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Socratism in Galen's Psychological Works

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Beiträge zur Altertumskunde

Herausgegeben von
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Antike Medizin im Schnittpunkt
von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften

Internationale Fachtagung aus Anlass
des 100-jährigen Bestehens des Akademienvorhabens
 Corpus Medicorum Graecorum/Latinorum

Im Auftrag der
Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
herausgegeben von
Christian Brockmann
Wolfram Brunschön Oliver Overwien
Mischungen – die vollkommene Proportion im äußeren Erscheinungsbild ist ein Ergebnis der Eukrasie, ein Ergebnis also der vollkommenen Mischung der Grundbestandteile des lebendigen Körpers.  

Mit Hippokrates und Polykleter sind die Exponenten der griechischen Erforschung von Körper und Gesundheit benannt. Galen sieht sich als ihr Erbe und als Vermittler dieser großen Tradition im Rom seiner Zeit. Dank seiner systematischen Arbeit kann nun jeder gründliche Kenntnis auf diesem Wissensgebiet erwerben. Das könnten sogar die barbarischen Völker am Rand des römischen Weltrichtes. Sie müssten sich nur entscheiden, Galens Buch zur Hand zu nehmen und zu lesen. Damit sind wir bei der Textstelle, die immer wieder zitiert wird, weil Galen hier die Germanen mit wilden Tieren vergleicht:

„Bei den Germanen werden die Kinder nicht gut aufgezogen. Aber ich schreibe dies jetzt weder für Germanen noch für andere wilde oder barbarische Menschen, ebenso wenig wie für Bären, Löwen, wilde Eber oder andere wilde Tiere, sondern für Hellenen und alle, die zwar ihrer Abstammung nach Barbaren sind, aber nach hellenischer Kultur streben.“

Dass Germanen seine Gesundheitsschrift tatsächlich würden lesen wollen, daran hat Galen sicher nicht einmal im Traum gedacht. Er spricht also mit rhetorischer Emphase, um seinen Lesern unmissverständlich klar zu machen, dass Fehler in der Pflege der Kleinindustrien graviereende Folgen haben. Das richtige Wissen ist aber nicht auf exklusive Zirkel beschränkt, es liegt offen zutage, jedenfalls für die an Medizin interessierten Leser. Wer es aber nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt, läuft Gefahr, so zu leben wie Germanen und wilde Tiere.

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46 Gal., De temp. 1 9: S. 36,16–37,1 Helm. – I 566,12–567,9 K.; und von den andhras ἐπαινεῖται Πολυκλείτου κανόνας ὑσιμάζομεν, ἐκ τῶν πάντων τῶν μορφῶν ἀκριβῆ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίαν ἔχων ὑσίματος τοιούτου τιμῶν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον, δὲ χρῆς ἔχοντες, ἀν καὶ κανόνας οὕτως. οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὑπάρχοντι τοις καὶ πρήπεται ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καθίστηκεν οὕτως ἀνθρώπος ἀναπτύξεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ δια- πλάσεως ἀρίστης τετυχθέν, ἵσσος μὲν ἐπιμένεις τῇ τῶν τεταρτῶν στοιχείων ἐνώπιος, τάχα δὲ τίνα διευθετήσει ἀρχήν ἐτέραιν ἐχούσῃ ἀνάλογον. ἀλλὰ τὸ γενόστρος ἐνάρκτος εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχεῖν τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐνώπιοις σύμμετροι ἐνώπιοι ἔχοντος ἐνώπιοι εἰσάγουσθαν ὑσίματος ἔστιν ἐνέχον. εὐθύς δ᾿ ὑπάρχει τῷ τοιούτῳ σύμμετροι καὶ τοὺς ἑνωμένους ἄριστα διακειμένη καὶ συνήρμοτος τοις καὶ μακράστερος ἔχων τῆς ἀναπτυξίας τοιούτου καὶ ἄριστους ἀρκετοὺς διακειμένη καὶ συνήρμοτος τοις καὶ μακράστερος ἔχων μείζον τῆς ἀναπτυξίας τοιούτου καὶ γυμνότητος.


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Socraticism in Galen’s psychological works

Ralph M. Rosen

It is well known that Galen took considerable pride in his philosophical eclecticism – he was famously suspicious of medical sectarianism, and such suspicions held for philosophy as well: his wide learning in the long philosophical tradition that preceded him and his concentrated work habits account for the intellectual stew that adds so much to Galen’s charm, even if it can frustrate those who might prefer greater philosophical consistency. The works that deal specifically with ethical and psychological issues are no exception. The overall cast of these treatises is largely Platonic, but a Platonism mediated by the subsequent history of Greek philosophy up to his own time – some Aristotelian, considerable Stoicism, a little Pyrrhonian skepticism, and so on. As scholars often remind us, even when Galen explicitly names his sources and influences, he sometimes seems to have an amalgamation of ideas and authors in mind. I would like to make a case in this study for a different sort of philosophical influence – one that has as much to do with narrative and self-presentation as it does with ideas or doctrine.

