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Socratism in Galen's Psychological Works

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Socraticism in Galen’s psychological works

Ralph M. Rosen

It is well known that Galen took considerable pride in his philosophical eclecticism— he was famously suspicious of medical sectarianism, and such suspicions held for philosophy as well: his wide learning in the long philosophical tradition that preceded him and his concentrated work habits account for the intellectual stew that adds so much to Galen’s charm, even if it can frustrate those who might prefer greater philosophical consistency. The works that deal specifically with ethical and psychological issues are no exception. The overall cast of these treatises is largely Platonic, but a Platonism mediated by the subsequent history of Greek philosophy up to his own time— some Aristotelian, considerable Stoicism, a little Pyrrhonian skepticism, and so on. As scholars often remind us, even when Galen explicitly names his sources and influences, he sometimes seems to have an amalgamation of ideas and authors in mind. I would like to make a case in this study for a different sort of philosophical influence— one that has as much to do with narrative and self-presentation as it does with ideas or doctrine.

The broad question I will explore in what follows is how Socrates— as distinct from Plato— and “Socraticism”— as distinct from Platonism— informed Galen’s ethical—psychological works, especially his Passions and Errors of the Soul, which will be my primary focus. Galen himself never goes out of his way to make strong doctrinal claims for Socrates, and he never singles out Socrates as a distinct influence on his own thinking independent of Plato; yet I would like to suggest that his deep reading of, and intellectual affinity for Plato led Galen to assimilate from that philosopher not only a variety of

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46 Gal., De temp. I 9: S. 36,16—37,1 Helm. — I 566,12—567,9 K.: καὶ τοῦς τῶν ἄνδρας ἐπαινεῖται Πολυκλέους κανόνων ουσιώδομον, εἰ τοῦ πάντων τῶν μορφῶν ἀκριβή τὴν πρὸς ἄλλης συμμετρίας ἐξέχει ὁμόμορφος τοιοῦτοι τύχαν. ἐστὶ μὲν εὖ ἐπὶ πλέον, ἐὰν νῦν ἡμιαὶς ἔστωμεν, ἢ ἢ κανονὸς ὀστός. οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἀγαροτίτιτος τε καὶ ξιρόστητος εἰς τὸ μέσον καθήστηκεν ὁ οὖστος εὐφράκτως ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ δια- πλάσαντες ἀπὶστες τετεύχθηκεν, ἵνα μὲν ἐπιστεύετο τῆς τῶν τετάρτων στοιχείων εἰκοσας, τάχα δὲ τίνα δεύτεραν ἀγαθὴν ἔτερον ἑχοῦσα ἀνυψεῖτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ γενόστεοι εὐφράκτων εἶναι τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν τὸ γὰρ ἐν εὐφράκισι σύμμετρον εἰκοσας ἔστιν ἔχονον, εὑρὸς δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῦ τοιοῦτος ἀξίου καὶ τῆς ἔνεργειας ἀρκεῖ οἰκείωσις καὶ σχημάτιστος τε καὶ μακροστῆτος ἐξεῖνες μετρίως θερμότιτος τις καὶ ψυχρότιτος.

47 Gal., De san. tuenda I 10,17: CMG V 4,2; S. 24,21—25: παρὰ μὲν γε γιὰ τὴν Γερμανίας του καλὸς ἀναφέρεται τὰ παιδία. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν γὰρ νῦν οὔτε Γερμανίας οὔτε ἄλλοις τοῖς ἄγοροις ἢ βαρβάροις ἀνθρώποις τούτων ἡγεῖσομαι, οὐ μέλλουσι γὰρ ἄρκτος ἢ λέοντας ἢ κάτορος ἢ πικτῶν ἄλλων ἑρωίδων, ἀλλ᾽ Ἐλληνοὶ καὶ ὅσοι τὸ γένει μὲν ἔστωσαν βαρβάρους, ζηλοῦσα δὲ τὰ μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνων ἐπιπήδησις.
idiosyncratically Socratic ideas, but also a number of Socrates’ personal qualities and protractive strategies in the presentation of his own autobiography and moral character. Of all Galen’s intellectual heroes, Socrates may well have had the most fully developed, historically credible biography; Plato certainly made him dramatically compelling, and as such, Socrates was an easy character to personalize and even emulate if one was sympathetic to his ideas and comportment.3

A few preliminary words are in order about the term “Socratism”. This is not the place to enter into the longstanding debate about how to separate Socrates from Plato or others who deploy him as a character, and in fact some of the work of defining Socratism has been done for us by the contemporary philosophical traditions that influenced Galen – Stoics, Cynics and others who fashioned themselves in various ways as heirs to Socrates. A generation before Galen, for example, the Stoic Epictetus advocated a form of Socratic psychotherapy that evidently interested Galen, as we may infer from the fact that he wrote a treatise about him (On Epictetus, against Favorinus; cf. De libris prorp. 14.21 (12); p. 168,11–12 Boudon-Millot = XIX 44,8–9 K.). For the Stoics, of course, it was as for Galen, Socrates was all about ethics, the repudiation of fruitless natural science, and the realization that the first step of a philosophical life is to recognize the limitations of one’s own knowledge. Moderation in all one’s activities, control of bodily


3 It may seem odd to think of Galen appropriating Socrates as a role model, given what appear to be rather stark differences in their respective temperaments. Indeed, Plato’s portrait of Socrates as unfailiing, even serene, seems antithetical to the volatile character that emerges from Galen’s own self-description in his writings. See further R. M. Rosen, Galen and the compulsion to instruct, in: Proceedings of the X16 Colloquium Hippocraticum (forthcoming Leiden 2009). But whether or not Galen was, in his personal life, able to live up to the kind of ideals Socrates traditionally came to embody, there is no reason not to think that his admiration for Socrates was genuine, and that he found in Socrates a particularly effective antecedent for the moralizing stance that he adopted in his ethical treatises.

