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In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and the Disruption of Rio’s Favelas

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In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and the Disruption of Rio’s Favelas

Abstract
This senior honors thesis explores the changing urban landscape of social inclusion in Rio de Janeiro as the city prepares itself for the 2016 Olympics. The study is driven by a simple question: who are the winners and losers in hosting the Games? The city is undergoing a number of infrastructure projects as it prepares for the Games, capitalizing on Olympic preparations but leaving significant populations of the city ignored. Combining economic development theory, tourism theory, and displacement theory, I focus on the specific case of Morro da Providência, Latin America’s oldest favela, to understand the eviction process that 835 families in this community are experiencing in favor of the construction of a cable car slated to be open in May 2013. This analysis explores the dynamics and tensions of urban renewal as it simultaneously operates on the global and local level in one of the most unequal cities in the world.

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IN THE SHADOW OF GLORY:
OLYMPIC PAGEANTRY AND THE DISRUPTION OF RIO'S FAVELAS

By
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In
Anthropology

Submitted to the
Department of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Deborah Thomas

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This senior honors thesis explores the changing urban landscape of social inclusion in Rio de Janeiro as the city prepares itself for the 2016 Olympics. The study is driven by a simple question: who are the winners and losers in hosting the Games? The city is undergoing a number of infrastructure projects as it prepares for the Games, capitalizing on Olympic preparations but leaving significant populations of the city ignored. Combining economic development theory, tourism theory, and displacement theory, I focus on the specific case of Morro da Providência, Latin America’s oldest favela, to understand the eviction process that 835 families in this community are experiencing in favor of the construction of a cable car slated to be open in May 2013. This analysis explores the dynamics and tensions of urban renewal as it simultaneously operates on the global and local level in one of the most unequal cities in the world.
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Asfalto  Formal city
Bairro    Formal neighborhood
BRT       Bus Rapid Transit
BRIC countries Brazil, Russia India, China — the fastest growing developing countries
Carioca   Resident of Rio de Janeiro
Conjuntos
DHESCA    Direitos Humanos Econômicos, Sociais, Culturais e Ambientais (Office of Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Human Rights)
Favela    Shanty town
Favela-Bairro Slum-to-neighborhood program
Favelados Favela residents
FIFA      International Federation of Association Football
HDI       Human Development Index
IAB-RJ    Instituto Arquitecto do Brasil – Rio de Janeiro
IMF       International Monetary Fund
IOC       International Olympic Committee
Loteamientos
Morar Carioca Literally, to live like a carioca. A new phase of Favela-Bairro program focused on the Olympics
Porto Maravilha Literally, “port of wonders.”
SMH       Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Housing Secretary)
Teleférico Cable car/gondola
UPP       Unidade de Polícia Pacificatoria – Police Pacifcatory Unit
Zona Oeste Western zone of the city
Zona Sul  Southern zone
1.1 Research question

The central question driving this senior honors research is twofold: “Who are the Olympics really for?” and “Are the Olympics an effective mechanism for growth in developing cities?” The Olympics are framed as a universal celebration of humanity, — they “embody all that is best in the human spirit and capture the hearts and minds of people around the world” — but in the end, there are winners and losers beyond the finish line as well (Rio 2016 Candidature file). Local residents of the host city often see few, if any, benefits to hosting the Games, and their lives may be greatly disrupted by the cost, crowds and construction caused by the event. The poorest neighborhoods are most vulnerable as strict timetables are used to justify top-down policies and limit opportunities for community input. This study focuses on the favela residents of Rio de Janeiro to explore the experience of one specific group left out of the promises of the Olympic dream. This analysis offers powerful insights into the effect of the Olympics on marginalized populations and into the structures of inequality that make this exclusion possible, even in the context of a left-oriented government that champions pro-poor policies.

1.2 Case selection

Rio 2016 is a remarkably rich case to study. With a booming economy and a series of pro-poor policies in place, in many ways Rio de Janeiro and Brazil as a whole seems primed to take off and host a successful Games for the world. But Rio 2016 is a study in crippling contrasts: of rich and poor, of rhetoric and reality, and of opportunities and missteps. These conflicts stand to undermine the success of the thirty-first Olympiad.
Rio de Janeiro — and Brazil as a whole — is experiencing incredible economic growth. Its booming GDP has replaced the United Kingdom’s as the fifth largest in the world. After a brutal military dictatorship and decades of neoliberal economic policies that made life increasingly difficult for the poor, Brazil is experiencing a decade of leftism geared toward inequality reduction and the growth of the middle class. The first Olympics to be held in South America, Rio 2016 is “the attainment of a dream for the entire South American continent” (Rio 2016 Candidature file). The Games function as “place-promotion”: they put Rio de Janeiro and Brazil on the map as a global city as a hub of economic, cultural, athletic and tourist activity. This Olympiad has the potential to bring in significant economic revenue and to revitalize poor sectors of society, all the while solidifying the development of a cohesive city identity.

The 2016 Games mark the end of a wave of mega-events that highlights the city’s focus on development and international public image. Rio hosted the Pan American games in 2007, the Global Military Games in 2011, the Rio+20 UN Conference in 2012, and will be hosting the two biggest sporting events in the next three years: the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. All of these events — and the Olympic Games in particular — are being framed as an opportunity for economic growth, infrastructure development and human rights development for the “entire civil society of Rio,” as the city’s mayor, Eduardo Paes noted (Downie 2011).

But a series of fault lines in Rio de Janeiro make this elusive promise of Olympic fixes unattainable. Vast persisting differences in wealth make Rio de Janeiro one of the most unequal cities in the world, with a Gini coefficient of .54 (World Bank 2012). The inequality in Rio manifests itself in the physical landscape of the city: one in five cariocas
lives in favelas, the precarious informal housing settlements located in the hills and outskirts of the city. Housing has always been a contentious point of struggle for Rio, and because the primary interaction between local host city residents and the Olympic Games is through real estate, the case of Rio de Janeiro is especially instructive in understanding the processes of Olympic exclusion and inclusion via housing (Shaw 2008). The social marginalization of particular demographic groups primes Rio for an inequitable delivery of Olympic benefits to its residents and puts precariously housed groups like favelados at risk.

This Olympiad falls in line with a growing pattern of developing nations hosting international mega-events. From the 2008 Beijing Olympics to the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, developing nations are using mega sports-events to jump start their economies and accelerate development. Mega-events are viewed as an opportunity for a quick fix to infrastructure problems, but often, underlying issues are not addressed in the rush to meet deadlines.

The particular case of the Morro da Providência favela highlights many of the challenges that Rio faces as an Olympic city. 832 residents face eviction to make way for Olympic works, which include a cable car slated to open in Providência in May 2013 [Table 1; Figure 3]. At 115 years old, Providência is Latin America’s oldest favela, and has survived over a century of aggressive favela removal campaigns by the municipal government. The displacement of poor favelados in areas like Morro da Providência signals the marginalized space that they occupy in society — cast aside and stigmatized, they are denied the full rights of their citizenship. The case of Providência illustrates the
government’s top-down Olympic urban renewal project, focused on a tourist-centered improvement of space rather than a concern for the wellbeing of its citizens. This example highlights the conflicting interests of global and local development needs in an Olympic city and the acute pressure that the Games put on the preexisting legal and physical structures of the municipality. Finally, Providência’s instances of resistance point to the complex power dynamics and the various locations of agency in Rio de Janeiro.

This paper focuses specifically on the Olympics, rather than the World Cup or the other mega events recently hosted in Rio because of the “idealist rhetoric of universal peace and international harmony” and the celebration of humanity that the Olympics supposedly celebrates (Tomlinson 2006). The disconnect between the rhetoric and its application is jarring. The preparations for the 2014 World Cup are nation-wide, in 12 cities, and are less focused on city-specific development. The 2016 Games are launching infrastructure projects in Rio unparalleled by the city’s other mega events, marking the Olympics as the most significant mega-event for the future of Rio’s urban planning.

Thus, Rio 2016 is a highly instructive case in studying the tensions of hosting a mega-event in a developing nation. The unique interplay between rapid economic development, mega-event tourism, and marginalized community displacement offers a number of compelling intellectual frameworks in which this analysis is based. The very benefits that the Games offer — infrastructure development, economic growth, and image promotion — also represent the very challenges that may undermine their success.

1.3 Methodology
My goal in writing this thesis is to explore the many different dynamics and experiences at play in the preparations for the Games. I drew from a wide variety of sources, from case studies of past Olympiads to firsthand accounts of eviction from Providência residents and news media coverage. I contrast official governmental files like the 2016 Candidature File with findings of human rights groups like the United Nations.

