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Aesthetic response and technical analysis
in the rhetorical writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus

By Cynthia Damon, Cambridge, Massachusetts

As his contribution to the classicizing revival of his own day Dionysius\(^1\) set himself the task of identifying tines eisin deixologwta tov arxhion rhotron te kai syggrafein kai tines auton evynont proairseis tov te bion kai tov logon kai ti par' ekastou de' lambanein h phylattesvai\(^2\). Implicit in this task is a theory of evaluation of which the details on occasion become explicit. Various attempts have been made to distill a comprehensive system from the scattered theoretical remarks, most recently by D. M. Schenkeveld\(^3\). After examining thirteen of these explicit passages Schenkeveld concludes: “He [sc. Dionysius] may well seem to operate within a coherent system, but in reality he discusses isolated aspects of a rather vaguely defined whole: he appears to lack a consistent view of the foundation of his literary criticism.”\(^4\) Yet these thirteen short passages comprise a very small proportion of the references to matters relevant to a theory of evaluation, and Schenkeveld’s refusal to take into account the chronological relationships between the treatises is rash in view of Bonner’s careful demonstration of development in Dionysius’ critical method\(^5\). Indeed one of the greatest weaknesses of the article is a direct result of this synchronic treatment. Schenkeveld’s Text I comes from the Thucydides, a relatively late work. It was chosen to be the first, he says, “because there Dionysius

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2 On the Ancient Orators 4, I 6, 21–24.

3 Theories of evaluation in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, MPhL 1 (1975) 93–107.

4 Schenkeveld 107. Cf. Lebel 84 and Pohl 44 for other assertions of inconsistency.

5 Schenkeveld’s refusal (94) also leads to slips such as the criticism of Dionysius for ignoring “his previous point of view”, when that previous point of view comes from a later essay, the Thucydides (104, in reference to a passage from the CV). It is only previous in the sense that
mentions the various groups of people able to criticize a work, the tools by which they do so, and their specific objects. If it is the fullest discussion of critical theory, it is also (with the possible exception of his Text XII, Din. 7, I 307, 7–17) the latest of the passages he considers. Because it sets up τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον and τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον as critical faculties of apparently comparable competence, Schenkeveld devotes much of his article to elucidating “the question of the range of the two capacities and that of a possible preference for one of them” 6. Yet this is difficult, because reason (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον) is mentioned nowhere else in the rhetorical writings as an evaluative tool7. The result is the disappointing conclusion already cited. This paper gathers a much greater number of passages relevant to Dionysius’ theory of evaluation, then looks to his critical practice for illustrations, explications and contradictions of his theory. Because of the number of passages to be considered in the first part of the paper, they have been organized into three categories by topic: (1) the effect of a work of literature on the hearer, (2) the faculties by which the work is judged, and (3) the critics who judge it.

I. Effects

Fundamental to a critic’s theory of evaluation are the effects he perceives language to have on its audience. Dionysius mentions three types of effect: aesthetic, moral and emotional. These arise from different aspects of language, act on different faculties in the listener and produce different types of evaluation. Each will be considered in its turn. Moral and emotional effects are

Schenkeveld discussed it earlier in his article. A generally accepted chronology of composition is as follows (from Bonner 38, * indicates placement not certain):

*1 Mimesis, books 1 and 2
2 Lystas, Isocrates, Isaes (and the preface
On the Ancient Orators)
*3 ad Aenmaeum I
4 Demosthenes, ch.1–33
5 de Compositione Verborum (CV)

Cf. also Usher 1, xxiii–xxvi; Grube 222–224; K. Sacks, Historiography in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Athenaeum 61 (1983) 67–87, esp. 83–87. Aujac (1, 22–28), following Costil, has proposed a different arrangement, making the Thucydides prior to the CV and the second half of the Demosthenes. The description of Thucydides’ σύντηξες in that work (Thuc. C.24,1 361, 7–12), however, seems to me to derive from and depend on Dionysius’ theory of the ἀμοιβα, which is worked out in the CV and Demosthenes chs. 38–41. The verbal similarities between this description and, e.g., the beginning of ch. 22 of the CV are not to be denied.

6 Schenkeveld 95.
7 Throughout this paper I will be using “reason” as a translation for τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον and “intuition” for Dionysius’ interchangeable terms ἡ ἴδιος αισθήσις and τὸ ἴδιον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον. These terms are compendious rather than precise, however. What Dionysius means by τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον is a critical faculty that can give an explanation for its verdict on a particular passage, whereas τὸ ἴδιον κριτήριον can only describe its reaction.
somewhat difficult to identify because it is not always clear what organ or faculty is affected by them. Aesthetic effects, on the other hand, are revealed by the part affected — when language acts on ἕ ἀκοῆ, ἕ ἁκρόασις or ἅ αἰσθήσεις, the effect is aesthetic. I therefore begin with this category.

A. Aesthetic effects

The importance of the ear’s demands on language can be seen from the following passage: ὅσοι δὲ μὴν ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἔννοια τὰ γενεκώτατα, ὅν ἐφίέσυλαν δει τοὺς συνιδέντας μέτρα τε καὶ λόγους, ἢ τε ἡδονή καὶ τὸ καλὸν· ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖ ταῦτα ἕ ἀκοῆ, ὁμοιον τι πάσχουσα τῇ ὀράσει καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῃ πλάσματα καὶ γραφὰς καὶ γλυφὸς καὶ δόσα δημιουργήματα χειρῶν ἐστὶν ἄν- υρωπίνον ὀράσια ὅταν εὐφωνίκη τὸ τε ἡδο ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλὸν, ἀρκεῖται καὶ οὐΔὲν ἓτι ποιεῖ (CV 10, II 36, 8–15).

Just as the ear sets the goals of good composition, so it registers approval of the four features found in all well-composed works: καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμη) καὶ μέλος ἐχουσιν αἱ λέξεις καὶ ρυθμὸν καὶ μεταβολὴν καὶ πρέπον, ὡστε καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης ἕ ἁκοῆ τέρπεται μὲν τοῖς μέλεσιν, ἀγεταὶ δὲ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς, ἀσπάζεται δὲ τὰς μεταβολὰς, ποιεῖ δ’ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ οἰκεῖον (CV 11, II 40, 11–15).

The passages which mention more specific aesthetic effects are so numerous that I resort to listing the causes and types of effect. The various elements of language that are said to affect the senses in general or the sense of hearing in particular are: letters8, letter junctions9, syllables10, syllable weight11, words12, figures (when misused)13, melody and rhythm in prose14, variety15, appropriateness16, vividness17, passages of poetry taken as a whole18, the poetical element in prose19, σύνθεσις20, and λέξις21. Expression, ὁ λεκτικός τόπος,
supplies most of the items on this list, while the elements of the πραγματικὸς
tόπος (εὐφρασίς, κρίσις, τάξις, ἔξεργασία)\textsuperscript{22} are entirely absent. As for the type
of effect produced, the following verbs are used to describe the action of lan-
guage on the ear: ἡδύνειν\textsuperscript{23}, γλυκαίνειν\textsuperscript{24}, τέρπειν\textsuperscript{25}, πικραίνειν\textsuperscript{26}, πραύνειν\textsuperscript{27},
λειάνειν\textsuperscript{28}, τραχύνειν\textsuperscript{29}, χαράττειν\textsuperscript{30}, ἀποκναίειν\textsuperscript{31}, ἐκμαλάττειν\textsuperscript{32}, διαχεῖν\textsuperscript{33},
ἐπιστώψειν\textsuperscript{34}, ἐπάγεσθαι\textsuperscript{35}, κόπτειν\textsuperscript{36}, λυπεῖν\textsuperscript{37}, προσιστασθαι\textsuperscript{38}, κινεῖν\textsuperscript{39},
ἐνοχλεῖν\textsuperscript{40}, ταράττειν\textsuperscript{41}, ἀποστρέφειν\textsuperscript{42}, κηλεῖν\textsuperscript{43}, γοιτεύειν\textsuperscript{44}, ἀδέλειν\textsuperscript{45}. Met-
taphors such as these stress the sensoriness of the effect\textsuperscript{46}. A large majority of the
passages from which these lists were compiled come from the Demosthenes and
the On Composition (with a few from the Thucydidides), i.e. from relatively late
works, and they seem to present a fairly coherent picture of the sources and
nature of aesthetic effects. This concentration of references suggests that Dio-

\textsuperscript{22} For this list, see W. Kendrick Pritchett, \textit{Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Thucydidides} (Berkeley 1975) xxxvi. See also Grube, \textit{Thrasymachus} 258, note 12, on the subdivisions of τὸ πραγμα-

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Dem.} 20, I 171, 7; \textit{CV} 11, II 38, 13 ( resilvent); \textit{CV} 11, II 43, 13; \textit{CV} 14, II 54, 11; \textit{CV} 14, II 55, 6;
\textit{CV} 16, II 63, 12. Cf. ἡδύνεσις at \textit{CV} 12, II 46, 3; ἡδύνει at \textit{Thuc.} 29, I 374, 17; ἡδύνει at \textit{Dem.} 38, I
211, 18; ἡδύνεις ὀργα at \textit{CV} 11, II 39, 18.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{CV} 12, II 43, 22; \textit{CV} 12, II 46, 4; \textit{CV} 15, II 60, 2. Cf. εὐγλώσσουν καὶ μελιχρόν at \textit{CV} 1, II 6, 9.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{CV} 11, II 40, 13.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Dem.} 43, I 224, 14; \textit{CV} 12, II 43, 22; \textit{CV} 15, II 60, 3; \textit{CV} 22, II 100, 12.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Dem.} 43, I 224, 14.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Dem.} 43, I 224, 15; \textit{CV} 12, II 44, 1.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{CV} 12, II 44, 1; \textit{CV} 14, II 54, 13; \textit{CV} 22, II 100, 11; \textit{Thuc.} 24, I 361, 10. Cf. ἀποτραχύνειν at \textit{Dem.}
43, I 224, 14 and ἀποτραχύνειν at \textit{CV} 22, II 104, 8.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{CV} 22, II 109, 6–7.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Dem.} 20, I 171, 17.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{CV} 12, II 46, 4. Cf. μαλακῆ καὶ λεπιθάνως ὀλισθάνουσα διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς at \textit{CV} 22, II 108 3.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{CV} 15, II 60, 3–4.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Dem.} 38, I 211, 8. Cf. στυφεῖν \textit{CV} 15, II 60, 3 (pace Usher, the effect here is on the ears, not the
mouth).

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{CV} 3, II 11, 5. Cf. ἀγέται at \textit{CV} 11, II 40, 13.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{CV} 12, II 44, 13; \textit{CV} 19, II 87, 16.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Dem.} 40, I 217, 9; \textit{CV} 9, II 34, 17.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Isoc.} 2, I 58, 2; \textit{Isoc.} 14, I 74, 6; \textit{CV} 12, II 44, 18.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{CV} 14, II 54, 11.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Thuc.} 42, I 397, 20. Cf. διοχεῖν at \textit{CV} 9, II 34, 18; ἀδέλεις at \textit{Dem.} 38, I 211, 18 and \textit{CV} 11, II
40, 1; ἀδέλεις at \textit{Dem.} 15, I 161, 7.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Dem.} 40, I 215, 13.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Dem.} 20, I 171, 11–12; \textit{Thuc.} 42, I 398, 13.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Dem.} 39, I 212, 9; \textit{CV} 3, II 11, 5; \textit{CV} 11, II 39, 19.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Dem.} 39, I 212, 9; \textit{CV} 12, II 46, 8.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Dem.} 20, I 171, 7.

\textsuperscript{46} That pairs like γλυκαίνειν/πικραίνειν are not just fancy equivalents for good and bad (i.e.
pleasurable and painful) is shown by the following praise for a model of the austere style of
composition: τραχύνει τὸ ἀλόπος καὶ πικραίνει μετρίως τὰς ἀκοὰς (CV 22, II 100, 11–12). Πικραίνειν is a term of praise at
\textit{Dem.} 40, I 215, 12; at \textit{Dem.} 18, I 167, 6–10 Dionysius says that
τὸ ἡδύνειν, is not always useful.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus

nysius’ aesthetic theory, already present in the Lysias, developed substantially in these later essays.47

B. Moral effects

The moral effect receives limited attention. Under this heading are to be placed passages in which Dionysius claims that a composition has been able to produce (not portray) moral qualities.48 The distinction between the two functions is most clearly shown in the pseudo-Dionysian Exetasis: τὸ ἰδιὸν φημὶ διπλοῦν εἶναι, κοινὸν τε καὶ ἰδιὸν. Πῇ διορίζω τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἰδιὸν ἀπ’ ἄλληλον, φράσω. Κοινὸν λέγω τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἐχόμενον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τί; τὸ εἰς ἀρετὴν προτρέπον καὶ κακίας ἀπαλλάττον. ἰδίον δὲ λέγω τὸ ῥητορικόν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τί; τὸ πρέποντας καὶ προσήκοντας τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ύπο-κειμένων πραγμάτων τῷ λέγοντι αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκούοντι καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος καὶ πρὸς οὗ ὁ λόγος (Exetasis 2, II 375, 9–17)49.