4 See also Galen’s treatise Against Favorinus’ attacks on Socrates (also mentioned in De libris prorp. 15.1 [13]: p. 169,16–17 Boudon-Millot = XIX 45,12–13 K.). The work has not survived, but the title testifies well enough to Galen’s special affection for Socrates as a thinker in his own right, able to be conceptualized apart from Plato.

pleasures and a disdain for excessive material goods were also retained as hallmarks of Socratism.4 Galen alluded to or openly embraced all of these at one point or another, but there are other Socratic qualities as well that interested him, largely of a more personal kind. These constitute aspects of Socrates’ personality and temperament that emerge from the autobiography Plato constructs for him in his dialogues, and constitute a paradigm for what a philosophical life might actually look like. In Socrates’ case, this is an unpretentious, homespun sort of life, measured, calm, reflective and self-critical, even philanthropic. Galen was obviously attracted to philosophy as a technical discipline, but he was also interested in the packaging; and the packaging he wanted to claim for himself, I would like to suggest, was pervasively Socratic.

It is interesting, in fact, to see the company Socrates keeps in Galen, where he ranks high, sometimes highest, in Galen’s pantheon of virtuous men. In his Exhortation for the study of the arts, ch. 5 (Protr. 5,1–2: CMG V 1,1, pp. 118,22–120,10), Galen contrasts the followers of Tyche with those of Hermes, and places the most virtuous men in the latter group. These are the most “decorous” (κόσμου) of all, the men who practice the arts (τεχνῶν ἔργαται). Galen further subdivides this large band of men into three sub-groups: the first, consisting of geometricians, arithmeticians, philosophers, doctors, astronomers and scholars, stand physically closest to the god and form a circle around him; the second sub-group includes painters, sculptors, language teachers, builders, architects and stone-carvers; all the remaining arts are included in a third sub-group. But almost as an afterthought, Galen imagines a fourth group – τετάρτην δή τινα τάξιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκπτωτον:

τούτων οὐκ ἢ τῶν χρηστών ὠντος ἢ ἠττὲν οὐκ ἠμῶν ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκυνήσας Σωκράτης (γίγας) ἢ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν πάντων καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀποκατάλυσιν καὶ Ἐμπλους καὶ οἱ τούτων ἔργαται, ὁ θάνατος καὶ τῶν θεῶν σέβομαι, ουκ ἠπετραχίος τιμής καὶ ἐπιτρέπεται ποτε τεςτού.

“When you consider what this group is like, you will, I think, not only emulate it but also revere it. For Socrates is in that group, and Homer, Hippocrates, Plato and all their lovers, whom we revere as equal to the gods, in that they are the god’s deputys and servants.”

5 See V. T. McKirahan, The Socratic origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), p. 369, who lists what she refers to as the “rather uncontroversial features of the historical Socrates”. Socrates’ intellectualism; exclusive interest in ethics [a claim nuanced, however, in DeFilippo and Mitsis, see above, n. 2 – R. M. Rosen]; the sufficiency of virtue for happiness: moderation and self-mastery with regard to bodily pleasures and material goods, in private as well as in public life; criticism of politicians and political institutions but commitment to obeying the laws.” On the drastically inconsistent ancient portrayals of Socrates (and the implicit difficulty in establishing anything like a stable conception of him to satisfy modern criteria), especially as mediated by philosophers of the Hellenistic period, see A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996, pp. 1–34.
most representative of a life that should inspire within us an almost erotic passion for philosophal emulation – the kind of philosophical eros that Diotima has in mind in her speech in the Symposium.

The passage from the Exhortation serves to introduce a general attitude towards Socrates that Galen fills out more systematically in his Passions and Errors of the Soul. In what follows, in fact, I would like to suggest that this treatise was informed by Plato’s Socratic dialogues not only in substance, but also in its narrative form. In particular, as if taking his own advice from the passage in the Exhortation just cited, Galen seems to be attempting to emulate Socrates in openly identifiable ways, adopting a number of idiosyncratically Socratic stances and rhetorical strategies in the service of his here highly Socratic agenda. Galen naturally frames the questions he addresses in Passions in a manner that reflects the grand sweep of philosophical debate up to his own day – in the first chapter alone, for example, he alludes to Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Epicureanism – yet the fundamental moral approach he takes here, and the particular voice he adopts in its service, seem suffused both with Socratics imagined as a historical figure, and Socratism as a way of life.

Very early in Passions, in fact, Galen alludes to a well-known scene from Plato’s Apology when he recalls how his own thinking developed in his youth on the question of self-knowledge and wisdom. When he was young, Galen says, he thought that people made too much of the Pythian oracle’s injunction to “know oneself”, since (he thought) it was not such a difficult task. Eventually, however, as he says, he realized that only the wisest man can know himself fully, and since wisdom of this sort is hard to come by in anyone, there will be great variation in the amount of self-knowledge men will display:

6 In fact, the text shows some signs of haste, almost as if we can hear Galen thinking out loud as he works out this fourth category of special men. With the phrase τούτων οίματι τῶν χρόνων νόσησαι, it is not entirely clear whether he is referring to the fourth χρόνος specifically, or to the large groupings of men who follow Hermes (as opposed to Tyche), which Galen had also introduced as a χρόνος (Protr. 5.1: CMG V 1.1, p. 118, 22). E. Wenkebacht, Galens Prosproklothymater, Quellen u. Studien z. Gesch. d. Naturwiss. u. d. Med. 4, 1945, p. 94, sensed this ambiguity and proposed the addition of μὲν γὰρ ὅλων after τούτων, I assume in order to make χρόνος refer to the larger, inclusive, group. But this seems unnecessary, and likely incorrect immediately preceding that line Galen says of the fourth subgroup that the god "honors and cultivates them above the others, and keeps them around him" (Protr. 5.2: CMG V 1.1, p. 120.6: τιμᾶτε καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἁλῶν ἔχει, περὶ αὐτῶν ἐχειν ἄξιον). It is this band of men, the fourth, that Galen suggests we should contemplate, emulate and revere in the next sentence. With this in mind, Wenkebacht’s addition of γὰρ in the next sentence (Σωκράτους γὰρ ὅτιν εἰς αὐτῶ) makes sense, with αὐτῶ referring to the fourth χρόνος, not the larger band that included all the followers of Hermes.


8 In the opening sentence of the work, Galen announces that Passions and Errors of the Soul is a written version of an oral disquisition he had once given to his (anonymous) addressee about a treatise by one “Antonius the Epicurean”. At the end of the same paragraph Galen acknowledges the long Greek philosophical tradition of ἑρατευτικὰ γράμματα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν (De propr. animi cuiuslibet. dign. et cur. 1.4: CMG V 4.1.1, p. 4.8–11). Galen makes no particular claims to striking originality, and defers to his great predecessors ("it would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did"); καὶ ἦν μὲν ἑλπίζων ἐκ ἑκείνων μινδάνειν αὐτῶ, ἀπετέλεσθαι p. 4.11–12), but he forge ahead on the principle, one assumes, that he can be a useful synthesizer of issues that have an urgency for everyone.
Socrates is not named here, but the allusion to Apology 20 e 8–22 e 6 is difficult to miss. This is the famous passage where Socrates recounts how Chaerephon went to Delphi to ask the Pythagorean priestess whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. When the priestess answered that there was not, Socrates proceeded to test this claim by questioning prominent Athenians who had a reputation for being wise. In the end he famously found plenty of people who thought they were wise, but little in them he could call sophia, and he concluded that for all his own ignorance, he himself must be the wisest for it, and certainly wiser than those whom everyone else considered wise. With a hint of self-mockery, Galen alludes to a period of youthful brashness when he scoffed at a famous dictum that was always difficult to separate from Socrates, despite the fact that it had become something of a popular cliché by Galen’s time. Perhaps it was an early sign of Galen’s taste for independent thinking, but it is interesting that in this case, Galen eventually acceded to the pull of a basic Socratic tenet.

There are several noteworthy aspects of the Galenic excerpt. First, Galen adopts here (as he does throughout this work) an autobiographical narrative that parallels Socrates’ own in Phaedo 96 a 5–3, where Socrates recounts his youthful interest in natural science as a means of understanding being and becoming, and his subsequent disillusionment with such an approach; and it is a narrative that gets Galen to the point where he essentially identifies with the famously paradoxical Socratic position of self-knowledge and ignorance. Like Socrates, Galen concludes that much of his knowledge really consists in an awareness of his own ignorance: only the “wisest man” can have true self-knowledge, and everyone else must concede varying degrees of self-ignorance (De propr. animi culuis. affect. dign. et cur. 2,3; CMG V 4, 1,1, p.5.4–5: τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀκριβῶς μὲν οὐδεὶς, ἦπερ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτερος ἔτερον). Further, in the larger context of Galen’s work, knowledge that the soul’s passions need diagnosis and treatment puts one already a step ahead of those who claim to have wisdom but deny that they suffer from pathē. For, as he says at Passions, ch. 3, “... all men make thousands of errors every day, and act under the influence of the passions, though they don’t quite realize it.” (De propr. animi culuis. affect. dign. et cur. 3,6: CMG V 4,1,1, p.8,18–20: ἀπάντας ἄνθρωπους καὶ ἐκεῖνων ἥμεραι μνήμη μὲν ἀμαρτάνοντας καὶ κατὰ πάντας ἔχον αὐτοῦ γε παρακολουθοῦντας). As he proceeds to argue in the same passage, taking a leaf from the Stoics: only the wise man is completely perfect, and such god-like perfection is exceedingly rare, if not impossible.11 Galen, like Socrates, freely admits his shortcomings, but by doing so openly and (most importantly) striving to do something about them, portrays himself as far wiser than most others.

Both Socrates and Galen thus face a logistical problem; if one is going to profess ignorance about oneself, how can one acquire self-knowledge, correct one’s flaws and so live a better life? As Galen puts it at Passions 3,2, how can one go about purging oneself of one’s passions if one is unaware of having them to begin with (De propr. animi culuis. affect. dign. et cur. 3,2; CMG V 4,1,1, p.7,7: πῶς οὖν ἄν τις οὐκ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλων ἔχων αὐτός;) The entire pedagogical thrust of Galen’s Passions in fact addresses this problem, and offers a method which, while it is unquestionably Stoic (perhaps even specifically Epicurean)12 in its self-help orientation, wears its

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9 Galen would certainly have encountered the Pythagorean injunction through any number of his philosophical studies, but the fact that in the passage quoted above he mentions it in the context of “the wisest” of men, suggests that he does, in fact, have the Socrates of the Apology on his mind here. See also Galen’s Exhortation, where he mentions several famous examples where the Pythagorean god addressed men, and begins his list with Socrates: “This was the god who told Socrates that he was the wisest of all men” (Protr. 9,3: CMG V 1,1, p.152,22–23: ἄνθρωπον ἀπάντων σοφότατος).

