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Bismark: A Life

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Dr. Jonathan Steinberg  
*on Otto von Bismarck*

Emily Mullin  
*on King Lear*

Kwang-Yew See  
*on General Giraud*

Anna Vinogradov  
*on Soviet Jews*

Brady Longergan  
*on Roman Bandity*
ABOUT THE REVIEW
Founded in 1991 and published twice a year through the History department, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the Review is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration.

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Letter from the Editors:

Gideon Spitzer and Emily Kern

The Editorial Board is pleased to present the first issue of the eighteenth volume of the Penn History Review, the Ivy League’s oldest undergraduate history journal. The Review continues to publish outstanding undergraduate papers based on original primary research. The Board is proud to feature scholarship that maintains the University of Pennsylvania’s tradition of insightful and diverse historiography. These papers span not only centuries and geographic regions, but also disciplines in the study of history. The authors published in this issue approach their historical inquiries with a particular respect to the larger theme of transformation. In addition to providing four exemplary student essays, this issue of the Review features a special introductory essay by Professor of Modern European History, Dr. Jonathan Steinberg.

We are honored to publish an incisive essay by the University of Pennsylvania’s very own Professor Jonathan Steinberg that traces the intellectual and psychological development of Otto von Bismarck. The piece begins with the question: “how did a giant of a man, a rural aristocrat with no military credentials, a record of failure and irresponsibility in normal jobs, and a dissolute life-style, became the great Bismarck of history?” Dr. Steinberg begins to answer this and other questions about the man he calls “the most interesting character of the nineteenth century.” The essay represents an excellent introduction to Professor Steinberg’s new book, Bismarck: A Life (Oxford University Press, February 2011).

Our second piece, written by University of Pennsylvania undergraduate Emily Mullin, explores the transformational 1838 production of King Lear by William Macready as a unique moment of unity between scholars and thespians. This 1838 version of Lear set the foundation for centuries of further Lear exploration – both on and offstage – by incorporating contemporary critiques of the play and revealing Macready’s particular interpretation of the play. This piece offers an exciting examination of the way scholarship interacts with art in order to reshape understandings of even the most canonical works.

Kwang-Yew See, a University of Pennsylvania undergraduate, authored
the third essay in the Fall 2010 edition: The Downfall of General Giraud: A Study in Wartime Politics. See’s piece investigates the diplomatic intrigue surrounding the American, and to a lesser extent the British decision to support General Jean Giraud in his duel for control of the French Resistance with General Charles de Gaulle. The essay surveys the evolving British approach to the Giraud despite his unwavering American support, juxtaposed upon the personal struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle.

Our fourth piece, Transformation of Jewish Identity in the Soviet Union by University of Pennsylvania undergraduate Anna Vinogradov, probes the evolution of Jewish identity in the USSR in the face of murderous campaigns by both Stalin’s regime and German invaders. The essay discusses the ways Soviet nationality policy influenced and coexisted with historic identity patterns of Soviet Jews. In particular, Vinogradov traces the process by which official Soviet atheism led to the Soviets to classify a historically religious group as a national one, forcing Soviet Jews to reconcile their religious past with an imposed nationalist identity.

The fifth and final article, by Brady Lonegran, begins by exploring the variable and sometimes arbitrary application of the term “bandit” by Roman authors to agents acting outside the traditional aegis of the state. Lonegran uses Sallust’s The Jurgurthine War to engage with problems of the definitional ambiguity: although Jugurtha’s fighting style matched that of most contemporaneous bandits, his status as ruler of a client-kingdom made him officially a rebel, while the official declarations of war by the Senate were more appropriate to a formal external foe.

The collection and publication of these papers represents the collaborative effort of many individuals. The Review would like to thank the many members of the history faculty who encouraged their students to submit essays for publication. The Editorial Board would like to especially thank Dr. Kathy Peiss, the undergraduate chair of the History Department, for her continued support, and Dr. Jonathan Steinberg, for his essay submission. Finally, we thank the University of Pennsylvania and the History Department for their generous financial support of the Review, efforts to foster undergraduate research, and commitment to cultivating future historians.

Gideon Spitzer       Emily Kern

Editors-in-Chief
I first lectured on Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) in Lent Term 1964 at Cambridge University as a very junior research fellow. From the beginning something about his achievements puzzled me. How had he done it? My new biography *Bismarck. A Life* (Oxford University Press, February 2011) asks this question. Of course, previous biographers have asked and answered it too but not as the central issue. They asked what did Bismarck accomplish, with what consequences for German and European history. I ask how a giant of a man, a rural aristocrat with no military credentials, a record of failure and irresponsibility in normal jobs, and a dissolute life-style, became the great Bismarck of history. A few contemporaries saw that Bismarck had an urge to dominate his fellow human beings more powerful than any other impulse in his nature. His university roommate, the American John Lothrop Motley (1814-1877), saw it in the eighteen year-old Bismarck and in 1839 published a novel about him long before he became the Bismarck of history, Morton’s Hope or the Memoirs of a Provincial in two volumes (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1839). I wonder how many readers of this journal know anybody in the Penn student body about whom they would want to write a novel. I suspect the answer would be none. If any of you want to read the original novel, there is a first edition in the Rare Book Room at the Van Pelt Library.

Here is what the thinly disguised Otto von Rabenmarck told Motley when they were freshmen at the University of Göttingen as recounted in Motley’s book:

‘I intend to lead my companions here, as I intend to lead them in after-life. You see I am a very rational sort of person now and you would hardly take me for the crazy mountebank you met in the street half-an hour ago. But then I see that this is the way to obtain superiority. I determined at once on arriving at the university, that the way to obtain mastery over my competitors, who were all, extravagant, savage, eccentric, was to be ten times as extravagant and savage as any one else . . .’ His age was, at the time of which I am writing, exactly eighteen and a half. ‘[p. 41]
The Prussian officer, Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879), probably saw the same ambition when he employed the undergraduate Bismarck to help him with military surveying. This will to dominate lay behind a charm of speech and manner, a delicious, irreverent sense of humor, a warmth and hospitality that captivated even his opponents. They say he ‘bewitched’, ‘encharmed’, ‘charmed’, ‘delighted’ and ‘fascinated’ them. Disraeli, no mean charmer himself, said “he talks as Montaigne writes”. [p. 373]

As a child he defended himself against his ambitious, cold mother by lies. He lied all his life and contemporaries saw that too. On other occasions, he told the truth about his plans so frankly that listeners could not believe their ears. He could be kind and cruel, emotional and cold, sensitive and heartless, honest and devious. His personality had authority and contemporaries used ‘demonic’, ‘diabolical’ or ‘despotic’ to describe it. He had stupendous intellectual powers and a huge capacity to work behind a façade of laziness.

Bismarck was the most interesting character of the nineteenth century. Theodor Fontane, the novelist and direct contemporary, said ‘When Bismarck sneezes or says prosit!, it’s more interesting than the speeches of six progressives.’ [p. 5] Here are a few vignettes from the book. When a particularly grumpy ambassador came to see him, Bismarck watched with relief as he left. Near the gate Bismarck’s dog began to bark, Bismarck shouted from the window, ‘Goltz! Don’t bite my dog’ [p. 119]. Christoph von Tiedemann went to dine at the Bismarck’s in 1875 and after dinner he and Heinrich von Sybel, the historian, were offered the use of the toilet facilities in Bismarck’s bedroom: two huge chamber pots. Von Sybel looked at them in awe. ‘Everything about the man is great; even his s---.’ [p. 10]

For all his brilliance, he could not be called a charismatic orator. On July 17, 1878 the Schwäbische Merkur carried a description of his parliamentary oratory:

‘How astonished are those who hear him for the first time. Instead of a powerful, sonorous voice, instead of the expected pathos, instead of a fiery tirade glowing with classical eloquence, the speech flows easily and softly in conversational tones across his lips, hesitates for a while and winds its way until he finds the right word or phrase, until precisely the right expression emerges. One almost feels at the beginning that the speaker suffers from embarrassment. His upper body moves from side to side, he pulls his handkerchief from his back pocket, wipes his brow, puts it back in the pocket and pulls it out again.’ [p. 1]

Afterwards Bismarck flew into a rage at the humble stenographers who took
down the debates in the Reichstag and described his dark suspicions a month later on 4 October, 1878, to one his aides, Mortitz Busch, who recorded it:

‘The shorthand stenographers turned against me in connection with my last speech. As long as I was popular that was not the case. They garbled what I said so there was no sense in it. When murmurs were heard from the Left or Centre, they omitted the word ‘Left’ and when there was applause, they forgot to mention it. The whole bureau acts in the same way. But I have complained to the President. It was that which made me ill. It was like the illness produced by over-smoking, a stuffiness in the head, giddiness, a disposition to vomit etc.’ [pp 3-4]

Consider that evidence. Could a sane man seriously believe that a conspiracy of stenographers had developed in the duller corridors of the Reichstag to undermine the greatest statesman of the nineteenth century? And the illness as a result? Hypochondria hardly does justice to the complaints.

Bismarck achieved his feats because his powerful personality disarmed and commanded his supporters and his opponents alike for nearly four decades, but not even the most sovereign of selves can operate successfully without help. In Bismarck’s case four factors created the ‘Bismarck of history’: first, the change in the international balance of power, over which he had no control; second the institutional structure of the Kingdom of Prussia after the Revolution of 1848, over which he also had no control; third, the appointment of another ‘genius’ General Helmut von Moltke (1800-1891), to be Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857 and his transformation of the Prussian army over which Bismarck as a civilian could by definition have no control, and finally, the support of a small group of influential patrons who saw in Bismarck - and rightly – that his ‘genius’ (discerning contemporaries used that word) would be the key to the preservation of the Prussian semi-absolute, military monarchy in the new political world created by the revolutions of 1848. In this one area, he had not only control but mastery.

International affairs played into his hands. In 1848 he saw the reality that the French Revolution of 1848 offered no threat, as he wrote to his brother Bernhard: ‘The motives of 1792, the guillotine and the republican fanaticism, which might take the place of money, are not present.’ [p. 88] He saw in the 1850s that the Empire of Napoleon III would do his job for him. As he wrote to his horrified patron, General Leopold von Gerlach, who regarded Napoleon III, as the embodiment of ‘red revolution,

‘The present form of government in France is not arbitrary, a thing that Louis Napoleon can correct or alter. It was something that he found as a
Portrait of Otto von Bismarck wearing a spiked Prussian helmet, 1880. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
given and it is probably the only method by which France can be ruled for a long time to come. For everything else the basis is missing either in national character or has been shattered and lost. If Henry V were to come to the throne he would be unable, if at all, to rule differently. Louis Napoleon did not create the revolutionary conditions; he did not rebel against an established order, but instead fished power out of the whirlpool of anarchy as nobody's property. If he were now to lay it down, he would greatly embarrass Europe, which would more or less unanimously beg him to take it up again.’ [p. 132]

Napoleon III, imprisoned in the myth of his great uncle, Napoleon I, had to liberate Italy. He provoked an unnecessary war with Austria 1859 and helped to weaken the most important element in the balance of power, the Habsburg monarchy. The incompetence of the Austrian monarch and his advisors did the rest. They owed Tsar Nicholas I a great debt for his intervention in 1848 which saved the Monarchy and crushed the Hungarian Revolution of 1849. When the Tsar asked for Austrian help against the Western Powers during the Crimean War in 1854, Franz Joseph refused it. Austria caught between Napoleonic France and a disgruntled Russia had no ally against Prussia. The new Tsar Alexander II came to the throne in 1855 convinced that Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war showed that serfdom and backwardness threatened the very existence of the Tsarist state. The great ‘reform era’ took Russia out of active diplomacy for just long enough for Bismarck to deal with a weakened, isolated and indecisive Habsburg Monarchy. He did not create these realities but he exploited them with consummate mastery.

The Prussian state which Bismarck served depended on its army and the compact between the Crown and its nobility. When Frederick William, the Great Elector, decided in 1653 to have ‘his own forces’ rather than to rely on mercenaries, he began a process which turned Prussia into a military monarchy, ‘not a state with an army, but an army with a state in which it happens to be stationed.’ Frederick the Great, another disastrous genius in German history, fashioned that army into the essential element in the social structure, as he explained in his Testament of 1752:

‘The Prussian nobility has sacrificed its life and goods for the service of the state; its loyalty and merit have earned it the protection of all its rulers...it is one goal of the policy of this state to preserve the nobility. [p. 15]

In Moltke’s order of battle for 1870, the famous names of Prussian history
show up again in the distribution of commands: several von Kleists (3), von der Goltzes (2), Neidhardt von Gneisenau, von Below (2), von der Osten, von Sennft-Pilsach, von Manteuffel, von Bülow (2), von Wedell, von Brandenburg (2), a colonel von Bismarck, von Wartensleben, von Alvensleben, etc. and a sprinkling of royal princes in staff and command posts. [p. 291]

Bismarck inherited the Prussian Constitution of 1850, a hybrid compromise between modern representative government with civil rights and the remains of the absolutism of Frederick the Great. The new parliament had no power over military nor civil appointments. It created a sort of cabinet but until the Cabinet Order of 1852 no very clear description of the office of Prime Minister called in Prussia, Minister-President. Parliament had the power of the purse and soon represented the growing commercial and industrial middle class. A House of Lords represented the ruling aristocracy. The King’s powers rested uneasily among the branches of government. Here too Bismarck had not created the conflict that must arise between Crown and Parliament over the army.

Bismarck's King, William I, (1797-1888) followed the model of Frederick the Great. He worked hard, avoided display and saw himself first and foremost as a soldier. In one respect, he differed from all his predecessors. He had the self-confidence to entrust his civilian affairs to Bismarck and in 1866 to surrender command of his army to the other ‘genius’ of the age, Helmuth von Moltke. For the four years from 1866 to 1870, Prussia had a unified military command structure under the greatest strategist and military planner of the modern era. Moltke took over a Prussian General Staff in 1857 which had developed a range of sophisticated war games and manoeuvres. He developed a plan for the use of railroad transport to get large armies to the right places in time and a strategy for their deployment –Getrennt marschieren, gemeinsam schlagen [march separately, fight together]. Slender, cultivated, modest and calm, Moltke became the idol of his troops. One of his staff officers wrote of him, ‘We all feel happy in his company, and absolutely love and worship him.’[p. 137]

The other man who transformed the army was less well known then and now, Lieutenant General Albrecht von Roon, (1803-1879). Roon made Bismarck’s career possible, and he knew it. In a letter from 1864 to his best friend, Clement Theodor Perthes (1809-1867), he put it this way:

‘Bismarck is an extraordinary man, whom I can certainly help, whom I can support and here and there correct, but never replace. Yes, he would not be in the place he now has without me, that is an historical fact, but
Left to right, Otto von Bismarck, Albrecht von Roon, and Helmuth Karl von Moltke, 1860.
Bismarck: A Life

‘...even with all that he is himself.’ [pp. 6 and 185]

Without Roon Bismarck could have had no career in the Prussian monarchy. Bismarck tried to get out of compulsory military service (documents omitted from the official publication of papers between the two world wars show this) and had no military credentials beyond a year as a reserve officer in a modest regiment. In Frederick the Great’s Prussia, the landed gentry and aristocracy all ‘served’ and ‘served’ meant only service in the army. They went first to the Kadettenanstalt, the military schools, and then to their regiment. Bismarck went to a bourgeois gymnasium and to university. He was, as Baron von der Osten sneered in Fontane’s novel Irrungen, Wirrungen, ‘nothing but a pen pusher’.

Without Roon, no Bismarck of history. When his friend Perthes accused him of appointing a man ‘who calculates so coldly, who prepares so cunningly, who has no scruples about methods’, Roon replied that Bismarck could ‘assess the nature and weight of the effective forces, which one cannot know precisely, that is the work of the historic genius’ [p. 6, 185]. Roon provided what Bismarck lacked: immediate access to the King. As a general, Roon could request an audience of the King as his commanding officer at any time. He served Bismarck loyally to his death in 1879; as one of Moltke’s staff complained, Roon was a kind of famulus, the medieval word for a sorcerer’s apprentice.

Bismarck, the sorcerer himself, used his magical gifts to manipulate and control a rigid, stubborn, reactionary old gentleman, William I, King of Prussia. If William I had had the decency to die at the biblical ‘three score and ten’ in 1867, Bismarck’s creation, the North German Federation, might have eventually absorbed the South German kingdoms but not through a devastating war. William did not die at 70, nor at 80, nor at 90 but in 1888 at 91 and that longevity of the old King gave Bismarck 26 years in office. During those twenty-six years Bismarck forced the King again and again by temper tantrums, hysteria, tears, and threats to do things that every fibre in his spare frame rejected. For twenty-six years Bismarck ruled by the magic that he exerted over the old man. Bismarck’s career rested on personal relations—in particular, those with the King and the Minister of War. Because Bismarck had a power-base of one person he depended on the old man’s health (excellent), his willingness to be bossed by him (limitless) and the tensions of the king’s marriage (weak husband – strong wife) to rule Germany and change history.

He thus re-enacted the horrors of his childhood with his cold, ambitious, frightening mother and his feeble, old, ineffectual father still exercising power.
over him. Indeed, had the king not been weak, Bismarck could not have used the remnants of royal absolutism to make his will felt through the entire political system. He paid a terrible price in hypochondria, hysteria, illness, sleeplessness, rage and over-eating. He destroyed much of his social life, the happiness of his children, the friendships of his youth and his peace of mind, but he dominated his society so utterly that contemporaries called him a dictator. He destroyed more than just his health. He had a disastrous effect on Germany. Political opponents became ‘enemies’ and enemies had to be crushed. In a speech to the Lower House in 1863, he explained his view of political conflict, ‘Constitutional life is a series of compromises. If these are frustrated, conflicts arise. Conflicts are questions of power, and whoever has power to hand, can go his own way.’ [p. 472] He destroyed German liberalism and tried to stamp out the Catholic Center Party. He outlawed Social Democracy and wanted to deprive socialists and trade unionists of their votes. He helped the worst elements of the old ruling class to survive, so they could in 1933 give the office that the ‘Iron Chancellor’ had created to a ‘Bohemian corporal’ who destroyed the rest of the Germany Bismarck had made.

