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Letter From The Editor

Dear Reader,

In 2015, the Discentes editorial team significantly upgraded the publication’s layout while simultaneously maintaining the prior standards for its academic content. For the spring 2016 edition, we are revolutionizing the content of the journal. For the first time, we are publishing material written by undergraduates at other universities, including Harvard, Princeton, and Brown University. Further, after an aggressive marketing campaign that netted more submissions than ever before, we have bolstered our editorial standards to improve the quality of Discentes’ articles.

In line with these efforts, the Spring 2016 edition of Discentes represents the diversity of Classics at several universities. Penn is well represented with Michael Freeman providing an alliterative translation of The Odyssey, and Nathan May tracing the reception history of Dido. Representing Brown, Annie Craig analyzes the Medieval poet Alcuin, while Austin Meyer studies the political role of Delphi. Finally, while Harvard’s Nick Ackert argues why damnatio memoriae wasn’t inflicted on Mark Antony, Princeton’s Erynn Kim offers a close interpretive reading of Sophocles’ Electra. Our annual Faculty Interview features Professor Rita Copeland, who discusses her background and the evolution of rhetoric from ancient Greece to the Middle Ages.

I would like to acknowledge the efforts that made this publication possible. First, I would like to thank our Content Editors: Nina Kaledin, Reggie Kramer, Alexis Ciambotti, and Vassili Fassas, along with Julia Pan, our Layout Editor. Second, I would like to thank my diligent Managing Editor, Alexander King, who spent some late nights editing with me. Finally, I would like to thank our faculty advisor, Professor Ralph Rosen, whose advocacy made this publication financially viable, and whose critical yet supportive feedback made preparing this publication a true pleasure.

Louis Capozzi
Faculty Interview:
Interview with Professor Rita Copeland
Interviewed by Nina Kaledin

To begin, what is your position within the Classical Studies Department?

Prof. Copeland — I am a professor in Classical Studies and I have a joint appointment in English.

How long at Penn? And what did you do beforehand?

I’ve been at Penn since 1999, which is the longest period I’ve been at any university. Previously, I was at University of Texas in Austin, which is where I got tenure. After that, I was at the University of Minnesota, and then I came here. Basically I’ve been here more than half of my academic life. I really love Penn.

What specifically do you like about Penn?

I really think Penn is the most congenial academic environment I’ve ever worked in. It is open, it is busy, and it is intellectually liberal. Interdisciplinarity is easy to do here for all kinds of reasons. In part because the administration encourages it—they make it possible to co-teach courses across departments, to cross list, to let students move between programs and departments, and there are many interdisciplinary units that function either as graduate programs or as simply research units and even working groups. The funding for that is good, and more importantly the administration does not say, “If you want to co-teach a course, which department is going to be paid?” Some universities do that, but Penn does not.

For those who don’t know you, could you elaborate on your area of study?

My area of research is the Middle Ages. But my Middle Ages, especially in terms of the work I’ve been doing very recently, extends from late antiquity all the way up to the
late middle ages. I spend as much time learning about the period of St. Augustine or the period of Macrobius, who is also 5th century, or the period of Boethius, which is what I’m teaching a graduate course on right now. Let’s say from the 3rd c A.D. onwards, or the early Christian period onwards, is my focus of study. That period is so much a transitional period looking backwards to antiquity but also setting the ground for the later Middle Ages. That period has become as much part if my medieval dossier as the standard Chaucer and Dante that you would think are appropriate to the Middle Ages. And I know we’ll talk about this later, but a lot of this has been helped by the work I’ve done on the history of rhetoric. You can’t study medieval rhetoric unless you really understand ancient rhetoric and unless you understand its key transformations in late antiquity.

**Will you elaborate more on your work on rhetoric?**

I wrote my first book on translation in the Middle Ages. But that book was really about the theory of translation as it was first articulated by none other than Cicero. The first theory of translation in the European West comes from Cicero. Cicero gives us the language for it, and that served as the language that everybody else picked up. Horace repeated it, then a couple of other people in late antiquity recycled it. And they all recur to that same formula. “I do not translate word for word but I translate sense for sense.” It is a real common place, but it means different things in different periods. For Cicero, it meant rhetoric. For others, it meant other kinds of frameworks, discourses, or fields of operation.
If it is not rhetoric it might be biblical interpretation or something else. That first book really set me on a course for thinking over the rest of my career about the history of rhetoric, the history of literary theory, and all the things that have to do with verbal production—reading, writing and speaking in one way or another. And one cannot study rhetoric in Chaucer unless you understand how the theory of rhetoric developed almost century by century from Greek antiquity all the way up through the Christian Middle Ages.

Do you think there are clear breaks century to century in rhetoric?

It is hard to break things down century by century when we do not have much evidence. So for the period from about 500 A.D.- 1100 A.D. we just do not have enough evidence to look at rhetoric in that manner. However, you can definitely break antiquity into different moments. There is the period of Aristotle and Demosthenes, and in Roman rhetoric the Republican period and the Imperial Period. And in late antiquity, there are shifts century to century. Second century rhetoric looks different from the rhetoric of the 4th and the 5th century A.D. After that, you tend to break it into larger units like early medieval, then the Carolingian period, that is, the period of Charlemagne, which is about 9th and 10th centuries, and then we talk about something that is called the high Middle Ages. And during the high Middle Ages, which is from about the 12th century onwards, you can start breaking things down again century by century because we have more information. It all depends on the number of texts that have survived or that we know about.

Do you have a favorite rhetorician?

I will tell you what I’m working on right now and this will lead you to my favorite rhetorician. I am working on a book called Emotion and the History of Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. I won’t try to explain the whole book, but I begin by talking about what Cicero gave to the Western Middle Ages.
Cicero was the major rhetorician for the Western Middle Ages, which is the Latin-speaking European West. Then in the late 13th century, there is period of intense translation activity involving the works of Aristotle. They start translating Aristotle’s Greek into Latin so that “everybody” can read, everybody meaning all the scholars. Most scholars in the Latin West could not read Greek, but if you could just get Aristotle translated into Latin, then the scholars could assimilate his ideas it.

Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was translated in 1269 A.D. And that, I think, is the turning point in European, rhetorical understanding. So if my book has a plot, the plot starts kind of slowly with the Ciceronian inheritance and I track that. The climax of the book, the moment of revelation, is the moment at which Aristotle steps back onto the scene. So do I have a favorite rhetorician? Yes, it is Aristotle. I think that Aristotle is the smartest man who ever lived. People may disagree with that claim, but Aristotle is really so smart. The whole of modern rhetorical studies is really indebted to Aristotle.

In terms of your other works, you just edited *The Oxford History of Classical Reception in English Literature that came out this year*.

Yes! The editors at Oxford approached me to edit it. They approached me in 2005 and I was still busy with a book that I was doing with a former member of this department named Ineke Sluiter. That work was called *Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric*, which was a big volume that we did together. When the editors at Oxford approached I was still really involved with that, so I did not get on with the work with this until 2009. It took five years from more or less active inception to bringing it out. It was a great thing to do and I am really pleased with it. It has twenty-five international authors and it is a serious attempt to understand how people in the Middle Ages, in this case medieval England, looked at antiquity. I hope that classicists and medievalists alike will read it. You probably hear every now and then in your classes that some
of the best manuscripts that we have for our Latin texts are early medieval. There is a huge gift that the Middle Ages gave to our understanding and preservation of classical antiquity. And so, classicists need to know about the period that conserved and transmitted their materials. I also fear that the general public thinks of the Middle Ages as just dark and full of terrible diseases and vicious religious wars. Well there is some of that, but there is some of that in all periods. The Middles Ages really wants to think very seriously about antiquity. They loved ancient philosophers. They love Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. They look up to these great, noble figures of the past.

**Will you talk a little about the courses you're teaching this semester?**

I am teaching an undergraduate course on literary theory, which I've been teaching now almost every year since I came to Penn. The course has gone through a couple of transformations since that time. I am really committed to the history of what it is that we call literary theory. I know that students encounter this big, fetishized thing called “theory.” They either are scared of it and run away, or they encounter it and it does not make sense but they find it fascinating. But there is a reason why we think about literature theoretically. The reasons for that are also found in the history of thought about literature. I teach the course chronologically. We start with Plato and end somewhere around the modern, 20th-century philosopher Michel Foucault. The issues that we’re still working with, contesting, and debating are issues that are already put in place in antiquity. Plato and Aristotle give us the fullest, earliest articulations around the notion of mimesis—what do we do when we represent? What is literary language supposed to do? Is literary language a distortion of truth? Where is truth? Can you get to truth outside of language? Those are some of the big questions that theory asks us now. Theory also asks question about intention and agency, about who is allowed to read and who is allowed to
interpret. All of those questions are formulated and refor-
mulated over the centuries until we get to modernity, where
they seem to be encased in very different kinds of discourses.
But in reality, they are really addressing many of the same
things. That is why I love that class. The graduate course I am
teaching is a course on classical reception. It is a course on the
philosopher Boethius who was executed around the year 524
A.D., and the reception of Boethius’ *De Consolatione Philoso-
phiae* in the Middle Ages and the early modern period. That
class has been really hard to do, but it is also really gratifying,
and I am enjoying it.

*Where do you see Classical Studies moving in the next 10-20 years?*

What a great question; there are so many ways one could
answer that. And I am speaking as a devoted, fellow traveler
with Classics. First of all, I do think that there are many ways in
which the canon that was agreed upon even twenty years ago
is exploding in many directions. One thing that is becoming
much more important and is now being brought into the
center is the question of late antiquity, both Greek and Latin
late antiquity. Another thing: let me use the example of Cam
Grey’s Peasant Project. There is a lot of interest in getting
below the surface of historical record. There has always been
interest, but now there is an interdisciplinary move. Cam has
gone out and got himself a degree in Environmental Studies
so he can figure out how to think about things like volcanoes
that were not recorded in the historical narratives. I think that
is really important. Archaeology gets together with Environ-
mental Studies and historiography and tries to produce a
thick description of culture, engaging scientific language
as well as literary and traditional historical language. So I’ve
given you two directions: a kind of opening up of temporal-
ities beyond the traditional canonical periods, and things like
the increasing interdisciplinarity of Classics. I really believe
that Classics is amazingly healthy and endlessly interesting.
Alcuin, the 8th century monk, scholar, and advisor to Charlemagne, receives most of his renown from his theological and political essays, as well as from his many surviving letters. During his lifetime he also produced many works of poetry, leaving behind a rich and diverse poetic collection. Carmina 32, 59 and 61 are considered the more famous poems in Alcuin’s collection as they feature all the themes and poetic devices most prominent throughout the poet’s works. While Carmina 32 and 59 address young students of Alcuin and Carmen 61 addresses a nightingale, all three poems are celebrations of poetry as both a written and spoken medium. This exaltation of poetry accompanies features typical of Alcuin’s other works: the theme of losing touch with a student, the use of classical – especially Virgilian – reference, and an elevation of his message into the Christian world. Alcuin’s ability to employ these poetic devices, which only really exist in the poetic sphere, to make powerful state-
ments within all these significant themes establishes poetry as a truly elevated medium.