10 The transmitted genitive παθῶν is difficult here with κατὰ; de Boer prints Marquardt’s emendation. Others have changed the preposition, or the case of παθῶν (see Claudii Galeni Peri ἡλικίας παθῶν καὶ ἀμαρτήματων (n.7), p.13 apparatus ad loc.; Magnaldis prints κατὰς (τὰ πάντα παθῶν), though the sense is clear enough.

11 Cf. De propr. animi culuis. affect. dign. et cur. 3,7–8: CMG V 4,1,1, p.9,7–12. Galen’s complicated relationship with Stoicism is frequently discussed. On points of detail, he can be vitriolic in his disagreements, e.g. in his famous attacks in De plactitis Hippocratis et Platonis II–V, though elsewhere he can appear to align himself intellectually with Stoic thinkers. See now C. Gill, Galen and the Stoics: mortal enemies or blood brothers? Phronesis 52, 2007, pp.88–120, esp. pp. 90–98, which offers an excellent, nuanced discussion, with further bibliography, of Galen’s fraught relationship with Stoicism. Much of Galen’s disagreement with Stoics concerned the nature of the soul (see, in addition to Gill, R. J. Hankinson, Galen’s anatomy of the soul, Phronesis 36, 1991, pp.197–233, T. Tieleman, Galen and Chryses on the soul: argument and refutation in the De Plactibus books II–III. Leiden, New York, Kölner: Philosophia Antiqua 68, pp.264–273, and idem, Galen’s psychology, in: Galen et la Philosophie, ed. by J. Barnes and J. Jouanna, Vandeuvre – Geneva 2003 (Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique 49), pp.151–161), but the question of the identity of a “wise man” was likely less controversial and allowed Galen to synthesize both Platonic and Stoic attitudes.

12 See A. A. Long, Epicureans. A Stoic and Socratic guide to life, Oxford 2002,
connection to Socrates rather transparently. Socrates routinely claimed that he was unsuited to dispense substantive knowledge, but instead was happy to interact with individuals, asking pointed questions, making observations, and putting to the test the things his interlocutors would say. Galen’s prescription is similarly interpersonal, individualized and elenctic.13 Galen would encourage everyone to find someone who could perform what amounts to a Socratic elenchus on them, not only to point out their debilitating passions, but also to engage them in a discussion about these passions, to cross-examine and counter-argue, especially if they refused to believe the criticisms leveled against them:

... ἀλλὰ σοι τούτῳ πρῶτῳ φιλοσόφημα τὸ καρτερεῖν ἐπηρεαζόμενον. ὕστερον δὲ ποτε κατεσταλμένων ικανός (τῶν) σαμπροχαίον σεβόμενος ἐπικεχειρήσεις ἀπολογεῖσαι τοὺς ἐπηρεαζόμενους ἐπιστοτες πικρός μηδέ ελεγκτικός μηδέ τοι φιλολογείς εμφανές [μηδέ] καταβάλλεις ἐξέλεγκτον ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφελεία ἐνεκά τῆς σῆς, ἵνα τι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀντιλογά τον αὐτοῦ πεδανόν ἔτη πεισθήται ἐκεῖνον ἀμείνου γιγνόσκειν ἥ μετὰ πλεόνευς ἐξέχοσεις εὐρής αὐτοῦ ἐξω τῶν ἐγκαθάρτων (δοῦλον). (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,10: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 10,7–14)

"... this is the first rudiment of philosophy, to put up with unfair criticism. Later, as you observe a reasonable decline in your affections, you will try to justify yourself against malicious attacks – but never in a harsh or argumentative way, never from a competitive spirit or a desire to do him down. You will do it for your own benefit: If his reply to your self-justification is plausible, you will either be convinced of his superior awareness or on further examination, find that his accounts are unfounded."

(transl. Singer, p. 105)

Galen’s method is explicitly mediated by the Stoic Zeno,14 but the procedure is essentially Socratic, and there are other indications in the work to suggest that Galen wanted the figure of Socrates vividly in the minds of his readers. One such indication occurs near the beginning of the work, where Galen adds one of Aesop’s fables as emblematic of his theme. Here he mentions the fable of the two knapsacks that Zeus has strapped around the necks of humans15 – the one in front contains things belonging to others, the one behind, our own affairs: ... τῶν μὲν ἄλλωστες τῆν πρόσω, τῶν ἰδίων δὲ τὴν ὑπίστω, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὰ μὲν ἄλλοτρα βλέπομεν αὐτί, τῶν δ' ἀσκηον ἐξέλεγκτον καταβάλλειν (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,7; CMG V 4,1,1, p. 6,5–7). The point of the fable, of course, is that we can see the misdeeds of others in the knapsacks we carry in front of us, but not our own, which we carry in the knapsack on our backs. Here, I suggest, lies another allusion to Plato’s Phaedo (60 c 8–61 b 7), specifically the scene early in that dialogue, where Socrates explains why he has decided to versify Aesopic fables while awaiting his execution. Socrates’ explanation there has a bantering quality about it, but it is far from frivolous: he notes that he never composed poetry before. But since a recurrent dream would often tell him to “cultivate mousikē”, and since it was possible that by mousikē the dream actually meant poetry instead of the philosophy he had practiced his whole life, he thought he should try his hand at poetry before he left the world. Poets, he says, must work with mythoi rather than logos, which is why he settles on Aesopic fables – he already knew these mythoi, and so could easily put them into verse. Socratic irony is operative even to the end: he chose a form that was unelaborated, prosaic, and, insofar as it was fictional (mythoi, not logos), at least superficially non-philosophical, yet he was well aware of the didactic, moralizing strains associated with Aesop. Socrates was the one, after all, who, at Phaedo 60 b 1ff., brought up the subject of Aesop to begin with, after he was freed from his chains, sat up and was moved to note (since his legs now felt so much better) how odd it was that a person cannot experience pleasure and pain at the same time. Socrates had long been interested in the philosophical problem of opposites, so it is revealing that this inspires him to muse on how Aesop might have dealt with the same question. As he says, if Aesop had himself noted that pleasure and pain were fundamentally inseparable from one another, he would have composed a fable in which god created a creature with two heads joined together (Phaedo 60 c 1–5). Aesop