It is the first of these two types that concerns us here. Dionysius himself discusses the production of moral qualities virtually only with respect to Iso-

47 Many more topics are treated in the Thucydides than in the CV or the latter half of the Demosthenes; it is the only essay in which elements of the πραγματικός τόπος get serious consideration. Style, and with it aesthetic effects, is relegated to a secondary importance.

48 The word ἰδιὸς and its derivatives have a variety of meanings in Dionysius’ critical essays. In the early Mimesis, the ability to portray appropriate characters seems to be meant when comedians are praised as ἰδιοί (Mim. II 207, 4). Similarly, Aeschylus is ἰδιὸν καὶ παθὸν τὸ πρέπον εἰδῶς (Mim. II 206, 3–4). Sophocles is said to surpass Euripides in ability to preserve the dignity of his characters (Mim. II 206, 13–14), i.e. his characters are well-portrayed, but he uses only noble types. Xenophon is deemed not inferior to Herodotus in τὰ ἰδικά (Mim. II 208, 5), which here constitutes a general category under the heading of τὸ πραγματικόν, but when τὸ λεκτικόν is being reviewed, he is blamed for assigning inappropriate speeches to his characters (Mim. II 208, 10–14). Thus the praise for τὰ ἰδικά is probably based on his overall moral tone. Herodotus surpasses Thucydides in τοῖς ἰδιοῖς (Mim. II 207, 13), and that this refers to character portrayal is made clear in the full quotation of this σύγκρισις in the Letter to Pompeius (although see Sacks [above, note 5] 66–74 on the possibility of expansion and refinement here), where the category is called ἰδιὸν τε καὶ παθὸν μίμησις (Pomp. 3, II 239, 18–19). Finally, ἰδιὸς is used to denote the character of a real person (as opposed to that of a literary persona) in the examination of Philistus. He is said to be an imitator of Thucydides in everything but ἰδιὸς, which is explained as follows: ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ φρονήματος μεστὸν· τούτῳ δὲ θεατητικὸν τῶν τυράννων καὶ δοῦλων πλεονεξίας (Mim. II 208, 15–17). The emphasis in this essay, and in all others but the Isocrates, seems to be on portrayal rather than on production of moral qualities. Yet a third meaning of the term, “a less-violent emotion than πάθος”, is found, e.g., at Dem. 2, I 131, 5–6. On this, see Grube, Critica 291–292.

49 On Pseudo-Dionysius see D. A. Russell, Classicizing Rhetoric and Criticism: The Pseudo-Dionysian Exetasis and Mistakes in Declaration, in: Le Classicisme à Rome aux 1er siècles avant et après J.-C., Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique tome 25 (Vandœuvres-Genève 1979) 113–130. Pseudo-Dionysius is dated to the second century A.D. In Dionysius’ own writings the difference is never so explicitly stated, but it is hinted at in the epitome of book II of the Mimesis when ἰδιοσοιτα (i.e. the correct portrayal of various characters) is listed in a catalogue of the stylistic virtues that Pindar aims at (Mim. II 205, 5), but a separate sentence is allotted to his concern with τῶν εἰς σοφοφοσύνην καὶ ἐσθέμειαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἰδιῶν (Mim. II 205, 6–7), i.e. the production of moral virtues.
crates. Chapters 5–9 of the Isocrates paraphrase and appraise the subject matter of various speeches of that orator. In chapters 5, 7 and 8 a rhetorical question stating the moral effect of the speech in question introduces the discussion: (ch. 5) τίς γάρ οὖν ἃν γένοιτο φιλόπολίς τε καὶ φιλόδημος ἢ τίς οὖν ἃν ἐπιτη-
δεύσει τὴν πολιτικὴν καλοκαγάτιαν ἁναγνώσεις αὐτῶν τὸν Πανηγυρικὸν;50
(ch. 7) τίς δὲ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν προτέρατι καὶ' ἐκκαστὸν τε ἀνδρὰ ὁδὸν καὶ κοινὴς τὰς πόλεις ὅλας τοῦ Περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης
λόγου; (ch. 8) τίς δὲ τῶν Ἀρεαπαγιτικῶν ἁναγνώσις λόγον οὖν ἃν γένοιτο κοσ-
μιώτερος; In chapter 6 Dionysius varies the format by placing the appraisal of
the Letter to Philip at the end: πολλῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ τοὺς ἁναγινώσκοντας ταύτα
dυνάστας φρονήματος τε μείζονος ύποπιμπλασθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν τῆς
ἀρετῆς; in chapter 9 he limits himself to the general point that the sort of advice
that Isocrates is giving is more effective than the moral precepts of philosophers
(Isoc. 9, I 69, 24–70, 2). In the Demosthenes, a later treatise, he describes the
overall effect of a passage of Isocrates as follows: ὅταν μὲν τινα τῶν Ἰσοκράτους
ἀναγνώσκων λόγων, εἰτε τῶν πρὸς τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας γεγραμ-
μένων ἢ τῶν ...51 ἐν ἦθει σπουδάτος γίνομαι καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐσταθεὶς ἔχω τῆς
γνώμης, ὡσπερ οἱ τῶν σπονδείων αὐλημάτων ἢ τῶν Δωρίων τε κάναρμονίων
μελῶν ἀκροφόμενοι (Dem. 22, I 176, 10–15)52.

50 Patriotic sentiment is aroused by Thucydides 2, 63, which, in Dionysius’ opinion, is a
passage διεξείροντα τὰς γυνὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ πάτριον (Thuc. 47, I 404,
10–12), but it is difficult to determine whether this is a moral or an emotional effect because the
specifically moral term in the comment on Isocrates (καλοκαγάτια) is lacking here.
The passage is one of those admired by Dionysius because its subject matter is not impeded by
stylistic oddities (Thuc. 47, I 404, 21–24), and this pattern of a cause from the realm of τὸ
πραγματικόν and an effect in the political sphere, resembling as it does the causes and effects
examined in chapters 5–9 of the Isocrates, may incline one to see this as a lone non-Isocratean
example of moral effect.

51 Usener marks a lacuna in the text here.
52 Aristotle’s discussion of music in the Politics helps elucidate what kind of effect Dionysius has
in mind here. Chapter 4 of book 8 is an inquiry into the value of music and in particular into how,
if at all, music should be used in the education of the young, and an important premise is
that music differs from other aesthetic arts in its ability to represent and affect character (1340
a 29–b 15). Both mode and rhythm are said to affect the ἡδος (1430 a 40–b 13), and this idea
still lingers on, though at a largely metaphorical level, in Dionysius, who frequently describes
modes and rhythms in terms that originally stood for moral values (e.g. Dem. 48, I 234, 20–22).
About the spondee of our passage, for example, he says ἁξίωμα δ’ ἔχει καὶ σεμνότητα πολλῆς
(CV 17, II 69, 5–6). He doesn’t discuss the Dorian mode elsewhere, but its character-building
quality is recommended to it both Plato (Rep. 399 a–c) and more emphatically to Aristotle (Pol.
1340 b 3–5, 1342 b 12–18 and especially 1342 a 28–30, περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογούσιν
ὡς σταυραμάττες οὐσίς καὶ μᾶλις ἡδος ἔχοντις ἁνέδρειον), who criticizes Plato for allowing
any other mode than this in his ideal state (Pol. 1342 a 33–b 1). The significance of ἐναρμόνιοι
is more difficult to assess. Most discussions of it are technical (cf. CV 19, II 85, 1 and 86, 2–3;
P. Oxy. 667) rather than evaluative, but a trace of the moral associations it carried may be
indicated by a passage in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemathe (918 b 21–23) where the en-
harmonic scale is said to be simpler and the sort of thing used when choruses were composed of
free citizens rather than vulgar professionals (cf. Pol. 1339 b 8–10). (Note that in this same
The γνώμη is affected as well as the ἡδος, and the analogy seems to be drawn from the sphere of the αἰσθήσεως, but this passage is the μὲν part of a μὲν—δὲ antithesis, and the δὲ part shows the effect of Demosthenes' speeches to be emotional. The contrast between moral and emotional effects is a commonplace⁵³; thus we may see in this passage a statement of the moral, rather than intellectual, aesthetic or even non-emotional effect of Isocratean prose. To summarize, the one thing that, according to Dionysius, has a moral effect is the πραγματικὸς τόπος of Isocratean speeches. He never identifies a faculty or critic by which this effect is judged, and does not himself use the concept in his analyses. Thus in chapters 37–41 of the Thucydides, where Dionysius' disapproval of the moral tone of the Melian Dialogue is evident, his criticism is not so much that the sentiments expressed have a deleterious effect on the reader's morals, as that they are obscurely phrased and inappropriate to the speakers⁵⁴. In fact, the category of moral effect seems to have been designed to accommodate Dionysius' sympathy with Isocrates' political philosophy and to give him something favorable to say about the orator, rather than as an essential component of his critical theory⁵⁵.

chapter [XIX] music is again distinguished from flavors, colors and scents by its association with moral character, 919 b 26–37.) Music, then, is the pre-eminently moral aesthetic field (the term is Aristotle's, αισθητική, Pol. 1340 a 29), and an analogy between men listening to music and Dionysius reading a speech of Isocrates is designed to demonstrate the moral, not aesthetic effect of Isocratean writing. The phrase πολὺ τὸ εὐσταθὲς ἐχω τῆς γνώμης reflects nicely Aristotle's description of the moral effect of the Dorian mode (στασισμωτάτης, cf. καθιστηκότος μάλιστα, 1340 b 4) and inclines one to read the doublet ἡδος/γνώμη as a pair of alternative terms for the seat of moral qualities rather than a contrast between ethical and intellectual effects.

⁵³ E.g. Dem. 43, I 224, 15–16, where the ability to produce either effect at will is an instance of the versatility of Demosthenes' style: τὰ μὲν εἰς πάθος ἐκτρέψει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἡδος ὑπάγεται.

⁵⁴ Grammatical inconsistency in the first speech of the Melians prompts the following jibe: τὸ τὸ τελευταῖον εἰ τις ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀξίωσει φέρειν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντας τοὺς σολοκισμούς, δοσὶ γίγνονται παρὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, σχήματα καλῶν; (Thuc. 37, I 389, 7–10). Their next sentence is an εννύμημα νενομένον μὲν οὐκ ἄτοπος, ἕρμηνευόμενον δὲ οὐκ εὐπαρακολουθητὸς (Thuc. 37, I 390, 4–5), and one of the later Athenian replies is λαβοῦσαν σκολιότερα (Thuc. 40, I 392, 25). Inappropriate sentiments: πρῶτον μὲν εἰρηκὼν εννυμήμα οὔτε τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως ἔξοδον οὔτε ἐπὶ τοιούτους πράγμασιν ἀρμόττων λέγεσθαι (Thuc. 38, I 390, 16–18); βασιλεύει γὰρ βαρβάρους ταύτα πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἠρμόττε λέγειν (Thuc. 39, I 391, 12–15); ταύτα οὐκ οὖν πώς ἄν τις ἑπανέσει νὸς προσήκουσι εἰρήσθαι στρατηγοὺς Ἀθηναίων (Thuc. 40, I 393, 12–14).