Alcuin makes clear in Carmina 32, 59 and 61 his belief in the power of poetry, in praising poetry as song and focusing on the aural power of words. At the beginning of Carmen 32 Alcuin writes, *Te cupiens apel – peregrinis – lare camenis* (“Desiring to strike you – abroad – with songs”). Above all things Alcuin’s desire for his student is to embrace poetry. He plays on the double meaning of words like *camenis* and *carmina*, which mean both poem and song, to emphasize the sound of poetry. In Carmen 32 he writes *tua vox resonat* (“your voice resounds”). This draws attention to the aural side of poetry in bringing up the action of the voice producing sound. The act of sounding repeats in Carmen 59 in the line *Nunc cuculus ramis etiam resonat in altis* (“Now the cuckoo still resounds in the high branches”). Later in this poem Alcuin writes *Qui nunc egregias regalibus insonat artes/ auribus et patrum ducit per prata sequentem* (“Which now sounds the distinguished arts into regal ears and leads the follower through the meadows of the father”). The *egregias artes* are brought to the ears in sound and not to the mind or eyes through reading. The placement of the word *auribus* at the beginning of the line bolsters the importance of the ears and thus of sound. An important poetic device for Alcuin is using the sound of words to emphasize meaning. He does this in the following lines: *Suscitat et vario nostras modulamine mentes/ Indefessa satis, rutilis luscinia ruscis* (“And it stirs up our minds with varying melody/ amply unwearied, the nightingale in the golden-red broom shrubs”). In the first line the string of nasal consonants plays up the melodic aspect of the sentence, while the harsh ‘s’ and ‘t’ sounds of the second line enforce the steadfast nature of the nightingale.

In Carmen 59 Alcuin mentions two different birds, *cuculus* (“cuckoo”) and *luscinia* (“nightingale”), both of which produce sound. These birds appear only in the beginning
of this poem and are a brief introduction to Alcuin’s use of birds as paradigms of aurality and song. He expands this idea in Carmen 61, which is entirely addressed to one bird, the nightingale (luscinia). The poem praises the nightingale and its song, allowing Alcuin to continue lauding the virtues of sound. Like in Carmen 59 the sounds of the line when read out loud emphasize meaning. In the lines Dulce melos iterans vario mudulamine Musae ("Repeating the sweet tune with the varying melody of the Muse")\(^6\) and Tu mea dulcisonis implesti pectora musis,/ Atque animum moestum carmine mellifluo ("You filled up my breast with the sweet sounding muses and my sorrowful mind with a song dripping with honey"),\(^7\) soft sounds are put in opposition to the harsher sounds, a way for Alcuin to describe the nightingale not only through words but also through sounds. The play between soft and harsh sounds is a device characterizing the nightingale as a strong figure that has the ability to produce soft melodies. When these two elements are combined they produce a layered character and poem.

As a teacher Alcuin often writes poems to his students, mainly the ones who have separated from him in some way. In Carmina 32 and 59 Alcuin laments that he has lost his students to excessive drinking of wine. Lines 1 through 22 of Carmen 32 address the student directly, while line 23 brings an abrupt shift where the poem addresses the student in the third person. This shift begins with the lines Dormit et ipse meus Corydon, scholaticus olim,/ Sopitus Bacho… ("And my Corydon himself sleeps, once a scholar, drunk with Bacchus").\(^8\) This loss of direct connection to his student mimics the loss of connection Alcuin has experienced in real life with his pupil. The loss of the student is felt in the lines Ebrius in tectis Corydon aulensibus errat/ Nec memor Albini, nec memor ipse sui ("Drunk Corydon wanders in covered halls, neither mindful of Albinus, nor he indeed mindful of himself"),\(^9\) The student is drunk (ebrius) and as a result does not remember Alcuin, a great source of pain for the teacher.

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\(^6\) Alcuin Carmina. 61.9.
\(^7\) Alcuin Carmina. 61.3-4.
\(^8\) Alcuin Carmina. 32.23-24.
\(^9\) Alcuin Carmina. 32.27-28.
Throughout his poetic collection Alcuin urges his addressees to remember him. Carmen 59 also concerns a student lost to wine, where Alcuin writes, *E brius initiat vobis neu vincula Bacchus,/ Mentibus in scriptas deleat neu noxius artes* (“Drunk Bacchus consecrates not with chains, not harmful erases the inscribed arts from your mind”). 10 Again Bacchus hinders the student, leading to a loss of an important skill, in this case the written art, something Alcuin as teacher would have helped this student to develop. This idea adds another layer to the separation between Alcuin and his student, which is silence. In Carmen 32 he writes *Nunc tua lingua tacet: cur tua lingua tacet?* (“now your tongue is silent: why is your tongue silent?”). 11 When considered in the context of Alcuin’s praise of song and sound, this separation is perhaps the most devastating. Looking at Carmina 59 and 61 the main praise of the nightingale (luscinia) is that she is indefatigable in her song, implying that she will not be silent.

Distance is another factor that separates Alcuin from his students. This distance is also a pain for Alcuin as distance creates silence. In Carmen 59 he writes *Atque natans ad vos pelagi trans aequora magni/ Albini patris deportat carta salutem* (“And swimming to you across the waters of the great sea/ the letter carries the well-wishes of father Albinus”). 12 The great expanse of sea between Alcuin and the student is crossed by the carta, which contains this written poem. This heightens the importance and ability of the written word to cross divides and create a connection between two people even when they are separated by great distance. Thus, Alcuin writes many poems to his wayward and distant students in an attempt to reestablish his connection with them in real life.

Alcuin, while he praises sung poetry, also praises written poetry, especially the poetry of Virgil. His use of Virgilian language and direct Virgilian references throughout his poetic corpus brings a new level to the emotion and meaning of his poems. In Carmen 32 the Virgilian reference
comes from Alcuin’s use of the name Corydon for his student. This name brings the reader to Virgil’s Eclogue 2, in which Corydon is scorned by his lover Alexis. This name brings up a negative moment that adds to the meaning of the poem. Although in Virgil, Corydon is the one scorned, Alcuin’s poem evokes the idea that the student whose name is Corydon is the one scorning Alcuin. At the end of the poem Alcuin directly quotes Virgil in the line Rusticus est Corydon, dixit hoc forte propheta/Vergilius quondam: ‘Rusticus es Corydon’ (“Corydon is rustic, the prophet Virgil said this once by chance once: ‘You are rustic Corydon’”). What is uncommon for Alcuin is that he follows this line from another poet of Charlemagne’s court, Naso, and claims his line Presbyter est Corydon (“Corydon is a presbyter”) better suits the situation. Using these references he praises the ability of poetic writing to capture a moment and emotion in the perfect words. In Carmen 61 the line Ut nos instrueres vino somnoque sepultos (“That you furnish burials with wine and sleep”) refers to Virgil’s line Invadunt urbem somno vinoque sepultam (“They furnish the funerary city with wine and sleep”). At this moment in the Aeneid there is an attack upon the town while its men are asleep and drunk. This reference heightens the destructive power of wine, to which Alcuin has lost his students in Carmina 32 and 59. In using Virgilian references Alcuin can heighten his own poems with the words of one of the great classical poets. In doing this Alcuin promotes the practice of written poetry and draws on a poetic tradition that allows him to tap into deep emotions and powerful moments.

Alcuin includes many classical references besides Virgil, and these references are both opposed and compounded with Christian themes. Study of Classical works during Alcuin’s time was the standard for the education of scholars and monks, so Alcuin’s contemporaries would not have wondered so much about their appearance in Alcuin’s poetry so much as how he chose to use them in relation to

14. Alcuin Carmina 32.32.
15. Alcuin Carmina. 32.4.
17. Virgil, Aeneid 2.265.
18. In his book Growing up in the Middle Ages, Paul B. Newman comments on the Church’s relationship to classical Latin texts and the monastic educational system that existed during Alcuin’s time. Newman remarks “Many works, such as those of Ovid and other great classical writers, included pagan themes and imagery of which the Church did not approve. However, rather than destroy these masterpieces, the Church kept them because they were fine examples of Latin composition and grammar which could be used to teach language to future generations of churchmen.” See Newman, Paul. Growing up in the Middle Ages (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2007), 114.

19. Alcuin Carmina. 32.11.

20. Horace alone makes an astounding number of mentions of the drink. Performing a search for the word Falerna in the Packard Humanities Institute’s database of literary texts (latin.packhum.org/search) returns fifteen separate uses within the Horatian corpus: Hor. Od. 1.20.10, 1.27.10, 2.3.8, 2.6.19, 2.11.19, 3.1.43; Hor. Epod. 4.13; Hor. S. 1.10.24, 2.2.15, 2.3.115, 2.4.19, 2.4.24, 2.4.55, 2.8.16; Hor. Ep. 1.14.34, 1.18.91.