13 On Stoic conceptions and use of the elenchus, see L. Repici, The Stoics and the elenchus, in: Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Symposium zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer, Bamberg 1.7.99, hrsg. v. K. Döring, Th. Ebert, Stuttgart 1993 (Philosophie der Antike 1), pp. 253–270, and F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione soocratica, Naples 2000 (Elenchos 30), pp. 281–286, with further bibliography. It is worth noting, as Repici points out, that the Stoic elenchus came to look quite different from the Socratic elenchus, especially that of the early Platonist dialogues. Galen’s prescription for moral self-improvement seems to involve a little of both methods; that is, he has an assured sense of what constitutes good and bad behavior, but seems to believe, like Socrates, that dialectic is the most persuasive way for individuals to find their way to the good.

14 He continues in the next sentence: “This was the formula approved by Zeno to ensure good conduct: that in all we do we should imagine that we shall shortly after have to justify our actions to our teachers. That was what he called the mass of people who are ready to offer unsolicited criticism of their fellows” (transl. Singer, p. 105, modified; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 10, 14–18: ὅταν γοῦν ἐμφανίσημος τίτατο πράξεως ἕκαστος ἀπαθής, ὡς ἀπολύτως ἐλεγκτικός ὑστερον τοσοῦτοι φαντάζομαι γιγνόσκειν ἥ μετὰ πλεόνευς ἐτοιούχοις ὅμοιοι τῆς ἐπιφάνειας, καὶ τοῦτον ἀμείνου γιγνόσκειν μηδέ τοις καταβαλλόμενοι ἐξέλεγκτον καταβάλλειν (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,7; CMG V 4,1,1, p. 6,5–7). The point of the fable, of course, is that we can see the misdeeds of others in the knapsacks we carry in front of us, but not our own, which we carry in the knapsack on our backs. Here, I suggest, lies another allusion to Plato’s Phaedo (60 c 8–61 b 7), specifically the scene early in that dialogue, where Socrates explains why he has decided to versify Aesopic fables while awaiting his execution. Socrates’ explanation there has a bantering quality about it, but it is far from frivolous: he notes that he never composed poetry before. But since a recurrent dream would often tell him to “cultivate mousikē”, and since it was possible that by mousikē the dream actually meant poetry instead of the philosophy he had practiced his whole life, he thought he should try his hand at poetry before he left the world. Poets, he says, must work with mythoi rather than logos, which is why he settles on Aesopic fables – he already knew these mythoi, and so could easily put them into verse. Socratic irony is operative even to the end: he chose a form that was unelaborated, prosaic, and, insofar as it was fictional (mythoi, not logos), at least superficially non-philosophical, yet he was well aware of the didactic, moralizing strains associated with Aesop. Socrates was the one, after all, who, at Phaedo 60 b 1ff., brought up the subject of Aesop to begin with, after he was freed from his chains, sat up and was moved to note (since his legs now felt so much better) how odd it was that a person cannot experience pleasure and pain at the same time. Socrates had long been interested in the philosophical problem of opposites, so it is revealing that this inspires him to muse on how Aesop might have dealt with the same question. As he says, if Aesop had himself noted that pleasure and pain were fundamentally inseparable from one another, he would have composed a fable in which god created a creature with two heads joined together (Phaedo 60 c 1–5). Aesop
may have been a purveyor of mythoi, but for Socrates these mythoi could have as much philosophical import as those he famously tells in other Platonic dialogues. It is often noted that the Aesopic tradition was appropriated in the Hellenistic period by Cynics and other thinkers with Socratic inclinations, so it is possible that Galen’s allusion to Aesop’s fable of the two wallets is more directly mediated by contemporary writers of that sort. But it is also curious that Galen proceeds to explain the meaning of Aesop by quoting a passage from Plato’s Laws, a passage on a theme identical to one in Galen’s Passions, self-love, even if Socrates is no longer an actor in the narrative. Plato’s Athenian here states that the greatest of evils for men is an “excessive love of oneself,” which blinds the lover to the errors (ἀμαρτήματα) of his beloved, i.e., the self, and leads him to esteem his own subjectivity over the truth:

τούτο δ’ ἐστιν ὁ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὐτῷ πᾶς ἀνδρόπος φύσει τέ ζήσει καὶ ὤρθος ἔχει· τὸ δὲ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύς γε πάντων ἀμαρτήματι διὰ τὴν ὀφθαλμα τοῦτω φιλίαν αὐτῶν ἐκάστοτε γίνεται ἐκάστῳ. τυφλούστων γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φίλος, ὡστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά καὶ τὰ καλά κακός κρίνει· τοῦτον τῷ δὲ ἀληθεύς αὐτὶ πᾶν τὸν ἄργον μὲν ἢ φόρον τὴν ἄθλητον ἢ τὸ τουτούρα χρὴ τὸν γέροντα ἐνδόμων στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἡνίαν παρ’ αὐτῷ ἐνδέον παρ’ ἄλλοις κακῶν προτετάμενα τυγχάνει. (Plato, Leges V: 731 e 1–732 a 4)

“And this is what they mean when they say that every man is by nature a friend to himself and that it’s appropriate for him to have to be like this. But in truth, at any rate, the cause of all errors (ἀμαρτήματα) for an individual on every occasion can be traced to the excessive love of oneself. For the lover is blind when it comes to the object of his love, so he’s a poor judge of what’s just, good and beautiful, thinking he should always honor his own self rather than the truth. For someone who aspires to be a great man does not need to love himself nor anything pertaining to himself, but rather just things, whether they happen to be done by himself or—even more so—by another.”

