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Leísta Spanish and the Syntax of Clitic Doubling

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Abstract
This dissertation introduces clitic doubling data from Leísta Spanish (a dialect spoken in the North of Spain). In this dialect, the dative form clitic is used as a direct object clitic when the referent (or associated overt or covert NP) is animate (sometimes also restricted to masculine). Like other doubling dialects, Leísta Spanish shows a (doubling) asymmetry between direct objects and indirect objects. Direct object doubling manifests animacy and specificity restrictions that do not hold of indirect object doubling.

In Chapter 2 I show that this data presents a problem for past analyses of clitic doubling which tie these interpretive restrictions to a particular clitic form. As a first step to solving the interpretive puzzle, I argue that dative and accusative clitics should receive different analyses. Dative clitics are agreement markers (a la Sportiche 1993); accusative clitics are determiners (see Torrego 1988; Uriagereka 1988).

The questions raised by Chapter 2 are: (1) How should dative-form accusative clitics in Leísta Spanish be analyzed? and (2) What is the internal structure of the direct object in a clitic doubling construction? These questions are answered in Chapter 4, where I argue that clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish should be analyzed as an instance of possessor raising. In both clitic doubling and possessor raising, a DP-internal constituent raises to be in a spec-head relationship with a dative clitic. Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for this analysis. Here, the internal structure of possessor DPs is established, and it is demonstrated that movement of a possessor DP out of a direct object DP is possible.

Chapter 5 addresses the question of the relationship between the prepositional accusative marker a and clitic doubling, known as Kayne's Generalization. The generalization is that clitic doubling cannot occur without a-marking. I explore two possible accounts for this relationship. The first possibility is that the relationship is syntactic. The a-marked element is a dative marked DP internal possessor. Given the hypothesis that clitic doubling involves the raising of a DP-internal possessor, if that possessor is necessarily a-marked, it follows that clitic doubling implicates a-marking. The second hypothesis is that the relationship arises due to the independent semantic properties of the two constructions, and that there is no direct dependence of one on the other. On this view, the semantic properties associated with a-marking are a subset of those associated with clitic doubling. The apparent dependence, then, is due to this subset relationship. Neither of these hypotheses is without problems, and these are discussed in the chapter.

Comments
LEÍSTA SPANISH
AND THE SYNTAX OF CLITIC DOUBLING

by
Tonia M. Bleam

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a major in Linguistics.

Fall 1999

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LEÍSTA SPANISH

AND THE SYNTAX OF CLITIC DOUBLING

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ xi

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

2. CLITICS AND CLITIC PLACEMENT .......................................................... 5

   2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 5

   2.2 SOME HISTORY: BASE GENERATION VS. MOVEMENT ..................................... 6

   2.3 ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIFICITY ..................................................................... 11

       2.3.1 Suñer 1988 ........................................................................................... 11

       2.3.2 Sportiche 1993 ..................................................................................... 14

       2.3.3 A Non-unified Analysis of Accusative vs. Dative Clitics ..................... 16

           2.3.3.1 Accusative clitics as determiners..................................................... 17

           2.3.3.2 Dative Clitics ................................................................................... 35

       2.3.4 Leísta Spanish as a challenge to the feature approach to specificity.. 44

           2.3.4.1 Problem 1: Specificity effects of doubling in Leísta Spanish ........ 45

           2.3.4.2 Accounting for Leísta doubling using features................................. 50

           2.3.4.3 Problem 2: Clitic form and the possibility of doubling .................... 51

           2.3.4.4 Problem 3: Specificity and Grammatical Function ......................... 53
2.3.5 The Clitic Form Dilemma ................................................................. 54

2.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 55

3. Possession Constructions ......................................................................... 57

3.1 Background .......................................................................................... 59

3.1.1 Possessive DP: Evidence from Hungarian .............................................. 59

3.1.1.1 Structure of the DP ................................................................. 59

3.1.1.2 Extraction ............................................................................... 63

3.1.1.3 Possession Sentences ............................................................. 64

3.1.2 Kayne’s 1993 Analysis of English Possessives ..................................... 65

3.1.3 The Syntax of Integrals ..................................................................... 70

3.1.3.1 Have and Be paraphrases ......................................................... 76

3.1.3.2 Evidence for the Standard vs. Integral Syntax ............................. 79

3.1.4 Modifications of the Integral Syntax .................................................. 80

3.1.4.1 A Hierarchical Structure for the Small Clause ............................ 87

3.1.5 Summary ......................................................................................... 91

3.2 Possessor Raising .................................................................................. 94

3.2.1 Animacy Effects on Dative Arguments ............................................. 101

3.2.1.1 Animacy Effects in the Possessor Raising Construction ............... 101

3.2.1.2 Datives as event participants .................................................. 103

3.2.1.3 Summary ............................................................................... 112

3.3 Conclusions .......................................................................................... 113
4. THE SYNTAX OF CLITIC DOUBLING ....................................................... 115

4.1 INTERPRETIVE ASPECTS OF CLITIC DOUBLING ................................. 115

4.2 A SYNTACTIC ACCOUNT OF LEÍSTA DOUBLING ....................................... 130

4.2.1 Realizing the One le Hypothesis .......................................................... 130

4.2.2 The Internal Structure of DP ............................................................... 133

4.2.2.1 The Integral Relation and its Interpretation ...................................... 133

4.2.2.2 The Derivation Internal to DP ......................................................... 137

4.2.3 Loose Ends ......................................................................................... 138

4.2.3.1 No Small Clause, No Doubling ....................................................... 138

4.2.3.2 Clitics with No Doubling ................................................................. 139

4.2.4 Animacy Restrictions on Clitic Doubling .............................................. 140

4.2.4.1 Event Participants and Animacy ...................................................... 141

4.2.4.2 The Integral Relation and Animacy ............................................... 142

4.2.4.3 Pronouns and Animacy ................................................................. 145

4.3 AN ANSWER TO THE CLITIC FORM DILEMMA ..................................... 149

4.4 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LO-DOUBLING AND LE-DOUBLING .............. 151

4.4.1 The Account of Lo-doubling Dialects ................................................ 151

4.5 DIRECT OBJECTS VERSUS INDIRECT OBJECTS ..................................... 155

4.6 SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 158

5. A-MARKING AND KAYNE’S GENERALIZATION ...................................... 160
5.1 A-MARKING AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DIRECT OBJECT .......... 161

5.1.1 Animacy ............................................................................................. 161

5.1.2 Specificity .......................................................................................... 166

5.1.3 Scopal Specificity............................................................................... 171

5.1.4 A-marking and specificity in Spanish ................................................ 175

5.1.5 Lack of a-marking and Property-denoting NPs ............................... 180

5.1.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 186

5.2 KAYNE’S GENERALIZATION ................................................................. 187

5.2.1 Past accounts of Kayne’s Generalization ........................................ 189

5.2.2 A New Syntactic Hypothesis ............................................................. 192

5.2.3 A Semantic Hypothesis: The Subset Hypothesis ........................... 197

5.3 SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 201

6. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 202

6.1 FUTURE WORK ..................................................................................... 207

REFERENCES ........................................................................................... 211
ABSTRACT

This dissertation introduces clitic doubling data from Leísta Spanish (a dialect spoken in the North of Spain). In this dialect, the dative form clitic is used as a direct object clitic when the referent (or associated overt or covert NP) is animate (sometimes also restricted to masculine). Like other doubling dialects, Leísta Spanish shows a (doubling) asymmetry between direct objects and indirect objects. Direct object doubling manifests animacy and specificity restrictions that do not hold of indirect object doubling.

In Chapter 2 I show that this data presents a problem for past analyses of clitic doubling which tie these interpretive restrictions to a particular clitic form. As a first step to solving the interpretive puzzle, I argue that dative and accusative clitics should receive different analyses. Dative clitics are agreement markers (*a la* Sportiche 1993); accusative clitics are determiners (see Torrego 1988; Uriagereka 1988).

The questions raised by Chapter 2 are: (1) How should dative-form accusative clitics in Leísta Spanish be analyzed? and (2) What is the internal structure of the direct object in a clitic doubling construction? These questions are answered in Chapter 4, where I argue that clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish should
be analyzed as an instance of possessor raising. In both clitic doubling and possessor raising, a DP-internal constituent raises to be in a spec-head relationship with a dative clitic. Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for this analysis. Here, the internal structure of possessor DPs is established, and it is demonstrated that movement of a possessor DP out of a direct object DP is possible.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

It is the goal of this dissertation to provide a syntactic analysis of clitic doubling constructions in Leísta Spanish, which is a dialect spoken in the northern part of Spain. The name Leísta refers to the fact that the dative clitic form le is used as a direct object clitic, when the referent is animate (and in many subdialects, masculine).

1. Le vi. Leísta
   CL.dat I.saw
   “I saw him/(her).”

This contrasts with standard Spanish where the clitics lo and la are used for direct objects, and le is only used for indirect objects.

2. Lo vi. Standard
   CL.acc.masc I.saw
   “I saw him/it.”

3. Le di el libro. Leísta/Standard
   CL.dat I.gave the book
   “I gave the book to him/her.”

Leísmo (the use of le for the direct object) is widely spread throughout the northern half of Spain. A subset of the Leísta dialects also exhibit direct object clitic
doubling. In all dialects of Spanish, there is some degree of direct object clitic doubling. For example, doubling of an overt pronoun is obligatory in all dialects.

4. a. Lo vi a él.  Standard
   CL I.saw A him
   “I saw him.”

   b. *Vi a él.

5. a. Le vi a él  Leísta
   CL I.saw A him
   “I saw him.”

   b. *Vi a él.

However, in standard varieties of Spanish, only pronouns, and not full NPs, can double in direct object position.

6. *Lo vi a Juan.  Standard
   CL I.saw A Juan

There are several dialects of Spanish, some of them Leísta, which allow clitic doubling.

7. Le vi a Juan.  Doubling dialects of Leísta

It is these dialects that will be the focus of this study.

In Chapter 2 I introduce the basic issues of clitic placement that have concerned generative grammarians since the 1970s. The central debate has been over whether the clitic’s surface position is its base position or a derived position. I argue that the dative-form clitic is base generated, whereas the accusative-form clitic is a determiner which moves out of the direct object DP to its surface position (Uriagereka 1988, 1995a).
In this chapter I describe specificity restrictions that hold of direct object doubling but not of indirect object doubling. I argue against recent featural accounts of specificity restrictions that treat both the dative and accusative clitics as agreement morphemes. I show that Leísta Spanish provides data that is problematic for a featural account of specificity that associates a specificity feature to a particular morphological form of the clitic.

Building on recent work by Uriagereka (1995b; 1997; 1998; 1999), I propose that doubled DPs in Leísta Spanish display the same syntax as inalienably possessed DPs. The syntax that I assume for both clitic doubling and inalienable possession is based on the structure proposed by Kayne (1993) for English possession, which in turn is based on Szabolcsi’s (1981; 1983; 1987) work on Hungarian possessives. Chapter 3 provides the foundations on which the analysis of clitic doubling is built. It is in this chapter that I motivate the structure for inalienable possession. I show how this structure underlies possessor-raising constructions. Possessor raising constructions provide evidence that a subconstituent (possessor) of the direct object can move out of the direct object and become a dative argument of the verb, triggering the presence of the dative clitic. We explore some interpretive restrictions that are associated with possessor raising and with dative doubling in general.

The analysis of inalienable possession and possessor raising developed in Chapter 3 is then applied to clitic doubling in Chapter 4. We show that some of the
interpretive restrictions of direct object clitic doubling can be reduced to the
restrictions on dative doubling in general. Other interpretive properties of doubling
are attributed to certain aspects of the underlying inalienable possession
construction.

In Chapter 5 I discuss accusative $a$-marking, which is a morphological marking
that appears with direct objects that are interpreted as animate and specific. I
explore two hypotheses concerning the relationship of $a$-marking to clitic doubling.
In one hypothesis the relationship between these two kinds of object marking is
syntactic and in the other it is semantic.
Chapter 2

CLITICS AND CLITIC PLACEMENT

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I address several issues concerning the nature of pronominal clitics in Spanish and in other Romance languages. One issue involves what clitics are and how they end up in their surface position. A related issue concerns clitic doubling, the central question being the relationship between the clitic and the full NP double.

I start in section 2.2 by introducing the basic debate concerning clitic placement in Romance that has been going on since the 1970s. This debate centers around the question of whether pronominal clitics are generated in their surface position, or whether they move there from the canonical argument position. Behind this debate lies the question of what clitics are. For example, are they arguments, agreement markers, or something else entirely? Certain interpretive effects associated with some clitics complicate the debate considerably. In section 2.3 I discuss clitic doubling in a particular variety of Spanish (Rioplatense) and show that direct object doubling in this dialect gives rise to specificity effects. Indirect
object doubling is not subject to such restrictions. I present two examples of featural accounts of this data (in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) and then present my analysis of accusative and dative clitics in Spanish (section 2.3.3). I argue that accusative and dative clitics require separate analyses. They are not derived in the same way. Accusative clitics are underlyingly determiners in the direct object DP, whereas dative clitics are agreement markers in the verbal projection. In section 2.3.4 I present data from Leísta Spanish and argue that this data poses a problem for a featural account of specificity. In section 2.3.5 I describe the general problem of accounting for the accusative le in Leísta Spanish.

2.2 Some History: Base generation vs. Movement

Pronominal clitics have been given essentially two accounts in the generative literature. According to the Movement Hypothesis (as introduced in Kayne 1975; and adopted by others, such as Quicoli 1980) the clitic is a pronoun that is base-generated as the object and then moves to a position adjacent to the verb. The early movement analysis was developed to account for languages like French where the clitic and the full NP were in complementary distribution.

Kayne (1975) considers both approaches (base generation and movement), as well as an intermediate approach (delete duplicate copy if a clitic is present) to account for French clitic placement. He argues that the grammar is simpler if we assume that the clitic is underlyingly in direct object position and then moves. Without this assumption, we would have to explain why a clitic can only appear on
verbs which take a direct object, and why the clitic and the direct object cannot both appear at once. If we take the clitic to be moved from the direct object position, then no extra mechanisms are necessary to account for the facts in French.

Authors such as Strozer (1976), Rivas (1977), and Jaeggli (1982) pointed out that the movement analysis could not account for all clitic languages due to the existence of clitic doubling in languages such as Rioplatense Spanish.¹ In clitic doubling constructions a full NP (or pronoun) occupies the object position, and so the clitic cannot have moved from this position.² Thus, the existence of the clitic-doubling construction seems to argue for a base-generation approach to clitics, at least in languages that allow clitic-doubling. As a result, much of the literature on

¹ Rioplatense Spanish is spoken in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and some areas of Chili. Descriptions of clitic doubling in this dialect in the generative literature are given by the authors mentioned above and by Suñer 1988.

² To jump ahead to a current perspective, one might argue that the movement hypothesis could be maintained if we assume a move-and-copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1995). Under this view the clitic could be seen as the spell-out of the higher copy, the full element having been deleted, whereas the lower copy is overt.
clitics in the 1980s and into the 1990s has adopted the base-generation hypothesis in different forms.

Despite its obvious advantage in accounting for clitic doubling languages, the Base Generation Hypothesis leaves one important question unanswered. Schmitt (1996) dubs this “the theta role problem”. As Borer notes:

…the movement analysis has one elegant result which base-generation analyses cannot achieve quite as easily. Since the clitic in the movement analysis is considered to have originated in the argument position, the fact that it satisfies the subcategorization frame of the head and is assigned a theta role by it is captured naturally. Furthermore, the coreferentiality (coindexing) between this clitic and the argument position follows clearly from a movement analysis but not from a base-generated one. (Borer 1984:34).

The “theta-role problem” is that the noun phrase can appear alone in object position without having a clitic present, and the clitic can appear alone without the NP. When the NP occurs alone, it appears to be receiving case and a theta role in the normal way. When there is no overt NP, it is the clitic that appears to be satisfying the subcategorization requirements of the verb and perhaps also receiving case (since it shows a morphological distinction for case). Thus, the question arises as to what happens when there is both a clitic and a full NP. If they are generated independently of each other, then what is the relation between them such that they do not each refer independently?

Borer (1984) addressed this problem by claiming that the clitic is a spell-out of features of the verb (case and phi features). On this analysis, the clitic is not an independent element that receives a theta role, and the NP complement still
receives a theta role in the usual way. So, Borer was one of the first generative proponents of the Base Generation Hypothesis to treat the clitic as an agreement morpheme. (Suñer 1988; Sportiche 1993/1996, Franco 1993, among others, take this position as well.)

Aoun (1981) and Hurtado (1984) maintain the Movement Hypothesis in the face of the problem posed by clitic doubling. These authors propose that the doubled NP is not generated as an argument, but is in some type of dislocated position. In this way, it can be maintained that the clitic is generated in complement position and moves to its surface position.

However, there are several arguments against the view that the double is in a dislocated position. These arguments, as given by Jaeggli (1986), show that NPs in clitic doubled constructions do not behave like other dislocated NPs. There are several respects in which they are different. I discuss just two of Jaeggli’s arguments here. One property of dislocated NPs is that there is an intonational break between the NP and the rest of the sentence. In clitic doubling constructions, there is no such break. Second, \textit{a}-marking on dislocated NPs is optional, whereas it is obligatory on clitic doubled NPs (and other NPs \textit{in situ}, whether clitic doubled or not).

Jaeggli’s arguments, however, only show that the clitic doubled NP is not in the same position as other dislocated elements. They do not show that the doubled NP is not in some other non-argumental position. Aoun (1996) argues that in
Lebanese Arabic, doubled NPs are not generated in complement position. He shows that doubled NPs form islands for extraction, using quantifier scope as a diagnostic for LF movement. Based on this kind of data, Aoun argues that the NP must not be generated in complement position. If it were in complement position, we would expect extraction to be grammatical (since the NP would be lexically governed by the verb).

However, there are other possible explanations for the fact that doubled NPs constitute barriers for extraction that do not involve analyzing the doubled element as an adjunct. First, all doubled direct objects in Spanish are interpreted as specific, as we will see below. We know that specificity itself seems to play a role in creating a barrier to extraction. The examples in (8) show the contrast between extracting from an indefinite NP (8a), which is grammatical, and extracting from a definite NP (8b), which is ungrammatical.3

8. a. What did you see a picture of t?  
   b. *What did you see the picture of t?

The doubling case can then just be assimilated to the more general case of specificity blocking extraction, whether this restriction is syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic. I present another explanation below in which the doubled element is a subconstituent of the direct object DP. So, in a sense we adopt Aoun’s idea that the

double is an adjunct, although perhaps it is not what we would typically think of as an adjunct. It should also be noted that these two explanations for the lack of extraction possibilities – that it should be reduced to specificity and that the double is a subconstituent of the object DP – are not necessarily incompatible. See Uriagereka (1993) for an account of specificity, which is an early version of the analysis that we develop here.

2.3 **Accounting for Specificity**

2.3.1 **Suñer 1988**

The debate about movement versus base generation was complicated by Suñer’s (1988) observation that clitic doubling is subject to specificity restrictions. Suñer observed that specificity restrictions hold of direct object doubling but not of indirect object doubling in Rioplatense Spanish. She gives the examples in (9)-(12) as evidence for this generalization. The examples in (9)-(11) show direct object doubling. In (9) we see that definite, animate NPs can be doubled by the accusative clitics *lo* and *la*. (10) shows that non-specific direct objects cannot be doubled. Included in Suñer’s definition of “non-specific” are cases where the NP is definite but the identity of the referent is not yet known. This is shown by the example in (10c), where the subjunctive mood in the relative clause signals the fact that the identity of the boy who will finish first is not yet known.
9. a. (Lo) ví a Juan
   CL saw.1SG A Juan
   “I saw Juan.”

   b. (La) oían a Paca/ a la niña/ a la gata
   CL heard.3PL A Paca/ A the girl/ A the cat.FEM
   “They heard Paca/ the girl/ the cat(fem).”

10. a. No (*lo) oyeron a ningún ladrón
    neg *CL they.heard A any thief
    “They didn’t hear any thieves”

    b. (*La) buscaban a alguien que los ayudara
    CL looked.for.3PL A someone that CL help.SUBJ
    “They were looking for someone who could help them”

    c. (*Lo) alabarán a-l niño que termine primero
    CL praise.FUT.3PL A-the boy that finishes.SUBJ first
    “They will praise whichever boy finishes first”

11. Diariamente, la escuchaba a una mujer que cantaba tangos
daily CL listened.3SG to a woman that sang tangos
   “Every day s/he listened to a woman who sang tangos.”

   The example in (11) shows that doubling of indefinites is possible. However, it is
   only possible if the indefinite is interpreted as specific. In the case in (11), the
   sentence means that it was the same woman who sang each time, and that she is
   known to exist. That is, la...a una mujer picks out a single, existing entity.

   The examples in (12) show that dative doubling is not restricted in the way
   that accusative doubling is. As in English, the expression los pobres (“the poor”)
does not necessarily refer to a particular group of poor people. Even when doubled
this expression can have a generic interpretation. Similarly, the bare plural in (12b)
has a non-specific interpretation.
12. a. Les dejaré todo mi dinero a los pobres
   'I will leave all my money to the poor'

   b. Les ofrecieron queso a familias de pocos medios
   'They offered cheese to low-income families'

To account for this set of facts, Suñer proposes that the accusative clitics *lo* and *la* are marked in the lexicon with the feature [+specific]. The dative clitic *le*, on the other hand, has no specification at all for this feature.

13. **Acc clitics**  
    *lo* / *la*  [+specific]  
    **Dat clitic**  
    *le*  []

Suñer assumes (along with Borer 1984, *inter alia*) that clitics are agreement morphemes and thus must conform to the “Matching Hypothesis” which says that clitics must agree in features with the full NPs that they double. Since the accusative clitic is [+specific], the NP double must be marked [+specific] as well. This is illustrated in (14).

14. **Matching Hypothesis**

   a. *Lo* vi a *Juan*  
      [+sp]  [+sp]  

   b. *Lo* busco a *un carnicero*  
      [+sp]  [-sp]

Because the dative clitic is underspecified for the specificity feature, its NP double
can either be specific or nonspecific.

After these interpretive effects were brought to light, any account of clitic doubling would have to account for these restrictions in addition to the syntactic considerations discussed above.

2.3.2 Sportiche 1993

Most recent analyses treating clitics as agreement morphemes involve a combination of the base generation and the movement approaches. Sportiche (1993), Franco (1993), and Torrego (1995), for example, take clitics to be functional heads which are base generated in a position higher than that of direct objects. Thus, these analyses fall into the category of base generation approaches. However, there is also a movement component to this (type of) analysis. These authors argue that the argument (whether overt or not) moves to the specifier position of the clitic phrase. So, the approach can be seen as a combination of both movement and base generation. In this section I will discuss Sportiche’s (1993) analysis as representative of this kind of approach.

Because of the noncomplementarity of the clitic and the NP in clitic doubling languages, Sportiche (1993) assumes that clitics are base generated in their surface position. However, he also shows that there are conditions of locality that exist between the clitic and the doubled NP, suggesting that movement is involved. To account for this, he argues that it is the doubled NP that undergoes movement, moving to the specifier of the clitic projection at LF. Like Borer and
Suñer, Sportiche takes the clitic to be an agreement morpheme, translating this idea into current terms with the use of functional projections. He takes clitics to head their own functional projections, called “clitic voices,” in Infl.

15. NomV
   /\                   /
  XP^1       Nom’      /
   /\                 /
  Nom     AccV       /
  /\             /
 XP^2       Acc’     /
   /\        /
 Acc +sp  DatV      /
  /\      /
 XP^3     Dat’      /
   /
 Dat       VP       /
   /
 XP*1…XP*2…XP*3

The tree in (15) is meant to show that the verb’s arguments (XP*s) originate in the VP and then move to the specifier of a functional projection in “IP”. XP*2 moves to XP^2, which is the specifier of an accusative voice. Similarly, XP*3 moves to the specifier of the dative voice (XP^3).

Sportiche assumes that there are two types of clitic heads. One type, the accusative clitic, licenses a specificity feature in the DP in its specifier position. This is illustrated using the feature [+sp] in the accusative head in the tree in (15). The other type, the dative clitic, is purely an agreement morpheme that is responsible for case assignment. Clitics and their associated XPs are subject to a
“Clitic Criterion”, which is stated in (16).


At LF

i. A [+F] head (clitic) must be in a spec/head relationship with a [+F] XP.


Thus, any XP that has an associated clitic must move to the specifier position of the clitic projection in order to satisfy the Clitic Criterion. The feature F can be a case feature, an agreement feature, or a feature like [+specific]. For Sportiche, the feature licensed in the accusative voice is a specificity feature, but the feature licensed in the dative voice is a case feature. It follows from this stipulation that accusative doubling but not dative doubling shows specificity restrictions.

Thus, Sportiche accounts for the two kinds of doubling in a way very similar to the way Suñer (1982) does. Both dative and accusative clitics are agreement heads (in the general sense). Dative doubling only involves checking case and agreement features, and so is not constrained by specificity considerations. Accusative clitics license the feature specificity, rather than (just) case and agreement features.

2.3.3 A Non-unified Analysis of Accusative vs. Dative Clitics

Sportiche takes as a working assumption that accusative and dative clitics have a unified syntax. Thus, both kinds of clitics are assumed to head clitic voices where they enter into a spec-head agreement relationship with their “double” or
associated NP (overt NP or pro). Any differences in the behavior of these two kinds of clitics are assumed to be due to the different lexico-syntactic features of these inflectional heads.

I take the opposite approach. Following recent work by Uriagereka, I will argue that accusative clitics (lo and la in Spanish) and dative clitics (le in Spanish) arise from different derivations. Dative clitics are functional heads of the verbal projection (along the lines of Sportiche 1993), whereas third person accusative clitics are analyzed as determiners that move from inside the argument position.

2.3.3.1 Accusative clitics as determiners

Uriagereka (1988; 1995a; 1996), following Torrego (1988), argues that third person accusative clitics in Romance are determiners. Both third person clitics and determiners diachronically derive from the Latin demonstratives, illum, illam, etc.⁴ (see, for example, Lapesa 1968; Wanner 1987). Uriagereka argues that the third person accusative clitics are synchronically as well as diachronically related to determiners. In particular, these clitics are taken to be specific, referential determiners that are generated in the D head of the direct object DP.

There are several reasons to think that accusative clitics are determiners in

---

⁴ Although it should be noted that the masculine determiner el in Spanish derives from the nominative form of the third person masculine Latin demonstrative ILLE, whereas the third person masculine clitic lo derives from the accusative form of the masculine demonstrative ILLUM (and the neuter ILLUD). All other clitics have the same source as their corresponding determiner (feminine singular as well as
Romance languages. The first suggestive piece of evidence has to do with the morphological form of the clitic. In Galician,\(^5\) for example, the accusative clitics have the same form as determiners, as shown in (17) which is taken from Uriagereka (1988).

17. Galician clitics and determiners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>clitic</th>
<th></th>
<th>determiner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sing</td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>sing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masc</td>
<td>(l)o</td>
<td>(l)os</td>
<td>(l)o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fem</td>
<td>(l)a</td>
<td>(l)as</td>
<td>(l)a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the chart in (17), the \(l\) in parentheses indicates the form that is used when the clitic or determiner cliticizes to the verb. Both determiners and pronominal clitics can be enclitic (on the verb or other governor), and in this case, the \(l\)-form appears. When these elements are proclitic, they appear without the \(l\).\(^6\) (See, for example, Alvarez 1983 and Uriagereka 1988 for examples and discussion of cliticization in Galician.)

At first glance, it appears that this morphological parallelism does not hold in Spanish. The feminine forms of determiners and 3\(^{rd}\) person accusative clitics are masculine and feminine plurals). (Lapesa 1968)

\(^5\) Galician (“Galego” to its speakers) is a Romance language spoken in Galicia, a province in the northwest of Spain (bordering Portugal to the South).

\(^6\) Determiners with overt NP complements cannot appear as proclitics to the verb. However, I assume that they do procliticize to their complement NP when they are not encliticized to the verb.
the same \(la(s)\) in both cases) as shown in (19), but the masculine forms are
different, as shown by the examples in (20).