21. Alcuin Carmina. 32.10


23. Alcuin Carmina 32.15-16.

24 Alcuin Carmina. 59.28-30.

Christian ideas. In Carmen 32 there is a clear line drawn between the Christian and classical world. Alcuin writes *Fortia de gaxis veterum et potare Falerna* (“to drink strong and old Falernian from the treasuries”). Falerna is a type of wine which classical authors, especially Horace, refer to in their poetry. Bacchus, the classical god of wine and drunkenness, appears in this poem as the agent causing his student to sleep and be silent. While drunkenness is attributed to the classical references in this poem, true and good nourishment is attributed to the Christian world. Alcuin writes *Tunc solidos sueras sumere corde cibos* (“Then to receive your solid food with the heart”). This line is a reference to the Biblical line: *facti estis quibus lacte opus sit non solido cibo* (“You are made to be ones for whom there is need for milk not for solid food”). This scriptural moment brings together the idea that Alcuin is presenting to his student that when the student was young and drinking milk he took in wisdom (*sophia*); however, once the student grew up and ate solid food and wine, he lost sight of this wisdom and as the scripture suggests, the word of God. Alcuin draws the connection between song and spirituality in the line *Ac divina tuis patuit scriptura loquelis, Aedibus in sacris dum tua vox resonat* (“And divine scripture lies open with your words, and your voice resounds in sacred buildings”). In this line the divina scriptura is intertwined with tuis loquelis stressing the bond between the two. The student, when silenced by the classical Bacchus, is cut off from speech and possibly spiritual connection. The same move is made in Carmen 59 when again Bacchus is responsible for hindering the student. At the end of the poem Alcuin writes *Sed praecepta sacrae retinet suae salutis/Dulcisono Christum resonantes semper in ore/Ille cibus, potus, carmen, laus, gloria vobis* (“But retain the mindful precepts of sacred health resounding the sweet sound of Christ always in your mouth, He the food, the drink, the song, the praise, the glory for us”). The way for the student to bring himself back to Christianity and salvation, after being lost to the Pagan god Bacchus, is to return to Christ, who is tightly bound
to sound. Alcuin repeats the notion that Christ provides the only food and drink one needs, and excess sustenance like wine is unnecessary and even harmful. In his poems Alcuin comments on the sacred nature of song and their ability to fill the heart. This idea is in Carmen 59 in the line *Carminibus sacris naves implere Fresonum* ("And with holy songs fill up the ships of Frisians")\(^{25}\) and earlier in Carmen 17 *Atque meum pectus comple caelestibus odis* ("And fills my breast with heavenly odes").\(^{26}\) These are not simply songs, but carmina sacrae and caelestes odis. For Alcuin poetry and song offer a type of spiritual fulfillment.

Classical and Christian references do not always act in opposition in Alcuin’s poetry, for he also utilizes references that unite the two realms. Alcuin is also accustomed to consolidating his classical and Christian references. He does this in Carmen 61 with the *luscinia* as a symbol for this harmony. In describing the song of the *luscinia* Alcuin uses language that references the Muses as in the lines *Tu mea dulcisonis implesti pectora musis* ("You filled my breast with sweet-sounding Muses")\(^{27}\), *Carmine te mecum plangere Pierio* ("that you strike me with Pierian song")\(^{28}\), and *Dulce melos iterans vario modulamine Musae* ("Repeating the sweet tune of the Muse with varying melodies").\(^{29}\) Alcuin writes about the Muses in other poems, especially in the context of poetic inspiration and creation. He opens Carmen 14 with *Pergite, Pierides, musali pollice flores/Carpite* ("Go forth, Muses, to seize the flowers with your muse-like thumb").\(^{30}\) Later in this same poem Alcuin writes *Ecce tuas aures, iuvenum clarissime, donis/ Versifico volui pauxillum tangere plectro* ("Behold your ears, most excellent youth, I wish with gifts, to touch a little with a verse-writing quill").\(^{31}\)

This line, from a poem with several references...

\(^{25}\) Alcuin Carmina. 59.13.
\(^{26}\) Alcuin Carmina. 17.2.
\(^{27}\) Alcuin Carmina. 61.3.
\(^{28}\) Alcuin Carmina. 61.6.
\(^{29}\) Alcuin Carmina. 61.9.
to the Muses, brings forth the creation of poetry as a gift worthy of the royal prince. The luscinia is then tied to the Christian world in the lines *Vox veneranda sacris, o decus atque decor/ Quid mirum, cherubim, seraphim, si voce tonantem* (“A voice to be venerated by holy ones, o glory and beauty what a wonder, angel, Seraphim, if thundering with a voice”).

The bird is placed at the level of the angels. Later in the poem the bird is recognized as a creature of God in the line *Hoc natura dedit, naturae et conditor almus/Quem tu laudasti vocibus assiduis* (“This nature gave, and the nourishing founder of nature whom you praise with unremitting voices”). While the bird’s song may be Muse-like, God was the one who gave the bird the ability to sing and in turn the bird praises God with his gift. While recognizing the inspirational quality of the Muses and the classical world, Alcuin ultimately recognizes the superiority of God in giving these gifts.

Carmina 32, 59 and 61 are perhaps some of the most famous works of Alcuin as they bring together the most important themes and poetic devices scattered across his entire poetic corpus. He focuses on the importance of sound and song while utilizing the aural nature of his poetry to bring forth meaning. An important theme he draws on in Carmina 32 and 59 is the separation between him and a student brought on by both silence and distance. His use of figures from the classical world skillfully plays against and with the Christian world. These themes and poetic devices allow Alcuin to hail the written and aural art he is creating: poetry. His ability to use the same themes and poetic devices to create new and different meanings in each poem speaks volumes to Alcuin’s skill and the power of his poetry.
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latin.packhum.org/search.

It is well known that Dido has had a long cultural afterlife since the *Aeneid* was first composed. Ever since Virgil depicted the Carthaginian queen, she has served as an object of fascination. Appearing in countless paintings and operas - from Pierre-Narcisse Guérin’s *Dido and Aeneas* to Cavalli’s *La Didone* - and other cultural media, she has remained a permanent fixture in western culture. However, her frequent appearances in the arts are only part of the story. Any reception history of Dido must reckon with what, for many, is a highly unexpected phenomenon: her powerful presence in the classroom setting, from late antiquity to the early modern era. Across this vast expanse of time, her emotional speeches were routinely appropriated in the service of schoolboys’ rhetorical training. In various impersonations, declamations, and rhetorical exercises—several of which we will observe in this paper as organizing case studies—students became deeply acquainted with the queen. Despite her ideologically problematic status—Rome’s founding, after all, necessitated her abandonment—she was embraced as a model of pathetic speech. In schoolrooms across time and space, Dido was redeemed by rhetoric.
Before examining this pedagogical practice, we should ask ourselves what makes it so surprising in the first place. One primary reason seems to be its apparent incongruity with dominant ideology: Dido’s pathos, after all, represents a powerful counterforce to the mission of “pious Aeneas,” the hero who must abandon the queen in order to fulfill his imperial mission. To momentarily empathize with the queen, for a Roman or English schoolboy, would seem to derail “a narrative of cultural origins” and foster anti-imperial sentiment. Moreover, the character was condemned by the dominant intellectual traditions. The important allegorizing tradition of the Aeneid, begun by Fulgentius in late antiquity, served to belittle the queen. In Fulgentius’ reading, Dido is transformed “into the personification of libido—desire or lust.” In another important commentary, by the twelfth-century Platonist scholar Bernard Silvestris, the same process of disparagement is at work. As Marilynn Desmond argues, “in glossing Aeneas’s journey through

the underworld, Bernard clarifies the relationship between Aeneas as rationality and Dido as libido... the normative male spirit, representing reason, has simultaneously purged himself of desire and the feminine. In countless other examples—among which one could include the work of Italian humanists, and, most famously, Dante’s Inferno—the most influential intellectual traditions demonized Dido as a lustful, effeminate other. When members of this masculine, hermeneutical tradition singled out a character for praise, it was typically “pious Aeneas,” the model of imperial virtue. Taking this dominant ideological encasement of the epic into account, the classroom performance of Dido’s anguish seems highly surprising. Calling on boys to enact and experience the queen’s grief, schoolmasters—from late antiquity to the early modern era—would seem to be disregarding the epic’s socially sanctioned reading.

A further factor that makes this practice so surprising is its dealing in powerful negative affects. Set against a history of thought about the emotions dating back to Plato, the impersonation of Dido—or, for that matter, of Niobe, Medea, or Hecuba—would seem to fly in the face of a dominant tradition that values “masculine” reason over “feminine” passion. By making their students weep for Dido, Plato would argue, schoolmasters allow poetry to enact its most destructive and irrational effect: “instead of being repulsed by the sight of the kind of person we’d regret and deplore being ourselves, we enjoy the spectacle and sanction it.” By impersonating the character, the boys are being forced to familiarize themselves with “an aspect...which hungers after tears and the satisfaction of having cried until one can cry no more.” Virgil’s depiction of Dido, as the argument goes, “[irrigate and tend] to these things when they should be left to wither, and it makes them our rulers when they should be our subjects, because otherwise we won’t live better and happier lives, but quite the opposite.”

3. Desmond, 1.
In the first of this paper’s case studies—St. Augustine’s famous childhood encounter with the *Aeneid*—this emotional aspect of the dramatic exercises is very much foregrounded. While the subject of his impersonation is not Dido but rather the angry wife of Jupiter, the description is still highly instructive: “I was to recite the speech of Juno in her anger and grief that she ‘could not keep the Trojan king out of Italy… The speaker who received highest praise was the one who had regard to the dignity of the imaginary characters, who most effectively expressed feelings of anger and sorrow, and who clothed these thoughts in appropriate language.”

The exercise that Augustine describes, it should be noted, is what Aphthonius labels a “pathetical ethopoeia,” “an imitation of the character” of someone “that shows emotion in relation to everything.” This is opposed to the “ethical” kind, which “introduce character only,” as well as the “mixed” variety, which both introduce character and produce pathos. The example that the rhetorician uses in his *Progymnasmata*, written in the same general timeframe as Augustine’s lifespan, is the “words a Hecuba might speak when Troy is fallen.”

In light of Aphthonius’ work, we can see more clearly what the young Augustine was tasked to do: on the most fundamental level, the schoolboy was asked to engender pathos through the relaying of strong, negative emotions. The effects to be imitated, in other words, were precisely the ones that Plato so famously censured. Moreover, when Augustine describes his reaction to Dido’s death, his language strongly evokes Plato’s critique in *The Republic*: “Had I been forbidden to read this story, I would have been sad that I could not read what made me sad. Such madness is considered a higher and more fruitful literary education than being taught to read and write.” The young Augustine, at this moment, undergoes the same experience as *The Republic’s* irrational playgoer, the captivated audience member who “hungered after tears and the

10. Apth. Prog. 280-281.
11. Aug. Con. 16.
satisfaction of having cried until one can cry no more.”¹² Both figures, in Plato’s framework, have abandoned reason for passion, productive wellbeing for regressive despair.

Why, then, in light of these seemingly problematic qualities, were the pathetic impersonations, as so influentially defined by Aphthonius, assigned? Manfred Kraus has provided a persuasive explanation: “… in the background of female ethopoeia there seems to be an imagination of a particular affinity of the female gender towards pathos. Accordingly, the opportunity for young men to safely display and rehearse vehement emotions appears to be the decisive element in female ethopoeia.”¹³ Ultimately, then, Augustine and other late antique schoolboys learned a crucial lesson from these female impersonations: the skill of using pathetic language. Thanks to the remarkable pathos of Dido and Juno, Niobe and Medea, these late antique students were equipped with a crucial tool. As future orators who would need to draw on pathetic power—as, for instance, in the act of arguing on behalf of a wronged client—the schoolboys received valuable training. With Virgil’s Carthaginian queen as their model, they were taught to effectively evoke sadness or pity in the listener. Thus, an initially surprising exercise can be seen to have borne real utility. Pathetic female impersonation, on Kraus’s terms, becomes a powerful means to an important rhetorical end.