1. All citations are drawn from Bismarck. A Life and the page numbers correspond to those in the book. All translations are mine.
On the evening of January 25, 1838, at the Covent Garden Theatre in London, the curtain opened on the first performance of *King Lear* to restore Shakespeare’s original story to the stage. For the first time in over one hundred and fifty years, under the influence of the tragedian and manager William Charles Macready, the play ended tragically, included Shakespeare’s Fool, and refrained from interjecting a romance between Cordelia and Edgar. This performance represents an essential moment in the study of Shakespearean criticism and understanding: until 1838 it was believed that *Lear* could not be represented onstage,\(^1\) that “classical” performances in general were unprofitable,\(^2\) and that the story of *Lear*, in particular, was distasteful to the public.\(^3\) But, while it may appear that Macready’s performance broke with all previous tradition, it was the culmination of previous scholarship and theatrical efforts that led to its production.

Examining the 1838 production of *Lear* and situating it as precisely as possible in its theatrical, critical, and artistic context, reveals the way in which this context played a role in the artistic choices Macready made. By taking into account contemporary nineteenth century scholarship on *King Lear* and learning from previous productions in its interpretation of the play, Macready’s performance unified two flanks that had been previously divided without apparent hope of reconciliation. Thus, the 1838 production of *King Lear* represents a vital moment in Shakespearean scholarship—the union, however brief, of the scholars and the theatre.

Perhaps the most brazen theatrical approach came in 1681 when Nahum Tate decided to rewrite the play almost entirely. Tate’s “revision” of *Lear* was by no means an isolated incident of theatrical vandalism. During the Restoration, many of Shakespeare’s plays were rewritten: the plots and language were simplified and condensed under the influence of neoclassical rules. Tate’s revision of *Lear* governed the production history of *Lear* for the next century—it was astoundingly popular, effectively replacing Shakespeare’s text until Macready brought it back in 1838. The changes Tate made became points of debate for actors and critics, subsequently crystallizing the debate over *Lear’s* interpretation as the century progressed. Thus, the first step
towards defining Shakespeare’s *Lear* onstage became defying the previous interpretation that had dominated it for so long.

Tate based his rendition on the principles of neoclassicism, specifically the Unities, as well as the predominating Augustan ideals of tragedy.\(^4\) In terms of neoclassical rules, the Unity of Action concerned Tate the most. The lack of cohesion between the Lear and Gloucester stories spurred him to invent a romance between Edgar and Cordelia—of which he was immensely proud, lauding it specifically in his introduction to the play.\(^5\) Bringing Edgar and Cordelia together unified the two plots, creating a Unity of Action, what he termed “Regularity,”\(^6\) not present in Shakespeare. The romance served Tate’s other purposes as well—to create a logical tragedy in which the motivations of the characters became logical and even admirable.\(^7\)

In order to explain Lear’s temperament and later madness, Tate foreshadowed it. Just before Lear’s entrance, Kent, now Lear’s “physician,” exclaims, “I grieve to see him with such wild starts of passion hourly seiz’d,/ As it render Majesty beneath it self.”\(^8\) To which Gloucester replies, “Alas! ‘tis the Infirmity of his Age,/Yet has his Temper ever been unfixt,/Chol’rick and suddain…”\(^9\) Thus, Lear became incarnated not just as an old man, but as one whose temper defined his character throughout his life and degraded the throne.

Tate’s final, and most substantial, change to the play was the ending. He dethroned the tragedy by ending the piece as a romance, in which Lear and Cordelia survive and Edgar marries Cordelia. Tate’s discomfort with the ending can hardly be attributed to his ignorance of literature. Even Shakespearean scholar A.C. Bradley, in his chef-d’oeuvre *Shakespearean Tragedy*, could barely reconcile himself to *Lear*’s ending.\(^10\) However, Tate’s immediate motivation for the changes lay in his interpretation. Tate saw *Lear* as a play about redemption and filial tenderness, and for that reason, saw no necessity in a tragic ending.\(^11\) In this story, the recognition scene, not the deaths of Lear and Cordelia, became the most important scene of the play. Thus, a tragedy would have been counterproductive to the moral he was trying to convey.

Making the play moral certainly fit within the context of the eighteenth century. Joseph Donohue noted in *The Cambridge History of Theatre*, by the late 1600s, “a society and a theatrical audience were developing which increasingly looked to plays to set examples of refined, morally upright conduct.”\(^12\) Critics and audiences met Tate’s alteration of the ending with approbation, and in many ways this moral ending stood in the way of *Lear*’s restoration to the stage simply because it was so satisfying. As late as 1774,
Macready’s Triumph

after Garrick had begun to restore Shakespeare’s text, William Richardson wrote, “[t]he morals of Shakespeare’s plays are, in general, extremely natural and just; yet, why must innocence unnecessarily suffer? Why must the hoary, the venerable Lear be brought with sorrow to the grave? Why must Cordelia perish by an untimely fate?” Thus, we can see to what extent almost a century later the audience and critics still approved of Tate’s interpretation.

Though the ending of Lear would inhibit its restoration during the eighteenth century, by 1742, David Garrick began putting Shakespeare back onstage. Garrick’s interpretation of Lear and his newfound respect for Shakespearean verse contributed to the growing understanding of the play. Garrick’s performance as Lear set the tone for all performances to follow; even Macready considered Garrick’s Lear when he began to construct his own. Thus, in order to understand Lear in 1838, we should first examine Lear in the mid-eighteenth century.

Lear was Garrick’s “chef d’oeuvre:” Garrick as Lear was “a little, old, white haired man, with spindle-shanks, a tottering gait, and great shoes upon his little feet.” His personal take on the character demonstrates a remarkably unique understanding of the famous king:

“Lear is certainly a weak man, it is part of his character—violent, old, and weakly fond of his daughters… his weakness proceeds from his age (four score & upwards) and such an old man full of affection, generosity, passion and what not meeting with what he thought an ungrateful return from his best belov’d Cordelia.”

Lear’s weakness, particularly in madness, was incarnated in Garrick’s physicality of him: “[h]e had no sudden starts, no violent gesticulation; his movements were slow and feeble; misery was depicted in his countenance.” Garrick’s model for Lear demonstrates that his conception of the character was based on pathos and senescence; Lear’s madness comes out of extreme grief, and is manifested by a slowing down of the mental processes, not frenzy.

At the beginning of his career, Garrick played Tate’s Lear, though he later worked to restore more and more of Shakespeare’s original text. He never reached the point, however, where he cut the love story between Edgar and Cordelia, included the tragic ending, or added the Fool. His restorations remained purely textual and organizational, changing little of Tate’s plot. George Stone attributed Garrick’s conservatism on these points to economic concerns: “[e]xamination of Garrick’s entire connection with the versions of Shakespeare and Tate… demonstrates the dilemma of an eighteenth-century mind caught between an ideal liking for Shakespeare and a canny
William Macready as King Lear with Helen Faucit as Cordelia.
understanding of box-office appeal.”

Indeed, Garrick’s choice to retain the romance between Edgar and Cordelia proved to be the wisest choice he could have made at the time. On February 20, 1768, George Colman, inspired by Garrick’s restorations of Shakespeare, staged an alteration of *King Lear* omitting the romance, though it retained the happy ending and still excluded the Fool. The *Theatrical Review* declared, “[w]e think his having restored the original...is a circumstance not greatly in favour of humanity or delicacy of feeling, since it is now, rather too shocking to be bourne; and the rejecting of the Episode of the loves of Edgar and Cordelia, so happily conceived by Tate, has, beyond all doubt, greatly weakened the Piece.”

The critical outrage sunk Coleman’s piece into obscurity. Years later, Macready wrote, “I believe the elder Colman put out an alteration, but I question whether it was acted; certainly it did not hold its place on the stage.” Thus, despite the progress made during the eighteenth century in restoring Shakespeare’s text, it left much to be desired. Tate’s version still held sway. However, off-stage, Shakespearean criticism also progressed.

After Garrick’s retirement in 1776, the critics took center stage in *Lear*’s development. Because of King George III’s impending madness, from 1780 until 1810, *Lear* was rarely performed, and banned outright from 1810 until the king’s death in 1820. In some ways, this hiatus in stage production allowed Shakespeare’s *Lear* to gain ground against Tate’s version. But, between 1780 and the early nineteenth century, other factors changed as well that may have predisposed the Regency era towards the darker, Shakespearean *King Lear*. Victor Hugo declared, “The nineteenth century has for its august mother the French Revolution... [it] has for family itself, and itself alone. It is characteristic of its revolutionary nature to dispense with ancestors.”

In the revolutionary spirit, then, theatre critics began to dispense with the regulations that had governed the theatre throughout the eighteenth century. The sentiment against Tate only grew stronger, even to the point of critiquing Garrick himself for playing Tate’s version. Charles Lamb, the renowned Shakespearean scholar declared, “I am almost disposed to deny to Garrick the merit of being an admirer of Shakespeare. A true lover of his excellences he certainly was not—for any true lover of them have admitted into his matchless scenes such ribald trash as Tate... [has] foisted into the acting [play] of Shakespeare?”

Psychology became a predominating interest of critics, particularly the episodes of Lear’s madness. The 1780s also saw the rise of interest in
the character of the Fool, though within the context of examining Lear’s character.\textsuperscript{19} In fact, the passion of the critics for the play’s psychological and philosophical depth led Charles Lamb to declare in 1812,

“The Lear of Shakespeare cannot be acted. The contemptible machinery by which they mimic the storm which he goes out in, is not more inadequate to represent the horrors of the real elements, than any actor can be to represent Lear… Lear is essentially impossible to be represented on a stage.”\textsuperscript{20}

His opinion that Lear did not belong onstage would remain the popular critical opinion, and would be, perhaps, verified, by the subsequent productions of the play—all of which failed to meet the theatrical and intellectual demands.

When King Lear officially returned to the stage after King George III’s death, Edmund Kean, the passionate, romantic star of the early nineteenth century stage, resolved to step into Garrick’s shoes as the man to take steps towards restoring the original story of King Lear. Though the first revival of the play, in 1820, was Tate’s version, on February 10, 1823, Kean decided to play Lear with the restored tragic ending. Kean had evidently declared his intentions that the audience should “see him over the dead body of Cordelia” even before 1820; the theatre critic Hazlitt went so far as to suggest that Kean’s poor Lear in 1820 was acted “out of spite.”\textsuperscript{21} Kean’s restoration of the ending was apparently a personal goal, though he restored little else in the play. The love-story between Edgar and Cordelia remained, and the Fool was still absent. The reviewer from the John Bull observed,

“We were a good deal disappointed on visiting the theatre to find that no steps had been taken to knock away Tate’s plastering and restore the original beautiful structure other than concerns the last act, and that all the mawkish love-scenes of the bungler were still suffered to encumber the splendid work of the bard.”\textsuperscript{22}

However, Kean’s restoration of the ending was a tremendous step forward for the stage. As Odell notes, “in face of the accumulated opinion of the eighteenth century that the death of Lear and Cordelia on the stage ‘would never do…’ Kean proved that it would.”\textsuperscript{23} Kean’s performance, regardless of its failings, moved the story of King Lear towards a full restoration.

In addition, Kean took steps towards theatrical realism in his interpretation: he was determined to have a realistic storm inside the theatre. Kean envisioned a tempest driven by mechanical effects he had seen demonstrated at a mechanical exhibition. The effect was elaborate: “The scenic trees were composed to distinct boughs which undulated in the
wind, each leaf was a separate pendant rustling with the expressive sound of nature itself.” 24 Unfortunately, the storm was so accurate that according to the review in the Times, Kean “could scarcely be heard amid the confusion.” 25 Macready probably read the cautionary line in the Times, “[Kean] should have recollected that it is the bending of Lear’s mind under his wrongs that is the object of interest, and not that of a forest beneath the hurricane.” 26

Unfortunately for Kean, despite his attempts at progress, the production itself was unsuccessful, not only because of the production values but because of Kean’s melodramatic performance as Lear. The failure to represent the tragic king only seemed to verify Charles Lamb’s definitive statement that Lear could not be acted. Critics continued to assert that the only way to experience King Lear was to read it. Keats’ poem “On sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again” demonstrated to what extent Lear had become a solitary, literary experience during the early nineteenth century. Lamb, too, asserted that only through reading Lear will we experience the play: “On the stage we see nothing but corporal infirmities and weakness, the impotence of rage; while we read it, we see not Lear, but we are Lear.” 27

Given this split between Lear’s life as a literary work and theatrical piece, Macready was the ideal actor to unify the two worlds. He represented the only person capable of doing justice to Shakespeare’s Lear onstage, “[a] man who passed his life at odds with the profession he led.” 28 Unlike Garrick, Macready cared more for the theatre as an entity than for his own popularity. Because the cultural climate of London had changed, a restoration of Shakespeare’s King Lear was daring, but not necessarily unthinkable. The danger was not so much in doing it, but in doing it right.

Macready spent his entire life working to elevate the theatre. He explained, “Among my motives the primary one was the wish to elevate my art and to establish an asylum for it.” 29 The lack of financial motives gave Macready a freedom that Garrick never had: he could challenge the status quo of the theatre. In doing so, he hoped “to establish a theatre in regard to decorum and taste, worthy of our country, and have in it the plays of our divine Shakespeare, fitly illustrated…” 30 Macready elevated “divine” Shakespeare beyond the pedestal Garrick had placed him on. In a sense, his desire to refine Shakespeare made him more of a Shakespearean critic than a man of the theatre. He detested the rewrites and any attempt to “improve” Shakespeare, particularly when the changes were made by managers in order to make a profit. In 1836, Macready went so far as to physically attack his manager, Alfred Bunn, for forcing him to play a truncated version of Richard III that
ended at Act III. After this episode, which banned him from the Drury Lane Theatre, Macready found that he would be forever dissatisfied with his profession unless he controlled his own productions.

As an actor, Macready applied his intellectual appreciation of Shakespeare. He studied his parts intensely and spent hours simply reading the plays he performed. George Vanderhoff, a fellow actor, described him as merging the two styles of the actors that preceded him, Kemble, a studious actor who specialized in elocution, and the passionate Kean: “[h]e tried to blend the classic art of the one with the impulsive intensity of the other; and he overlaid both with an outer-plating of his own, highly artificial and elaborately formal.” Macready’s peers often noted that his diligence allowed him to change acting styles depending on the part he played. In his youth, his fellow actors ridiculed him for “acting” during rehearsals that were generally little more than walk-throughs. In fact, the first chance he had to play Lear, in 1820 (a feeble attempt to challenge Kean’s first revival), he turned down because he believed he would not be able to study Lear adequately in just a few weeks. Instead, he appeared as Edmund.

After turning down the opportunity in 1820, Macready first appeared as Lear in London during the 1834 production at Drury Lane. Trewin described the performance as “a fairly reasonable version, for though the Fool was still un-restored, he had managed to lop most of Tate’s foolishness, and Shakespeare’s last act was played as it had been a decade before in the Kean-and-Elliston revival.” Thus, Macready furnished the second step towards a complete restoration of Shakespeare’s Lear: the love story had finally been cut, and only the Fool remained to be restored—though that omission alone left a considerable amount of text un-spoken onstage. Given that that Fool could be considered the most risky element of Shakespeare’s Lear to restore (Macready would believe so as well in 1838), Mr. Bunn would doubtless not approve of his appearance in the piece. Certainly, Macready’s own lack of influence over productions, specifically his inability to curb cuts to Shakespeare’s work, eventually contributed to his decision to become the manager of Covent Garden.

On September 30, 1837, Macready opened his first performance as manager of the Covent Garden Theatre in London. In a public address to the house he announced that the “decline of drama, as a branch of English literature [is] a matter of public notoriety; that [he] hoped to advanced it as a branch of national literature and art.” Not far away, Alfred Bunn, now Macready’s rival, retorted publicly that classical plays have always shown...
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heavy losses and contemporary plays heavy gains, so “the public had what it wanted.” Throughout the season, the two theatres competed publicly for audiences; the common rivalry between theatres was spurred by the ideological and personal differences between the two managers. But, by January 1837, it appeared Bunn was right—Macready announced that Covent Garden had lost £3,000. In a daring, and perhaps reckless, decision to recuperate losses and jump-start the season in the New Year, Macready announced that he would restore *King Lear* to the stage, “as Shakespeare wrote it, with the character of the Fool, and without the silly manipulation…that had so long disgraced the stage.” Thus, *King Lear* became a last hope for Macready’s plan to elevate the theatre and restore Shakespeare to its rightful place on the English stage.

The artistic choices that went into the 1838 production of *King Lear* deserve attention as a way of defining how this performance was a keystone moment in *Lear’s* production history. The sheer fact that Macready stuck to Shakespeare’s original plot as much as possible (despite rather judicious textual cuts), and that he removed the love-story and restored the Fool, singled out this performance. But the production itself—Macready’s interpretation of Lear’s character, the illustration of the Fool, and the set design—distinguished the 1838 *King Lear* as a defining moment that changed the course of the play’s production history. Through the artistic choices made, the performance commented on contemporary artistic theory, while at the same time defined and developed a unique critical interpretation of the play.

Unlike other portrayals of Lear, Macready’s did not begin as a senile old man or a weakened monarch, but as a strong vigorous king whose “overwhelming passion in his worn-out frame…[hastened] the passage from a healthy understanding to a disordered one.” In Macready’s interpretation, Lear’s passion, insupportable in his old age, causes his madness. Macready, writing to a friend, explained his understanding of Lear, and shed light on his portrayal of the character:

“Most actors, Garrick, Kemble and Kean among others, seemed to have based their conception of the character on the infirmity usually associated with ‘four score and upwards,’ and have represented the feebleness instead of the vigour of old age. But Lear’s was in truth a ‘lusty winter:’ his language never betrays imbecility of mind or body. He confers his kingdom indeed on ‘younger strengths:’ but there is still sufficient invigorating him [sic] to allow him to ride, to hunt, to run wildly through the fury of the storm, to slay the ruffian who murdered his Cordelia, and to bear about her dead
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body in his arms… Indeed the towering rage of thought with which his mind dilates identifying the heavens themselves with his griefs, [sic] and the power of conceiving such vast imaginings, would seem incompatible with a tottering, trembling frame, and betoken rather one of ‘mighty bone and bold emprise,’ in the outward bearing of a grand old man.”