The broad question I will explore in what follows is how Socrates – as distinct from Plato – and “Socraticism” – as distinct from Platonism – informed Galen’s ethico-psychological works, especially his Passions and Errors of the Soul, which will be my primary focus. Galen himself never goes out of his way to make strong doctrinal claims for Socrates, and he never singles out Socrates as a distinct influence on his own thinking independent of Plato; yet I would like to suggest that his deep reading of, and intellectual affinity for Plato led Galen to assimilate from that philosopher not only a variety of

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1 Socrates is mentioned a total of fifty-six times in the extant corpus of Galen, in a variety of contexts across fifteen works, although he is never himself the subject of an extended philosophical disquisition. Indeed, many of the references to Socrates are fleeting and of little consequence in themselves (as, for example, the many times he is adduced in the Institution logica as an exemplum in a logical argument; cf. e.g., Inst. log. 6.2; 16.10–11; pp. 13,24–14,1; 40,24–41,13 Kalbfleisch). Merely collecting occurrences of Socrates’ name in Galen is not, therefore, especially illuminating. “Socraticism” may seem an anachronistic alternative (it was not a term Galen himself used, in any case), but, as I suggest in what follows, it does seem to capture a specific philosophical attitude that Galen had internalized from a lifetime of engagement with Socrates through his close reading of Plato.

2 Galen was also familiar with the Socratic works of Xenophon, but he cited them only relatively few times. He mentions Xenophon a total of only fourteen times, ten of
idiosyncratically Socratic ideas, but also a number of Socrates’ personal qualities and protractive strategies in the presentation of his own autobiography and moral character. Of all Galen’s intellectual heroes, Socrates may well have had the most fully developed, historically credible biography; Plato certainly made him dynamically compelling, and as such, Socrates was an easy character to personalize and even emulate if one was sympathetic to his ideas and comportment.3

A few preliminary words are in order about the term “Socratism”. This is not the place to enter into the longstanding debate about how to separate Socrates from Plato or others who deploy him as a character, and in fact some of the work of defining Socratism has been done for us by the contemporary philosophical traditions that influenced Galen – Stoics, Cynics and others who fashioned themselves in various ways as heirs to Socrates. A generation before Galen, for example, the Stoic Epictetus advocated a form of Socratic psychotherapy that evidently interested Galen, as we may infer from the fact that he wrote a treatise about him (On Epictetus, against Favorinus; cf. De libris pror. 14,21 (12): p.168,11–12 Boudon-Millot = XIX 44,8–9 K.).4 For the Stoics, of course, as it was for Galen, Socrates was all about ethics, the repudiation of fruitless natural science, and the realization that the first step of a philosophical life is to recognize the limitations of one’s own knowledge. Moderation in all one’s activities, control of bodily

pleasures and a disdain for excessive material goods were also retained as hallmarks of Socratism.5 Galen alluded to or openly embraced all of these at one point or another, but there are other Socratic qualities as well that interested him, largely of a more personal kind. These constitute aspects of Socrates’ personality and temperament that emerge from the autobiography Plato constructs for him in his dialogues, and constitute a paradigm for what a philosophical life might actually look like. In Socrates’ case, this is an unpretentious, homespun sort of life, measured, calm, reflective and self-critical, even philanthropic. Galen was obviously attracted to philosophy as a technical discipline, but he was also interested in the packaging, and the packaging he wanted to claim for himself, I would like to suggest, was pervasively Socratic.

It is interesting, in fact, to see the company Socrates keeps in Galen, where he ranks high, sometimes highest, in Galen’s pantheon of virtuous men. In his Exhortation for the study of the arts, ch. 5 (Protr. 5,1–2: CMG V 1,1, pp.118,22–120,10), Galen contrasts the followers of Tycse with those of Hermes, and places the most virtuous men in the latter group. These are the most “decorous” (κόσμους) of all, the men who practice the arts (τεχνῶν ἐργατάς). Galen further subdivides this large band of men into three sub-groups: the first, consisting of geometers, arithmeticians, philosophers, doctors, astronomers and scholars, stand physically closest to the god and form a circle around him; the second sub-group includes painters, sculptors, language teachers, builders, architects and stone-carvers; all the remaining arts are included in a third sub-group. But almost as an afterthought, Galen imagines a fourth group – τετάρτην δὴ τινα τάξιν ἐπί τῶν ἄλλων ἔκκριτον:

τοῦτον σύμει τῶν χεριῶν νοσήσας ὁποῖος ἔστω ὁ μάλιν ὑμῶν (τῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προκανήσας Σωκράτης (για) ἔστω ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Ὑμᾶρ καὶ ὁ Πολυκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ τούτων ἔρασται, οὗ ἔστω καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς σέβομαι, ὅπως ἄρα τινὲς καὶ ὑπηρέται τοῦ θεοῦ.

“When you consider what this group is like, you will, I think, not only emulate it but also revere it. For Socrates is in that group, and Homer, Hippocrates, Plato and all their lovers, whom we revere as equal to the gods, in that they are the god’s deities and servants.”

3 It may seem odd to think of Galen appropriating Socrates as a role model, given what appears to be rather stark differences in their respective temperaments. Indeed, Plato’s portrait of Socrates as unflappable, even serene, seems antithetical to the volatile character that emerges from Galen’s own self-description in his writings. See further R. M. Rosen, Galen and the compulsion to instruct, in: Proceedings of the XIth Colloquium Hippocraticum (forthcoming Leiden 2009). But whether or not Galen was, in his personal life, able to live up to the kind of ideals Socrates traditionally came to embody, there is no reason not to think that his admiration for Socrates was genuine, and that he found in Socrates a particularly effective antecedent for the moralizing stance that he adopted in his ethical treatises.

4 See also Galen’s treatise Against Favorinus’ attacks on Socrates (also mentioned in De libris pror. 15,1 [13]: p.169,16–17 Boudon-Millot = XIX 45,12–13 K.). The work has not survived, but the title testifies well enough to Galen’s special affection for Socrates as a thinker in his own right, able to be conceptualized apart from Plato.