Because of the currency of this case, I drew heavily on news media, which has been crucial to staying up-to-date on the events in Rio. I balanced this approach with a strong emphasis on historical Olympic trends and economic and mega-event theory to provide some weight and context to the case of Rio de Janeiro.

Much of this thesis draws on firsthand accounts of the residents in Providência facing eviction. Many of their accounts have been recorded on community blogs like RioOnWatch, which has acted as a digital open forum for favela residents across the city to come together and share their experiences. Whenever possible I used primary sources — videos, first-person testimonials, to most accurately capture the experiences of the individuals experiencing displacement. Whenever possible, I read the text in the original Portuguese, translating words and sentences structures as needed.

It is important to acknowledge that the availability of information somewhat biases the sample available here. Large, information-rich communities like Morro da Providência, are more organized and tapped into a larger communications structure than smaller communities like the nearby Flor do Asfalto, which has received little coverage of the 35 families being evicted. I discuss this bias in greater length in section 5, which discusses the methodological limitations of my research.
1.4 Definitions

This thesis understands mega-events to be “major one-time or reoccurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term” that “rely on their success in terms of uniqueness, status, or timely significance to create interest and attract attention” (Ritchie 1984:2). This thesis primarily explores the dynamics of sports mega-events, like the Olympics and the World Cup, but other mega-events, like major conferences, can also have a similar pattern of effects on the host city. The Olympics, my focus in this paper, are often considered the ultimate mega-event, bringing together all of the dynamics together (Figure 5). While this discussion is in part based on the general economic and political climate in Rio de Janeiro, my focus in this paper is on the specific effects of the Rio 2016 Olympics on the city.

The other significant element to this work explores the life of favela residents. While the specific dynamics of favela life are complex and difficult to generalize, by favela I generally mean a shantytown in the hills of Rio de Janeiro where people live in informal housing settlements. I discuss the details of favelas in great detail in sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.3.

1.5 Thesis overview

This study first provides context to the different dynamics of the 2016 Games. A brief summary of mega-events theory, which focuses on the delivery of outcomes in past Olympiads, provides the context to Rio’s approach to the Games as a mechanism for economic growth. This is followed by a social, historical and political contextualization of
the favelas in Rio society, with a special look at historical trends that are evoked with the current conflict.

The third section discusses the current conflict in Rio between the government and the favelas that face eviction. This section incorporates first-hand accounts of the evictions, as told by residents. Finally, I discuss the implications of my analysis — what can Rio 2016 and the world learn from the experience of evicted favela residents? With a growing desire among developing countries to host mega-events, the events leading up to Rio 2016 have strong implications for future projects.

2. Background to the research problem

2.1 The elusive Olympic legacy

The Olympics are often hailed as the “Mother Teresa of global events,” a peaceful union of elite athletes to “unify the world for 17 glorious days in a celebration of athletic perfection” (Shaw 2008:17). The Olympics have led to ceasefires in armed conflicts and promote an idea that social transformation can be realized through sport (Toohey 2007).

Motivations for playing host to an Olympic Games are varied and widespread, but the seductive lure of the Olympics has attracted a healthy competition for Olympic host in almost every Games since World War II, notes Olympic economist Hølger Preuss (2004:83). Cities expect significant economic benefits in a number of categories, including expanded tourism, trickle-down growth, infrastructure improvements, increased employment and intangible benefits that range from “improved public welfare to enhanced international reputation to renewed community spirit” (Magnan 2010: xxviii) (Table 5).
Winning a bid to play host to an Olympiad is considered a huge honor, a transformative decision that validates the host city on the international stage. IOC President Jacques Rogge hailed the selection of Beijing as host for the 2008 Games as a “new era for China” (Longman 2001). Gianna Angelopoulous, Director of the Athens 2004 bid, emphasized the transformative aspects of hosting the Games when she said that Athens would be a “new city” that would give the world “the Olympics of their dreams” (Longman 1997). This mega-events rhetoric extends beyond the Olympics to many international sporting events: Thabo Mbeki beamed as he declared that “Africa’s time has come” after South Africa was awarded the 2010 World Cup bid (Meldrum 2004).

This rhetoric and excitement has spilled over to Rio de Janeiro. “Today is the most emotional day in my life, the most exciting day of my life,” said then-president Lula da Silva when Rio was selected to host the 2016 Games (Macur 2009). “I’ve never felt more pride in Brazil. Now, we are going to show the world that we can be a great country.”

But a deeper evaluation of the delivery of outcomes in past Olympiads reveals a mixed bag: economic benefits are often mediocre at best, infrastructure projects often go over budget, and real estate prices soar. “The Olympic games are the great circus maximus of planet earth,” notes sociologist and Olympic critic Helen Lenskyj (2008).

The Olympics puts the global orientation of the Games into direct conflict with local needs of the host city’s residents. The Olympics can create a hostile political and cultural climate in the host city in the months and years leading up to the Games, argues anti-Olympic activist Christopher Shaw (2012). The physical landscape is disrupted as Olympic construction takes hold and alters the fabric of the city. The glorified framing of the Games creates a narrative in which the “overriding goals of the Olympic movement
take precedence over petty concerns ... the bad things that happen on the local level are virtually inconsequential to the overall sweep and majesty of the Olympic experience” (Shaw 2008:18). It is often the local residents who end up absorbing the failures of hosting the Games, which include debt, unneeded infrastructure, crowding, rent increases, and “socially unjust displacement and redistributions” (Shaw 2008:18).

Local city taxpayers shoulder much of the cost of hosting the Games. For example, the initial estimates for the expenditure for London 2012 was £1.8 billion, noted at the time of the city’s bid for host to the games. By 2007, this number had risen to £7.1 billion (Magnan 2010:xxvii). The final numbers for the event, hosted just last year, have not been released yet.

The deeper failures of the Games — the long-lasting effects — take five, ten, or twenty years to become manifest (Magnan 2010:xxvi). The long-term impacts of the Games are under-studied; often attention shifts away from the host city as soon as the Olympic Torch is put out, as sports sociologist J. A. Magnan notes. Short-sighted evaluation makes it difficult to really understand the transformative effects of the Games: the Organizing Committee of an Olympic Games disbands two years after the Games end, cutting the 20-year process of analyzing the effects of a Olympiad short (Magnan 2010:xxix).

2.2 Place-promotion and global cities

Much of the excitement of hosting an Olympiad centers around the opportunity to introduce or solidify the host city’s “ascendancy and power on the world stage” (Reigel 2010:17). Mega events are now a “global marketing opportunity” (Tomlinson 2006:5). To
ensure a perfect debut or affirmation of the city’s elite global status, the city aims to paint a desirable image of a world-class metropolis, a tourist destination, and a utopic urban center that runs flawlessly.

Rio de Janeiro has a chance to prove to the world that it is ready to join the ranks of global cities like Barcelona and London, that it can put on a big party like Carnival but also host a complex international event like the Games or the World Cup. The Secretary of Housing, Pierre Batista, sees the Games as an opportunity to show Rio in a positive light: “The Cidade Maravilhosa now has the chance to remove itself from the reputation of disorganization and social exclusion that still remains and to become more enchanting to the eyes of visitors from throughout the world as well as offering better quality of life for all its citizens” (Selvanayagam 2010). A successful Olympics can lead to a virtuous cycle of image promotion: “The aura spread by the Olympic image can considerably promote the further development of a host city” (Preuss 2004: 290).

In the preparations to launch a flawless Games, Olympic cities transform into what Saskia Sassen has termed global cities. Economic, cultural and political powerhouses, global cities are urban centers that transcend national borders and drive the global economy while shaping the cultural and political landscape (Sassen 1991). Global cities enjoy efficient transportation and telecommunication structures; they have first-class tourism and cultural complexity (Sassen 1991). They are home to cosmopolitan citizens, are easily accessible by international airport and are economically important (Sassen 1991). Even host cities like Sochi, host to the 2014 Winter Games, or Salt Lake City, 2002 host, temporarily meet these criteria during the two weeks when the whole
world is watching (Preuss 2004). This is not to say that all host cities permanently
transform into global cities, but rather, that they meet these criteria during the Games.
Host city contenders are often hopeful that the structural improvements carried out for
the Olympics will leave residual effects.