The passion and vigor Macready found in Lear, contrary to other representations, not only redefined the character for the 19th Century audience, but also suggested a different interpretation of the play. Macready conceived of Lear as a powerful monarch, one who commanded respect and wielded authority.

However, as Lady Pollock observed, Macready also created a character whose self-conception did not match reality. His body could not support his passion. We might conclude that Lear’s giant mistake—disinheriting Cordelia—did not stem from senility (even passionate), but from his “outward bearing of a grand old man.” In Lear’s vigorousness, Macready had given him a tragic flaw—almost as if he borrowed from classical theatre tradition. Perhaps this is what he referred to when he wrote in his diary after rehearsals that his version of Lear was “very striking [to a] classic eye.”

We may better understand Macready’s interpretation of Lear by understanding the critical environment in which he worked. In addition to the actors who conceived weak Lears, each of the critics had their own interpretation of Lear’s character, many of which Macready read during his study of the play. Hazlitt’s observations on Lear, from Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays written in 1817, demonstrated what Macready was most likely not aiming for in his interpretation: “It is [Lear’s] rash haste, his violent impetuosity, his blindness to everything but the dictates of his passions or affections, that produces all his misfortunes, that aggravates his impatience of them, that enforces our pity for him.” Hazlitt characterized Lear as a child, or perhaps more appropriately, as a selfish, senile old man unable to see anything but his own wants or needs. Of Hazlitt’s observations Macready wrote, “[w]hat conceited trash that man has thought to pass upon the public.”

On the other hand, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a Shakespearean critic Macready respected, conceived of Lear very differently. Macready attended all of Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare, so we can assume Macready would have been familiar with Coleridge’s opinions on Lear. Coleridge’s analysis forgave more than Hazlitt’s, and emphasized Lear’s humanity. He blamed Lear’s misfortunes on “the strange yet by no means unnatural, mixture of selfishness, sensibility, and habit of feeling derived from and fostered by the
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particular rank and usages of the individual.” He did not shy away from addressing old age, either: “[i]n Lear, old age is itself a character, its natural imperfections being increased by lifelong habits of receiving a prompt obedience.” Macready’s portrayal of Lear embodied these two descriptions fairly closely. Macready mentioned Lear’s “outward bearing of a grand old man,” which mimicked Coleridge’s conviction of rank and perhaps selfishness as well. Thus, by creating a “vigorous” Lear, Macready situated his production among the ranks of Shakespearean critics. His conception of Lear became a unique interpretation that participated in the contemporary discussion surrounding Lear’s character.

Macready’s incarnation of Lear was certainly not the only innovation he brought to the performance. His most notable contribution to the play was the restoration of the Fool, brought back for the first time since Tate. The restoration of the Fool was the only element of the play that had not yet been seen onstage by 1837. The characterization of the Fool in Macready’s performance clearly demonstrated the way in which this production of King Lear fit into the contemporary conception of the play. The Fool, although a new addition, enabled the play to adhere to tradition while at the same time incorporating the new character of Lear that Macready developed.

The neoclassical rules that governed Tate demanded the elimination of the Fool in the name of purifying the tragedy. While some of the stringent neoclassical ideals such as Unity of Place and Time came to be questioned in the late eighteenth century, this particular rule, a part of Unity of Action, was still upheld. In the advertisement for his 1768 performance, George Colman wrote, “I had once some idea of retaining the Fool, but after the most serious consideration I was convinced that such a character in a Tragedy would not be endured on the modern stage.” Writing in his journal after the first rehearsal of King Lear in 1838, Macready expressed similar hesitations with regard to the character of the Fool: “[m]y opinion of the introduction of the Fool is that, like many such terrible contrasts in poetry and painting, in acting representation it will fail of effect; it will either weary and annoy or distract the spectators. I have no hope of it and think that at the last we shall be obliged to dispense with it.” Thus, he illustrated the continuing discomfort with the Fool, even in nineteenth century aesthetics. A few days later, instead of cutting the Fool, he cut the actor who played the Fool. Macready strove to find a balance between what he saw as theatrical integrity in the restoration of Shakespeare and character of the Fool whom he did not believe could be restored.
Priscilla Horton as Ariel in *The Tempest*, 1838.
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In order to realize his vision of the Fool (and consequentially *King Lear* as a whole) Macready made an unpredictable choice—he cast a woman in the part. He had originally cast Drinkwater Meadows, “a capable, routine actor,” according to Trewin. 51 On the second day of rehearsal Meadows was out and Priscilla Horton was in. His decision to cast Priscilla Horton after so few rehearsals shows us Macready’s vision of the Fool and his intentions for *Lear*. He used the Fool as a comparison to Cordelia in order to heighten the pathos and family drama.

When Macready complained about Meadows, he explained his vision of what the fool should be: “a sort of fragile, hectic, beautiful-faced, half-idiot-looking boy.” 52 His friend and fellow actor Bartley suggested that a woman should play the role and Macready “caught at the idea and instantly exclaimed: ‘Miss P. Horton is the very person.’ [He] was delighted at the thought.” 53 Macready’s delight tells us that Priscilla Horton brought very particular characteristics to her role as the Fool. She was not just any actress: renowned for her agile dancing and contralto singing voice, she was also very young—she turned twenty just two days before rehearsals began. She would later be most remembered for playing Ariel in Macready’s *Tempest*. In the drawing of Priscilla as Ariel, we have an image of what Macready’s Fool would have been—slender, “fragile,” and certainly, “beautiful-faced.” A reviewer of Priscilla’s performance noted, “Her ‘poor fool and knave’ is perhaps not that of Shakespeare… Still hers is a most pleasing performance, giving evidence of deep feelings; and she trills forth the snatches of song with the mingled archness and pathos of their own exquisite simplicity.” 54 Charles Dickens was also quite struck by her performance, declaring it, “as exquisite a performance as the stage has ever boasted.” 55

In casting the Fool as a beautiful girl, Macready’s interpretation contrasted significantly with later harsh interpretations of the Fool. In the twentieth century, Harold Bloom even went so far as to give the Fool partial responsibility for Lear’s madness: “on some level of purposiveness, however repressed, the Fool does labor to destroy Lear’s sanity.” 56 Instead, Macready’s Fool was meant, in the spirit of contemporary criticism, as a contrast to Lear. Charles Dickens attested in his review of Macready’s Lear, “[the Fool] is interwoven with Lear, he is the link that still associates him with Cordelia’s love, and the presence of the regal estate he has surrendered.” 57 Furthermore, the Fool’s femininity may have been meant to reference Cordelia and thus heighten the pathos of the family tragedy.

Macready used the visual image of the Fool as a young woman to strengthen
the pathos of the play. The actress who played Cordelia, Helen Faucit, was just twenty-one at the time of production, and we can see in the illustration that she had the same slender, “fragile,” structure and delicate features as Priscilla Horton. Thus, in playing Lear as caring for the Fool, as opposed to being “[blind] to everything but the dictates of his passions or affections” 58 as Hazlitt believed, Macready demonstrated that Lear, though passionate, retained a consciousness of others’ feelings.

Furthermore, in heightening the resemblance onstage between the Fool and Cordelia and in creating an affiliation between the two characters in Lear’s mind, Macready escalated the family drama of *King Lear*. According to J.S. Bratton, “the essential Lear [of the nineteenth century] is a tale of ‘filial tenderness and parental suffering.’” 59 Bratton blamed this interpretation on the “Victorian failure to come to grips with *King Lear*.” 60 If the heart of the piece is Lear’s parental anguish, then the resolution of the play becomes the recognition scene, and theatrical intuition says to end the play happily, as Tate, Garrick, and many others did.

Perhaps in other interpretations it may be true that the interest in familial tenderness prevents the audience from appreciating the play, but in Macready’s *Lear*, Lear’s ‘parental suffering’ may have increased the public’s ability to relate to the story. As we have examined, Macready’s conception of Lear’s character was not the weak, unhappy father of previous performances. Instead, he embodied the grandeur of a king—he gave orders and expected to be obeyed. His role as a father, then, became just one aspect of his character, not its entirety. The Fool allowed Macready to stray from the familiar conception of Lear as “weakly fond of his daughters,” 61 while still illustrating Lear’s affection for Cordelia. Through the Fool, the public was able to recognize the Lear they understood from the past, and yet, at the same time, learn that the pathos they recognized was heightened in a stronger, more regal Lear.

Our final analysis of the 1838 *King Lear* examines Macready’s choices in scenery. Macready’s detailed representations of Shakespeare’s plays proved not only memorable, but defined a new style for Shakespeare. It was, in fact, something very close to what Kean had attempted almost two decades before, except Macready insisted against “[having] the magnificence without the tragedy and the poet…swallowed up in display.” 62 And unlike Kean, who was most interested in the possibility of spectacle, Macready’s intention was “to give Shakespeare all his attributes, to enrich his poetry with scenes worthy of its interpretation, to give his tragedies their due magnificence.” 63
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Macready’s *Lear* adhered to historical realism in a way the nineteenth century had rarely seen before. Judging by the scenic description, Macready staged the play as a historical piece in Saxon England, like all previous renditions. However, his attention to detail—lightning that split the sky, sheeted elements, the trophies and instruments of war, and elaborate costumes for Lear’s soldiers—showed a commitment to faithful representation beyond Garrick’s Shakespearean costuming and proportional backdrops. While this effort resembled Kean’s determination to have every individual leaf move during the storm scene, Macready’s production aimed for realism that progressed into the realm of art. Christopher Baugh noted in “Stage Design from Loughterbourg to Poel,” “paradoxically, the urge was, on the one hand, for greater reality, yet at the same time, it was reality composed and structured as pictorial art.”

Macready borrowed from the aesthetics of the picturesque, as well as the historical costuming of Saxon England.

The 1838 performance of *Lear* was extraordinarily well received. The play revived the hopes of the Covent Garden Theatre and Macready’s ambitions for Shakespearean restorations, capturing the praise of the critics for the entire season. But, Macready’s performance had its critics, most of whom complained of Macready’s gradual development of Lear’s character and his pathos. Generally, however, reviews were favorable. The John Bull review declared,

“*[King Lear] was* commenced with such taste, and so admirably carried into effect by the manager of this theatre. Mr. Macready deserves, and will obtain, the deep respect and gratitude, not only of the playgoing but of the literary world, for his earnest and well-directed zeal to do honour to our nation’s chieftest intellectual pride.”

Dickens proudly asserted, “Mr. Macready’s success has banished that disgrace [Tate] from the stage for ever.” Odell, writing in 1920 and looking back on the century agreed, “with this production the ghost of Nahum Tate—so far as England, if not America, was concerned—was laid forever.” Macready himself noted after opening night, “the impression created by *King Lear* seemed to be wide and strong.” His *Lear* would be remembered as “one of [his] greatest performances and was perhaps of all the most universally admired; its effect upon an audience was immense.” Subsequently, he continued to play Lear for the rest of his career with great success.

In 1838, William Macready’s *King Lear* set the foundation for centuries of *Lear* exploration. His production built upon the innovations and interpretations of Tate, Garrick, and Kean, as well as the multitude of Shakespearean critics who
first began to ask questions about Shakespeare’s original. Macready’s ability to comment on the current opinions circulating about Lear established the play as a piece to be respected onstage as well as off. In doing so, he not only commented on the contemporary criticism, but also contributed to it. The 1838 King Lear made decisions about the play that a scholarly written opinion simply could not: in the performance, the physicality of Lear illuminated his character; the actor (in this case, actress) chosen to play the Fool determined the audience’s perception of the role; the authenticity of the scenery and the mechanics of the storm scene complemented the text, illuminating the story for the audience in a completely unique fashion. Macready envisioned Lear as more than a feeble old man, creating instead a vigorous King in “lusty winter.” 72 He recognized the importance of restoring the Fool, and how the Fool could be used to enrich the performance; he strove to visually “do justice” to Shakespeare’s text onstage. In King Lear, Macready finally gave the public a glimpse of what the play could look like. We cannot say definitively that without Macready we would never have discovered the magnificence of Lear onstage, but we certainly would have discovered it differently, and probably at a later date. It took a particular type of actor to combine the criticism and scholarship of Shakespeare and represent it onstage. Thus, perhaps we might say that Macready’s greatest triumph in crafting King Lear was simply defying the critical scholars and the conservative theatre managers by proving that the play could be performed onstage, and would continue to be performed, so long as there were men brave enough to tackle the tragedy.

4 Bruce, Columbia Critical Guides, 22-23.
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6 Ibid., 203.
7 Bruce, Columbia Critical Guides, 24.
8 Tate, 208. 1. 1. 51-53.
9 Ibid, 208. 1. 1. 54-55.
10 Bruce, Columbia Critical Guides, 97.
13 Bruce, Columbia Critical Guides, 25.
14 Stone, “Garrick’s King Lear,” 91.
15 Theatrical Review (1772), quoted in George C.D. Odell, Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving, Volume I (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 381.
19 Bruce, Columbia Critical Guides, 1.
22 Review of King Lear, John Bull February 16, 1823, quoted in Odell, Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving, 156.
23 Odell, Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving, 154.
25 Review of King Lear, The Times, April 25, 1820, quoted in Odell, Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving, 165.
26 Ibid.
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30 Ibid., 370.

31 George Vanderhoff, quoted in Duclos 113.


34 Trewin, *Mr. Macready*, 60.

35 Ibid., 103.


37 Ibid., 135.

38 Trewin, *Mr. Macready*, 139.


42 Ibid., 13, 249.


49 Odell, *Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving*, 380.


51 Trewin, *Mr. Macready*, 139.

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53 Ibid., 113.
54 *John Bull* review of *King Lear*, quoted in Odell, *Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving*, 195.
58 Hazlitt, Characters, quoted in Bruce, *Columbia Critical Guides*, 76.
60 Ibid., 131.
61 David Garrick to Tighe, June 1773.
63 Ibid., 83.
66 Odell, *Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving*, 194.
67 Harris, “King Lear in the Theatre,” 218.
68 *John Bull* review of *King Lear*, quoted in Odell, *Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving*, 194.
69 Dickens, “The Restoration of King Lear,” 78.
71 Pollock, *Macready as I Knew Him*, 104.
On April 17, 1942, a man escaped from his prison at Konigstein by lowering himself down the castle wall and jumping on board a train that took him to the French border. In November of that year, he donned an elderly lady’s garb and pulled off another dramatic escape from France to Algiers.\(^1\) The arrival of this man, French General Henri Giraud, in Algiers marked the beginning of a power struggle between General Charles de Gaulle and General Giraud for control of the French resistance forces in French North Africa. This personal duel and power struggle involved not only the French, but also the active and repeated intervention of the British and American governments. The United States, under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, maintained a narrow-minded stance in favor of General Giraud, a position which caused the ouster of their favored general by General de Gaulle in the struggle to control the French resistance forces in North Africa.

In early 1943, Roosevelt’s held an idealistic assessment of the political situation of France, commenting in a conversation with General Giraud on January 17, 1943\(^2\) that he believed that the sovereignty of France rested with the people. FDR further argued that from a legal and constitutional standpoint, there could be “no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard.” In other words, as Roosevelt retorted when General de Gaulle mentioned the sovereignty of French Morocco,\(^3\) neither de Gaulle nor Giraud could claim to represent the sovereignty of France. Given the German invasion of France and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi-backed Vichy regime in France, President Roosevelt correctly judged that the French people would not be able to exercise their sovereign rights. However, as the war wore on, President Roosevelt based the stance of the United States on this narrow judgment, which turned out to be too narrow-minded.

First, President Roosevelt erred by comparing French sovereignty to that of United States. The Roosevelt Administration tended to view political power in France along the lines of its own post-Civil War voting coalition,\(^4\) a situation that led to a distorted American understanding of the sources of
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political power in the French political landscape. The British, who stood as the strongest ally of the United States during the war, arrived at the conclusion during a War Cabinet meeting in June 21, 1943 that US assessments of the French political situation could not be trusted because “[the Americans] knew nothing about France.”

By single-mindedly claiming that the French could not exercise their sovereignty before the war had concluded, the United States failed to consider the continuity that would exist between the French North African administration and postwar France. The US Administration seemed to ignore the notion that a candidate who enjoyed a greater popularity at home would be most capable of exerting power when France regained her freedom after the war. General de Gaulle was that candidate – he enjoyed a substantial support base in metropolitan France gained due to his efforts to rally the Fighting French instead of collaborating with the Vichy regime. De Gaulle’s base of support included every major party, trade union and resistance organization in France. The activism of de Gaulle’s supporters did not go unnoticed by the British, who noted that “the de Gaullist correspondents had been more active in the press than those who supported General Giraud,” resulting in a perception that newspaper correspondents were disposed to take a view which favored the former.

In contrast to de Gaulle’s wide base of support, General Giraud struggled to establish a broad-based coalition. Giraud drew his strongest support from his fellow generals and senior officers in the army, but this once-powerful group lost influence after French military’s collapse in the face of German invasion. The ambiguous stance of General Giraud toward the Vichy government, combined with his lack of vision for France’s political future caused Giraud to be labeled “a compromise candidate.” In a conversation with American General Wilbur on January 23, 1943, General de Gaulle pointed out that General Giraud could not represent the people of France because he was voted into power by Nogues, Boisson and Chatel, all members of the Vichy government. President Roosevelt did not view the popularity of either general as a determining factor behind backing a post-war French leadership, as FDR did not believe in the continuity between the French North African command and a postwar French government.