The next case study—the process of neuming, or the placement of musical notations in the classics—is perhaps the most striking example of Dido’s rhetorical redemption. From the tenth to twelfth centuries, small markings called “neums” were written in the texts of writers like Statius, Lucan, and Virgil. We have evidence that many of the most important epics were neumed: De bello civili, the Thebaid, the Achilleid, and the Aeneid all received the notation.¹⁴ Jan Ziolkowski, in his magisterial account of the practice, has

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¹² Plat. Rep. 75.
pointed out the different kinds of passages that were selected for neuming. One popular type was “insights into the nature and workings of the universe”; another was “pronouncements on the history of Rome.” For our purposes, however, the most important category is the pathos-laden speeches of women. Strikingly, Ziolkowski writes, “the frenzy of Dido in the fourth book of the Aeneid, as it reveals itself in harangues to Aeneas and Anna as well as in a monologue, garnered more attention from neumators than any other episode in any classical Latin poem.” Recognized more than other passages in the classical cannon for their emotional impact, Dido’s Book 4 outbursts were frequently selected for performance by students; just as in the case of the late antique ethopoeiae, the queen’s words, at the most fundamental level, were singled out for their rhetorical power. Dido’s overwhelming emotional impact, the worst nightmare of an Augustine or Plato figure, was here embraced for its pathos, with its unmatched ability to engender pity and sorrow.

When one considers our final case study—a pair of glossed fifteenth-century Italian manuscripts of the Aeneid, one called the Casanatense and the other the Corsiniana—Dido’s rhetorical usefulness becomes exceptionally clear. In a recent article, Marjorie Curry Woods has taken a look at these manuscripts, focusing on the way in which characters’ speeches were subdivided into different rhetorical sections: Exordium, Narratio, Confirmatio, etc. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the pair taken from Virgil’s Carthaginian queen. In the first speech, Dido addresses the recently shipwrecked Aeneas for the first time. The

15. Ziolkowski, 147.
16. Ziolkowski, 162.
Casanatense commentator labels this “Verba Didonis ad Eneam captando benivolentiam”: (the words of Dido to Aeneas, trying to capture his goodwill.)\(^{18}\) Over the course of the speech, the two commentators outline the functions of each section, emphasizing, among other things, her *compatientia* (empathy with Aeneas), *narratio* (the point at which she tells her story,) and *hortatio* (the “call to action” when she calls the young men to come under her roof.)\(^{19}\) Ultimately, what emerges is a remarkable rhetorical strategy, one that, as Woods notes, could come straight out of the courtroom.\(^{20}\)

The next speech of Dido that receives attention from the commentators, the queen’s confrontation of Aeneas in Book IV, is especially interesting as a moment of high emotional impact and pathetic power. The Corsiniana commentator, Woods notes, “uses...technical rhetorical terms, thereby emphasizing the development of the speech.”\(^{21}\) By contrast, the Casanatense glossator strikingly “repeats *Nota* (take note!) at important points, emphasizing instead their cumulative emotional impact.”\(^{22}\) Ultimately, then, the intense, negative emotions so forcefully critiqued in *The Republic* are seen here to hold a powerfully useful rhetorical force. As Woods writes: “it is important to recall that the purpose of courtroom rhetoric from which these terms were taken was to generate emotion and reaction rather than to convince quietly on logical grounds. From this perspective, the interest in women speakers, or perhaps more exactly in the rhetorical situations of emotional women speakers, is significant.”\(^{23}\) In other words, the successful lawyer arguing on behalf of his client necessitated the pathos-inducing power of a Dido figure; he had much to learn, rhetorically, from the Carthaginian queen. The capacity to arouse an overwhelming affective response, a cause for condemnation in *Confessions* or *The Republic*, becomes, for the fifteenth century rhetorician, a necessary skill.

Across all three moments of Dido’s classroom
afterlife that we have observed—the impersonation by the young Augustine in late antiquity, the neuming in the early middle ages, and the fifteenth-century glosses—we see something like rhetoric’s redemption of the queen. Despite the presence of a dominant ideology that disapproves of her, as well as an ancient tradition that censures the kind of passion she engenders, Dido was utilized across the centuries for her rhetorical power. Where the queen’s emotional impact actualizes Plato’s worst fears regarding the literary arts, teachers and rhetoricians found in it real value. Where Augustine deemed it ruinously destructive, others detected in it a powerful utility. For centuries, rhetoricians recognized that when it came to the art of persuasion, the crucial skill of keeping one’s audience in mind, Dido had much to teach. The particular rhetorical circumstances that a former schoolboy might face—courtroom arguments, any appeal to pathos—called upon traits that the queen uniquely possessed. Unimportant to her author, and disparaged on the terms of later ideologies, Dido found a redemption of sorts in rhetorical education. Across centuries, it was in the classroom where her powerful impact—irrelevant to some, destructive to others—could be seen to bear real value.
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The ancient site of Delphi is one shrouded in mystery. Located on the slopes of Mount Parnassos in the region of Phocis, the sanctuary has been the subject of much attention in both ancient and modern times. The *Hymn to Pythian Apollo*¹ and Alcaeus’ *Hymn to Apollo* narrate the mythical origins of the site.² It is clear from these accounts and others that Delphi is shrouded in mystery; yet when one looks past these myths, one can examine the role of Delphi as a place for interaction among *poleis*. Oracular consultations were not the only activity that took place at the site. A considerable number of activities took place at the Delphi: rich offerings and sanctuaries were dedicated, Panhellenic games were held, and alliances were formed. In some ways Delphi served to smooth over discord between states; in others, however, the site and its institutions may have fostered conflict.

It is unlikely that the actual oracles delivered by the Pythia, the priestess of the Temple of Apollo³, constrained interstate discord. Fontenrose has collected a considerable number of purported oracular responses, preserved in a variety of sources.⁴ Whether these responses are legendary or accurately reflect the pronouncements of the Pythia is not particularly important, as they serve a narrative role.

Individuals or communities could use oracular responses to drum up popular support for their actions or strengthen ties between poleis. Solon, seeking to spur Athens into recapturing Salamis, wrote poems that may have included oracular elements.⁵ Preserved by Plutarch is one such verse that Solon may have intended to present as an oracular response: “Happy is the city that hearkens to one herald.”⁶ In this way Solon’s appeal was strengthened when, feigning madness and pronouncing verses, he persuaded the Athenians to fight to regain control of Salamis.⁷ Thus Delphi could play a role in the fomenting of conflict.

Conversely, oracular responses could be used to strengthen ties between communities. As Herodotus relates, the city of Thera offered an account of colonization different than that of its settlement Cyrene. Thera’s account emphasizes the great pains that a polis took in preparing a

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settlement expedition; it does not place particular emphasis on the role of Battos, the oikistes, or founder, of Cyrene. The Cyrenean account, on the other hand, de-emphasizes the role of Thera, emphasizing rather Battos’ “royal ancestry” in his duty to found a settlement. Each account makes reference to oracular consultation at Delphi; however, the consultation stories are different, serving the different purposes of each account. As Osborne argues, Thera sought to “[keep] alive links” with the wealthy Cyrene, and thus it highlighted its role in settlement. Ultimately, the two poleis affirmed their ties in a fourth century decree concerning citizenship rights. It is telling the decree, according to its own language, was to be placed “in the ancestral temple of Pythian Apollo.” Delphi could serve some role in smoothing over discord, as Thera and Cyrene show, but one cannot conclude that Delphi always did so. Individuals and groups could politicize the oracle for their own ends, sometimes with discord as a result.

Oracular consultations undertaken by tyrant families certainly demonstrate the potential for Delphi to be politicized. Sometime in the late sixth century, Herodotus relates, the Alcmeonidai, an elite Athenian family seeking to unseat the more dominant Peisistratidai, “bribed the Pythia to tell any Spartiates who came to consult the oracle…to liberate Athens.” This use of the oracle hardly smoothed over interstate discord; learning of the bribe, the Spartans sought to restore Hippias as tyrant of Athens. Not long after the expulsion of the Peisistratidai, Kleisthenes gained power, himself the grandson of Kleisthenes of Sicyon. This elder Kleisthenes was also involved with the politicization of the oracle at Delphi. Inquiring whether he might expel from Sicyon his rival Adrastus, Kleisthenes gets a stark and insulting response: ‘Adrastus is ruler of the city, you but a stone thrower.” This oracular response is nothing but a fabrication, argues Parker, the “blunt rebuke…but another fiber in the skein of later anti-Kleisthenic propaganda.” Thus individuals could use the institution of oracles to further

10. Osborne, 10-11.
11. Hdt. 2.28.
12. Hdt. 9.36.
their political ends, as some unknown individual did to belittle Kleisthenes as a leuster. And politicization of Delphi could contribute to interstate discord, as the expulsion of the Peisistratidai illustrates.

Oracular consultation, though, was not the only significant activity associated with Delphi. Stephanitic games—in which victors were awarded crowns—were first held at Delphi in the early sixth century. The games celebrated either Apollo’s slaying of the dragon; alternatively, they may have commemorated the victory of the Amphictyon—the league that controlled Delphi from the sixth century on—in the First Sacred War.\footnote{Michael Scott, Delphi: A History of the Center of the Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 73.} Thus one function of games such as these may have been memory-building; that is, the preservation of stories or events deemed important to identity. Stephanitic games may have served other functions as well. Artistic and athletic artistic contests like the Pythian Games provided the opportunity for “informal meetings between [aristocratic] individuals from different states.”\footnote{Catherine Morgan, Athletes and Oracles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 136, 204.}

These elite interactions could take on a number of forms. Kleisthenes of Sicyon, for example, as Herodotus relates, used the occasion of the Olympic Games to announce to

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{stadium.jpg}
\caption{Modern remains of the stadium used for Pythian Games.}
\end{figure}
aristocrats from around the Mediterranean that he sought to marry off his daughter. One can speculate, then, that this festival aspect of Delphi may have served to mollify interstate discord. At the Pythian Games, powerful members of different poleis could cultivate relationships; or, as Neer puts it, they could symbolically “[mediate] their conflicts over athla”. Indeed, Delphi may have smoothed over discord by acting as a place where elites could build solidarity between poleis and strengthen their own position within the polis. Morris discusses such in his monograph on archaic social paradigms. “Elitist poetry” allowed elites to construct an elite identity, “an imagined community” between poleis. Among other themes, this poetry drew on elite experiences and interactions at interstate games held at sites such as Delphi.