2.2.1 Tourism and cultural performance

Olympic cities are tourist destinations. During the Olympics, host cities attract
elite visitors as well as the global masses. Past Games have attracted massive crowds to the
host city for the events: Los Angeles saw 770,000 out-of-city visitors during the 1984
Games; Atlanta saw 968,000 in 1996 (Preuss 2004). Non-US events are lower: Seoul only
saw 240,000 tourists in 1988, but Barcelona and Sydney both drew over 450,000 and both
Athens and Beijing surpassed 660,000 visitors (Preuss 2004).

A temporary jump in the number of tourists to the host city may bring in
economic revenue to local businesses but may present long-term challenges to the
tourism sector. Hotels often over-expand, failing to consider the post-event demand they
may see, leading to empty beds after being over-capacity for the two weeks between the
Opening and Closing Ceremonies. The tourist sector also risks losing regular visitors to
the city who avoid it because of the higher prices and overcrowding during the Games.
This change in consumption patterns often hurts the regular entertainment and leisure
industries in the host city (Preuss 2004: 293). Tourism traditionally spikes during the
Games but then returns to pre-Game levels in the aftermath, suggesting that the
Olympics have been unsuccessful in permanently reshaping a host city in the eyes of the
world and that an Olympic City may only temporarily be described as a global city (Preuss 2004).

There are still, however, intangible benefits to hosting the Games. Place-promotion can help to internally solidify the group identity of the city and nation. The cultural performances put on by the host city, like the Opening Ceremony confers a certain level of pride to city residents and the nation as a whole. The opening ceremony of the London 2012 Games celebrated the literary heritage of the nation; Beijing 2008 celebrated the long and complex culture of the nation. In a sense, the Olympics performs a nationalistic agenda, bringing together nations of the world in a controlled form of warfare—sport—and in doing so it “produces recurrent discourses on national identity” (Blanchard 1995; Tomlinson 2006:6).

But painting a celebratory and homogenous image of the nation can lead to marginalizing specific groups and minimizing the diversity of the nation. Contested national narratives are not included in the celebratory Opening Ceremonies. London 2012 did not shed light on the IRA; Beijing 2008 did all it could to cover up the allegations of human rights violations in the country (Yardley 2008). Sydney 2000’s Ceremony left aboriginal communities invisible, obscuring the darker side of Australia’s history (Longman 2000).

In preparation for the Games, Rio de Janeiro has constructed a number of walls separating favelas from the bairros, formalized neighborhoods (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 2011). This suggests that the narrative of life in the slums, often at odds with the government, will not be included in the Opening Ceremony, obscuring the importance of
favelas to carioca life. “In a game of visibilities and invisibilities, [the city] seeks to redesign representations regarding Rio de Janeiro: touristic city, integrated city and safe city” (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 2011). The favelas do not fit into this utopic image. The favela evictions that I discuss in great detail below further underline this process of rendering favelas invisible.

2.2.2 Local political atmosphere before and during the Games

The host city’s efforts to present a tranquil and pleasant city impacts the political environment of the region in the lead up to the Games. In some cases, mega-events may have positive effects, “prompting otherwise reluctant public officials into carrying out much-needed projects for the city” (Zimbalist 2012). But in many cases, Governmental efforts to minimize or erase political dissent in the lead up to the Games often leads to conflicts (Zimbalist 2012).

A series of conflicts between residents and the police leading up to the Summer 2012 Games in London highlighted the city’s “extremely low tolerance for dissent” (Qasim 2012). The city enacted the Anti-Social Behavioral Order to prevent any protests from erupting in the time leading up to the Games. This Order essentially evolved into a state of hyper-surveillance and limited free speech (Walker 2012).

Opposition is also being stamped out in Rio de Janeiro in attempts to project an image of a tranquil city. A number of protests against Olympics-related construction have been shut down by the Unidades Polícias Pacificadoras, the police units installed in violent neighborhoods (Bahia 2012). One such protest in the Américo Brum Square in Morro da Providência was shut down in April 2012 (Bahia 2012). The candidature file
obscures this dissent in its emphasis of the support that the city has for hosting the Games. “Rio 2016 has the full support of our government and Brazilian society as a whole… there is no organized public opposition to hosting the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio” (2016 Candidature File).

The Olympics create a frenzied political climate focused on achieving a specific set of goals by a specific deadline for a specific population. This leaves no room for “rational, effective long-term planning for the city,” as urban economist Andrew Zimbalist notes (2012). The municipal government’s primary focus is on preparing the city for the incoming international community, privileging the global over the local. This “focus on building the city for the visitor class may strain the bonds of trust between local leaders and citizenry” as the civic agenda is skewed away from local interests to the “detriment of fundamental municipal services,” notes urbanist Peter Eisinger (2000). This is the tinder that can ignite tension between local protestors and the municipal government. Such was the case in Vancouver, where the No Games 2010 Coalition protested the city’s ignorance of homelessness, poverty, education and health in the city, instead putting on a display of bread and circus for the world (Shaw 2008).

In other cases, like Rio 2016, violations of city residents are more overt, yet seemingly justified by the Olympic context. “In a mega event, you basically justify not having to enforce human rights or environmental legislation. It is like they have suspended basic rights much like a state of emergency due to a war or a catastrophe,” notes Raquel Rolnik (2011) special rapporteur to the United Nations on adequate housing, who is currently studying the specific case of mega-sports events in Rio de
Janeiro. Jorge Bittar, municipal housing secretary, justifies the mass evictions in Rio through a seemingly simple logic: “No one is resettled if not for a very important reason,” he said (Romero 2012). What the government defines as very important is completely divorced from the residents’ perspective.

2.3 Infrastructure development

Beneath the intangible effects that place-promotion has on the urban atmosphere of a host city lies the hope and excitement that hosting the Games may provide concrete benefits — freshly paved roads, improved water and sewage, and more efficient public transport — to the host city. Infrastructure preparations for the Olympics can be a catalyst for urban renewal. The 2016 Candidature file notes that “for the people of Rio, the Games will transform their city with new infrastructure, new environmental, physical and social initiatives and new benefits and opportunities for all.” The idea that the Olympics can be a potential catalyst for developing this infrastructure is relatively new: early Olympiads were staged in existing spaces like parks and fairgrounds until the 1946 Tokyo Games (Zimbalist 2012).

2.3.1 Transportation

With a significant influx of people to the host city, roads and subways are often expanded and fortified in preparation for the incredible volume of visitors to the Games. Many host cities experienced transportation improvements in the preparations for the Games. In Sydney, bus and urban train systems were dramatically expanded (Lenskyj 2000). Barcelona constructed the B-20 motorway, a ring road that improved transit in the city and was opened just before the 1992 Games (Brunet 1995). Athens improved much
of its transportation infrastructure leading up to the 2004 Games by developing a new airport, ring road and subway system (Longman 1997).

The long-term impacts of these projects, however, are mixed. The Athens subway project was incredibly expensive, and the B-20 ring road in Barcelona led to controversial population displacement (Preuss 2004). Again, we see the growth is not always inclusive. This is a pattern that host cities have seen time and time again: transportation infrastructure that is meant to bring people together often proves to be divisive. This trend continues in Rio, where the highways that are connecting visitors to the Olympic sites in Rio de Janeiro are also creating gashes through neighborhoods and displacing poor cariocas who have no place to go (Figure 1).

The deadline structure of the Games creates an environment in which the work must be done quickly, and the city needs to find the easiest and fastest way to achieve that goal. Because many Olympiads host major events in the city center, where space is tight, host governments are forced to find the “weakest link,” the path of least resistance to getting the most work done as quickly and as cheaply as possible. This helps to explain the process by which poor neighborhoods are slighted and the people who live in them evicted. This is the case in Rio as well, where the favelados in the centrally located Morro da Providência are being displaced to make way for a cable car for tourists.

### 2.3.2 Sports Venues

Buying into the mantra of “if you build it they will come,” host city governments see the construction of sports venues as a keystone of Olympic development. In the eyes of politicians, stadiums represent a long-term investment in the economic health of their
cities. The construction of huge stadiums to host major events like track and field, as well as the Opening and Closing Ceremonies is often costly, but it is an investment that governments reason will pay off over time (Magnan 2010).

This is very rarely the case, however. Many Olympic stadia fall into disuse after the Games, never again attracting the hundreds of thousands of visitors that flocked to the Games. These Olympic “white elephants,” as J. A. Magnan describes them, still stand in Montreal, Sydney, Athens, Beijing, and an uncertain future awaits the 80,000-seat Olympic Stadium in London (Macur 2013). This Olympic overbuilding has left cities in debt, and can become an embarrassing physical symbol of a costly and problem-riddled Games. Further, stadium upkeep can continue to be a financial drain: The Athens stadiums, for example, cost the municipal government €100 million to maintain annually, despite rarely being used (Lyall 2013).