Based on the belief that France could not exercise sovereignty before the war ended, the United States decided that the liberation of France should be a military objective and not a political one. Other factors also contributed to this view – the United States maintained plans to occupy France after its
The captured French General Giraud, during his daily walk. Germany, ca. 1940-41.
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liberation, and had already set up a school in Charlottesville for this purpose. In any case, the military approach to France’s liberation led to an American preference for General Giraud as the leader of the French resistance after the assassination of Admiral Darlan, the High Commissioner of France for North and West Africa. As a five-star general, Giraud enjoyed the support of the entire French military, while the French army in North Africa would not submit to de Gaulle’s command because of his two-star rank.11 Second, the United States remained wary of the political ambitions held by General de Gaulle, who disagreed with the American idea of a strictly military liberation campaign. The United States was not the only country that was wary of de Gaulle – Churchill had also expressed the view during a War Cabinet meeting on March 15, 1943 that de Gaulle had personal motives to have “the title-deeds of France in his pockets.”12 In contrast to de Gaulle, General Giraud represented a consensus candidate for the Americans and British – he agreed with President Roosevelt’s view that the most important thing to do was to “get on with the war” and would not let the conflicting political situation divert him from the urgent task of liberating French territory from enemy control.13

During his meeting with General de Gaulle on January 22, 1943, President Roosevelt expressed his view that there existed no irreconcilable differences between Giraud and de Gaulle. In hindsight, Roosevelt’s belief in the potential for reconciliation proved quite incorrect and idealistic – de Gaulle and Giraud could not bridge their differences in a number of critical areas. The administrative structure of the French resistance forces in North Africa was a key area of contention. General de Gaulle insisted that General Giraud should rally to the Fighting French, after which he could be appointed as a member of the French National Committee and command the forces. De Gaulle refused to compromise because he believed doing so would be “a disservice to France” because of Giraud’s cooperation with Vichy representatives.14 On the other hand, Giraud held a more flexible stance, even agreeing to a power-sharing agreement with de Gaulle.15 In the end, efforts at reconciliation failed; instead, General de Gaulle worked to assert his dominance in the power struggle by leveraging his position on the military committee that had jurisdiction over all the fighting forces.

A simple comparison of the background and beliefs of both Giraud and de Gaulle would have made clear the impossibility of reconciliation between the two generals. General Giraud, who was already sixty years old by the time World War II began, was a five-star general in the French Army. He
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was an authoritarian officer who believed in the military rank hierarchy. For example, Giraud informed Harold Macmillan, the British Resident-Minister in French North Africa, that he was confident of fruitful negotiations with de Gaulle since the latter served as a Colonel under his orders. In contrast, General de Gaulle positioned himself as an intellectual officer after labeling Giraud as a practical one. De Gaulle was never one to conform – as a junior officer he advocated the aggressive use of tanks, even though the French high command was opposed to the idea. He also criticized General Gamelin’s defensive strategy and advocated offensive tactics. After the war, de Gaulle placed the blame squarely on the highest ranks of the military for its failure to defend France against German invasion, instead of on the pre-war Republican government. All these views made de Gaulle unpopular with his superiors and peers in the army, a fact that did not appear to bother him in light of his rejection of the hierarchical structure of the military.

The Vichy government was another area of substantial disagreement between de Gaulle and Giraud. General de Gaulle maintained a deep-seated resentment for the Vichy administration. On June 18, 1940, de Gaulle aired his views over the BBC, accusing Marshall Petain of inadequately preparing France for war and for seeking an armistice with the Germans. While in exile in Britain, General de Gaulle spent his energies organizing the French Resistance to liberate France from Vichy control. In the aforementioned conversation with General Wilbur, de Gaulle declared that the Fighting French represented the true France and held the responsibility of liberating the nation from Petain, who had become a “pale shadow” of the national hero he had been in World War I. General de Gaulle’s strong views in opposition to the Vichy gained him the support of French political leaders ranging from the communists and socialists on the left to members of the Action Française on the right.

On the other hand, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Eden characterized Giraud as trying to balance between the Fighting French and the Vichy government, resulting in Giraud having “no position at all” with regard to the legitimacy of the Vichy government. Giraud recognized no need to challenge the legal order imposed by the Vichy government, even though it had incarcerated thousands of Jews in concentration camps with the passage of its anti-Semitic laws. A benefit of this ambiguous position was that Giraud could appeal to the officers under Petain who retained power within the French Imperial Council as well as to the members of the political elite in French North Africa who wanted a break from the Petainist past.
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without accepting a Gaullist future. When tasked with dismantling the Vichy legal system in North Africa, Giraud proceeded with such a lack of urgency as to incur the irritation of the British. General Giraud was outspoken in his opposition to the Axis powers, despite his ambiguous stance on the Vichy government. As a side note, the United States, like Giraud, showed tolerance towards the Vichy government – a stance which paralleled the American dislike of de Gaulle’s French National Committee. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, claimed that relations with the Vichy government yielded important benefits, such as the opportunity to avoid prolonged military resistance to the landings during Operation Torch.

For the United States, one idealistic belief led to another. President Roosevelt, in correspondence with Secretary of State Hull, outlined his plans for the French North Africa administration. Roosevelt quickly realized that General Giraud had no administrative ability, but at the same time, the French Army based in North Africa would not follow General de Gaulle’s orders. Speaking to General Giraud, President Roosevelt revealed plans to have him and General de Gaulle jointly handle the military situation in Africa by forming a three member “Committee for the Liberation of France” with a third leading civilian member. This plan seemed to represent an effective compromise agreement for leadership of postwar France, save for the fact that no suitable civilian could be found with a stature comparable to that of Giraud or de Gaulle.

President Roosevelt initially suggested Jean Monnet, but only because he had “kept his skirts clear of all political entanglements during the past two years” and would not oppose the American view that the liberation of France should above be a military objective. Cordell Hull exposed the bias in Roosevelt’s thinking in a respectful way, by reminding President Roosevelt that General Giraud’s membership on the British Purchasing Commission would “create doubts in a great many French minds.” Hull instead advocated Roger Cambon as for membership in the future French leadership tripartite, as someone with outstanding integrity and loyalty to all the “best elements” of France.

Roger Cambon appeared to be all things to all people. To the Americans, his father’s service in North Africa cemented his reputation in the region, while his impartial approach to French groups made him an ideal candidate for Roosevelt’s plans for the French North Africa administration. The British, during a War Cabinet meeting, further investigated Cambon’s political views and his leadership potential. Mr. Cambon had informed British
representatives that the rising Gaullism in the region had led to a credibility crisis for Giraud in Algiers. Despite holding this view, Cambon added that he had a bitter personal prejudice against de Gaulle and would say almost anything to discredit him. Indeed, Mr. Cambon’s personal enmity for de Gaulle may have persuaded the United States to push for Cambon’s membership on the proposed “Committee for the Liberation of France” as a tie-breaking counterbalance to de Gaulle’s influence.

As it turned out, sources close to Cambon informed Cordell Hull that Cambon had been retired for some years and would be unwilling to accept the responsibilities that President Roosevelt had in mind for him. Hence, the United States placed their hopes on Leger, who had a greater experience in administration and had proved himself a supporter of Roosevelt’s policies in France and North Africa. Secretary Hull proposed a plan to hand the eager Leger the role as chief civil administrator, with Cambon installed as the Cambon’s advisor. Leger and Cambon were known to have a close personal relationship, and the Roosevelt Administration viewed such a union as the perfect plan for succession of the French North Africa administration.

In contrast to the United States, the British adopted a far more balanced stance in the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The British, unlike the Americans, understood the continued influence of the French resistance in wartime France. Britain, given its geographical location and desire to maintain a close postwar relationship with France, feared being on the wrong side of a French postwar power struggle. This worry led the British to maintain a balanced stance throughout the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. In a meeting between Churchill and the War Cabinet on April 11, 1944, the British spelled out their policy towards the question of Giraud or de Gaulle: they would attempt in all their power to maintain friendly relations between the two generals. The British held this stance until the end of war, even after General de Gaulle had established complete dominance over the French resistance forces, abolished the role of Commander-in-Chief held by General Giraud, and offered Giraud the insignificant post of Inspector-General. The British plan had always been to strengthen the power of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) as a check to the de Gaulle’s power.

Before de Gaulle established complete dominance over the French military, the British had refused to support the narrow anti-de Gaulle stance adopted by the United States. Churchill and his government understood that de Gaulle enjoyed a strong reputation throughout France as the spirit
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of the Resistance. The British recognized that none of the other French leaders had “a prestige and position comparable with that held by General de Gaulle,” even though he had an attitude that made him difficult to work with. Hence, the British refused to pin all their hopes on Giraud despite the clear preference of their American allies for him.

There were many instances when events tested the balanced stance of the British. In the prelude to the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General de Gaulle recognized the importance of meeting General Giraud to develop a common platform for French Resistance, but was reluctant to do so under the auspices of an Allied forum. The British stepped in to show de Gaulle that they were committed to bridging the differences between de Gaulle and Roosevelt, taking pains to ensure that they would not be seen as dictating who should be the leader of the Fighting French movement. This approach appealed more to the senses of de Gaulle than the high-handed insistence of the United States that de Gaulle be present at the conference or pushed out of the running for leadership of the French North Africa administration. The British communicated the same message, but with their balanced stance they succeeded in encouraging de Gaulle to attend the Casablanca Conference. In another incident, General Eisenhower, for the purpose of coordinating military operations with the French Army based in North Africa, met with both generals on 19th June 1943 and insisted that the control of the French forces remain in the hands of Giraud. Although Eisenhower tried to deliver this message gently, his point angered General de Gaulle, who viewed Eisenhower’s demand as a breach of French sovereignty. Consistent with their balanced stance, the British chose to delay further discussions on this issue until the FCNL had reacted to Eisenhower’s statement.

Who did the British prefer? This question can only be answered by peeling away the layers built up by their balanced stance and looking at the heart of their French policy. In a meeting on April 11, 1944, the British War Cabinet investigated the fundamentals of their policy on Giraud versus de Gaulle, concluding that they opposed General de Gaulle in full command of the French military. The British preferred to place General Giraud in charge of military affairs, believing that he had showed himself to be adaptable to persuasion, logic, and influence. Thus, the British decided that they would allow General de Gaulle to remain the joint President (with General Giraud) of the FCNL, so long as he did not gain lone command of the army.

Given that the British shared a dislike of General de Gaulle with the American administration, the reasons the British did not part with de Gaulle
present an interesting example of wartime pragmatism. The British War Cabinet meeting held on May 23, 1943 involved an extensive discussion of British policy vis-à-vis General de Gaulle. First, British sources at the time indicated the existence of 80,000 Fighting French troops positioned in different parts of the world, a fact which complicated a break with de Gaulle because of the importance of these forces to British operations in French Equatorial Africa. Second, French Trade Unionists feared the increasing influence of the United States. The British, as an outgrowth of their fear of supporting the losing side in the wartime struggle to control the postwar French government, lent their support to the Fighting French because of the loyalty the resistance group commanded among the French trade unions and working class. In addition, the British believed that if they sided with Roosevelt and broke with de Gaulle, many Frenchmen opposed to de Gaulle would rally behind him as a show of national pride. This situation could have reinforced de Gaulle as the symbol of the Republic, backfiring on the potential plans of the British to isolate him. Moreover, if the British broke with General de Gaulle, their actions would be interpreted in the court of public opinion as a capitulation to the United States and a signal of British diplomatic weakness. The fact that de Gaulle sat in exile in London proved an additional complication to the British government’s ability to break with the Fighting French, as such a move would likely have harmed British credibility with other wartime allies. Although the United States did not allow the British to sway its stance on Giraud versus de Gaulle, the British did on many occasions weigh the American stance before setting its policy vis-à-vis the French Resistance. While the British were balanced in their support of de Gaulle and Giraud, the Americans were quite narrow-minded in their insistence on Giraud as their preferred leader of the FCNL. Little did the Americans expect that in the final power struggle, their narrow-minded support for Giraud would backfire against their preferred candidate and cause him to lose ground against de Gaulle.

General Giraud despite, or perhaps because of his military experience, was a malleable character whose beliefs could be easily influenced. Roosevelt and the British appreciated the pliability of Giraud; they realized that despite General Giraud’s status as a political neophyte, he “showed himself to be adaptable to persuasion, logic and influence.” Stemming from this belief in Giraud’s flexibility, the British trusted that it would be easy to alter Giraud’s ambiguous attitude toward the Vichy government, a stance which de Gaulle exploited in order to win the support of the French people against Giraud.
General Charles de Gaulle shaking the hand of General Henri Giraud in front of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Casablanca Conference (January 14, 1943)
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Roosevelt utilized General Giraud’s malleability in order to convince him of American plans for the French North Africa administration. FDR extended Giraud an invitation to the President’s villa for a discussion on January 17, 1943 of the American vision of postwar France. Although Giraud “habitually shied away” when a foreigner discussed the internal politics of France, Roosevelt’s stature as the President of the United States dissipated Giraud’s ego and convinced him to adopt Roosevelt’s judgment that the French people had to wait until the end of the war to exercise their sovereign rights. Convinced by Roosevelt’s view that the liberation of France should be a military objective, Giraud stated his belief that the most important and urgent goal of the French Resistance was to “get on with the war.” When Giraud shared his plans for French North Africa with Catroux, the General emphasized the primary goal of the proposed FCNL: to wage war and attain victory against the Axis powers. General Giraud maintained that complications of war with the Axis made it impossible to have two French commanders in charge, and recommended himself for leadership because he had lived in France more recently than General de Gaulle and was thus more familiar with the situation in the country.

The malleability of General Giraud’s beliefs made him the ideal candidate in Roosevelt’s eyes to lead the French forces in North Africa during the war. However, in molding Giraud into an ideal leader, Roosevelt caused him to be less capable of competing with de Gaulle for leadership of the French forces. Even barring Roosevelt’s influence, Giraud did not possess a strong, coherent vision of the postwar political situation in France. The only aspect of the Vichy government that Giraud felt strongly enough to condemn was its ties with the Axis powers. By convincing Giraud that the liberation of France should only be a military objective, Roosevelt painted in General Giraud’s an idealized notion of a quick liberation and transition to political stability. However, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud in convincing him of the military nature of French liberation caused Giraud not to develop a coherent vision for the political future of postwar France, a great weakness for him in the power struggle with de Gaulle.

This gaping weakness was exploited by General de Gaulle in his political maneuvers against General Giraud. By consistently proclaiming his goal of overthrowing the Vichy government, de Gaulle rallied support from communists and socialists on the left and members of the Action Francaise on the right. By building a strong political coalition, de Gaulle wiped out the support base of his opponent Giraud, who ended up with “no effective
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organization of loyal followers within France itself.” In other words, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud left the American’s as his most influential and loyal supporters.

Besides molding General Giraud’s views of French liberation in a manner that put him at a disadvantage to General de Gaulle, the narrow-minded stance of the United States also served to increase de Gaulle’s popularity. The British, understood the negative feelings among the French that arose from the US support for Giraud. In a meeting between Churchill and the War Cabinet on May 23, 1943, six months before Giraud lost his position as co-President of the FCNL, the French Minister of Labor and National Service informed the British that the Trade Unionists had been showing “considerable fear of growing United States influence.” Although the unionists did not fully support General de Gaulle, the Fighting French movement enjoyed strong support among the French working class as the strongest resistance force. Hence, the negative perceptions that grew out of American support for Giraud hurt his reputation in France against the wily de Gaulle.

By June 1943, the British concluded that the American reputation in France stood at an all-time low. Churchill and his government attributed the unpopularity of the United States to their strong belief that the liberation of France should be a purely military objective, despite lacking American knowledge of domestic French politics. Roosevelt’s open anger at de Gaulle for the General’s expansion of the committee which presided over the administration of French North Africa only exacerbated tensions. The British linked the plummeting reputation of the United States in France to the rise in popularity of de Gaulle, and refused to break their relations with the General for fear of damaging their own reputation in France.

In July 1943, the British War Cabinet discussed another development in the struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The United States government had been accused of leaking a public statement to the press in their attempt to break up the FCNL and remove General de Gaulle from power. The public statement revealed confidential information regarding Britain’s stance on the struggle between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. Churchill sent the secret document to Washington as a gesture of goodwill for the reference of Roosevelt, and was quite perturbed at the release of the document. The British government feared the leaked document would harm their relationship with the FCNL, especially at a time when the authority of the committee was increasing daily. This action by the United States ran the risk, the British believed, of further “strengthening de Gaulle’s position at the expense of the
Committee,” in particular because the United States suffered a declining reputation in France.

The traditional historiography of Giraud’s marginalization contends that de Gaulle’s vision for a postwar French government, combined with his strong anti-Vichy stance, allowed de Gaulle to outmaneuver his Giraud’s narrow focus on a military liberation. But the United States in fact holds responsibility for shaping Giraud’s narrow focus on the military aspects of liberation. Furthermore, the declining wartime reputation of the United States in France caused American support for Giraud to become a political liability in his power struggle with General de Gaulle. Despite the consistent support of the President Roosevelt for General Giraud, the American press often challenged the narrow approach of the Roosevelt Administration to France’s political future. The July 1943 issue of LIFE magazine features an article which discusses the pro-Giraud stance adopted by Roosevelt and the United States government on the leadership of the French Resistance in North Africa. The editors of the magazine believed that the United States was not “acting in its best interests” by supporting Giraud against de Gaulle. LIFE’s editorial staff argued that while General Giraud should earn the respect of the United States for his escape from German territory, Roosevelt’s insistence that the liberation of France should be a military pursuit was naïve because of the inevitable political implications of liberation. As a result of this insistence, the article argues, Roosevelt and the State Department based their policy on France on Roosevelt’s dislike for de Gaulle. Roosevelt it seems overlooked one key fact: millions of Frenchmen and women “never stopped resisting the Germans.” This fact cemented de Gaulle’s popularity among the French people who disliked the Nazi-backed Vichy government. Thus, the narrow support of the United States for General Giraud, who had in fact never enjoyed a wide following in France or North Africa, caused the General’s downfall and the accompanying failure of US policy regarding France’s postwar leadership.