18. Spanish clitics and determiners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>clitics</th>
<th>determiners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sing</td>
<td>pl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masc</td>
<td>lo</td>
<td>los</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fem</td>
<td>la</td>
<td>las</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. a. La vi. clitic
CL-fem I.saw
I saw her/it.

b. Vi la mesa. det
I.saw the-fem table-fem
I saw the table.

20. a. Lo vi. clitic
CL-masc I.saw
I saw it (him).

b. Vi el libro. det
I.saw the-masc book-mask
I saw the book.

c. *El vi

d. *Vi lo libro.

In Spanish the masculine clitic form is \(lo\) (20a), whereas the masculine determinant
form is \(el\) (20b). (Although in the plural, they are the same: both the clitic and the
determiner are \(los\)). The clitic cannot have the form \(el\), as shown in (20c). And, as
shown in (20d), it is not possible for the determinant to be spelled out as \(lo\) when it
has an NP complement.

However, *lo* is a possible determiner when there is no NP complement, as in the following examples.  

21. a. Lo malo de este situacion es que…
   the bad of this situation is that…
   “The bad part of this situation is that…”

b. Vi lo que hiciste.
   I saw the that you did
   “I saw what you did”

Although *lo* is not the only form for determiners, the fact that it can be a determiner in some cases shows that the clitic paradigm does have a parallel in the determiner paradigm. The fact that clitics and determiners are morphologically identical adds plausibility to the idea that clitics are underlying determiners.

That clitics are determiners that undergo head movement from the object DP is supported in other ways by data from Galician. Uriagereka (1988; 1996) argues that determiners in Galician undergo syntactic head movement when they appear cliticized to the verb – even when these determiners have an overt NP

____________________

7 Notice that in (21), *lo* is considered to be a neuter determiner or pronoun. This can be seen in the difference between *el malo* and *lo malo*. When applied to a movie, for example, *el malo* means “the bad guy” and *lo malo* means “the bad part”. So a question arises under the current analysis as to why *lo vi* can mean “I saw him” and is not restricted to meaning “I saw it”. Interestingly, in Leísta Spanish the facts come out as we expect. *Lo vi* only means “I saw it”, and not “I saw him”. To account for non-Leísta dialects we have to assume that the morphological component neutralizes the distinction between neuter and masculine in the clitic system but not in this aspect of the determiner system (i.e., only when the
complement. That is, in cases like (22), he argues that the determiner lo not only cliticizes to the verb phonologically, but also syntactically, undergoing head-movement out of the DP and up to the verb.\(^8\) Cliticization of the determiner is optional. The non-cliticized version is given in (23).

22. Comemo-lo caldo.
   ate.we-the soup
   We ate the soup.

23. Comemos o caldo.
   ate.we the soup
   We ate the soup.

Notice the similarity with the form of the pronominal clitic, shown in (24). There is a difference, however, between determiners and pronominal clitics. Cliticization is optional with determiners (as seen above), but obligatory with pronouns, as shown by the ungrammaticality of the non-cliticized example in (25).

   ate.we-it
   We ate it.

25. *Comemos o.
   We ate it.

I am arguing that determiners and clitics are really the same element underlingly, but I will continue to make the distinction between determiners and

determiner is followed by a null complement does this distinction come out).\(^8\) Uriagereka (1996) is careful to note that (22) is not a case of clitic doubling. Clitic doubling involves a clitic plus a full DP. In (22), there is a clitic and a determinerless NP. The clitic in this case is the determiner of the NP caldo (“soup”).
pronominal elements since this is a useful descriptive distinction. Ultimately, our analysis of the above facts is that a determiner obligatorily moves out of DP and cliticizes to the verb if there is no overt lexical material in its complement. These determiners will be referred to as pronominal clitics or just clitics. A determiner can optionally move out of DP in Galician if its complement contains lexical material. These determiners will be referred to as determiners, or cliticized determiners (in the case of Galician). Spanish differs from Galician in that cliticization of the determiner is impossible if there is any lexical material in its complement. I return to this fact below.

Encliticization of the determiner (and of the pronominal clitic) is evidenced by some phonological processes. For example, by comparing (22) and (23), we can see that the final consonant of the verb is deleted and [l] is inserted in the cliticized version (22).9

The argument that determiner cliticization involves syntactic movement is based on the fact that there is a clear syntactic characterization of the relationship between the clitic determiner and its host. The host must be a governing [-N] head. The list of possible hosts is given in (26) (from Alvarez Caccamo (1989), cited in Uriagereka (1996)).

9 This is not meant to be a formal phonological rule, but just a description of the difference between the cliticized and non-cliticized forms. The [l] is probably present underlyingly and thus is not “inserted” per se.
26. Possible hosts:
   a. all verbs: comer+o = come-lo
   b. most prepositions in preposition function (not as complementizers):
      por+a = po-la
   c. special clitics: lle+as = lle-las
   d. quantificational elements like *ambos* “both”, *todos* “all”:
      ambo+os = ambo-los
   e. the conjunction *e mais* “and” (lit. “and more”): mais+a = mai-la

The fact that the clitic host must be a head supports the idea that determiner cliticization is head movement. Additionally, the fact that the host cannot be nominal ([+N]) suggests a syntactic process rather than a phonological one. As Uriagereka (1996) points out, nouns and adjectives are not structural governors in the same way that prepositions and verbs are. This is seen in the difference in case assigning capabilities, for example. Again, the fact that there is a syntactic characterization of the class of possible hosts supports the idea that cliticization is a syntactic process.10

Another argument along this line given by Uriagereka (1988; 1996) is that non-governing verbs cannot be hosts to cliticization. For example, the determiner of a post-verbal subject may cliticize to the verb that it is thematically related to, as shown in (27); however, a post-verbal matrix subject cannot cliticize to an embedded verb, as shown in (28).

---

10 Of course this depends on one’s theory of PF and whether PF operations are syntactic. See Otero 1996 for an alternative perspective on the determiner cliticization facts.
27. para fala-lo profesor
   in.order talk-the profesor
   “in order for the professor to talk”

28. a. Din que vos chegastedes os fillos de Petra.
   say.they that you arrived the sons of Petra
   “The sons of Petra say that you arrived.”

   b. *Din que vos chegastede-los fillos de Petra.
   say.they that you arrived-the sons of Petra

The same point is made by the causative examples in (29). With no cliticization of
the determiner, (29a) is ambiguous between a reading where “the man” is the object
of the embedded verb “see” and a reading where it is the subject of the matrix verb
“make”. However, when the determiner from “the man” is cliticized to the
embedded verb, as in (29b), the DP can only be interpreted as the object of the
embedded verb and not as the subject of the matrix verb.

29. a. Fixonos mirar o home.
    made.he-us see the man
    “He made us see the man.”
    “The man made us see.”

   b. Fixonos mira-lo home.
    made.he-us see-the man
    “He made us see the man.”
    * “The man made us see.”

Again, these examples are used to show that determiner cliticization is unlikely to
be purely phonological. The fact that cliticization requires a (governing) host in the
same clause suggests that determiner cliticization involves a syntactic process as
well as a phonological one.

That determiners are able to undergo syntactic cliticization in Galician is
suggestive evidence that third person accusative pronominal clitics in Galician and other Romance languages are also determiners underlyingly and move out of DP on the surface. Under this analysis, both pronominal clitics and determiner clitics undergo a movement as in (30) (from Uriagereka 1988, p.403).

30. a. \[V \ comimo-lo_i ... [DP \ t_i [\text{caldo}]]\]
   b. \[V \ comimo-lo_i ... [DP \ t_i [\text{pro}]]\]

On the other hand, there are two reasons to think that determiner cliticization in Galician might be purely phonological rather than syntactic. The first of these is discussed in Uriagereka 1988. The problem is that pronominal cliticization allows movement to a higher position than does determiner cliticization. Determiners can encliticize to a governing verb (or other head), but unlike pronominal clitics, they cannot appear as proclitics of the verb, and they cannot clitic climb. This is shown in (31) and (32), respectively. That pronominal clitics can appear as proclitics and can climb is shown in (33) and (34). (Examples are from or derived from Uriagereka 1988).

31. *Dixen que o comemos [t [caldo]].
   said-I that the ate.we soup
   I said that we ate the soup.

32. *Quixemo-lo ler [t [libro]].
   wanted.we-the read book
   “We wanted to read the book”

33. Dixen que o comemos [t [pro]].
    said-I that it ate.we
    “They said that we ate it.”
If clitics are determiners and if determiner cliticization is syntactic movement like pronominal cliticization, then we would expect clitics and determiners to be alike in the positions that they can move to.

Uriagereka 1988 gives an account of this difference in behavior between determiners and clitics in terms of case. The basic difference between the two is that for the determiners, the NP complement is overt, whereas for the clitics, it is not. Uriagereka assumes that overt NPs need case at S-structure and that case is assigned from the verb via the determiner. In order for the determiner to assign case to the NP, the determiner must govern the NP. That is, there must not be a closer governor. Pro NPs, on the other hand, are assumed not to need case at S-structure (although all DPs need case at LF), and thus there is no government requirement between the determiner/clitic and the NP complement.

A second apparent problem for analyzing Galician determiner cliticization as syntactic is one that has not been discussed before to my knowledge. We have seen that determiner cliticization can take place from a post-verbal subject, as in (35).

35. Chegamo-los nenos.
arrived.we-the children
We, the children, arrived.

If determiner cliticization is syntactic like pronominal cliticization, then we would
expect that pronominal cliticization should be able to take place in the same environment. That is, we would expect to find pronominal cliticization from post-verbal pro subjects. However, pronominal clitics are impossible in this case, as shown in (36) for Galician, and (37) for Spanish.

36. a. *Chegamo-los.
   arrived.we-CL
   “We arrived.”

   b. *Os chegamos.
      CL arrived.we

37. *Lo llega.
   CL arrive
   “He arrives.”

If cliticization in (35) is syntactic, then we have no explanation for the lack of subject clitics in Galician. If the determiner can move out of a DP with a lexical complement to a governing head position (either V or some position where V moves which c-commands the (VP-internal) subject position), there is nothing in the theory to prevent a determiner with a pro complement from doing the same thing.

One possibility is that determiner cliticization and pronominal cliticization actually involve movement to two different positions. The other possibility is that determiner cliticization is really just phonological and does not involve syntactic movement at all. I leave this question open since I think there are good arguments for both positions.

It is important to note that the bigger question of whether clitics are
determiners does not hinge on whether Galician determiner cliticization is syntactic. If it turns out that determiner cliticization does involve syntactic movement, then we can see that there is a very strong parallel between clitics and determiners which provides support for the idea that clitics are determiners. If, however, Galician determiner cliticization is purely a phonological phenomenon, it does not necessarily mean that clitics are not determiners. The fact that there is phonological cliticization of determiners is suggestive evidence that clitics and determiners are related since it gives us a window into how clitics might have changed historically: first they were phonological clitics only, and later they became syntactic clitics (just in the case where there is no phonologically overt material in their complement).

Thus, I take third person accusative clitics in Spanish and Galician to be determiners with a pro complement, as shown in (38) (taken from Uriagereka 1995a).\(^{11}\)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
38. & \text{a.} & \text{b.} \\
& \text{DP} & \text{DP} \\
& \text{(double)} & \text{D'} \\
\text{D'} & \text{D'} \\
\text{D clitic} & \text{NP pro} & \text{D det} & \text{NP lexical nominal}
\end{array}
\]

In Spanish, (unlike Galician, perhaps), a determiner cannot move out of DP

\(^{11}\)See Postal 1966 for the (similar) idea that pronouns in English are determiners + one.
if there is overt material in its complement (Uriagereka 1988). There is no
determiner cliticization of the type shown in the Galician examples in (22). Even if
there is a pro complement, the presence of some overt material like a relative clause
or PP is enough to keep the determiner from cliticizing, as shown in the following
examples. ((39) is taken from Uriagereka 1988).

39. a. Vi el/la que vino
   I.saw the(masc/fem) that came.3sg
   I saw the one who came

   b. Vi el/la de Francia
      I.saw the(masc/fem) of France
      I saw the one from France

40. a. *La vi que vino
    CL I.saw that came

   b. *La vi de Francia.
      CL I.saw from France

Based on the data in (39) and (40), we can conclude that the only time we
see cliticization of the determiner in Spanish is when there is a pro complement and
when there is no overt material governed by the clitic (that is, in the complement of
the clitic). The derivation of clitic placement for a sentence like (41a) is given in
(41b).

41. a. La vi.
    CL I.saw
    “I saw her/it.”

   b. [ [vp vi [dp la [pro]]]]
In the structure in (41b) I am intentionally vague about the landing site of the clitic. I assume that the clitic moves to the head of a projection above VP, but exactly what kind of head this is does not concern me at this point. There are reasons to believe that the landing site is T(ense), as discussed in Uriagereka (1988), since clitic placement in Spanish depends on the finiteness of the verb. In later work, Uriagereka (1999) takes the landing site to be $v$ (Hale and Keyser 1993, Chomsky 1995). I put off further discussion of the landing site of the accusative clitic until Chapter 4.

2.3.3.1.1 Specificity

To account for the specificity effects of accusative clitics, Uriagereka (1995a) appeals to their status as determiners. Accusative clitics are taken to be definite determiners based on their similarities in terms of morphology and in terms of other properties such as anaphoricity (both pronouns and definite determiners depend on previous mention). On this view, whatever inherent property is responsible for the specific interpretation of definite determiners is the same property that is responsible for the specificity of clitics. This may be the right line to pursue to account for the interpretation of clitics by themselves, as in (42).

42. La vi.
   I saw her.

However, the issue is confounded by the (hypothesized) presence of pro which is the complement of the clitic/determiner (as discussed above). As a pronoun, this
element will contribute a specific interpretation as well. Thus, it is difficult to
determine the contribution of the clitic by itself to the object’s interpretation as
specific. Notice that dative clitics by themselves are interpreted as specific also
(Juan Uriagereka, p.c.), even though these elements are not (proposed to be)
determiners.

43. a. Carmen le entregó el libro.
   Carmen CL-dat gave the book

   b. Carmen gave him/her the book.

   c. *Carmen gave somebody/nobody the book.

The sentence in (43a) can only have a reading as in (43b) where someone specific
is being referred to as the recipient of the book. It cannot have a meaning as in
(43c) where an indeterminate person or nobody at all is receiving the book, even
though these meanings are compatible with the dative clitic when it is accompanied
by an overt indirect object, as shown in (44).

44. Le entregó el libro a alguien.
   CL gave the book to somebody

It seems reasonable to assume that pro is giving rise the specific, pronominal
interpretation in (43) and that the specificity does not come from the dative clitic
itself. Since we are positing pro in the case of the accusative clitic as well, we are
not able to attribute the specific reading to the clitic in this case either.

The case of doubling is where the difference between accusative and dative
clitics is apparent. As we saw above (in section 2.3.1), direct object doubling shows
specificity restrictions whereas indirect object doubling does not. Suñer and Sportiche attribute the specificity effect to an inherent feature of the clitic. Therefore, at this point we may be tempted to agree with these authors and attribute the specificity restrictions to the accusative clitic, and we could associate this specific meaning with the fact that the clitic is really a definite determiner. However, as we will see in section 2.3.4, accusative clitic doubling shows specificity restrictions even when the clitic used is dative in form. We return to this point below. In addition, we will see in Chapter 4 that the specificity restriction on doubling is stronger than the specificity effect in sentences with non-doubled clitics (i.e., clitics with no overt double). Thus, we will ultimately not rely on the clitic’s status as a determiner to account for specificity effects in direct object doubling.

2.3.3.1.2 Clitic Doubling

As we have seen, I adopt a movement analysis of clitic placement for direct object clitics in Spanish. I have not shown how the movement analysis is to be reconciled with the existence of clitic doubling, however. To answer the question of how the clitic and the double can occupy the same position, Uriagereka (1988, 1995a)\textsuperscript{12} posits a more highly articulated structure for NPs than had been previously assumed in the clitic literature. According to this view, neither the double nor the clitic exhaustively occupies the object position. As we have seen, following an idea he attributes to Esther Torrego.

\textsuperscript{12}
the clitic is taken to be a determiner that is generated inside the object DP and that
takes a pro complement. In this early work, the double is taken to be generated in
the specifier of the determiner. The structure for the doubled example in (45a) is
given in (45b).14,15

13 The idea that the clitic and the double originate as a single constituent goes back
at least to Kayne (1972), where the proposal is made to account for subject clitic
doubling in French.

14 In the analysis that we ultimately adopt, the double moves through spec,DP but is
not generated there.

15 Maribel Romero (p.c.) suggests that one way to test whether the specificity is
coming from the clitic’s status as a definite determiner or from the null pronominal
element is in terms of presupposition projection (Langendoen and Savin 1971). The
definite description in (i) can be interpreted within the scope of the intensional
predicate want. That is, the person referred to is only the mayor of Pella in my
mother’s belief world.

i. a. My mother wants to meet the mayor of Pella,
    b. but in reality Pella doesn’t have a mayor.

A pronoun, however, does not have this property and must necessarily be
interpreted with respect to the actual world.

ii. My mother wants to meet him.

Thus, to tell whether specificity is coming from a definite-determiner in the guise
of a clitic or from a pronominal element in Spanish clitic doubling sentences, we
should test sentences where the clitic is inside a belief context, such as the one in
(iii).

iii. a. Mi madre quiere conocerlo al novio de Blanca,
    b. pero en realidad no tiene novio.

The prediction is that the presupposition will be able to be interpreted inside the
belief context if the specificity is due to the clitic as a definite determiner.
However, if there is a null pronominal element present, then the presupposition
associated with the definite description in the doubled NP should be interpreted all
the way at the top and should not be able to stop underneath the belief verb quiere.
Unfortunately, I am not able to decide the answer to this question since I do not
have access to lo-doubling speakers. I leave this question for future research.
45.    a. Juan la vió a ella  
        Juan CL saw A her  
        “Juan saw her”  

        b. Juan vió [a [DP [DP ella] [[D la] [NP pro]]]]

So, we can see that the presence of a full NP double does not necessarily preclude a movement analysis. On this analysis the clitic moves out of the DP at S-structure.

The structure given in (45b), however, has the problem of explaining the semantics of the doubling relation. In particular, we need to explain what role the double (“ella”) is playing and what it is doing in the specifier of D. In later work, Uriagereka (1995b; 1999) addresses this issue. He argues that the double is really generated in a small clause structure (along the lines of Kayne 1993) and ties clitic doubling to possessive structures and possessor raising structures. This analysis is explained and developed further in the following chapters.

To summarize, we have seen in this section that third person accusative clitics are best understood as determiners in Spanish and Galician. These elements undergo head movement from their base position in the direct object DP to a position adjacent to the verb. I adopt Uriagereka’s version of the movement hypothesis whereby the clitic moves from its base position in the direct object DP; however, the clitic is not the exhaustive instantiation of the DP. In this way, we are able to maintain a movement analysis for the clitic, while still allowing for the

16 Or before Spell-out, depending on the framework assumed.
possibility of clitic doubling. We will see the analysis of clitic doubling in Chapter 4.

2.3.3.2 Dative Clitics

Unlike accusative clitics, dative clitics do not resemble determiners morphologically. I will take this lack of resemblance to mean that datives are not determiners and that they have a syntax different from accusative clitics. Other differences in the properties of accusative and dative clitics suggest that they should be analyzed differently as well. For example, doubling with accusative clitics is very restricted in Spanish. In most dialects, only pronouns can be doubled by an accusative clitic. And even in dialects that allow full NP doubling, there are animacy and specificity restrictions on accusative doubling. With dative doubling, on the other hand, there are no such restrictions.\textsuperscript{17} All dialects allow doubling of the indirect object, and there are almost no restrictions on the interpretation of the doubled NP,\textsuperscript{18} as we saw in section 2.3.1 for Rioplatense and as we will see in section 2.3.4 for Leísta Spanish.

I take a Sportiche-type approach to the dative clitic. That is, I analyze this

\textsuperscript{17} At this point, I am only referring to doubling of indirect objects. In the next section we will discuss the problem of analyzing the dative-form clitic that is used in direct object doubling constructions and that does impose specificity restrictions.

\textsuperscript{18} Although see section 3.2.1 for discussion of some interpretive restrictions on dative doubling.
clitic as the head of a functional projection. The indirect object moves to the specifier of this projection where features are checked or matched between DP and the head. Following Uriagereka (1988), I equate dative doubling constructions in Romance to English-type double object or dative shift constructions. (Also see Demonte (1995), and Ormazabal and Romero (1999).)

Doubling of a dative argument is optional in Spanish, as shown in (46).\(^{19}\)

46. a. Di un libro a Juan.
    gave.I a book to Juan
    I gave a book to Juan.

b. Le di a Juan un libro.
   CL gave.I to Juan a book

c. Le di un libro a Juan.
   CL gave.I a book to Juan
   I gave Juan a book.

The Spanish constructions have parallels in the two dative constructions in English: the prepositional dative and the dative shift (or double object) construction which are shown in (47a) and (47b) respectively.

47. a. I gave a book to John.

b. I gave John a book.

Dative doubling constructions pattern with dative shift constructions in English. Sentences with a non-doubled dative pattern with the prepositional dative in

\(^{19}\) In fact, I believe that the optionality is in terms of whether the argument is expressed as an NP or a PP. If the argument is an NP, then it is obligatorily doubled.
It has been observed (i.e., Oehrle 1976, Pinker 1989, Goldberg 1995) that goal indirect objects in English cannot be shifted when they represent locations, as in (48b).


Ormazabal and Romero (1999) show that it is impossible to double indirect objects in Spanish in the same cases. This is shown in (49).

49. Marta (*le) envió un libro a Nueva York.
Marta CL sent a book to New York

I will follow Uriagereka (1988), Demonte (1995), and Ormazabal and Romero (1999) in analyzing dative doubling in Spanish as dative shift. I will adopt the account of English dative shift presented in Baker (1996). Baker proposes that the goal argument in English double object constructions moves past the theme or direct object to the specifier of an aspect projection which dominates an inner VP shell (Larson 1988). The underlying structure that Baker proposes for ditransitive constructions in general is based on Larson 1988, with modifications by Travis (1991). This structure is shown in (50).

50. a. John passed the ring to Mary.

The tree given in (50b) shows the structure for the V NP PP construction in (50a). The direct object (theme) is generated in specifier of the inner VP shell, and the indirect object (goal) is the complement of the inner V. This structure accounts for the fact that the direct object asymmetrically c-commands the indirect object in the V NP PP construction. The verb raises overtly to a head higher than the theme argument.

The same basic structure also gives rise to dative-shifted sentences, as in (51).

51. John passed Mary the ring.

To derive (51), however, the goal is generated as an NP rather than as a PP. This goal NP moves to the specifier of AspP (Travis 1991), as shown in (52). Thus, the
goal NP asymmetrically c-commands the theme NP (Barss and Lasnik 1986).

To account for Spanish dative doubling, then, I assume that the clitic le is generated in the Asp head, and that the indirect object NP moves to the specifier of AspP.20,21

20 In fact, it is not crucial for me that the head where le is generated be an aspect head, and I will not discuss what role dative clitics play in the aspectual interpretation of a sentence. I use AspP simply to adopt a concrete proposal of dative shift. Demonte (1995) calls this projection DCLP for “Dative Clitic Phrase”. Ormazabal and Romero (1999) assume that the constituent containing the DO and IO is a phrase headed by an applicative preposition, and hence not a VP shell at all. In their structure, AppP is dominated by VP. The App head moves up to V, and then the goal can move to spec, VP, corresponding to the spell-out of the dative clitic on the verb. As far as I can tell, these proposals are indistinguishable.

21 Alternatively, le may be generated higher in the tree than Asp. Under this

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\[39\]
The movement of the goal NP to spec,AspP in Spanish appears to take place either overtly or at LF, given that either order shown in (54) is possible.

Examples from Demonte (1995) are given in (55).

54. a. cl-V DO IO  
   b. cl-V IO DO

55. a. Le di el libro a María.
   CL I.gave the book to Maria

   analysis, the only way for the goal to reach the specifier of this le projection (and thus license the spell-out of le) is for it be an NP (rather than a PP) and raise through spec of AspP. In either case, the Asp projection is implicated.
Demonte notes that with the clitic, either order in (55) is possible with normal intonation and with no change in focus or information status. Without the clitic, both orders are possible, as shown in (56). However, the order in (56b) is marked and corresponds to a contrastive focus interpretation of the IO. It cannot be interpreted as having neutral focus (answering the question *what happened?*, for example).

56. a. Di el libro a María.
   I gave the book to Maria

   b. %Di a María el libro.
   I gave to Maria the book

Thus, I assume that raising of the goal-argument is a different kind of movement when the clitic is present from when the clitic is not present. Without the clitic, the goal can only raise past the theme via some type of focus-movement.\(^{22}\) However, when the clitic is present, the goal undergoes movement to spec,AspP, with no concomitant focus effects.

That movement of the goal to spec,AspP optionally takes place at S-

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\(^{22}\) Discussing focus interpretations and word order in Spanish is outside the scope of this dissertation, so I will not be more precise about the proposed focus movement. (See Zubizarreta (1998) for these matters.) I simply wish to show that the IO-DO order has different effects depending on whether the clitic is present or not.
structure is supported by the adverb placement data shown in (57) (from Demonte 1995).

57. a. Le entregó secretamente los papeles a Juan.
   cl gave.3sg secretly the papers to Juan.
   S/he gave Juan the papers secretly.

b. Le entregó los papeles secretamente a Juan.

c. Le entregó a Juan secretamente los papeles.

d. *Le entregó secretamente a Juan los papeles.

Secretamente is a VP adverb (on the manner reading). I will assume, along with
Demonte, that this adverb is adjoined to the inner VP, as shown in the tree in (58).\(^{23}\)

In order to derive the order in (57a), I propose that the theme and the goal
stay in situ at s-structure. The only element that moves is the verb. I assume that the

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\(^{23}\) It is possible that the adverb is adjoined higher. If so, this would mean that the
phrase where le is generated is higher as well. In any case, the adverb facts show
verb moves through the Asp head, picks up the clitic along the way and continues
to the higher V, and on to I. The goal NP a Juan moves up to spec,AspP at LF.

To derive the order in (57b), the theme DP moves out of the inner VP and
past the adverb. The theme cannot move to spec,AspP. Given the hypothesis that le
is the spell-out of Asp when this head has certain features, such as +dative, then the
direct object cannot move to spec,AspP because it will have the wrong features.
Moreover, movement of the direct object to this position would result in the
trapping of the indirect object in VP since there would be no local move for it to
make. The indirect object would not be able to check its features against le, leading
the derivation to crash. 24 Instead, I assume that the direct object can move to a
higher projection, either spec,vP, as in Chomsky (1995), or to spec,AgroP.

Alternatively, the goal can move past the adverb to spec,AspP
overtly, yielding (57c).

(57d) shows us that there is no position below the adverb but above the
theme for the goal NP to move to. If the order V IO DO is obtained, this can only
mean that the IO has moved out of the inner VP (or whatever the domain of the
adverb is assumed to be). Thus, the adverb marks a certain domain. The word order
facts show us that when the IO moves past the DO, it moves to a position outside

that there is no position below the adverb for the IO to move to.

24 Note that even if le is generated higher than AspP (and thus the feature mismatch
is not a problem), the direct object is blocked from moving to spec,AspP because of
this domain. When this movement occurs overtly, the dative clitic must be present. I assume then, that, the presence of the clitic signals movement to its specifier, and that this movement can be covert as well as overt.

To summarize, I analyze dative clitics and accusative clitics as arising from a different underlying syntax. Dative clitics are agreement heads in the verbal domain, whereas accusative clitics start out as determiners inside the direct object DP. The question I ask in the next two sections is how to analyze dative-form clitics that serve to double direct object arguments. The basic question is whether these elements are to be treated as accusative clitics or dative clitics.

2.3.4 Leísta Spanish as a challenge to the feature approach to specificity

A problem for the Suñer-Sportiche type of analysis for clitic doubling is presented by data from Leísta Spanish. These authors associate the +specific feature to a particular clitic form. The accusative clitics *lo* and *la* are marked +specific whereas the dative clitic *le* is not. In Leísta Spanish, however, the accusative clitic can take the same form as the dative clitic. That is, indirect objects and (some) direct objects are both doubled by *le*. In the following examples, the clitic and its coreferential NP are in bold.