The construction of these sports venues is focused around tourism-centered development, focusing on attracting external revenues rather than developing the local economy. Olympic stadia rarely, if ever, address the needs of the local population or serve any functional purpose in the day-to-day workings of the city. Further, the funds spent on building the stadium could have been spent on other services to actually benefit the citizenry.

Eisinger (2000) argues that tourism-focused policies are a modern-day version of bread and circus. The redirecting of public funds to stadiums, convention centers or casinos, rather than schools, public housing or healthcare indicates that the municipal agenda is geared towards the betterment of visiting elites. It is a policy that favors constructing “stadiums for millionaires and tourists rather than schoolrooms for poor
children,” Eisinger argues (328). Stadia fall into disuse because the demand cannot be sustained by the permanent needs of local residents. The “projected spending and spillover benefits” of regional impact models never materialize (Porter 1999:61).

The most successful host cities seem to be those that construct few new stadiums, freeing up infrastructure funds to be spent on long-lasting benefits to the city. Barcelona only spent 9.1 percent of its total Olympic budget on constructing new venues, allowing for less sports arena investment and more money spent on infrastructure improvements to benefit city residents like new roads and sewage systems (Brunet 1995).

In this respect, Rio 2016’s prospects are promising. It has many preexisting stadia from earlier mega-events and is investing relatively little in venue construction. The budget included in the Candidature File allocates only US$490,250 to sports venue construction. In contrast, it allots significantly more for lasting infrastructure: US$ in 2008 4,451,487 in transportation and US$770,000 in power and electricity (Candidature File:127).

2.3.3 Housing

“The Olympic Games at the local level are all about real estate,” notes anti-Games activist Christopher Shaw (2008), who organized the No Games 2010 protest in Vancouver. Local residents are most impacted by the Games through the long-term impact it has on their homes.

Both tangible and intangible displacements — eviction and gentrification/rising housing prices — have forced millions of people out of their homes in preparation or as a result of Olympic Games. 720,000 Seoul residents were evicted in 1988. 30,000 people
were displaced in Atlanta in 1996, and 9,000 of the city’s homeless were arrested in an effort to “clean up the streets” in preparation for the Games (COHRE). 1.5 million people were displaced in preparation for Beijing 2008 (COHRE). A network of Brazilian activists from across the country estimate that 170,000 people will be evicted from their homes in preparation for the 2014 Cup and the 2016 Games (Romero 2012).

Coupled with forced evictions from homes is a second process of intangible displacement via gentrification. Promises of affordable housing have been a constant feature of recent Olympic bids but have failed to materialize in almost all post-Games cities and are instead replaced with rising real estate prices in poor neighborhoods. Cox et. al (1994) argues that “the experience of previous host cities for the Games indicates that the Olympic Games have usually contributed significantly to the worsening of housing affordability and access for low-income people” (45).

Even in cities generally considered a success, like Barcelona, we see rising housing prices extending across the whole city, “making housing accessibility quite difficult for the local population” (Lenskyj 2008:27). The average Barcelona family needed to dedicate more than 54 percent of its annual income to pay rent or mortgage in the years following the Games. This says nothing of poorer populations, who have actually moved out of the city in large part (Lenskyj 2008). The East End of London is currently experiencing gentrification as a product of the Games being hosted there last summer, and emerging evidence suggests that Morro da Providência is observing a spike in real estate prices as Olympic construction continues there (Colbert 2012).

Preuss (2004) argues, however, that the real-estate speculation that occurs in Olympic cities after the Games may be connected to national economic trends, rather
than directly linked to hosting the Games. To link rising housing prices with the Olympic Games, argues Preuss, there must be a demonstration of a redirecting of funds for “social housing schemes to erect the Olympic Village and that less apartments were created than would have been possible through alternative housing projects costing the same amount of money” (263). He notes that there is little data to support this theory.

Taking Preuss’s critique into account, it becomes even more evident that the rise in housing prices in Morro da Providência is a result of Olympic works. The rise in commercial real estate in Providência is currently growing at twice the rate of the rest of the city (Barbosa 2013). Providência’s real estate speculation cannot be linked to larger national trends: where Brazil has seen an annual GDP growth of over four percent for more than a decade, the spike in real estate prices in Providência can be traced to 2010, when the Olympic works started in the neighborhood (Colbert 2012).

2.3.4 Improvements to urban ecology

Rising real estate prices may also be linked to the general atmospheric improvements in the urban ecology. The tangible infrastructure improvements may translate into a revival of the urban life of a city through the interplay of the built environment and the lived experience of residents.

With new sports venues, parks, leisure time recreation areas, improved transportation, and housing, the city stands to see a cultural revitalization through an improvement in the quality of public space (Preuss 2004:94). Olympic cities are nice places to be. Atlanta, host of the 1996 Games, invested more than US$71.7 million into “city atmosphere” in preparation for the Games, and the effects of this continue today

But these benefits are also not equally experienced across all sectors of society. It is not inclusive growth: often only the elites benefit from these changes. Only the citizens with “money to spend” benefit from the physical improvements to the city; “the impoverished sector of the population gain little benefit if leisure time quality is improved by attractive follow-up events or if living is improved by offering expensive housing near the city centre in a nice city atmosphere” (Preuss 2004: 93). With neither the time nor the resources to spend on additional leisure time, the poor do not see the benefits of these ecological improvements.

2.4 The Olympics as a mechanism for economic growth

Economic development has increasingly become a significant motivator in hosting the Olympics. Short-term benefits — direct revenue generated from commerce and tourism — are coupled with long-term goals sought through lasting touristic and trade effects.

Examples like Los Angeles and Barcelona, where investments were low and returns were high, make bidding cities hopeful. Los Angeles 1984 brought in an incredible surplus of US$200 million, making it by far the most financially successful host city in terms of directly generated revenue because it attracted corporate sponsors (Abrahamson 2001). Barcelona, host of the 1992 Games, is often lauded as the poster child for an Olympiad with long-lasting economic benefits (Brunet 1995: 8). It spurred significant infrastructure development in the region, created over 20,000 permanent jobs,
ignited a four-year construction boom, and helped to reverse economic stagnation in the region (Brunet 1995). The Games transformed the city and helped reshape its global image.


Los Angeles and Barcelona, however, are the exceptions, not the rule. Most host cities in the last half century have overestimated the positive impact that hosting the Games could have on their economy — many, like Montreal 1976 and Athens 2004 are left in significant debt after playing host (Preuss 2004:175). Montreal’s US$1.5 billion in debt took 30 years to pay off; Athens was left with a public sector debt of five percent of GDP (Bray 2011:100). The Athens government paid for nearly 80 percent of the Olympic budget for the 2004 Games, and only 15 percent of the total budget was spent on infrastructure (Preuss 2004:176).

Summer Games since the millennium have brought in between US$5 —$6 billion in total revenue, with nearly half of this income siphoned off to the International Olympic Committee (Zimbalist 2012). In contrast, expenditures have risen to exorbitant amounts: US$16 billion in Athens, US$40 billion in Beijing, and an estimate of almost US$20
billion in London (Zimbaliast 2012). Only some of this spending went toward long-term
infrastructure projects that continued to have positive benefits after the Closing
Ceremony. Further, long-term benefits of hosting the Games are not realized as demand
for Olympic services and infrastructure is reduced over time (Preuss 2004).

The Rio de Janeiro municipal government estimates that with hosting the Games
will come 50,000 temporary and 15,000 permanent jobs in construction, retail and
tourism — with job training for 48,000 residents — and more than 24,000 new homes for
residents after the Olympic Village is vacated (Candidature file). The city’s hope is that
the economic surplus will free up money for other social programs.

City Mayor Eduardo Paes, echoes this sentiment, emphasizing the social
improvements the Games, and the city’s series of mega-events will have for the city:
“Within a short time, the city will be the base of a number of international events that will
mark its future history… with these scenarios, we want the city to continue moving up
the reference scale of the Human Development Index (HDI) in terms of quality of life and
social inclusion. The opportunity is now, and I believe it is something that we may not
have again” (Selvanayagam 2010).