⁵⁵ He claims to have written a defence of political philosophy πρὸς τοὺς καταστρέφοντας αὐτῆς ἠδίκως (Thuc. 2, I 327, 20–22). This is not extant, but we can see him struggling to find something good to say about Isocrates. After criticizing the lack of variety in the compositions of Isocrates and his imitators, he says καὶ αὐτῷ μὲν ἵσως τῷ Ἰσοκράτῃ πολλαὶ χάριτες ἐπήνυσαν ἄλλα ταύταν ἐπικρίσεις τὴν ἀμορφιάν (CV I, II 87, 18–19) but has no specifics to mention. In another passage he says ἄν τούτοις οὐ μέμψετο τοῖς ἄνδρα (sc. Isocrates) τοῦ ὄμματος (γενναία γὰρ ἡ διάνοια καὶ δυναμικὴ κινήσει πάθος), τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως λεπτὸν καὶ μεληκὸν αἰτίωμα (Dem. 20, I 171, 1–4). Grube, as usual, has put his finger on the problem:
C. Emotional effects

Emotional effects, too, come under discussion with surprising infrequency considering the importance, by Dionysius’ own estimation, of emotional effects in oratory: ἡν δ’ ἄρα πάντων ἰσχυρότατον τῷ μέλλοντι πείθειν δήμον ἡ δικαστήριον ἐπί τὰ πάθη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἀγαγεῖν (Dem. 18, I 166, 24–26)56. Isocrates’ inability to produce this sort of effect serves as foil for Demosthenes’ mastery, for, when reading a speech of this orator, Dionysius says: ἐνθουσιώδες τε και δεύορ κάκεεσε ἁγομαι, πάντος ἐτερον ἐς ἐτέρου μεταλαμβάνων, ἀπιστῶν, ἀγνών, δεδίων, καταφρονῶν, μισῶν, ἔλεον, εὐνοῶν, ὀργίζομενος, φύνον, ἁπάντα τὰ πάθη μεταλαμβάνων, ὅσα κρατεῖν πέφυκεν ἀνυρωπίνης γνώμης (Dem. 22, I 176, 16–20)57. Here the emotional effect is said to overpower the rational faculty; elsewhere it is subordinate to αἱ ἀκοαί: some figures of speech used by Demosthenes are κινητικῶτατα τῶν ὀχλῶν, but only ἄχρι τοῦ μῆ λυπῆσαι τὰς ἀκοὰς (Dem. 40, I 217, 7–9)58. Again the category is of extremely limited extent, for, despite the value of emotional effects to an orator, only Demosthenes is said to produce them59. As in the case of moral effects, no faculty is adduced by which these might be judged and Dionysius does not comment on emotional effectiveness when analysing specific passages of any author. The category was a traditional one in discussions of rhetoric and our

56 The distinction between portrayal and production of πάθος is less clear than that for θυσία, perhaps because emotion portrayed leads so readily to emotion produced. Cf., e.g., Arist. Rhet. 1408 a where Aristotle urges an orator to make his style reflect the emotions appropriate to the subject-matter because συμμοισταιθεῖ ὁ ἄκοιχος ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ λέγοντι, κἂν μηθῶν λέγη. Or, Horace in the Ars Poetica: si vis me flere, dolendum est / primum ipsi tibi, tunc tua me infortunia laedent / Telephvel Peleu (102–104). In the discussion following the passage quoted just below (where Dionysius is experiencing various emotions) he says that Demosthenes felt and displayed these emotions himself during the delivery of his speeches (τὴν αὐτοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ παράσταμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεικνυόμενον, Dem. 22, I 177, 10–11), and that anyone who wants to read them aloud effectively must at least feign them.

57 Dionysius does concede that this was not what Isocrates was aiming at: παθάνειν τε ὡς δύναται τοὺς ἀκροατῶν, ὡς σαβεῖ, τὰ πολλὰ ὡς οὐδὲ βούλεται, πείθεται δὲ ἀποχρῆν τῷ πολιτικῷ διάνοιαν ἀποδείξει. σπουδαίαν καὶ ἦδος ἐπαικίας (Dem. 18, I 166, 19–21).

58 Pericosis, paronomoeosis, antithesis, paronomasia, antistrope, anaphora. Note that these same figures, when used to excess, actually deprive Isocrates’ prose of τὸ παθητικόν (Isoc. 2, I 57, 18–58, 3 and Isoc. 13, I 73, 10–74, 3).

59 Thucydides, too, receives a point for surpassing Herodotus at τῶι παθητικῶι when their relative virtues are being totted up in the Mimesis. It is interesting, however, that neither ἦδος nor πάθος (both standard rhetorical categories) is mentioned in the critiques of the orators (Lyias, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides) with which the book concludes.
author seems to have accepted its existence without taking it up into his own critical theory.\(^{60}\)

There remain a number of passages which are less easy to categorize. In the Lysias, those who use unusual language and artificial expressions are said to stun their inexperienced hearers. Gorgias, for example, καταπλήξατο τούς ἀκούοντας τῇ δημηγορίᾳ (Lys. 1, 11, 6–7). Compare the effect of Plato’s style: εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος ἐκπλήττεται ταῖς Πλατωνικαῖς ἐρμηνείαις ... κάγῳ τούτων εἴς εἰμὶ (Pomp. 1, II 221, 12–13). This kind of effect does not fit readily into any of our categories – it has the right cause for an aesthetic effect, an element of the λεκτικὸς τόπος – but the metaphor describes something which stuns the rational faculty into inactivity rather than something which stimulates the senses.\(^{61}\) The verb καταπλήξατο recurs in conjunction with purely aesthetic effects (ἡδύναι, μαλάξαι) in a comparison of Thucydidean and Lysianic λέξεις, but the parts affected are διάνοια and νοῦς: ἢ μὲν γάρ (sc. λέξεις) καταπλήξασθαι δύναται τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ δὲ ἡδύναι, καὶ ἢ μὲν συστρέψαι καὶ συνυπνεῖν τὸν νοῦν, ἢ δὲ ἀνεῖναι καὶ μαλάξαι, καὶ εἰς πάνος ἐκείνη προσαγαγεῖν, εἰς δὲ ἡδύς αὕτη καταστήσαι (Dem. 2, I 131, 3–6).

Rational and aesthetic faculties are again confounded when Dionysius amplifies the definition of ἐνάργεια (δύναμις τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀγωσα τὰ λεγόμενα) by saying: ὁ δὲ προσέχων τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖς Λυσιου λόγοις οὐχ οὕτως ἐστι σκαίτος ὁ δυσώρευστος ὁ βραδύς τὸν νοῦν, ὃς οὐχ ὑπολήμετρα γινόμενα τὰ δηλούμενα ὀρθῶν ... (Lys. 7, I 14, 20–23). The effect is felt in the αἰσθήσεις, but διάνοια and νοῦς are involved too, and not as intellectual qualities, but as equivalents for αἱ αἰσθήσεις.\(^{62}\) It is clear from this last passage that at least one of the problems is terminological (a problem familiar to students of Dionysius), namely that his desire to avoid repeating himself at short intervals leads him to use less-than-precise “synonyms”. There are relatively few parts of the human system that can be said to be affected by language (γνώμη, νοῦς, διάνοια, ἡδύς, ἀκοή, αἰσθήσεις, ἀρίστασεις); given the frequency with which aesthetic effects are discussed, terms appropriate to other types of effect tend to be called into service to describe these as well.\(^{64}\)

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61 The sort of thing, for example, that Dionysius has in mind when he explains a sententia of Aeschines (ὡς ύμᾶς ὄρρωδω κακῶς πάσχοντας τὴν σύννεσιν τῶν Δημοσθένους ὀνομάτων ἀγαπήσαντας) as follows: καὶ γάρ ἐντάθη πάλιν ὁ δόδοικε, μὴ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν αὐτῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀγαπήσασιν Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ λάβωσιν ὑπὸ τῆς συννέσεως γοητευόμεντες, ὥστε καὶ τὸν φανερῶν αὐτῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀφεῖναι διὰ τὰς σειρῆνας τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας (Dem. 35, I 207, 10–16).

62 Cf. the confusion of emotional effect and rational part affected at Thuc. 23, I 360, 10: pre-Thucydides historians did not stir up emotions in the mind (οὔδὲ πάνος διεγέρον τὸν νοῦν).

63 Lebel (87) credits him with a “terminologie polyvalente”.

64 This may be sufficient to explain the terms of the comparison between Thucydides and Lysias, but the three passages where the effect is “dazzlement” remain anomalous. They ought, perhaps, to be put into a minor category of “intellectual effects”, but while Dionysius oc-
II. Critical faculties

We have seen that of the three types of effect produced by language only the aesthetic effect is considered by Dionysius with any thoroughness. Aesthetics also predominate in discussions of faculties by which literature is judged. The earliest statement occurs in chapter 11 of the Lysias, where various excellent qualities, not all literary, are said to be perceived aiστησει, ou λόγος. The passage deserves quotation in full: ὡστε εἰ τις ἡξιοθεί λόγῳ διδαχθῆναι ταύτῃ τὴν δύναμιν, ἢ τίς ποτ’ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι καὶ ἄλλων πολλάν καὶ καλῶν πραγμάτων διασκελαλήτου ἀπαιτῶν λόγον· λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ κάλλους μὲν σωμάτων, τί δὴ ποτὲ τούτ’ ἐστιν, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὄραν, ἐπὶ κινήσεως δὲ μελῶν καὶ πλοκῆς φθόγγον, τί λέγεται τὸ εὐάρμοστον, ἐπὶ συμμετρίας δὲ χρόνον, τίς ἢ τάξις καὶ τί τὸ εὐρυύμον, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς δὲ συλλήβδην ἔργου τε καὶ πράγματος, τίς ὃ λεγόμενος καιρός καὶ ποῦ τὸ μέτριον. αἰσθῆσει γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον κατα- λαμβάνεται καὶ οὐ λόγῳ. ὡσ' ἐπερ οἱ μουσικοὶ παραγγέλλουσι ποιεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ἀκριβῶς ἀρμονίας, ὡστε μηδὲ τὴν ἐλαχιστὴν ἐν τοῖς διαστήμασι διέστην ἄγνοιεν, τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐμπίεζε καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ταύτης ἀκρι- βέστερον θετεῖν κριτήριον, τότε καγώ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκοις τὸν Λυσιάν καὶ τίς ἢ παρ’ αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστί βουλομένους μαθεῖν ὑποδείξην ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν, χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάνει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκεῖν αἰσθή- σιν (Lys. 11, I 18, 15–19, 10).

What Dionysius says next is important: he considers charm the most important and characteristic of Lysias' ἀρεταί whether composition (as opposed to evaluation) is a matter of τέχνη or not: εἴτε φύσεως αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν χάριν) δεῖ καλεῖν εὐτυχίαν εἴτε πόνον καὶ τέχνης ἐργασίαν εἴτε μικτὴν εξ ἀμφοῖν ἐξίν ἡ δύναμιν (Lys. 11, I 19, 12–13; cf. Dem. 13, I 158, 9; Dem. 47, I 232, 5–6). That is, the critic is to rely on his ἄλογος αἰσθήσεις to judge a work that may in fact be the product of τέχνη. The tools of writer and critic are not

sionally says that the intellect is made not to function (intentionally, i.e. when the audience is deceived, e.g. Dem. 35, I 207, 10–16, or not, i.e. when the audience is confused, e.g. Isa. 16, I 114, 17; Thuc. 9, I 337, 18), he never says it is stimulated into activity. In fact it must be cajoled into acting at all: in the Demosthenes Dionysius recommends a pleasant style in the narrative portions of speeches because εἰ μὴ τὸ παρῆδον ἢ σύνδεσις ἐπενέγκα τῆς παραμυθήσεως τὸν τῆς διανοιῶν κόσμον, οὐχ ἔξοισαν αἱ πίστεις βάσιν ἄσφαλον (Dem. 45, I 230, 5–7).

65 On the whole Dionysius seems to consider the process of creating good writing more technical than the process of evaluation. He defines rhetoric, for instance, as follows: ῥητορικὴ ἐστί δύναμει τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῇ, τέλος ἐξουσία τὸ εὐ λέγειν (Mim. II 197, 2–3), and in a later treatise carps at the spurious orator who practises rhetoric ὀδῷ τε καὶ τέχνης χωρίς (CV 25, II 131, 16). His goal in the CV is to explain the principles which ancient writers used in order to write well, for πολλῇ πρόνοια τοῖς ἄρχαιοι ἡ καὶ ποιήσει καὶ συγγραφεῖς φιλοσόφοι τε καὶ ῥήτοραι τῆς ἱδέας ταύτης, καὶ οὔτε τὰ ὄνομα τοῖς ὄνομασιν οὔτε τὰ κόλα τοὺς κόλας οὔτε τὰς περιόδους ἀλλήλαις εἰκὴ συνάπτειν φωντο δεῖν, τέχνη δὲ τις ἢ παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑθερήματα αὐτῶν χρωμένοι συνετῆσαν εἰ (CV 5, II 27, 8–14). These ὑθερήματα τῆς συνθετικῆς ἐπιστήμης applied, for example, to how to fit letters (Dem. 40, I 216, 12–16) and words (CV 6, II 29, 19–30, 12) together, and to when and how to use periodic
always so clearly distinguished. In the On Composition, for example, after
prescribing some rules for good composition, Dionysius warns the aspiring
author that an un-scientific for good element – ὁ καίρος – is really the most important:

ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πάντων οἶομαι δεῖν τὸν καιρὸν όραν.οὔτος γὰρ ἡδονής καὶ ἁπάθειας
κρατήσειν μέτρον. καιροῦ δὲ οὔτε ρήτωρ οὐδεις οὔτε φιλοσόφος εἰς τόδε 
γε 
tέχνην ἔρισεν, οὔδε ὅσπερ πρῶτος ἐπεχείρησε περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφειν Γοργίας ὁ
Λεοντίνος οὐδὲν ὁ τι καὶ λόγου ἀξίου ἔγραψεν· οὔδὲ ἔχει φύσιν τὸ πράγμα εἰς 
καλολής καὶ ἐντεχνὸς τινα περιλήφην πεσεῖν, οὔδὲ ὀλάξ ἐπιστῆμη ὑπατός ἀν
τιν ὁ καιρὸς ἀλλὰ δόξη. ταύτην δʼ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ πολλάκις γυμνά-
παντες ἀμείνοι τῶν ἄλλων εὑρίσκουσιν αὐτὸν, οἱ δʼ ἀγαπαντον ἀφέντες
σπανιώτερον καὶ ὅσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης (CV 12, II 45, 10–21).