5 See V. T. McKirahan, The Socratic origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), p.369, who lists what she refers to as the “rather uncontroversial features of the historical Socrates”: Socratic intellectualism; exclusive interest in ethics [a claim nuanced, however, in DeFilippo and Mitsis, see above, n.2 – R. M. Rosen]; the sufficiency of virtue for happiness; moderation and self-mastery with regard to bodily pleasures and material goods, in private as well as in public life; criticism of politicians and political institutions but commitment to obeying the laws.” On the drastically inconsistent ancient portrayals of Socrates (and the implicit difficulty in establishing anything like a stable conception of him to satisfy modern criteria), especially as mediated by philosophers of the Hellenistic period, see A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996, pp.1–34.
The very diffidence with which he introduces this group ("a sort of fourth grouping, distinct from the others") suggests how important it was for him to identify an even more élite subset of an already virtuous group of men. The first three sub-groups of men who worked in the arts may have been reasonably comprehensive, but they still did not represent the absolute crème de la crème. For this, Galen had to devise a fourth group, the one reserved for Socrates, Homer, Hippocrates, Plato and, as he puts it, their "lovers" (σόφοι). All the members of this group are favored by the god, but Galen regards these alone as worthy to be esteemed as gods. Galen’s language in this passage—he mentions how we should emulate (ζηλοῦν) this group of exalted men, and become their lovers—is reminiscent of Diodora’s language to Socrates in her famous speech in Plato’s Symposium on ascending to the good. At Symposium 209 c 7–d 4, for example, Diodora describes to Socrates how aspiring to the highest good advance from the love of human children to a love of the incorporeal offspring of "Homer, Hesiod and the other poets," and she mentions specifically which we admire or emulate (again, ζηλοῦν) such poetic ἔγχονα:

καὶ πάς ἡ δὲ ἐξεύθετος ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτος παῖς ἡμῶν γεγονότας ὑπὸ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους, καὶ εἰς Ἀθηναίοις ἀποθέητας καὶ Χορδοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοὺς ἁγιασμένους ἡμῶν, ὥσα ἔγχονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσι, ἐκείνοις δὲ διότι τούτον κλέος καὶ μείζον παρέχεται αὐτῷ τοιαύτα δόντα . . .

“And everyone would prefer to have children of this sort rather than human ones, and would look to Homer and Hesiod and the other good poets in emulation of the kind of offspring they left behind, offspring which, since they are immortal themselves, provide for them immortal fame and remembrance.”

It is impossible, of course, to know whether or not Galen was alluding to Diodora’s speech in the passage from the Exhortation quoted above, but it is interesting how he refers there almost exclusively to Socrates as the fore-

most representative of a life that should inspire within us an almost erotic passion for philosophical emulation—the kind of philosophical eros that Diodora has in mind in her speech in the Symposium.

The passage from the Exhortation serves to introduce a general attitude towards Socrates that Galen fills out more systematically in his Passions and Errors of the Soul. In what follows, in fact, I would like to suggest that this treatise was informed by Plato’s Socratic dialogues not only in substance, but also in its narrative form. In particular, as if taking his own advice from the passage in the Exhortation just cited, Galen seems to be attempting to emulate Socrates in openly identifiable ways, adopting a number of idiosyncratically Socratic stances and rhetorical strategies in the service of his here highly Socratic agenda. Galen naturally frames the questions he addresses in Passions in a manner that reflects the grand sweep of philosophical debate up to his own day—in the first chapter alone, for example, he alludes to Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Epicureanism yet the fundamental moral approach he takes here, and the particular voice he adopts in its service, seem suffused both with Socrates imagined as a historical figure, and Socratism as a way of life.

Very early in Passions, in fact, Galen alludes to a well-known scene from Plato’s Apology when he recalls how his own thinking developed in his youth on the question of self-knowledge and wisdom. When he was young, Galen says, he thought that people made too much of the Pythian oracle’s injunction to "know oneself", since (he thought) it was not such a difficult task. Eventually, however, as he says, he realized that only the wisest man can know himself fully, and since wisdom of this sort is hard to come by in anyone, there will be great variation in the amount of self-knowledge men will display:

8 In the opening sentence of the work, Galen announces that Passions and Errors of the Soul is a written version of an oral disquisition he had once given to his (anonymous) addressee about a treatise by one "Antonius the Epicurean". At the end of the same paragraph Galen acknowledges the long Greek philosophical tradition of ἐπανευρήματος τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ταθέων (De prp. an. cuiusl. affect. cogn. et cur. 1,4: CMNone V 4,1,1, p. 4,8–11). Galen makes no particular claims to striking originality, and defers to his great predecessors ("It would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did"); καὶ ἔν δὲ βλέπου εἰς εἰκόνας μονάδες αὐτῷ, ὅσπερ καταγωνίζων p. 4,11–12), but he forged ahead on the principle, one assumes, that he can be a useful synthesizer of issues that have an urgency for everyone.
Socrates is not named here, but the allusion to Apology 20 e 8–22 e 6 is difficult to miss. This is the famous passage where Socrates recounts how Chaerephon went to Delphi to ask the Pythian priestess whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. When the priestess answered that there was not, Socrates proceeded to test this claim by questioning prominent Athenians who had a reputation for being wise. In the end he famously found plenty of people who thought they were wise, but little in them he could call sophia, and he concluded that for all his own ignorance, he himself must be the wiser for it, and certainly wiser than those whom everyone else considered wise. With a hint of self-mockery, Galen alludes to a period of youthful brashness when he scoffed at a famous dictum that was always difficult to separate from Socrates, despite the fact that it had become something of a popular cliché by Galen’s time.12 Perhaps it was an early sign of Galen’s taste for independent thinking, but it is interesting that in this case, Galen eventually acceded to the pull of a basic Socratic tenet.