For Galen, the dilemma can only be resolved, as we have seen, by offering ourselves up to an elenchus by others, those who can see what is in those wallets strapped over our backs. It is interesting, then, that Galen draws out the moral of the Aesopic fable by way of Plato: “For it seems that Aesop’s fable and Plato’s account show that discovering our own errors is really quite hopeless” (transl. Singer, p. 102, modified; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 7,8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 6,12–14; πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνεχώθες δ’ τε τοῦ Ἀιτίοντος μύθος καὶ τοῦ Πληθύνων λόγος ἀνεπάρτητος ἢ μὴ τῶν ἔσοδος ἀμαρτήματος αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνει). Like Socrates in the Phaedo passage, Galen here draws a distinction between the mythos of Aesop and the logos of philosophy, but in the end the two work together, both in the Phaedo and in Galen’s Passions, to serve a didactic purpose. Galen seems very much, therefore, to have bypassed explicit reference to any contemporary sources for this passage, and instead wants his reader to think back to its Classical origins in Plato. This is not the only place in Passions where Galen seems to have the opening scene of the Phaedo on his mind, and where he seems quite self-consciously to be modeling himself on the Platonic Socrates. At the beginning of Passions 8, in a passage that has become well known even outside of Galenic studies, Galen once again shifts into autobiographical mode, describing how he came to develop his attitudes about anger and other dangerous emotions. The language is Socratic, with its reference to the Delphic motto about self-knowledge, and the analogy Galen draws between his own parents and the married couple Socrates and Xanthippe most revealing:

‘Εγώ τοίνυν, ὅπως μὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔχων, οὐχ ἔχω φάναι (τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γνῶναι χαλεπτὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς τελείοις ἀνδραίοι, μη τι γε δὴ τοῖς ταῖσισι), εὐτύχης δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὴ τοῦτον διὰ τοῦτον, ἀγαθὴ δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἐργαστήριτας ἔχων παρὰ τὸ παρὰ τῷ ἐργαστήριτας διασκεδάζει μόνον, ὅταν τελείους μὲν ἔσοδος, τοῖς δὲλατέροις ἐστὶν καὶ τῷ ἐργαστήριτας τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 8,1–2: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 27, 20–28,4)

“I can’t really say how I came to have my nature – for knowing oneself is difficult enough for grownups, let alone for children. But I had the great fortune to have a father who was the least prone to anger, extremely just, good and kind to others. My mother, though, was so irascible that she sometimes bit her maidservants, and she was constantly shouting and fighting with my father more than Xanthippe did with Socrates. I was thus enabled to make a direct comparison between the fine qualities of my father’s deeds and the wretched afflictions to which my mother was subject; and this woke in me the feelings of warmth and love for the former, and hatred and avoidance of the latter.” (transl. Singer, p. 119 [modified])

Despite a conspicuous, even infamous, anecdotal tradition about Xanthippe after Plato, her only explicit appearance in Plato is the opening of the Phaedo (60a 9–b 1), where Socrates ordered her removed because of her emotional behavior: “Some of Crito’s people led her away lamenting and beating (βοσώντας τε καὶ κοπτομένην) her breast.” The lines of comparison are clear: Galen’s father is to Socrates as his mother is to Xanthippe; Galen observed his parents closely, and in comparing the two tried always to imitate his father’s example, and avoid his mother’s. Insofar as Galen lived his life in imitation of his father, then, his alignment with Socrates is all but explicit here. The rest of this passage confirms that Galen idealized his father, whether consciously or not, as a figure with a good number of decidedly Socratic qualities: he never grieved (αυτερωσι) at misfortune, he was philosophic-

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16 For a detailed discussion of this appropriation, see Adrados (n. 15), vol. I, Leiden and Köln 1999 (Mnemosyne, Suppl. 21), pp. 604–644.

17 Galen may well have had Epicurean’s portrait of Socrates as fundamentally unrule-
ally curious and the ecletic, but always wary of committing to any one sect, and he urged on his son the pursuit of the canonical virtues that obsessed Socrates as well, dikaiosyne, sóphrosyne, and andreia, as well as phronésis. As Galen sums up a few paragraphs later, in a passage that puts the finishing touch on the portrait of his father as a Socrates figure, “my father accustomed me to disdain reputation and honor, and to respect only truth” (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. VIII 8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 29,18–19: δὲς τὸ καὶ τὶς ῥὸ μὴν εἰςινε με κατασχομενον ἀληθείαν μόνην τιμῶντα.) To be sure, we would probably call at least part of his father’s background “Platonic” or “Aristotelian”, rather than “Socratic” – Galen notes, for example, at De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 8,5: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 28,19–20, his father’s training in geometry, arithmetic, architecture and astronomy, and this hardly sounds particularly Socratic; or at least not Plato’s Socrates. This training, passed on as it was to Galen, informs especially the second half of this work, Errors, and accords well with his notorious commitment to empirical argument and logical demonstration. But even Galen’s concerns in Errors are not incompatible with the Socratic emphasis on knowledge – even technical knowledge derived from natural philosophy – that advances human virtue and goodness. Recent scholarship has emphasized, for example, that the mature Socrates seems to have embraced even some aspects of natural philosophy, provided it was directed towards the good of humans, and avoided the fruitless complaints about the autobiographical section of Phaedo. At the end of

able in mind here as well; cf. Epic., II 12,14: τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ μάλιστα Ἰδιων Χαράτεως μὴ δέοτα παραφασμαίναι καὶ λόγῳ, μὴ δέοτα λοιπον προεγκασθείς υπὸ Χαράτου καὶ νομοκαταστασιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιπῶν καταστασιν ανέχεσθαι καὶ πας ἕναν μάλιν ὧθελον (This was the first, most idiosyncratic thing about Socrates, that he never lost his cool in conversation, never offered anything abusive or violent, but put up with others when they were being abusive, and ended [conversational warfare].)