The terminology is slightly different, but the advice is consistent with that
given to τοῖς ἀναγινόσκουσι τὸν Λυσιάν καὶ τὶς ἡ παρʼ αὐτῷ χάριν ἐστὶ βου-
λομένοις μαθεῖν (Lys. 11, I 19, 6–8), i.e. to critics: “to give the intuition a
lengthy course of exercise in feeling without thinking” 67. The ear plays a major
role again in analyzing an Isocratean example of the smooth style of compos-
ition. That qualities fundamental to the style are present in the passage, says
Dionysius, τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάλιος (CV 23, II 119, 16–17). In
the Demosthenes, too, the importance of the ἁλογος αἰσθήσεις in forming a
judgement of an author’s style is apparent: τοῦτο δὴ ποιεῖν ἀξίωσιμι’ ἀν καὶ
τοῖς βουλομένους τὴν σύνθεσιν ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι τὴν Ἀμορποῦναν, ἐκ πολλῶν
αὕτην δοκιμάζειν ἰδιωμάτων, λέγω δὴ τῶν κρατίστων τε καὶ κυριωτάτων
πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἐμμελείας, ἢς κριτήριον ἀριστον ἢ ἄλογος αἰσθήσεις. δεὶ δ’ αὐτῇ
τριβῆς πολλῆς καὶ κατηχήσεως χρονίου (Dem. 50, I 237, 11–17).

After some discussion of this first item – ἡ ἐμμελεία – rhythm and variety
are added to the list of features to look at in forming an opinion of Demosthe-
nes’ style. Both of these are said in the On Composition to affect the sense of

sentence structure (CV’9, II 35, 17–36, 4; cf. also CV 26, II 135, 22–136, 13; Dem. 52, I 243,
9–15). He also refers, rather casually, to ὁ τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμη (CV’11, II 40, 9) and
to poetry which is κατακλασιμόν καὶ ἐντεχνὸν (CV’26, II 137, 19) and poets who ποικίλως
φιλοσοφοῦσιν (CV 15, II 60, 10). Several authors are criticized for not following the precepts of
tέχνη (e.g. Hegesias, CV’ 18, II 79, 15–19; Thucydides Thuc. 19, I 353, 13–14 and Thuc. 24, I
363, 20–364, 2). A recurring theme which is concerned with the technical nature of composition
is the dissimulatio artis. In general, the finest style exploits technical variety to conceal téchnη
(CV’9, II 86, 19–21). Lysias is a paradigm for this technique (Lys. 10, I 17, 12–13; Mim. II 216,
7–11; Lys. 3, I 11, 17–12, 2; Isa. 16, I 114, 18–19; Dem. 2, I 131, 8–14). Plato comes in for some
praise under this heading (Dem. 6, I 138, 18–21 = Pomp. 2, II 229, 10–12) but the obvious ars of
Isocrates (Isoc. 2, I 58, 1–3; Isoc. 14, I 74, 5–6), Isaeus (Isa. 4, 196, 15–18), Demosthenes (Isa. 4, I
96, 20–23; Dem. ch. 9) and Theopompus (Pomp. 6, II 247, 16–21) is detrimental to their
effectiveness. The use of art to conceal art is also a topic in descriptions of the austere style
(Dem. 38, I 211, 16–20; CV 22, II 100, 10–101, 6).

66 I follow Usher in preferring the MSS reading ὃραν to Userne’s υήραν.
67 In chapter 6 of the CV’, too, the author who desires to compose well is advised to consider the
effects of various elements of language on the ear – precisely the same process as is used in
evaluating the completed composition.
hearing and are thus presumably also judged by the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεως. The necessity of practice is a recurring feature in these passages which proclaim the independence and importance of the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεις, and will be discussed more fully in the section on critics.

We now come (in our roughly chronological survey) to the passage with which Schenkeveld started, chapter 27 of the Thucydides. Here Dionysius discusses the two faculties by which literature is judged: τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, which is inborn and which is concerned with pleasure and pain, and τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον, which discerns technical excellence in the various arts.

After reproducing a lengthy section of Thucydidean narrative (7, 69, 4–72, 1), Dionysius explains that he made the passage his example τεκμαίρομενος, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχή τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῆς λέξεως ἀγεται, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, ὃ περίκαμεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἥδεων ἢ ἀνιαράν, ἀλλοτριοῦτα πρὸς αὐτῷ οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν, ἤρ' οúde διαγγέλωσκεται τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλὸν (Thuc. 27, I 371, 5–10). We have seen the importance of the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεως in a number of passages, but τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον appears nowhere else in the rhetorical writings as an evaluative instrument. This leads to difficulties for Schenkeveld when he sets out to discover which faculty Dionysius prefers. Because the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον is never defined more fully than in this passage of the Thucydides (where all that is said is that it discerns τὸ καλὸν in the various arts), Schenkeveld has to determine what this faculty is before he can assess its value to Dionysius. His first attempt to do so goes astray.

68 It is perhaps worth remarking that elements of language which produce aesthetic effects are ipso facto judged by the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεως, but that this is not usually made explicit. Rather, one finds discussions of the critical role of the αἰσθήσεως in connection with matters like χάρις and καυρός, which one would not automatically assign to it.

69 The pairing of practice (τριβή) and instruction (κατήχησις) in the last passage quoted may seem to contradict Dionysius’ earlier denial of the possibility of a τέχνη of, for example, καυρός. In the Dinarchus, however, one kind of imitation, that which is φυσικός and ἐκ πολλῆς κατήχησεως καὶ συντροφίας λαμβανόμενος, is contrasted with another, inferior type which is ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγγελμάτων (Din. 7, I 307, 11–12), so we can see that, whatever it is that κατήχησις provides, it is not technical precepts.

70 Schenkeveld (104), following Pavano, finds it “plausible” that “Dionysius plays down the role of the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεως in favour of the rational judgement, which acts as a corrective of τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον in the Thucydides because he is here arguing against critics whose rational faculties have been overemphasized by their infatuation with Thucydides (κακοφανεῖσαν τὴν διάνοιαν, Thuc. 34, I 382, 12). But it does not follow from the fact that these critics have “lost their reason” (Schenkeveld’s translation) that they are using (or misusing) τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον to support their judgement. In fact, Dionysius likens them to lovers (τοῖς κεκρατημένοις ὑπερ' οἷας δὴ τὶνος ὅπερ ἔρωτι πολὺ ἀπέχετο μενίας) and contrasts them with impartial critics (ὃσοι δ' ἀδεκαστὸν τὴν διάνοιαν φιλάσσουσι καὶ τὴν ἐξέτασιν τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀρθοὺς κανόνας ἀναφέρουσιν, ἐτείς φυσικῆς τἱνος κρίσεως μετατηρήσεις εἶτε καὶ διὰ διδαχῆς ἠθικῆ τὰ κρίτηρα κατασκευασμένας). These last, it is clear, may be either laymen or experts. The admirers of Thucydides use no proper critical faculty, and their witlessness cannot justify Dionysius’ new emphasis on τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον here.

71 Schenkeveld 98.

72 Schenkeveld suggests (96) that the ὀρθοὺς κανόνας of his Text II (Thuc. 34, I 382, 17) are based
Pointing to chapter 12 of the Lysias, where Dionysius says he became suspicious about the authenticity of some speeches because his αἰσθησίας did not detect the characteristic Lysianic charm but finally proves their spuriousness with a chronological argument, Schenkeveld comments: “We can say that Dionysius professes to have an aesthetic method, but hesitates to apply it. In the ultimate analysis, his ratio has the upper hand.”

The chronological argument may very well be an application of ratio, but it is hardly a judgement of τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλὸν. That is, Schenkeveld’s ratio and Dionysius’ λογικὸν κριτήριον have nothing in common, and Dionysius cannot fairly be accused here of inconsistency or timidity in practicing aesthetic criticism.

The next few pages of Schenkeveld’s article are devoted to reductiones ad absurdum which are meant to show that if one takes Dionysius at his word, the province of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον must be ridiculously limited. Ridiculous, that is, when one recalls Dionysius’ definition of rhetoric as a τέχνη (quoted in note 65 above): “Its consequences would be that, for the greatest part, his instruction in rhetoric is non-technical.” But this is to confound the creation and the criticism of literature, a thing which Dionysius himself does upon occasion, but which, in view of his statement that charm, even if a product of τέχνη, is to be judged αἰσθησίας, οὐ λόγος, the critic of Dionysius should be wary of doing. Certainly the passage from the Thucydides with its two κριτήρια must be taken into account in any discussion of Dionysius’ theory of evaluation, but one must also accept the fact that his theoretical statements leave the question unanswered, and look for evidence of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον in Dionysius’ critical practice.

III. Critics

We have now come to the third category, the critics. Of these there are two legitimate types, ὁ ἰδιώτης and ὁ τεχνίτης. In some areas their reaction to a work of literature is the same. The charm of Lysias, for example, is recognized on a technical, i.e. logical, principle (although he sees that “this explanation implies a contradiction”), but in the context (being available to both trained and untrained critics) they are much more likely to be of comparable generality to the ἀδέξαστον διάνοιαν mentioned in the same sentence.

Schenkeveld 99.

Note that Dionysius only claims to give his αἰσθησίας the casting vote when it is difficult to arrive at an answer with other arguments. The chronological argument has an absolute validity (provided, of course, the dates are reliable), so Dionysius’ αἰσθησίας would not be called into play here.

Schenkeveld 103.

Also an early passage (from the Mimesis) with a late one (from the Thucydides).

As is their original attraction to literature: τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς λέξεις φιλόκαλον καὶ ταῖς νεαραῖς πέρακε συναντῆται ἥλιος, ἐποίησε θέα τῶν ἐγκυκλισμῶν ὡραίων, ἀλλά τινας καὶ ἀπό τῶν ἐνδυσαστικῶν ὑπηρετῶν τῶν χρῶν (CV 1, II 4, 19–5, 2). Cf. CV 11, II 38, 23–39, 2: φασική τις ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ὀικεῖοτης πρὸς ἐμελείαν τε καὶ εὐρυμέταν. Indeed it is important to Dionysius that literature not be the exclusive property of a
by layman and specialist alike because that sort of quality is perceived αἰσθήσει, οὖν λόγῳ (Lys. 11, I 19, 1-2). Similarly, Thucydides is considered to be at his best when he appeals to both types of critic (although for different reasons, Thuc. 27, I 371, 1-22). Of course, the fact that the different types of critic have different criteria inevitably leads to disagreement at times: οὗ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ εὐπαιδευτῶν στοχαζόμενος λόγος οὖν ἔσται τῷ φαινῷ καὶ ἀμαθεὶ πλήθει πυθανός, οὗ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις ἀρέσκειν ἄξιον καταφρονήθησεται πρὸς τῶν χαριεστῶν, οὗ δ’ ἀμφότερα τὰ κριτήρια 78 πειθέν ἦττον ἔτοιμον ἀποτεύεται τοῦ τέλους (Dem. 15, I 161, 17-22). But even here there is a middling sort of style that would appeal to both tastes. Let us look more closely at the qualifications of each kind of critic.