59. **Le vi a Pepe** ayer.
    CL I saw A Pepe yesterday
    “I saw Pepe yesterday.”

this locality issue with the indirect object.
60. \textbf{Le di el libro a Pepe ayer.} \hfill indirect object

CL I.gave the book to Pepe yesterday
“I gave the book to Pepe yesterday”

Under minimal assumptions, the Suñér-Sportiche analysis predicts that specificity restrictions should correspond to the form of the clitic, and not to the grammatical function of the double. The prediction for Leísta Spanish is that \textit{le} should not require its double to have a specific interpretation independent of whether the double is a direct object or an indirect object. However, I show in the next section that Leísta Spanish parallels other doubling dialects in that direct object doubling shows specificity effects whereas indirect object doubling does not, even though the clitic \textit{le} is used in both cases.

2.3.4.1 Problem 1: Specificity effects of doubling in Leísta Spanish

As in other dialects of Spanish, accusative clitic doubling in Leísta is restricted by the interpretation of the NP. Doubling is only possible with “specific” NPs. For example, names and definite NPs can be doubled, as shown in (59) and (61) respectively.

61. a. Le vi al profesor ayer.
   CL I.saw A-the professor yesterday
   “I saw the professor yesterday.”

   b. Le vi a tu tío ayer.
   CL I.saw A your uncle yesterday
   “I saw your uncle yesterday.”

   c. Le vi a este tío ayer.
   CL I.saw A this uncle yesterday
   “I saw this guy yesterday.”
The examples in (62) and (63) show that NPs with quantifiers such as todos los (‘all the’) allow doubling, but NPs with muchos (‘many’) do not.

62. Juan les ha visto a todas las chicas.  
Juan CL has seen A all the girls  
“Juan has seen all the girls.”

63. Juan (*les) ha visto a muchas chicas.  
Juan CL has seen A many girls  
“Juan has seen many girls”

Indefinite NPs allow doubling, as shown in (64), but the NP necessarily receives a specific interpretation when doubled.

64. Le vi a un tipo (que llevaba puesta una falda).  
CL I saw A a guy that wore put a skirt  
“I saw a guy wearing a skirt.”

In what follows, I give examples of sentences with direct objects that can be interpreted either as specific or non-specific. However, when the direct object is doubled by the clitic (le), only a specific interpretation is possible.

In the intensional context in (65), the direct object NP can have either a specific or non-specific reading. In one interpretation, the existence of the secretary is asserted (in the actual world). It means “I’m looking for a particular person who happens to be a secretary.” This is the specific interpretation, illustrated in (65b). In the second, non-specific, interpretation, the existence of a particular secretary in the actual world is not asserted. It means “I am looking for someone to fill the role of secretary.” This interpretation is shown in (65c).
65.  a. Estoy buscando a una secretaria.
    I.am looking.for A a secretary
    ‘I’m looking for a secretary’

    b. specific: una > buscar

    c. non-specific buscar > una

When clitic doubling obtains in the same example, as in (66), only the specific reading is possible.

66.  Le estoy buscando a una secretaria.
    CL I.am looking.for A a secretary
    ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’

    b. specific: una > buscar

    c. *non-specific buscar > una

A similar type of example is given in (67).

67.  a. Todo policía va a buscar a dos criminales.
    every police go to to.look.for A two criminals
    “Every police officer is going to look for two criminals.”

    b. Todo policía les va a buscar a dos criminales.
    every police CL go to to.look.for A two criminals

The *a*-marked NP in (67a) can have any of three different readings. There is the lowest scope reading where each police officer has a quota of arrests to make, so they are going to go look for (at least) two people who are breaking the law. The intermediate scope reading is where each police officer has two particular criminals to arrest and that these criminals vary from officer to officer. The widest scope reading is that there are two particular criminals and every police officer has been
assigned to find the same two guys. The clitic doubled example in (67b) can only have the widest scope interpretation.

A different kind of example is given in (68). A non-doubled plural definite NP is ambiguous (in some contexts) between a kind reading and a definite reading. So the example in (68a) can have either the kind reading in (68b) which means something like “I know what soldiers are like”; or it can have the definite reading in (68c) which means “I know some particular group of soldiers that we’ve mentioned already”.

68. a. Conozco a los soldados.  
   I.know A the soldiers.
   
   b. “I know soldiers.”
   
   c. “I know the soldiers.”

When this NP is clitic doubled, the kind reading is ruled out and only the definite reading remains.

69. a. Les conozco a los soldados.  
   CL I.know A the soldiers
   
   b. *I know soldiers
   
   c. I know the soldiers.

Thus, we see that direct object doubling in Lefsta Spanish manifests the same kinds of specificity restrictions that were shown to hold of lo-doubling dialects. This conclusion is further supported by the impossibility of doubling negative quantifiers and other elements that can only have a non-specific
interpretation.

70. Juan no (*le) conoció a nadie. 
    Juan neg CL met A no one 
    “Juan didn’t meet anyone.”

71. Juan no (*le) vió ni a un (solo) niño. 
    Juan neg CL saw not A one (single) boy 
    “Juan didn’t see any boy.” or “Juan didn’t see one single boy.”

Similarly, bare plurals do not allow clitic doubling since these are necessarily interpreted as non-specific.

72. Juan (*les) ha conocido a lingüistas. 
    Juan CL has met A linguists 
    “Juan has met linguists.”

The above examples show that direct object doubling in Leísta Spanish is subject to a specificity restriction. Indirect object doubling, however, shows no such restriction, as in other dialects of Spanish. This is shown in the following examples.

73. Les dejaré todo mi dinero a los pobres 
    to.them 3PL.I.will.leave all my money to the poor 
    “I will leave all my money to the poor”

74. Les ofrecieron queso a familias de pocos medios 
    to.them 3PL.offered cheese to families of few means 
    “They offered cheese to low-income families”

75. Marta no le envió su tesis a ningún profesor. 
    Marta neg CL sent her thesis to no professor 
    “Marta didn’t send her thesis to any professor.”

76. Marta no le envió su tesis a nadie. 
    Marta neg CL sent her thesis to nobody 
    “Marta didn’t send her thesis to anybody.”
Marta no le envió su tesis ni a un (solo) profesor.
Marta neg CL sent her thesis not to a (single) professor.
“Marta didn’t send her thesis to any/a single professor.”

Crucially, both direct and indirect object doubling use the same form of the clitic \(le\). An analysis which accounts for specificity restrictions by tying the form of the clitic to a specificity feature runs into problems when confronted with this kind of data.

2.3.4.2 Accounting for Leista doubling using features

It should be noted, however, that it is not impossible for a Suñer-Sportiche-type analysis to account for this data. In Suñer’s terms, the problem can be handled by stipulating that accusative \(le\) and dative \(le\) are two different lexical entries.\(^{25}\) One has the features +accusative and +specific, and the other has the feature +dative and is unspecified for specificity. In Sportiche’s analysis, it could be maintained that there is one accusative clitic voice to (the specifier of) which the direct object DP must move. Specificity is licensed in this clitic voice. The clitic head is spelled out either as \(le\) or \(lolla\), depending on features such as animacy (and gender). The problem with this kind of analysis is that it makes the homophony in between accusative \(le\) and dative \(le\) an accident. If it turns out that the similarity in form is really an accident, then that is what the analysis must account for. However, \(a\)

\(^{25}\) As Jeff Lidz points out, an alternative is that the features +ACC and +specific are linked independent of the form of the morpheme.
priori, an analysis that takes these elements to be the same seems superior to one that takes them to be accidentally homophonic.

2.3.4.3 Problem 2: Clitic form and the possibility of doubling

Because the Suñer-Sportiche type analysis treats all clitics as agreement morphemes, it predicts that doubling should always be possible. The fact that clitic doubling is not always possible in a given language requires stipulations that do nothing more than describe the facts. For example, the fact that dative doubling is obligatory but accusative doubling is impossible in Standard Spanish requires a stipulation that says exactly that. We have seen that, in order to explain Leísta doubling, the featural analysis requires that there be two clitics pronounced le.

Moreover, the accusative le is generated in the same position as the other accusative clitics, lo and la. Now we might expect that accusative le would pattern with lo and la in its doubling possibilities since the rules governing doubling are tied to the syntax of a given head and not to its morphological form.

This expectation is not met. The possibility of clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish is tied to the form of the clitic and not to the grammatical function. In other words, the form of the clitic determines whether doubling is possible at all. For example, even when the NP is specific, the clitic la cannot double a full NP (78a), even though la can be used to refer to a (feminine) human in general (78b-
c).\(^{26,27}\) Le is required in order to double.

78. a. \((*La)\text{ vi a María}\)
    \((*\text{CL-acc})\text{ I.saw A María}\)
    “I saw Maria”

    b. \(\text{A María, la vi.}\)
    \(\text{A María CL-acc I.saw}\)
    “Maria, I saw her”

    c. \(\text{La vi.}\)
    \(\text{CL-acc I.saw}\)
    “I saw her/it.”

79. \(\text{Le vi a María.}\)
    \(\text{CL-dat I.saw A María}\)
    “I saw Maria”

Again, neither of the accounts summarized above predicts that the form of the clitic should determine whether doubling is possible or not. Rather, they predict that the form of the clitic only determines the specificity restriction. In Leísta Spanish, we find the opposite is true on both counts.

\(^{26}\) As might be expected, the possibility of doubling with la varies from (sub)dialect to (sub)dialect, even within Leísta Spanish. I have found one speaker that allows doubling with la (although still only with animate DPs). I have not determined what other aspects of her grammar might correspond to this difference with other speakers. It is a possibility that I did not control for a right-dislocation reading with this speaker (judgements were done over email). Thus, it may be that la-doubling is only possible when the “double” is in a dislocated position – which is also possible with other speakers.

\(^{27}\) Note that (b) is a case of clitic-left-dislocation (Cinque 1991), a construction with different properties from clitic doubling. As Cinque argues, the double is not moved from argument position in clitic-left-dislocation construction. So, these are not even derived from underlying clitic-doubling constructions.
2.3.4.4 Problem 3: Specificity and Grammatical Function

The deeper problem with the above accounts is that they stipulate the specificity restrictions and the fact that these restrictions are associated with a particular clitic. The question that neither addresses is why it should be that accusative clitics are the ones that are +specific while datives are unspecified for this feature? Under these analyses, we would predict that a language might manifest exactly the opposite pattern of facts. Nothing prevents a language in which dative doubling requires specificity, but accusative doubling does not. As far as I know, no such language is attested. Instead, it seems that in language after language, object marking (such as object agreement and case marking) is dependent on some notion of specificity, whereas there is no such dependence for dative arguments. (See de Hoop 1996 for a survey of interpretive effects of direct object marking in a range of languages.) I do not want to push these arguments too far since I know of no account that provides a wholly satisfactory answer to this problem, the analysis presented here included. However, I take it as a goal to find a syntactic account of clitic doubling that reflects the semantic and morphological facts that we have observed without simply stipulating them through the use of a feature.

Notice, however, that the analysis we have adopted for accusative-form clitics (whereby accusative clitics are analyzed as determiners) does not give a ready-made solution to the Leísta problem either. In particular, it is not clear
whether accusative le should be treated as a determiner, as the “standard” accusative clitics (lolla) are treated. I discuss this problem in the following section.

2.3.5 The Clitic Form Dilemma

Leísta Spanish poses a problem for any account of clitic doubling, and not just for the featural account which we have argued against above. The problem is that we have a single piece of morphology that has different restrictions depending on its grammatical function. The semantic restrictions are not tied to a particular morphological form.

The facts are that accusative le has the same form as dative le. If we believe that this similarity is more than coincidental, we are led to posit a single analysis for the two clitics. Call this “the One le Hypothesis”. In Sportiche’s analysis, for example, this idea could be spelled out as proposing that both dative le and accusative le head the same clitic voice, say the dative voice. This is a good move, since positing two different le’s would be missing a generalization, as noted earlier. However, the problem with this view is that accusative le has different interpretive restrictions from dative le. We will refer to this problem as the “specificity problem”.

Rather than capturing the morphological generalization, we could choose to address the specificity problem by positing a unique source for all the accusative clitics (the accusative le along with lo and la) – that is, all those which show specificity restrictions – and a separate source for the dative version of le. Call this
“the Two le Hypothesis”. In Sportiche’s system, this idea could be implemented by generating both accusative le and lolla in the same clitic voice where the head is marked +specific. However, under this hypothesis we are positing that the form le arises in two different ways. We will refer to this problem as the “two le problem”. Whether we adopt the One le Hypothesis or the Two le Hypothesis, we will be missing a generalization. However, there may be a way around this problem.

As we will see below, I adopt the One le Hypothesis, but I argue that accusative le and dative le arise from different derivations – one which gives rise to specificity effects and one that does not. Under this analysis, we are able to solve the specificity problem without positing homophonous clitics.

### 2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the question of whether clitics are base-generated or moved from argument position. I provide a different answer to the question depending on the type of clitic. Dative clitics are argued to be base-generated, whereas accusative clitics are moved from argument position. The problem presented to a movement analysis of clitics is that full DP arguments can appear in argument position. I have given a hint of how this problem is to be addressed in later chapters. I will argue that both the accusative clitic and the full DP double are generated as subconstituents inside the DP argument. What remains is to explain what the nature and relationship of these two elements is inside the DP. I will argue that the internal structure of a doubling DP is that of inalienable
possession. The next chapter is devoted to giving a syntax for expressing possessive relations. I then apply what we learn from possessive constructions to the problem of clitic doubling and provide an analysis of clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish in Chapter 4.

An additional question is raised in this chapter about the nature of accusative uses of the dative-form clitic le in Leísta Spanish. This question is addressed in Chapter 4, where I argue that the accusative le is generated in the same position as the dative le (that is, they are the same element). In Rioplatense Spanish, the clitic/determiner escapes the object DP, but in Leísta Spanish doubling, I argue that it is the double, a subconstituent of the DP, which escapes. This element moves up to the specifier of the le projection (AspP), and thus is treated as a dative argument after undergoing movement.
Chapter 3

POSSESSION CONSTRUCTIONS

In the previous chapter we introduced the Torrego-Uriagereka Hypothesis of clitic doubling. The hypothesis is that the DP double originates as a subconstituent of the direct object, basically as shown in (80).

80. Juan vió [a [DP [DP ella] [[D la] [NP pro]]]]

As we mentioned, this analysis raises several questions. First, what is the relationship between the DP subconstituent and the larger DP? Second, in trying to apply this analysis to Leísta doubling, why is it that the double can be associated to a dative form clitic? Remember that we are assuming that the dative clitic is generated as a functional head of a verbal projection, and that this element is licensed when a full DP moves into its specifier. Thus, if a direct object can be doubled by the clitic le, we must address the question of why the direct object can be associated with a morpheme which, in turn, is associated with dative case. Third, how does this analysis account for the interpretive effects associated with doubling?

Obviously, the answers to these three questions are interrelated. I propose
that the answers lie in treating clitic doubling as a specialized instance of a possessive structure. In particular, it is proposed that clitic doubling is akin to but also more abstract than inalienable possession. The DP subconstituent (the overt double) underlyingly has the syntax of a possessor, and can move out of the direct object DP and up to the projection of the dative clitic. We will see in this chapter that there is good evidence from Hungarian possessive constructions that subconstituents of (direct object) DPs can be associated with dative case morphology and that such elements are able to escape from the object DP and appear in argument position (while maintaining their dative morphology). Thus, rather than assume that the direct object can optionally appear with the dative case, we propose that it is a subconstituent of the direct object that moves to the specifier of the dative clitic. As for the interpretational aspects of clitic doubling, there are now two questions. One is our original question about the source of the interpretational restrictions on doubling. The second is, given that we are treating clitic doubling as an instance of possession, why does a clitic doubling construction only make reference to a single entity rather than the two entities associated with a possessor and a possessee. One of the answers to this second question is addressed (first) in work by Hornstein et al. (1994) who introduce the notion of “Integral”. Integrals involve cases of part-whole (and related) relations where two entities are represented, but these two entities count as the same. We can intuitively view clitic doubling as inalienable possession of oneself. Clitic doubling structures involve the
double as the “possessor” or “whole” and a null pronominal element as the “possessee”, “part” or “reifier” of the whole. Some of the interpretational restrictions of clitic doubling, then, come from the nature of this integral relation. Other aspects of the interpretation will come from the role that the double plays once it escapes from DP and becomes part of the verbal domain.

3.1 Background

3.1.1 Possessive DP: Evidence from Hungarian

The goal of this section is to provide some motivation for the highly articulated structure of the noun phrase that I adopt in subsequent sections. We also show that the possessor in Hungarian can be associated with dative case, and can escape DP to appear in an argument position.

3.1.1.1 Structure of the DP

Szabolcsi (1981, 1983, 1987) shows that there are two distinguishable positions for possessors inside the DP in Hungarian, demonstrating the need for several layers of projection within the DP. (81) shows an example of one kind of possessive construction in Hungarian. I adopt the structure shown in (82) (adapted from Szabolcsi 1987) to accommodate these possessor constructions.

81. a te titk-od
    the you secret-poss.2sg
    “your secret”
All possessed nouns in Hungarian show person and number agreement with the possessor. Szabolcsi gives the generalization in (83).

83. **Szabolcsi’s Generalization**: Hungarian NPs have an overt subject if and only if the possessed N shows person-number agreement.

We can take this obligatory agreement marking as evidence for an agreement projection inside the DP. We assume that the noun “secret” moves to the Agr head much as a verb does in order to check its agreement features.\(^\text{28}\) The possessor subject is “licensed” by agreement in that Agr assigns nominative case to the possessor in its specifier. In addition, the determiner is assumed to be a functional head in its own projection above AgrP, thus accounting for the word order shown

\(^{28}\) Although see Szabolcsi (1987) for arguments that this is too simplistic a view. There is a problem with the placement of quantifiers such as “every”. Following Kayne (1993), I will assume that NP in (82) can also be a QP (that is, can contain a quantifier). I also assume that agreement-marking is base-generated on the head noun and that movement to check the agreement features occurs at LF. However, the details of this are not crucial to my analysis.
The existence of two specifier positions inside DP (shown in (82)) is supported by the existence of two possessor constructions in Hungarian. In one construction the possessor appears between the determiner *a(z)* (“the”) and the noun (as in (81)), i.e., in spec,AGRP. In the other the possessor appears before the determiner *a(z)*, i.e., in spec,DP.

Additional examples of the first kind of possessor construction are given in (84) (from Szabolcsi 1987).

84.  a.  az én kalap-om
    the I hat- POSS.1sg
    “my hat”

    b.  a te kalap-od
    the you hat- POSS.2sg
    “your hat”

    c.  a Péter kalap-ja
    the Peter hat- POSS.3sg
    “Peter’s hat”

Here the possessor appears between the determiner *a(z)* (“the”) and the possessed noun. The possessor is zero-marked for case (which is equivalent to nominative case in Hungarian) and the possessed noun shows agreement morphology corresponding to the person and number of the possessor. Szabolcsi assumes that in this construction the possessor NP has nominative case which is assigned by
In the second type of possessor construction, the possessor is dative marked and precedes the article \( a(z) \). In this construction the possessor is assumed to be in the specifier of the determiner phrase. Examples of this construction are given in (85) (from Szabolcsi (1987)).

85. a. én-nek-em a kalap-om
   I-DAT-1sg the hat-POSS.1sg
   “my hat”

   b. te-nek-ed a kalap-od
      you-DAT-2sg the hat-POSS.2sg
      “your hat”

   c. Péter-nek a kalap-ja
      Peter-DAT the hat-POSS.3sg
      “Peter’s hat”

   Thus we see that there are two possessor positions: one higher than the definite determiner and which is dative-marked, and the other one lower than the determiner and nominative-marked. This is shown schematically in (86).

Note that Agr also licenses pro-drop, showing a further parallel with sentential Agr.
3.1.1.2 Extraction

The two kinds of Hungarian possessor constructions also differ in terms of extraction possibilities. Dative-marked possessors can be extracted from DP, but nominative-marked possessors cannot. This is shown in (87) and (88) respectively (from Szabolcsi 1987).

87. a. Péter-nek léttam [t₁ a t₁ kalap-já-t]
   Peter-DAT saw-I the hat-POSS.3sg-ACC
   “For x = Peter, I saw x’s hat”

   b. Ki-nek léttam [t₁ a t₁ kalap-já-t]?
      who-dat saw-I the hat-POSS.3sg-ACC
      “For which x, I saw x’s hat”

88. a. *Peter-∅ léttam [a t₁ kalap-já-t]
    Peter-NOM saw-I the hat-POSS.3sg-ACC

   b. *Ki-∅ léttam [a t₁ kalap-já-t]?
      who-NOM saw-I the hat-POSS.3sg-ACC

The extraction facts accord with the structure we have given in (86). The specifier
of DP acts as an escape hatch. A possessor can only move out of the object DP if it first moves to the specifier of the highest projection in the DP. This specifier position is also associated with dative marking, and thus we see that any possessor that is extracted from DP must be dative-marked.

3.1.1.3 Possession Sentences

We have just seen that dative-marked possessors can move out of the object DP in cases of wh-extraction. Szabolcsi (1981) also shows that subjects of possession sentences such as the one in (89) are derived from a DP-internal position.

89. Péter-nek van kar-ja
    Peter-dat is arm-poss
    “Peter has an arm.”

It is clear that the subject Peter originates as the possessor of arm since arm is possessor-marked and agrees with the subject. There are no other cases of co-arguments agreeing this way in Hungarian. Also, just like the other cases of extraction, the possessor is necessarily dative-marked (and not nominative-marked). The derivation is shown in (90).
Peter and arm are in a spec-head relation underlyingly. The morpheme ja in Agr arises when there is an element in the spec of AgrP. There is also an agreement feature for person, but in the case of 3rd person, this morpheme is phonetically null. The possessor Peter then moves to spec,DP where the dative morpheme is licensed. From here it moves to spec,IP (subject position).

3.1.2 Kayne’s 1993 Analysis of English Possessives

Kayne (1993) extends the Szabolcsi syntax for possessors to English. In particular, he proposes that the subjects of have-sentences originate as DP-internal possessors parallel to the Hungarian be-possession sentences. Have-sentences such as in (91) are derived from an abstract BE which takes the complex possession-DP as a complement, as shown in (92).
91. John has three sisters.

92. \( \ldots \text{BE [DP Spec D}^0 [ \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} [ \text{AGR}^0 \text{QP/NP}]]] \)

In particular the underlying representation of the DP (91) is given in (93).

93. \[
\text{DP} \\
\quad \text{Spec} \\
\quad \quad \text{D}' \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{D} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{AGRP} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{John} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{AGR}' \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{AGR} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{QP} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{three sisters}
\]

Given an underlying representation as in (93), \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) can remain in situ (spec,AGRP) only if it is able to receive case in this position. Kayne suggests that in both English and Hungarian, AGR is not sufficient by itself to license a DP in its specifier. An additional condition is that the D that selects AGRP must be definite. In English, the definite D must remain phonologically unrealized, but in Hungarian it can be overt (as seen in (84) above). Kayne’s representation of a definite possessed DP is shown in (94).
This is the representation for the possessed DPs in sentences as in (95).

95. a. I met John’s three sisters in the park yesterday.
   b. John’s three sisters were in the marching band in high school.

We know that the possessed DP in such sentences is definite because the referent of this DP is presupposed to exist. This can be shown in sentences where the element in question is placed under negation.

96. a. I didn’t read Mary’s poem.
   b. I didn’t read a poem of Mary’s.

97. a. I didn’t read the poem.
   b. I didn’t read a poem.

With the prenominal genitive in (96a), the poem is presupposed to exist. This sentence means that there is a (particular) poem that I did not read. With the indefinite possessive construction in (96b), the poem is not presupposed to exist.\(^{30}\)

\(^{30}\) Thanks to Anna Szabolcsi for pointing out this test and these examples.
This sentence means that I did not read any poem. This is exactly parallel with what we find with non-possessive definite and indefinite DPs in negative contexts, given in (97). Thus we take prenominal possessors to always have a +definite feature (in D), as shown in (94).

On the other hand, if D is indefinite, then DP_{poss} is not licensed in spec,AGRP. In Hungarian, the DP_{poss} must raise to spec,DP and then out of the DP entirely. As we saw above, the possessor is assigned dative case in spec,DP, which it maintains under movement.

English uses a different strategy to license the DP_{poss} in the absence of a definite determiner. One alternative construction which is possible in English is the post-nominal genitive, which is shown in (98).

98. I met three sisters of John’s.

Kayne assumes that to generate the possessive in (98), the QP moves to spec,DP and the preposition of is inserted in D. The of in D then serves to license DP_{poss} in situ.

99. 

Returning to the derivation of the have-sentence, a second possibility for
“saving” an indefinite possessed DP in English is through movement of the possessor in sentences with be or have. In this case, DP_{poss} can move to spec,DP (move #1 in (100)) and from there can move to matrix subject position (move #2), as in Hungarian.

100.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{IP} \\
\text{DP}_{\text{poss/i}} \\
\text{John} \\
\text{I'} \\
\text{BE} \\
\text{D'} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{AgrP} \\
\text{Agr'} \\
\text{Q}&\text{P} \\
\text{3 sisters}
\end{array}
\]

However, Kayne suggests that as it stands, movement #2 in (100) is illicit, since spec,DP is an A-bar position (following Szabolcsi’s (1981) idea that this position is parallel to spec,CP). Movement #2 is movement from an A-bar to an A position (spec,IP), a case of improper movement. And indeed, the result of this, *John is three sisters, is not grammatical.\(^{31}\) Thus, he suggests, that D, which in some sense

\[\text{In Hungarian, it is possible to say this sentence with be, as in (i), presumably because the possessor can move out of DP without necessarily moving to an A-position. (Example is from Szabolcsi 1981).}\]

i. Péter-nek van kar-ja-∅-∅
Peter-dat is arm-poss-3sg-nom
‘Peter has an arm’ (lit: To Peter is an arm.)
is prepositional, incorporates into BE, as shown in (101).

101.

```
IP
  ▲
 I'
  ▲
 I
  ▲
 BE+D_k
  ▲
 t_i
  ▲
 t_k
  ▲
 AgrP
  ▲
 Agr'
  ▲
 Agr
  ▲
 QP
```

32

This incorporation saves movement #2 by changing spec,DP to an A-position.

The spell-out of BE+D is *have*. This derivation gives rise to *have*-sentences such as (91), repeated here as (102).

102. John has three sisters.

3.1.3 The Syntax of Integrals

Hornstein, Rosen, and Uriagereka (1994) extend the Kayne-Szabolcsi syntax of possessors to cases of what they call “Integral Relations”. The category of Integrals includes part-whole relations and inalienable possession, among other

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32 Kayne extends the idea behind Baker’s (1985) Government Transparency Corollary to apply to specifiers in addition to complements. The idea is that any specifier which is governed by I is an A position. By raising D to I, D and I are equated, and the specifier of D is now associated with or governed by I, thus
relations. In this section I discuss the concept of integrals, some of the modifications to the Kaynian DP structure that Hornstein et al. introduce, and some arguments for the syntactic structure they propose to represent integrals.

Hornstein et al. note that the sentence in (103) is ambiguous between an inalienable possession interpretation (104a) and a locational interpretation (104b).

103. There is a Ford T engine in my Saab.

104. a. My Saab has a Ford T engine.
   b. (Located) in my Saab is a Ford T engine.

The inalienable reading in (104a), which Hornstein et al. call the Integral Interpretation, can be further paraphrased as the following.

105. My car partially consists of a Ford T engine.

The paraphrase given in (104b), which Hornstein et al. call the Standard Interpretation, can only mean that the engine is located in my Saab, perhaps sitting in the back seat. There is no entailment that the engine is part of the car in this sentence.33

Hornstein et al. propose that these two different readings are derived from different underlying structures. I first discuss the structure that gives rise to the

making it an A position.

33 Notice that the sentence in (104b) does not exclude a situation in which the engine is an integral part of the car. If an engine is part of the car, it is also located in the car. Thus, making a statement about the location of the engine does not exclude a situation which also could be described using an integral sentence.
integral reading and then discuss the structure for the locational reading.