There are several noteworthy aspects of the Galenic excerpt. First, Galen adopts here (as he does throughout this work) an autobiographical narrative that parallels Socrates’ own in Phaedo 96 a 5–3, where Socrates recounts his youthful interest in natural science as a means of understanding being and becoming, and his subsequent disillusionment with such an approach; and it is a narrative that gets Galen to the point he essentially identifies with the famously paradoxical Socratic position of self-knowledge and ignorance. Like Socrates, Galen concludes that much of his knowledge really consists in an awareness of his own ignorance; only the “wisest man” can have true self-knowledge, and everyone else must concede varying degrees of self-ignorance (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dgn. et cur. 2,3; CMG V 4, 1,1, p. 5,4–5: τὸν δὲ ἄλλον ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπος, μὲν οὐδεὶς, ἢππον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτερος ἔτερο). Further, in the larger context of Galen’s work, knowledge that the soul’s passions need diagnosis and treatment puts one already a step ahead of those who claim to have wisdom but deny that they suffer from pathê. For, as he says at Passions, ch. 3, “... all men make thousands of errors every day, and act under the influence of the passions, though they don’t quite realize it.” (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dgn. et cur. 3,6; CMG V 4,1,1, p. 8,18–20: . . . ἀπάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐκκίνησιν ἤμεραν μυρία μὲν ἀμαρτώντας καὶ κατὰ τᾶς τοῦ ἐπιστήμης πράττοντας, ὡς ἢν αὐτοῦ γιὰ παρακολουθοῦντοι). As he proceeds to argue in the same passage, taking a leaf from the Stoics: only the wise man is completely perfect, and such god-like perfection is exceedingly rare, if not impossible.13 Galen, like Socrates, freely admits his shortcomings, but by doing so openly and (most importantly) striving to do something about them, portrays himself as far wiser than most others.

Both Socrates and Galen thus face a logical problem: if one is going to profess ignorance about oneself, how can one acquire self-knowledge, correct one’s flaws and so live a better life? As Galen puts it at Passions 3,2, how can one go about purging oneself of one’s passions if one is unaware of having them to begin with (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dgn. et cur. 3,2; CMG V 4,1,1, p. 7,7: πῶς όν ἐν τῇ ἐκκίνησιν τῶν μὴ γνῶν ἐπιστήμης πράττον εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ;)? The entire pedagogical thrust of Galen’s Passions in fact addresses this problem, and offers a method which, while it is unquestionably Stoic (perhaps even specifically Epictetan)12 in its self-help orientation, wears its

9 Galen would certainly have encountered the Pythian injunction through any number of his philosophical studies, but the fact that in the passage quoted above he mentions it in the context of “the wisest” of men, suggests that he does, in fact, have the Socrates of the Apology on his mind here. See also Galen’s Exhortation, where he mentions several famous examples where the Pythian god addressed men, and begins his list with Socrates: “This was the god who told Socrates that he was the wisest of all men (Protr. 9,3: CMG V 1,1, p. 132,22–23: ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος σοφώτατος).”

10 The transmitted genitive τοῦ ἄνθρωπος is difficult here with κατά; de Boer prints Marquardt’s emendation. Others have changed the preposition, or the case of τοῦ ἄνθρωπος (see Claudio Galeni Pergameni Peri ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ άμαρτήματος (n.7), p. 13 apparatus ad loc.: Magnalidi prints κατά (τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), though the sense is clear enough.

11 Cf. De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dgn. et cur. 3,7–8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 9,7–12. Galen’s complicated relationship with Stoicism is frequently discussed. On points of detail, he can be vitriolic in his disagreements, e.g. in his famous attacks in De placentis Hippocrates et Platonis II–V, though elsewhere he can appear to align himself intellectually with Stoic thinkers. See now C. Gill, Galen and the Stoics: mortal enemies or blood brothers?, Phronesis 52, 2007, pp. 88–120, esp. pp. 90–98, which offers an excellent, nuanced discussion, with further bibliography, of Galen’s fraught relationship with Stoicism. Much of Galen’s disagreement with Stoics concerned the nature of the soul (see, in addition to Gill, R. J. Hankinson, Galen’s anatomy of the soul, Phronesis 36, 1991, pp. 197–233, T. Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on the soul: argument and refutation in the De Placitibus books II–III. Leiden, New York, Köln 1996 [Philosophia Antiqua 68], pp. 264–273, and idem, Galen’s psychology, in: Galen et la Philosophie, ed. by J. Barnes and J. Jouanna, Vandeuvres – Geneva 2003 [Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique 49], pp. 151–161), but the question of the identity of a “wise man” was likely less controversial and allowed Galen to synthesize both Platonic and Stoic attitudes.

12 See A. A. Long, Epictetus. A Stoic and Socratic guide to life, Oxford 2002,
connection to Socrates rather transparently. Socrates routinely claimed that he was unsuited to dispense substantive knowledge, but instead was happy to interact with individuals, asking pointed questions, making observations, and putting to the test the things his interlocutors would say. Galen’s prescription is similarly interpersonal, individualized and elecnic. Galen would encourage everyone to find someone who could perform what amounts to a Socratic elenchos on them, not only to point out their debilitating passions, but also to engage them in a discussion about these passions, to cross-examine and counter-argue, especially if they refused to believe the criticisms leveled against them:

... ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὑπό τοῦτο πρῶτον φιλοσοφῆμα τὸ καρπερεύμενον. ὥστε ὁ δὲ ποτὲ κατεστολμέψας ἰαθώς τὸν σωτῆρα σεισθιμόνος ἐπικρινθήσεσθαι ἀπολογείται τῇ ἐπικρίσει ὁμοίως λέγοντα τιμωρίας τὸν πορός μηδέν ἔλεγχος μηδὲ τοι τὸ κατελειπτήν ἔκεινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἄφηλες ἔνακτα τῆς συμβολῆς τοῦ καθί πρός τὴν ἀντάλλαγιαν ἀντιπάλους αὐτὸν τιμωρίας ἐπί Σωκράτης ἐκέινον ἀμείνην γιγαντοκεφάλων ἤ μετὰ πλεονεκῆς ἐξετάσεως εὐρίς αὐτὸν ἔξω τῶν ἐγκαλεμένων (δύτα). (De propri. animi cuisiul. affect. dign. et cult. 3:10; CMG V 4.1.1, p.10,7–14)

"... this is the first rudiment of philosophy, to put up with unfair criticism. Later, as you observe a reasonable decline in your affections, you will try to justify yourself against malicious attacks - but never in a harsh or argumentative way, never from a competitive spirit or a desire to do him down. You will do it for your own benefit. If his reply to your self-justification is plausible, you will either be convinced of his superior awareness or on further examination, find that his accounts are unfounded." (transl. Singer, p.105)

Galen’s method is explicitly mediated by the Stoic Zeno, but the procedure is essentially Socratic, and there are other indications in the work to suggest..

On Stoic conceptions and use of the elencho, see L. Repici, The Stoics and the elencho, in: Dialektiker and Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoia und ihrer Vorläufer, Symposium zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer, Bamberg 1–7.9.1991, hrsg. v. K. Döring, Th. Ebert, Stuttgart 1993 (Philosophie der Antike 1), pp. 253–270, and F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione sozocratica, Naples 2000 (Elenchos 30), pp. 281–286, with further bibliography. It is worth noting, as Repici points out, that the Stoic elencho came to look quite different from the Socratic or Eratonic elencho in the early Paronic dialogues. Galen’s prescription for moral self-improvement seems to involve a little of both methods; that is, he has an assured sense of what constitutes good and bad behavior, but seems to believe, like Socrates, that dialectic is the most persuasive way for individuals to find their way to the good.

He continues in the next sentence: “This was the formula approved by Zeno to ensure good conduct; that in all we do we should imagine that we shall shortly after have to justify our actions to our teachers. That was what he called the mass of people who are ready to offer unsolicited criticism of their fellows” (transl. Singer, p.105, modified; De propr. animi cuisiul. affect. dign. et cult. 3:11; CMG V 4.1.1, p.10, 14–18: οὕτω γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ἰσθηνί θέληται πρὸς τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀφαίρεσιν ἀφοῦ ἀπολογητικῶν ἐλεγχοῦν (ὑπό τοῦτον τοκετήρισθα). ὡς δάκτυλον τοῦ ἄκρωτον, οὐκ ἀνυπακοήτως ἄθλον τῶν ἀνήλικων ἐπιτίμητον καθελθοῦν καὶ ἀμφότερος παρακαθήλων).

may have been a purveyor of *mythoi*, but for Socrates these *mythoi* could have as much philosophical import as those he famously tells in other Platonic dialogues. It is often noted that the Aesopic tradition was appropriated in the Hellenistic period by Cynics and other thinkers with Socratic inclinations, so it is possible that Galen’s allusion to Aesop’s fable of the two wallets is more directly mediated by contemporary writers of that sort. But it is also curious that Galen proceeds to explain the meaning of Aesop by quoting a passage from Plato’s Laws, a passage on a theme identical to one in Galen’s Passions, self-love, even if Socrates is no longer an actor in the narrative. Plato’s Athenian here states that the greatest of evils for men is an “excessive love of oneself”, which blinds the lover to the errors (ἀμαρτήματα) of his beloved, i.e., the self, and leads him to esteem his own subjectivity over the truth:

τούτο δ’ ἐστιν Ὡ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὐτὸ πάς ἀνθρώπως φύσει τέ ἂστιν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· τὸ δὲ εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸ δὲ ἐλθεῖν γε πάντων ἀμαρτήματι διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτὸς φίλην αὐτῶν ἐκάστου γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε. τυφλὸτης γάρ περὶ τὸ φιλοῦμεν ὁ φίλος, ὡςτε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄγαθα καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακός κρίνει, τὸ αὐτοῦ τρόπον τὸ ἔλθειν ὃι τίμων δὲν ἠγούμενος’ ὡςτε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ὡςτε τὰ καλοῦ τὸν τῆν γε μέγαν ἄνθρωπον ἐσθένειν στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἄντε παρ’ αὐτὸν ἓντε παρ’ ἄλλοι μάλλον προτέρως τυχάνη. (Plato, Leges V: 731 e 1–732 a 4)

“And this is what they mean when they say that every man is by nature a friend to himself and that it’s appropriate for him to have to be like this. But in truth, at any rate, the cause of all errors (ἀμαρτήματα) for an individual on every occasion can be traced to the excessive love of oneself. For the lover is blind when it comes to the object of his love, so he’s a poor judge of what’s just, good and beautiful, thinking he should always honor his own self rather than the truth. For someone who aspires to be a great man does not need to love himself nor anything pertaining to himself, but rather just things, whether they happen to be done by himself or – even more so – by another.”