2.5 Specific challenges to host cities in the Global South

The Olympics offers an elusive dream to all hosts, but the unique set of
opportunities and challenges that it presents to cities in developing nations requires
special attention. More and more developing nations are hosting mega-events, like the
Beijing 2008 Olympics, the 2010 South Africa World Cup, and the upcoming World Cups
in Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022). The benefits of playing host in the specific context of developing countries, however, remain unclear.

Mega events offer developing cities a chance for accelerated economic and infrastructure development, a way to jumpstart the country’s fiscal and physical growth. The Games may act as a catalyst to speed up municipal and state decision-making, overcoming political gridlocks and recalcitrant politicians and “impelling the city to finally do what was long overdue,” argues Zimbalist (2012). Such was the case with Athens’ transportation and construction updates. The highly public image of the Olympics may also put positive pressure on politicians to improve their human rights and environmental record, as was observed in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Games (Longman 2001).

These short-term benefits, however, may be premature or superficial. The international media attention might lead a host nation to push problems further under the table, acknowledging that there is a problem but feeling that there is not enough time to adequately address the root issues before the Opening Ceremony. Any infrastructure investments that come to a host nation are often linked to greater investments in stadiums and general preparations for the bid and staging of the mega-event (Lenskyj 2008).

International sporting event organizers like FIFA and the International Olympic Committee are not focused on developing economies but rather are for-profit groups with the primary aim to generate revenue and promote international athletics. The technical requirements of the IOC and FIFA are consistent across the board and do not consider the additional cost of compliance for nations with more work to do in meeting
the IOC standards (Alegi 2009, 398). South Korea spent US$2 billion on new stadiums in preparation for the 2002 World Cup while Germany, only four years later, spent only US$700 million because of the preexisting infrastructure it had in place (Alegi 2009:398).

In all cases, the justification of Olympic expenditures must be considered in the larger context of the host city’s economy. Baade and Matheson (2003) argue that with this view it is painfully clear that the opportunity cost to hosting the Games is exorbitantly higher in developing nations (15). The US$15 billion that the Chinese spent in Beijing in 2008 could have arguably been better spent on healthcare, environmental concerns, education and housing in the region (Zimbalist 2012). While the same arguments could be applied to the US$15 billion that London spent in 2012, the pressing need for this funding is much lower in London, where the standard of living is on average much higher and more people have more access to higher quality healthcare and education.

The case of the 15th Pan American Games, which took place in Rio in 2007, highlights the tensions of hosting a mega-event in a developing BRIC nation. The Pan American Games were the first mega-event hosted in Brazil in 44 years, meaning that costly investments in sports venues were needed, leaving the city with significant debt (Curi et al 2011). The 2007 candidature bid offered empty promises for a legacy of transportation improvements, investment in social projects and public security, economic stimulation and a far-reaching urban transformation — these promises were not realized (Curi et al. 2011).

2.6 Political and economic growth in Brazil
Dilma Rousseff’s presidential election in the fall of 2010 cements a decade of leftist shift in Brazilian politics (Pomar 2011). Lula da Silva’s two-term presidency, which started in 2003, was marked primarily by a leftist social agenda that expanded the political arena to include the poor (Sader 2009). His social programs, like the *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer program, tackle issues like hunger, education, poverty and inequality that face the urban and rural poor. (Bohn 2011). During his tenure 20 million people rose out of acute poverty and inequality dropped 5.5 percent (*The Daily Beast*). The passing of the torch to Rousseff, Lula’s chief of staff, marks a continuity in this leftist agenda (Pomar 2011).

Brazil’s decade of leftism is in line with a larger shift to the left in Latin American politics — Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela have popularly elected leftist leaders as well — as a rejection of the neoliberal economic policies espoused by many of the military dictatorships of the 1980’s (Paramio 2006). The pro-business approach of economic neoliberalism — the privatization of public banks and companies, the attraction of speculative capital, and the retraction of social functions of the state — lead to a “deterioration of the legitimacy of the state,” emphasizing a system that sustained the accumulation of capital over the collective needs of its citizenry to the detriment of the poor (Sader 2009:28; Harvey 2003:940). Latin America’s 21st century leaders are working to rebuild the state delivery of social services and refashion the government and economy to serve the people. Hugo Chavez’s death in March 2013 may represent a complication to the Venezuelan left, though his leftist Vice President and interim successor Nicolas Maduro has been consistently leading in the polls leading up to
the April 14 election, suggesting a continuity in Chavez’s leftist politics (Hinterlaces Poll 2013).

While da Silva’s and Rousseff’s tenures have focused in large part on remedying the social problems developed under neoliberalism, it has not entirely abandoned neoliberalism as an economic model (Sader 2009). Where Argentina and Bolivia, among others, re-nationalized key companies and banks, Brazil has left companies privatized, interest rates high, and a highly global trade network in place (Sader 2009).

The Brazilian economy has expanded at an unprecedented rate during the last decade, with about a four percent average annual GDP growth (Rhode 2012). In 2010 it grew a remarkable 7.5 percent and in 2012, it overtook the United Kingdom as the fifth largest economy in the world, valued at US$ 2.52 trillion (Mozée 2012). In 2012 it also lent nearly US$ 10 billion to the IMF in response to the Eurozone crisis, solidifying its geoeconomic ascendancy (Winnett 2012). The economy is complex and diverse: major industries include mining, banking, oil and gas, hydroelectric energy, as well as automobile manufacturing, steel production and technology (Forbes 2008).

The middle class has expanded significantly over this period — the Getulio Vargas Institute approximates that 33 million people entered this economic bracket under Lula da Silva’s tenure (Cortes Neri 2009). Now about 106 million Brazilians out of a population of 190 million fall into this economic bracket (The Daily Beast).

But this promising boom has its limits: Brazil’s economic growth has not proven to be inclusive — Brazil remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. With Gini coefficient of .54, it is more unequal than the other BRIC countries (World Bank 2012). 2010 census data reveals that half of the Brazilian population continues to live on
less than R$373/month (~US$180), significantly less than the R$510 minimum wage in 2010 (Leahy 2011). As the middle class expanded, tens of millions of people missed out on the opportunities presented under da Silva and Rousseff.

Growth does not directly translate to poverty reduction, and can in fact exacerbate inequality, as Jeffrey Sachs argues in his 2005 work *The End of Poverty*. Urban sociologist Loïc Wacquant supports this view, arguing that social inequality “persists and deepens within a context of overall economic prosperity” in contexts of advanced marginality and structural inequality (Perlman 2010:158).

Da Silva’s and Rousseff’s social policies have not succeeded in equally distributing the wealth among the classes. We can see the limited benefits for economic growth in the persisting inequality in Rio de Janeiro, where an unequal distribution of assets, including property, is preventing inclusive growth.

### 2.7 The favelas of Rio de Janeiro

Inequality in Rio de Janeiro manifests itself in the physical landscape of the city, whereas poor favelados live separate lives from the rich cariocas with beachfront properties. The favelas are often viewed as stigmatized spaces, populated by people living on the social margins, despite the physical centrality of many favelas in the city. Urban anthropologist Janice Perlman contests this view, however, arguing that favelas are central to the social fabric of quotidian carioca life (1976). Favelas may offer physical proximity to the urban center but they remain on the periphery of the political priorities of the state.
Rio’s is the largest favela population in Brazil. It is disproportionately populous: it represents a quarter of the national favela population despite the fact that Rio only accounts for three percent of the total Brazilian population (Perlman 1976). 700 favelas pepper the city in total (Tusia 2012); of the 5,857,904 Cariocas living in Rio de Janeiro at the time of the 2000 Census, 1,092,476 were officially living in favelas (Perlman 2010:52). This is 18.7 percent of the carioca population, though it is difficult to measure an official number of residents in informal housing. Rio’s favelados have outpaced the general growth of Rio’s population every in every decade since 1950 except the 1970’s, when 100,000 favela residents were evicted under the military dictatorship regime (Perlman 2010:53). Rio’s favelas grew by 6.5 percent in the second half of the 20th century; the city grew by 2.5 percent in the same time period (Perlman 2010:53). This data strongly supports the view that favela residents are significant to Rio de Janeiro’s culture, economy and society and should not be victimized by the government.

2.7.1 Definitions

Infrastructure in Rio’s favelas ranges from communities with dirt roads and makeshift shacks constructed with plastic, wood and scrap metal to neighborhoods with electricity, paved roads, running water and apartments with multiple floors (Tusia 2012). Many of these homes were built by the residents, anthropologist James Holston notes in his analysis of informal settlement patterns in Brazil (Holston 1991a). The official definition of a favela, as defined by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, is a “settlement of 50 housing units or more located on public or private property and
characterized by disordered occupation without the benefit of essential public services” (Perlman 2010:59).