The framing of relations as between states may even be inaccurate, as Morgan suggests. One can see a pattern common to activities at Delphi in the archaic period—it is elites who consult the oracle, elites who participate in contests, and elites who build dedications. Elites, then, may have been the central actors in interstate relations in the archaic period. It was not until the classical period that the coalescence of the state as a unit occurred; this transition may have been tied to practices at Delphi, as the nature of dedication practices changed over time. One might speculate that at some point in the archaic period, middling groups gained more sway as a stronger civic identity emerged. For much of the archaic period, examination of the role Delphi played in interstate relations is, more accurately, an examination of how elite interactions at Delphi shaped the relations between the poleis those elites represented.

The shift toward a stronger civic identity can perhaps be seen in the emergence in the Amphicrytonic League. The Delphic Amphicryon, members of which included Sicyon, Athens, and other prominent poleis, may have arisen out of the First Sacred War. That conflict,
its particular details obscured by legend, was fought the local city Crisa against several poleis from around Greece, each side hoping to control the sanctuary. Such an event illustrates how Delphi could both foster and check interstate conflict. Out of war over the site emerged a cooperative association that sought to mollify discord and protect what its members had in Delphi “as a successful node on an important trade network.” As Low argues in her application of international relations theory to classical Greece, the Delphic Amphictyony was key in the coalescence of an interstate system. Through the Amphictyony, member poleis were “united by the fundamental ties of chôras kai biou kai ethôn kai eleutherias, ‘territory and life and customs and freedom.’” One might consider these—territory et al.—as norms that informed the behavior of member poleis with one another, norms originating from sacred sites like Delphi. One might speculate as well that these norms began to crystallize near the end of the archaic period.

Over the archaic period, from the eighth century down to the fifth, Delphi played somewhat of a varied role in interstate relations. Delphic oracles themselves certainly had the potential to sanction interstate strife. Other activities at Delphi, however, seem to have minimized interstate strife, fostering elite solidarity in the middle of the archaic period and interstate cooperation in the late archaic as stronger civic identities emerged. Perhaps the late sixth century reconstruction of the Temple of Apollo by the Alcmeonidai best illustrates this increasing cooperation associated with Delphi. Such was a joint effort, funded by several Greek sources, and a “political statement” as well, the Alcmeonidai intending to “gain favor amongst participant states.” But the Alcmeonidai purportedly bribed the Pythia at the same time, an act that brought about bad blood between Athens and Sparta. Thus there was potential for both conflict and cooperation to arise from activities at Delphi.
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Animus after Actium?
Antony, Augustus, and Damnatio Memoriae
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Historians of ancient Roman memory – most notably Harriot Flower and Eric Varner – offer strong evidence that the Augustan regime sought to rehabilitate the legacy of Mark Antony after his death. They argue that given Antony’s geographically diverse and relatively numerous visual and epigraphic remains, Antony could not have been fully subject to the dishonoring of memory, or damnatio memoriae, typically inflicted upon deceased political pariahs through the erasure of their name and image from public and private spaces.¹ While the archaeological and textual signs of Antony’s post-mortem preservation are surprisingly numerous, the reasons for such clemency remain compareably unexplored. Why would Augustus have impeded the damnatio memoriae of his most hated rival?

I argue that the perplexing preservation of Antony’s memory in the late 1st Century BCE may have actually corresponded with the values projected by the Augustan regime and its ideological revolution. I will explore three central themes of the Augustan revolution – (1) its focalization of auctoritas, (2) its departure from Hellenistic values, and ultimately, (3) its emphasis on the virtues of pietas and clementia – to demonstrate that each of these three revolu-

tionary pillars would reject the *damnatio memoriae* of Antony as an ideological violation because of the sanction’s communicative implications. In the bigger picture, a comparison between known Augustan values with the researched visual repercussions of damnatio memoriae not only exposes a number of reasonable theories about Antony’s preservation, but also materially informs our understanding of Augustan censorship and its effect on the memory sanctions of the later Principate.

Augustus’ meteoric rise to power followed no constitutional precedent: after the victory at Actium, the man who would become Augustus declared himself as the empire’s supreme leader, bypassing republican laws and the judgment of the Senate. He projected that such superiority was legitimized by *auctoritas*, or as Karl Galinsky defines it, material, intellectual, and moral superiority justified by moral rectitude.\(^2\) *Auctoritas* is highly individualistic in nature. An *auctor*, from its initial use in the Twelve Tables, is a guardian who guarantees or stamps approval upon a certain proposal, considering whether or not to accept or reject it with his own judgment and then taking responsibility for the consequences.\(^3\) Such controlling and paternalistic overtones project that for the regime, the burden of authority depended not on the constitution of the Republic or the judgment of the Senate, but on the prudence of a single person with a (supposedly) superior moral vision. Thus, the way Augustus presented his ascendancy to the public via imagery and literature was predicated not simply on being the last warlord standing after a decade of civil conflict. Instead, it hinged upon a self-righteous belief that he had survived his rivals through his superior vision for Rome’s salvation.

A complete and total erasure of Mark Antony would superficially seem to serve *auctoritas* well; it would eliminate the memory of another who had challenged Augustus’ morally-driven, sole rule. Recent research, however, reveals


\(^3\) Galinksy, 13.
that the process of damnatio memoriae may not have had this effect. As Charles Hedrick Jr. describes, damnatio memoriae paradoxically draws attention to the fact that the individual suffering censure is not represented, for silence and absence are themselves overtly conspicuous.\(^4\) Complete eradication of Antony’s memory, even after his death, would have drawn more attention to the fact that another had threatened Augustus’ own auctoritas, proving that it was not infallible. On the other hand, keeping Antony’s image around would avoid such conspicuousness and strengthen Augustus’ auctoritas by conveying how it was unthreatened by the lingering shadow of its greatest challenger. Attention to Antony created from the memory sanction would have been widespread because sculpture and imagery functioned as a communicative medium in Roman society. As Varner suggests, most people were largely illiterate and depended upon imagery to convey ideas.\(^5\) In his discussion of Augustan imagery, Paul Zanker concurs, arguing through the proliferation of art during the Augustan revolution that imagery was a new “visual language” through which Augustus was able to pass down his moral judgments.\(^6\) Hence, a total censorship of Antony in art would have been perceived by all regardless of class differences, circulating Antony’s memory and presence throughout society more than if his image were left unviolated.

In addition to considering its implications for auctoritas, it is also worth noting that damnatio memoriae fell under a Hellenistic cultural tradition, and the Augustan revolution emphasized a deliberate moral departure from Hellenistic values. During the death throes of the Republic, many conservatives felt that the luxury, debauchery, and decadence of the Greek East imposed a degenerating, corrupting influence upon Roman society which precipitated moral decline.\(^7\) As Zanker describes, this view was particularly amplified because the civil war unevenly distributed spoils into the hands of the wealthy.\(^8\) Given this fear of moral

\(^4\) Headrick Jr., Charles. History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity (Austin: University of Texas, 2000), 93. Emphasis added.

\(^5\) Varner, 1.


\(^7\) Zanker, 2.

\(^8\) Zanker, 2.
decline, Augustan revolutionary art frequently entailed a Roman re-adaptation of certain Hellenistic archetypes to break away from the luxury of the Greek East and focus instead on religious revival and familial obligation.\(^9\) The Augustan revolution thus entailed a deliberate departure from the Hellenic influence associated with excess.

\emph{Damnatio memoriae} itself has obvious Hellenistic roots – the Greeks too censored political pariahs from their past, and it was likely that the Romans knowingly adopted the practice from them. Roman memory sanctions contained a known Greek precedent; Varner outlines several instances of Greek memory sanctions which bear striking resemblance to their future Roman counterparts both in practice and in description by ancient historians. Most notable are the \emph{damnationes memoriae} of Hipparchos in the 5th Century BCE, the orator Demetrios of Phaleron in the 4th, and of Philip V of Macedon in the 3rd; all are accounted for by archaeological evidence (statue remnants, both bronze and marble).\(^10\) Such repeated behavior across several consecutive centuries suggests that these memory sanctions were an ingrained Hellenistic cultural practice. Moreover, memory sanctions were fundamental components of ancient Greek laws designed to preserve the stability between warring Hellenistic city states and their rulers; traitors who shifted from city to city and were condemned to \emph{damnatio memoriae} to intimidate others against doing the same.\(^11\) Given the repeated legal use of \emph{damnatio memoriae} in the Greek East that would mirror the Senate’s later use of the process against political exiles, Flower goes so far as to conclude that “in an analysis of the function of memory and punitive sanctions the Greeks provide the essential background to later Roman practices.”\(^12\) In short, \emph{Damnatio memoriae} had verifiable Greek origins which the Romans would have recognized since they adapted them for their own use. Although the process exhibits none of the perceived excesses or debauchery of the Hellenistic world, it would have been counter-revolu-

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11. Flower, 18-19.

12. Flower, 18.
tionary for Augustus to use a Hellenistic process to condemn Antony when his entire movement for greater moral legitimacy was grounded in a deliberate departure from Greek culture.

Finally, like auctoritas and a general departure from Hellenistic practices, the centrality of the Roman values of pietas and clementia to the Augustan Revolution likely contributed to the decision not to subject Mark Antony to damnatio memoriae. The importance of both pietas and clementia is reinforced by their inscription upon the clipeus virtutis, a monumental shield immortalizing the central themes of the Augustan cultural program, erected by the Senate when Octavian became Augustus in 27 BCE. Their centrality within works of Augustan literature – most notably the Aeneid – and their prominent personification in sculpture suggest that they were both boldly-advertised, propagated virtues representative of the emperor’s new “Golden Age.”

The virtue of clementia is the appropriate expression of mercy towards a conquered people who submit to Roman authority, and this mercy appears to have been an accepted standard of ideal Roman behavior. Consider how Vergil, through the speech of Aeneas’ father Anchises, describes the optimal behavior of future Romans as “to spare the conquered and to crush the proud.” Furthermore, Augustus had a

clear precedent for clementia from his uncle, Julius Caesar; the link between Augustus and the deified Julius Caesar as promoters of clementia followed naturally from Augustus’s claim to divine status as divi filius, the son of the deified Julius Caesar.  

Virtue was associated with Caesar’s projections of superlative leadership whose strength resided in the “fair” treatment of enemies during his foreign wars, and therefore later projected upon Augustus and his regime.