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5 Public Record Office (PRO), CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 June 1943.
7 PRO, CAB/65/34/36, W.M. (43) 82nd Meeting, 7 Jun 1943.
12 PRO, CAB/192/2, W.M. (43) 40th Meeting, 15 Mar 1943.
14 PRO, CAB/65/37/2, Telescope No. 87, 17 Jan 1943.
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26 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
28 PRO, CAB/65/42/5, W.M. (44) 47th Meeting, 11 Apr 1944.
29 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (42) 91st Meeting, 1 Jul 1943.
30 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
31 PRO, CAB/65/37/2, W.M. (43) 9th Meeting, 18 Jan 1943.
32 PRO, CAB/65/37/3, W.M. (43) 11th Meeting, 19 Jan 1943.
33 PRO, CAB/65/38/15, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
34 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
35 FRUS, Conferences at Washington, 1941 – 1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 655: Churchill had proposed that the French provisional regime be left under the leadership of de Gaulle, but Roosevelt would have none of that.
36 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
42 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
43 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
44 PRO, CAB/65/35/9, W.M. (43) 99th Meeting, 14 Jul 1943.
One night in January, 1935, the curtain closed on the dark stage of the Bolshoi Theater as Solomon Mikhoels and his Moscow State Yiddish Theater finished a performance for a gala event. It was a night of optimism and triumph for the proponents of the new, revolutionary, Bolshevik-approved, Soviet Yiddish culture. Stalin himself led a standing ovation for Mikhoels.¹ No one in that theater could have guessed that by 1949, Stalin would have murdered the actors in the troupe and Hitler would have murdered most of the Jews in the audience.

Both the immense popularity of Mikhoels and his murder by Stalin in 1948 were emblematic of the extreme historical circumstances that affected Soviet Jewry from 1917 onwards. Modern Soviet Jewish identity, which is fundamentally national with few religious or cultural elements, is a product of these extraordinary pressures.

In order to understand how a radically modified identity can be salient for Soviet Jews, it is important to recognize that Judaism has been transformed over time as new categories have been applied to it. “Religion” and “nationality” are themselves modern concepts that did not figure in Jewish identity for thousands of years. Religion itself, of course, is ancient but it was not separated from other aspects of life that are considered “secular” or “national” until modernity. “Judaism developed in the ancient Near East at a time when no differentiation was made between religion and ethnicity. The biblical account of the founding of Judaism is simultaneously an account of the genesis of the Jewish people.”³ However, the religious and national elements of Jewish identity have been reconfigured over time in response to historical circumstances.

Today, Western European and American Jews define themselves primarily in terms of religion, de-emphasizing the national elements of Judaism that originated in biblical times. This development is closely linked to the strong assimilatory forces that have affected Jews in these communities. Jews who have culturally assimilated to their country of residence do not wish to have their loyalty and patriotism called into question because of their...
identification with a foreign national group. This occurred, for instance, during the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the nineteenth century in France, when Anti-Semitism led to the conviction of a Jewish artillery captain for treason. In order to facilitate full cultural and national assimilation, Western European and American Jewish identity adopted its religious focus, leaving the realm of the national to the host country.

In the Soviet Union, the historical circumstances were different than those in Western Europe and therefore the resultant Jewish identity was different as well. Like the Western European and American identity, the Soviet concept of Jewish nationality is distinctly modern. Before 1917, assimilation was less pervasive amongst the Jews of Eastern Europe, many of whom continued to live in isolated communities until the Russian Revolution. When the Bolsheviks came to power, Soviet Jews were pressured to de-emphasize not the national elements of their identity, but rather its religious aspects. After the Russian Revolution, Jewish identity underwent a process of drastic transformation. It was destroyed and then reinvented in a new national form, and eventually the new form was stripped of its cultural content. Since the USSR was an atheist state, religious aspects of Judaism were strongly discouraged and Jews were instead recognized as one of many Soviet nationalities. Religious Jewish identity was suppressed in favor of Soviet Yiddish culture, which was then destroyed after World War II on Stalin’s orders. Soviet Jews were left with an extremely limited knowledge of Jewish religion or culture, but they continued to be identified as Jews by nationality through their official documents and they consistently affirmed their own Jewish identity in the national sense, as a minority group with a common ancestry. When immigrants like my mother, Elizabeth Vinogradov, left the fallen Soviet Union and came to the U.S. in the early 1990s, they continued to view the Jewish people as a nationality or an ethnic group. Historical circumstances and processes shaped Soviet Jewish identity, ultimately resulting in an identity with strong national elements, but few cultural or religious ones.

Soviet nationality policy in general, not only towards the Jews, is an intricate subject. Rogers Brubaker has argued that “The Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized the existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry. It codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship.” In other words, the state and the nation were separate entities in the USSR. Nationalities were encouraged to function on a sub-state level; the Soviet Union was not unified by, or created
Solomon Mikhoels playing King Lear in a production by the Moscow State Yiddish Theatre, Moscow, 1934.
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for, any one nationality. Instead, the USSR was made up of fifteen Union Republics that were sovereign according to the constitution, if not entirely so in practice. Each republic was named after a different nationality within the USSR.

It certainly appears on the surface irrational for the Soviet government to have institutionalized sub-state national groups, some even with their own territories, as they could potentially have detracted from the central power of the state. While it is impossible to determine the exact reasoning behind these policies, there are several plausible explanations that can be considered. Brubaker suggests that multi-ethnic nationality policy was unintended by Soviet officials, who created it haphazardly and did not expect it to last as long as it did.

It was thus through an irony of history, through the unintended consequences of a variety of ad hoc regime policies, that nationality became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly internationalist, supranationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state.

Another important factor is that multi-nationality was a political reality for the Bolsheviks, who inherited it from the Russian empire when they came to power. The territory that they found themselves controlling was the home of many ethnic minorities, some of whom were calling for cultural and political autonomy or even independence after the revolution. The new government was forced to take these nationalistic demands into account.

Nationality policy, therefore, may have been a way to pacify discontented ethnic minorities, while simultaneously working towards their eventual assimilation into communist Soviet society; “the passing of ethnic discontent would result in the demystification of ethnic groups and their ultimate fusion under communism.” In this view, the government was promoting diversity only to eventually attain unity. I am, however, critical of this interpretation because it seems unlikely that nationality policy was only a means to an end of fusion. If this was the case, why did the Soviet state promote ideas about national difference so actively and consistently, and why was national identification made compulsory through the passport system?

There is another explanation of Soviet nationality policy that is more compelling: institutionalized nationality appealed to the government because it was a form of social control. It was a chance to reshape national identities in accordance with Soviet principles. The government could infuse identities with satisfactory content, or drain any unacceptable content. Soviet nationality “policies were intended…to harness, contain, channel,
and control the potentially disruptive political expression of nationality by creating national-territorial administrative structures and by cultivating, co-opting, and (when they threatened to get out of line) repressing national elites.” In this way, the power of various national groups could be overseen by the state.

These explanations of Soviet nationality policy in general still do not explain why Jews specifically were recognized as a Soviet nationality. Additionally, why did the Soviet state create and encourage national Yiddish culture? One factor was the practical necessity and convenience of bringing Soviet ideas to the not-yet-acculturated Yiddish-speaking masses. The promotion of Yiddish culture and the recognition of Jews as a nationality can be seen as a “[concession] made in the face of the obvious lack of support for Bolshevism among the Jewish masses and the need to work among them in Yiddish if they were to be won over.” If this was the state’s goal, it was successfully achieved. Many Jews became loyal Soviet citizens in the 1920s and 1930s, and formed a large part of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The new Jewish identity, however, was more than a means for advancing Bolshevik propaganda among the Jewish population. It was also the lesser of two evils in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, as it served as a substitute for Hebrew culture. “The idea was to create a new Jewish culture and a Soviet Jewish nationality, one which would be secular, socialist, and Yiddish. This nationality would have nothing in common with the religious, Hebraist, Zionist, bourgeois Jews in capitalist countries.” The government wanted Soviet Jews to take on a new identity that would divorce them from the rest of world Jewry and align them more closely with the USSR in terms of ideology. Yet, at the same time, Soviet officials probably hoped that the new Yiddish-centered identity would gain international support for the new Soviet state from Yiddish speakers, who were all over the world after the great migration of Jews from Eastern Europe.

The new national identity was also meant to integrate Jews into the Soviet system. It was a way of creating national roots for the cosmopolitan Jew, a rootless foreigner. Therefore, like Zionism, these policies were intended to normalize the Jewish people, at least with respect to other Soviet nationalities. To this end, the government backed a campaign to turn 400,000 urban Jews into farmers since it believed Jews were too concentrated at the top of the social pyramid and that some had to be moved to the bottom. This project eventually became the Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan, a national territory created for the Jews by the Soviet state. This approach was meant
to solve the problem of the abnormal Jews by making them like Ukrainians, Georgians, and other territorial Soviet nationalities. “Like Zionists, who needed territory in which to incubate a Hebrew nation in Palestine, Soviet Jewish activists fought to establish Jewish agricultural colonies, Jewish city councils, and eventually an entire Jewish region.”16 In practice, however, the Jewish Autonomous Region turned out to be essentially a legal fiction. On paper the Jews had a territory, but in reality it was only a formality and so far to the east, near the border with China, that few Jews moved there.

Although the Jewish territory was merely a formality, the new national identity was not. It was an effective means for organizing Jewish society that had a lasting impact on the nature of Judaism in the Soviet Union. By condemning certain aspects of Jewish practice and actively promoting others, the Soviet government created definitions of “nation” and “religion” for the Jews. The Soviets split Jewish identity into its components and determined that certain aspects, such as the Yiddish language, were “national” and therefore could play a role in Soviet multiethnic policy, while others were religious and had to be eliminated. What criteria did Soviet officials use to make these decisions? How did they judge whether certain elements of the identity posed a threat to the Soviet state? Actually, they were informed in their decisions by the Jewish sections of the Communist Party, who “argued to a puzzled party leadership that Hebrew must be a ‘bourgeois’ language because it was used almost exclusively by the class enemy, rabbis and Zionists. Yiddish, on the other hand, was the language commonly spoken by the Jewish workers, and hence was a ‘proletarian’ language.”17

Many of these Jewish party members became part of the Soviet Yiddish intelligentsia, a small group of writers, activists, publishers, critics, and scholars who played the largest role in the redefinition of Jewish identity.18 The intelligentsia was created and supported by the Soviet government, which gave the group of Jewish public figures “conditional access to power to remake the ethnic group in the state’s own image.”19 With the blessing of the state, the intelligentsia led the way in the 1920s and 1930s, an era of Yiddish cultural production in areas such as literature and theater. The development of secular Jewish nationalism through Yiddish culture was seen as a contribution to Soviet socialism in this period, not an attempt to undermine it.20 Therefore, the intelligentsia did not feel any conflict between their loyalty to the Soviet state and their desire to build a Jewish nation.

The close association of the Yiddish intelligentsia with the Soviet government raises questions about which group was truly in control of the
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transformation of Jewish identity. Which historical actors took the initiative in bringing about the high degree of acculturation that occurred? Was it Soviet officials or the Jews themselves who were eager to rid themselves of the religious content of their Judaism? In other words, the creation of this new identity highlights tensions between self-definition and definition by others. To an extent, Soviet Jews allowed themselves to be defined externally by a dominant group; the destruction and recreation of their identity was initiated through government policy rather than a grassroots movement among the Jews themselves. Nevertheless, the members of the Jewish intelligentsia were not merely tools of the state. Although they promoted the spread of Bolshevik ideology in Yiddish with the state’s backing, they also had a significant amount of agency. “The Soviet Yiddish intelligentsia served as intermediaries, envisioning the future of Jewish culture and society for the state and for Jews, and using state power to realize those visions.”

This was not simply a one-sided process based on the state using the intelligentsia to destroy and create Jewish identities. Rather, the intelligentsia also used the power of the Soviet state to realize their goals for the modernization of the Jewish people. Both sides used each other, as the Jewish intelligentsia worked with the Soviet government towards the same goals. The new identity was not entirely forced on the Jews from the outside but was welcomed by Jewish public figures.

The new national identity was embraced not only by the small group that made up the intelligentsia, but also by many Jews in the former Pale of Settlement who saw it as a chance to partake in the wider world. They acculturated quickly into Soviet life, leaving the shtetls for the big cities. “No other ethnic group was as good at being Soviet, and no other ethnic group was as keen on abandoning its language, rituals, and traditional areas of settlement.” Jews who knew Yiddish preferred that their children learn Russian, which they saw as the language of opportunity. Cultural production in Yiddish continued, but once the Jews were redefined as a Soviet nationality they felt that more doors were open to those who were willing to acculturate. “Linguistic and cultural modernization and assimilation were happening ‘from the bottom up’ without any outside interference from Jewish intellectuals or the Soviet state.” Therefore, Soviet Jewish culture was neither created nor destroyed solely by the non-Jewish state. The Jews themselves participated in both the destruction of the old identity through assimilation and the construction of the new one. The process of redefinition was both external and internal. In an essay on Soviet Jewish identity, Aleksander Voronel
laments the loss of “tradition, language, unique forms of community life, understanding of earlier generations, [and] identity with Jews all over the world” that resulted from the destruction of the old identity. He writes that “it would be unfair to blame the Soviet government for these losses. The rupture with age-old traditions of Jewry was to a great extent the fault of the older generation of Jews themselves.”

The dichotomy of self-definition vs. definition by others is, however, too simplistic to describe what happened. There were some Jewish groups who wanted to redefine themselves and reduce the influence of religion, whether because they were faithful believers in communism or because they saw this as a way of escaping discrimination based on religion. Yet there were other Jews who were traditionalists and played no role in the actions of the intelligentsia. Jews did not uniformly agree on a new definition of themselves, nor did they uniformly accept a definition created by outsiders. This was, at least, the situation in the early years of Bolshevik rule, the 1920s and 1930s. Later on, even the intelligentsia lost control of the process of redefinition, which was taken over by non-Jews in the Communist party and hence became an entirely externally driven process.

By the 1930s, nationality had become a major aspect of an individual’s legal status in the USSR. It was recorded in the majority of documents, internal and external, including passports and numerous bureaucratic forms. National identification had become a mandatory and pervasive aspect of everyday life. The Jews were locked into their new identity in a way that they probably had not expected. According to my mother,

“The Jews were tricked by Soviet policies of nationality. In tsarist Russia, nationality did not exist but religion did and Jews thought they were oppressed because they practiced their religion. But time showed that that was not the case; even in tsarist Russia on the surface they were hated for their religion but underneath that there was always hatred because of their national identity. People would say that Jews were manipulative, stubborn, and greedy, none of which had anything to do with their religion.”

The belief that the Jews were always a nationality underneath a surface of religion is very interesting. It indicates that after the Jewish national identity was established, it seemed to some Soviet Jews almost like it had always existed. Some Soviet Jews saw it as somehow deeper than religious identity. Religion was something that the Jews did, but national identity was something that the
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Jews were. The route back to the old identity was closed.

Once the Soviet government had established a high degree of control over the Jews as a nationality, there was no longer any need to bother with the intelligentsia and meaningful cultural production. Therefore, after World War II, Stalin decided to systematically destroy Soviet Yiddish culture by abolishing its institutions and murdering its leaders. All Yiddish schools were closed, while Yiddish publications and theatrical productions were strongly discouraged. There was the official campaign against rootless cosmopolitans, the arrest of Yiddish cultural figures such as writers and actors, and the infamous Doctors’ Plot, where most of the accused were Jews. The murder of Mikhoels in 1948 was only the tip of the iceberg. Most major Jewish figures who did not die during World War II and the Holocaust were killed in the Great Purges of 1936-9 and the anti-Semitic purges of 1948-52.

With the elimination of Jewish institutions, Jews transitioned from being members of a community to individual actors within Soviet society. What effect did this have on their identity? It led to their further immersion in Russian culture, the emptying of Jewish content from their identity, and their increased focus on their persecution as Jews as a substitute for a religious or cultural identity. What was once a physical, interactive community became an invisible, almost imagined community of people who never met as a group or shared any religious or cultural experiences but nevertheless felt connected in some way. For instance, my mother felt that her Jewish identity connected her to famous Jewish scientists and scholars: “My only solace was the existence of these famous and bright Jewish people who showed me that to be a Jew is not such a bad thing and that I was not alone.”

Thus, in the years after the Purges, Jewish identity became externally defined and passive. The USSR officially recognized the Jews as a national group whose membership was inherited. Therefore, Soviet Jews did not believe one has to do anything to create or maintain a Jewish identity. It was considered an inescapable fact of life that is recorded in one’s documents at birth. The passive identity is related to the absence of choice that came to be perceived by Jews after the destruction of Yiddish culture. “The state kept asking its citizens about their nationality, and they kept answering, over and over again—first according to their self-perception or self-interest and then according to their blood (whether they liked it or not).” For later generations, the perception of choice was entirely destroyed. Jews were forced to repeatedly and passively affirm the label they had been given. When my mother wanted to register her son in a nursery or even get a library card, she
had to fill out a form and item number five always asked for her nationality. Because of the lack of choice, “western Jews have tended to see Soviet Jews as tragic subjects or repressed, silenced objects.” Shneer suggests that this impression is the result of viewing Soviet Jewish history through the lens of hindsight, which is colored by the Purges. This passive identity was all that was left to the Jews after the destruction of Yiddish culture. Jewish identity became a label lacking religious or cultural content. How could Soviet Jews be an “ethnocultural nation” if they hardly knew any substantial Jewish culture? My mother told me, “I didn’t know what Chanukah was, but I knew I was Jewish. I always knew I was different. The only holidays I knew were Passover and Yom Kippur. I didn’t know that Jews should not mix meat and milk. I only knew they could not eat pork.” How could such patchy, incomplete knowledge of Jewish traditions serve as a foundation for a national group? Did Soviet Jews really have anything in common other than ancestry?

There have been some attempts by scholars to prove that there actually was a significant amount of content in the seemingly empty identity. For instance, Shneer argues that Soviet Jewish culture could not possibly rid itself Jewish content because the cultural symbols, myths, and archetypes that were used to create the new ethnic identity already had Jewish meanings that could not be erased. The Soviet state and the intelligentsia could not have created the new culture from nothing; they built it on a basis of Jewish life that already existed. However, this argument pertains mainly to the period of cultural production in the 1920s and 1930s. Jewish myths and archetypes were used in the literature and plays of this period, but they were not really perpetuated after these formats were destroyed.

Voronel also tries to find some communal elements that can be used to justify the existence of Jewish identity as more than an empty label. He points to “characteristic traits and inter-relational principles creating a psychological community” and to a “literary heritage.” Yet how many Soviet Jews really had an in-depth knowledge of Jewish literature? Their knowledge was limited to certain authors, such as Sholem Aleichem, while biblical and rabbinical literature was completely ignored.