The government’s narrow definition, however, overlooks a significant portion of the population — favela population estimates range from one million to four million (Perlman 2010). This discrepancy can be accounted for by a broader definition of informal housing — one that includes both conjuntos and loteamientos in the official approximations. Data from the 2000 Brazilian census shows that 37 percent of Rio’s population was living in informal housing, with favela residents making up 18.7 percent of that population (Perlman 2010). Another 12 percent lives in conjuntos while the remaining six percent of informal residents live in loteamientos (Perlman 2010). A loteamiento is a clandestine, quasi-legal residence in the hillside, while a conjunto is a type of public housing with little governmental involvement — a poorly maintained apartment building rife with violence and overcrowded with poor residents (Perlman 2010).

A fourth group of peripheral residents is the homeless, who are often ignored entirely from the study of marginal housing in Rio de Janeiro. While little data exists on the percentage of homeless cariocas, Brazil’s Economic Research Institute Foundation estimated in 2003 that 2,500 cariocas were homeless. People living in all of these settlement patterns are being displaced by Olympic works.

2.7.2 History

The Olympic favela removal evokes a long and tumultuous history between the municipal government and favelados that dates back over a century. To understand the
current evictions, we must understand the context in which the favelas evolved in relation to the government and its larger view for Rio’s 20th century urban planning. Because one of the basic assumptions in property rights is the idea that “historical precedent confers legitimacy,” it is important to understand the history and root of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro to understand the context in which people chose and were forced to settle there (Holston 1991b: 697).

Rio’s favelas arose amid the abolition of slavery and an aggressive urban renewal and removal project. The end of slavery in 1888 resulted in a housing shortage in many of Brazil’s urban centers as ex-slaves flocked to cities looking for work (Brandão 2006). This housing shortage forced ex-slaves into unhygienic tenements in the city center, much to the chagrin of the city’s then-mayor, Pereria Passos (Brandão 2006).

Passos began a significant urban renewal project to simultaneously clear the city of this illiterate class of poor ex-slaves and to model Rio after the great European cities. The parallels between the current preparations for the Olympics and this effort to “express Rio’s increasing importance on the international scene” and to “elevate it to the same level of other important international cities” and are unmistakable (Brandão 2006:39).

The city beautification process was closely modeled off Baron Haussmann’s work in Paris 30 years prior. Passos’s administration, with support from the federal government, tore down numerous tenements to construct stately buildings in the European architectural style and to build wide avenues modeled on the Champs-Elysées (Brandão 2006:42). The Théâtre Municipal was inspired by the Paris Opera House, and the Avenida Rio Branco are products of this public works effort.
More than 3,000 tenement homes were destroyed during Passos’s tenure, forcing the poor out of their homes and into the hills. A small settlement of soldiers had established themselves in what is now Morro da Providência in 1897, waiting for land promised by the government as payment for their military service (Perlman 1976). Many of the evicted ex-slaves joined the soldiers in Providência, solidifying the area as a housing settlement (Brandão 2006). One thousand residents from the Cabeça do Porco tenement were evicted and moved to Morro da Providência (Perlman 1976:76). Other favelas like Mangueira popped up in the hillsides in the years following as the government continued to create a hostile and inhospitable environment to poor cariocas (Perlman 1976:79).

Favelas emerged as a product of state-produced poverty and from a paradoxical combination of governmental aggression and indifference. The basis of the favelas in the hills is twofold. First, hillside homes offered proximity to the workplace in the Zona Sul (Southern Zone). Second, falling just outside the city limits, settlement in the hills did not violate the Rio de Janeiro Civil Code of Public Works, which forbade the building of unauthorized homes or improvement of preexisting building structures within the city limits (Pino 1997b:41).

Favela-governmental relations have remained antagonistic since their inception, with the main goal of the government consistently being favela removal. Favelas were first officially recognized by the Rio government in 1937 when the municipal building code declared them illegal (Frisch 2012). Direct favela removal campaigns began in the 1950’s and continued more aggressively through the 1970’s (Fischer 2008). Though a 1956 law banned the eviction of favela residents, the military dictatorship that ruled from 1964 to
1985 ignored that law and was especially forceful in legislating new favela removal policies (Fischer 2008).

By the end of the 1970’s, it is estimated that the dictatorship had relocated over 100,000 favela residents, exacerbating their already precarious financial positions and disrupting communities (Perlman 2010). Many residents of favelas in the Zona Sul, near the city center, were relocated to far-off shantytowns in the Zona Oeste (Western Zone) where they had to pay a significantly higher price to commute to work near their former homes in the Zona Sul (Tusia 2012). The favela population dropped significantly in this period, only to rise again in the 1980’s and 1990’s, with drug lords regulating social order in the void left by the government (Tusia 2012:14). In 1982, the government cut a deal with the drug lords that prohibited the police from entering the favelas, depriving favelados of state protection as drug-related violence raged (Perlman 2010:175).

More recently, programs have shifted from slum removal to efforts to control and contain the individuals in the favelas (Tusia 2012:17). The discourse has shifted from spatial removal to a control over bodies of the poor. However, as I argue below, the recent razing programs by the government in preparation for the Olympics is much more in line with earlier programs of slum removal.

Economic shifts have contributed to favela growth. In booms, migrants flock to the city seeking jobs (Pino 1997b). For example, Rio’s favelas exploded in the 1940’s under Getulio Vargas’s urban industrialization programs — part of the larger Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic model of the time — that attracted hundreds of thousands of poor rural migrants to the city (Pino 1997b). Most settled in the favelas as they looked for work. Once they arrived in Rio, however, many struggled to
find industrial jobs and instead found work in the formal and informal service sectors (Tusia 2012). Rio’s favela population nearly tripled during the 1960’s, at the peak of the ISI model (Pino 1997b:159).

Favelas also grow in a contracting economy. As the military dictatorship moved in and shifted away from ISI economics to neoliberalism, the public sector and service sector jobs that employed poor migrants in the 1960’s were the hardest hit by the economic shift to privatization (Tusia 2012:117). With a contracting of the welfare state’s safety net, many of these unemployed migrants who were not previously living in the favelas moved in, unable to afford rents elsewhere.

It is important to understand the economic and political forces that pushed the poor into the favelas. It was not an idle choice by lazy people unwilling to pay for housing but rather it was “historically contingent upon the workings of larger, structural forces and of changes in the global economy,” as anthropologist Tusia Tomi notes (2012). Economist Hernando de Soto (2000) echoes this point: “The migrants became extralegals to survive: They stepped outside the law because they were not allowed inside,” (87). The inconsistent ebbs and flows of aggressive removal policies were highly disruptive — residents moved in during peaceful periods, only to be forced out by later governmental aggression.

2.7.3 Opportunity structures and quality of life in Rio’s favelas

This brief history of favelas in Rio de Janeiro illustrates favela development was primarily the result of governmental forces, rather than in the hands of favela residents. What implications does this have for the agency that favelados have over their own lives?
Do they enjoy the same level of social and economic mobility as non-favela residents?

Wage inequality between favela residents and *bairro* residents is stark. Janice Perlman, an urban anthropologist who has studied Rio’s favelas since the 1970’s, found that in the South Zone, the most unequal area of the city, non-favela residents earned 566 percent more monthly than favela residents, according to 2010 census data (Perlman 2010:58). Favela residents have little access to healthcare or waste management and report being underfed at a higher rate than the city’s general population (Perlman 2010: 158). On average, favelados report higher rates of unemployment, are less educated, have less access to social services, and live in more crowded houses (Perlman 2010:159).

Education in favelas offers fewer opportunities to students than schools in the *asfalto*, the formal urban grid. “Being in a favela means having teachers who are not as good as the ones who teach in *bairros* and who only show up 2-3 times a week; having less social support for staying in school; being in a crowded (usually noisy) home with the television on and no room to study or for privacy” (Perlman 2010:236). Non-favela residents earn about twice as much as favela residents where both groups have completed high school (Perlman 2010:238).

Further, much of the favelados’ wealth is invested in their homes. There is a low return on investment because the houses are in the informal market, reducing their capacity for residential mobility. Homes in the favelas “are not integrated into the formal property system and as a result are not fungible and adaptable to most transactions” (De Soto 2000:87). This economic pressure keeps favelados in favelas.