De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 8,2,6: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 28,4–6, 25–30, 6. It may not be mere coincidence, in a passage that may already allude to the Phaedo (118 a 15–17), that Galen here sounds as if he has the last sentence of that work in mind, where Plato refers to Socrates as the “best, wisest and most just man he ever met”: “Ἡ μέτα τελετου ἡ ξηριστες του ἐπιφύση τε καὶ τέκνον ἣμυν ἡγέτητο, ἀνδρός ὅς ἡμες φαγμεν ᾴν, τότε οὐ επεροῖς ἀριστον καὶ ἄλλον φρονιμοστετόν καὶ δικαιοστετόν.”

See above, n. 2, on the Stoic portrait (which amalgamates both Xenophon and Plato) of a Socrates who acknowledged a philosophical role for natural philosophy in ethical inquiry; and see next note.

See e.g., P. A. Vander Waerds, Socrates in the Clouds, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), pp.84ff. in discussing Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ fraught attitude towards natural philosophy: “This account [Xenop., Memor. IV 7,4–5] of the mature Socrates’ attitude toward natural philosophy makes it clear that study even of its more technical disciplines should be pursued insofar as the knowledge in question conveys some practical benefit upon its possessor, though knowledge is not to be pursued for its own sake ..., there can be no doubt that he relies on a very definite

conception of the cosmos and mankind’s place in it in formulating his own substantive moral doctrines.” See also DeFilippo and Mistal (n.2), pp.252–271, who discuss how the Stoic reconciled their interests in natural philosophy with a Stoic foundation that might at first glance seem incompatible with them.


See, for example, the exchange between Callicles and Socrates at Plato, Gorg. 491 d–495 b, where Socrates claims that the kind of life advocated by Callicles – unlimited gratification of the bodily pleasures – looks more like that of the charadrius bird, which immediately excretes whatever it ingests, or the “frightly shameful and miserable” life of the instable catamite (494 e–4–5). Galen too, in his persistent advocacy of sôphrosyne, remains fixated on food and excessive consumption in general: “For it is not sufficient to lead a life free of anger; one must purge oneself also of luxuriousness and lasciviousness, of drunkenness, idleness, and envy” (transl. Singer, p. 114; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 6,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p.21,11–12;
succumbing to bodily addictions (ibid., 7:2–5: CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 24,10–25, 11); even Galen's special concern in this work for managing emotions, which owes much to the Stoic background, has Socratic roots traceable to the Gorgias.23 But there is one aspect of Passions that suggests a very specific connection with the Socrates of Gorgias, namely Socrates' counterintuitive prescription for self-improvement in this work. By "counterintuitive", I mean that when Galen says that everyone, himself included, should actively seek out someone who will assess and criticize one's own faults, it is doubtful (and he knew it) that most people would find this an appealing course of action. But adopting counterintuitive positions is a famously Socratic strategy in general (we need only think of him recommending in the Apology, 36 d, that his "punishment" be free meals in the Prytaneum), and a running motif in particular in the Gorgias. At 480 b 7ff., for example, Socrates reaches the climax of his conversation with Polus by concluding that if we are to use rhetoric for anything at all, it should be used to instruct ourselves when we commit injustice. And what seems even more absurd to his interlocutors, people should admit their wrongdoing and voluntarily seek punishment so their soul can be healed of its sickness. From the start, Socrates recurs to the language of medicine: it is important to treat the psychic disorder sooner rather than later, lest it eventually become incurable: ὅπως μὴ ἐγκατατάσσω τὸ νόσσωμα τῆς ἀθυκίας ὑπολογίζω τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσω καὶ ἀνίστατον (Plato, Gorg. 480 b 1–2). Socrates waxes increasingly eloquent in his next speech urging the unjust person to "grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery, pursuing what’s good and admirable without taking account of the pain" (transl. Zeyl, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 6–8: παρέχειν μάζατον εὑκαί καὶ ἀνήρικοι ὀστέρ τέμνειν καὶ καίειν ἱστρό, τὸ ὄρασιν καὶ καλὸν διώκοιτο, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγειόν). In a final flourish Socrates makes his famous pronouncement that "... if his unjust behavior merits flogging, he should present himself to be whipped; if it merits imprisonment, to be imprisoned, if a fine, to pay it; if to exile to be exiled; and if death, to be killed" (transl. Zeyl, modified, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 8–10: ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν ἥξει ἡμῖν ἀθυκία Τι, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμῶν, δεῖ, ἐὰν δὲ ἡμίλας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ σανᾶτος, ἀποθηρύσκοντα). Polus replies that the whole thing seems "absurd" (Plato, Gorg. 480 e 1: άτοτε), even as he feels compelled to agree that their discussion has led them to this conclusion.