Following Kayne (1993) and Szabolcsi (1981), Hornstein et al. assume that the subject of the *have* sentence in (104a) is derived from a position inside the DP that also contains a *Ford T engine*. This complex DP is the object of the abstract verb BE, as discussed in section 3.1.2. The DP complement of BE contains a small clause where one element is the subject and the other element is the “predicate”.\(^{34,35}\)

\[\text{In particular, the underlying structure of the complement DP in (104a) is given in (107).}\]

---

However, the integral reading is not entailed by this sentence.

\(^{34}\) Note that “predicate” is not being used in the familiar sense of the word. The intended sense will be clarified below.

\(^{35}\) The small clause is represented as an AGR projection in this work. Uriagereka later modifies this structure to be a small clause with no functional head which is the complement of AGR. Hornstein *et al.* note that all of the arguments that they present should hold of either structure.
The underlying small clause structure shown in (107) is the source of the integral interpretation. It encodes the part-whole relation between the engine and the car in this example. More generally, Hornstein et al. claim that the small clause encodes “Relation R”, which is the abstract relation which underlies a number of more familiar relations. In addition to the part-whole relation discussed here, this structure is claimed to underlie other inalienable relations (such as family membership) and mass term predications (as in This ring is gold). (Also see Castillo (1999) who accounts for container-contained relations using the integral syntax discussed here.)

The derivation of the have-sentence in (104a) (repeated here as (108a)) is shown in (108b).

108. a. My Saab has a Ford T engine.
Both of the elements originating in the small clause undergo movement. The subject of the small clause (or the “whole” of the part-whole relation) moves to spec,IP and becomes the subject of the main clause. As in Kayne 1993, D undergoes head-movement and incorporates into BE (which I am taking to be in I). The motivation for the head movement in this case is to create a local domain, allowing my Saab to move to matrix subject position. The “predicate” of the small clause also moves. This element moves to spec,DP. The reason for this movement is not discussed, but it is assumed that the predicate moves in this case on a parallel with the there-sentence, where this movement is needed to derive the correct word order.

The integral reading of the existential there-sentence in (103) (repeated here as (109a)) is derived as in (109b).

109. a. There is a Ford T engine in my Saab. (integral reading)
b. IP
   there
   I'
   I
   be
   an engine
   D'
   D
   in
   my Saab
   AgrP
   Agr'
   Agr
   t_i

Here we see that D is spelled out as the preposition *in* (in keeping with Kayne’s idea that D is prepositional). Therefore, *in my Saab* is not a PP and, in fact, is not a constituent in the integral reading of this sentence. To derive the correct word order, the predicate *a Ford T engine* moves to spec,DP.

In addition to the integral representation (shown again in (110)), it is also possible for the small clause to contain a standard predication relation. So, *in my Saab* can originate as a constituent PP which is predicated of *engine* in the normal way. This structure is shown in (110b), and underlies the standard or location interpretation, illustrated by (104b) above.

110.  a. …[SC my Saab [a Ford T engine]]… Integral
    b. … [SC a Ford T engine [in my Saab]] Standard

In the derivation of the standard interpretation of the *there*-sentence in (103), *a Ford T engine* starts as the subject of the small clause rather than as the “predicate.”

No movement is necessary in order to derive the *there*-sentence.
111. There is [SC [a Ford T engine] [in my Saab]]

Alternatively, the subject of the small clause can raise to the subject of *be* as shown in (112b), deriving (112a).

112. a. A Ford T engine is in my Saab.

   b. IP
       DP\textsubscript{j}
       an engine
       I'
       I
       be
       ti
       SC
       PP
       in my Saab

3.1.3.1 *Have* and *Be* paraphrases

In this section, we examine some differences between standard and integral sentences that provide arguments for the postulated differences in structure, shown in (110).

Hornstein *et al.* note that the copular sentence in (112a) is not ambiguous between a standard and integral reading. It only has the standard interpretation (the location reading) and not the integral interpretation. We have seen above how the standard interpretation is derived, but not why the integral interpretation is excluded. In (113a) the underlying structure for the integral interpretation is repeated. (113b) shows the derivation that would be required to produce (112a) from the underlying integral small clause.
Hornstein et al. assume with Kayne (1993) that spec,DP is an A-bar position. Hence, movement from this position to the subject position (an A position) is illicit.

Unlike Kayne, however, they assume that D-movement does not save this derivation. Thus, there is no way to derive the surface order *A Ford T engine is in my Saab* from the underlying integral syntax.

So far, we have seen that the Integral interpretation of a *there* sentence allows a paraphrase with *have*, but not with *be*. This fact is shown more clearly with examples of *there* sentences that only have an integral interpretation, such as the one in (114a). Hornstein et al. give the examples in (114b-c) to show that this
sentence only has a *have* paraphrase and not a *be* paraphrase.

114.  
   a. There are ten provinces in Canada. Integral
   
   b. Canada has ten provinces.
   
   c. #Ten provinces are in Canada.

Note that (114c) is somewhat acceptable with a locational reading, but is not an appropriate way to express the idea that Canada is comprised of ten provinces.³⁶

Similarly, *there*-sentences which only have a standard interpretation allow a paraphrase with *be* but not with *have*. This is shown by Horntein *et al.*’s examples in (115).

115.  
   a. There are two men in the garden. Standard
   
   b. #The garden has two men.³⁷
   
   c. Two men are in the garden.

This contrast provides further evidence that the distinction between standard and integral interpretations is on the right track. The sentences discussed in this section show the distinction more clearly than the ambiguous cases considered earlier.

³⁶ For U.S. citizens, the judgement might be easier to get with the sentence in (i).
   i. #Fifty states are in the United States.

³⁷ Notice that with a different object, this sentence can express an integral relation, and then is grammatical, as expected. (The example is due to Laura Siegel, p.c.)
   i. The garden has two apple trees.
3.1.3.2 Evidence for the Standard vs. Integral Syntax

In this section we give two arguments from Hornstein et al. for the different constituent structures proposed for the in+NP sequence in the two constructions. We have seen that the analysis takes P+NP to form a constituent in the Standard reading but not in the Integral reading. The first argument for this difference comes from extraction. If the preposition is pied piped in a wh-question, only the standard reading is obtained. This can be seen in (116) and (117).

116. You believe there is a big trunk on this elephant. (ambiguous)
117. On which elephant do you believe there is a big trunk? (Standard only)

When the P+NP sequence is left in-situ as in (116), the sentence is ambiguous between the standard and the integral interpretation. Hornstein et al. play on the ambiguity of the word trunk to get the two different readings. On the standard interpretation, the trunk is a big box or suitcase that (of course) is not inalienably possessed by the elephant. Rather, the elephant is carrying the trunk on its back. The integral interpretation is that the trunk is the elephant’s nose, and thus is an integral part of the elephant.

If we try to extract P+NP together, only the standard reading results. That is, (117) only has the reading of the big suitcase being carried on the back of the elephant. This is because only in the standard reading does P+NP form a constituent that can be moved as a piece.

Notice that neither reading allows stranding of the preposition.
Which elephant do you believe that there is a big trunk on?

Hornstein et al. note that this sentence is almost acceptable on the standard reading, but on the integral reading, it is totally out.

Both of these facts make sense given the analysis. In the integral reading, the preposition *in/on* is the D head which takes AgrP as its complement. The NP *this elephant* is not the complement of the preposition, rather it is in the specifier of the complement AgrP.

Hornstein et al. suggest that the preposition in the integral interpretation is parallel to the complementizer in (119). Here too the complementizer does not form a constituent with the NP after it, and thus it can neither be pied piped, as in (119a), nor stranded, as in (119b).

119. a. *For which person would John prefer t to take out the garbage?*
b. *Which person would John prefer for t to take out the garbage?*

Hornstein et al. give another test that shows this difference in constituency using the modifier *right*. If *right* modifies the sequence *in my Saab* then only the standard interpretation is obtained.

120. There is a Ford T engine right in my Saab. (Standard only)

This is expected if we assume, following Emonds (1969) and Jackendoff (1973), that *right* modifies PP constituents.

3.1.4 Modifications of the Integral Syntax

Hornstein et al. represent Relation R as holding between the specifier and
the complement of an Agr projection. Uriagereka (1995b, 1997, 1998) modifies this syntax slightly and proposes that Relation R be expressed in a (headless) small clause which is the complement of the Agr projection, as shown in (121).

121.

```
    DP
   /   \
  D    AGRP
     /   |
   AGR  SC
      /   \
     subj  pred
```

The empirical reasons for this structure given by Uriagereka (1995) are based on the following paradigm.

122. a. the poor neighborhoods of the city
    b. the city’s poor neighborhoods
    c. a city of poor neighborhoods
    d. *(a/the) poor neighborhoods’ city

We will give Uriagereka’s account of the ungrammaticality of (122d) below. First, however, we will focus on the grammatical examples in (122a-c).

Uriagereka points out that the expressions in (122a-c) all express the same integral relationship between neighborhoods and the city. The neighborhoods are a(n) (inalienable) part of the city. However, the reference differs in the different expressions. The whole DP in (122a) and (122b) refers to (a set of) neighborhoods, whereas the DP in (122c) refers to a city. Because the same relation is expressed in both (122a) and (c), it is assumed that these two should have the same underlying
representation (cf. Katz and Postal 1964). Putting this together with the fact that the reference of the DP is different in these two expressions means that reference is not determined by the underlying structure, but rather by the derived structure.

In order to account for this data, Uriagereka makes several assumptions. First, the Integral relation is expressed in a small clause, as illustrated in (123).  

\[123. \text{DP} \]

\[\text{D} \quad \text{the} \]

\[\text{AgrP} \]

\[\text{Agr} \quad \text{SC} \]

\[\text{DP} \quad \text{NP} \]

\[\text{the city} \quad \text{poor neighborhoods} \]

Second, (following Kayne), it is assumed that \textit{of} is the spell-out of the Agr head. What follows \textit{of} is material that is left in the small clause. Thus, the derivation of (122a) is as in (124).

\[124. \text{a. the poor neighborhoods of the city} \]

---

38 It is not clear in Uriagereka (1995) where the determiners of the two noun phrases are generated. I am assuming that the determiner \textit{the of the poor neighborhoods} is generated in the X head. The “predicate” of the small clause is thus an NP, and the subject is a DP (containing its determiner). The determiner in D “goes with” whatever element raises to spec,AGRP. If this is the case, then either the subject or the predicate can be an NP, gaining its reference by moving to spec,AGRP and matching up with the determiner.
Third, it is assumed that the genitive marking ’s is in a functional head above Agr.

Thus the derivation of (122b) is as in (125).

125. a. the city’s poor neighborhoods

And finally, assuming that there is only one source for of, (122c) is derived as in (126).\(^39\)

\(^39\) Again, I remain agnostic at this point as to whether the determiner a forms a constituent with city underlingly and raises to spec,AGRP. The other possibility is that the determiner is generated in the functional head that takes AgrP as a
What we find, then, is that whichever element moves to spec, AGRP is the element that determines the reference of the DP (Uriagereka 1995b). For Uriagereka, referentiality is not a property of the lexical elements or their semantic types, but is “a consequence of the syntactic process” (1995b:272). In the minimalist approach that he adopts, there is a feature that is checked in AGR. Either element in the small clause can in principle be associated with this feature and thus be attracted to spec, AGRP.

However, as we saw in (122), the paradigm is not complete. Making the assumptions discussed so far, we can now explain the ungrammaticality of (122d), repeated here.

127. *(a/the) poor neighborhoods’ city

In principle, there are two derivations for (127). Both are ruled out for independent reasons.

The first derivation would involve the raising of neighborhoods to spec, DP.

complement.
Uriagereka (1995b) states that this derivation is ruled out because such a movement would violate locality (in particular, he appeals to the Minimal Link Condition of Chomsky 1995).

Here the movement of “hoods” to spec,DP would skip over a filled spec position and would violate the Minimal Link Condition or shortest move (Chomsky 1993). Or in Pesetsky’s (1982) terms, it would create nested paths of movement.

Thus, according to Uriagereka (1995b; 1998) either element can make the initial move out of the small clause to spec,AGRP and thereby become the referent of the clause. However, only the subject of the small clause can move to spec,DP and become the genitive-marked element.

Alternatively, a second imaginable derivation is one where *neighborhoods* is generated as the “subject” of the small clause. In this case, the movement of *neighborhoods* to spec,DP would create crossing rather than nested paths.
However, this underlying structure is independently ruled out because the interpretation would be wrong.

130. SC
    hoods  city

The subject and predicate positions in the small clause determine which element is considered to be a part of the other. The underlying syntax shown in (130) would give rise to a semantics where cities are parts of neighborhoods, and this is what is ruled out. I am assuming that the underlying representation in (130) is not ruled out by the syntax *per se*. Rather, it may go wrong at some “later” point when the speaker tries to connect this structure up with his/her knowledge of the world. Thus, in a situation where the speaker is presented with a neighborhood that encompasses more than one city, presumably (127) would be an acceptable way to describe one of these cities.
3.1.4.1 A Hierarchical Structure for the Small Clause

It should be noted that what is crucial to Uriagereka (1995b; 1998) is not the headlessness of the small clause, but the existence of an extra layer of structure in addition to the DP and AGRP layers that were assumed previously. Thus, he argues that these same two layers of structure exist, but they are above the small clause where the subject and predicate are generated (rather than the AGRP being the small clause itself, as in Hornstein, et al. 1994).

I adopt the three-layer structure of Uriagereka (1995b; 1998). However, I also follow Hornstein et al. in maintaining the small clause as a structure containing a head.

An argument for maintaining the hierarchical structure in the small clause concerns the locality argument that Uriagereka (1995b) gives for ruling out (131).

131. *(a/the) poor neighborhoods’ city

Uriagereka (1995b; 1998) claims that the movement shown in (132) is not local.

132.
However, it is not clear how this movement is any less local than the movement in (133) (which is argued to be a grammatical derivation).

Any definition of locality based on “closeness” will treat both elements of the small clause equally. The set of elements that c-command the base positions of city and hoods are exactly the same. And since each element c-commands the other, there is no way to define one as hierarchically higher than the other. Thus, the possible movement domains of both elements in the small clause should be the same, since neither element is higher in the tree than the other or closer to the target of movement, assuming that we define these notions (height and closeness) in terms of c-command. In what follows I assume Chomsky’s (1993; 1995) definition of locality given here.

134. **Minimal Link Condition**

K attracts α only if there is no β, β closer to K than α, such that K attracts β.
135. β is closer to K than α unless β is in the same minimal domain as
   (a) the target of movement or (b) α.

136. a. Max(α) is the smallest maximal projection including α.
   
b. The domain D(CH) of a chain (CH) is the set of categories included in
      Max(α) that are distinct from and do not contain α or the trace of α.
   
c. The minimal domain of a chain MIN(D(CH)) is the smallest subset K of
      D(CH) such that, for any element γ in D(CH), some β in K reflexively
      dominates γ.

One way to derive the difference in the two movements is to assume that in
fact the small clause has a hierarchical structure, as shown in (137).

137. DP
     /\  AGRP
    /   \  AGR
   /     \  IntP
  /       \  subj
 /         \ (city)
\         /   Int'
  \       /   pred
   \     / (hoods)

The structure given in (137) shows a hierarchical small clause representing the
Integral relation between the subject and predicate (or specifier and complement) of
the small clause (as in Hornstein, et al. 1994). It also shows the extra layer of

By having a headed small clause we are able to distinguish the movements
in (132) and (133) in terms of locality. (138b) shows the grammatical derivation of
(138a) involving local movements. We assume that Int moves to Agr, and that this
complex head then moves up to D.

138.  a. the city’s neighborhoods

In contrast, (139) shows a derivation with non-local movement. The DP city moves to spec, AGRP. In order for hoods to move, it must cross two specifiers. This is the movement that is ruled out by the definition of local movement given above. The derivation proceeds as follows. First, Int moves to Agr. At that point, the minimal domain of \langle Int, t \rangle is \{[spec, AGRP]; [spec, IntP]; hoods\}. However, when the complex head containing Agr and Int moves to D, hoods is no longer in the same minimal domain as city (in spec, AgrP). Therefore, city is closer to the target of movement (spec, DP) than hoods is, and so movement of hoods is prohibited.
Thus, I adopt the headed small clause structure in (137) because this allows us to rule out (139a) as a case of non-local movement.  

3.1.5 Summary

Up to this point, we have seen the following. First, Szabolcsi (1981; 1983; 1987) showed the need for two possessor positions inside the DP in Hungarian and gave a basic syntax for these using functional projections. The higher possessor is marked with dative morphology and the lower possessor is nominative marked (zero-marked). Szabolcsi showed that the dative-marked possessor can move out of the (object) DP. The subject and object in possession sentences are both derived

An additional reason the movement in (139b) is bad may be because the determiner associated with “neighborhoods” is generated in D, and movement of the NP past the determiner is what gives rise to ungrammaticality. If this is the reason for the ungrammaticality of (139a), then the locality argument for the
from a single DP which is the complement of *be* in Hungarian. We then saw how Kayne (1993) modifies the Szabolcsi syntax and applies it to English to give a unified account for possessor expressions like the ones in (140).41

140. a. My Saab’s engine
   b. My Saab has a Ford T engine.

He assumes that the two elements in these sentences are the subject and predicate position of an Agr projection in the DP.

141.  
```
DP
  Spec  D’
  D    AGRP
  DPposs
My Saab
  AGR  QP
  Ford T engine
```

The AGR head can be spelled out as the genitive marking ’s, deriving (140a). Or the DPposs can move through spec, DP and up to the matrix subject position, deriving (140b).

Building further on these ideas, Hornstein *et al.*, (1994) use a modified Kaynian syntax to account for the integral interpretation of (142). existence of a head in the small clause goes away.
142. There’s a Ford T engine in my Saab.

Following Kayne’s idea that D is prepositional in some sense, they assume that D can be spelled out as in (or as a limited number of other prepositions that are locative in form, such as on). Second, they assume that the “predicate” element of the small clause can move to spec, DP. Contrary to Kayne, they argue that the possessor does not move through spec,DP on its way to matrix subject position (spec,IP) in the derivation of (140b). Their main argument for this point of view comes from the fact that (143) is ungrammatical on the integral interpretation.

143. a. An engine is in my Saab. *Integral Interpretation
   b. Fifty states are in the U.S. *Integral Interpretation

They assume that the sentences in (143) lack an integral reading exactly because the “predicate” an engine cannot move from spec,DP to spec,IP, this being an instance of improper movement. (And contrary to Kayne, movement of D to BE does not save this derivation.)

Finally, we saw the need to posit an additional layer of structure in Integral DPs to account for the “neighborhoods” paradigm. The underlying representation for Integral relations that we adopt is given in (144).
In this section I analyze the possessor raising construction in Spanish as an instance of an integral relation (Hornstein et al. (1994); Uriagereka (1997; 1998; 1999)). I use the terms “external possession construction” (Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992)) and “possessor raising” to refer to structures in which there is an element external to a (direct object) noun phrase which is interpreted as the (inalienable) possessor of (the entity represented by) that noun phrase. A Spanish example of this construction is shown in (145).

145. Juan le vio la mano a Carmen.  
    Juan CL saw the hand to Carmen  
    Juan saw Carmen’s hand.

Here the possessor of la mano (“the hand”) is in indirect object position and is doubled by the dative clitic (le). It is also possible to express the possessor by means of the clitic only, with no overt indirect object (in the case that the individual has already been mentioned), as shown in (146).
An example of an internal possession construction is shown in (147). Here the possessor is internal to the direct object NP and is expressed by a *de*-phrase (*of*-phrase).

It can be shown that the external possessor in (145) is in fact external to the direct object DP, and that the internal possessor is internal in (147). That is, I will argue for the constituent structures given in (148).

Kayne (1975) provides two tests as evidence for the constituency posited in (148) in the equivalent examples in French. In what follows, we argue for the constituency in (148) by applying Kayne’s tests.

The first test uses cleft constructions. It is assumed that elements that can be clefted as a unit are constituents. For example, in the internal possessor construction the possessed element and the possessor can be clefted together in (149). Thus we conclude that they form a constituent.

In the external possessor construction, on the other hand, the possessed element
and the possessor cannot be clefted together.

150. a. *Fue la mano a Carmen lo que Juan (le) vió.

       b. Fue la mano lo que Juan le vió a Carmen.

A second test which supports the posited constituency in (148) is pronominalization. In the external possessor construction, the possessed element can appear as a pronominal clitic, leaving behind the a-phrase. However, the parallel is not possible with the de-phrase of the internal possessor construction.

151. a. Juan se la vió a Carmen.

       b. *Juan la vió de Carmen.

The pronominalization facts accord with the analysis we have adopted in which the clitic is a determiner underlyingly which can move out only if there is no lexical material in its complement. In (151a), the possessor a Carmen is not inside the DP, and hence, the clitic can move out. In (151b), the possessor de Carmen is inside the DP and so the clitic must remain in DP. The fact that the clitic/determiner can appear in the DP in this construction, as shown in (152), is further support for this view.

152. Juan vió la de Carmen.
The idea is that in this configuration, *la* cannot escape the DP.

There has been much debate in the literature as to whether the external possessor moves from an underlying DP-internal possessor position or whether it is base-generated as an indirect object that controls a null element inside the possessed DP. Landau (1999) provides several arguments that possessor raising constructions in Hebrew and Romance involve movement rather than control of an anaphoric element. I will assume without argument that the possessor moves from a DP internal position and takes on the role of an indirect object in the surface syntax.

Following Hornstein, *et al.* (1994) and Uriagereka (1997; 1998; 1999), I claim that the possessor raising structure example in (145) involves an underlying integral syntax. That is, underlyingly *mano* and *Carmen* are elements in a small clause inside the DP complement of *ver* (“to see”), as in (154).
Note that Uriagereka and Hornstein et al. differ in their assumptions about how the derivation proceeds from here. The derivation I assume more closely resembles that of Uriagereka.

In order to derive (155), the small clause “predicate” mano moves up to spec,AGRP. This movement is shown in (156).

155. Juan le vió la mano a Carmen.

156. This movement occurs for both the internal and external possession constructions. In order to derive the internal possessive construction, the possessor stays in the
specifier of the small clause. If it remains there, then Agr is spelled out as *de* (“of”).

Alternatively, the possessor can move to spec,DP, as shown in (157).

From this position, the DP<sub>poss</sub> can escape the DP. We assume that this escaping of the DP triggers the presence of the dative clitic in Spanish.

The process by which the dative clitic appears is the following. I assume that the DP<sub>poss</sub> needs to have Case and that Case can be assigned to it in one of two ways. Either it can remain *in situ* and receive case under government by *de* (the Agr head), or it can move out of the DP entirely and receive case in the dative clitic voice. This second movement is illustrated in (158).
I assume that the clitic le is overt when some element moves to its specifier in the course of the derivation. The projection headed by le is the locus of dative case assignment. When the head has a dative case feature, it is spelled out as le, and a DP carrying dative case is attracted to its specifier.

The hypothesis that possessor raising involves movement to a dative position in the verbal domain is supported by the following fact: if a verb has an underlying indirect object, possessor raising out of the direct object is blocked.

159. *Se le dió la mano a su hija a Juan.
   CL CL gave the hand to his daughter to Juan
   “He gave his daughter’s hand (in marriage) to Juan.”

There is only one dative case projection and only one element can be attracted to its specifier to check dative case. If an indirect object is present, this element is obligatorily dative marked and thus precludes any other element from being dative
marked (in the same clause).

3.2.1 Animacy Effects on Dative Arguments

3.2.1.1 Animacy Effects in the Possessor Raising Construction

In this section I discuss the nature of animacy effects that can be witnessed in the external possessor construction. In some possessor raising constructions there is an animacy restriction on the external possessor. This is shown in (160) where *la mujer can serve as an external possessor but *la mesa (“the table”) cannot (unless mesa is personified).42

160.  a. Juan le vió una mano a la mujer.
     Juan CL saw a hand to the woman

     b. #Juan le vió una pata a la mesa.
        Juan CL saw a leg to the table

There is other data, however, that provide apparent counterexamples to the claim that the external possessor must be animate. I give one such example in (161).

161.  a. Carmen le cortó una mano a la mujer.
      Carmen CL cut a hand to the woman

     b. Carmen le cortó una pata a la mesa.
        Carmen CL cut a leg to the table

The examples in (161) have the same form as (160) above, but in this case, an inanimate is possible. The difference between these two examples is whether the

42 (b) is marked with # rather than * because the sentence is acceptable if the table
possessor is interpreted as affected or not. In (161) the dative-marked argument is interpreted as affected. In (160) it is not. I am not prepared to discuss the exact nature of “affectedness” since this would take us too far afield. It is intuitively clear that seeing an object does not affect it in the way that cutting it does. We can demonstrate that these intuitions have linguistic substance with independent tests. One test to show whether an argument of the verb is affected or not is by the construction is “what X did to Y is Z”, where Z is the action to be tested and Y is the element that is affected (or not) (Jackendoff 1987). The test is illustrated with English examples in (162).

162. a. What Carmen did to the woman was cut her hand.
   b. #What Carmen did to the woman was see her hand.

Here it can be seen that cut is interpreted as affecting its object, but see is not. The same can be shown in Spanish.

163. a. Lo que hizo Carmen a la mujer fue cortarle la mano.
   b. #Lo que hizo Carmen a la mujer fue verle la mano.

The conclusion is that a possessor can appear as an indirect object (external to the possessed DP) only if it is interpreted as affected or animate. Affected external possessors may be animate or inanimate. In exactly the cases where there is no affected role for the indirect object to have, the animacy effect kicks in.

In the next section we take a digression about dative arguments and their is being personified.
interpretation. I aim to show that the restrictions on the interpretation of external possessors is due to a restriction on dative doubling in general. I will argue that dative arguments must be interpreted as event participants. In order to be interpreted as an event participant, the element must be interpreted as either affected or as animate (and perhaps there are other ways in addition, but I do not explore these here).

3.2.1.2 Datives as event participants

Kayne (1975) notes that there is a semantic difference between *acheter à* (“buy” + dative) and *acheter pour* (“buy for”). In Kayne’s terms using the dative implies a direct connection between the subject and the receiver (indirect object).

164. a. Il achète des jouets aux petits-fils de ses petits-fils.
   he buys some toys to-the grandchildren of his grandchildren

b. Il achète des jouets pour les petits-fils de ses petit-fils.
   he buys some toys for the grandchildren of his grandchildren
   “He’s buying toys for his grandchildren’s grandchildren.”

According to Kayne, the sentence in (164a) is appropriate if the subject is the head of a huge family, whereas in (164b) the subject may be “merely thinking of his future descendents” (p.137). When the dative is used, there is an entailment that the grandchildren actually receive the toys, whereas with the *pour*-construction, the receipt of the gifts is not entailed.

The distinction discussed by Kayne is reminiscent of dative shift or double object constructions in English. There is a systematic difference in interpretation
between dative shifted and prepositional dative constructions in English (noted by Oehrle (1975) and others). Jayaseelan (1988) gives the following examples showing that with the double object construction in (165a), there is an entailment that the indirect object *his wife* is not only a goal but is also the recipient. In the *for-*construction in (165b), there is no such entailment.

165. a. John bought his wife a kimono, #but finally gave it to his mistress.  
b. John bought a kimono for his wife, but finally gave it to his mistress.

The French and English examples above show us that there are is a difference in interpretation between benefactives that are dative marked (either through dative morphology in French or through dative shift in English) and benefactives that are expressed as PPs.

The same distinction holds with goal arguments as well. Consider the following sentences with a verb like *send*.

166. a. I sent a package to Mary.  
b. I sent Mary a package.

167. a. I sent a package to London.  
b. *I sent London a package.

The (b)-examples in (166) and (167) entail a *cause-to-have* meaning. This meaning is not entailed by the canonical dative construction ((a)-examples) where the dative argument is a mere goal (directional or otherwise). In the canonical dative constructions, there is no entailment that the entity represented by the indirect
object ever receives the element represented by the direct object. This accounts for why *Mary* can be shifted but *London* cannot. Mary represents an entity that can possess something (be caused to have it), whereas London cannot. London is only a location.\(^{43}\)

Following the parallel with the benefactive *for*-examples above, I propose that the distinction in interpretation is due to a distinction between dative indirect objects and PPs. A phrase of the form “to NP” is ambiguous between a PP and an indirect object. The interpretation of indirect objects is restricted: these elements must be able to participate in the event in terms of being a recipient of an object, or perhaps by being affected by the event in some way. Thus, London cannot be an indirect object, but only the object of a preposition. The phrase *to London* in (167) is unambiguously a PP, and this accounts for why it cannot appear in the double object construction.\(^{44}\) Only true indirect objects can appear in this construction. The phrase *to Mary*, then, is (possibly) ambiguous. It can be a PP, but it can also be a true indirect object, correlating with the possibility of the NP appearing in the double object construction.