That leaves the perception of certain distinguishing national traits, which my mother also mentioned. She said, “Although Jews lost many of their traditions, they tried to maintain certain national characteristic. For instance, in the upbringing of their children they always put education first. There were more bookish types among the Jews than among the population
Map displaying the locations of different ethnic groups recognized in the Soviet Union in 1974
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in general.” While it is doubtful that such group tendencies are enough to maintain a cultural community, what is certain is that Jews nevertheless felt very strongly connected to their identity and to each other through a sense of common national origin and national destiny. “They are no longer a community of faith as they are one of fate.”

In spite of its lack of religious or cultural content, the identity proved durable and salient even after the disappearance of Yiddish, the national language. “There was a concerted effort on the part of the intelligentsia to make Yiddish the defining feature of Soviet Jewishness. After all, without language what would define Jews in a socialist, atheist, modern world?” Shneer raises this question but does not answer it. His focus is on the rise of Yiddish as a cultural medium rather than on Soviet Jewish identity post-Yiddish culture, post-World War II, post-Purges. In the sober light of this later period, the one cohesive force that came to the forefront of Soviet Jewish identity was anti-Semitism. At a time when Soviet Jews had very few real characteristics to distinguish them from the general population, anti-Semitism filled that role and preserved their group consciousness.

Government policy regarding anti-Semitism changed dramatically over time. Initially, in the 1920s, the Communist Party disapproved of anti-Semitism and even took initiatives to combat it. Populist anti-Semitism was connected to a capitalistic way of thinking. However, after the Purges and WWII, the government’s policies changed. The reasons for this complete reversal are unclear, though it was probably related to the creation of Israel as a Jewish state. Soviet officials discovered that “the Jews as a Soviet nationality were now an ethnic Diaspora potentially loyal to a hostile foreign state… presumed to be beholden to an external homeland and thus irredeemably alien.” The government no longer saw any reason to protect a group of people who were perceived essentially as foreigners.

Full assimilation became impossible for Jews because of official anti-Semitic campaigns. Thus, the Jews acculturated without assimilating. They admired Russian culture, but could never feel that it fully belonged to them; it was seen as a culture created by, and for, another ethnic group. The most pervasive emotion associated with Jewish identity in the USSR was alienation. This led to a negative definition of identity that was based on what Jews were not, namely Russian, rather than what they were. For some Soviet Jews, identity confusion resulted from the conflict between their Russian cultural immersion and their Jewish national label. For instance, Soviet Jewish political activist Larisa Bogoraz wrote, “Unfortunately, I do not
feel like a Jew…I am accustomed to the color, smell, rustle of the Russian landscape, as I am to the Russian language, the rhythm of Russian poetry…And nevertheless, no, I am not Russian. I am a stranger today in this land.”  

Bogoraz later resolved this problem by converting to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Anti-Semitism and inescapable, meticulously documented nationality combined to make life difficult for Soviet Jews after WWII. For instance, various “affirmative action” programs were established that legitimized discrimination against Jews while favoring other ethnic minorities. “In some contexts, notably admission to higher education and application for certain types of employment, legal nationality significantly shaped life chances, both negatively (especially for Jews) and positively (for ‘titular’ nationalities in the non-Russian republics, who benefited from mainly tacit ‘affirmative action’ or preferential treatment policies).”

Mandatory ethnic identification made it difficult for Jews to avoid discrimination, but is an ethnic Jewish identity inherently anti-Semitic? Not necessarily. The initial creation of this identity was not perceived that way. It divided the community and pitted modernity against tradition rather than anti-Semites against Jews. In the 1920s and 1930s, it was the Jewish intelligentsia rather than the Soviet government that conducted anti-Judaism campaigns. Members of the intelligentsia participated in the abolishment of traditional Jewish institutions such as synagogues and Jewish schools. Proponents of the new identity were against religion and traditional ways of life, but they were not necessarily anti-Semites. Many of them were Jews themselves who wanted to perpetuate Jewish life in a different way.

However, Jewish ethnic identity later became a convenient form for perpetuating anti-Semitic stereotypes, and for destroying the religious and cultural content of Judaism. After the Holocaust, it was associated with Hitler and his particularly virulent form of racial anti-Semitism. Soviet Jews “may never have been to a synagogue, seen a menorah, heard Yiddish or Hebrew, tasted gefilte fish, or indeed met their grandparents. But they knew that they were Jews in the Soviet sense, which was also—in essence—the Nazi sense. They were Jews by blood.” From the Soviet point of view, the Holocaust confirmed that the Jews are a race or ethnic group. After all, Hitler exterminated Jews because of their family trees, not because they expressed religiosity. However, the association of Jewish ethnicity with Hitler discredits Soviet ethnic identity from the point of view of American Jews. They do not want to preserve an identity that was affirmed consistently by
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anti-Semites. Why should Jews allow themselves to be defined ethnically by outsiders when they can define themselves religiously and culturally? On the other hand, when American Jews insist that Jewish immigrants from the former USSR abandon their ethnic Jewish identity and re-define themselves religiously, are they not asking these immigrants to let themselves be defined by others?

Anti-Semitism and mandatory national identification were enough to maintain Jewish identity in the Soviet Union even in the absence of religion, tradition, and culture. Does this mean that Soviet Jews need to be persecuted to know who they are? Can their identity persist in the absence of anti-Semitism and mandatory documentation? Soviet Jewish immigrants in the U.S. have shown that it can. Psychological studies of these immigrants have determined that when Jewish, Russian, and American identities are considered, the immigrants feel most strongly connected to the Jewish identity.\(^{41}\) Soviet Jewish immigrants also indicated that it is important to them that their children identify as Jewish, even if they do not observe Jewish traditions.\(^{42}\) They have pride in their identity, however “empty” it may be, and they want their children to perpetuate it. Self-identification is the most important aspect of Soviet Jewish identity in the U.S., which is ironic because in the USSR self-identification through choice was impossible.

Soviet immigrants have also preserved their own form of Jewish identity even in a context where they have the chance to redefine themselves. They continue to perceive the Jewish people as an ethnic group and do not consider religion essential to Jewish identity. In the same study cited above, “more than 93% of the participants mentioned nationality as a criterion [for considering themselves Jewish], and only 7% religion.”\(^{43}\) Many of the immigrants who identified as Jewish also indicated that they have no religion.\(^{44}\) In general, their identity continues to have little religious, cultural, or traditional content, though some have become religious or at least enhanced their knowledge of Jewish traditions.

American Jews have had a difficult time accepting the legitimacy of Soviet Jewish ethnic identity. They often consider Soviet Jews, who are immersed in Russian culture, to be more Russian than Jewish. “Soviet Jews are referred to as ‘Russians’ by Americans in the United States…However, ironically, Soviet Jews were not and could not be considered ‘Russian’ in the former Soviet Union.”\(^{45}\) In the USSR, they were constantly reminded that they were Jews. In the US, they are often excluded from the Jewish community. These problems stem from the differences between the social construction
of Jewish identity in the Soviet Union and America. In the 1970s, during the first wave of Soviet Jewish immigration to the U.S., observant American Jews reached out to immigrants in an attempt to bring them back into the religious fold but they were largely unsuccessful. Few synagogues were able to attract the immigrants to join.\textsuperscript{46} This led to feelings of disappointment and even resentment among American Jews towards the Soviets. “You could hear it on the streets, on the boardwalk, in the synagogues, in the stores: ‘Why did we fight to bring them here? Why did they want to come here? They’re not even Jews. They don’t want to be Jews.’”\textsuperscript{47} Soviet Jews do not understand what wanting to be a Jew means because wanting implies that they have a choice. They only understand being a Jew. Even those who wished at some point that they had been born Russian did not believe that this wish made them any less Jewish. Their identity is unquestionable and inescapable. It may be lacking in religious, cultural, and traditional content, but it has played such an omnipresent role in their lives that it should not be lightly dismissed. Besides, “passive identity can be transformed into active assertiveness, and some form can be filled with content.”\textsuperscript{48} If these immigrants are truly integrated into the Jewish community, it is likely that their identity will take on more religious and cultural elements rather than remaining solely national; it will eventually adapt itself to take into account factors other than Jewish ancestry and a common history of Anti-Semitism. There is a perception among American Jews that Soviet Jewish identity has been distorted by the USSR. This is undeniably true. It was transformed in accordance with the historical experience of Soviet Jews. This, however, does not make it less genuine than American Jewish identity, which has also been transformed. “Judaism has been enfeebled because its historic manifestations could not be squared with the dominant ideals of American society.”\textsuperscript{49} A new, modern Jewish identity has been created in the U.S., like in the Soviet Union, and in the course of its creation much Jewish culture has also been lost. In a way, American Jewish identity was also determined by others; it was shaped by the social pressure of acculturation exerted by the great American melting pot.

Like American and Western European Jewish identity, Soviet Jewish national identity is the product of historical processes resulting from interactions between Jews and non-Jews in the modern period. The redefinition of Jews as a national group was not entirely forced on them by the Soviet government; in many cases Jewish communities and their leaders welcomed it and contributed to its formation, especially in the early years of
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Bolshevik rule that saw the creation of Soviet Yiddish culture. After World War II Yiddish culture declined, but it had been created within a national form that persisted while emptied of its religious and cultural Jewish content. The label of the Jews as a nationality became a pervasive and constant factor in the lives of Soviet Jews in the years after World War II. They knew very little about Jewish religion and culture, but they continued to be identified as Jews by nationality through their official documents.

The view of the Jewish people as a nationality that Soviet Jews subscribe to, may conflict with the perceptions of American Jews, many of whom emigrated from the same territory earlier and have never experienced the USSR. American Jews have a primarily religious Jewish identity, while many of the Soviet immigrants consider themselves Jews without a religion. Confronted with both sets of categories, I struggled to determine whether the Jews are primarily a religion or a nation, but in reality they are not one or the other. Jewish identity is constructed and dynamic; it evolves through historical processes. Notions of Soviet Jewish ethnic identity as “not real” or “artificial” stem from a narrow approach to the question of identity. While it is true that the ethnic identity was created through historical circumstances, especially by Soviet nationality policy, what identity is there that was not somehow historically created? The creation of Soviet Jewish identity does not make it an illusion. To Soviet Jews, it is meaningful and legitimate.

There is no one solid Jewish identity running as an unbroken thread from antiquity to eternity. In this sense, the Jewish insistence on unchangeableness is a myth. It may be difficult to understand how such a changeable identity can be meaningful, but each version of Jewish identity is meaningful within the context of its own time and place. Ethnic Jewish identity made sense in the context of the USSR, though it is not in accordance with American Jewish experience. The situation of Soviet Jews developed differently from that of American Jews, but their identity is equally legitimate. It is possible to view the history of Soviet Jewish identity by emphasizing the earlier period of cultural production or the later decline and draining of content. The most remarkable aspect of Soviet Jewish identity, however, is its persistence. It has lasted through the transformations of the 1920s and 1930s, the era after the Purges, and even emigration out of the former USSR. The essential aspects of Soviet Jewish identity are its durability, its mutability, and its reality. The rest is commentary.
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2 Although the terms “national” and “ethnic” have distinct meanings in English, their meanings are very close to one another in Russian. Ethnic groups within the Soviet states were referred to as “nationalities”, though they clearly did not constitute sovereign nation-states in the sense that is implied by the English meaning of the word. To bypass any confusion or controversy over differences between the two terms, they will be used interchangeably in this paper.
4 Although the terms “national” and “ethnic” have distinct meanings in English, their meanings are very close to one another in Russian. Ethnic groups within the Soviet states were referred to as “nationalities”, though they clearly did not constitute sovereign nation-states in the sense that is implied by the English meaning of the word. To bypass any confusion or controversy over differences between the two terms, they will be used interchangeably in this paper.
7 Ibid., 53.
8 Ibid., 54.
12 Gitelman, “The Evolution of Jewish Culture and Identity in the Soviet Union,” 64
13 Ibid., 65
15 Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, 248
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18 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 4.
19 Ibid., 9.
20 Ibid. 10.
21 Ibid., 15.
22 Slezkine. The Jewish Century, 247.
23 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 18.
25 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 13.
26 Ibid., 2.
28 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 4.
29 Ibid., 3.
31 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 3.
34 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 8.
35 Slezkine. The Jewish Century, 297.
39 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture 1918-1930, 11.
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42 Ibid., 8.


44 Ibid., 4.


47 Ibid., 97.


Roman Banditry:
Scorning Senatorial Skullduggery in Sallust

Brady B. Lonegran

It is generally accepted that during both the Republican and Imperial eras (including the Pax Romana), banditry was commonplace throughout the known world.¹ Due to its prevalence outside of urban centers, contemporary writers regarded brigandage as an unremarkable natural phenomenon only warranting a cursory glance.² For this very reason, in his book *Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality* (1999), Grünewald argues that an empirical study on banditry is simply impossible.³ However, as MacMullen notes in his appendix on ‘Brigandage,’ the Latin term *latro* (or the Greek: *lestes*) was applied to men apart from the traditional bandit. For example, it included individual usurpers or challengers of legitimate Imperial power rather than bands of marauders from the ‘barbaric’ border-states.⁴ Grünewald takes this observation further in his work on bandits and emphasizes *latrones* and *lestai* as historical categories, which can be used to classify social realities. For him, the *latro* is a literary topos, an “artifact of the literary imagination.”⁵

‘Banditry,’ as viewed in Rome, was synonymous with the illegitimate exercise of personal power. As Shaw points out, in the stateless societies of Homeric Greece, banditry was an acceptable and even honorable occupation.⁶ However, the formation of ‘the state’ as an “institutionalized form of power” left little room for extralegal displays of authority as they acted as decentralizing forces that threatened the supremacy of the state.⁷ With this development, all forms of *latrocinium* or *lesteia* acquired their contemporary connotations, and we come to the discussion of the sanction or the legitimization of power.

The fundamental question we must ask in a discussion of banditry and its relation to other expressions of power is ‘who sanctions whom?’ In historical accounts and literary depictions, we have three primary manifestations of the exercise of violence (vis). We have *latrocinium* symbolized by the *latro*, rebellion characterized by the rebel, and war (*bellum*) personified by an enemy (*hostis*) of the state. Although there are certain criteria and qualifications that separate these categories, the difference is often arbitrary and comes down to the attitude and agenda of the author. With the inherent vagueness of the terminology, we see Roman authors use these classifications interchangeably according to the direction of their narratives. In short, it is often the ulterior...
motive of the author that dictates the characterization of ‘historical’ figures. The subject of the author and his relation to the representation of historical figures as ‘bandits’ bring us to a few of the underlying questions motivating this paper: Is Jugurtha a bandit? If not, who is he, and why does Sallust portray him in such a way? Before getting into these questions, it seems imperative that we discuss and analyze ‘the bandit,’ as a real life phenomenon and more importantly, as a literary and historical metaphor, exploited by moralizing writers of Republican and Imperial Rome. It seems essential to note that Shaw and Hobsbawm among others are largely responsible for establishing the foundation upon which Grünewald successfully elaborates, and it is through these three authors, whom I attempt to establish a methodological framework from which I can approach the question of Jugurtha. In addition to establishing the boundaries among these three primary manifestations of power, our treatment of Jugurtha also necessitates a discussion of client-kings in relation to Rome. Once we have established the context, we can then turn our attention to Jugurtha as he is portrayed in Sallust’s *The Jugurthine War.*

Before trying to understand what constitutes a bandit, it can be helpful to figure out what a bandit is not. In Roman legal terms, “[e]nemies [hostes] are those who have declared war on us or on whom we have declared war; all the rest are bandits [latrones] or plunderers [praedones].” Implicit in the definition is that the aggressor or the opposing party must be a “sovereign” state acknowledged by Rome. Apart from a recognized political entity, enemies must be able to fight a regular war (bellum) with Rome. Irregular warfare would then be anything inconsistent with conventional Roman military strategy and focused primarily on guerrilla tactics. With such a selective definition, tribal warfare, village conflict, urban unrest and any acts of aggression not preceded by a formal declaration of war cannot be distinguished from banditry. As a rule, Roman legal classification of enemies is very exclusive, and “[t]he terminological indecisiveness of the sources raises the question as to whether the juridical distinction between hostes and latrones really had any practical relevance.” Since both banditry and war pose a threat to the state, sometimes the only distinction between the two is whether or not they pose a significant threat to Roman authority. Although nebulous, this criterion shows how, through an escalation of hostilities, a resistance movement can become a war. There are three factors that transform an individual and his men from *latrones* into *hostes*: the size of his forces, the success of his operations and the respect of the opposition.
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brigandage and war. Thus, a foreign power could initiate a war against Rome and based on size, strategy and success, be considered a bandit-state incapable of legitimate warfare. With this in mind, the terms hostes and bellum become pretentious classifications meant to distinguish Rome from the rest of the world and hardly reflect the historical reality.

The term ‘rebel’ serves as a transition between latrones and hostes and implies that the aggressors are inhabitants of the Roman world. The most commonly recorded examples of rebels among Roman writers were the Isaurian and Cilician ‘bandits’ of the Taurus Mountains as well as the Celtiberians in Spain under Viriatus. Rebellions, generally caused by Roman expansion and the subsequent subjugation of native populations, often last until the success of Romanization. It is with rebels especially that we see a significant variance in the use of terminology. Part of this inconsistency arises from modern writers, who see Isaurian and Cilician banditry as an act of protest against the Roman order. Similarly, Shaw describes the increase in scale of the Cilician resistance as demonstrative of a shift from banditry to rebellion. Hopwood also notes that ‘bandits’ frequently functioned as the nucleus of any full-scale peasant rebellion. Furthermore, he argues that shepherds, whose transhumant style of living left them marginalized, were often assumed to be associated with bandits and may have played a similar role in regional resistance.

This association of shepherds and bandits with resistance movements is not an exceptional case. Rebels are often associated with or even called bandits, and there is considerable overlap between the attributes of both. As we will see, the two types are generally of ‘barbarian’ origin, resort to guerrilla warfare, exploit a superior knowledge of the terrain and have complex motivations. The nebulous nature of these definitions, which is largely the result of authorial motives, can be elaborated upon more easily once we have established the criteria and qualifications for our bandit.