But favelas are not necessarily concentrated areas of poverty where all residents have no opportunity for upward social mobility. Not all poor people live in favelas', and
not all people who live in favelas are necessarily poor. This is a crucial detail to note in understanding the current evictions in Rio — it is the intersection of precarious housing and low socioeconomic status that makes the evictions in Rio such a significant challenge to the urban poor. Favelas lead to a combination of economic and political discrimination, mediated through property laws and the economic valuation of property that leads to a strong correlation between poverty and favela residence. But this connection does not hold true in all cases. The favelas are in many ways a symbol, a tangible space, for poverty in Rio, but this heuristic device has its shortcomings.

Janice Perlman’s findings suggest that favelas may be a temporary housing option for some residents — that they move freely in and out of the hills. She observed a relatively high degree of residential mobility when surveying the current occupancy patterns of the favela residents she had interviewed 30 years ago. About as many of them continued to live in favelas 30 years later as had moved to bairros, or formal legal neighborhoods. Further, the grandchildren of the original occupants lived in legal neighborhoods at almost twice the rate as those who continued to live in favelas (Perlman 2010:337). Considering the relative ease of expanding auto-constructed houses to absorb the spatial demands of a growing family, this statistic is strongly indicative of the outward mobility opportunities available in favelas.

There is also a growing trend of gentrification currently happening in some of the more centrally located favelas, indicating two-way mobility (Santos Olivera 1996). Race does not seem to be a strong indicator of social mobility in favelas: Perlman did not find any correlation between being light skinned and having the social mobility to leave favelas at higher rates (156).
But many other favelados choose to stay, despite having the financial or social capital to move away. They cite strong social ties and attachment to their home as primary factors in their decision. Members of community organizations invest time and energy into community work, becoming deeply rooted in their community and expressing a reluctance to leave, even if they have the financial agency (Perlman 2010).

This analysis of residential mobility speaks to the varied levels of agency over residential patterns among favela residents. One constant, however, is the adverse effects of favela removal for all residents, who are denied agency over their lives when the government launches a removal campaign. Favelados who are too poor to move are adversely affected from the displacement, left with no home and not enough funds to relocate elsewhere. Those who want to stay are deprived of the positive social benefits of favelas when they are forced out. Favela displacement deeply disrupts the social fabric of the community and any compensation home owners might receive from the government would not mirror the investment they made in the land. We see all of these dynamics at play in the Olympic removals taking place in Morro da Providência.

2.7.4 Perceptions/Representations of favelados

Corollary to an examination of economic mobility in favelas is an examination of social and spatial mobility. Understanding the social space that favelados occupy in carioca society is crucial to understanding the present-day processes of favela removal.

Eighty-three percent of favela residents in 2001 said that they believed their residence in a favela to be a major source of discrimination in their lives (Perlman 2010:154). Race is also perceived as a factor of discrimination among favelados: Perlman’s
recent study revealed that 80 percent of older favelados, who have lived there for over 30 years, perceive skin color to be a basis of stigma (155).

The discourse surrounding favelas often refers to them as Río’s primary urban problem. Latin American scholar Daniel Goldstein (2004) suggests that poor people in Latin American cities are treated as “marginals,” and are viewed as “backward, aggressive, and uncivilized in nature, qualities that their geographical position on the urban periphery reflects” (12).

The city walled off favelas during the 2007 Pan American Games and began a similar process in 2009 around favelas in the Zona Sul in preparation for the Olympics and World Cup (Tusia 2012). The walling of favelas marks an effort by the municipal government to create “islands of excellence to be shown on television, thus hiding the unsightly parts of the city: the poor neighborhoods and favelas” (Curi et al. 2011). Teresa Caldeira (1996) argues that this erection of physical boundaries amplifies inequality as it “creates environments that generate the sense that different groups belong to separate universes and have irreconcilable claims… cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion” (317).

Janice Perlman powerfully disputes this classical conception of favelas as marginalized spaces. In her seminal 1976 work *The Myth of Marginality* and again in her recent 2010 book simply titled *Favela*, she argues that favelados are in fact “not marginal at all but inextricably bound into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own interests” (Perlman 2010:150). They play an integral role in the economic and political realms of carioca life, but they are “exploited, manipulated and repressed… although they are neither socially nor culturally marginal, they are stigmatized and excluded from a
closed class system” (Perlman 2010:150). Economist Hernando de Soto estimates that the extralegal sector accounts for up to two-thirds of the total economic output in Latin America (85).

Perlman argues that the discourse surrounding favelas in many ways shapes the perception and reality of the hillside homes. Drawing on the Foucauldian conception of discourse as a system of ideological thoughts that construct the worlds which they describe, this image of a dangerous, crime-ridden area with lazy and uneducated residents perpetuates the stigma surrounding the space and shapes the interactions residents have with civil society and the government (Foucault 1972:25). “The power of the ideology and discourse of marginality was so great that it became self-fulfilling, justifying favela removal and perversely creating precisely the disaffection and disconnection that was professed to be a danger to the stable social order in the first place” (Perlman 2010:150).

In highlighting the central role that they play in shaping carioca culture and society, Perlman is reframing the discourse surrounding favelados to one that acknowledges their function and utility in society. This view, one that emphasizes the cultural and economic contributions of favelados — from soccer, slang and samba to consuming products at inflated prices and taking on the worst jobs for the lowest pay — asserts the importance and value of favelados to Rio society.

This perspective is what the municipal government must consider before razing favela communities across the city in preparation for the mega-events of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. “Insofar as the favela residents are seen as “social problems” the idea of getting rid of them will never be off the policy table” (Perlman 2010:148).
Favelas like Morro da Providência have made historical and contemporary contributions to the culture that defines life in Rio de Janeiro. “Providência is part of one of the most important cultural sites in Afro-Brazilian history, where the first commercial sambas were composed and traditions like capoeira and candomblé flourished,” notes the Providência Residents Commission (2012).

Contemporary favela culture is also flourishing. Electronic music is thriving in the downtown favela of Lapa, which hosted its second annual Rio Funk Parade in November 2012 (Vitali 2013). The Carioca Design Center recently hosted an exhibition of 125 pieces of modern art designed by residents from 15 favelas (UPP Social 2012).

In Morro da Providência, cultural organizations are thriving. Mauricio Hora, a photographer who grew up in Providência, founded Favelarte, an educational, cultural and entertainment organization with a focus on improving the quality of life in Providência (Williamson and Hora 2012). Providência residents also organized a haute cuisine food festival and competition last November, bringing together the specific cuisines of various favelas in the city (Clarke 2012).

2.7.5 The location of political power and agency in favelas

In the absence of an active government working to provide public services to its citizens, favelados have a long history of providing for themselves. What started as Residents’ Associations that provided services like street paving, electricity and water has evolved into more focused political organizations centered on demanding rights and services.
Residents’ Associations were thrust into the political sphere as concerted favela removal programs surged in the 1970’s. Groups mobilized around “government inaction or hostile displacement programs led jointly by government and real estate interests,” notes sociologist Michel Fontaine (1985:65). As eviction efforts slowly waned, resistance organizations shifted their focus to the political arena, with an aim to “secure community stability and obtain basic infrastructure” (Fontaine 1985: 61). This “emergence of new participatory publics expanded substantive citizenship to new social bases” as they searched for channels to access political power (Holston 2011). They found allies on the peripheries of the formal sector: in opposition politicians, radical journalists and charitable organizations (Holston 2011). The Federation of Residents’ Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro demanded fundamental urban services from the government and was particularly adept at influencing candidates for City Council Positions, until the mid-1980’s when drug lords became the primary leaders of favelas and operated primarily in extralegal channels (Perlman 2010:175).

Contemporary political organizations in favelas have shifted to a more policy-oriented agenda. The push for the regularization of property has become the primary goal since the 1990’s, with the view that ownership guarantees residents a secure home and ensures the “continued existence” of the favela (Santos Olivera 1996). Fontaine (1985) notes that these associations have ”a detectable amount of interstitial or residual power, temporary perhaps, furtive or ephemeral, but not less real in those sectors [the favelas] of Brazilian society” (61). Community-based political organizations in favelas have empowered their residents to find viable channels to political power, leveraging their power and entering into consciousness about their rights as citizens.
These organizations introduced the idea of a right to legal rights, which is crucial in a democracy and for the pursuit of equality (Holston 1996b:722). “Among the conditions necessary for democracy is that people acknowledge those from different social groups as co-citizens, i.e., as people having similar rights,” notes Caldeira (1996:310).