For Galen, the dilemma can only be resolved, as we have seen, by offering ourselves up to an elenchus by others, those who can see what is in those wallets strappev over our backs. It is interesting, then, that Galen draws out the moral of the Aesopic fable by way of Plato: “For it seems that Aesop’s *fable* and Plato’s *account* show that discovering our own errors is really quite hopeless” (transl. Singer, p. 102, modified; De propr. animi cuissul. affect. dign. et cur. 7.2: CMG V 4.1.1, p. 6.12–14: πολλοί γὰρ ἔχειν δ’ τε τοῦ Ἀρίστοκρος μένος καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος λόγος ἀνεπιστοτέραν ήμιν τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἀμαρτήματος εὑρέσειν ἐπιστορεύει). Like Socrates in the Phaedo passage, Galen here draws a distinction between the *mythos* of Aesop and the *logos* of philosophy, but in the end the two work together, both in the

Phaedo and in Galen’s Passions, to serve a didactic purpose. Galen seems very much, therefore, to have bypassed explicit reference to any contemporary sources for this passage, and instead wants his reader to think back to its Classical origins in Plato. This is not the only place in Passions where Galen seems to have the opening scene of the Phaedo on his mind, and where he seems quite self-consciously to be modeling himself on the Platonic Socrates. At the beginning of Passions 8, in a passage that has become well known even outside of Galenic studies, Galen once again shifts into autobiographical mode, describing how he came to dwell his attitudes about anger and other damages emotions. The language is Socratic, with its reference to the Delphic motto about self-knowledge, and the analogy Galen draws between his own parents and the married couple Socrates and Xanthippus most revealing:

’Εγὼ τούτων, ἄτης μὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔχω, οὐκ ἔχω φάναι (τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γνώναι) χαλεπνόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ τελείου ἀνθρώπου, μή τι γέ γη τοῦ παιδιοῦ, εὔτυχες δὲ μεγάλην εὐτυχίαν, ἀρνητότατον μὲν καὶ δικαιότατον καὶ χρυσότατόν καὶ φιλονομητότατόν ἔχων πατέρα, μητέρα δὲ ὄργωλωτήν, ὃς δάκειν ἴσως ἔνυπτα τὰς περαταίας, οἷς δὲ κεφαλήγει τε καὶ μάρασσας τὸ πατρί μᾶλλον ή σωτήρια Σωκράτη. παραλληλά τ’ ἐστιν μοι τὰ καλὰ τῶν τοῦ πατρικοῦ ἔργων τοῦ σινχρός πάθεις τῆς μητρὸς ἐπηγαγεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀστάσαις τε καὶ παλιός τὰ δὲ φεύγανεν καὶ μοισκεύειν. (De propr. animi cuissul. affect. dign. et cur. 8.1–2: CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 27, 20–28, 44)

“I can’t really say how I came to have my nature – for knowing oneself is difficult enough for grownups, let alone for children. But I had the great fortune to have a father who was the least prone to anger, extremely just, good and kind to others. My mother, though, was so irascible that she sometimes bit her maidservants, and she was constantly shouting and fighting with my father more than Xanthippe did with Socrates. I was thus enabled to make a direct comparison between the fine qualities of my father’s deeds and the wretched affections to which my mother was subject; and this awoke in me the feelings of warmth and love for the former, and hatred and avoidance of the latter.” (transl. Singer, p. 119 [modified])

Despite a conspicuous, even infamous, anecdotal tradition about Xanthippus after Plato, her only explicit appearance in Plato is the opening of the Phaedo (60a 9–b1), where Socrates ordered her removed because of her emotional behavior: “Some of Crito’s people led her away lamenting and beating (βουσών τε καὶ κοπτομένην) her breast.” The lines of comparison are clear: Galen’s father is to Socrates as his mother is to Xanthippe; Galen observed his parents closely, and in comparing the two tried always to imitate his father’s example, and avoid his mother’s. Insofar as Galen lived his life in imitation of his father, then, his alignment with Socrates is all but explicit here. The rest of this passage confirms that Galen idealized his father, whether consciously or not, as a figure with a good number of decidedly Socratic qualities: he never grieved (ἀπετέθανε) at misfortune, he was philosophic-

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16 For a detailed discussion of this appropriation, see Adrados (n. 15), vol. I, Leiden and Köln 1999 (Mnemosyne, Suppl. 201), pp. 604–644.

17 Galen may well have had Epicureus’ portrait of Socrates as fundamentally unruflle-
ally curious and the eclectic, but always wary of committing to any one sect, and he urged on his son the pursuit of the canonical virtues that obsessed Socrates as well, *dikaiosyne, sophrosyne, and andreia*, as well as *phronesis*. As Galen sums up a few paragraphs later, in a passage that puts the finishing touch on the portrait of his father as a Socrates figure, “my father accustomed me to disdain reputation and honor, and to respect only truth” (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. VIII 8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 29,18–19: δόξης τε καὶ τιμῆς ὁ πατὴρ εἰσίνε με καταφρονείν ἀλήθειαν μόνην τιμῶντα.) To be sure, we would probably call at least part of his father’s background “Platonic” or “Aristotelian”, rather than “Socratic” – Galen notes, for example, at De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 8,5: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 28,19–20, his father’s training in geometry, arithmetic, architecture and astronomy, and this hardly sounds particularly Socratic; or at least not Plato’s Socrates. This training, passed on as it was to Galen, informs especially the second half of this work, Errors, and accords well with his notorious commitment to empirical argument and logical demonstration. But even Galen’s concerns in Errors are not incompatible with the Socratic emphasis on knowledge – even technical knowledge derived from natural philosophy – that advances human virtue and goodness. Recent scholarship has emphasized, for example, that the mature Socrates seems to have embraced even some aspects of natural philosophy, provided it was directed towards the good of humans, and avoided the fruitless complaints about the autobiographical section of Phaedo. At the end of