In the category of σφήνεα Lysias is preferred to Thucydides and Demostenes because his speeches are clear and τῷ πάνω πόρρῳ δικοῦσιν πολιτικῶν ἀφεστάναι λόγων (Lys. 4, I 12, 18-19; cf. Thuc. 27, I 371, 10-11). When praising the more elaborate style of Demostenes, however, Dionysius credits the layman with more experience: οἱ συνιόντες εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συνάγοντες, ἐνυμα πολιτικῶν δεῖ λόγον, οὔτε δεινοὶ καὶ πεπερτοὶ πάντες εἰς καὶ τὸν Ἐθνικοῦδιδού νοῦν ἔχοντες οὐδ’ ἀπαντεῖσιν ἢ ἀκοπέ ι διακρινεῖς λόγους γενναίον ἀπείροι, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ γεωργίας οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ υἱοστροφίας οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων τεχνῶν συνεργηκότες, οὐς ἀποστέρων καὶ κοινότερον διαλεγόμενον μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀρέσει (Dem. 15, I 160, 20-161, 5). Such experience, of course, does not amount to technical knowledge; the layman evaluates literature by means of τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον. 79 This

78 Τάκροαστήρια is Reiske’s emendation of the MSS reading τὰ κριτήρια. Αἱ ροαστήριον is not used elsewhere by Dionysius. Its usual meaning, “place where listening is done”, is inappropriate here. The only reference for the meaning “audience” in LSJ is Plutarch Cat. Mat. 22. Reiske’s objection to κριτήρια was presumably to its application to persons, but “τὸ τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον” is used by Dionysius as an alternative expression for “ὁ ἰδιώτης καὶ τὸ τεχνίτης” at Thuc. 27, I 371, 20-21: ὁ μὲν γε πολὺς ἐκεῖνος ἰδιώτης οὗ δυσχεραινεῖ τὸν ἄλογον τῆς λέξεως καὶ σκολίων καὶ δυσπαρακολουθητηνον; ὁ δὲ σπάνιος καὶ οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιτυχούσης ἀγαφῆς γιγαντομένος τεχνίτης οὗ μέισται τὸ ἀγανένει καὶ χαμαιπετε καὶ ἀκατάσκεπον, ἀλλὰ συνωθὸν ἔσται τὸ τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον, ὑπ’ ὧν ἀμφότερον ἀξιοδομεῖ ἀπανταὶ κρίνεται κατὰ τὰς τέχνας. ὑπὸ + genitive here, a construction suggesting a personal agent, supports this identification, as does the presence of the verb κρίνεται. Κρίνεται and its nearly synonymous compounds are only used by Dionysius with persons as subjects (except at Dem. 40, I 215, 2 where the subject is a highly personified ἄρμονία), never with organs of judgment. Cf. also Dem. 24, I 183, 14–15 where κρίνεται is used in the passive with a dative instrument when the instrument is the non-personal ἄλογος αἰσθήσεως; ταῖς γὰρ ἄλογός αἰσθήσεις ἀπαντὰ τὰ ὄχληρα καὶ ἡδέος κρίνεται.

79 And is unable to improve upon a faulty performance: καίτοι γ’ εἰ γε τελεύσει τοῦ ἰδιώτην τοῦτον τι ἄν ἐνεκάλει τοῖς τεχνίταις οἷς ἰδιοτημένοις, αὐτὸν ποίησα λαβόντα τὰ ὀργάνα, οὐκ ἄν δύνατο. τί δὴ ποτε; ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιστήμης ἐστίν, ἣς οὐ πάντες μετετίθησαμεν, ἐκείνο δὲ

highly cultured minority: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοῖς οἰκυμένοις μόνοις εἶναι τῶν εὐπαιδευτῶν ἀναγγέλλει τε καὶ συνείλε τὴν Ἐθνικοῦδιδοῦ διάλεκτον ταῦτα λέγειν ἐξο, ὅτι τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκαῖον τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἅπασιν (οὐδὲν γάρ ἂν ἀναγκαίοτερον γένοιτο οὐδὲ πλούσιο- λεστερον) ἀναρριθεῖν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου, ἄλογον παντάσπασιν ἀνυπότο τε σιούντες, ὧσπερ εἰς τὰς ὀλίγορχεμένας ή πυραννυμένους πόλεσιν (Thuc. 51, I 410, 8–15).
faculty pronounces on pleasure and pain generally: ταῖς γὰρ ἀλόγως αἰσθήσεσιν ἀπαντά τὰ ὀχληρὰ καὶ ἥδεα κρίνεται, καὶ οὕτων δεῖ ταῦτας οὕτε διδαχῆς οὕτε παραμυθίας (Dem. 24, I 183, 14–16). Its displeasure is aroused by mistakes in, say, a musical performance (CV 11. II 39, 3–8) or by an unusual rhetorical style: τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβῶς καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ξένον καὶ πάν, ὁ τι μὴ σύνηθες αὐτοῖς ἀκόουειν τε καὶ λέγειν, ὀχληρῶς διατίθησαν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ὡσπερ τι τῶν πάνυ ἀναρων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ ποτών ἀποστρέφει τοὺς στομάχους, οὕτως ἐκεῖν ὀχληρῶς διατίθησαν τὰς ἄκοας (Dem. 15, I 161, 5–10). Justifiably so, it appears, for the layman is never said to be an inadequate critic. In fact, while defending his own right to examine the style of a Thucydidēs Dionysius goes so far as to say ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἦττον τῷ τεχνίτου κριτῆς ὁ ἰδιώτης, τῶν γε δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καταλαμβανομένων, καὶ ὅτι πάσα τέχνη πάθος δὲ πάσην ἄπειδουν ἢ φύσις (CV 11, II 39, 8–13). Cf. also CV 3, II 11, 12–14 and CV 26, II 137, 16–18, where the layman’s lack of concern and ability to speak and write well are discussed.

80 Only apparently contradictory is the highly metaphorical preface to the studies of Lysias. Isocrates and Isaeus, where the ἄγνοια of the mob is said to enable the slatternly rhetoric of Mysia, Phrygia and Caria (i.e. the Asianist style of rhetoric) to establish itself in Greek cities, indeed even in “highly civilized cities” (οὐδέματα ἦττον ἐν ταῖς εὐπαιδευτοῖς) and to out the virtuous (i.e. Atticist) rhetoric. Then, later in the preface, ἀμαθία is said to have delayed the course of the Atticist revival in some cities. The context, however, is not an examination of the critical powers of the general audience, but preparation for the encomium of the discernment of the contemporary Roman διναστεύοντες, ὅπων κοσμοφυόντον τὸ θρόνον τῆς πόλεως μέρος ἐτι μᾶλλον ἀπειδεύκειν καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον ἡνάγκασαι νοῦν ἔχειν and a revival of good literature has taken place (On the Ancient Orators 3, I 5, 26–6, 1). This rhetorical flourish, then, highly charged as it is with political overtones, does not constitute an inconsistency in Dionysius’ theory of literary criticism.

81 The text here is problematical. The best manuscript (M) has τῶν τε δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καταλαμβανομένων and is followed without comment by Usher. This text requires that τῶν be understood also before τοῖς πάθεσι, i.e. “works perceived both by the ἀλόγος αἰσθήσεως and by the emotions”. This use of the article + τε is not uncommon, but Denniston remarks that “laxity in the placement of τε following the article not infrequently results in serious ambiguity” (518, n. 1). This, in fact, seems to have happened here. Usener wanted to see τε in its more usual place following the first of two coordinated items (cf. Denniston 515–516) and posited a lacuna after πάθεσι to be filled with, he suggested, καὶ τῶν τῷ λογισμῷ, i.e. “works perceived both by the ἀλόγος αἰσθήσεως and the emotions, and by the rational faculty”. This addition, postulating an exercise of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον by the ἰδιώτης, has no parallel in Dionysius’ critical theory and, as we have seen above, is not grammatically necessary. L. Sadée (De Dionysii Halicarnassensis scriptis rhetorici quaestiones criticae [Argentorati 1878] 212–213) was troubled by the fact that πάθεσι had an article whereas its coordinate, αἰσθήσεως, had none, but since the constructions themselves are not parallel (διά + gen. vs. dative) this does not seem an insurmountable objection and his emendation (τῶν γε δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ ἀλόγος πάθεσι καταλαμβανομένων) is nearer than it is necessary. It does, however, contain one interesting feature. He claims to be following Reiske in reading γε for τε. Usener, too, attributes this suggestion to Reiske (although the pages to which he refers [881 sq.] are not the pages on which it should have appeared [817]), but I have not found it in Reiske’s edition. (He prints τῶν τε δι’ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς πάθεσι καταλαμβανομένων, following, he says, H. Stephanus, but also Sylburg.) Whatever its source, the γε is an attractive emendation, because it would make the phrase parenthetic and allow the τοῦτον τῶν
toúτων στοχαζέται τῶν κριτηρίων καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὴν ἀρχήν (Thuc. 4, I 329, 24–330, 4). The textual difficulties of this passage are discussed in note 81; I translate as follows: "... that of many works the layman is no less a judge than the expert – of those, that is to say, which produce aesthetic or emotional effects – and that these are the two critical faculties (i.e. the two types of critic) which every form of art, originating in consideration thereof, aims to please"82.

The τεχνίτης are described as οἱ δὲ πολιτικοί τε καὶ ἀπ’ ἀγορᾶς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἐλληνικότες (Dem. 15. I 161, 10–11), or, more briefly, οἱ ὅλιγοι καὶ εἰπαίδευτοι, and are contrasted with οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἰδιώται (Dem. 15, I 161, 17–20). In chapter 27 of the Thucydides the τεχνίτης is ὁ σπάνιος καὶ οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιτυχίας ἄγοψης γνώμενος τεχνίτης and is said to apply to λογικον κριτήριον to recognize τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλὸν (Thuc. 27, I 371, 12–21). The specific examples in this passage of flaws that attract the attention of the τεχνίτης are illuminating – he notices potential virtues that are absent (ἄγεννες, ἀκατάσκευον; χαρακτηριστικοῖς referring, presumably, to a lack of elevation) while the ἰδιώτης is disturbed by awkwardness in what he hears (δυσχερανεῖ τὸ φορτικὸν τῆς λέξεως καὶ σκολιὸν καὶ δυσπαρακολούητον). The τεχνίτης concerns himself with λέξεις (τῆς κατασκευῆς ταύτης τῆς λέξεως); the attention of the ἰδιώτης is more narrowly focussed on words and figures of speech (ὅνόματι ἢ σχήματι)84. The expert enjoys a style that is ἐγκατάσκευον καὶ πεπιττὸν καὶ ἐξόν; the layman prefers something ἀπλούστερον καὶ κοινότερον (Dem. 15, I 161, 4). The τεχνίτης may scorn the ignorance of the mob (Thuc. 27, I 371, 13), but Dionysius insists that the criteria of both sorts of judge are valid and to be consulted by the aspiring author, whether his goal is persuasion (Dem. 15, I 161, 17–22) or artistic excellence (Thuc. 27, I 371, 20–22)85.

κριτηρίων of the next phrase to refer back to the two types of critic (for which equivalence one can find support from other texts, e.g. Thuc. 27, I 371, 20–22; Dem. 15, I 161, 17–22), rather than to αἰσθήματας and πάθη (for which one cannot). Usher makes the phrase parenthetic in his translation, but it is not clear that his text can bear that construction.

82 I am omitting from consideration among references to the κριτήριον the very numerous passages in which Dionysius tries to bolster support for his own analysis by saying, for instance: οὕτως ἔστιν, δς οὐχ ὁμολογηθεῖσαν, εἰ μόνον ἔχοι μετρίαν αἰσθήσεως περὶ λόγους ... (Dem. 32, I 200, 21–22).

83 Again (see above note 82) I am not looking at passages referring to biased, contentious, corrupted or ill-educated critics which serve to attack Dionysius’ opponents rather than to discuss the qualifications and criteria of the ideal τεχνίτης. Examples are Dem. 23, I 178, 16–19; CV 25, II 131, 14–18; Thuc. 34, I 382, 11–23.

84 Cf. the musical errors that the layman reacts to in the theatre: ὃτι μίαν χορδὴν ἀσύμφωνον ἔκρουσε καὶ διερχόμενον τὸ μέλος καὶ ἃτι στομόν ἐμπεννότας ἢ μὴ πίεσα τὸ στόμα ὅρωλιγμόν ἢ τὴν καλουμένην ἐκμέλεσιν ἱεράσε (CV 11, II 39, 3–8).

85 It is interesting to note that whereas the judgement of the layman is never called into question, the opinions and theories of several τεχνίτης are criticized. The authors of treatises on rhetorical matters (τέχναι) are themselves poor stylists (CV 4, II 21, 6–10) and have nothing useful to say to the neophyte writer (CV 5, II 26, 21–27, 6). Theophrastus is unable to detect a spurious speech in the Lysianic corpus (Lys. 14, I 23, 16–19). Aeschines’ criticisms of Demosthenes may be “malicious” (σκοφοραντόν, Dem. 55, I 247, 23) but Dionysius devotes 3 chapters (55–57)
But Dionysius’ insistence on μακρά τριβή in conjunction with τὸ ἁλογον κριτήριον prevents us from making neat pairs, from saying that the layman applies intuition and the expert reason to the text in hand. The education of the τεχνίτης is extensive; laymen are at best only οὐκ ἄπειροι (Dem. 15, I 161, 1–2) and lack specific technical knowledge. Yet it is the layman who exercises τὸ ἁλογον κριτήριον and it is with this faculty that μακρά τριβή is thrice associated (Lys. 11, I 19, 8–10; CV 12, II 45, 18–21; Dem. 50, I 237, 16–17). The solution, as Schenkeveld has seen, is that both types of critic receive impressions via the ἁλογος αἰσθήσεις. Thus Lysianic χάρις, perceived αἰσθήσει, οὐ λόγο, is apparent to layman and expert alike. That is it the τεχνίτης who devotes μακρά τριβή to refining his sensibilities is only to be expected and is, moreover, suggested by the plural τὰ κριτήρια (i.e. both τὸ λογικὸν and τὸ ἁλογον) in a passage which contrasts the natural critic with the trained one: ὅσοι δ’ ἄδεικαν τὴν διάνοιαν φυλάσσουσι καὶ τὴν ἔξετασιν τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀρθοὺς κανόνας ἀναφέρουσιν, εἴτε φυσικῆς τινὸς κρίσεως μετεύθυντος εἴτε καὶ διὰ διδαχῆς ἰσχυρά τὰ κριτήρια κατασκευάζοντες ... (Thuc. 34, I 382, 15–19). The expert’s double duty is apparent in Dionysius’ own criticism. After quoting a passage of Demosthenes, for example, he gives first his aesthetic response (the verb is πάσχω, and he insists that this response is the general one), namely that it is in a general way superior to a piece of Isocrates quoted earlier, then attempts to account for its superiority by an analysis of Demosthenes’ technique (Dem. 21, I 175, 20–176, 9). It will be useful, in fact, to examine Dionysius’ critical practice in more detail to see the extent to which it follows the theory described above, and in particular to clarify the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον.