Second, I propose that we can see the interpretive requirements of real

\(^{43}\) Of course, to the extent that London can be seen as an animate entity, like *the people in the London office*, it can appear in the double object construction.

\(^{44}\) Whether the double object construction is derived via transformation or base generated is a separate issue. Either view is compatible with the claims discussed above.
datives in the following way: (true) indirect objects must be interpreted as participants in the event denoted by the predicate of which they are the argument. That is, the entity represented by the dative argument must be conceived as directly participating in the event described by the verb. In the French examples, the children must receive the toys bought by the subject. In the English dative shift examples, Mary must receive the package that is sent to her.

Notice that these examples of dative shift in English manifest what looks like an animacy effect. The animate indirect object (Mary) can shift but the inanimate one (London) cannot. However, this effect is not absolute. There are many examples where an inanimate element can be dative shifted. 45

168. a. She gives syntax a bad name.
   b. She gave the table a kick.
   c. Give peace a chance.

Thus, animacy is not the only factor which licenses the dative shift construction. Note is that in (168b) the object is interpreted as affected, as the test in (169) shows.

169. What I did to the table was give it a kick.

So, affectedness also plays a role in licensing dative shift.

In (a) and (c), however, the object is neither affected nor animate. I do not have an insight into exactly what aspect of the interpretation of these elements is at
play in these examples such that dative shift is possible. It should be noted, however, that these two examples have an idiomatic feel, and that non-affected, inanimate shifted objects only seem to possible with *give and not other verbs (as far as I know).\textsuperscript{46} Another interesting thing to note is that these expressions cannot appear in prepositional dative constructions.

170. a. *She gives a bad name to syntax.
   b. ?She gave a kick to the table.
   c. *Give a chance to peace.

As mentioned, I do not know what factors license dative shift in these idiomatic or light verb expressions with *give. But it does seem to be the case that animacy and affectedness are two of the factors (perhaps among others) which allow the an object to appear in the shifted construction. We saw above that the object-shifted position entailed an event participant interpretation. Thus, there is a connection between animacy and event participation. We have also seen that other things (besides animate things) can be event participants if they have the right property. What I want to suggest is that animate things can always event participants, independently of whether they have other properties (such as being affected) which are typical of event participants. Inanimate entities are much more restricted in their ability to be event participants. I have no explanation for the connection between

\textsuperscript{45} Thanks to Anna Szabolcsi to pointing some of these out to me.
animacy and event participation, but simply observe it to be true.

Ormazabal and Romero (1999) discuss animacy effects in Spanish dative
doubling constructions like the one in (171). Here, the dative clitic and the indirect
object that it doubles are underlined.

171. Juan le envió un libro a tu hermano.

Following Demonte (1995), they argue that dative clitic doubling has the same
structure (derivation) as dative shift constructions in English. They show that
Spanish dative doubling has the same kind of animacy effects that (as discussed
above) English double object constructions have. In Spanish, it is impossible to
double certain inanimate goal indirect objects, just as it is impossible to shift these
in English. This is shown in (172).

172. a. Marta (*le) envió un libro a Nueva York.

I will refer to both of these constructions as double object constructions in what
follows.

Ormazabal and Romero’s analysis of the animacy effect seen here is as
follows. They assume that the underlying structure for double object constructions
in both languages is as in (173). App is an applicative preposition. The verb selects
the complex predicate AppP, with the direct object in specifier position and the
indirect object in complement position.

46 Other light verb examples with give are give it a rest, give it the boot.
The double object construction is derived via movement (essentially following Larson 1988). They assume that first the applicative morpheme incorporates into the verb and that then the IO raises to spec,VP, as shown in (174).

In English, this derivation yields the word order V IO DO. In Spanish, movement of the IO to spec,VP corresponds to the spell-out of the morpheme *le* on the verb, thus giving rise to dative clitic doubling. The word order V DO IO in Spanish is derived via further movements of the verb and the direct object. Notice that this derivation differs slightly from the derivation we gave in Chapter 2; however, the differences are largely notational and bear no explanatory burden. What is crucial is simply that IO raises out of VP and triggers the spell-out of the dative clitic.

The animacy restrictions in double object constructions, they claim, are due
to the fact that V attracts an animacy feature. The movement of IO to spec,VP is only possible if the IO has the feature [+animate]. If the IO is not animate, as in (175), then movement to spec,VP is not possible. This accounts for the ungrammaticality of the examples in (175).

175. a. Marta (*le) envió un libro a Nueva York.

However, as we noted for English, the animacy restriction is not absolute, making animacy the wrong feature to account for double object constructions in English as well as dative doubling in Spanish. Exactly the same kinds of exceptions to the animacy restriction in English dative shift pop up in Spanish dative doubling.

176. Le di una patada a la mesa.
   CL I.gave a kick to the table
   I gave the table a kick.

In (176), we see that the dative argument a la mesa can be doubled by a clitic even without animacy (that is, the table is not interpreted as personified). Again, we need to assume that there are other factors that allow dative doubling. In (176), we can appeal to the notion of affectedness. What animacy and affectedness have in common is that an argument with these features is able to be interpreted as an event participant. In Spanish, doubling with a dative clitic is a marker not only that an element is receiving dative case, but that the element is interpreted as an event participant. Hence, animacy is one of the factors determining dative doubling. However, it is not the only one.
In the absence of an understanding of how the interpretation of event participation is represented in the syntax and thus how it can correspond to a syntactic movement, I will simply assume that there is a feature [+A] (mnemonic for both animacy and affectedness) which corresponds to an event participant interpretation. This feature is present in the head that is responsible for assigning or checking dative case. Any element that moves to the specifier of this dative head must have feature [+A] and thus must be interpreted as an event participant. It is not terribly satisfactory to use a feature to represent something as complex as event participation. However, this may be the best we can do at present. I leave the question of exactly what it means to be an event participant, along with how this might be represented syntactically, to future investigation.47

The result of what we have said so far is that whatever moves to the spec of le must be interpreted as an event participant. Animates are automatically able to

47 We have given a mechanistic account of these interpretive restrictions by requiring the feature +A to be checked in the dative clitic phrase. Notice that the feature +A, however, is defined disjunctively. An NP has the feature +A if it is either animate or affected. We would like to find a way to treat animacy and affectedness as a single property. These two properties may be unified under Uriagereka’s notion of “change”. Uriagereka suggests that what we have been referring to as “animacy” is really a concept he calls “change potential”. The idea is that humans categorize entities in terms of their ability to change over time. Animate beings have change potential in that they are volitional beings that move and do things to create change. Other objects may not be able to create change themselves, but if they undergo change in an event, we may be able to conceive of them as having change potential. Thus, if an object is affected by an event, it has change potential. So the idea is that event participants are elements with change potential, and that animacy and affectedness are unified in this one conceptual
full this role, but NPs with other interpretations can fill this role as well.

### 3.2.1.3 Summary

Returning to possessor raising constructions, we saw in section 3.2.1.1 that a possessor can only appear externally (as an indirect object) if it is interpreted as animate or as affected. We accounted for these interpretive restrictions in terms of general restrictions on the interpretation of indirect objects. Indirect objects must be interpreted as event participants, and an element can be interpreted as participating in the event if it is animate, and therefore is a potentially volitional participant, or if it is affected by the event.

Specifically, we proposed that an external possessor originates as the DP-internal subject of an integral relation. This element can move to the spec,DP position where it is associated with dative marking. From there, it moves to the specifier of the dative clitic, where it checks dative case and the feature +A. This feature is associated with the event participation reading which we have seen that all indirect objects must have.

177. Le vi la mano a Carmen.
   CL I.saw the hand to Carmen
   “I saw Carmen’s hand.”
3.3 Conclusions

In this chapter we have introduced the notion of Integral which we will use in the next chapter to account for clitic doubling. In particular, we have seen how a subconstituent of the direct object DP can be dative marked and escape from its DP.Internal position to become an argument of the verb. We have seen, in the case of possessor raising, that the subconstituent DP (DPposs) can become a dative argument of the verb, and that becoming a dative argument imposes certain interpretive restrictions on the DP.

In the next chapter, we will see that clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish is an instance of an integral relation. In this dialect, the double is a subconstituent of the
direct object which escapes the DP and becomes a dative argument of the verb, thus accounting for the use of the dative clitic with the direct object.
Before discussing the syntactic account of clitic doubling, I first address some aspects of the interpretation of clitic doubling structures. The interpretive factors will then be used to motivate the syntactic analysis presented in section 4.2.

4.1 Interpretive aspects of clitic doubling

As we saw in Chapter 2, clitic doubling imposes restrictions on the interpretation of the direct object in Leísta Spanish. Only direct objects that are interpreted as specific can be doubled. For example, in the sentences in (179), the doubled NP object only has a widest scope interpretation.

179. a. Le estoy buscando a una secretaria.
   CL I.am looking.for A a secretary
   ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’

   b. Todo policía les va a buscar a dos criminales.
      every police CL go to to.look.for A two criminals
      “Every police officer is going to look for two criminals.”

We also saw that clitic doubling is not compatible with a kind interpretation of a definite NP. This is shown again in (180).
180.  a. Conozco a los soldados.
     I know A the soldiers
     “I know soldiers.”
     “I know the soldiers.”

     b. Les conozco a los soldados.
        CL I know A the soldiers
        “I know the soldiers”
        *“I know soldiers.”

     In the kind interpretation, no actual soldiers need to be known by the speaker. It is
     similar to a property interpretation: *I am familiar with soldier properties* or *I know
     what soldiers are like*. This is the interpretation ruled out by the clitic. It seems that
     in both types of examples (in (179) and (180)), the clitic requires a “referential”
     interpretation of the NP.

     We will take this idea of “referentiality” as a starting point, and it will be
     the goal of this section to define what definition of “referentiality” is needed for
     describing the restrictions on clitic doubling. In direct object doubling, *le* most
     commonly doubles names, as in (181), and definite NPs in general, as in (182).48

     181. Le vi a Juan.
         LE I saw A Juan
         ‘I saw Juan’

     182. El chico le vió a su hermana.
         The boy *LE saw A his sister
         ‘The boy saw his sister’

48 Clitic doubling is always optional. So in all the examples given, the clitic should
    be in parentheses. Since this optionality is irrelevant to the point I am making here,
    I leave the parentheses out in the text so as not to complicate the examples.
As we know, indefinite NPs can also be interpreted as referential, and thus are compatible with *le* when interpreted referentially. In the context of (183), for example, it is possible for *le* to double the indefinite NP *una secretaria.*

183. Le estoy buscando a una secretaria que trabaja aquí. Se llama María...

   *LE* I.am looking.for *A* a secretary that works here. Her name is María....

In (184), more examples are given where the clitic is possible under a referential interpretation of the indefinite object.

184. a. La profesora le castigó a un niño.
   The professor *LE* punished *A* a boy.

   b. Les entrevistaron a dos secretarias.
      *LES* they.interviewed *A* two secretaries.

   c. Le estoy buscando a alguien que trabaja aquí; tal vez le conoces...
      *LE* I.am looking.for *A* someone who works here; maybe *LE* you.know
      ‘I’m looking for someone who works here; maybe you know him/her.’

   d. Les llevaron a algunos de los heridos al hospital.
      *LES* llevaron *A* algunos de los heridos al hospital.

In the above examples, the clitic is not possible with a non-referential interpretation of the object NP. Similarly, object NPs which only have a non-referential interpretation cannot be doubled by *le*, as shown in (185).

49 I found some variation among speakers in their willingness to double a referentially-interpreted indefinite under intensional predicates (as in (183)). However, all speakers could double referential indefinites under extensional predicates (as in (184)). So for some speakers, there may be a finer-grained distinction that I do not yet understand.
185.  a.  No (*le) vi a nadie.
     Neg LE I saw A no-one
     ‘I didn’t see anyone’

     b.  Todas las mujeres (*les) han destruido a menos de cien hombres.
     ‘All the women have destroyed fewer than one hundred men’

     One notion of referentiality which could potentially account for the
     examples where clitic doubling is allowed is that of Fodor and Sag (1982). In
     discussing the interpretation of indefinites, Fodor and Sag argue that indefinites are
     ambiguous between a referential interpretation and a quantificational interpretation.
     By referential, they mean that the NP can be interpreted as taking the widest scope
     possible in the sentence. As we have seen, this is the interpretation that the clitic
     forces. It is somewhat misleading to use the term widest scope, however, since
     what is really meant is that the NP is interpreted as scopeless, as names are
     interpreted. For indefinites, being referential or scopeless will have the appearance
     of taking widest scope. One test for the referential interpretation of indefinites is
     that they can “scope” out of islands, whereas quantificational NPs are clause-
     bounded. Thus, if clitic doubled indefinites are interpreted as referential in the
     sense of names, then they should be able to be interpreted as taking wide scope out
     of syntactic islands like adjunct islands. The following example shows that a clitic-
     doubled object can scope out of a relative clause.
Todos los profesores están buscando al decano que le castigó a un estudiante de mi clase.

“All the professors are looking for the dean that punished a student in my class.”

Thus, referentially-interpreted direct objects can clitic double, where referentiality means that the NP has widest scope (or is scopeless).

Another (more intuitive) way of thinking about referentiality that applies to the examples that we have seen so far is that the speaker knows the identity of the referent of the NP. That is, referentiality is equivalent to epistemic specificity in the sense described by Farkas (1994).

However, there are examples that show that epistemic specificity cannot quite be the right notion. Epistemically specific NPs can clitic double, but there is a wider class of NPs which can clitic double as well. One example that shows this is given in (187).

187. Le voy a premiar a cualquier niño que termine primero.

I’m going to reward whichever boy finishes first.

In this example, the speaker does not know the identity of the referent of whichever boy finishes first. This NP appears to be non-referential in the sense of epistemic specificity and yet allows clitic doubling.

It can be noted that the NP in this example is “specific” in the sense
described by Frawley (1992).\(^{50}\) This use of “specific” is different from the notion of scopal specificity. Rather, what is meant here is that the referent is identifiable or (referentially) accessible (Givón (1984)) (or “individuated” in Hopper and Thompson’s (1984) terminology). While there is no way for the speaker to know which boy will win before the end of the race, the speaker knows that once the race is finished, there will be a unique referent for \textit{boy who finishes first}. So perhaps “unique referent” or “identifiability” are the properties that clitic doubling is sensitive to.

So far, we have seen that what is meant by “referential” is either “uniquely identifiable” or “having a widest scope interpretation”. Either one of these could correctly describe the interpretation of an NP that can double in the examples that we have seen so far. There are additional examples, however, that can help us choose between these.

The example in (188) shows that clitic doubling is possible even when the object NP does not receive widest scope.

188. a. Cada chico le vió a su hermana.
   Each boy \textit{le} saw \textit{A} his sister

   b. Each boy\(_i\) saw his\(_i\) sister

\(^{50}\) Frawley (1992) considers subjunctive mood as an indicator of lack of specificity, however. The NP \textit{cualquier niño que termine primero} is specific in terms of unique identification (hence clitic doubling is possible), but non-specific in the sense that this description does not yet hold of any individual boy in the actual world at the time the speaker utters the sentence (hence the subjunctive mood in the relative clause).
c. Each boy$_i$ saw his$_i$ sister

The NP *su hermana* ("his sister") can receive widest scope interpretation, as shown in (188c), where the possessive pronoun is not bound by the subject. That is, each boy saw John’s sister, say. In addition, however, the sentence can receive a low scope interpretation, shown in (188b), where the possessive pronoun is bound by the subject. The NP cannot be interpreted as having widest scope because in order for the possessive to be bound by the subject, it must be interpreted under the scope of the subject quantifier.

Thus, we can see that the semantic constraint on doubling is not referentiality defined in terms of widest scope. We have seen that non-referential NPs can be doubled. In these “non-referential” cases, however, there is still a strong semantic restriction. The referent of the NP is identifiable either in the actual world or in some future world, or the NP receives a function interpretation, where there are multiple referents but each one is identifiable through the function (the sister-of(x) function in (188)).

At this point we can also be more precise about what me mean by “referential” in the interpretation of the clitic doubled indefinites in the examples above. We saw that they receive a widest scope interpretation in examples like (189) and (190) and can scope out of islands.

189. *Le* estoy buscando a una secretaria.

   CL I am looking for a secretary
   ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’
As discussed above this data is compatible with the Fodor and Sag view that indefinites can be interpreted as names. However, later authors have argued that in fact indefinites are not interpreted as having widest scope, but that they receive a choice function interpretation. A choice function is a function which takes a set as input and returns a certain member of that set. It has been argued that English NPs of the form “a certain X” receive a choice function interpretation (Hintikka 1986), where the NP can only receive the “specific” interpretation. For example, the only interpretation in (191) is one where the existence of the object NP is asserted independently of the worlds introduced by the intensional predicate.

I’m looking for a certain secretary.

It is argued that the NP, rather than introducing an existential quantifier or an individual variable, introduces a function variable. This variable is bound by existential closure over function variables at the root. The logical representation for (191) is given in (192).

This enables the NP to appear to be scoping out of islands because the variable that it introduces is bound at the very highest level, and not only within the clause that contains the indefinite.
choice function and not as referential is by their scoping properties. Both are predicted to scope out of islands, but the referential view predicts that, once outside the island, there should be no intermediate readings. That is, there should be no readings that are wide scope with regard to the island but narrow scope with regard to some quantifier outside the island. This is because, unlike a quantifier, the referential reading is not derived via movement. Rather, since the interpretation is as a name, the indefinite should not interact scopally with other elements. The hallmark of a choice function interpretation, on the other hand, is that it can have the appearance of scoping out of islands, but also can be skolemized when there is a bound variable inside the noun phrase (Kratzer 1998). That is, an intermediate scope interpretation is predicted if there is a bound variable inside the NP.

Kratzer (1998) and Reinhart (1997) have argued that choice functions represent a possible interpretation of indefinite NPs. They have also argued that this can be distinguished from a referential interpretation because in addition to being able to scope out of islands, the indefinite can scope out of an island without taking widest scope. An English example is shown in (193), due to Abusch (1994).

193. a. Every professor, will reward every student who reads some book she recommended.
   b. For every professor x, there is a book y that x recommended, and x will reward every student who reads y.

---

51 According to Fodor and Sag, the indefinite CAN interact scopally inside its clause since here it can have a quantifier interpretation. It is only when the indefinite appears to scope out of islands that the quantifier and the referential reading can be disambiguated.
A possible interpretation of (193a) is given in (193b). Here, the indefinite *some book she recommended* can be interpreted outside of the relative clause which forms a syntactic island to movement. At the same time, however, it does not take widest scope, since it contains a variable which is bound by the matrix subject quantifier. Kratzer argues that the bound variable is what allows the intermediate reading since it has the effect of skolemizing the function. That is, it has the effect of relativizing the function to some other quantifier. In effect, the function is bound by two operators: one is the existential quantifier over function variables; the other is the universal quantifier in the matrix subject position.

194. \[ \exists f \forall y [\text{professor}(y) \land \forall x [(\text{student}(x) \land \text{read}(x, f(y)(\text{book})) \rightarrow \text{reward}(y, x))] \]

(194) says that there is a function such that every professor will reward every student who reads the book selected by that function, and the function is relativized to the choice of professor. Here we see that the function takes two arguments. It takes the set of books and it takes the professor, and returns the book that was recommended by that professor.

Indefinites can have this interpretation in Spanish, as shown in (195).

195. Todo profesor premió a cada estudiante que conoció a un lingüista que es amigo suyo.

“Every profesor rewarded each student who met a linguist who is a friend of his.”

And clitic doubled NPs can have this interpretation as well, as shown in (196).
Cada/todo profesor premió a cada estudiante que le conoció a un lingüista que es amigo suyo.

Thus, we can conclude from this section that clitic doubling is compatible with a choice function interpretation of indefinites. This fits in with the more general hypothesis that clitic doubling imposes an “identifiability” restriction on the NP. A choice function provides a way to locate the referent(s) of the NP, just like other functions (such as the “sister-of(x)” in example).

There is yet another notion of referentiality that seems to be at play in clitic doubling constructions. A referential NP in this sense is “an instantiation or reification (of a concept) that is locatable in space and time”. That is, we will assume following work by Uriagereka, that there is a (grammatical or representable) difference between NPs that refer to concepts and NPs that refer to reifications of those concepts. This will become clearer in the following examples.

Uriagereka (1999) discusses (the Spanish version of) the following type of example:

When I looked at you, I saw your mother in your smile.

If I say a sentence like (197), I most likely do not mean that I saw your mother in physical form. I did not see her nor did I see her reflection (as in a mirror) (although this is also a possible reading). Rather, I saw some aspect of your mother; or, your smile reminded me of some aspect of your mother. But, your mother did not participate in this event in any way. The same is true for the Spanish version, given in (198), (from Uriagereka 1999).
198. A-l ver-te a ti, vi a tu madre en tu sonrisa.
   at-the to-see-you A you I.saw A your mother in your smile
   “Upon seeing you, I saw your mother in your smile.”

   A secondary reading that is possible in these examples is that I actually saw
   the image or reflection of your mother. Perhaps your teeth are so shiny that I could
   see in them the reflection of your mother who is standing nearby. This reading is
   not very salient in the sentences given above, but is possible.

   Uriagereka notes that if this example is clitic-doubled, the preferred reading
   is lost.

199. Juan le vió a tu madre (#en tu sonrisa)
   Juan CL see A your mother
   “Juan saw your mother”

   (199) can only mean that Juan saw your mother’s reflection (the shiny teeth
   reading), and not some aspect or reminder of your mother.

   Uriagereka notes that with the aspect-reading (i.e., not the shiny-teeth
   reading) of the sentence in (198), your mother is not actually referred to (in some
   sense of “refer”). In the reflection reading, on the other hand, we could argue that
   your mother (or some representation of your mother) is referred to. I suggest that
   “referentiality” in this sense is equivalent to event participation. We noted in
   Chapter 3 that indirect objects are always interpreted as event participants. Direct

52 Thanks to Carmen Río Rey for the vivid description of the reading.
objects, however, are not necessarily interpreted this way. In the most natural interpretation of the English sentence in (197), for example, I am suggesting that the object your mother is not interpreted as an event participant. On the other hand, if I say (200), it means that there was an event of seeing in which John and your mother (or some representation of your mother) were participants. (He could have seen her on television, or he could have seen her reflection in a store window, or in somebody’s teeth.)

200. John saw your mother.

The event participant reading can be tested by having a following sentence with a pronoun referring back to the entity and also referring to the event at the same time. For example, in (201), when I say she looked good, I am referring back not just to your mother, but to your mother as part of the event described in the previous sentence.

201. a. I saw your mother yesterday.

b. She looked good.

However, the same is not possible with the smile-example. In (202), we see that the second sentence referring back to your mother is infelicitous in this case.

202. a. I saw your mother in your smile.

b. #She looked good.

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53 Thanks to Juan Uriagereka for pointing out this difference between direct objects and indirect objects.
This is not to say that non-referential (or non-event-participant) NPs cannot introduce discourse entities that can be referred to by a subsequent anaphor. The following example shows the smile example followed by a sentence with a pronoun that is anaphoric on your mother.

203. a. I saw your mother in your smile.

    b. That reminds me, she’s coming to visit next week.

The difference in this case is that the pronoun refers back to your mother, but it does not force reference to your mother as part of the seeing event in the previous sentence.\textsuperscript{55} I will use this kind of anaphora as a test for whether an entity is interpreted as an event participant or not. If it is possible in a subsequent sentence to refer back to the entity as part of the event denoted by the previous sentence (perhaps using the same tense as in the previous sentence is the test), then the entity is an event participant. This is the sense in which your mother is an event participant in (201) but not in (202).

Recall that I argued in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1.2) that indirect objects are necessarily interpreted as event participants. What I would like to suggest now is that clitic doubling with le forces the event participant interpretation precisely because the NP becomes an indirect object in the course of the derivation. Thus, I

\textsuperscript{54} This example is due to Bob Frank (p.c.).

\textsuperscript{55} This kind of anaphora is reminiscent of anaphora in modal subordination contexts, as discussed by Roberts (1987;1989).
adopt the one *le* hypothesis introduced in Chapter 2. The morpheme *le* is spelled out as the head of a verbal functional projection if a (dative-marked) DP moves to its specifier position. Any element that moves to the specifier of the *le*-phrase is interpreted as an event participant. Indirect objects move to this position, and I argue that a subconstituent of the direct object DP can also move to this position. One case of a subconstituent moving to the specifier of *le* is that of possessor raising, as we saw in the previous chapter. Another case, I will argue, is that of clitic doubling. In the following section, I present an analysis of clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish where the doubled DP is a subconstituent of a complex DP object. This DP object has the internal structure of a possessive or integral DP, where the overt double is the “possessor” and pro is the “possessed” element. $\text{DP}_{\text{poss}}$ moves through spec,DP and to the specifier of the *le* phrase.

204.
Thus, we will show that some of the interpretive effects of doubling arise because the double becomes a dative argument of the verb and hence an event participant. Other interpretive aspect of doubling will be attributed to the internal structure of the direct object DP.

4.2 A Syntactic Account of Leísta Doubling

4.2.1 Realizing the One le Hypothesis

We have seen that clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish is only possible with the dative clitic *le* and not with the accusative clitics *lo* and *la*.

205. a. Le vi a Carmen.
   CL.dat I.saw A Carmen

   b. *La vi a Carmen.
   CL.acc I saw A Carmen

We have also seen that clitic doubled direct objects must be interpreted as event participants, as in (206).

206. Juan le vió a tu madre (#en tu sonrisa)
   Juan CL see A your mother (in your smile)
   “Juan saw your mother”

To account for these facts, I adopt the One le Hypothesis introduced in Chapter 2. According to this hypothesis, the clitic *le* which is used to double direct objects is the same clitic that is used with indirect objects.

According to the analysis of dative clitics that we adopted in section 2.3.3, *le* is the head of a verbal functional projection. This head is spelled out as *le* when
it has the features +dative and +A. (Recall that +A is the feature that is responsible for the event participation interpretation.) When these features are present, a DP necessarily moves (is attracted to) the specifier position of the dative projection. Thus, the overt spell-out of the head corresponds to the presence of a DP in the specifier at some stage in the derivation. We showed in section 2.3.3.2 that this movement could be overt or at LF.

We showed in Chapter 3 that, in addition to the base generated indirect object, a DP that is generated inside the direct object can also move to the specifier of the dative phrase, thus triggering the spell-out of the clitic le. The hypothesis I explore here is that in Leísta clitic doubling a subconstituent DP generated inside the direct object moves to the specifier of the dative phrase. This DP is dative-marked and moves to spec, CIP_{DAT} to check the features +dative and +A, as shown in (207).

207. a. Le vi a la mujer.

b. 

```
CIP_{DAT}  
   spec

   Cl

   le

   [+dat, +A] V

   DP_{DO}

   DP_{poss}

   a la mujer

   [+dat, +A] D

   AgrP

   pro

   …
```
Adopting this analysis allows us to account straightforwardly for some of the interpretive aspects of clitic doubling that we have seen in the previous section. In particular, we saw that doubled objects in sentences like (207) must be interpreted as event participants. We argued in Chapter 3 that dative arguments in general must be interpreted as event participants and that even elements that become dative arguments in the course of the derivation must have this interpretation. Thus, we can reduce the event participation restriction on clitic doubling to the interpretive restriction on dative arguments in general.

However, there are additional interpretive restrictions that hold of direct object doubling that do not hold of indirect object doubling. If the restrictions on direct object doubling were completely reducible to those of datives (event participation), then we would expect the two kinds of doubling to be possible with all the same noun phrases. Contrary to this prediction, the examples in (208) and (209) show that indirect object doubling is possible in more cases than direct object doubling is.

208. a. No le envió el tesis a nadie.
   neg CL sent the thesis to nobody
   “S/he didn’t send her/his thesis to anybody.”

   b. No (*le) vió a nadie.
   neg CL saw A nobody
   “S/he didn’t see anybody.”