The virtue of pietas - or loyalty to gods, family, and country - is perhaps the most important value on the clipeus virtutis because of its overtones of social responsibility and inherent “Romanness.” Because this value had long been considered as uniquely Roman even before the Augustan era, it was focalized as the central figurehead of the Roman revolution personified in various images throughout the empire. The most notable examples, as Galinsky suggests, are perhaps images of Aeneas carrying his father Anchises out of burning Troy, like the image carved on the Altar of the Gens Augusta found at Carthage. Augustus advertised that he had shown piety to his “father” Julius Caesar in the same way that Aeneas had for Anchises, and that he expected his subjects to treat him similarly as pater patriae.

Clearly, clementia and pietas were central to Augustus’s cultural program, and the communicative implications of damnatio memoriae would have constituted flagrant violations of both of them. Beginning with clementia, damnatio memoriae evidently evoked the mutilation of a corpse as an extreme form of punishment for a condemned elite. The similarities between the corpse mutilation and damnatio memoriae extend beyond how both were typically inflicted upon members of the elite postmortem as an especially abusive form of punishment. The punitive mutilations of statues are analogous to those of corpses: both modes of mutilation strategically lacerate sensory organs like the eyes, ears, nose, and tongue. Pliny’s Panegyricus, in which Pliny describes

17. Galinsky, 84.
18. Galinsky, 86.
21. Varner, 3-4. Note that Varner’s list spans for half a paragraph; it has been truncated here for reasons of scope.
the statues of Domitian during his damnatio memoriae as if they were bodies that could feel pain and leak blood, is especially demonstrative.\(^{23}\) It was, to use Varner’s phrase, “anthropomorphic rhetoric” which treated the condemned images as if they were actual bodies.\(^{24}\)

As it entails inflicting further violence on a helpless opponent, the desecration of a corpse ipso facto would be an outright violation of clementia. Sufficient textual evidence from Augustan literature contextualizes such mutilation as such. Consider Virgil’s treatment of the mutilation suffered by Deiphobus, a son of Priam, described in Book VI of the Aeneid.\(^{25}\) During the fall of Troy, Deiphobus is savagely mutilated by a condemnable Odysseus, in turn portrayed negatively for inflicting unnecessary harm on an enemy whom he has already subdued.\(^{26}\) Given the analogy between corpse mutilation and defacing statues, and because of his extensive cultural emphasis on clementia, it would have been overtly hypocritical for Augustus to have inflicted damnatio memoriae upon Antony.

In addition to defying clementia, damnatio memoriae would also have violated pietas, or loyalty to gods, family, and country. In an effort to strengthen his former political alliance with Antony at the height of the Second Triumvirate, Octavian offered him in marriage to his sister Octavia, transforming Antony into his brother in law.\(^{27}\) The loyalty towards family implied by pietas would expressly forbid a war between two brothers – it is likely for this reason that Octavian declared his war as against the foreign Queen Cleopatra, and not Antony himself.\(^{28}\) Indeed, Octavian represented his triumph at Actium as a victory against Egypt and its queen; Antony was not overtly portrayed to disguise the stain of civil war.\(^{29}\)

Clearly, the notion of two brothers fighting was shameful, perhaps even conjuring imagery within Roman consciousness about the previous civil wars between Marius

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\(^{24}\) Varner, 3.

\(^{25}\) Vergil, Aeneid 6.509-35.

\(^{26}\) Varner, 4.


\(^{28}\) Flower, 131.

\(^{29}\) Flower, 119.
and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, or even Remus and Romulus. The implications of inflicting *damnatio memoriae* upon the closest possible form of sibling by marriage, a brother-in-law, would have been perceived equally indecorous as it too represented one brother harming another. As Flower concludes, Augustus’ position was linked to both consensus and harmony, so the *damnatio memoriae* of Antony would, as a clear violation of pietas, conflict with a key propagandistic element of the Augustan revolution.30

In conclusion, perhaps Augustus avoided invoking *damnatio memoriae* against Mark Antony due to conflicts with several key elements contained in his program of cultural renewal. The process of *damnatio memoriae* violated the Augustan principles of (1) *auctoritas*, (2) departure from Hellenism, and ultimately, (3) *pietas* and *clementia*. The erasure of Antony would have been hypocritical, and therefore counterproductive, to promoting the propagandaized morality of the new regime. In the bigger picture, given the ideological conflicts between *damnatio memoriae* and the Augustan revolution, it seems that the Augustan censorship (or lack thereof) in regards to Antony specifically did not appear to serve as a precedent for the frequent use of memory sanctions that would become so common later in the principate and beyond. In line with Tacitean cynicism, the future usage of *damnatio memoriae* against Piso, Messalina, Agrippina the Younger, and countless other eventually reviled members of the imperial household may only reflect how distant the core ideals of the ephemeral Golden Age had become after Augustus passed.

30. Flower, 131.
**Works Cited**


Sing to me, muse, of a man of many mischiefs, who made many wanderings, since he sacked the sacred citadel of Troy: he saw the cities of many men and marked their mindset, he suffered such sorrows on the sea concerning his spirit seeking to secure his own soul and the nostos of his soldiers. But he could not help his hetarous, however eager he was: for they were ruined by their respective recklessness, hooligans, who ate the heifers of Helios Hyperion who thus hindered the homecoming day for them. Declaim to us these deeds, as you decide, deity, daughter of Zeus.
1. **πολύτροπον**: ‘mischiefs.’ This somewhat archaic word was chosen both to concisely express πολύτροπον, a difficult phrase to communicate in English, and to retain the alliteration.

2. **ἔπερσεν**: ‘he saw the cities.’ The translator added this enjambment to assist the alliteration, a decision acceptable due to the poem’s pre-existing use of enjambment throughout these lines.

3. **ἔγνω**: ‘marked,’ as in, ‘made a mental note of,’ is used for the sake of concision and alliteration.

4. **πολλὰ δ᾽...γ´**: ‘such,’ instead of the more literal ‘many’ in order to keep the alliteration.

5. **νόστον**: ‘nostos;’ transliterated to avoid translating the more concisely expressed Greek term into a bulky and awkward series of English terms. The internal and the terminal ‘s’ also assist the alliteration here.

6. **ἑταίρων**: ‘soldiers,’ lit. ‘companions.’ ἑταίρων is translated as ‘soldiers’ here for the sake of alliteration.

7. **ἑτάρους**: ‘hetarous;’ here, the Greek word is transliterated solely to assist the alliteration.

8. **αὐτῶν...σφετέρησιν**: ‘respective;’ here, for the alliteration and concision.

9. **αὐτὰρ**: ‘who;’ here, to clarify the subject of this line. The extra alliteration is an added bonus of this translation choice.

10. **τῶν**: supply ‘deeds.’ ‘Deeds,’ a less ambiguous choice than ‘things,’ and additionally contributes to the alliteration.

11. **ἁμόθεν γε´**: ‘as you decide.’ Difficult to express elegantly in English, this phrase is translated more literally to minimize awkward construction, convey appropriate meaning, and assist the alliteration.
The attempt to extract a definite interpretation of Sophocles’ *Electra* has polarized the scholarship into two distinct camps.¹ The pessimists maintain that the play is “sombre and unrelieved beyond any other play of Sophocles,”² while the optimists describe it as “not even (in a deep way) a tragedy,”³ but rather “a combination of matricide and good spirits.”⁴ This dichotomy has led to an attempt at reconciliation that is equally dissatisfying. Grappling with this slippery issue, one scholar seems to throw up his hands, stating, “I have no solution to these dilemmas and rather think that Sophocles had none.”⁵ The tone of the text is indeed troubling. Exploring a complicated case of justice achieved by corrupt means, the play seems to leave the audience with more questions than answers. Surely the end cannot justify means so extreme as matricide and murder? Perhaps it can, for the protagonists of Sophocles’ *Electra* apparently get away with murder by the end of the play. In any case, the main issue at hand is the nature of justice, and it is clear that the question of whether Electra promotes justice or injustice has no easy answer.

¹ John Sheppard (1918, 1927) and J.H. Kells (1973) give ironic readings that ultimately fall in the pessimistic camp. Sir Richard Jebb (1894) uses a Homerizing approach that concludes optimistically, and Waldock (1966) has a strictly optimistic reading. There are many other examples for each camp (see MacLeod p. 5, n. 11 and p. 11, n. 24), but the aforementioned readings are, if not the most groundbreaking, at least effectively representative of their respective camps.

This obstacle, however, has not prevented scholars from seeking different angles that might usefully shed light on the play. Such scholars as Leona MacLeod recognize that defending the middle ground is necessary to read this complicated play, since the audience may support Orestes and Electra and “recognize the justice of their cause” but simultaneously feel “urged to be repelled by their arguments and the brutality of their attitudes and actions.” MacLeod focuses on “the understanding of the role of the dolos and the aischron in the pursuit of a just vengeance” to show that there is justice in Electra, but the means used to achieve it gives the play an undeniably dark tone. While this perspective seems to best reconcile and also acknowledge the complexities of this tragedy, it does not explain the potential motivation behind portraying such dubious justice, or what Mark Ringer calls “the play’s extraordinary tonal ambivalence.” Ringer claims that “this ambivalence is rooted in the tragedy’s metatheatrical nature,” for theater itself is the art of duality—actors play characters, and nothing is actually real. His sweeping analysis of the play’s metatheatrical elements, while constructive, can perhaps be developed in a particular direction in order to explain the purpose of the tonal ambivalence rather than merely uncover its roots. While a single close reading cannot be presumed to resolve the scholarly dispute over optimistic versus pessimistic readings of the play, it may yield fruitful implications for this debate. By studying the tension between traditional gender roles in speech and deed (λόγος and ἔργον) and space within and without (ἔνδον and ἐκτός) during the climactic murders...
in Sophocles’ *Electra*, one can see how Electra’s manipulation of these tensions through her speech gives her metatheatrical control over the action within the text, the physical and metaphysical space of the play, and ultimately the entire drama, leaving justice fulfilled but only under Electra’s own terms.