IV. Critical practice

An important measure of Dionysius’ critical maturation, according to Bonner, is the increasing detail with which he conducts the analysis of his παραδείγματα. Bonner perceives, however, a dichotomy in the treatment of showing that they are also inept. Finally, the technical system for determining word order that Dionysius himself toyed with is rejected because πάντα δὲ τὰ τάτα διεσάλευσεν ἡ πείρα καὶ τοῦ μηδὲνος ἄξια ἀπέφανεν (CV 5, II 26, 16–17).

86 The statement in the Demostenes that the aesthetic faculty needs neither instruction nor encouragement (οὐθὲν δὲ ταύτας οὗτε διδαχῆς οὗτε παραμυθίας, Dem. 24, I 183, 15–16) is not inconsistent with the recommendation of μακρὰ τριβή. Rather, it is comparable to the περικαμεν of chapter 27 of the Thucydides. Practice is not necessary, but it is not unproductive either.

87 Schenkeveld 95, 103.

88 Training in the aesthetic arts was not exclusively technical – teachers of music, for example, encouraged their students to sharpen their sense of hearing (Lys. 11, I 19, 2–6). Cf. Dem. 50, I 237, 17–238, 2 for an example from the visual arts.

89 The plural κριτήρια is not used elsewhere by Dionysius except to refer to these two faculties or to the two types of critic that apply them.

90 Bonner 68, 74, 84, 88, 92, 97, 101–103.
harangues in chapters 43–48 of the Thucydidese: “Those passages of which he approves are set forth in full; those which he finds in any way objectionable are analysed, and the reasons underlying his objection, whether it be obscurity, poetical expression, or frigidity resulting from Gorgianic figures, are in each instance set forth.”\textsuperscript{91} This tendency to be explicit about faults but only vaguely encomiastic about virtues (e.g. ταύτα μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις καλὰ καὶ ζήλου ἀξία ἤγονὺς, Thuc. 48, I 406, 13–14) is also evident in Dionysius’ discussions of “good” and “bad” narratives and speeches in the Thucydidese. In chapter 28 he quotes a “good” narrative and pronounces his verdict: σαφῶς τε καὶ συντόμως καὶ δυνατῶς ἀπαντὰ εὑρήκεν (Thuc. 28, I 372, 10–11). Enough said. The next bit, a long example of “bad” narrative (and a notoriously difficult section of Thucydidese, 3, 82–83), is examined phrase by painful phrase; Dionysius points out numerous faults and rewrites no less than thirteen sentences in an effort to clarify Thucydidese’ meaning. This fills chapters 29–33. In chapter 36 Dionysius prefacese the uninterupted quotation of a set of “good” speeches with a checklist of their virtues: καὶ λόγους ἀποδίδοσαν (sc. Θουκυδίδης), οίους εἰκός ἦν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων εἱρήσκει, τοῖς ἑκάστης πρόσωποις ἐπρέπονται καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἰκείως καὶ μὴ ἐλέλειποντες τῶν μετρίων μήτε ὑπεραίροντες, λέξει τε κεκόσμηκεν αὐτοὺς καθαρὰ καὶ σαφὲι καὶ συντόμω καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχουσί (Thuc. 36, I 384, 1–5).

Chapters 37–41, by contrast, are given over to a thorough investigation of the objectionable points, moral and stylistic, of the Melian Dialogue. And yet this tendency of labeling the “good” and dissecting the “bad” is in despite of Dionysius’ declared intentions for this section of the treatise: παρατιθὲις τοῖς τε πραγματικοῖς καὶ τοῖς λεκτικοῖς καταρρύθμισιν ἡ ἀμαρτήμασι τὰς αἰτίας (Thuc. 25, I 364, 8–10).\textsuperscript{92} A similar imbalance, though differently implemented, can be seen in Dionysius’ treatment of Plato’s two styles. The style which Dionysius approves is described in metaphorical or abstract terms: καθαρά γὰρ ἀποχρόντως γίνεται καὶ διανύγης, ὠσπέρ τὰ διαφανέστατα τῶν ναμάτων, ἀκριβῆς τε καὶ λεπτῆς παρ’ ἤντινον ἐτέραν τὼν τὴν αὐτὴν διάλεκτον εἰργασμένων. τὴν τε κοινότητα διώκει τῶν ὀνόματων καὶ τὴν σαρφήναις ἀσκεῖ, πάσης ὑπερίδουσα κατασκευὴς ἐπιτιθέον, ὦ τε πίνος αὐτῆς ὅ τῇ ἀρχαιότητος ἡρέμια καὶ λεληπτότως ἐπιτρέπει χλοερόν τε τι καὶ τευθόλως καὶ μεστὸν ὃς ἀνύσις ἀναδίδωσι καὶ ὠσπέρ ὑπὸ τῶν εὐῳδεστάτων λειμαίων αὐρά τις ἥδεια ἐξ αὐτῆς φέρεται (Dem. 5, I 136, 17–137, 5).\textsuperscript{93}

Amidst this talk of clear streams, lush foliage and fragrant breezes, only one concrete virtue – standard vocabulary – finds mention. The many faults of

\textsuperscript{91} Bonner 92.

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Thuc. 3, I 328, 3–8. The negative emphasis emerges even in his general statements about what a critic does. A proper critic, as opposed to one with excessive admiration for the author in hand, should show ἐκάστου πράγματι παρατιθέεις τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ταύτα μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἐπιτίθεαι ἐν τῷ κυριῷ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων τὸν προσώπων λέγεσθαι, ταύτα δ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτω τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔδε μέχρι τούτου (Thuc. 34, I 382, 1–4).

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Dem. 13, I 157, 19–23, another metaphorical description of good style.
Plato’s more elaborate style, on the other hand, are identified with great specificity: ἐκχείται δ’ [sc. Ἡ Πλάτωνική διάλεκτος] εἰς ἀπειροκάλους περιφράσεις πλοῦτον ὄνομάτων ἐπιδεικνυμένη κενόν, ὑπεριδοῦσά τε τῶν κυρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ χρήσει κειμένων τὰ πεποιημένα ζητεῖ καὶ ξένα καὶ ἄρχαιοπρεπῆ. μάλιστα δὲ χειμάζεται περὶ τὴν τροπικὴν φράσιν, πολλὴ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιμέτοιοι, ἀκαίρος δ’ ἐν ταῖς μετωνυμίαις, σκληρὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ σφιξουσα τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐν ταῖς <μεταφοραῖς>. ἀλληγορίας τε περιβάλλεται πολλὰς (καὶ μακρὰς), οὔτε μέτρον ἑχούσας οὔτε καίρον, σχήμασι τε ποιητικοῖς ἐσχάτην προσβάλλουσιν ἄδιαν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Γοργιείοις ἀκαίρως καὶ μειρακιώδῶς ἐναβρύνεται (Dem. 5, I 137, 13–138, 5).

Another example of this imbalance is found in Dionysius’ attempts to illustrate the Protean\(^{94}\) versatility of Demosthenes’ style. Unusual vocabulary, hyperbaton, unnecessary verbiage, odd syntax and awkward periodic structure are among the faults exemplified and corrected in a passage of “Thucydidean” Demosthenes (Dem. ch. 9). Dionysius is refreshingly reluctant to call this kind of composition “bad”, but the frequency of the adjective περίκρατος here reveals his distaste\(^{95}\). In discussing Demosthenic style where it borders on Lysianic, however, he resorts to the weary (and wearying) formula of general ἀρέταί (Dem. ch. 13). These, he seems from the rhetorical questions to think, are self-evident, for no specific passages are adduced. It is thus hardly surprising to find that Dionysius’ first attempt at detailed analysis (in ch. 14 of the Isocrates) is a response to faults of style, and that the characteristic virtue of Lysias’ style, χάρις, was a πράγμα παντὸς κρείττον λόγου (Lys. 10, I 18, 10)\(^{96}\). It is nothing unusual for a critic to find it easier to point out errors in a passage than to account for its success. Nor is Dionysius alone in being unaware of the asymmetry, but it must be taken into account when we try to determine the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον, for it begins to look as though what the τεχνίτης demonstrates is not τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ καλόν, but τὸ μὴ καλόν.

A useful index of this is the technique of metathesis, to which Dionysius has increasing recourse in the later treatises\(^{97}\). The majority (33) of the rewritten sentences point out stylistic faults in the original by providing simple, unam-

\(^{94}\) *Dem*. 9, I 149, 1–2.

\(^{95}\) The reason for this reluctance is explained in ch. 10; in Thucydides the style is faulty because he uses it to excess, but the bounds of propriety, Dionysius says, are not overstepped by Demosthenes.

\(^{96}\) Cf. *Din*. 7, I 307, 7–17, where of the two sorts of μίμησις he describes (natural and mechanical), he is rendered speechless by the good sort (ὁ φυσικός), but the faults of the other sort (ὁ ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγεγέματον) constitute a useful critical tool. Also *Dem*. 13, I 156, 10–14, where it is the virtues of a passage of Lysianic Demosthenes (purity, precision, lucidity, concision, terseness, realism, simplicity) that make critics uncertain about authorship.

\(^{97}\) In the *Isocrates* there is one re-written sentence, in the *Isaeus* there are two, in the *Demosthenes*, nine, in the *Ct*; nine, and in the *Thucydides* and its appendix the second *Letter to Ammaeus*, twenty-two. There is also a lacuna in ch. 25 of the *Thucydides* which will have contained more metatheses. While this may not be a strictly logical technique of analysis, it is certainly the sort of thing only a τεχνίτης does.
biguous and otherwise unobjectionable renderings of the same idea. The new versions are intended to show what a layman (Isa. 11, I 107, 5) or, rather, what o... áκολούθως τῇ κοινῇ συνήθειᾳ σχηματίζοντες τὴν φράσιν (Amm. II 11, I 430, 18–20) would have written. Ten of the metatheses, however, are intended to show that by changing the word arrangement in a passage of good writing one can either produce a different style of equal acceptability, or destroy its effectiveness altogether. In chapter 4 of the On Composition, for example, he quotes a sentence of Herodotus, describes its style as ὑπαγογικόν καὶ ἰστορικόν, then gives two rearrangements. The style of the first is ὅρθον καὶ ἑνδαχόντον and rather Thucydidean, of the second, μικρόκομψον, ἁγέννες and ὑπάρξακον, reminiscent of the writing of the Asianist Hegesias (CV 4, II 19, 9–11). In places like this, if anywhere, we might expect τὸ λογικόν κριτήριον to reveal technical excellence, but all Dionysius does is label the various stylistic characters, never putting his finger on that wherein the character lies. There is only a disappointing series of comments like ἄρ’ ἐτι μένει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡμοσιμένων τῶν κάλων ἢ αὐτῇ χάρις ἢ τὸ ἄυτὸ πάθος: οὔδεις ἂν εἶποι (CV 7, II 30, 16–17). Metathesis, then, though an eminently satisfactory means of locating a passage’s faults, is not used by Dionysius to explain its virtues in any but the most general terms.

It is in the On Composition that Dionysius makes his most energetic attempts to account for the effectiveness of good writing. He limits his attention here to σύνδεσις (omitting for the present, he says, ἐκλογὴ ὑνομάτων and τὰ νοῆματα) and seems to be breaking new ground with the three ἀρμονίαι (CV, ch. 1). The number of the elements of language said to affect the ear

98 In three cases he claims more positive virtues for his versions (συντομοτέρας καὶ χαριστέρας, Dem. 19, I 168, 4–5; στρογγυλότερα, Dem. 19, I 168, 18 and Dem. 20, I 170, 2. See Grube, Thrasymachus 257 [with note 10] for the meaning of στρογγυλός). These three of course hardly constitute a comprehensive application of τὸ λογικὸν for the purpose of identifying τὸ καλὸν.