In Organised Crime in Late Antiquity, Hopwood argues that bandits are not just the literary topoi described by Shaw. Instead, he asserts, “Bandits were more than an abstract category: their lives on the ground were brutal and short; they were men, however, with temporary aims, rather than long-term principled causes. In times of stability they were something that the political cadre could be drawn together to oppose; in times of transformation they were conspicuous symbols of that transformation.” Although Hopwood seems to posit this idea against Shaw’s primary aim, which is to demonstrate that what we have from ancient sources is merely
Jugurtha in chains before Sulla, illustration from *La conjuración de Catilina y la Guerra de Jugurta* (Madrid, 1772)
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a figurative representation of an ideal, the two ideas do not seem wholly incompatible. Shaw would agree with Hopwood that bandits did exist as more than an abstraction; but he would point out that these concrete bandits were so unremarkable that they did not warrant the attention of ancient sources, and that our sources only refer to bandits in terms of forces opposing Rome or in the context of political discord. Shaw even provides an additional explanation for why our sources are so lacking by describing his concept of ‘space.’ Claiming that bandits existed on the periphery of mainstream society, he allows for need and greed as the primary motivations for banditry and argues that bandit communities “tended to be characterized by an absence of all ‘higher’ civil modes of communication in writing or graphic symbols.” In short, ‘real’ bandits left no written record, so we can only speculate on their reality and have to accept our ‘historical’ and literary examples for what they are: metaphors. At the very least both Hopwood and Shaw would plausibly agree with Grünewald in saying that banditry was perpetrated by bands of disreputable folk out to make a buck at the tip of a sword.

The term latro originally meant mercenary but came to describe “any sort of extra-legal man of violence.” Roman legal definition distinguishes banditry from common theft by the former’s use of violence (vis), by its reliance upon a band (factio) and by its premeditated intention. The first criterion is consistent with the notion of an “economy of violence”, which consists of materials procured by way of violence or the threat of violence. Bandits were also distinct from other non-violent criminals. “They were interstitial characters, seen neither as persons with rights in civil law nor as enemies of the state but somewhere in between.” Somewhere between common criminals and hostes, bandits were prosecuted harshly and left without the right to an appeal. They were either burnt alive, crucified, impaled or thrown into the arena. Moreover, brigands were often killed immediately upon arrest. Interestingly enough, these same punishments were reserved for insurgents as well, further blurring the lines between the two categories.

By this point, we can tentatively define banditry as a premeditated act of opportunistic violence committed by groups of individuals. This classification leaves room for both the ‘real’ bandit and his literary representation, on which we should now focus our attention. However, before departing from reality, we can look at Shaw’s description of latrocinium, which applies to both types of banditry and provides an easy transition into the remainder of our discussion:

“Banditry is a form of personal power… This individual power, based on charisma, on appearance, on brute strength, and on the ties forged by way
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of personhood (kinship, friendship, or clientage), is probably one of the primal forms of power known to humans.”

This quote evokes images of typical Homeric heroes and is consistent with the depiction of banditry in the texts of Roman antiquity. As we will soon see, this exercise of personal power inherently poses a challenge to the sovereign state by creating a separate autonomous entity.

Although inconsistent with reality, Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘social bandit’ fits perfectly with the romanticized depictions of ancient authors and feed into the framework provided by Grünewald. Hobsbawm takes a Marxist interpretation, apparent in his discussion of the social origins of bandits:

“For the crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its ambiguity. He is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal roles of poverty, and establishes his freedom by means of the only resources within reach of the poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination.”

With this explanation, he stresses the bandit’s close connection to the poor. For our purposes, Hobsbawm is spot on in terms of the autonomy of the brigand, but as we will see later, bandits were drawn from all backgrounds. However, his definition remains consistent with a Marxist reading of the subject. Additionally, the ‘social bandit’ is motivated by a desire to counteract and avenge injustice and to regulate the interaction between the wealthy and the destitute so as to prevent the exploitation of the weak. He argues that bandits are “reformers, not revolutionaries”, but that they can act as the first phase in a progression towards revolution when their acts become associated with defiance against oppressive forces or when they themselves have been overcome by hope for a better future. In short, one can see how bandits could transition easily between robbery and revolution, as they become armed and mobilized.

To illustrate his points, Hobsbawm outlined nine basic criteria for his ‘social bandit,’ whom we will find as the prototype for Grünewald’s ‘noble’ bandit. “First, the noble robber begins his career of outlawry not by crime, but as the victim of injustice.”

Second, the social bandit is motivated to oppose inequality. Third, he is to provide for a redistribution of wealth by way of stealing from the wealthy for the betterment of the impoverished. Fourth, he never kills without justification. “Fifth, if he survives, he returns to his people as an honourable citizen and member of the community.”

Sixth, he enjoys the support of his community and often maintains a role as a local leader. Seventh, the ‘social bandit’ is invincible except in the case of betrayal. Eighth, he cannot be seen or beaten. Ninth, he only challenges the
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authority of the local tyrant, while the king or emperor is the embodiment of justice. The mythical account of Robin Hood is the basis for Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit’ and is surprisingly consistent with the ‘noble’ bandits we have in Roman sources. The main difference, however, lies in the fact that unlike Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit is often meant to criticize the Emperor and local officials. Otherwise, we will see that Hobsbawm’s qualifications act as motifs throughout our sources and that Grünewald expands upon the conception of the ‘social bandit.’ Although Hobsbawm’s theory is highly romanticized, he does admit the certainty that “[i]n real life most Robin Hoods were far from noble.”

Using the ‘historical’ accounts available, Grünewald has created two types of bandits (‘common’ vs. ‘noble’) and four classifications based on their actions (‘bandits,’ ‘rebels,’ ‘rivals’ and ‘avengers’). In his investigation of banditry, he considers the cases of Viratus, Tacfarinas, Catiline, Bulla Felix and Maternus among others. Although each individual primarily fits into one category or another, he admits that there is significant overlap and that his definitions, by no means final, should be used only as a valuable tool. In this case, the ‘common’ bandit is the malevolent manifestation of this classification, bent on terror and destruction. In contrast, the ‘noble’ bandit is more akin to Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit.’ As we have already seen, the distinction between bandits and rebels is quite arbitrary. Later, it will make more sense when we see how and why our ancient authors used one term versus the other. To point out this lack of clarity, Grünewald shows through Viriatus and Tacfarinas how terms are used interchangeably. The classification of rivals applies to political or ideological rivals like Catiline, faction leaders of the Late Republic and the Third Century Crisis, and those who are portrayed more directly as rivals to Imperial power, like Bulla Felix and Maternus. The avenger is probably the most flexible category, as most historical bandits are cited as motivated by a desire for vengeance. Revenge is a significant aspect of the literary topoi surrounding the bandit, and as motivation, it is consistent with Hobsbawm’s conception of the ‘social bandit.’ Banditry in its ‘noble’ form was also typified by its leader’s charismatic “magnetism,” which contributes to a bandit’s following as well as to the success of his operations. As with the ‘social bandit,’ the ‘noble’ bandit, otherwise invulnerable, is susceptible only to deceit. Grünewald cites both Maternus and Bulla Felix as examples of men whose exploits end only when close associates betray them. However, the ‘noble’ bandit is victorious even in defeat. To demonstrate the fact that he cannot be brought down by conventional means, he always gets the last laugh.
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For example, when the Praetorian Prefect Papinian asks Bulla why he entered a life of brigandage, he replies, “Why did you become a prefect?” The use of quick-witted quips in the face of defeat is an inheritance from Tacitus and possibly even earlier sources and demonstrates the inadequacy of current leadership, as we will see later in this discussion.

The barbarian origin of the bandit is another important feature for our developing definition. Rural districts, populated by ‘uncivilized’ rustics living on the margins of society, are the typical breeding grounds for barbarian bandits in Roman sources. What is considered even more ‘barbaric’ is the nomadic mode of life practiced by shepherds, depicted as so unsettled and uncivilized that they are not even agrarian. As shepherds are viewed as more barbaric than agrarians, we see another reason for their close association with banditry. Similarly, Shaw refers to the “hereditary” nature of brigandage in Cilicia, Isauria and Spain, and we see in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* the criminal pedigree boasted of by Haemus the Thracian. The hereditary and barbaric nature of banditry reinforces the motif of the bandit as a ‘noble savage.’ The Celtiberian leader Viriatus personifies this ideal version of the truth, which is prevalent throughout historical accounts. The barbarism of these historical figures is also stressed because brigandage was considered the most primitive manifestation of power in pre-state societies ruled only by social contract. In short, the remoteness of any geographical location was indicative of its level of barbarism and banditry.

Although banditry requires a state to dictate which expressions of power are and are not legitimate, it also requires a state insofar as it exists on the periphery, straddling its political boundaries. Shaw describes this area as a “no-man’s-land”, outside the jurisdiction of Imperial governors. Similarly, the extent of Roman control in any district is dependent upon the geography of that region. Mountains, forests, swamps and essentially any “topography sufficiently forbidding to prevent the effective penetration of urban institutions” also usually demarcated the limits of Roman authority. The natural resistance to urban encroachment offered by these isolated and oftentimes impregnable locales was thought to be indicative of the prevalence of bandits and was believed to be a source of their strength. The bandits in our historical accounts are often shown to have an advantage in their familiarity with and affinity for the harsh terrain. As we will see later, superior knowledge of local topography and the use of lighter long-range weapons conducive to guerrilla warfare were commonly associated with bandits.

The band (*factio*), although generally understood to be small, is an essential
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aspect of banditry as being distinct from common robbery. Bandits rely on the social contract they share with their brothers in arms as well as on the local support of their families and the greater community. Even if they do not enjoy the support of the community as a whole, bandits depend heavily upon some sort of third party member, who acts as a mainstream contact. These receptatores, responsible for the conversion of stolen objects into money, act also as informants and are considered just as bad, if not worse than the bandits with whom they work. The most successful and enduring bandits relied on their allegiance to wealthy landowners (honestiores/domi). By this association, bandits could legitimize their acts of violence. Shaw reports that in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses we see the poor as most often drawn to banditry for the social mobility it offers (inclusion and a sense of recognition as part of a ‘gang,’ acquisition of material wealth and a sense of empowerment through the exercise of violence). Arguably the most important aspect of ‘the band’ as a metaphor and as a draw for prospective brigands is the bandits’ egalitarian system of justice. The most important feature of this ideal is the equal division of booty, from which Marxist interpretations arise. Also significant is the idea that the bandits maintain a fair system of material distribution without laws and, as social contract serves as the only safeguard against administrative abuse. As we will find, this social cohesion, often absent in Roman society, is an escapist ideal for many writers.

As we discussed before, bandits were marked by their affinity for irregular warfare. Regardless, the Romans pretentiously referred to any opponent as a bandit if he could not “field a regular army of heavy infantry, trained in and equipped with the weapons of Greco-Roman military science.” For this reason, despite the respect bestowed upon Viriatus as a military commander, he was still generally portrayed as a rebel bandit rather than as a legitimate enemy. Despite their derision of partisan warfare, the Romans resorted to guerrilla tactics on several occasions (for instance, the final phase of the Second Punic War). In truth, as a form of indigenous resistance, where native insurgents have limited resources and a superior knowledge of the terrain, it is simply the most strategically viable option. Along with partisan tactics, bandits also used the cloak of darkness “to exploit the common fear, deliberately disguising themselves as ghosts in order to add to the terror of their sudden nightly incursions.” Similarly, there is a common cultural association of bandits with ghosts, darkness and death. This connection is reasonable as the obscurity of night enhances the aura of apparent invisibility as well as the general effectiveness of guerrilla attacks.
In *The City of God*, St. Augustine poses two important questions: “Remove justice and what are states but gangs of bandits on a large scale? And what are bandit gangs but kingdoms in miniature?” For our discussion, there is only one difference separating states and bands of brigands: the legitimization of violence. As Shaw points out, both live “parasitically” by stealing from others. Like empires, gangs of bandits were known to employ both large-scale and more modest operations; some bands would even exact payment from neighbors in exchange for “protection.” Hopwood notes that taxation and its enforcement in the provinces by kollektiones were no different from the ‘tribute’ of bandits. Either violence or the threat of violence was almost always used in order to exact revenue from Roman subjects. Additionally, Hopwood, attempting to explain why Rome’s policy of extortion was considered taxation rather than banditry or opportunistic violence, comes up with the notion of a “monopoly of violence” held by the state. As discussed previously, the development of the state and the formation of institutionalized power transformed these expressions from a Homeric ideal into an immoral act. Hopwood continues by explaining that if the state is to maintain its ‘monopoly of violence,’ then, as a mediator of internal conflict, it must actively choose a side, protecting one and condemning the other. In doing so, the state creates a definition of what is lawful, and because independent expressions of power inherently undermine government authority, they become acts of banditry unjustifiable under law.

As we have seen before, the most enduring bandits were those who could depend upon the influence of wealthy patrons. Hopwood points out two roads available to the extra legal man of violence: either he could remain free and run the risk of capture, torture and execution, or he could exchange his individual autonomy and martial skill for the protection of local elite. These armed retainers often functioned in two capacities by which their violence became legitimate. As their patrons were generally local town-councilors or *eirenarchs* (peace officers), typically drawn from the elite, they could be deputized as a pseudo police force, serving as a bodyguard for the wealthy individual and his estate. This outsourcing or insourcing, as the case may be, was even taken up by provincial governors, who lacked the military resources to patrol their own territories. Members of these quasi-peacekeeping forces, known as the *diogmitai*, were generally drawn from those armed retainers already serving the local elite. Under Roman law, these *diogmitai* were quite literally given a ‘license to kill’ and were not held responsible for their actions. Moreover, these so-called peacekeepers often “behaved as badly as the villains they were
supposed to be chasing." That Rome resorted to using bandits to fight other bandits illustrates the point that the only distinction between brigandage and ‘moral’ acts of violence was the sanction of the state.

In Roman conception, the bandit’s relation to both shepherds and soldiers is very important, as it helps demonstrate the legitimacy of power under Roman rule. Shaw explains that the shepherd and soldier always existed as “potential” brigands. The first problematic class of soldier is the veteran. After active service, the professional Roman soldier is prepared for neither the transition into agrarian life nor reentrance into mainstream society. With their skill set, it was much easier to turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. The defeated armies of the Late Republic’s civil wars were often forced to demobilize, so many of these men resorted to brigandage out of economic necessity. During periods of political instability, robber barons took advantage of this pool of unemployed professional soldiers to increase their wealth and power. In this way, men who typically would have been considered bandits were able to fill the vacuum and acquire legitimate authority. For example, during the Third Century Crisis, Maximinus the Thracian, a shepherd bandit who became a Roman soldier, won renown and eventually the Imperial throne for his daring military feats and positive yet decidedly ‘barbarian’ attributes. Most importantly, Maximinus was not the exception; the barbarian bandit emperor became a theme of the Late Empire in the West.

Similar trends occur in the Roman military in general as it becomes more barbarized. Cassius Dio shows that soldiers were often drawn from the same pool as bandits and that there was little visible difference between soldiers and bandits. Cassius Dio claims that this practice originated in the Roman tendency to recruit barbarians in order to maintain an auxiliary force while preventing these same men from becoming bandits in their own territories. As we have already seen, many Roman soldiers had lived as shepherds prior to enlistment, for they transitioned easily into both soldiery and brigandage because they have a skill set comparable to that of soldiers. Additionally, because of the “de facto freedom” inherent in their mobility, armament and distance from administrative centers, shepherds were considered natural predators.

Towards the end of the Republic, Cicero coined the term latro as a political epithet. Unlike other types of bandit, in its political context, the term latro was never positive. However, it still implied that same lack of legitimacy and was used more figuratively as a means of comparison between the policies of a particular politician and the general outlawry of brigands. Because it was
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typically used to challenge the legitimacy of an opponent, the term eventually
came to be synonymous with usurper.67 In coining this usage of latro, Cicero
drew upon the similarities between political parties and gangs of bandits.68
As a political epithet, it was used during the civil war between Caesar and
Pompey as well as throughout the Imperial era. During the Crisis of the Third
Century, it was used primarily as a way to “stigmatize” political opponents as
dangerous and illegitimate claimants to the throne.69 According to the literary
and historical topoi, once on the throne, these bandit emperors maintained
their personal qualities. They were set apart by their humble origins, rough
demeanor, brute strength, affinity for alcohol and sexual appetite.70 Despite
possible positive associations, the use of the term against legitimate emperors
was generally a result of “the deep conflict between the senatorial aristocracy
and the so-called soldier-emperors.”71

The brigand as a political label was also used for local dynasts that had
fallen in favor at Rome. During the civil wars of the Late Republican era,
these same warlords were especially prone to being denigrated as latrones if
they were on the losing side of the war effort.72 Although clients of victorious
Romans were often safe from this mockery, any marginal, independent prince
could be regarded as a bandit because it was believed that he “used [his]
personal arm[y] to fight private wars which, from a legal point of view, were
no more than plundering expeditions.”73 In short, any semi-independent state
outside of direct Roman administration was subject to the label of bandit.

The bandit is a metaphorical figure in Roman history and is used as a
comparison rather than a representation of reality. As a rule, any mention
of bandits by a Roman writer signals the existence of an ulterior motive.74
Generally, literary and historical banditry provides a “social mirror” and
microcosm of the current social order, which often inverts traditional
relationships and carries with it a criticism of the inequities of the current
world order.75 Typically, the egalitarian values of the literary bandit acted as an
ideal and offered a “picture of a better world”76 where justice prevailed and
where men could rely on one another through bonds of “philia (friendship)
and syngeneia (cooperation)” as the only means of social contract.77
Grünewald’s commentary on the selflessness of Cilician pirates amongst
themselves summarizes the effect of the bandit as a literary fabrication: “even
if this report is fantasy, at least it offers an insight into the unfulfilled wishes
and longings of a society in which social constructs such as the patron-client
system were no longer able to provide a basic level of cohesion.”78 Moreover, the
inclusion of bandits in historical accounts provides “a consistent commentary
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on the nature of power and on the contrast between the opposites of justice and legitimacy in the exercise of power. As both a political epithet and a narrative device, the bandit is at the forefront of the Roman dialogue on the legitimacy of power.