Electra first asserts her control over ἔργον through λόγος by stretching the traditional female and male roles assigned to λόγος and ἔργον. The tension caused by this manipulation is particularly apparent in the scenes involving the murders of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, specifically when Electra addresses the chorus at the beginning of the strophe:

Hλ. ὦ φίλταται γυναῖκες, ἅνδρε αὐτίκα
teloũsin toûργον• ἀλλὰ σῖγα πρόσμενε.
Χo. πῶς δή; τί νῦν πράσσουσιν; ¹¹
El. O dearest women, the men at once
will finish the deed; but wait in silence.
Ch. How indeed? What are they doing now?²²

The antithesis in line 1398 between the vocative γυναῖκες and the nominative ἄνδρες, the subject that will complete τοûργον (l.1399),¹³ nicely illustrates what Thomas Woodard calls “the masculine world of erga” and “the feminine world of logoi.”¹⁴ Women are traditionally confined to speech; only men can act. Here Electra urges the female chorus not only to wait rather than act (πρόσμενε)¹⁵ but also to suppress what power of speech they have (σῖγα).¹⁶ The roles of women and men seem to be clearly delineated. Woodard argues that “Orestes and Electra serve as emblems for the worlds of ergon and logos respectively,”¹⁷ and up to this point it does indeed seem that the men and women are following their traditional roles. At line 1400, however, a shift occurs when the chorus asks Electra what the men are doing now (πράσσουσιν).¹⁸ One would expect Electra to answer the chorus with a simple description relaying the concept of justice. The reason scholars do not know what to make of the play is because Electra’s justice is achieved by unjust means and thus not a black and white case. Some scholars, such as Whitman (1951) try to evade this issue, arguing that the play’s focus is the character of Electra rather than justice (Whitman, 155). However, avoiding the issue only sweeps the problem under the rug, for justice plays too large a role in Electra to be ignored, especially given how undeniably complicated and thus problematic this role is. Other scholars do little more than restate formerly proposed arguments. MacLeod seems to best illustrate a productive middle ground since she accepts justice as the play’s main issue and faces it head on (MacLeod, 19).

8. MacLeod, 186.
10. Ringer, 128.
12. All translations in this paper are author’s own.
action encapsulated in the word πρόσσον, but instead she interacts with the masculine sphere of ἔργον. The tone of this scene is undeniably dark as Clytemnestra cries out an unprecedented total of five times (αἰαῖ; οἴμοι; ὦ τέκνοι; τέκνοι; ὦμοι; ὦμοι). The pathos generated by Clytemnestra’s cries starkly contrasts with Electra’s indifferent tone. Although Electra knows that Clytemnestra is the source of the cries, she refers to her twice with the indefinite pronoun τις, effectively stripping away Clytemnestra’s identity. Thus, Electra does not simply describe the goings on inside the house but also expands the function λόγος can have. The spheres of λόγος and ἔργον collide and intermingle as Electra’s words suddenly have power beyond that of description.

The most striking physical show of the power of Electra’s λόγος comes with Clytemnestra’s actual murder;

Electra orders Orestes to strike Clytemnestra a second time, and her λόγοι immediately result in actual ἔργα. In Sarah Nooter’s words, Electra is “the linguistic agent of murder.” Nooter, however, believes that the metatheatrical element of Electra’s role only entails her commentary on the offstage action and does not give Electra complete agency over the deed. Similarly, Rachel Kitzinger argues that Electra’s λόγος dominates the beginning of the play but the “incompatibility of λόγος and ἔργον must be central to our understanding of the end of the play.” Thus, according to the view shared by Nooter and Kitzinger, Electra is merely a mouthpiece for the action as she relays to the audience the murderous deeds that are occurring offstage. Indeed, Kitzinger goes so far as to claim that Electra’s words are “so plainly removed from [the action] that they are shockingly futile and empty” and thus “distract from, rather
than complete, our experience of the murder.” Kitzinger compares Sophocles’ version of the murder to Euripides’ Electra, in which Electra takes physical part in the murder with Orestes, or in Kitzinger’s words, “her hand is laid on top of his as they perform the murder together,” as if the audience can see the action, as if the murder does not happen offstage. Perhaps Electra is more distant from the action in Sophocles’ version of the play as far as the plot is concerned, but in the actual performance, because of the staging of the play, it is Electra’s λόγοι that encapsulate and, in the audience’s perspective, actually are the action, as compared to the mere post facto description in Euripides’ Electra.

Indeed, it is only through Electra’s words that the audience experiences any of the action. As David Seale states, “this explicitness of visual meaning is achieved by the clear link between visual language and visual effect.” Ultimately, Kitzinger’s interpretation does not take into account the actual effect of a text meant for performance. If anything, it is at the end of the play that Electra’s λόγος dominates more than ever as λόγος and ἔργον become intimately intertwined. Electra’s λόγοι not only surpass simple description but also become ἔργα in and of themselves. Through her words, Electra becomes the linguistic agent of murder, using metatheatricality not only to comment on the action but also to control the action from within the play through her words. As per usual the action occurs offstage. However, it is Electra’s interaction with the offstage events that is unusual. Electra’s commentary becomes a sort of “macabre” dialogue with Clytemnestra. Electra orders an action to occur, and Clytemnestra confirms the completion of this action. Thus, Electra has the power to make λόγος become ἔργον.

On the other hand, while other characters attempt to exercise this power, they are unsuccessful. Aegisthus, for instance, tries to take control of the situation by ordering silence (σιγᾶν) but ironically is himself rendered speechless.

when Electra reveals Orestes to him (οὐ λέγω).\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, when Aegisthus and Orestes are conversing and thus stalling the action, Electra interrupts, ordering Orestes not to allow Aegisthus to speak any longer (μὴ πέρα λέγειν ἔα).\textsuperscript{33} While the male characters are onstage, they are incapable of committing action, and Electra steals from them even their power of speech. In so doing, Electra uses her words to physically silence the men herself. Thus, only Electra’s λόγοι have the power to silence and murder her opposition. She is not simply “the ultimate interlocutor”\textsuperscript{34}—though she is that as well—but also exercises metatheatrical control over the action. Through her λόγοι, she can be distanced from the actual ἔργα yet simultaneously act as the agent of their execution, for her λόγος is ἔργον.

Many scholars do not seem to recognize this crucial tension caused by Electra’s intermingling the two previously separate spheres of λόγος and ἔργον as she, a female, interacts with the ἔργον by giving λόγος an ergative force beyond post facto description. Woodard states that throughout the course of the play, Electra realizes her need for ἔργον over λόγος.\textsuperscript{35} To Woodard, ἔργα are the external shape of λόγοι,\textsuperscript{36} and Electra can only attain ἔργα “through a conjunction of Orestes’ hand and her tongue.”\textsuperscript{37} From this perspective, ἔργον and λόγος are in a sort of symbiotic relationship, for λόγος is the meaningful force behind ἔργον, and ἔργον is the manifestation of λόγος; one cannot exist without the other. Through Electra then “Sophocles heals the breach between ergon and logos… and reconciles triumphantly the claims of actual and ideal.”\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps the breach is crossed, but it is crossed because it is transgressed rather
than healed. Although Ringer affirms Woodard’s claim that “Electra leaves the domain of words and begins to operate in the masculine sphere of deeds,” it seems more accurate to say that Electra does not step from one sphere to the other but rather that the spheres intermingle under Electra’s manipulation, for by the end of the play her λόγος is in itself ἔργον. Electra creates tension between λόγος and ἔργον by taking two opposed elements and making them coexist on a single plane. The dichotomy here is the separation between female and male roles within λόγος and ἔργον and the functions of λόγος and ἔργον as separate units.

Using speech to create deed, Electra makes the dichotomy into a continuum, mixing two seemingly opposed elements together. It is through this manipulation of λόγος and ἔργον that Electra creates tension, which she then bends to her will. Thus, the tension between ἔργον and λόγος is not simply a show of “theatrical self-consciousness” as Ringer would have it. Indeed, the tension is not merely of text reflecting theatricality and of duality within dramatic action; rather, it is of Electra herself taking control over the action. Hence, the metatheatricality stems not only from the text but also from its main character, from Electra herself.

This metatheatrical reading of λόγος as ἔργον has implications for the resolution of the play. Some scholars argue that the complexities of Electra cannot be resolved because the play is meant to speak to many different people; because of the diversity of perspectives within the audience, plays must necessarily have a variety of characters that yield a “plurality of voices,” which are not and cannot be resolved. Therefore, the play itself cannot have a clean resolution. This answer, while convenient, unfortunately does not agree with the evidence offered by the play’s final scenes, which seem rather to reflect that there is an unsettling lack of tension in the voices. At the end of the play, Clytemnestra is dead, the chorus strongly condones Electra and Orestes’ murderous

39. Ringer, 129.
40. Ringer, 130.
41. Allan and Kelly define the plurality of voices in the following way: “The plurality of voices in Athenian tragedy is perhaps the form’s most obvious and significant feature. Spoken interactions between (the several) characters and chorus drive the drama, and the multiplicity of these perspectives lend tragedy a uniquely varied and complex vocal dynamic, in which the clash of values and attitudes encapsulates the very essence of the play” (William Allan and Adrian Kelly, “Listening to Many Voices: Athenian Tragedy as Popular Art,” in The Author’s Voice in Classical and Late Antiquity, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 77).
action $^{43}$ and Orestes leads Aegisthus, the final obstacle, offstage to be murdered. Electra has silenced all opposition. Thus, it cannot be that the “plurality of voices”$^{44}$ explains Electra’s lack of resolution because the tension between the various voices has been effectively eradicated by the end of the play. Electra no longer has too many voices but too few. By manipulating the functions of λόγος and ἔργον, however, Electra creates a new source of tension while simultaneously destroying the usual tragic tension among the voices. A metatheatrical reading of the play shows how Electra takes control over λόγος and ἔργον, which gives her power over the action and thus the ability to commit the murders and silence her opposition. Electra makes the play come to a resolution that is satisfactory to her, but questionable to the audience. Thus, a metatheatrical reading of λόγος and ἔργον explains how such complex justice can exist in the play. It does not, however, completely resolve the ambiguous tone resulting from such a justice.

Electra’s metatheatricality, however, does not end at her internal manipulation of λόγος and ἔργον but also applies to her external manipulation of the space of the play itself. Nooter writes that Electra “uses her poetic authority to control the behavior and experiences of the other characters, while also imposing her priorities on the shape of the tragedy itself.”$^{45}$ Nooter, however, defines the “shape of tragedy” as the metrical and structural elements of the play.$^{46}$ When viewing this play through a metatheatrical lens, it seems worthwhile to further this exploration of tragic shape by studying the physical space inside and outside of the οἶκος as well as the play’s metatheatrical space within and without.

The female and male genders traditionally act “in separate spaces, one inside, one outside,”$^{47}$ but perhaps these gender distinctions between inside and outside are not as easily defined as they may seem. Helene Foley claims that tragic female characters “who take action, and especially
those who speak and act publicly and in their own interest, represent the greatest and most puzzling deviation from the cultural norm.”

This statement, however, assumes that there is a one-to-one correlation between the gender roles in the fictional world of tragedy and in the real world of fifth century Athens. This is not the case. As P.E. Easterling points out, Electra “is over-stepping the mark in making public display of what should be kept private, but the house is in such a perveted state that she is entitled to question her obligation to obey its rules.”