209. a. Le di una patada a la mesa.
   CL I.gave a kick to the table
   “I gave the table a kick.”
b.  *Le vi (a) la mesa.
   CL I.saw A the table
   “I saw the table.”

In (208) we see that a negative bare quantifier can be doubled as an indirect object but not as a direct object. In (209) we see that an inanimate NP can be doubled as an indirect object but not as a direct object. Thus, we cannot reduce all of the interpretive aspects of clitic doubling to the interpretive properties of being a dative. We have also not yet discussed what the internal structure of the direct object is such that the full NP double can be a subconstituent of this DP. These two issues are related and we turn to them now.

4.2.2 The Internal Structure of DP

4.2.2.1 The Integral Relation and its Interpretation

Following Uriagereka (1999), we propose that clitic doubling is an instance of an Integral relation. This means that the direct object DP contains an Integral small clause with a subject and a “predicate”, as shown in (210).

210. DP
   DO
   D AgrP
   Agr IntP
   subj Int’
   Int pred

The overt double is the subject of the Integral small clause. The “predicate” is a
null element. Uriagereka calls this element pro, but considers it to have the properties of a classifier (also see Muromatsu 1995). This null classifier serves to measure out or reify the entity represented by the subject DP (which is possibly an abstract concept).

Uriagereka proposes this structure to account for clitic doubling in dialects such as Cordoba Spanish (spoken in central Argentina) in which direct object doubling yields particular interpretive effects discussed by Schmitt (1996). Doubling in this dialect is possible with the clitics lo and la (and so, I will refer to it as a lo-doubling language) and it also allows (optional) doubling of inanimate direct objects, as shown in (211).

211. a. La toqué a la sonata hasta las doce.
   CL I.played A the sonata until the twelve
   “I played the sonata until twelve”

   b. Toqué la sonata hasta las doce.
   I.played the sonata until the twelve.

Schmitt shows that clitic doubling gives rise to a difference in the aspectual interpretation of this sentence. Without doubling, the sentence in (211b) can have an iterative reading where the sonata was played multiple times. Or it can have a reading where a single playing of the sonata lasted until 12:00. The sentence in (212) shows that the iterative reading is possible when the object is not doubled.

212. Toqué la sonata hasta las doce – diez veces
    I.played the sonata until the twelve – ten times
    “I played the sonata until twelve (ten times)”
213. La toqué a la sonata hasta las doce – *diez veces  
    CL I.played A the sonata until the twelve ten times  
    “I played the sonata until twelve.”

The clitic doubled version in (213), however, can only mean that the sonata was played once. No iterative reading is available.

Uriagereka suggests that the explanation of this contrast lies in the kind of object that a sonata is. A sonata is an abstraction which has a physical reality only when it is played. In other words, playing a sonata reifies it or instantiates it in the real world. The noun phrase *la sonata* can refer either to the concept or to the reification. When this NP is clitic doubled, however, only the reification can be referred to. The hypothesis is that the pro predicate (classifier) in the Integral small clause is responsible for this interpretation. That is, the pro predicate is a reifier; it takes an abstraction and returns a reified instance of that abstraction.

Thus, to account for the Cordoba Spanish example of doubling in (214), the small clause in (215) is proposed.

214. La toqué a la sonata.  
    CL I.played A the sonata  
    “I played the sonata”

215. 
    IntP  
    /   
    DP  Int’
    la sonata  Int  pro

Adopting the Integral small clause in (215) to account for Leísta Spanish, we now want to ask whether we can attribute the specificity restrictions that hold of...
direct object doubling but not of indirect object doubling to the semantic force of
the pro predicate. Recall that direct object doubling was not possible with the
negative quantifier nadie (“nobody”).

216. No (*le) vio a nadie.
    neg CL saw A nobody
    “S/he didn’t see anybody.”

According to our analysis, it makes sense that this NP resists doubling since there is
no possible reification of nobody. The small clause is not possible since combining
nadie with the pro predicate would create a semantic mismatch. Without a small
clause, there is no possibility of doubling since there is no subconstituent DP inside
the direct object that can carry dative case and thus be able to license the spell-out
of the clitic le.

The same reasoning explains why kind NPs cannot be doubled, as in the
example repeated here.

217. a. Conozco a los soldados.
    I.know A the soldiers
    “I know soldiers.”
    “I know the soldiers.”

b. Les conozco a los soldados.
    CL I.know A the soldiers
    “I know the soldiers”
    *“I know soldiers.”

Following Carlson (1977), I take kind NPs to be interpreted as concepts rather than
as sets of individuals. A reification of a kind NP is an instance of the kind, i.e., an
individual. Kind NPs cannot be doubled because doubling forces reification, thus
not allowing the kind interpretation to surface. The only reading of a plural NP compatible with doubling is that of a set of individuals.

4.2.2.2 The Derivation Internal to DP

We have seen that several aspects of the interpretation of clitic doubling are accounted for by the small clause structure that we have posited. In particular, the null predicate is responsible for the reification reading that clitic doubling gives rise to. The underlying syntax that we have adopted for clitic doubling is the same as that of inalienable possession and other integral relations, the only difference being that a null element (pro) replaces the overt predicate in the Integral relation. In addition, we have seen that clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish has the same syntactic derivation as possessor raising. The subconstituent DP<sub>poss</sub> raises out of DP, and up to the specifier of the dative clitic phrase. Internally to the DP, this means that DP<sub>poss</sub> must raise through spec,DP<sub>DO</sub> in order to escape DP<sub>DO</sub>. It is in passing through this position that DP<sub>poss</sub> is α-marked, this being a reflex of dative case which is associated with this position. Just as in other Integral expressions the predicate of the small clause raises to spec,AGRP and establishes the reference of the DP. In this case, the predicate of the small clause is pro, and thus the reference of the DP is an instantiation of DP<sub>poss</sub>. 
4.2.3 Loose Ends

4.2.3.1 No Small Clause, No Doubling

A question to ask at this point is: why does the presence of a small clause and pro allow for the possibility of doubling which would otherwise not exist. So, next we consider a case where there is no small clause, as in (220).

219. a. Vi la mesa.
   I saw the table

   b. *Le vi (a) la mesa.
      CL.acc I saw A the table

220. VP
    V
    DP
    D
    la
    NP
    mesa
Why is it that in this case, the NP *mesa* cannot move up to spec of D, and from there move to spec,CLP and license the dative clitic? First, I assume that the NP cannot move to the specifier of the dative clitic phrase because only DPs have structural case; NPs do not. Second, the whole DP cannot move to the specifier of the dative phrase because this DP (being the direct object) has accusative case and cannot check dative.

Thus we see that having the articulated integral structure inside the DP is what accounts for the possibility of doubling. In the doubling case, there is an “extra” DP which is able to move out and trigger the dative clitic.

### 4.2.3.2 Clitics with No Doubling

If the presence of *le* is triggered to a DP moving to its specifier, then a question remains as to why it is triggered in the case where there is no overt DP object, as in (221).

221. Le vi.
   CL I.saw
   “I saw him”

Also, what is the difference in the derivations between non-doubling sentences with *le* and non-doubling sentences with *lo* and *la*?

222. a. La vi.
   CL I.saw
   “I saw her/it.”
b. Lo vi.
   CL I.saw
   “I saw it.”

I adopt the standard position that non-doubled clitics have an null pronoun associated with them. We have seen that only dative-marked elements can move to the specifier of the $le$ phrase. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the DP$_{DO}$ containing the pro object moves to the specifier of the dative phrase, since this DP is marked accusative. Instead, the same analysis applies in this case as with an overt double. That is, there is an Integral clause consisting of a DP$_{poss}$, in this case null, and the pro predicate. The derivation will proceed in the manner described for overt doubles. The derivation for lo and la with no overt double was given in Chapter 2. These clitics are treated as determiners with pro complements. They move out of DP and up to the verbal domain.

4.2.4 Animacy Restrictions on Clitic Doubling

We have observed that clitic doubling is only possible with animates. In this section I discuss possible sources for this animacy restriction within the analysis we have given. In part, this restriction can be attributed to the status of the full NP double as an event participant. However, I show that event participation cannot fully account for the animacy restriction, given that affected non-animates can be event participants in general, but cannot be doubled when they are direct objects.
4.2.4.1 Event Participants and Animacy

We saw in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1) that surface-level dative arguments are interpreted as event participants. We further saw that event participants are either animate or affected. For example, animacy and affectedness condition possessor raising in Spanish.

223.  
   a. Juan le vió una mano a la mujer.  
       Juan CL saw a hand to the woman  
       “Juan saw a hand of the woman.”  
   b. #Juan le vio una pata a la mesa.  
       Juan CL saw a leg to the table  
       “Juan saw a leg of the table.”

224.  
   a. Carmen le cortó una mano a la mujer.  
       Carmen CL cut a hand to the woman  
       “Carmen cut the woman’s hand.”  
   b. Carmen le cortó una pata a la mesa.  
       Carmen CL cut a leg to the table  
       “Carmen cut a leg of the table.”

An inanimate cannot be an external possessor (223b) unless it is interpreted as affected, as in (224b). We argued in section 3.2.1.2 that these restrictions on external possession fall out from their role as a dative argument of the verb, which in turn must be interpreted as an event participant.

We have argued that, in Leísta Spanish, direct object clitic doubling is essentially an instance of possessor raising. The double is a subconstituent of the direct object which becomes a dative argument of the verb in the course of the derivation. Because it becomes a dative argument, it is necessarily interpreted as an
event participant. We have also seen that there are animacy restrictions on direct object clitic doubling. The question that arises is whether these restrictions can be reduced to the animacy restrictions on event participants in general. Unfortunately, the answer to this question appears to be “no”. The problem is that, as we have seen, the event participation reading allows for non-animates as long as they are interpreted as affected. However, the restriction on clitic doubling is more stringent. Inanimate direct objects cannot be doubled even if they are interpreted as affected.

225. (*Le) partió al vaso.
   CL 3sg.broke A-the glass
   “S/he broke the glass.”

The ungrammaticality of doubling in (225) is not predicted by an analysis that takes the animacy restrictions on doubling to be reduced to the event participation reading of the dative argument. In the next section we examine the source of the additional animacy restrictions.

4.2.4.2 The Integral Relation and Animacy

We have seen that the animacy restrictions of direct object clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish cannot be accounted for solely in terms of event participation. Another source for these restrictions might be the integral relation encoded in the small clause internal to the direct object DP. In particular we might imagine that only animate NPs can appear as the subject of an integral small clause. Given the underlying structure of (226) in (227), this view places the animacy restriction in
the specifier of IntP.

226. Le vi al hombre.

227. 

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \quad \text{AgrP} \\
\text{Agr} \quad \text{IntP} \\
\text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \quad \text{Int}' \\
\text{el hombre} \quad \text{Int} \quad \text{NP}_{\text{pred}} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{[+anim]} \\
\end{array}
\]

However, it cannot be that the integral relation itself imposes an animacy restriction on its subject. Recall that most of the prototypical examples of integral relations discussed in Chapter 3 involve inanimates.

228. a. There’s a Ford T engine in my Saab.

b. My Saab has a Ford T engine.

We have also seen that inalienable possession in Spanish is expressed as an integral relation in both the external and internal possession constructions. In these cases too, the subject of the integral small clause can be inanimate.

229. a. Le corté una pata a la mesa. \hspace{1cm} \text{(External possession)}

   CL I.cut a leg to the table

b. Le corté una pata de la mesa. \hspace{1cm} \text{(Internal possession)}

   CL I.cut a leg of the table

The underlying structure of the integral small clause of both (229a) and (229b) is given in (230).
Thus, we cannot pin the animacy restriction on the integral relation *per se*.

However, there is a difference between direct object clitic doubling and the possessor cases that we have shown here. In direct object clitic doubling the predicate of the integral small clause is a null element (that we are calling “pro”\textsuperscript{56}), rather than an overt NP.

The analysis we have given leads us to the conclusion that it is this element that must be responsible for the animacy restrictions we observe in clitic doubling. We

\textsuperscript{56} I have been calling this element “pro” for ease of reference and concreteness. However, I am not convinced that the null predicate should be analyzed as pro. Jeff Lidz suggests that PRO might be a better choice and that, in fact, this might help explain the animacy properties that it has. A relevant property of PRO is that it requires absolute identity with its controller (see, among others, Lidz and Idsardi 1998 for discussion). I leave this issue for future exploration.
do not know very much about the nature of this pro element. However, the fact that this element is imposing animacy restrictions tells us something about its meaning. Following Uriagereka’s insight, I assume that it means something like “persona”. If this is the right meaning, then the animacy restriction follows directly. Only animate elements have personas.

4.2.4.3 Pronouns and Animacy

In the previous section we saw that animacy effects that are manifested in clitic doubling are accounted for in terms of the pro predicate in an integral relation. This element is interpreted as something like “persona”. We might ask at this point whether there is an alternative analysis for the animacy effects in clitic doubling. In particular, if we can find another construction in Spanish manifesting animacy restrictions, we could try to see whether the restrictions on clitic doubling could be reduced to the restrictions of this other construction.

In fact, there do exist other cases of animacy restrictions which appear to be unrelated to clitic doubling. A well-known fact about Spanish and other Romance languages is that tonic pronouns in argument position must be interpreted as animate (see, e.g., Cardinaletti and Starke 1994). (The examples given here are from my own data-collection).

57 See Uriagereka (1995b) and Muromatsu (1995) for some ideas on this topic.

58 Juan Uriagereka (p.c.) points out that Galician and Portuguese do not have this
232.  a. Ella es alta.
pron-fem is tall
“She/*it is tall.”

b. El fue mandado a Londres.
pron-masc was sent to London
“He/*it was sent to London.”

c. Llegó ella ayer.
arrived pron yesterday
“She/*it arrived yesterday.”

233.  a. Lo vi a él.
CL I.saw A pron
“I saw him/*it.”

b. Le vi a él.
CL I.saw A pron
“I saw him/*it.”

The examples in (232) show that a subject pronoun can only be interpreted as animate. This is true even though subject pronouns are not a-marked or clitic doubled. The animacy restriction holds of subjects that are derived through passivization (232b) and of subjects that are postverbal (232c), in addition to subjects in canonical position (232c).\(^{59}\) The examples in (233) demonstrate that full

\(^{59}\) One counterexample to this generalization that I have come across is given in (i).

i. Acabaste la tesis, o acabó ella con-tigo?
finished.2sg the thesis or finished.3sg pron with-you
“Did you finish the thesis, or did it finish you?”

I have no idea why the animacy restriction does not hold in this example. Possibly relevant is the fact that ella is emphatic: “or did IT finish YOU”. The positioning of the pronouns is expressing something contrary to expectations (Javier Martín, p.c.). However, in other contexts emphasis does not override the animacy restriction in
pronouns in direct object position must also be interpreted as animate. Pronouns in this position are necessarily a-marked and clitic doubled. In other contexts, pronouns are not necessarily interpreted as animate, however. The same pronouns can appear as objects of prepositions with an inanimate interpretation, as shown in (234).

234. a. Llegó hasta ella.
   I.arrived until pron
   “I arrived as far as it.”

b. Puse el mantel sobre ella.
   I.put the tablecloth over it
   “I put the tablecloth over it/her.”

Pronouns in indirect object position are obligatorily animate just like subject and object pronouns.

235. Le di una patada a ella.
   CL I.gave a kick to pron
   “I gave her/*it a kick.”

From the data given so far, we can formulate the generalization in (236).

236. **Pronoun Generalization**: Pronouns that are arguments of the verb must be interpreted as animate.

If we then assume that clitics must conform to this generalization, we would have an independent source for the animacy restriction on clitic doubling. However, we can see that clitics by themselves do not have to be interpreted as animate.

---

60 This only holds of the personal pronouns *mi* (“me”), *tِh* (“you”-acc), *ella*
237. Le di una patada (pro)
   CL I gave a kick
   “I gave it/her/him a kick.”

Notice, that pro does not conform to the generalization either. Moreover, clitic
doubling of a full NP indirect object does not manifest the animacy restriction.

238. a. Le pasé la franela a la mesa.
   CL I passed the cloth to the table
   “I wiped the cloth over the table.”

b. Le di una patada a la silla.
   CL I gave a kick to the chair
   “I gave the chair a kick.”

Thus, we see that the clitic le does not fall under the pronoun generalization.

Therefore, the animacy effects on direct object clitic doubling can not be explained
by appealing to the animacy of pronouns in general.

   Now the question is whether the animacy effect on pronouns can be related
to the animacy effects that we see in clitic doubling. In particular, we would like to
see whether the analysis we have given for these effects can account for the
animacy effects we see in tonic pronouns. Effects on direct object doubling
implicate a pro predicate interpreted as “persona”. In order to account for the
animacy restriction on tonic pronouns, I appeal to the Integral relation and pro
predicate. I posit that all tonic pronouns in argument position are subjects of an
Integral small clause with a pro predicate.

239. \[
   \begin{array}{l}
   \text{DP} \hspace{1cm} \text{[AgP [IntP ella [ Int pro]]]} \\
   \end{array}
   \]

   “she/her”, él (“he/him”), etc., and not of demonstrative pronouns, for example.
The animacy restriction is due to the pro element as discussed above.

We have observed that the clitic *le* can be interpreted as inanimate when it corresponds to an indirect object but not to a direct object.

240. Le di una patada (pro)
CL I.gave a kick
“I gave it/her/him a kick.”

241. Le *vi.*
CL I.saw
“I saw him/*it.”

This supports the analysis that we have given above whereby direct object *le* is generated because a subconstituent of the object DP moves up to the specifier of the dative phrase. In order for this to happen, an Integral small clause with a null predicate must be present in the underlying structure. On the other hand, indirect object *le* arises when the whole indirect object DP moves to the specifier of the dative phrase. The Integral small clause is not implicated in indirect object doubling.

4.3 *An Answer to the Clitic Form Dilemma*

The analysis of clitic doubling adopted in the previous section gives us a way around the clitic form dilemma. Recall from section 2.3.5 that the problem was how a single form of the clitic could impose interpretive restrictions when it doubled direct objects but not when it doubled indirect objects. If we adopt the One *le* Hypothesis we cannot assign a feature like +specific to the clitic itself, since the same clitic behaves differently in different contexts. We also cannot attribute the
possibility of doubling to the grammatical function since only *le*, but not *lo/la*, allows doubling. We have noted that direct object and indirect object doubling do share some interpretive properties: in both cases, the entity represented by the NP must be conceived of as an event participant. However, we also saw that there are some remaining interpretive restrictions that hold only of direct object doubling and not of indirect objects. Since it is the internal structure of the DP which determines these additional interpretive properties, we do not have to associate these properties with the clitic itself. Thus, we are free to adopt the One *le* Hypothesis discussed in section 2.3.5. That is, we can posit a single derivational source for accusative *le* and dative *le*, but still account for why accusative *le* shows specificity effects while dative *le* does not. Let us suppose, as we have been arguing, that dative (form) clitics are always generated in the head of a clitic voice or *v* head, and accusative (form) clitics are always generated as determiners inside the DP complement. In the following example then, the accusative *le* is the base-generated head of a clitic voice outside of VP. The internal structure of the DP is given in (243).

242. *Le* vi a la mujer.
In this derivation, *la mujer* and pro are the elements inside the small clause. The presence of pro is what gives rise to the specificity effect required by clitic doubling. Pro moves to spec of Agr. *La mujer* moves to spec of D, and from there it can move out of the DP and into the specifier of ClP_{dat}, thus licensing the spell out of the clitic *le*.

### 4.4 Differences between Lo-doubling and Le-doubling

#### 4.4.1 The Account of Lo-doubling Dialects

Uriagereka (1999) provides an analysis of clitic doubling with *lo* and *la* which makes use of the Integral structure which we have been discussing. The example from Cordoba Spanish is repeated in (244).

244. La toqué a la sonata.
   “I played the sonata.”

The difference between the underlying structure of the *lo*-doubling example and the
le-doubling expressions we have been examining lies in the presence of the
determiner in D of DP_{DO}. Otherwise the derivation internal to DP_{DO} proceeds as in
Leísta Spanish, as shown in (245).

245. 

Recall that we are analyzing the accusative clitics as determiners. The
determiner *la* is generated under D, and this element moves up to the head of a
functional projection outside of VP that is responsible for checking the accusative
case of the direct object DP. For concreteness, I assume this head is *v* (Chomsky
1995). Following Torrego (1998), I assume that *v* has a D feature which attracts the
clitic. In addition, this head has an accusative case feature which attracts the whole
DP_{DO} to its specifier. (cf. Uriagereka 1999)
One difference in the derivations is that in Cordoba Spanish DP\textsubscript{poss} does not raise out of DP\textsubscript{DO} (at S-structure) whereas in Leísta Spanish it does. We assume that the raising of DP\textsubscript{poss} out of DP\textsubscript{DO} is signaled by the presence of the dative clitic. Assuming that the basic analysis is right, the fact that direct object doubling with \textit{le} is not possible in Cordoba Spanish, then, is evidence that DP\textsubscript{poss} remains internal to DP\textsubscript{DO}.

A question left open by this analysis is why there are no animacy restrictions on direct object doubling in Cordoba Spanish. I leave this question for future research. Another question to address is why doubling with \textit{la} is not possible in Leísta Spanish. the question is why a determiner cannot be generated in D when there is an integral phrase with a null predicate, as in (247).
This is the structure that would give rise to doubling in Argentine (Rioplatense and Cordoba) Spanish, as in the following example.

248.  

```
La vi a la mujer.
```

“*I saw the woman”

Argentine Spanish

However, this sentence is ungrammatical in Leísta Spanish. Doubling is only possible with the clitic *le and not with the accusative clitics *lo or *la.

249.  

```
*La vi a la mujer.
```

*Leísta Spanish

This is unexpected in the case of *la since in general this clitic can refer to human, feminine entities.

250.  

```
La mujer, la vi.
```

It is also unexpected in terms of the analysis that we have presented here. There is no general incompatibility with the features of the clitic and the NP *la mujer, as shown by the example in (250). Also, the determiner must be possible with a pro complement in general, since it is possible to say (251) with no overt element.

154
Thus, I see no reason why the clitic/determiner should not arise. At this point it is necessary to stipulate that in Leísta Spanish, there is a constraint against having an overt determiner when there is an element in the specifier of DP (or the constraint blocks an overt determiner when there is an Integral relation with a null predicate). Whether this restriction can be derived from independent principles remains to be seen.

### 4.5 Direct Objects versus Indirect Objects

We are adopting the hypothesis that direct object doubling with *le* involves movement of a DP out of the direct object, and that this DP becomes a dative argument of the verb in the course of the derivation. Given this hypothesis, one might think that I am claiming that Leísta speakers somehow do not know the difference between direct and indirect objects, or that this distinction is blurred in clitic doubling contexts. This idea might be further supported by the fact that animate direct objects are marked with the same morphology that marks dative (that is, *a*-marking). The examples in (252) show that animate direct objects share the same morphological marking with indirect objects.

252. a. **Le vi a Juan.**
   
   CL.dat I.saw A Juan
   
   “I saw Juan.”
b. Le di un libro a Juan
   CL.dat I.gave a book to Juan
   “I gave a book to Juan.”

I do not wish to make the claim that Leísta speakers treat animate direct objects as indirect objects, however. It can be shown that, in general, Leísta speakers make a clear distinction between direct and indirect objects, just as speakers of other dialects do. In what follows I show two tests for distinguishing direct objects from indirect objects. Speakers of Leísta Spanish behave exactly the same with regard to these tests as other speakers. In fact, the question comes up with all speakers of Spanish whether a-marked direct objects are treated as indirect objects. However, this is not the case, since direct objects, even animate ones, behave differently from indirect objects.

One test for distinguishing direct from indirect objects is that direct objects can passivize, as shown in (253), but indirect objects cannot, as shown in (254).

253. a. Las propiedades fueron vendidas al gobierno.
   the properties were sold to the government

   b. Muchos ramos de flores fueron dados a la bailerina.
   many bouquets of flowers were given to the dancer

   c. La pelota fue tirada a María.
   the ball was thrown to Maria

   the government was sold the properties

   b. *La bailerina fue dada muchos ramos de flores.
   the dancer was given many bouquets of flowers
c. *María fue tirada la pelota.
   Maria was thrown the ball

Notice that an animate direct object can be passivized. If speakers were confusing animate direct objects with indirect objects, the prediction would be that they would reject passivization of animate direct objects. This prediction is not borne out, however.

255. a. María fue llamada.
   Maria was called

   b. El hombre fue tirado al mar.
      the man was thrown to-the sea

Another test distinguishing direct objects from indirect objects is to see whether the NP can undergo tough-movement. Tough-movement is the movement of a direct object of an embedded verb to the subject of a tough-predicate such as difícil (“difficult”). (256a) shows a sentence with no tough-movement and (256b) shows the same sentence with tough-movement.

256. a. Será difícil contar las noticias a mis hijos.
   It will be difficult to tell the news to my children.

   b. Las noticias serán difíciles de contar a mis hijos.
      The news will be difficult to tell to my children.

Only direct objects can appear as the subjects of tough-movement constructions, as in (256b). Indirect objects cannot, as shown in (257).

257. *Mis hijos son difíciles de contar las malas noticias.
   My children are difficult to tell bad news to.

Again, animate direct objects pattern with other direct objects and against indirect
objects in their ability to undergo tough-movement, as shown in (258).

258. Mis hijos son difíciles de entender.
    My children are difficult to understand.
    In some ways, the results of these tests in conjunction with the clitic
doubling facts are difficult to interpret. First, just because the NP *el hombre* can
passivize in (255) does not mean that when it is doubled it is not analyzed as an
indirect object by speakers. The problem is that the doubled version of the direct
object can never be directly tested since all of the tests we have involve changing
the grammatical role of the NP in such a way that its direct object morphology is
not maintained.

4.6 Summary

In Chapter 2 we introduced the Torrego-Uriagereka hypothesis that the overt DP
double is a subconstituent of the direct object. We then raised two questions about
direct object clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish. One question was about the internal
structure of the direct object DP and the nature of the posited subconstituent DP.
The second question was about the accusative use of the dative clitic *le*. We asked
why this dative form element could be associated to a direct object. In this chapter
we addressed these two questions by providing an analysis of clitic doubling in
terms of the Integral syntax that was motivated in Chapter 3.

    Direct object doubling with *le* requires that the overt double be in an
Integral small clause with a null predicate, which acts as a reifier of the concept
represented by the double. This null predicate also imposes animacy restrictions on
its subject, thus accounting for the animacy restrictions on direct object doubling.

The double (DP_{poss}) raises out of DP and into the specifier of the dative clitic phrase, triggering the spell-out of the clitic le. In its movement out of DP_{DO}, DP_{poss} passes through the specifier of DP_{DO}, a position which we have shown is associated with dative case in other languages. The dative clitic le can be associated with what appears to be a direct object because it is a subconstituent of this DP which raises and becomes associated with the clitic.

There are two main sources for the interpretive effects on direct object doubling. First, we have seen that there are some interpretive properties that indirect object doubling shares with direct object doubling. In particular, in both cases, the entity represented must be interpreted as an event participant. We associate this interpretation with the dative clitic phrase. The remaining restrictions fall out from the nature of the Integral relation and the reifying null predicate. What we have described as specificity restrictions are due to the fact that DP_{poss} (the double) must be interpreted as reified.
Chapter 5

A-MARKING AND KAYNE’S GENERALIZATION

In addition to clitic doubling, Spanish exhibits another kind of object marking. Animate direct objects (which are interpreted as specific) are marked with the morpheme \( a \), which is homophonous with the dative case marker. (I will gloss accusative \( a \) simply as \( A \) since there is no translation for this morpheme in English.)

259. \( \text{Vi a la mujer.} \)
    \( \text{I saw A the woman} \)
    \( \text{“I saw the woman.”} \)

The two kinds of object marking interact in that clitic doubling appears to be dependent on \( a \)-marking.

260. \( \text{clitic doubling } \rightarrow a \)

The implication stated in (260) is known as Kayne’s Generalization (Jaeggli 1982).