able in mind here as well; cf. Epicr., II 12,14: τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα θυμιάματα παρακατέμενας έν λόγοι, μηδέποτε λοιδοριών προενέργοις, άλλη τῶν λοιδορούντων ανέκδεσθαι καί παρά παρόνικον (‘This was the first, most idiosyncratic thing about Socrates, that he never lost his cool in conversation, never offered anything abusive or violent, but put up with others when they were being abusive, and ended [conversational] warfare’). 18 De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 8,2, 6: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 28,4–6. 25–30, 6. It may not be mere coincidence, in a passage that may already allude to the Phaedo (118 a 15–17), that Galen here sounds as if he has the last sentence of that work in mind, where Plato refers to Socrates as the “best, wisest and just man he ever met” : “Ήσεί ἡ τελεστὴ, ἢ ἑξεκρίττει τοῦ ἑταίρου ἢν έγένετο ἀνδρός, ὃς ἔμεινε φαίνειν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὁ ἐπεράφθην ἀριστον καί ἄλλον φρονιμοτότου καί δικαιοτότου.” 19 See above, n. 2, on the Stoic portrait (which amalgamates both Xenophon and Plato) of a Socrates who acknowledged a philosophical role for natural philosophy in ethical inquiry; and see next note. 20 See e.g., P. A. Vander Waerds, Socrates in the Clouds, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), pp. 84ff. in discussing Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ fraught attitude towards natural philosophy: “This account [Xenoph., Memor. IV 7,4–5] of the mature Socrates’ attitude toward natural philosophy makes it clear that study even of its more technical disciplines should be pursued insofar as the knowledge in question confers some practical benefit upon its possessor, though knowledge is not to be pursued for its own sake . . ., there can be no doubt that he relies on a very definite conception of the cosmos and mankind’s place in it in formulating his own substantive moral doctrines.” See also DeFilippo and Misiti (n.2), pp. 252–271, who discuss how the Stoic reconciled their interests in natural philosophy with a Stoic foundation that might at first glance seem incompatible with them. 21 See Long, Epicurus (n.12), pp. 67–86; on the Gorgias, in particular, pp. 70–74. On Epicurus and Socrates more generally, see K. Döring, Exemplum Socratis, Wiesbaden 1979 (Hermes-Einzelschriften 42), pp. 43–79, esp. p. 44: “Von allen Philosophen, die wir hier zu behandeln haben, ist Epiket ohne Zweifel derjenige, auf den die Gestalt des Sokrates den stärksten und nachhaltigsten Eindruck gemacht hat.” See, for example, the exchange between Callicles and Socrates at Plato, Gorg. 491 d–495 b, where Socrates claims that the kind of life advocated by Callicles – unlimited gratification of the bodily pleasures – looks more like that of the *charadrius* bird, which immediately excretes whatever it ingests, or the “frightfully shameful and miserable” life of the instable catamen (494 a 4–5). Galen too, in his persistent advocacy of *sophrosyne*, remains fixated on food and excessive consumption in general: “For it is not sufficient to lead a life free of anger; one must purge oneself also of luxuriousness and lasciviousness, of drunkenness, idleness, and envy” (transl. Singer, p. 114; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 6,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 21,11–12;
succumbing to bodily addictions (ibid. 7,2–5: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 24,10–25, 11); even Galen’s special concern in this work for managing emotions, which owes much to the Stoic background, has Socratic roots traceable to the Gorgias.23 But there is one aspect of Passions that suggests a very specific connection with the Socrates of Gorgias, namely Socrates’ counterintuitive prescription for self-improvement in this work. By “counterintuitive”, I mean that when Galen says that everyone, himself included, should actively seek out someone who will assess and criticize one’s own faults, it is doubtful (and he knew it) that most people would find this an appealing course of action. But adopting counterintuitive positions is a famously Socratic strategy in general (we need only think of him recommending in the Apology, 36 d, that his “punishment” be free meals in the Prytanæum), and a running motif in particular in the Gorgias. At 480 b 7 ff., for example, Socrates reaches the climax of his conversation with Polus by concluding that if we are to use rhetoric for anything at all, it should be used to indict ourselves when we commit injustice. And what seems even more absurd to his interlocutors, people should admit their wrongdoing and voluntarily seek punishment so their soul can be healed of its sickness. From the start, Socrates recurs to the language of medicine: it is important to treat the psychic disorder sooner rather than later, lest it eventually become incurable: ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθῇ τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀκίδας ὑπολογίσας τὴν γυγίαν ποιήσας καὶ ἀνίατον (Plato, Gorg. 480 b 1–2). Socrates waxes increasingly eloquent in his next speech urging the unjust person to “grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery, pursuing what’s good and admirable without taking account of the pain” (transl. Zeyl, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 6–8: παρέξειν μάσσατα εύ καὶ ἀνέδρας ὀστή ἀδύνατον καὶ καλῶν διώκομαι, μὴ ὑπολογισμόν τὸ ἀλένειον). In a final flourish Socrates makes his famous pronouncement that “… if his unjust behavior merits flogging, he should pres-

ent himself to be whipped; if it merits imprisonment, to be imprisoned, if a fine, to pay it; if to be exiled; and if death, to be killed” (transl. Zeyl, modified, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 8–13: ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγήν ἔχει ἥπερ-

κῆς ἢ, τύπτειν παρέξετο, ἐὰν δὲ δεσποῦ, δεῦ, ἐὰν δὲ ἡμιοῦ, ἀποτι-

νοῦτα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγής, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ σανάκτη, ἀποθνῄσκωντα). Polus replies that the whole thing seems “absurd” (Plato, Gorg. 480 e 1: ἀτούτο), even as he feels compelled to agree that their discussion has led them to this conclusion.