99 For the use of the technique in ancient criticism see N. A. Greenberg, Metathesis as an instrument in the criticism of poetry, TAPA 89 (1958) 262–270. Three of Dionysius’ ten metatheses in this category involve poetry.

100 Demetrius, by contrast, who uses this technique extensively in the περὶ ἄρμηνειῶν, has 44 metatheses, 38 illustrating virtues in the original, only 4 correcting faults. The remaining 2 give unranked alternatives.

101 He is concerned here to a much greater extent than elsewhere with poetry, and some of his best criticism is of passages of Homer. This may be due to the quality of his predecessors in the field. According to Max Pohlenz (Τὸ πρέπον, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes, NAG [1933] 53–92, esp. 74–79), he is indebted to earlier critics like Panaetius, Ariston of Chios, Diogenes of Babylon, Heracleides of Pontus and Crates of Mallos, in short to “den Kreisen, die sich mit der Dichterkritik beschäftigen” (77). See also D. M. Schenkeveld, Oi κριτικοὶ in Philodemus, Mnemosyne 21 (1968) 105–106 for the influence of these critics on Dionysius. Both the surviving fragments of οἱ κριτικοὶ and Philodemus’ rebuttal, however, deal primarily with the theory of aesthetic effect. Of their practice no traces remain. Aujać (3, 40) admits Dionysius’ debt to the past, but concludes: “Le fait est, en tout cas, que l’on constate une assez grande distance entre la situation qu’il présente et celle que l’on peut deviner à travers le témoignage de Philodème, son aîné de quelque cinquante ans”.

102 Pohl 49.
escalates rapidly in this work, yet Dionysius puts together a critical framework making use of both aesthetic response and technical analysis. Chapter 11 begins with a list of the four means by which a composition is rendered pleasing: μέλος, ρυθμός, μεταβολή and τὸ πρέπον (CV 11, II 37, 11-12). The uses of these are surveyed briefly in chapter 12, then more thoroughly in chapters 14-20. Under the heading of μέλος Dionysius describes the 24 letters and assigns them their euphonic values. Long α, for instance, is the εὐφωνότατον of the vowels (CV 14, II 51, 13), σ is ἄχαρι δὲ καὶ ἄνδες (ὑπερώδους γὰρ καὶ ἀλόγου μᾶλλον ἡ λογικῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ φωνῆς ὡς συριγμός, CV 14, II 54, 16-17). In the section on ρυθμός 12 metrical feet are evaluated in quasi-moral terms: the trochee is ταπεινός τε καὶ ἀσέμνος καὶ ἀγεννής (CV 17, II 70, 6-7), the bacchius ἀνδρώδες πάνυ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ εἰς σεμνολογίαν ἐπιτήδειον (CV 17, II 72, 12-13). This groundwork laid, he analyses the effects of syllables and letters (i.e. μέλος) in some passages of Homer, and of meter (ρυθμός) in four prose authors. It will be worth looking at his treatment of several examples in detail.

To illustrate the possibility of representing reality by the letters and syllables appropriate to it Dionysius cites the line ηἶόνες βοῶσιν ἑρευγομένης ἀλός ἑξαί (II. 17, 265) which, he says, portrays the ocean’s ceaseless roar by means of the παρέκτασις τῶν συλλαβῶν (CV 15, II 60, 12). What exactly does he mean by παρέκτασις? W. Rhys Roberts would have it that he is referring to the long vowels, particularly ο and η, in the line. Usher suggests that “the effect of restless movement is achieved in the Greek by the juxtaposition of vowels in diaeresis and the pure dactylic metre”, but he is supplementing Dionysius’ statement considerably. In the first part of this chapter Dionysius had devoted several paragraphs to explaining how some long and short syllables are longer than others (σταλὴν vs. ἦ, or στρόφος, τρόπος and ῾Ρόδος vs. ῾όδος; CV 15, II 58, 1-59, 14), but this kind of lengthening is nowhere referred to by παρέκτασις or any comparable term, and the concept is not strikingly relevant to the line in question. Comparison with the next two examples, said to portray a hugeness of grief and a lengthy, passionate prayer (Κύκλως δὲ στενάχον τε καὶ ὄδινων ὄδυνης, χερσὶ ψηλαφῶν [Od. 9, 415-416] and οὐδ’ εἰ κεν μάλα πολλὰ πάθη ἐκάργυρος Ἀπόλλων/, προπροκυκλινδόμενος πατρός Διός αἰγίχοιο [II. 22, 220-221]), suggests that what Dionysius has in mind are the “extra” syllables in ηἶόνες and βοῶσιν: ψηλαφῶν, ὄδυνης, προπροκυκλινδόμενος and αἰγίχοιο are all longer than their Attic counterparts ψηλαφῶν, ὄδυνας, προκυκλινδόμενος, and αἰγίχοιο. Compare also the passages exemplifying η τῶν συλ-

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103 Chapters 14-16 deal with the euphonic values and effects of letters and syllables, which are rather different topics from μέλος as described at CV 11, II 40, 17-42, 14, where he discusses the tonal intervals available to a writer (i.e. what we call “melody”), but Dionysius does not explain the shift in focus.

104 Roberts, ad loc.

105 Usher 1, 110, note 1.

106 As, of course, are ηἶόνες and βοῶσιν with respect to Attic ηἶόνες and βοῶσιν. Cf. Aristotle on
λαβών τε καὶ γραμμάτων ἑλάττωσις (CV 15, II 61, 17–19): in the line ἀμβλήθην γοῦσα μετά διμήχην ἐξεπε (II. 22, 476), ἀμβλήθην is a contracted form of ἀναβλήθην; in ἡνίχοι δ’ ἐκπληγένε, ἐπεὶ ἰδον ἀκάματον πῦρ (II. 18, 225), ἐκ-
πληγένε and ἰδον are shorter or lighter than Attic ἐξεπλάγασαν and εἰδον. It is
of course exasperating to see Dionysius attributing impressive effects to small
causes, but it is characteristic of Dionysian argumentation to do so. In
chapter 3 of the essay On Composition, for example, he claims that word-ar-
rangements alone accounts for the excellence of the description of Odysseus’ first
encounter with Telemachus (Od. 16, 1–16). Again, in chapter 18 he would
have us believe that the principal difference between Homer’s lines on the abuse
of Hector’s corpse and the description of a similar incident in a historical work
of the much-despised Hegesias is the rhythm.

After discussing the effects of syllables, he looks at how Homer uses letters:
smooth, flowing letters portray youthful beauty (Od. 17, 36–37; 6, 162–163; 11,
281–282), letters that are difficult to pronounce introduce pitiable, frightening
or awe-inspiring sights (Od. 6, 137; II. 11, 36–37), unpleasant and ill-sounding
letters are used for the unpleasant fate of the Cyclops’ victims (Od. 9, 289–290).
He does not point to specific letters in specific lines, but in some cases it is
possible even for those not equipped with Greek ears to guess what he means:
λ is fairly prominent in Od. 11, 281–282 and is the right sort of letter for bridal
beauty (ηδύνει μὲν γὰρ τὸ λ καὶ ἔστι τῶν ἡμιφώνων γλυκύτατον, CV 14, II 54,
11–12), the feral σ probably contributes to the unpleasant effect of Od. 9,
lengthened (ἐπεκτεταμένον) and shortened syllables, Poetics 1457 a 35–b 5: ἐπεκτεταμένον δὲ
ἔστιν ἢ ἄφηρμενόν τὸ μὲν ἄδιππον μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον τι ἢ τὸ ὄικείου ἢ συλλαβῇ
ἐμβεβλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἄφηρμενόν τι ἢ ἀτυχων, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν ὁδὸν τὸ πόλεος πόλης καὶ τὸ
Πηλείδου Πηλιάδεω, ἄφηρμενον δὲ ὁδὸν τὸ κρί καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ “μία γίνεται ἀμφότερον ὥν.”

The importance of the word βοὸστην in II. 17, 265 is further attested by Aristotle
(Poetics 1458 b 31) and by the scholium on the line which Roberts cites (155): καὶ ἔστιν ἰδὲν κύμα μέγα
ὑπάλληλος ἐπιφερόμενον στοματω βεβαίας καὶ τὸ ἀνακόπηται βρυχόμενος, καὶ τὰς ἕκα-
τέρουν τὸν στοματο τῇ ὀνομίᾳ τῆς ἐπεκτάσεως τοῦ
βοὸστην. αὕτη ἢ εἰκῶν Πλάτονος ἔκαλε τὰ ποιήματα ὀὕτως ἐναργέστερον τοῦ ὁρμένου τὸ
ἀκούόμενον παρατηρήσει... τῆς γὰρ ἐπαλλήλου τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκβολῆς ἢ τοῦ “βοὸστην” ἀνάδι-
πλοσις ὅμοιαν ἀπετέλεσε συνφώτια.

The first example of ἑλάττωσις is somewhat puzzling, since the forms γοῦσα and δεπεν recall
βοὸστην of II. 17, 265, which serves as an example of παρέκτασις. Dionysius’ comment (ὅ τοι
πνεύματος δῆλοτα ἄκουσε καὶ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἄτακτον, CV 15, II 61, 15–16), however,
suggests that he may have only one effect in mind here. Cf. CV 16, II, 64, 8 where
συγκόψει is used of things difficult to pronounce, bearing in mind the alleged difficulty of
pronouncing consecutive vowels (also Dem. 38, I 210, 12–211, 4; Dem. 40, I 215, 8–10; CV 20, II
93, 4–6).

One must resist the temptation to give him credit for the kinds of analyses modern critics can
devise for the lines.

Bonner remarks (72): “This is indeed a precarious process of elimination, a typical result of the
rhetorical training; Dionysius quite fails to see that the attraction of the passage lies partly in
the dramatic beauty of the situation and partly in the very simplicity of the words chosen for
the narrative.”

Roberts’ discussion of the differences occupies 3 pages (53–55) in his Introduction.
289–290. In the other examples it is less easy to identify the important letters111, but Dionysius leaves us in no doubt as to how much importance for composition as a whole he attaches to the euphonic values of letters: όστε πολλή ἀνάγκη καλήν μὲν εἶναι λέξειν ἐν ἣ καλά ἐστιν ὀνόματα, κάλλους δὲ ὀνομάτων συλλαβάς τε καὶ γράμματα καλὰ άιτην εἶναι, ήδειαν δὲ διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἰδινόντων τὴν ἁκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τό παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων, τὰς τε κατὰ μέρος ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, καὶ ἣς δηλοῦται τα τῇ ἡμι καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ διαφέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κατασκευῆς τῶν γραμμάτων γίνεσθαι τοιαύτας (CV 16, II 63, 9–18, cf. CV 13, II 47, 22–48, 2).

Rhythm is likewise important: διὰ μὲν τῶν γενναίων καὶ αξιωματικῶν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντων ρυθμῶν ἀξιωματική γίνεται σύνθεσις καὶ γενναία καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄγεννόν τε καὶ ταπεινῶν ἀμεγέθης τις καὶ ἀσέμνος (CV 18, II 73, 13–17). But Dionysius’ metrical analyses are not particularly instructive112. Leaving aside the incredulity that arises when one finds Dionysian single-mindedness leading to an evaluation of Thucydides like υψιλός εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ καλλιτεῆς ὡς ἑυγενεῖς ἐπάγων ρυθμοῦς (CV 18, II 75, 16–17), the scansion themselves, as he admits, are open to question113.

The various materiae of word-painting used in Homer’s description of Sisyphus and his boulder (Od. 11, 593–598) are analysed with great success in the chapter on τὸ πρόσφυον (ch. 20)114. Dionysius’ first step is to describe the effect of the passage: ἐνταῦθα η σύνθεσις ἐστιν ἡ δηλοῦσα τῶν γινομένων ἐκαστον, τὸ βάρος τοῦ πέτρου, τὴν ἐπίπονον ἐκ τῆς γης κίνησιν, τὸν διερειδόμενον τοῖς κόλοις, τὸν αναβαίνοντα πρὸς τὸν ὄχθον, τὴν μόλις ἀναφομένην πέτραν (CV 20, II 90, 13–17). This, he says, is felt by everyone. He then demonstrates how the effect, by no means an accidental one, was achieved, investigating rhythm, word length, syllable length and the letters that occur at word boundaries115.

111 What is one to make of the hiatus and semi-vowel/consonant clashes in Od. 17, 36–37, for example? If this had been a line of Pindar, its composition might have been called rough!

112 Even the epitomator of CV thought that the chapters on rhythm could be improved: “Le seul remaniement important du traité primitif concerne les chapitres 17 et 18, consacrés à l’étude des rythmes: l’abréviateur, tout en s’appuyant sur Denys, fait un exposé original, systématique, et présente une nomenclature des pieds métriques assez différente de celle adoptée par Denys.” Aujac 3, 45.