Tragedy is a world of extremes, so it is not simple matter to label a character’s actions as a deviation from the norm when a good deal of tragic elements can reasonably be perceived as such. Thus, in the tragic world, a reversal of the traditional gender norms of reality may create tension, but not always for the sole purpose of total gender subversion.

In this same vein, it must be made clear that while the tension between ἔνδον and ἐκτός in Electra may exist because of a manipulation of the traditional gendered spaces, the contrast between ἔνδον and ἐκτός can have implications beyond that of gender distinction and subversion. Foley focuses on gendered spaces because she believes that a play’s “pointedly gendered voices can help to lay the basis for interpreting its controversial ethics.” While this may perhaps be true, Foley comes to the conclusion that “the female lamenting voice is restrained, brutalized (inadvertently by Orestes, and by the play deliberately), questioned, partially undercut, put in its place.” On the contrary, in the actual text of the play, it appears rather that Electra’s voice is the one that-overpowers Orestes and the entire play itself.

By manipulating λόγος and ἔργον, Electra controls the action and silences her opposition. Indeed Electra’s presence dominates the stage both “in its duration and its visual impressiveness” more so than any other Sophoclean character, except perhaps Oedipus in the Oedipus at Colonus.” Thus, it is not readily apparent how Electra’s voice

48. Foley, 4.
50. Foley, 147.
51. Foley, 171.
52. Seale, 79.
is brutalized. Furthermore, Foley concludes by saying that “the role played by female lamentation and invective in vendetta is messy, personal, angry, excessive, even dangerous,” which is the reason that “the pursuit of justice is for Electra equally messy.” Essentially, Foley concludes that Electra’s justice is “messy” because it is vendetta justice, a tenable yet rather unsatisfying resolution. Ultimately, it is clear that a tension exists in Electra between the gendered spaces within and without, but Easterling more convincingly asserts that “the place of Electra” as a dramatic question throughout the play “seems to be the point of the ‘inside’/‘outside’ contrast rather than any more ‘standard’ exploration of gender distinction or of the relation between oikos and polis.” More than a dramatic question, the contrast between the spaces within and without can be usefully linked to Electra’s metatheatrical role. With her manipulation of ἔργον and λόγος, Electra controls the play from within, as λόγος metatheatrically becomes ἔργον. However, with her manipulation of ἐνδόν and ἐκτός, Electra steps out of the play to become its metatheatrical director, a role which has interesting implications on the resulting justice conceived by the play.

The space of the play is explicitly defined during the murder scenes. Electra establishes her place ἐκτός when the chorus asks her why she is outside:

Χο. σὺ δ᾽ ἐκτός ἥζας πρὸς τί;  
'Ηλ. φρουρῆσοι’ ὁπως Ἀϊγισθος <ἡμᾶς> μὴ λάθῃ μολὼν ἔσου.56
Ch. But for what purpose have you come outside?  
El. In order to keep watch so that Aegisthus may not escape our notice in going inside.

As Woodard states, Electra “is on stage to do something.” The space ἐκτός is usually reserved for males, who are the traditional governors of ἔργον. Here, however, Electra, a woman, is ἐκτός with a purpose, emphasized by the future participle as well as the following purpose clause; she is
Providing her reasoning for being outside, Electra defines the boundaries of space. At this point, the woman is ἐκτός, and the man is ἔνδον. Moreover, the man is committing murderous ἔργον inside the house. This reversal not only of the normal gendered spaces but also of the normal spheres in which ἔργον can occur creates great tension between ἔνδον and ἐκτός. Clearly delineating the space in which everything is happening, Electra brings this tension into the spotlight.

Furthermore, Electra goes beyond simply describing the space ἔνδον and ἐκτός in order to call attention to the tension between the two spheres; she actively manipulates this tension. When Electra talks about the space of the play, the space molds itself to her description. During Clytemnestra’s death scene, Electra relays that someone shouts ἔνδον. Clytemnestra is indeed ἔνδον. Although this first example could easily be written off as simple description of location, later, when Electra and Orestes see Aegisthus approaching, Electra orders Orestes to go back inside (ἄψορρον) and then to hasten where he intends (ᾗ νοεῖς ἔπειγέ νυν). Orestes follows Electra’s commands and goes back inside. Electra is no longer describing but directing. Just as her λόγοι have power beyond description to manipulate the action of the play, so too do her λόγοι have power beyond description to manipulate the blocking of the play.

Electra is the only character with this power over space. At the end of the play, space within and without is discussed in the dialogue between Orestes and Aegisthus, but they have no power to manipulate it.

58. Soph. El. l.1402-3.
60. Soph. El. l.1430.
61. Soph. El. l.1436.
Or. May you go inside with speed: for now is not the contest of words, but for your soul.

Ae. Why do you lead me into the house? How, if this deed is good, is there need of darkness and are you not ready to kill?

Or. Do not dictate: but go where you killed my father so that you may die in the same place.

Orestes commands Aegisthus to go inside quickly (εἰσω), but Aegisthus does not move. Instead, Aegisthus asks Orestes why Orestes does not lead him into the house (ἐς δόμους). Again, neither character moves. Then Orestes orders Aegisthus a second time to go where Aegisthus killed Orestes’ father (ἐν θαλασσαῖς) in order that he may die in that same place (ἐν ταὐτῷ). Both men talk extensively about the space of the play but are frozen in place, unable to act and equally powerless to manipulate the action or the space. Electra’s power as metatheatrical director is thus unique to her character.

Just like any other director, Electra positions the actors to make a statement. She has the power to move beyond the literal to the figurative through her direction. In her conversation with Aegisthus, Electra affirms that she is the right person to ask about the events concerning Orestes:

ἔξοιδα• πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ; συμφορᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἔξωθεν εἴην τῶν ἐμῶν τῆς φιλτάτης. I know; for how not? For I would be foreign to the dearest misfortune of my kin.

In line 1449, Electra uses the word “ἔξωθεν” in a present contrafactual statement to affirm Aegisthus’ assumption that she is not “foreign to” Orestes’ misfortune. However, the duality of the word ἔξωθεν to represent physical as well as figurative space creates innuendo. Electra is physically ἔξωθεν, and, by killing her mother, Electra is indeed...
foreign to or outside of the misfortune of her dearest kin. In this way, Electra’s blocking of the play uses literal physical space to allude to the figurative positions of characters within their relationships to one another. Thus, Electra uses her physical location for metaphorical and metatheatrical effect.

Electra takes further control of the direction of the play by defining her position outside of the play when she tells Aegisthus that the supposed messengers of Orestes’ death are inside (ἔνδον) and have found their way to the kind patroness. Under Electra’s direction, ἔνδον is the place of murders. By placing herself firmly ἐκτός while clearly having power over the action ἔνδον, Electra establishes herself as external director of the play. Thus, Electra’s position ἐκτός is not simply the space that is ἐκτός but still internal to the play; Electra is ἐκτός physically but also metatheatrically, for she not only controls the action of the characters from within but also their actions and blocking from without in a way that metaphorically illustrates both the characters’ relationships to one another and the happenings of the overturned house. In this way, Electra uses her metatheatrical power to create meaning.

This power to create meaning through her metatheatrical direction of the play bears heavy implications for the justice Electra achieves by the end of the play. MacLeod emphasizes that “grasping the nature of δίκη… is crucial for understanding the play as a whole.” The concept of δίκη is not easy to define and must be considered within the context of the work in which it appears. Therefore, when reading the play metatheatrically, it is necessary to understand the implications that come with δίκη considered under Electra’s direction of the play. Electra seizes control over the action of the play in order to commit the murders of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus and manipulates λόγος and ἔργον in order to silence anyone who opposes her. She thus has control over the play’s internal action. Considering Electra as the
play’s director takes this reading to another level. Electra has control from without as well. She uses her metatheatrical power to manipulate the space in a way that creates meaning. If Electra can control meaning in the play, it is plausible that she can control the meaning of the play. The meaning of the play here involves δίκη and the implications surrounding the kind of δίκη posited by the text. If Electra controls the play, she controls the meaning of δίκη.

In this way, δίκη can be defined by the play: Electra can achieve justice, but it is justice entirely under her own terms. Ringer essentially claims that “what is just unavoidably contains elements of injustice” because “the play’s metatheatrical resonances explode conventional notions of closure and compel the audience to perceive duality almost everywhere within the dramatic action.” But what if it is more than that? When Electra takes over the play, she gains the power to make justice entirely her own. She defines justice for herself as the murders of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Then she takes over the play in order to achieve that justice under her own terms without consequence. The problem occurs when a reader tries to understand the play using his own definition of justice. By doing so, he misses the point of Electra’s play, namely that it is Electra’s play in every sense of the phrase.

By reading the play metatheatrically as something that is under Electra’s control and thus manipulated to achieve Electra’s personal goals, one can also explain the surprising finish of the play, which ends before Aegisthus is actually murdered. P.J. Finglass comments that “there is no ancient parallel for such extraordinary abruptness.” The ending is problematic because it is clear that Clytemnestra’s murder is not the climax of the play since Aegisthus’ impending murder pulls focus from her, but at the same time the audience never gets to see Aegisthus’ murder. If Aegisthus’ murder is meant to be the climax, does the play have no climax at all? Perhaps.

70. Ringer, 128.
71. Ringer, 128.
It would be difficult to explain why Sophocles would cut off the play before such a crucial moment. However, if one reads Electra as the director of the action, suddenly the ending makes more sense. Electra cuts off the action where she does because by that point she has gotten everything she wants. Clytemnestra is dead, and Aegisthus will be murdered. By ending the play before Aegisthus’ death scene, Electra does not give Aegisthus the dignity of holding a position of importance. Thus, Electra achieves her goals without giving either Clytemnestra or Aegisthus the satisfaction of being the climactic point of her play. Electra walks away with everything.

Ultimately, a metatheatrical reading of the play explains the complexities of dark justice without oversimplifying or ignoring these complexities or labeling them as irreconcilable. For Electra, this metatheatricality is twofold: first, λόγος is ἔργον; and second, Electra is not just ἐκτός of the house but ἐκτός of the play itself. Thus, Electra is the external, metatheatrical director of her play. She controls the actions and the space of the play and manipulates them in order to create meaning and fulfill a purpose that is entirely her own. Because of this power, Electra is able to achieve justice by questionable means without facing the consequences expected by the audience. There is justice, but it is a justice fulfilled completely under Electra’s own terms. Justice is achieved, but it is a dark justice indeed.

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Works Cited