In this chapter I present two hypotheses to account for this empirical generalization. One hypothesis says that the relationship between clitic doubling and \( a \)-marking is purely syntactic. \( A \)-marking can be seen as dative case morphology which is assigned to the subconstituent \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) inside the direct object DP. The other hypothesis is that the relationship between clitic doubling and \( a \)-marking is a
semantic one. Here the idea is that each construction has its own semantic properties and that these happen to overlap; or more precisely, that the properties of clitic doubling form a subset of the properties of a-marking. Hence, there is an appearance of dependence, but in fact, each piece of morphology arises independently of the other and for its own “reasons”. Both hypotheses leave a number of issues unresolved. We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal, but ultimately we will not decide between them.

In order to discuss the semantic and syntactic relationship between clitic doubling and a-marking, it is first necessary to discuss the interpretive restrictions that correspond to a-marking, independently of clitic doubling. We examine these interpretive aspects of a-marking in section 5.1.

5.1 A-marking and the interpretation of the direct object

5.1.1 Animacy

The most obvious function of a-marking in Spanish is to distinguish animate from inanimate direct objects. Animate direct objects are marked by a, as shown with the human object in (261) and the non-human animate in (262). Inanimate objects cannot be a-marked, as illustrated in (263).

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61 In the examples given here, a-marking on the animate NP is obligatory. We will see cases in next section where a-marking is optional.
261. a. Vi a la mujer.
   I saw A the woman
   ‘I saw the woman.’

   b. *Vi la mujer.
   I saw the woman

262. a. Vi a-l gato.
   I saw a-the cat
   ‘I saw the cat’

   b. *Vi el gato
   I saw the cat

263. a. *Vi a la mesa.
   I saw a the table

   b. Vi la mesa.
   I saw the table
   ‘I saw the table’

Because of its sensitivity to animacy and in particular to the feature [+human], this morpheme is often called “Personal a” in teaching grammars. Grammarians and linguists have also called it “accusative a” or the “prepositional accusative”. I will use these terms interchangeably in addition to the term “a-marking” throughout this chapter.

Animacy is the property responsible for a-marking. However, defining animacy is difficult since the linguistically relevant category is more dependent on our conceptions than on the biological world. For example, inanimate objects can be anthropomorphized, and in these cases they will be a-marked. This fact is observed by the Real Academia Española (1959): “Pueden llevar la preposición a los nombres de cosas que personificamos, o que usamos como complemento de
verbos que por lo regular llevan complemento de persona con dicha preposición.”
(roughly, “Names of things that are being personified can carry the preposition.
Also, nouns that constitute the complement of a verb that normally take a human
direct object can take the preposition.” Translation mine.) For example, the verbs in
(264) normally take an animate direct object. We think of greeting, defeating, and
summoning as actions that are done to people (or other animates). Therefore, when
inanimate objects appear with these verbs, they will generally be a-marked.

264.  
   a. Los pájaros saludan a la aurora.
       the birds welcome A the dawn
       “The birds greet the dawn.”
       (Gili Gaya 1973, cited in Suñer 1988)
   
   b. El entusiasmo venció a la dificultad
       the enthusiasm defeated A the difficulty
       “Enthusiasm defeated difficulty.”
       (Gili Gaya 1973, cited in Suñer 1988)
   
   c. llamar a la muerte
       to.call A the death
       “to summon death”
       (Academia Española 1959:192)

It can be shown that a-marking in these examples is the accusative a rather than the
dative a because these verbs take an accusative form of the clitic when the object is
pronominalized. In the dialects that I examine, the indirect object clitic is invariably
le, regardless of the object’s animacy or gender status.  

62 Thus, if a verb takes the

62 There do exist so-called Laísta and Loísta dialects where the clitics la and lo
(respectively) are used for indirect objects as well as for direct objects when the
clitic *la* for a feminine object, then it is clear that this NP is a direct object rather than an indirect object. According to this test, all of the object NPs in (264) are direct objects, as shown in (265).

265. a. La saludan.
   CL.acc greet.3pl
   “They greet her.”

   b. La venció.
   CL.acc defeat.3sg.pst
   “S/he defeated her.”

   c. La llamaron.
   CL.acc call.3pl.pst
   “They called her.”

By the same token, NPs can be “inanimatized”. NPs like *monstruo* (“monster”) are normally considered animate and hence are *a*-marked, as in (266).

266. Los científicos vieron a un monstruo.
   The scientists saw A a monster

In some cases, however, the NP *monstruo* can be viewed as inanimate. For example, in talking about the process of Dr. Frankenstein’s (and his fellow scientists’) creation of the monster, speakers reject *a*-marking on the NP *monstruo*, as in (267). Until the monster is imbued with life-force, it is not an animate being, and hence does not get *a*-marked.

267. Los científicos construyeron (*a*) un monstruo.
   The scientists built (*A*) a monster

object is feminine or inanimate and masculine. The speakers I used for the IO vs. DO tests were not Laísta or Loísta Speakers, however.
Similarly, NPs like *robot* take *a* if the robot is in the form of a person, but otherwise do not. Thus, we can see that *a*-marking largely depends on the speaker’s conception of what counts as animate.

I will generally ignore this conceptual fuzziness from here on, although it should be kept in mind when thinking about the optionality of *a*-marking. Previous accounts of this optionality have depended (at least in part) on making the NP [-animate] when *a* is missing on an otherwise animate-seeming NP (see Jaeggli 1982, Brugè & Brugger 1996). If we assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between animacy and *a*-marking, then whenever *a* is absent, we are forced to analyze the NP as inanimate. For example, in a sentence like (268), Jaeggli claims that when *a* is absent, the wounded are seen simply as objects to be carried, and not as animate beings.

268. Llevaron los heridos a-l hospital.
They.carried the wounded to-the hospital

However, such an approach is both ad hoc and nonpredictive. The word *heridos* ("wounded") can only refer to animate objects, since only animates are conceived of as having wounds. (Inanimate objects can be *dañado* “damaged” but not “wounded"). I assume that there is a straightforward mapping of semantic animacy to the syntactic feature [+animate], but that there is not a straightforward mapping between the feature [+animate] and *a*-marking. Empirically, we find non-*a*-marked animate NPs in cases where it is difficult to see that the interpretation involves inanimatization, such as in (268). Therefore, I conclude there is no one-to-one
correspondence between animacy and $a$-marking. We will see below that $a$-
marking depends on the semantic type of the object, in addition to its status as
animate or inanimate.

5.1.2 Specificity

In the previous section, we have seen that $a$-marking is sensitive to
animacy. However, while animacy is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient
one for determining whether the direct object will carry accusative $a$. That is,
inanimate direct objects cannot be $a$-marked. Animate direct objects can be $a$-
marked, but $a$-marking is not obligatory in all cases. In addition to animacy, $a$-
marking is dependent on the specificity of the direct object.

In this section I show that $a$-marking distinguishes strong and weak NPs in
Milsark’s (1974) sense. Milsark defines strong NPs as the class of NPs that cannot
appear as the post-verbal subject in English existential *there*-sentences. Weak NPs
are those that can appear in *there*-sentences. Strong NPs are names, definite NPs,
and NPs that appear with certain presuppositional quantifiers (those that necessarily
presuppose the existence of the set that they range over (Milsark 1974; Diesing
1992)). Indefinites and NPs with quantifiers such as numerals and *many* and *few*
are considered weak NPs. The same distinction can be shown to hold in Spanish.
The examples in (269) show that an indefinite with *un* (“a” or “one”), an NP
quantified with a numeral, *dos* (“two”); and an NP quantified with *muchos*
(“many”) can all appear in an existential sentence.
269.  a. Había un hombre en el jardín.
    there.was a man in the garden
    “There was a man in the garden.”

    b. Había dos hombres en el jardín.
    there.was two men in the garden
    “There were two men in the garden.”

    c. Había muchos hombres en el jardín.
    there.was many men in the garden
    “There were many men in the garden.”

The examples in (270) show that names, definite NPs, and NPs quantified with

todos los cannot appear in the existential context.

270.  a. *Había María en el jardín.
    there.was Maria en the garden
    “*There was Maria in the garden.”

    b. *Había el hombre en el jardín.
    there.was the man en the garden
    “*There was the man in the garden.”

    c. *Había todos los hombres en el jardín.
    there.was all the men in the garden
    “*There were all the men in the garden.”

Accusative $a$-marking also distinguishes strong and weak NPs. Animate
NPs which are strong (cannot appear in existential sentences) are obligatorily $a$-
marked. Animate NPs which are weak are optionally $a$-marked. The sentences in
(271) through (274) show that $a$-marking is obligatory with direct objects that are
names, definites, and strongly quantified NPs. 63 Example (271) shows that names

63 That is, a-marking is obligatory on names, definites, and strongly quantified NPs
that are animate. Inanimates, even if strongly quantified, cannot be a-marked, as
are obligatorily $a$-marked.

271. a. Vi a María.
   I.saw A María
   ‘I saw Maria’

   b. *Vi María.
   I.saw Maria

A-marking is obligatory on definite NPs. (272) is an example with a non-human
animate NP, and (273) is an example with a human NP.64

272. a. Vi a-l gato.
   I.saw A-the cat
   ‘I saw the cat’

   b. *Vi el gato
   I.saw the cat

273. a. Vi a-l estudiante.
   I.saw A-the student

   b. *Vi el estudiante
   I.saw the student

The example in (274) shows that strongly quantified NPs (of the form todos los X)
shown in (i).

i. Vi (*a) todos los libros.

Throughout this whole chapter I will only be dealing with animate NPs, and
so instead of repeating this fact, I use “NP” to mean “animate NP”. This will not be
confusing as long as the reader keeps in mind the generalization that inanimate NPs
are never $a$-marked. The only time there is any optionality is when the NP is
animate, and then $a$-marking depends on the type of NP (in terms of definiteness,
etc).

64 Juan Uriagereka (p.c.) points out that while $a$-marking is obligatory on both
names and definite NPs, there is a contrast between these. Lack of $a$-marking on
are obligatorily $a$-marked.

274. a. Vi a todos los estudiantes.  
I saw all the students

b. *Vi todos los estudiantes

On the other hand, weak NPs are optionally $a$-marked.\(^{65}\) (275) gives an example with the indefinite determiner un (“a” or “one”). An example with a numeral is given in (276), and (277) shows a direct object with the weak quantifier muchos (“many”).

275. a. Juan y María llevaron a un herido a-l hospital.  
Juan and Maria carried a wounded (person) to-the hospital

b. Juan y María llevaron un herido al hospital.\(^{66}\)  
Juan and Maria carried a wounded (person) to-the hospital  
“Juan and Maria took a wounded person to the hospital.”

276. a. Vi a dos estudiantes.  
I saw two students

---

names is much worse than lack of $a$-marking on a definite NP.\(^{65}\) In addition to the strong-weak nature of the NP, the optionality of $a$-marking depends on the verb (Torrego (1998)). With some verbs $a$-marking is obligatory even on indefinite objects. The optionality of $a$-marking seems to depend on the semantics of the verb, although the correct generalization about the relevant semantic properties is extremely elusive. Torrego argues that verbs which are eventive and take affected objects require $a$-marking on their object, but I have found numerous exceptions to this claim. For example, the verb matar (“to kill”) is eventive and its object is affected, and yet, $a$-marking is optional with this verb.

\(^{66}\) For speakers to really hear whether the a is present or not, it helps to have a plural subject causing the verb to end in [n] (a consonant). If the verb ends in a vowel, it is difficult to differentiate the a. All the generalizations given here were tested using both singular and plural subjects, although I only give one version in the text.
b. Vi dos estudiantes.
I saw two students

277. a. Vi a muchos estudiantes.
I saw a many students

b. Vi muchos estudiantes.
I saw many students

In this section we have seen that strong NPs are obligatorily a-marked, whereas weak NPs are optionally a-marked. At this point, we want to ask what the difference is between a-marked and non-a-marked NPs when a-marking is optional, as in (275)-(277). We will see in the following sections that a-marking gives rise to an interpretational difference. A-marked NPs are interpreted as specific, whereas non-a-marked NPs are interpreted as non-specific. The term “specificity” is useful for its intuitive appeal; however, this term has been used to mean many different things in the literature. Therefore, it will be necessary to define what we mean by “specific”. The notion of specificity that most closely corresponds to the a-marking phenomenon in Spanish is that described by Farkas (1994) as “scopal specificity”. This is a broader notion than the kind of specificity described in Enç (1991), for example, which Farkas calls “partitive specificity”. It is true that partitive specifics (those NPs that denote entities that are equal to or subsets of NPs that have been mentioned in the previous discourse) are a-marked in Spanish, but not all a-marked NPs are partitively specific. In section 5.1.3, I define scopal specificity. In section 5.1.4, I show that a-marked NPs in Spanish can be
scopally specific, whereas non-

-a-marked NPs are necessarily non-specific. In section 5.1.5 I account for these differences in interpretations by positing that 

-a-marking is a morphological reflex of the semantic type of the direct object NP. I argue that direct object NPs can be property-denoting or argumental and that 

-a-marking is sensitive to this difference. Property-denoting direct objects are not 

-a-marked; argumental direct objects are.

5.1.3 Scopal Specificity

Scopal specificity is based on the interpretation of the NP with regard to other scope-taking elements in the sentence. An indefinite NP is non-specific if its interpretation is dependent on some other quantifier or intensional predicate in the sentence. It is specific if its interpretation is not dependent on one of these kinds of elements. (Thus definites and names are scopally specific.) Consider the English example given in (278).

278. a. Three students read a syntax book (that I recommended).

   b. a syntax book > 3 students

   c. 3 students > a syntax book

In the specific interpretation of a syntax book, shown schematically in (278b), there is a single foreign language which all three student have read. That is, the value of the indefinite is fixed independently of the domain of quantification. The denotation of the NP is “rigid with respect to the cases that form this domain” (Farkas, p.4). In other terminology, scopal specificity means taking scope over
some other scope-taking element. A scopally specific NP is one that is interpreted
*de re*. In (278), the specific interpretation of the object is the one in which it takes
scope over the subject quantifier.

The non-specific interpretation of the indefinite object is the one in which
the books vary with respect to the students. That is, the denotation is non-rigid with
respect to the domain of quantification. The object takes scope under the subject
quantifier (is interpreted *de dicto*), as shown in (278c).

One difficulty in examining the different scopal readings of indefinites is
determining whether there are really independent readings (Reinhart 1976;1995).
The problem is that the *de re* reading of the indefinite denotes a possible subcase of
the *de dicto* reading. For example, one condition under which the *de dicto* reading
of (278) is true is one in which three students happen to have read the same book.
All the conditions which make the *de re* reading true also make the *de dicto* reading
true. However, it can be demonstrated that the indefinite does have two
independent readings by negating the sentence in question (Ruys 1992).

279. It’s not the case that three students read a syntax book (that I
recommended).

The two readings correspond to the paraphrases given in (280).

280. a. It’s not the case that there’s a particular syntax book that three students
read.

b. It’s not the case that three students read any syntax book.

Now the two readings have different truth conditions. Imagine a situation in which
I recommended *LGB, French Syntax*, and Ross’s dissertation. Student1 and Student2 read Ross’s dissertation, and Student3 read *French Syntax*. No student read *LGB*. In this situation, the reading with a specific interpretation of *a syntax book* (280a) is true, and the non-specific interpretation (280b) is false. Thus, the readings can be differentiated. In the rest of the examples we discuss the same test can be applied to show that there are in fact distinct readings.

Another way to show that indefinites are really give rise to ambiguous interpretations is to place them under a non-monotone quantifier (Ruys 1992).

281. a. Exactly half the students mentioned some professor.
   b. exactly half > some professor
   c. some professor > exactly half

In this case, the narrow scope reading (281b) does not entail the wide scope reading (281c). The wide scope reading can be true in a situation in which there was a particular professor that was mentioned by exactly half the students, even though perhaps more than half the students mentioned some professor or other.

There are other types of elements which the indefinite object can interact with scopally. An example with an intensional predicate is given in (282).

282. John wants to marry a Norwegian.

Intensional predicates (like *want* or *look for*) introduce sets of possible worlds. Scopally non-specific indefinites are interpreted within the domain of these worlds. Thus, when the NP *a Norwegian* is interpreted non-specifically, the identity of this
NP will vary from world to world. Specific indefinites, on the other hand, are interpreted in the domain of the actual world (the world with respect to which the main predicate is interpreted).

An indefinite can be scopally specific with regard to one domain, but non-specific with regard to another domain. Consider the example in (283).

283. Every executive was looking for a secretary.

The object NP a secretary can be interpreted in three different ways. It can have a widest scope interpretation, where there was one secretary (say John) that everyone was looking for. Here the value of a secretary is rigid with respect to both the subject quantifier (every) and the intensional predicate (look for).

The indefinite object can also have a narrowest scope interpretation (non-specific or narrow with regard to both the subject quantifier and the intensional predicate), where none of the executives cares who s/he finds; any secretary will do. In this case, a secretary is interpreted non-rigidly with respect to both the quantifier and the intensional predicate.

But there is also a third interpretation where the NP takes intermediate scope. Every executive is looking for a particular one of his or her secretaries; the value of secretary covaries with executive, but in each case the secretary is specific. That is, a secretary is interpreted rigidly with respect to the intensional predicate, but non-rigidly with respect to the subject quantifier.
5.1.4 A-marking and specificity in Spanish

In this section I show that when an object NP in Spanish is interpreted as specific or rigid with regard to some other scopal element, it must be marked with personal a.

In (284) we see an example of an intensional predicate with an indefinite object. In this example, the speaker goes on to name the person s/he is looking for, showing that s/he has someone in mind. Thus, the indefinite is interpreted de re; it has rigid reference with respect to the possible worlds that the intensional predicate introduces. The secretary is posited to exist in the real world. (284) shows that when a de re reading is forced, a-marking is obligatory.

284. a. Estoy buscando a una secretaria que trabaja aquí. Se llama María.
    I am looking for a secretary who works here. REFL call Maria ‘I’m looking for a secretary who works her. Her name is Maria’

b. *Estoy buscando una secretaria que trabaja aquí. Se llama María.
    I am looking for a secretary who works here. REFL call Maria ‘I’m looking for a secretary who works her. Her name is Maria’

c. una > buscar

Without a-marking, only a de dicto (narrow scope) reading obtains, as illustrated in (285). Here the indefinite is interpreted inside the scope of the intensional predicate. This means that the identity of the secretary varies with the worlds introduced by look for. (It could be Mary in one world, John in another, etc.)

285. a. Estoy buscando una secretaria.
I am looking for a secretary

b. buscar > una

Another diagnostic for specificity is the mood of the verb in a relative clause. If the verb of a relative clause is in indicative mood, the NP modified by the relative clause is interpreted as specific. If the relative clause is in subjunctive mood, then the NP is interpreted as non-specific (Frawley 1992). When the specific reading is forced by indicative mood in the relative clause, then a-marking is obligatory, as shown in (286).

286. a. Juan y María buscan a una chica que sabe español.
   Juan and Maria look for a girl knows-IND Spanish
   “Juan and Maria are looking for a girl who speaks Spanish.”

b. *Juan y María buscan una chica que sabe español.
   Juan and Maria look for a girl that knows-IND Spanish

When the NP is non-specific, as signaled by subjunctive mood, a-marking is optional.

287. Juan y María buscan (a) una chica que sepa español.
   Juan and Maria look for (A) a girl that knows-SUBJ Spanish
   “Juan and Maria are looking for a girl who might know Spanish.”

   When there is a quantificational subject an a-marked object can have scope over the subject (288), but a non-a-marked object cannot (289).\(^{67}\)

\(^{67}\) The problem of showing that there are two different readings arises here. In (289b), I treat the reading where un profesor takes scope over todos as being ungrammatical. But as we mentioned above, the situation described by this reading is a possible subcase of the de dicto reading, which is possible. So it is possible for

176
288. a. Todos los estudiantes mencionaron a un profesor.
    All the students mentioned a one professor.

   b. todos > un; un > todos

289. a. Todos los estudiantes mencionaron un profesor.
    All the students mentioned one professor

   b. todos > un; *un > todos

Describing this as a scope fact may be somewhat inaccurate. The reason the object can be interpreted with scope over the subject in this example is probably because the indefinite has a choice function interpretation, and not because it is a quantifier that scopes over the subject. Martín (1998) shows that quantified objects cannot scope over the subject, even when $a$-marked. In order to have scope over the subject the object must be clitic-left dislocated. The choice function interpretation of indefinites is discussed with regard to clitic doubling in Chapter 4.

Again, we can show that there is a genuine ambiguity in cases where indefinites occur under a subject quantifier. The example in (290) has a non-monotone quantifier in subject position. The indefinite object is $a$-marked and two distinct readings are possible.

290. a. Exactamente la mitad de los estudiantes mencionaron a un profesor.
    Exactly the half of the students mentioned a one professor
    “Exactly half the students mentioned a professor.”

the sentence with the non-$a$-marked object to describe a situation in which all the students happen to mention the same professor. Here too we can use the negated sentence to show that a reading is present with the $a$-marking example that is not present with the non-$a$-marking example.
b. un profesor > exactamente la mitad

c. exactamente la mitad > un profesor

With no $a$-marking, however, the object indefinite can only have narrow scope.

291. a. Exactamente la mitad de los estudiantes mencionaron un profesor.
   “Exactly half the students mentioned a professor.”

   b. exactamente la mitad > un profesor

   Similarly, an $a$-marked object can take scope over negation (292b) whereas a non-$a$-marked object cannot (292a).

292. a. No he visto dos estudiantes.
   no>2 students; *2 students>no

   b. No he visto a dos estudiantes.
   no>2 students; 2 students>no

   In (293), there are three logically possible scope positions: narrowest scope, widest scope, or intermediate scope above the verb (assuming that there is some intensional aspect to the future) but below the quantificational subject.

293. a. Cada soldado va a matar dos hombres.
   each soldier goes to kill two men

   b. Cada soldado va a matar a dos hombres.
   each soldier goes to kill $A$ two men
   ‘Each soldier is going to kill two men’

   The non-$a$-marked object in (293a) must be interpreted with narrowest scope.

   Under this reading, the killing of two men is like a quota that each soldier has to fill. It does not matter which two men get killed, it is the fact that there are two of them. With $a$, in (293b) there is an intermediate reading, which is that for each
soldier there are two particular men that that soldier is going to kill. The object a dos hombres is interpreted as scopally non-specific with regard to the subject because the two men co-vary with each soldier. But it is scopally specific with regard to the intensionality of the verb. Notice that the widest scope interpretation of the object is ruled out because of the combined meanings of each and kill. It would be impossible for each soldier to kill the same two men since that would entail that the men are killed multiple times. With other verbs, however, this widest scope reading, along with the intermediate reading, is possible with an a-marked object. This can be seen with the verb buscar in (294).

294. Cada policía va a buscar a dos hombres.
    each police goes to look for two men
    ‘Each policeman is going to look for two men’

The intermediate reading is brought out in a scenario where each policeman is going to look for his two best snitches. The widest scope reading is salient in a scenario where each policeman is going to look for the two men who were convicted in the Oklahoma bombing (who have escaped from prison).

An important thing to note at this point is that although there is a correspondence between a-marking and scopal specificity, it is not the case that this correspondence is one-to-one. A-marked NPs can be interpreted as specific, but

68 Peter Cole and Bob Frank suggest that a collective killing, as with a firing squad, should be possible. However, this meaning is ruled out by cada just as it is by each in English. The sentence in (i) is odd even with the firing squad scene in mind.

i. #Each man killed John.
they can also be interpreted as non-specific. In the intensional example repeated in (295), in addition to the specific reading where the speaker knows that the secretary exists, there is also a possible non-specific reading (anyone will do).

295. Estoy buscando a una secretaria.
I. am looking. for A a secretary

From this data we can make the following generalization with regard to the interpretation of \( a \)-marked direct objects.

296. **\( A \)-marking Generalization**: animate non-\( a \)-marked indefinite NPs take scope in their surface position only; \( a \)-marked NPs can have any scope.

5.1.5 Lack of \( a \)-marking and Property-denoting NPs

In order to account for the \( A \)-marking Generalization stated in (296), I propose that non-\( a \)-marked direct objects are predicative NPs (interpreted as properties) that are semantically incorporated into the verb in the sense of van Geenhoven (1995; 1996; 1997). In particular, I will argue for the \( A \)-marking Hypothesis as stated in (297).

297. **\( A \)-marking Hypothesis**: \( a \)-marked animate NPs are interpreted as generalized quantifiers. Non-\( a \)-marked animate NPs are interpreted as properties.

I follow Zimmermann (1993) who argues, contra Montague (1974), that NPs that are syntactic arguments can be interpreted as properties, and that this is the source of the *de dicto* interpretation of these NPs in intensional contexts. I extend this idea, and propose that objects of extensional verbs can also be interpreted as properties. I adopt machinery from van Geenhoven (1995; 1996; 1997) for interpreting direct
objects as property-denoting (see also McNally 1995).

Van Geenhoven argues that there are two types of verbs, those she calls “incorporating” and those she calls “non-incorporating”. Non-incorporating verbs are the normal kind. They take individual-denoting NPs as objects. Incorporating verbs are those that are able to take a property-denoting NP in object position. According to van Geenhoven’s analysis, incorporating verbs introduce an existential quantifier which binds a variable representing the internal argument of the verb. The property-denoting object NP is then interpreted as modifying this variable. The interpretation of the incorporating version of *carry* is given in (298).

298.  

\[
\text{carry} \Rightarrow \lambda P \lambda x \exists y [\text{carry}(x, y) \land P(y)]
\]

We can now see how the sentences with and without *a*-marking will be interpreted. The derivation of (299a) with no *a*-marking is given in (299b). The verb is an incorporating verb and the object NP is interpreted as a property.

299. a.  

María llevó un herido.

b.   

S

\[
\exists y [\text{carry}’(\text{maria}, y) \land \text{wounded}’(y)]
\]

NP     VP

\[
\lambda x \exists y [\text{carry}’(x, y) \land \text{wounded}’(y)]
\]

V

\[
\lambda P \lambda x \exists y [\text{carry}’(x, y) \land P(y)]
\]

NP

\[
\lambda z [\text{wounded}’(z)]
\]

Since the non-\(a\)-marked indefinite is interpreted as a property, it will always
be incorporated, as in (299). It never contributes its own existential operator, but is bound by the existential operator that is introduced as part of the semantics of the verb. Thus, any element that c-commands the verb is predicted to take scope over the object as well. This gives us the result that non-\(a\)-marked indefinites will always be interpreted as non-specific. For example, in (300), the non-\(a\)-marked indefinite object can only be interpreted with narrow scope with regard to negation. Since negation takes scope over the verb, and the indefinite is incorporated into the verb, negation necessarily takes scope over the indefinite as well.

300.  
   a. No he visto dos estudiantes.  
   I haven’t seen two students  
   b. *dos > no  
   c. no > dos

The interpretation of the \(a\)-marked version (301a) is given in (301b). Note that the derivation of this example depends on how we treat indefinites in general. I take \(a\)-marked indefinites to be interpreted either as individuals or generalized quantifiers. In the literature both positions have been taken and I will assume that both interpretations are available. In (301), I depict the indefinite as an individual which introduces a free variable that is bound by an existential operator that is introduced by an automatic process of existential closure (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982). Note that taking indefinites as generalized quantifiers would yield the same logical representation.
301. a. María llevó a un herido.
   b. 

   \[
   S \quad \text{carry(maria,wounded'(y))}
   \]

   \[
   NP \quad \lambda x [\text{carry}(x,\text{wounded'}(y))]
   \]

   \[
   V \quad \lambda y \lambda x [\text{carry}(x,y)] \quad \text{wounded'}(y)
   \]

   Notice that the analysis of a-marking presented here can account for the interpretation of indefinites in extensional as well as intensional contexts. In intensional contexts and contexts with other scope-taking elements, the presence or absence of a-marking makes a difference in terms of truth conditions. In an extensional context with no other scope-taking elements, there is nothing to measure the specificity of the object against. Yet, a-marking is still optional on indefinites in these contexts, as shown in the examples below. Speakers feel like there is some slight difference in meaning or feeling, even though the truth conditions are the same with or without a-marking.

302. a. Juan y María llevaron a un herido a-l hospital.
   Juan and Maria carried a wounded (person) to-the hospital
   b. Juan y María llevaron un herido al hospital.
   Juan and Maria carried a wounded (person) to-the hospital
   “Juan and Maria took a wounded person to the hospital.”

