliation, inflicting heavy casualties. In December 1875, General Kuroda and Count Inoue arrived in Korea to negotiate a Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Like George F. Seward in 1868 and Frederick Low in 1871, Inoue and Kuroda had been instructed to follow the methods Commodore Perry had used in Japan. This time, these tactics prevailed. Japan and Korea signed the Treaty of Kianghwa on February 27, 1876, establishing diplomatic relations, opening three Korean ports, securing extraterritorial rights for Japanese nationals, and detaching Korea from Chinese suzerainty.

On October 29, 1878, Navy Secretary Richard W. Thompson authorized Admiral Robert W. Shufeldt to open Korea for America. The initiative for this expedition came almost entirely from Shufeldt himself. The Admiral blamed Western behavior for the failure of 1871, and resolved to mollify King Gojong throughout the proceedings. At first, Shufeldt attempted to exploit the newly forged Japano-Korean intimacy, but Japan suspected ulterior motives and impeded his efforts. Equally curious of Shufeldt’s intentions was Li Hungchang, the Chinese official for Korean affairs, who
invited Shufeldt to Tianjin. Li offered to use his authority to persuade Korea to negotiate, evidently hoping to exploit the negotiations to offset Japan’s recognition of Korean independence. Li enlisted Chinese officials to transport the treaty to Korea on board a Chinese ship, despite the fact that Shufeldt refused to insert a clause recognizing Korean subservience to China. Shin Chen and Chin Hong-Chi of the Korean Royal Cabinet signed the Shufeldt Treaty on behalf of King Gojong on May 22, 1882. Japanese and American success in Korea inspired a great contest for Korea, with Great Britain and Germany securing treaties with the Hermit Kingdom in 1883, followed by Italy in 1884 and France in 1886.

Throughout the middle decades of the 19th century, American diplomats pursued consistent goals in the Far East: striving to earn most-favored-nation status and protecting the lives and property of American citizens while preserving the sovereign integrity of Asian nations. Every plenipotentiary who crossed the Pacific to negotiate the opening of Asian commerce—Caleb Cushing, Matthew C. Perry, Townshend Harris, George F. Seward, Frederick Low, and Robert W. Shufeldt—carried with him the same American principles. The differences between these missions, therefore, were not ideological. They were strategic. For example, Perry and Low’s missions were necessarily more threatening than Cushing’s, as Japan and Korea clung to traditional policies of seclusion in a way that China did not. Furthermore, Japan had a reputation for brutal treatment of shipwrecked American sailors and Korea had set fire to the General Sherman, which was still presumed to have been a legitimate commercial venture at the time of the Low expedition.

Low’s expedition, the 1871 American Invasion of Korea, mimicked Commodore Perry’s 1853 mission to Japan both ideologically and strategically. However, whereas Perry’s action reflected an accurate assessment of strategic realities, Low’s action “was as much of a failure as most imitations are.” The Invasion of Korea was an unwinnable war. Considering the spike in Korean morale after the prior French Invasion, a diplomatic mission backed by a small naval fleet was not sufficient to end Korea’s seclusion. Even if force was the best option, then America would have had to utterly decimate Korea, perhaps even occupy the peninsula, before Daewongun would have submitted to the treason of international commerce. A mere five American warships could never have sufficed. America’s commitment to anti-colonialism rendered this solution untenable. In the greater context of American diplomacy in the Far East, the American Invasion of Korea stands out not as an imperialistic
anomaly or a moral atrocity. It distinguishes itself as a woeful miscalculation and a sheer strategic nightmare.

1 Kim, Yongkoo. *The Five Years’ Crisis, 1866-1871* (Inchon: Circle, 2001), 100.
3 Kim, Yongkoo, 100.
7 Battistini, Lawrence H., 19.
8 Kim, Yongkoo, 104.
11 LaFeber, Walter, 102.
13 Webster to Cushing, in Webster, Daniel, *The Diplomatic and Official Paper of Daniel Webster, While Secretary of State*. (Charleston, South Carolina: Nabu Press, 2010), 361.
15 Ibid.
16 Webster to Cushing, in Webster, Daniel, 362. “Your mission has in view only friendly and commercial objects—objects, it is supposed, equally useful to both countries.”
17 Cited in LaFeber, Walter, 137.
19 Cited in Dennett, Tyler, 408.
Cited in Dennett, Tyler, 411.

Dennett, Tyler, 414.

Dennett, Tyler, 451.


Cited by Kim, Yongkoo, 32.

Cited by Kim, Yongkoo, 33.

Masson, Eugène to his parents, 15 December 1866: “Pendant notre trajet, nous nous faisions passer pour des enfants de la lune, mais arrivés à quelque distance de la capitale ils auront probablement trouvé que les enfants de la lune pénétraient trop dans leur intérieur”

Kim, Yongkoo, 24.

Masson, Eugène to his parents, 15 December 1866: “Nous quittons la Corée pour venir passer l’hiver en Chine car nous ne sommes vraiment pas assez de monde pour occuper toute cette puissance, il est probable que si le roi ne s’est pas soumis pour le printemps prochain, on y reviendra avec des forces supérieures que l’on nous enverra de France.”

M. Moustier to M. Bellonet, 10 November 1866, Correspondence politique. Chine, no. 42. Source: Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes de la république française.

Cited by Kim, Yongkoo, 48.

Cited by Kim, Yongkoo, 47.

Cited by Kim, Yongkoo, 88.

Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, 15 December 1866. Foreign Relations of the United States (Henceforth FRUS), 1867-68, 426. Source: United States Department of State.

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Cited in Kim, Yongkoo, 81.

Kim, Yongkoo, 87.

Cited in Kim, Yongkoo, 85.

Cited in Kim, Yongkoo, 88.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward, 3 July 1868. FRUS, 1870,
337.
43 Mr. Williams to Mr. Seward, July 31, 1868. FRUS, 1869, 544.
44 Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward, 14 October 1868, FRUS, 1870, 338.
46 Cited in Kim, Yongkoo, 76.
47 Mr. Fish to Mr. Low, 20 April 1870. FRUS, 1870-71, 334.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, 22 November 1870, FRUS, 1871-72, 74.
51 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, 13 May 1871, FRUS, 1871-72, 115.
53 Ibid.
54 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, 2 June 1871, FRUS, 1871-72, 121.
55 Ibid.
57 Cited in Chang, Gordon H., 1348.
58 Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, 2 June 1871, FRUS, 1871-72, 122.
59 Grant, Ulysses S., Third Annual Message to Congress, 4 December 1871 <http://millercenter.org/cripps/archive/speeches/detail/3742>
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Cited by Chang, Gordon H., 1360.
63 Ibid.
64 Dennett, Tyler, 453.