113 For a similar over-valuation of rhythmic effects cf. the assessment of the opening sentence of the De Corona: τί σῶν ἐκώλευ καλῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι λέξεως, ἐν ἥ μήτε πυρήχος ἐστι ποίς μήτε ἰαμβικὸς μήτε ἀμφιβραχὸς μήτε τῶν χορευόν τροχαίοιο μῆδείς (CV 18, II 79, 1–4). On his scansion, cf. e.g. Bonner (74): “Dionysius frequently runs into metrical difficulties in his eagerness to prove his case, and has left more than one editor nonplussed over his apparent disregard of the quantities of the Greek language.” Also Roberts’ and Usher’s notes ad locc.

114 The claims of μεταβολή having been dealt with summarily in ch. 19. The examples suggested to illustrate good variety are “all of Herodotus, all of Plato and all of Demosthenes” (CV 19, II 87, 3–5); for counter-examples, the student is directed to the works of Isocrates and his followers (CV 19, II 87, 10–11).

115 A. Hurst (Un critique grec dans la Rome d’Auguste: Denys d’Halicarnasse. ANRW vol. 2, pt. 30, no. 1, p. 857) is interpreting Dionysius’ statement that Homer’s word-arrangement was de-
That is, aesthetic response and technical analysis constitute the basis for his evaluation of the passage. We may suppose, then, that it is this sort of detailed analysis that he would consider application of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον. But it remains to consider the critical techniques he employs in the final part of the On Composition and in the later critical works.

He continues to use the foundations established in chapters 14–20 when analysing examples of the austere and smooth ἄρμονία (chh. 22–23), retaining also the format of the discussion of the Sisyphus passage, namely a description of effects followed by an examination of causes. His attention has shifted somewhat away from the intrinsic qualities of letters themselves to the “roughening” effect of certain letter combinations at word junctions. In general he objects to hiatus and to consonant combinations that do not naturally belong together, by which he means those that are not found together at the beginnings of syllables within words. The junction of final ζ and initial ζ in the phrase Θουκυδίδης Αὐγουστος ξυνέγραψε, for example, is rough, since oὐ ... προτάττε- ται τὸ δ τοῦ ζ κατὰ συνεκφοράν τὴν ἐν μιᾷ συλλαβῇ γινομένην (CV 22, II 108, 20–109, 1). Other objectionable consonant iuncturae are: Πελοπονησίων καὶ; ἐν χορόν; κλαμάν πέμπτε; τὸν Φίλιππον; πανδαιδαλόν τε; χάριν άθεοί; ιοδέτων λάχετε; αἶρεσίν μοι; γάρ χρητῇ. Rhythmic concerns are not prominent in this portion of the CV – he only notes the absence of satisfying clausulae in two periods of the introduction to Thucydides’ Historiae (CV 22, II 110, 9–16) and states that the presence of such is a general feature of the smooth style (CV 23, II 113, 6–11). In his comments on the prose passages he mentions larger compositional units – figures, clauses and periods – but provides no examples. These chapters seem to reflect his high estimation of the value of individual letters for good composition.

The topic of chapter 25 is πῶς γίνεται λέξεις ἄμετρος ὁμοία καλῷ ποιήματι

signedly mimetic (CV 20, II 90, 6–8) without taking into account the elements of the passage that Dionysius actually examines when he says: “Ce que le critique nous montre là, ce n’est pas le rôle que jouerait la composition dans un passage homérique, c’est que cette dernière constitue en tant que telle le moyen mimétique auquel le texte doit sa beauté. À l’extrême limite, la poésie homérique est composition dans la mesure où l’analyse qu’en offre Denys lui semble épuiser ce qu’on peut dire des moyens.”

116 Cf. CV 23, II 119, 10–16 where Dionysius lists qualities fundamental to a particular style that are present in a passage under examination. This list is derived from his theoretical and technical exposition of the nature of the style at CV 23, II 111, 19–112, 9, but he justifies his assessment (i.e. that the passage exemplifies this style) by saying τὸ ἐλογον ἐπιμαρτωλὰ τῆς ἀοίδης πάθος.

117 This had already come under notice in a general way in ch. 20: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων ψώμα καὶ ἢ τὸν τραχυόντων γραμμάτων παράδειγμα (sc. ἐμμετρήστω) τὰ διάλεξιμα τῆς ἐνέργειας καὶ τὰς ἐποχας καὶ τὸ τοῦ μόχθου μέγεθος (CV 20, II 91, 14–17).

118 This concept is put to good use, at least on paper. Roberts notes that Dionysius’ statements run contrary to our ideas of Augustan pronunciation of final α, subscript iota, assimilated stops, etc. (219, 221, 224, 231; also Aujac 3, 154, 158; Pohl 190). Aujac suggests an explanation: “Denys semble en effet étendre un peu arbitrairement à la prose une théorie qui concernait proprement la poésie, et la poésie chantée” (3, 31).
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η μέλει (CV 25, II 122, 14–15) and it focusses largely on prose rhythm. The details of analysis are messy and involve him in at least one contradiction, but the chapter is important for our study because it contains Dionysius’ defense of the method of detailed analysis that we have been examining. His opponents, he thinks, will say: ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐν οὕτως ἄθλιος ἦν, ὥσπερ ὄτε γράφοι τοὺς λόγους, μέτρα καὶ ρυθμοὺς ὄσπερ οἱ πλάσται παρατιθέμενος, ἐναρμόττειν ἐπειράτο τοῦτος τοὺς τύπους τὰ κώλα, στρέφων ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ παραφυλάττον τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ πάντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς μορίοις τοῦ λόγου πολύπραγμον; (CV 25, II 132, 1–8). Their objections center on the search for prose rhythm, but Dionysius’ reply defends the analysis of euphonic details as well: τί οὖν ἄτοπον, εἰ καὶ Δημοσθένεις φροντὶς εὐφωνίας τε καὶ ἐμμελείας ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἰκῆ καὶ ἀβασανίστως τιθέναι μήτε ὄνομα μήτε νόμημα; πολὺ τε γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔμοι δοκεῖ προσῆκειν ἄνδρι κατα- σκευάζοντι λόγους πολιτικὰς μημεια τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως αἰώνια μηδένος τῶν ἔλαχιστῶν ὀλιγορεῖν, ἢ ψυγράφων τε καὶ τορευτῶν παισιν ἐν ἦλιο ψυχρῇ ἑωρόν ἐυστοχίας καὶ πόνους ἀποδεικνυμένοις περὶ τὰ φλέβια καὶ τὰ πτίλα καὶ τὸν χνόν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας μικρολογίας κατατρίβειν τῆς τέχνης τὴν ἀκρίβειαν (CV 25, II 133, 13–134, 1).

Letter combinations, though not the sole point under discussion in the descriptions of the austere and smooth ἀρμονία which occupy chapters 38–41 of the Demosthenes, are still the most prominent. Clashing iuncturae are responsible for the primary characteristics of the austere style (Dem. 38, I 210, 9–211, 5), and the effort to fit words together without clashes (rather than, e.g., a desire for balanced clauses) is made to account for the padding found in examples of smooth composition (Dem. 40, I 214, 24–215, 8)10. None of the παραδείγματα is analysed here, but when a Demosthenic example of the mixed ἀρμονία is under consideration (ch. 43) letter junctions are the only details mentioned. After spending about 40 lines pointing out rough iuncturae he pays only lip service to other elements of this style: οὐ μόνον δὲ αἱ τῶν ὀνο- μάτων συζυγία τὴν μικτὴν ἀρμονίαν λαμβάνουσι παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ μέσην, ἀλλὰ

119 He is interested in rhythm throughout a sentence rather than clausulae. See Usher 2, 9 on these two different traditions.
120 He scans a bit of the proem to the De Corona as follows: οὗν ἐνοικαν ἔχων ἔγαγε διατελῶ (CV 25, II 130, 20–131, 4), having altered ἔγαγε to ἔγαγε to complete the iambic line and taking liberties with the obligatory short in the first metron, not to mention the anapaest (falsely divided, so that there is no proper caesura) in the third foot, whereas in chapter 18 he had scanned a slightly longer version of the phrase in such a way as to emphasize the absence of “ignoble” feet: οὗν ἐνοικαν ἔχων ἔγαγε διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πάσιν ὑμῖν (CV 18, II 78, 7–12). On the problems of the version in chapter 22, see Roberts, ad loc.
121 In the earlier essay on Isocrates Dionysius had said that Isocratean padding resulted from the pursuit of periodic structure and rhythmic clausulae (Isoc. 3, I 58, 13–21). This discrepancy is a clear indication of the narrowing of Dionysius’ critical focus.
122 Only clashes are discussed, even when the composition tends towards the “smooth” extreme (Dem. 43, I 225, 7–226, 5). Apparently whatever combinations are not rough are smooth.
kai a\t t\n\nc\'n\n\nc\'n\nc\'n\n\nc\'n\nc\'n\nc\'n\n\nc\'n\nc\'n\nc\'n\n
With this constant imbalance in mind we can perhaps achieve a more precise understanding of Dionysius’ advice to neophyte critics: τοῦτο δὴ ποιεῖν ἀξιόσωμα ἄν καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους τὴν συνθέσιν ἄκριβῶς εἰδέναι τὴν Δημοσθένους, ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὴν δοκιμάζειν ἰδιωμάτων, λέγω δὴ τῶν κρατίστων τε καὶ κυριωτάτων- πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἐμμελείας, ἣς κριτήριον ἄριστον ἡ ἄλογος αἰσθήσεις. δεῖ δ’ αὐτὴ τριβής πολλῆς καὶ κατηχήσεως χρονίου (Dem. 50, I 237, 11–17).

The first of the significant characteristics that he urges a critic to consider is ἐμμελεία. We have seen that the chapters of the CV that, structurally speaking, were devoted to μέλος – the first of the four means of good composition – dealt, in fact, with the effects of letters and syllables, and that iuncturae received the first and generally the foremost consideration in all subsequent analyses of the ἀρμονία. It is likely, I think, that this is the kind of subject matter he is recommending here\textsuperscript{123}. But note that in this same passage the importance of the ἄλογος αἰσθήσεις and the insufficiency of τέχνη alone for critical evaluation of ἐμμελής ἀρμονία are stressed\textsuperscript{124}. With this we are back to the two essential faculties. Although the effects of iuncturae are not discussed in the Thucydides, it was Dionysius’ confidence in the validity of this kind of detailed analysis that prompted his portrayal in that work of intuition and reason as partners in the task of evaluating literature\textsuperscript{125}. We may conclude, then, that Dionysius’ critical system is not inconsistent, only incomplete\textsuperscript{126}.

\textsuperscript{123} Pohl (44) considers this sort of analysis inconsistent with Dionysius’ theories about the aesthetic effects of language. Now it may very well be that the way Dionysius tries to account for good writing is inadequate or that we would have preferred a more purely aesthetic reaction, but there is no conflict here between aesthetic and rational systems; rather, the description of an aesthetic effect and the technical analysis of causes are two facets of a thorough critical examination.

\textsuperscript{124} To be sure, the τέχνη envisaged is rather scanty: εξ ὀλίγων παραγγελμάτων καὶ προσκαίρου κατηχήσεως (Dem. 50, I 238, 2–3).

\textsuperscript{125} The subject-matter of the Thucydides is much more comprehensive than that of the CV or the latter half of the Demosthenes, and the description of Thucydidean σύνθεσις is relegated to a single sentence: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν τ’ ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν μετέχον των ἀξιωματικῆς καὶ σύστησαν καὶ στιβαράν καὶ βεβηκόταν καὶ τριχύνουσαν τὰς τῶν γραμμάτων ἀντιτύπωσεις τὰς ἀκούσει ἀντ’ τῆς λιγορας καὶ μαλακῆς καὶ συνεξεξεμένης καὶ μηδὲν ἐξούστος ἀντίτυπον (Thuc. 24, I 361, 7–12). Since we have seen that it is only in the area of σύνθεσις that Dionysius was able to use τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον to identify positive elements of τὸ καλὸν, it is not surprising to see that the detailed analysis of the Thucydides concentrates again on faults. The polemical aim of the treatise – he is trying to counteract the folly of those admirers of Thucydides who considered him the καλόν τῆς ἱστορίκης πραγματείας and, more dangerously, τῆς περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους διενότητος ὁρὸν (Thuc. 2, I 327, 11–13) – also diverts his attention from beauties of σύνθεσις, which could never excuse obscurity, Thucydides’ fundamental failing according to Dionysius.

\textsuperscript{126} I should like to record here my gratitude to K. J. Dover, M. McCall, D. A. Russell and the anonymous referees at Museum Helveticum for the valuable suggestions they made at various stages in the preparation of this paper.