303. a. Vi a dos estudiantes.
   I.saw a two students
   b. Vi dos estudiantes.
   I.saw two students
In the analysis given, the final representation of the meaning of an extensional sentence is exactly the same whether incorporation takes place or not; compare (299) and (301). That is, interpreting the indefinite as a property or as an individual has the same effect in the final representation in these kinds of sentences. The derivation proceeds in a different way in the two cases since the building blocks are different, but the result is the same. This corresponds with speakers’ intuitions that the presence or absence of a-marking creates no difference in truth conditions in sentences where there is no other scopal element.\(^{69}\)

Additional evidence in support of the a-marking hypothesis comes from pseudocleft contexts.\(^{70}\) In pseudocleft sentences such as (305) and (306), the relative pronoun depends on whether the coda of the pseudocleft is animate. The relative pronoun \textit{quien} ("who") can only be used if the coda is human, as is the NP

---

\(^{69}\) We said above that speakers do feel like there is some difference between a-marked and non-a-marked objects of extensional verbs (and where there are no scopal elements). However, speakers are unable to find truth-conditional differences. The difference just has to do with how the speaker is thinking of the object. This means that choosing between a property-denoting NP and a individual-denoting NP maps to a difference in meaning at some level, but in terms of the formal (i.e., truth-conditional) semantics, there is no difference.

\(^{70}\) Thanks to Maribel Romero (p.c.) for pointing out this test.
Juan in (305). The relative pronoun *lo que* is used for inanimates, as shown in (306a). The example in (306b) shows that *quien* cannot be used for inanimates.

305. A quien vi fue a Juan.
   Who I saw was Juan.

306. a. Lo que vi fue un barco.
   What I saw was a ship.

   b. *A quien vi fue (a) un barco.
   Who I saw was a ship.

When the coda is interpreted as a property, the relative pronoun is *lo que*. The example in (307) shows that the pronoun used with properties is *lo que*, even when the property is one that exclusively describes humans.

307. a. Lo que es es un imbécil. (property)
   What he is is an imbecile.

   b. *A quien es es un imbécil.
   Who he is is an imbecile.

The generalization is that the pronoun *quien* requires its associated element to be human. On the flip side, any element that is +human and interpreted as an individual and not as a property should allow the relative pronoun *quien* in the pseudocleft context. Given our analysis that non-*a*-marked NPs are necessarily

71 Notice that *lo que* is not impossible with animates.

i. Lo que vi fue a Juan.
   What I saw was Juan.

In this case, the feeling is that someone asked “what did you see” and the speaker answers “what I saw was Juan”. Notice you can also say in English, “the things I saw were a book, John, a pencil...”. So a human can be one of the “things” that were seen. The more normal way to say this is with *quien* as in (305).
predicative (property-denoting), the prediction is that non-\textit{a}-marked NPs will not allow association with \textit{quien}. This prediction is borne out. The examples in (308) show that a non-\textit{a}-marked NP can be associated with \textit{lo que} but not with \textit{quien}, even though the NP refers to humans. Thus, the hypothesis is supported that non-\textit{a}-marked (animate) NPs are interpreted as properties.

308. a. Lo que vi fue muchos niños.
    What I saw was a ton of children.

    b. *A quien vi fue muchos niños.
    Who I saw was a ton of children.

309. A quien vi fue a muchos niños.
    Who I saw was many children.

The example in (309) shows that the same NP with \textit{a}-marking can be associated with \textit{quien}.

5.1.6 Conclusion

We have seen in this section that the presence or absence of \textit{a}-marking on direct objects is dependent on interpretive factors such as animacy and scopal specificity. Animate direct objects that are interpreted as specific must be \textit{a}-marked. I have argued that the specificity effects are due to the nature of \textit{a}-marking as a reflex of the semantic type of the direct object NP. Predicative NPs are not \textit{a}-marked, whereas argumental NPs are. In the next section, we examine the relationship between \textit{a}-marking and clitic doubling.
5.2 Kayne’s Generalization

The generalization that clitic doubling requires a prepositional element on the direct object is attributed to Kayne by Jaeggli (1982) and is quoted in (310).

310. Kayne’s Generalization: An object NP may be doubled by a clitic only if the NP is preceded by a preposition.

Applied to Spanish, Kayne’s Generalization says that clitic doubling will only obtain if a-marking is present. This generalization holds in Leísta Spanish (as in other dialects). There are no cases of clitic doubling where the full NP is not marked by a “prepositional” element (either the dative preposition a or accusative a-marking). Clitic doubling is possible with both direct and indirect objects.

Indirect object NPs can double freely and are preceded by the preposition a (“to”), as shown in the following examples.

311. Le di el libro a Carmen.
   Cl I gave the book to Carmen
   “I gave the book to Carmen”

312. Le puse un techo nuevo a la casa.
   Cl I put a roof new to the house
   “I put a new roof on the house.”

Direct object doubling is more restricted than indirect object doubling. Only animate direct objects can clitic double and these are exactly the NPs that are a-marked.

72 Suñer (1988) cites examples in Rioplatense Spanish where clitic doubling can hold without a-marking.
313. Carmen le conoció a Juan Carlos.
    “Carmen met Juan Carlos.”

314. El chico le vió a su hermana.
    “The boy saw his sister.”

315. La profesora le castigó a un niño.
    “The profesor punished a boy”

316. Le encontré a-l gato.
    “I found the cat.”

Inanimate NPs cannot be *a*-marked or clitic doubled. (The form of the clitic which can be used with inanimates is *lo* or *la*, but doubling is not possible no matter what form of the clitic is used.)

317. a. Juan partió (*a) el vaso.
    “Juan broke the glass”

    b. *Juan le partió el vaso. 73

    c. *Juan lo partió el vaso.

318. a. Juan limpió (*a) la mesa.
    “Juan cleaned the table.”

    b. *Juan le limpió (a) la mesa.

    c. *Juan la limpió (a) la mesa.

73 This sentence is grammatical if the clitic is interpreted as an “ethical” or “affected dative”. The asterisk is meant to indicate that the sentence is ungrammatical if the clitic is interpreted as co-referring with the object.
Note that not every a-marked NP can double. There are direct object NPs which can be (or are obligatorily) a-marked, but that cannot be doubled. For example, negative quantifiers\(^{74}\) are a-marked in direct object position. However, they cannot be doubled by a clitic.

319. No vi a nadie.
    neg I.saw A no-one
    “I didn’t see anyone.”

320. No (*le) vi a nadie.
    Neg LE I.saw A no-one
    ‘I didn’t see anyone’

However, these do not constitute counterexamples to Kayne’s Generalization, since this generalization is stated as a one-way implication. Object NPs may be doubled by a clitic if preceded by a preposition, but being preceded by a preposition does not necessarily mean that the NP can be doubled.

5.2.1 Past accounts of Kayne’s Generalization

The generalization that clitic doubling relies on the presence of a preposition holds in several different languages, such as Hebrew (Borer 1984), Lebanese Arabic (Aoun 1996), and Romanian (Steriade 1980, Dobrovie-Sorin 1990; 1994).\(^{75}\) Why should this correlation exist? Past accounts of Kayne’s Generalization have taken the relationship to be a causal one: the clitic cannot

\(^{74}\) or NPIs, depending on one’s analysis (see Herberger 1998).

\(^{75}\) Exceptions include Modern Greek (Iatridou 1995) and Albanian (Massey 1992).
appear unless the prepositional element is present. For example, Chomsky (1982), Borer (1984) and others following Jaeggli (1982) have captured Kayne’s Generalization with the following syntactic account: The clitic absorbs accusative case from the verb. A full NP complement of the verb will be caseless, and hence will violate the case filter unless it has an independent way to receive case. The $a$ is a case-assigning preposition, and thus saves the NP from violating the case filter.

Thus, whereas the generalization itself can be taken simply as an observation of the implication between clitic doubling and prepositional marking, the explanations for Kayne’s Generalization attribute the dependence to a causal relation between the appearance of one and the appearance of the other: clitic doubling depends on $a$-marking syntactically. I will call this the Dependence Hypothesis. The question that I want to address in this chapter is whether there is evidence for this causal relation.

Evidence for the dependence is difficult to find. For example, with indirect object doubling the dependence is not clear since indirect objects are obligatorily preceded by the dative prepositional marker $a$ independently of whether clitic doubling obtains. (321) shows that the dative preposition is obligatory even without clitic doubling.

321.  

a. Di el libro a Carmen  
I gave the book to Carmen

b. *Di el libro Carmen  

Notice that the dative preposition is obligatory even if the indirect object NP is
inanimate or nonspecific, as shown in (322) and (323), respectively. That is, there are no interpretive factors governing the presence of the dative \( a \) (unlike accusative \( a \)-marking).

322.  
   a.  Doné el libro a la biblioteca.  
       I donated the book to the library
   b.  *Doné el libro la biblioteca.

323.  
   a.  La vieja va a donar todos sus bienes a museos.  
       the old-fem go to donate all her goods to museums  
       “The old woman is going to donate all of her belongings to museums.”
   b.  *La vieja va a donar todos sus bienes museos.

In these cases, it cannot be shown that clitic doubling depends on \( a \)-marking because it is not possible to see whether clitic doubling could obtain in the absence of the preposition. This is because there are no cases where the preposition does not occur.

With direct objects, on the other hand, only a subset of NPs are \( a \)-marked, and here we can see that Kayne’s Generalization holds. However, even here it is difficult to argue for the Dependence Hypothesis since in most of the cases where clitic doubling obtains, \( a \)-marking is obligatory independently of doubling. This is true in the example in (324). (325) shows that \( a \)-marking is obligatory in this context independent of clitic doubling.

324.  Le vi a Juan.  
      CL I saw A Juan

325.  a.  Vi a Juan.
b. *Vi Juan.

According to past versions of the Dependence Hypothesis, *a*-marking is simply a case-saving device, similar to *of*-insertion in English (Chomsky 1981). If this were so, however, we would expect *a*-marking only to arise when it is needed for case. Instead, it seems to arise independently of any need for case. Under this view, in non-doubling contexts, the direct object NP is receiving case both from the verb and from the prepositional *a*.

![Diagram](image)

Borer (1984) notes this fact, but sees “no reason to assume that such redundant marking is ungrammatical” (135). This suggests, contra this version of the Dependence Hypothesis, that the main purpose of *a*-marking is not to assign case to the direct object DP.

### 5.2.2 A New Syntactic Hypothesis

On the other hand, in the analysis of clitic doubling that we presented in Chapter 4, there is a way to maintain the dependence hypothesis without positing that one NP receives case from two different sources. We have seen that to account for clitic doubling we posit a highly articulated structure internal to the direct object DP. The overt DP which appears to be the direct object is really a subconstituent (DP_{poss}) of the direct object. In the case of clitic doubling, DP_{poss} is marked with dative case and moves up to the specifier of the dative clitic phrase to check this
Under this analysis, it is natural to view $a$-marking as the spell-out of dative case on the DP subconstituent of the direct object. Thus, the direct object itself is not receiving case twice, nor is $a$-marking a spell-out of accusative case that occurs only when the DO is animate. Instead, the hypothesis is that a subconstituent DP can be dative-marked if it moves through spec,DP$_{DO}$. This derivation provides an alternative version of the Dependence Hypothesis: Clitic doubling is dependent on $a$-marking because in order for the clitic to be spelled-out, DP$_{poss}$ must move to its specifier. In order for DP$_{poss}$ to move up to the clitic phrase, it must first pass through the escape hatch position spec,DP$_{DO}$. It is in this position that dative case, realized as $a$-marking, is assigned.

The problem with this view is that $a$-marking can occur even in the absence of clitic doubling. We saw that the clitic $le$ appears when a DP moves to its
specifier. If the clitic is absent, it means one of two things. One possibility is that \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) can appear with dative morphology corresponding to its movement to \( \text{spec,DP}_{\text{DO}} \). However, instead of moving up to the specifier of the dative phrase, \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) can remain in this DP-internal position. Alternatively, the presence or absence of the clitic corresponds to whether movement out of the direct object DP occurs before or after spell-out. If \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) moves out of \( \text{DP}_{\text{DO}} \) before spell-out, then the clitic is overt. If movement of the DP occurs at LF, then the clitic is null. (A similar idea is proposed by Ordoñez (1999) to account for the spell-out of the clitic in normal dative doubling cases.)

A second problem is the following: if it is possible for a \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) to be dative-marked (that is, \( a \)-marked) in a position internal to the direct object DP, as shown in (328), then it is not clear why this can only happen inside the direct object and not inside other argumental DPs.

328.

```
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{DPposs} \\
a \text{Juan} \\
\text{D'} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{AgrP} \\
\text{pro} \\
\text{Agr'} \\
\text{Agr} \\
\text{....}
\end{array}
\]
```

For example, subjects cannot be \( a \)-marked, as shown in (329). The ungrammaticality of (329) is not immediately predicted by the analysis that we have presented.

194
329. *A Juan se durmió.
   A Juan SE slept
   “Juan fell asleep.”

Notice also, that we do not propose the analysis of $a$-marking shown in (328) for underlying indirect objects. In the case of indirect objects, it is proposed that the whole DP argument is marked with dative case and that this surfaces as the morpheme $a$. We might expect then that in addition to the $a$-marking on the whole indirect object, that there might be a subconstituent DP that is $a$-marked as well. The prediction would be that double $a$-marking is possible on a single indirect object DP. But clearly this is not possible.

330. Le di el libro a (*a) Juan.
   CL I.gave the book to to Juan
   “I gave the book to Juan.”

It is only direct objects that allow a subconstituent to be $a$-marked. If this analysis of $a$-marking is to be adopted, we need to account for why it is restricted to direct objects. We can account for why subconstituent $a$-marking is only possible inside the direct object if we assume that this $a$-marked element must move to the specifier of the dative phrase at some point in the derivation. An $a$-marked DP cannot appear inside a subject DP because subjects are generated above the dative clitic phrase, as shown in the tree below.
Thus, movement from inside \( \text{DP}_{\text{subj}} \) to the specifier of the clitic phrase would necessarily involve lowering, an impossible movement. An \( a \)-marked \( \text{DP}_{\text{poss}} \) cannot appear inside the indirect object DP because \( \text{DP}_{\text{IO}} \) must check its dative feature by moving to spec, ClP. It is assumed that two dative elements cannot move to the same dative clitic phrase to check the same feature(s). To make this analysis go through, it is necessary to assume that there is only one dative ClP per clause. This is a reasonable assumption since it is impossible to generate sequences of the form \( le \ le \ le \). This analysis predicts that two \( a \)-marked DPs cannot appear in the same clause, as in (332).

332. Carmen les presentó a Xabier a sus padres.
Carmen CL introduced A Xabier to her parents
“Carmen introduced Xabier to her parents.”

In fact, the status of two-\( a \) sentences is controversial. Aissen (1974) claims that
sentences such as (332) are ungrammatical. However, I have found speaker variation on this point. If the facts as reported in Aissen are correct, then the analysis that we have given of a-marking is supported. To the extent that (332) is grammatical, it suggests that dative-marked subconstituent DPs can remain inside the argument DP containing them. Thus, we lose the explanation of why a-marking cannot appear on subjects or doubly on indirect objects.

5.2.3 A Semantic Hypothesis: The Subset Hypothesis

An alternative view is that a semantic feature (such as animacy) is the factor that is independently responsible for both a-marking and clitic-doubling. According to this view, clitic doubling is not dependent on a-marking. Both arise for the same reason, but independently. I will call this idea the Independence Hypothesis. We have already seen for a-marking, however, that animacy is not the only factor governing it. But perhaps there is some other factor or factors that both clitic doubling and a-marking depend on, such as specificity. In fact, however, clitic doubling and a-marking cannot depend on exactly the same semantic factors. This is because clitic doubling cannot obtain in all the contexts that a-marking can obtain. As we saw above, negative quantifiers cannot be clitic doubled, though they can be a-marked. The example is repeated here.

76 Notice that this fact provides an argument against the syntactic account of a-marking. If a-marking occurs only when there is an integral small clause, then we expect that a-marked NPs will only have a reified interpretation (as we saw with
333. No vi a nadie.
   neg I.saw A no-one
   “I didn’t see anyone.”

334. No (*le) vi a nadie.
   Neg LE I.saw A no-one
   ‘I didn’t see anyone’

(335) shows that the same holds of other strong quantifiers like cada N (each N).

335. (*Le) vi a cada hombre.
   (*Cl) I.saw A each man
   “I saw each man.”

Indefinite NPs can be clitic doubled in general, as shown in (336). However, indefinite NPs which only have a non-specific interpretation cannot be doubled, though they can be a-marked. The interpretation of the NP in (337) can only be non-specific due to the subjunctive mood of the relative clause, and here le is ruled out.

336. Luis le busca a un estudiante que habla francés.
    Luis CL looks.for A a student that speaks-IND French
    “Luis is looking for a student who speaks French.”

337. Luis (*le) busca a un estudiante que hable francés.
    Luis (*CL) looks.for A a student that speaks-SUBJ French

    Thus, we see that a-marking occurs in a wider set of cases than clitic doubling does. This suggests that the factors regulating clitic doubling are more restrictive than those regulating a-marking. Thus, we propose a semantic account for Kayne’s generalization which is a version of the Independence Hypothesis. This hypothesis which we will call the Subset Hypothesis states that both the clitic and clitic doubling). Then, negative quantifiers should never be a-marked.
the prepositional (accusative) a arise independently based on the semantic interpretation of the NP. However, the semantic properties which give rise to clitic doubling form a subset of the semantic properties which give rise to the clitic, thus deriving Kayne’s observation of the one-way implication.

In order to show that the subset hypothesis holds, it is necessary to find cases where clitic doubling further restricts the possible meanings that are present with just a-marking.

We saw in section 5.1.4 that a-marked NPs can be interpreted with any scope. This is opposed to non-a-marked NPs which obligatorily take narrow scope with regard to any (other) quantificational element in the sentence. In the intensional context in (65), the a-marked NP can have either a specific or non-specific reading. Either the existence of the secretary is asserted (in the actual world), that is, I’m looking for a particular person. Or I am looking for someone to fill this role; the existence of a particular secretary in the actual world is not presupposed.

338.  Estoy buscando a una secretaria.
       I.am looking.for A a secretary
       ‘I’m looking for a secretary’

When clitic doubling obtains in the same example, as in (66), only the specific reading is possible.

339.  Le estoy buscando a una secretaria.
       CL I.am looking.for A a secretary
       ‘I’m looking for a secretary.’
A similar type of example is given in (67).

340.  a. Cada policía va a buscar a dos criminales.
    each police go to to.look.for A two criminals
    “Each police officer is going to look for two criminals.”

    b. Cada policía les va a buscar a dos criminales.
    each police CL go to to.look.for A two criminals

The a-marked NP in (67a) can have any of three different readings. There is the lowest scope reading where each police officer has a quota of arrests to make, so they are going to go look for (at least) two people who are breaking the law. The intermediate scope reading is where each police officer has two particular criminals to arrest. The widest scope reading is that there are two particular criminals and every police officer has been assigned to find the same two guys. The clitic doubled example in (67b) can only have the widest scope interpretation.

A different kind of example is given in (68). As we saw earlier, a plural definite NP is ambiguous (in some contexts) between a kind reading and a definite reading. So the example in (68a) can have either the kind reading in (68b) which means something like “I know what soldiers are like”; or it can have the definite reading in (68c) which means “I know some particular group of soldiers that we’ve mentioned already”.

341.  a. Conozco a los soldados.
    I.know A the soldiers.

    b. “I know soldiers.”

    c. “I know the soldiers.”

200
When this NP is clitic doubled, the kind reading is ruled out and only the definite reading remains.

342. a. Les conozco a los soldados.  
    CL I know A the soldiers

    b. *I know soldiers

    c. I know the soldiers.

We have seen that not only does clitic doubling obtain in a subset of the cases where $a$-marking obtains, but the meanings that are possible with clitic doubling form a subset of the meanings that are possible with $a$-marking. I leave formalization of the Subset Hypothesis for future research.

### 5.3 Summary

In this chapter we have examined the semantic restrictions on $a$-marking. We propose that non $a$-marked animate NPs are interpreted as properties, and $a$-marked NPs are interpreted as arguments (generalized quantifiers or individuals). We showed that this analysis accounts for the obligatory narrow scope interpretation of non-$a$-marked NPs and the variable scope behavior of $a$-marked NPs. We also discussed the relationship between $a$-marking and clitic doubling. An analysis of this relationship is somewhat elusive. I have speculated on two paths we might take for investigating this topic further, both of which seem promising in different ways.
Chapter 6

Conclusions

Clitic doubling in Leísta Spanish presents us with a problem that I have called the Clitic Form Dilemma. The problem is that a single piece of morphology (the clitic le) imposes different semantic restrictions depending on the grammatical function of the DP it doubles. Direct object doubling manifests stricter interpretive restrictions than indirect object doubling. In particular, doubled direct objects are necessarily interpreted as animate and specific. The fact that a single form is used for both accusative and dative leads us to posit the One le Hypothesis. However, then we are left without a source for the asymmetric interpretive restrictions. These restrictions cannot be tied to the grammatical function independently of doubling since direct objects are not more restricted in their range of interpretations than indirect objects (in fact, usually it is the opposite). Therefore, it appears that the restrictions have to do with the doubling configuration itself. The fact of doubling alone cannot be responsible since this is constant in both cases. So, the asymmetry must arise from the combination of doubling and the syntax related to the grammatical function.
I have argued that the underlying configuration which leads to doubling is different for direct objects than for indirect objects, although the syntax of the clitic remains constant. Doubling with the clitic *le* involves movement of the doubled DP to the specifier of the dative clitic phrase. In the case where the indirect object doubles, it is the whole indirect object DP which moves to the specifier of the clitic phrase.

In the case of direct object doubling with the dative clitic *le*, it is crucially not the whole direct object DP which raises. This movement would create a clash in case features. Instead, a subpart of the direct object DP is what raises.
Crucially, data from Leísta Spanish and the clitic form dilemma show us that the featural accounts discussed in Chapter 2 must be wrong. The featural account of interpretive restrictions on clitic doubling posits that the feature [+specific] is associated to a particular clitic. This kind of account predicts that particular interpretations correspond to particular morphological forms. This prediction is not borne out in Leísta Spanish. The same clitic shows specificity restrictions with direct objects only. The only way to maintain the featural account is to posit two different clitics having the same form (le), each with different featural specifications. Aside from the obvious homophony problem, this solution is unsatisfactory in that it offers no account for why doubling is possible with some clitic forms and not others (i.e., the difference between la and le). Similarly, it does not account for why direct objects asymmetrically show specificity morphology cross-linguistically.
I do not criticize the featural account for its use of features, but rather for the particular way features are used. I have argued against the proposal that direct object clitics have a feature [+specific] that is lacking in indirect object clitics, and that this accounts for the more restricted range of interpretations possible with direct object doubling than with indirect object doubling. I argue that there is no such [+specific] feature. Instead, specificity is configurational rather than featural; it is these configurational properties that are then responsible for clitic doubling. Specificity appears not to be a unified semantic notion, and thus there is no unified notion that the syntax can make reference to through the use of a feature.

I have argued that there is not a direct connection between the clitic and the interpretation of its double. This argument is complicated by the observation that there are three different interpretive aspects of clitic doubling to explain. The specificity restrictions can be divided into two categories: specificity as event participation and specificity as reification of a concept. A third interpretive factor is the animacy of the NP.

One interpretive aspect of doubling can be more or less directly related to the particular clitic (le). I have argued that the dative-form clitic appears in a unique (local) syntactic configuration. The dative clitic is the head of a dative phrase, and surfaces only when a dative-marked DP moves to its specifier. I have further argued that this dative case specifier position corresponds to the interpretation of the DP as an event participant. In this way, there is a direct connection between the
However, this restriction to event participant interpretations is imposed on both direct and indirect object doubling in Leísta Spanish. The differences between direct and indirect object doubling are due to the internal structure of direct object DPs in conjunction with the fact that a subpart of the DP is able to escape the direct object DP but not the indirect object DP. Any argument DP can have a reified interpretation, and presumably this is (or could be) due to a complex internal structure. However, only in the case of direct objects does this internal structure directly affect the possibility of clitic doubling. Any indirect object NP interpreted as an event participant will double. This doubling is independent of the internal structure of the indirect object DP and hence independent of whether it is interpreted as reified. For direct objects, the possibility of doubling is not available unless the DP has the complex internal structure associated with the reified interpretation. Thus, direct object doubling depends directly on the reified reading and is more restricted than indirect object doubling.

We have speculated that the animacy restrictions on doubling have the same source as the reified interpretation. It is the internal structure of the DP that determines the interpretation as animate. In Leísta Spanish the null classifier is interpreted as “persona” and is thus directly responsible for the interpretation of the DP as animate. The complex internal structure again is what gives rise to doubling.

Crucially, the complex internal structure of the direct object DP allows for
clitic doubling but does not require it. Thus, animate and specific DPs can double, but doubling is not obligatory for these DPs.

The approach that I have taken is to take the morphology seriously. I do not posit ambiguous forms and I assume that the dative clitic really corresponds to dative case (or at least a non-accusative case) on the DP that moves to its specifier. Taking this approach has allowed us to expand the set of data that are relevant to clitic doubling. In particular, we have shown that possessor raising and accusative clitic doubling receive the same analysis. Relating these two constructions has given us insight into the nature of some of the specificity restrictions, notably how direct objects can receive an event participation interpretation which is generally associated with dative arguments.

6.1 Future work

The ideas that we have pursued here open several lines of inquiry. One question concerns the nature of the relationship between syntax and the event participation interpretation. The account I have given stipulates that the specifier position of the dative phrase corresponds to the DP’s interpretation as an event participant. Further investigation is required to determine the nature of this mapping between the syntax and semantics.

Another area of future work is to tease apart the differences between the event participant reading and reification. We have argued that both of these concepts contribute to the reading of a doubled direct object as specific. We need
event participation to account for the *mother in your smile* readings where clitic doubling requires the entity to be interpreted as an event participant. We need reification to account for the *sonata* examples in Cordoba Spanish. In Leísta Spanish, we need to make reference to reification or some other notion of specificity beyond event participation (what is required for datives) to account for why direct object doubling (with *le*) is more restricted than indirect object doubling (with *le*). Thus, it does not appear that we can dispense with either notion. However, the meanings are largely overlapping, and one would like to have clear tests to determine which notion is doing the work of specificity in any given case. Perhaps different dialects rely on these notions of specificity in different ways or to different degrees. For instance, in Cordoba Spanish, we have no reason to believe that direct objects are necessarily interpreted as event participants. This makes sense since there is no association to dative morphology. In this dialect, the internal structure of the DP giving rise to reification may be the only kind of specificity at work in direct object doubling.

A third open issue concerns the dialect differences that exist in clitic doubling languages. Cordoba/Rioplatense Spanish allows doubling with the accusative form clitics, whereas Leísta Spanish only allows doubling with the dative form clitics. We have addressed this question to some degree by giving an analysis of the syntax of dative and accusative form clitics and of doubling with these clitics. The question of the difference is now reduced to: Why do the
Cordoba/Rioplatense dialects allow determiner raising with an overt double complex DP structure where Leísta Spanish requires a null determiner?

Other more general questions that were not directly addressed in this thesis but are natural extensions of it are the following: (i) How does this analysis extend to languages with no clitics but specificity effects of the relevant kind? (ii) We have only addressed third person clitic doubling. How should first and second person doubling be handled? First and second person clitics in all dialects of Spanish behave like Leísta le in that the same form is used (me and te) regardless of grammatical function. Thus, we would predict that they should receive the same analysis as Leísta le. It may also be reasonable to think that me and te behave like le in that first and second person seem (intuitively) more likely to be event participants, given their status as discourse-present entities. (iii) Why do direct objects show specificity morphology? Again, we have addressed this third question to some degree. We have shown that subconstituents can move out of direct object DPs and not out of indirect object DPs. This question seems to be related to the difference between direct objects and indirect objects in terms of their status as event participants. We have argued that (true) indirect objects must be interpreted as event participants, whereas this is not necessarily the case for direct objects. We might imagine that because direct objects are optionally event participants, languages would tend to mark this difference. The details of how this connection
works and exactly why the semantic property of event participation would be reflected in this way remain unresolved here.
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