Galen for his part likewise recommends self-indictment at Passions 7,4, just after he has suggested that we find an older person to point out our vices. Although Galen here focuses on afflictions with fewer public consequences for the individual than those imagined by Socrates in the Gorgias, his phrasing is strikingly similar to Socrates’:

..., πρῶτον αὐτῷ χάριν μὲν γινόμει παροντικά, χορομαχεύοντα δὲ διασκέδασται κατὰ μόνας ἐστιν ὑπολογίζησας ἐκκενθήσας τε περικομένως τὸ πάθος, οὐκ ἔχει τῇ μὴ φαίνεται τοις ἀλλαῖς μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅστε μηδὲ δίδων ἐγκαταλείπεται αὐτῷ τῇ ψυχῇ ξένη ἀποστράτευτη τῇ τῶν συνήθεων ἀδραμένων πονηρῶς.... ἐκκενθήσας γάρ αὐτῷ φυγήν ἔπτη, πρὶν αὐξάνοις ἀλένειον γενόλυσον. (De propr. animi cuist. affect. dign. et cur. 7,4–5: CMG V 4,1, p. 25,4–11)

“..., we must first of all thank him [sc. our senior advisor who has assessed our faults] immediately, and later, contemplate in solitude, applying criticism to ourselves and attempting to excise the affection – not merely to the point where it is no longer apparent to others, but in such a way that its actual root is removed from the soul. For it may grow back, nourished by the evils of those around us. ... It should be cut out in the early stages of growth, before it has grown so large as to be incurable.” (transl. Singer, p. 117)

Galen has no Polus at hand to comment on whether or not such a prescription is absurd, but in an earlier passage, he offers an amusing anecdote that may, in fact, allude to Socrates’ notion of giving oneself over to voluntary punishment for unjust behavior. At Passions 4,9–12, Galen tells the story of a friend of his from Crete who nearly killed two of his slaves in a fit of rage over some lost luggage. Galen saved the slaves, he says, but his friend was so ashamed of his behavior that he “took me by the hand, led me into a house somewhere, offered me a strap, stripped off his clothes, and ordered me to beat him for what he had done under the influence of – in his own words – his accursed anger” (transl. Singer, p. 108 [modified]; De propr. animi cuist. affect. dign. et cur. 4,12: CMG V 4,1, p. 14,19–22: ὁ δὲ φίλος Κρῆς ἐστι αὐτῷ καταγόντως μεγάλος εἰσεχάζοντας καὶ λαθόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἰς ὅμοιον τῶν, καὶ προσθέσας μᾶντα καὶ ἀποδύναμον ἐκέλευσε μαστιγοῦν αὐτοῦ ἐφ’ ὅς ἐπεμέχαρεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καταράτου την μικρήν μιαστίζειν). This begins to sound much like what Socrates was after in the Gorgias passage discussed above. It is curious, however, that Galen was amused by the whole scene; he told his friend as much, but the friend was adamant and kept begging him to whip
him. As Galen says, "the more earnest his entreaties to be flogged, the more he made me laugh" (transl. Singer, p. 108; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 4,12: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 14,24–25: μέλλων ἔτοιμε με γελάν, δεινό μέλλον ἔνεκετω μαςτίγων ἔμετοι δεόμενος).

Could it be that this is Galen’s own response to Socrates’ iconoclastic position in the Gorgias passage that people who have committed injustice should voluntarily offer themselves up for punishment? In that passage, not long after Polus said that he found Socrates’ position absurd, Callicles too had to ask Chaerephon whether or not Socrates was simply joking (481 b 6–7). There is, in the end, something amusing and counterintuitive about Socrates’ position, and when confronted with an actual example of it, Galen corroborates this response. But Galen does not leave it at this: he does not want to dismiss completely the idea that people should seek to correct their flaws. Rather, it seems, he ends up offering a more practical, realistic spin on Socrates’ advice – a spin that he derives ultimately from Socrates himself. For the story of his Cretan friend ends with Galen getting him to agree that his punishment should not be the whip, but logoi, and the logoi he proceeds to offer him concern the regulation of one’s anger by words, rather than whips. Whereas it may be unreasonable, and even a little silly, to think that people will routinely submit themselves voluntarily to physical punishment for their bad behavior as Socrates advocates in the Gorgias, Galen points out here that it is hardly unreasonable, and far more practical, to imagine that a kind of punitive logoi (indicating here both rational argument and just plain conversation) can actually have a therapeutic effect on an individual’s soul. This, of course, is a decidedly Socratic recommendation as we often find in other Platonic contexts. It certainly worked for Galen’s Cretan friend, who, Galen says, became much improved after a year of careful attention to his behavior: ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ἔνιστό ὁ προσωπογόμον ἐστώ τοῦ πολὺ βελτίων ἐγένετο (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 4,14: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 15,6–7).

Galen’s goal in writing Passions and Errors, was, as he states early in the work, modest and almost self-effacing. He notes near the end of ch. 1 that many philosophers have written on the subject before, and he mentions Chrysippus, Aristotle and Plato by name. He then tells the person who requested the work from him that “it would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did” (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 1,4: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 4,11–12: καὶ ἤμι μὲν βελτίων ἔς ἐκεῖνον μανθάνειν σοῦτα, ὀμπερ καγκέλο), which I take to mean, among other things, that he made no special claims to originality in this treatise. So we are certainly prepared from the start for the mix of Stoicism, Aristotelianism and Platonism that we end up with in the work. But Galen’s philosophical allegiances were, of course, closest to Plato, and in his ethical works, at any rate, the Platonic Socrates often seems a looming, if not always explicit, presence. It may always be