Galen for his part likewise recommends self-indictment at Passions 7, 4, just after he has suggested that we find an older person to point out our vices. Although Galen here focuses on afflictions with fewer public consequences for the individual than those imagined by Socrates in the Gorgias, his phrasing is strikingly similar to Socrates':

..., πρῶτον αὐτῷ χάριν μὲν γιόναι παρατέκις, χαρισμαίνει δὲ διασκέδασθαι κατά μόνος ἐαυτός ἐπιπάθειας ἐκκοπῆς τε περιουμένου τὸ πάθος, οὔ δὲ τὸν μὴ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλακτος μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῷ ἄλλῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτιθεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς αὐτῶν τινάς, οὕτως ἐκκοπῆς τε περιουμένου τὸ πάθος. . . ἐκκοπῆς γάρ αὐτῷ φωνῆμεν ἐπὶ, πρὶν ἀδύνητον ἀνείποιν γενέσθαι. (De propr, animi curial. affect. dign. et cur. 7.4–5: CMG V 4.1.1, p. 25.4–11)

"... we must first of all thank him [sc. our senior advisor who has assessed our faults] immediately, and later, contemplate in solitude, applying criticism to ourselves and attempting to excise the affection – not merely to the point where it is no longer apparent to others, but in such a way that its actual root is removed from the soul. For it may grow back, nourished by the evils of those around us. . . . It should be cut out in the early stages of growth, before it has grown so large as to be incurable." (transl. Singer, p. 117)

Galen has no Polus at hand to comment on whether or not such a prescription is absurd, but in an earlier passage, he offers an amusing anecdote that may, in fact, allude to Socrates' notion of giving oneself over to voluntary punishment for unjust behavior. At Passions 4.9–12, Galen tells the story of a friend of his from Crete who nearly killed two of his slaves in a fit of rage over some lost luggage. Galen saved the slaves, he says, but his friend was so ashamed of his behavior that he "took me by the hand, led me into a house somewhere, offered me a strap, stripped off his clothes, and ordered me to beat him for what he had done under the influence of – in his own words – his accursed anger" (transl. Singer, p. 108 [modified]; De propr. animi curial. affect. dign. et cur. 4.12: CMG V 4.1.1, p. 14, 19–22: ὃς δὲ φιλός δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐσοφονοῦς καταγγελίας τὴν εἰς ὑποκίνον παρέξει, καὶ προσφεύσεις καὶ ἀποδοθειμένον ἑκάστῳ ἀναγνώστου τῷ ἐπαράζει ὄργων ἐπιαστῆς). This begins to sound much like what Socrates was after in the Gorgias passage discussed above. It is curious, however, that Galen was amused by the whole scene; he told his friend as much, but the friend was adamant and kept begging him to whip
him. As Galen says, “the more earnest his entreaties to be flogged, the more he made me laugh” (transl. Singer. p. 108; De propr. animi cuisiul. affect. dign. et cur. 4,12: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 14,24–25: μελλόν ἄντοιει με γελάν, δοσφ μέλλον ενείκετο μαστιγωθήναι δεώμενοι).

Could it be that this is Galen’s own response to Socrates’ iconoclastic position in the Gorgias passage that people who have committed injustice should voluntarily offer themselves up for punishment? In that passage, not long after Polus said that he found Socrates’ position absurd, Callicles too had to ask Chaerophon whether or not Socrates was simply joking (481 b 6–7). There is, in the end, something amusing and counterintuitive about Socrates’ position, and when confronted with an actual example of it, Galen corroborates this response. But Galen does not leave it at this: he does not want to dismiss completely the idea that people should seek to correct their flaws. Rather, it seems, he ends up offering a more practical, realistic spin on Socrates’ advice — a spin that he derives ultimately from Socrates himself. For the story of his Cretan friend ends with Galen getting him to agree that his punishment should not be the whip, but logoi, and the logoi he proceeds to offer him concern the regulation of one’s anger by words, rather than whips. Whereas it may be unreasonable, and even a little silly, to think that people will routinely submit themselves voluntarily to physical punishment for their bad behavior as Socrates advocates in the Gorgias, Galen points out here that it is hardly unreasonable, and far more practical, to imagine that a kind of punitive logoi (indicating here both rational argument and just plain conversation) can actually have a therapeutic effect on an individual’s soul. This, of course, is a decidedly Socratic recommendation as we often find in other Platonic contexts. It certainly worked for Galen’s Cretan friend, who, Galen says, became much improved after a year of careful attention to his behavior: ἣκενος μὲν οὖν ἡν ἐνιστοῦ προνοησίμενος ἐνυςοῦ πολὺ βελτίων ἐγένετο (De propr. animi cuisiul. affect. dign. et cur. 4,14: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 15,6–7).

Galen’s goal in writing Passions and Errors, was, as he states early in the work, modest and almost self-effacing. He notes near the end of ch. 1 that many philosophers have written on the subject before, and he mentions Chrysippus, Aristotle and Plato by name. He then tells the person who requested the work from him that “it would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did” (De propr. animi cuisiul. affect. dign. et cur. 1,4: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 4,11–12: καὶ ἴν μὲν βελτίων ἐξ ἥκενος μαντής αὐτῷ ὀπτερ καγώ), which I take to mean, among other things, that he made no special claims to originality in this treatise. So we are certainly prepared from the start for the mix of Stoicism, Aristotelianism and Platonism that we end up with in the work. But Galen’s philosophical allegiances were, of course, closest to Plato, and in his ethical works, at any rate, the Platonic Socrates often seems a looming, if not always explicit, presence. It may always be difficult to unpick completely the jumble of philosophical threads that make up Passions and Errors, but I hope to have made a plausible case that Galen looked to the figure of Socrates in particular — whether directly through Plato or mediated by Stoic appropriations — not only as a spiritual and intellectual forebear, but also as a paradigm for shaping an autobiographical voice and narrative of his own.