In order to understand the duality of the good and the bad representations of bandits, it is helpful to examine some examples. In the historical accounts of Roman authors, Viriatus is a projection of the ideal citizen of Rome. He acts as a reincarnation of Cincinnatus (or Romulus and Remus among others) and the primitive yet noble origins of Rome. Here, his barbarian heritage is a positive as it is used to provide a sharp contrast with the greed, corruption and brutality of the Roman commanders sent against him. Not only does he form a critique of those military men, but he is also a condemnation of the decadence of the senatorial aristocracy. Additionally, Viriatus stands apart because of his righteous cause. Here, his motivations are meant to contrast with the egotistical impulse behind Roman foreign policy. Not only did Viriatus resist the unjust incursions of Rome and nobly defend his people, but he also avenged the brutal massacre of his comrades at the hands of Servius Sulpicius Galba. Roman writers even justify Viriatus’ youthful banditry because it served as preparation, “strengthened his manly virtues and increased his capacity for great deeds.” It is also important to note that whenever Viriatus is referred to as a bandit it is only to highlight his superior skills as a shrewd and charismatic military leader. He is transformed into a bandit to show how barbarian virtus can overcome the Roman military machine.

Numidian rebel Tacfarinas, though forced to resort to guerrilla warfare like Viriatus, he was depicted negatively. First off, Tacfarinas’ career embodies a devolution in character. Whereas Viriatus begins as a shepherd bandit and through his manly virtues becomes a tribal leader and successful military commander, Tacfarinas is seen as suspect in his motivations and as embarking upon a moral decline after his desertion from the auxiliary forces. Grünewald argues that Tacfarinas was considered a also bandit because he never represented a serious threat to Roman authority in North Africa. More importantly, Tacitus portrays him as a trivial threat in order to demonstrate Tiberius’ incompetence and inadequacy as Emperor. Regardless, his negative portrayal is also symptomatic of Roman attitudes towards desertion, viewed as betrayal and even as rebellion.

In the case of Bulla Felix and Maternus, the former represents the ‘noble’ bandit while the latter his ‘common’ counterpart, distinguished by his motivations. On the one hand, Felix is motivated by a pursuit of justice
and acts as a wake up call for the Emperor; Maternus’ actions, on the other hand, are dictated by baser instincts, which inspire his designs on the Imperial throne. In representing Maternus as a usurper brought down by fellow bandits who prefer the authority of the rightful emperor to that of a usurper, Herodian questions the legitimacy of the emperors of the Severan Dynasty. Like Tacfarinas, the character of Bulla Felix was used to cast doubt on the competence of Septimius Severus because he had such a difficult time subduing a mere bandit. There are also a number of other theories surrounding Bulla Felix as a literary fabrication. Grünewald argues that his name and character were meant to channel imperial authority. As examples, he cites the connection between Bulla and the Imperial amulet of the same name as well as the moniker Felix, which was assumed by several emperors, Sulla in particular. Additionally, Grünewald points to the link between Bulla’s band of followers and the Senate, both of which are composed of exactly six hundred men.

In contrast to Septimius’ burdensome taxes, Bulla is depicted as only stealing a part of his victims’ belongings. Most importantly, Bulla is shown masquerading in the uniforms of Roman centurions and magistrates. This depiction illustrates Cassius Dio’s primary criticism, which is the “loosening of the traditional social hierarchy” leading inevitably to the lowest classes rising to the highest positions. In this way, Cassius Dio expresses his outrage at the “superficiality and artificiality of state power and social constraints.” In short, Bulla’s character is meant to shift his audience’s focus to the problems for which its members should be held accountable.

Having completed our overview of banditry, we can now shift our focus to the topic of client-kings, which are relevant to our analysis of Jugurtha. Like bandits, client-kingdoms existed on the peripheries, both in and outside of the Roman Empire. Hobsbawm explains this phenomenon perfectly when he writes, “Where the state is remote, ineffective and weak, it will indeed be tempted to come to terms with any local power-group it cannot defeat.” Although Hobsbawm refers to ‘bandits’ in particular, his statement can be directly applied to the case of Roman client-kingship because as Braund argues, the relation of the client-king to Rome is not always one of subservience, in which case, Rome often acted out of convenience in order to avoid costly military confrontations. Braund makes this point also because client-kings were not always the mindless lackeys abhorred by Tacitus and should be referred to as ‘friendly’ kings instead. Realistically, both sides, not just the Empire, had to find their relationship gratifying. Linda Honey claims that the whole conflict in Isauria arose when the Isaurians, who were originally ‘friends’ of the
Northern Africa under Roman rule, from the *Historischer Schulatlas*, 1879.
Roman Empire, felt slighted after Rome had broken their ‘covenant’ (which is meant to be reciprocal and has serious implications in Near Eastern culture) with the imposition of taxes.\textsuperscript{94} In return for contributing soldiers, provisions and money (rarely as a form of institutionalized taxation), the friendly king “had a moral claim to Rome’s protection.”\textsuperscript{95} Most client-kings had adequate resources at their disposal to defend their territory, and the knowledge that assailing an allied power could very well provoke Roman retaliation was generally sufficient deterrence. This association also served to enhance Rome’s status as a military power and discouraged future transgressions.\textsuperscript{96}

The most important reward for a client-king’s allegiance was the power and authority. Braund stresses that men with no legitimate or hereditary right to the throne owed their position entirely to the endorsement of Rome. These men could also rely upon Roman protection if ousted from power.\textsuperscript{97} Rome enhanced its reputation by displaying its power to give away (or simply recognize) entire kingdoms. In return, the friendly king handled administrative affairs and performed essential functions in an environment less receptive to Roman governors.\textsuperscript{98} This delegation of administrative affairs and inherent autonomy is demonstrative of much of Rome’s policy towards local authorities. Braund’s main point seems to be that Rome exploited this means of delegation because she “gained a great deal from her friendly kings in return for a relatively meager investment.”\textsuperscript{99}

At one point or another in his \textit{Jugurthine War}, Sallust ascribes the qualities characteristic of each of our categories to Jugurtha. First off, since he was recognized as King of Numidia, it is important to analyze the nature of that kingship. Although “he was born to a concubine”\textsuperscript{100} and was “inferior to [Adherbal and Hiempsal] on his mother’s side,”\textsuperscript{101} the current Numidian king, Micipsa, “adopted him and established him as heir along with his sons in his will.”\textsuperscript{102} Here, because of his ignoble birth, Jugurtha’s legitimacy as heir to the Numidian throne is thrown into question. After the death of Micipsa, Jugurtha begins to consolidate his power. Instead of sharing administrative duties, he decides to dispose of his adoptive brothers “by whatever means.”\textsuperscript{103} After the murder of Hiempsal, “[t]he Numidians [were] divided into two parties,” one led by the remaining brother and the other by Jugurtha.\textsuperscript{104} This splintering of the state is reminiscent of the civil wars of the Late Republic and those of succession of the Empire. It is also important to note that the same phenomenon also occurred in other client-kings, where Rome often acted according to expediency and did not care which side won as long as it remained loyal to Rome. One can then see why the Republican authorities
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overlooked Jugurtha’s murder of Adherbal and Hiempsal. However, Rome’s hand was forced after the massacre at Cirta: “when the choice arose between loyalty to a client-king and loyalty to the Italian traders, Jugurtha could not hope to win.” So, in spite of his connections, Jugurtha overstepped his bounds and provoked a formal military response.

As we have seen in the previous section on client-kingship, Jugurtha shows a considerable level of autonomy and does not embody his title’ subservient connotation. By sending gifts and exploiting his connection to Scipios, “Jugurtha acquired access to the favour and goodwill of the nobility”, and like any politically adept client-king, he “canvassed individual members of the senate” for his consolidation of power. He also interacts with a neighboring kingdom through his recruitment of Bocchus of Mauretania as an ally. Jugurtha even binds himself to Bocchus through ties of marriage, which hold little value as a result of Numidian and Mauretanian polygamy.

Despite the dubious nature of Jugurtha’s deceitful tactics, Sallust repeatedly reminds us of the Numidian’s popularity in Rome and North Africa. As we have seen, P. Scipio “counted him amongst his friends…”, which helped preserve his high regard in the Senate. Most notably however, Sallust depicts Jugurtha as popular amongst his fellow Numidians and African neighbors. He is referred to as “dear to them all” and as “a man so well liked by his compatriots” periodically throughout the text in order to demonstrate “the Numidians’ burning enthusiasm for Jugurtha.” Even Bocchus in his double-dealings has to consider the fact that by betraying his neighbor, “he might alienate the hearts of his compatriots, for whom Jugurtha was dear and the Romans resented.” In my mind, the degree of popularity and support Jugurtha enjoys amongst his people as ruler of Numidia helps legitimize his claim to the throne; more importantly however, it demonstrates one of the first and foremost characteristics of our literary bandit.

Along with fulfilling the criterion of maintaining the support of his community, Jugurtha is initially represented as the embodiment of early Roman virtues. “He was powerfully strong, of becoming appearance but, above all, forceful in intellect.” Additionally, he was “[a] man of action above all” who “had an appetite for glory” and “[b]y working very hard and taking great pains, as well as by the most deferential obedience and frequent encounters with danger, he had soon reached such a degree of distinction that he was overwhelmingly dear to our men…” As a Numidian of barbarian ancestry, Jugurtha qualifies another criterion for our literary bandit. In short, Sallust characterizes Jugurtha as a ‘noble’ barbarian and ideal Roman
(i.e. “Numidians for the most part fed on milk and wild-animal flesh”), reminiscent of Rome’s founders.\textsuperscript{115}

Along with the previously discussed attributes, Jugurtha is most identifiable as a bandit because of his military tactics and charismatic leadership. Before every engagement, “by using guarantees, threats and entreaties as was appropriate to the temperament of each man, he motivated them all in different ways.”\textsuperscript{116} In short, through encouraging words and his presence in battle, Jugurtha “magnified both the courage of his own men and the terror of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{117} Additionally, his tactics stand out as being decidedly guerrilla. Jugurtha is often shown attacking “unexpectedly”\textsuperscript{118} “at dead of night”\textsuperscript{119} and seizing “many mortals along with cattle and other plunder.”\textsuperscript{120} He regularly uses his elite ‘band’ of Numidian cavalry to ambush enemy forces, and he often takes advantage of his superior knowledge of the terrain and of the cover provided by local vegetation to conceal his movements.\textsuperscript{121} Many of the confrontations reported by Sallust are noted for their “irregularity”\textsuperscript{122} and are even said “to resemble banditry rather than a battle.”\textsuperscript{123} In addition to nocturnal raids, Jugurtha also resorts to “contaminating the fodder and water sources” in his war of attrition against Roman forces under Metellus.\textsuperscript{124} Finally, like our other ‘noble’ bandits, Jugurtha cannot be defeated by conventional means. Instead, he is betrayed by his Mauretanian ally and ambushed by the Romans en route to an alleged peace conference.\textsuperscript{125}

Although he exhibits many of the qualities characteristic of our literary latro, Jugurtha also demonstrates that he is a legitimate threat and enemy of the Roman state. First off, Sallust describes the conflict as a “war…which the Roman people waged with Jugurtha, king of the Numidians [and which] was great and fierce and of only sporadic success.”\textsuperscript{126} Implicit in this statement is the recognition of Jugurtha as a legitimate political entity. It also illustrates why the conflict could be seen as both a war and as a series of isolated acts of banditry or rebellion because although it was significant to some degree, it was of limited success and eventually ended in Jugurtha’s defeat. However, there is a significant body of evidence pointing to the interpretation that the conflict between Rome and Jugurtha was that between two warring powers. Although we have seen that Jugurtha regularly used guerrilla tactics in his military operations, he is also depicted as a very able commander and is shown only abandoning conventional warfare after his confrontation with Metellus (who along with Marius stoops to both deceit and total warfare as well as slash and burn techniques against civilian targets).\textsuperscript{127} Against the previous commander, Jugurtha mobilizes and commands large armies organized into
infantry, cavalry and elephants,\textsuperscript{128} practices a decidedly Roman brand of siege warfare\textsuperscript{129} and even sends a defeated Roman army under the yoke in the typical fashion.\textsuperscript{130} Most importantly however, the Senate issues a formal declaration of war against Jugurtha and dispatches Metellus to direct military operations in Africa. And, although Sallust never mentions it, upon his return to Rome, Marius was granted a Triumph in which Jugurtha was paraded throughout the city in chains prior to his execution.

After looking at the various aspects of the conflict between Jugurtha and Rome, it is necessary to look at Sallust’s motivations for his representation of the Numidian. As with Bulla Felix and Viriatus, the bandit is rarely the actual focus of any historical account. Sallust is no exception in that his didactic intentions dominate his interpretation of events and use Jugurtha as a means of illustrating a point.\textsuperscript{131} “Like his Greek predecessors… who shaped their narratives to illustrate a view of human nature, Sallust molded his own narrative… to expose corruption in Rome and to put the war with Jugurtha into a larger historical and moral context.”\textsuperscript{132} As Dué claims, Sallust’s goal was to highlight the moral corruption in Rome. Sallust believed that in the decades of relative stability following Hannibal’s defeat, Rome had lost its edge, becoming a den of corruption characterized by bribery and deceit.\textsuperscript{133} Sallust also distorts the timeline of events to realize his own intent. Although the war of succession and Jugurtha’s return from Numantia were more than fifteen years apart, Sallust compresses the chronology in order to demonstrate the infectiousness of Roman decadence. As a result, the narrative reads as if Jugurtha’s moral decline and subsequent ambition for power were precipitated by his interaction with the Roman nobility in Scipio’s entourage.\textsuperscript{134} This argument is also concurrent with Sallust’s thesis that the ruination brought about by the devolution of virtue into base ambition was caused by contact with the inherently depraved Roman senatorial class.\textsuperscript{135} More specifically, he seeks to paint a picture in which members of the aristocracy are entirely consumed by corruption while the plebeian party leaders always have the best interests of the Roman people at heart.\textsuperscript{136} It is clear that Sallust has a particular political agenda in mind; he often shifts his focus away from Jugurtha in favor of the Roman aristocracy.

As we have already noted, Sallust’s historical account of the conflict in Numidia is not really about Jugurtha at all. Instead, it is meant to focus on Roman leaders like Metellus, Marius and Sulla, who are more important in the historical framework of the capital. With these characters as representatives of opposing parties, Sallust plays with the notion of political cooperation
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and expresses his belief that cooperation leads to greatness while the lack thereof inevitably results in failure and destruction. Additionally, Levene describes Sallust’s account as a deliberate ‘fragment,’ intended to allude to the unavoidable downfall of Marius and Sulla. In this way, Jugurtha and Metellus, as well as Metellus and Marius, act as foils for one another and as literary prototypes for the eventual ruination of the younger Marius and Sulla Felix.

After looking at numerous sources and comparing our methodological frameworks and working definitions to Jugurtha, it seems as if we have made little to no progress. In one respect, Jugurtha was most certainly a bandit; he relied upon his superior knowledge of local topography, the cover of darkness and the mobility of his cavalry to wage a partisan war against oftentimes suspect Roman commanders. However, in another respect, as a former auxiliary and the ruler of a client-kingdom (loyal to Rome since the time of his grandfather), he was obviously a rebel by coming into conflict with his patron state. And, in yet another respect, judging by the Senate’s formal declaration of war and the Triumph held in the capital upon his defeat, he was undoubtedly a hostis, posing a legitimate threat to the hegemony of the Roman Republic. Considering his questionable legitimacy and usurpation of power, Jugurtha even personifies the Ciceronian interpretation of the latro. However, amidst all of this uncertainty, one truth remains: Sallust’s Jugurtha does conform to our definition of banditry, but only as a piece of literary topos.

3 Grünewald, Bandits, 8.
5 Grünewald, Bandits, 13.
7 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 303.
8 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 305.
9 Grünewald, Bandits, 40.
10 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 305.
11 Grünewald, Bandits, 40.

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12 Grünewald, *Bandits*, 41.
16 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 301.
20 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 325.
30 Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 34.
33 Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 34.
35 Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, 137.
38 Grünewald, *Bandits*, 118.
40 Grünewald, Bandits, 50.
41 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 329.
43 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 308.
44 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 329.
45 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 323.
46 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 323.
47 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
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48 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 304.
49 Grünewald, Bandits, 39.
50 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 328.
51 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 303.
52 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
53 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 324.
54 Hopwood, Crime, 188-189.
55 Hopwood, Crime, 189.
56 Hopwood, Crime, 196.
57 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 319.
58 Grünewald, Bandits, 22.
60 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 316.
64 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 339.
65 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 316.
66 Grünewald, Bandits, 72.
67 Grünewald, Bandits, 89.
68 Grünewald, Bandits, 73.
70 Grünewald, Bandits, 89.
71 Grünewald, Bandits, 86.
72 Grünewald, Bandits, 79.
73 Grünewald, Bandits, 79.
74 Grünewald, Bandits, 5.
76 Grünewald, Bandits, 7.
77 Shaw, “The Bandit”, 332.
78 Grünewald, Bandits, 6.
80 Grünewald, Bandits, 35.
81 Grünewald, Bandits, 38.
82 Grünewald, Bandits, 55.
83 Grünewald, Bandits, 48.
84 Grünewald, Bandits, 55.
85 Grünewald, Bandits, 136.
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87 Grünewald, Bandits, 111-112.
88 Grünewald, Bandits, 118.
89 Grünewald, Bandits, 121.
90 Grünewald, Bandits, 9.
92 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 44.
93 Braund, Friendly King, 182.
96 Braund, Friendly King, 182-183.
97 Braund, Friendly King, 186.
98 Braund, Friendly King, 184.
99 Braund, Friendly King, 185.
101 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 57.
102 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 56.
103 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 58.
104 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 59.
106 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 59.
107 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 111.
108 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
109 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
110 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
111 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 136-137.
112 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
113 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 54.
114 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 55.
116 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 89.
117 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 68.
118 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 67.
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128 Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, 82.
129 Sallust, *The Jugurthine War*, 68.