The municipal government has become more involved in the delivery of services in recent years. It launched Favela-Bairro, a “slum to neighborhood” project in 1995 with the goal of “promoting urban and social integration” and “reversing the process of urban decline that follows the growth of spontaneous low-income settlements in metropolitan areas” (Prefeitura de Cidade do Rio de Janeiro). It aims to update the urban infrastructure in 72 communities and thus better integrate them into the asfalto grid of official carioca life (Brakarz 2004). The program has seen some improvements in the physical infrastructure of favelas, but has been criticized for its forceful top-down approach to community work. The program has evolved in recent years into the Morar Carioca program, with a special focus on favelas surrounding Olympic sites.

The distinct locations of agency between this governmental program and the political organizing based in favela communities speak to the different power dynamics in play in these two approaches. Who has control over the delivery of social services and infrastructure in Rio’s favelas illustrates the agency that residents have in determining their own fates. Governmental involvement may not necessarily translate to citizen control, as the Favela-Bairro program illustrates. This distinction is important in understanding the Olympic evictions in Morro da Providência and across the city.
2.8 Claims to legal property in favelas

A third crucial factor in shaping the rights and power of favelados is the regulation of property in the legal code. Property is a powerful asset that confers its owners economic agency (De Soto 2000:59). Property is closely associated with citizenship and property ownership often translates into rights.

The Brazilian legal system does not adequately regulate property law in its legal code, which in some cases leads to conflict and in other cases, to resolution or ignored and unperturbed extralegal practices (Holston 1991b). With roots in the colonial legal codes designed with the express intention of consolidating large swaths of land for rich elites, Brazilian land law is complex, contradictory and not designed with the interests of the poor and landless in mind (Holston 1991b).

An intricate layering of conflicting laws on the municipal, state and federal level combined with irregular enforcement of the law has lead Holston (1991b) to conclude that “land law in Brazil promotes conflict, not resolution” (695). In his comprehensive analysis of Brazilian land law from the colonial period to the present, he argues that the law so frequently produces “unresolvable procedural and substantive complexity in land conflicts” that it initiates conflict and extrajudicial solutions. While in many cases this conflict leads to eviction, some residents have successfully leveraged the ambiguities and complexities of the legal code to their advantage. Usurpation may initiate a judicial settlement and has in some cases precipitated the legitimation of the land claims on the judicial level (Holston 1991b:700).
Some legal codes, like the 1937 municipal Código das Obras directs that favelas be demolished. The 1956 municipal law directly contradicts this, declaring it illegal to evict favela residents, adding another dimension to this cacophony of legal codes. The ambiguities and inefficiencies of this legal system underlines "the unstable relationship between the legal and the illegal," and the context in which precarious housing in Rio de Janeiro takes place (Holston 1991b:717).

There are, however, several channels to claim property rights for favelados. A loophole in the 1916 civil code, Usucapião, can be a useful tool to claim land rights. The peaceful and uncontested occupation of land for more than 20 years confers occupants with a title to their property (Fernandes 2000).

This practice has evolved into a system of adverse possession that was codified in the 1988 constitution. Article 183 of the 1988 Brazilian constitution states that:

He who possesses an urban area of up to two hundred and fifty square meters for five years without interruption or opposition, using it to your house or your family, you will acquire the domain, provided they do not own any other urban or rural property (Brazilian Constitution of 1988, translated by William Reichert).

The law states that after five years of uncontested land possession, the land title is transferred to the current occupant. While this theory is a powerful concept, its implementation is spotty at best and has been highly contested by the government in cases of attempted enforcement (Fernandes 2000).

A more indirect channel to property title is the very illegality of land occupation. Many attempt to use the conflict to their advantage, which eventually confers them a legitimated claim to their precarious land occupation (Holston 1991b). “The illegality of their land occupation eventually prompts confrontation with legitimate authorities in
which residents usually succeed in legalizing their precarious land claims” (Holston 1991b). Thus, “illegal appropriation becomes a basic means of land acquisition and illegality a common mode of social organization at all levels of Brazilian society” (Holston 1991b).

This is not to say that the legal complications and irresolution in the “jural–bureaucracy,” as Holston (1991b) describes it, are an ideally designed system. The imperfections certainly outweigh the benefits, and the challenges that residents of the informal housing sector face are steep. To fully lay claim to land ownership residents must register their lot with the Law of Public Registries. Further, the subdivision in which they are registered must be recognized, and there are many problems with fraudulent land swindlers providing false documentation of subdivision registry. These roadblocks often become prohibitive to favelados attempts at obtaining legal titles to their homes.

In economist Hernando de Soto’s analysis of capitalism in non-Western nations, he argues that property exclusion is the ultimate conflict of a “capitalist apartheid” (2000:67). Informal property, he argues, must be incorporated into the formal property system before a society can become fully equal or realize its full economic potential. Such was the case in the United States, which “embraced extralegal settlement arrangements” as it emerged in the global economic arena (De Soto 2000:148) “The recognition and integration of extralegal property rights was a key element in the United States becoming the most important market economy and producer of capital in the world,” de Soto argues (148). As Brazil becomes an important player on the international economic stage, now is the time to restructure the economic property system throughout the country to promote more equitable distribution and access.
2.9 Land, power and citizenship: Fighting for “A right to the city”

As favelados come to perceive themselves as citizens and recognize their rights to dignity, security and mobility, the fight for land ownership politicizes them and raises their consciousness about the fight for rights and resistance to the government removal programs.

Conflicts in the urban peripheries, in irregular residence, unemployment and poverty, often lead to a demand among the residents living on the margins for civil rights. From this notion, argues Holston (2010), arises a conception of citizenship, but one specific to urban contexts, mediated through an articulation of David Harvey’s notion of the right to city.

Harvey, writing at the beginning of Lula da Silva’s tenure in 2003, describes the need for a right to the city in the face of neoliberalism and privatizations. The right to the city is the right to change the city. Drawing on Marx, he argues:

We change ourselves by changing our world. This dialectical relation lies at the root of all human labor. We individually and collectively make the city through our daily actions and our political, intellectual and economic engagements. But, in return, the city makes us (939).

Cariocas shape the landscape of inequality in Rio de Janeiro, but this inequitable landscape reflects back on its residents as well. The geography of inequality and spatial violence creates people who are products of these elements.

Holston (2009) describes this fight for the right to the city in the Brazilian context, describing the phenomenon of “insurgent urban citizenship” as “the political transformation that occurs when the conviction of having a right to the city turns
residents into active citizens who mobilize their demands through residentially-based organizations that confront entrenched national regimes of citizen inequality” (264).

This approach to citizenship that Holston describes is circuitous and indirect, but this is precisely what favelados need to overcome in a complex web of historically defined conceptions of citizenship that extend beyond national membership.

Brazil’s landed elites formulated a regime of citizenship using social differences that were not the basis of national membership — differences of education, property, race, gender, and occupation — to distribute different treatment to different categories of citizens. It thereby generated a gradation of rights among them, in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens and exercised as the privilege of particular social categories (Holston 2010).

This is the context in which the property renders favelados less than full citizens, and in which the government views them as expendable details in its overarching plans for the Olympics.

3. Findings

The current conflict: Favela removal in preparation for the 2016 Games

The Olympics are reshaping the urban landscape of Rio de Janeiro through a series of preparatory infrastructure projects, carving deep gashes into the mountainous terrain and forcing residents out of their homes. Rio de Janeiro is constructing two new highways, building four Olympic sites, and is organizing dozens of localized urban renewal projects in neighborhoods around the city. The city is buzzing with construction.

These Olympic works are disproportionately affecting the poor living in favelas, whose legal claims to land are precarious at best. 7,185 households in favelas across the city face direct eviction (Comité Populario). This translates to 28,000 residents being forced out of their homes, assuming that each household holds only four family members
Actual figures are probably much higher, as a single home may hold multiple families, and families in favelas typically have more than two children (Pino 1997a).

Poor cariocas living on the periphery of the city, in areas like Jacarepaguá, are being displaced by the TransOeste and TransOlímpica highway projects [Figure 1]. Cariocas living in more central favelas, like Metrô Mangueira are experiencing disruption due to stadium construction or renovations (Romero 2012). 4,000 residents of the Vila Autódromo favela, for example, will be removed to construct the Olympic Park (Romero 2012). Other projects in the city center, like a cable car being constructed in Morro da Providência, are primarily being designed as tourist attractions for Olympic visitors. The municipal government frames these projects as pieces in a larger urban renewal scheme called Morar Carioca that involves crime reduction, housing improvements and better integration of the favelas into the social fabric of the city (Cidade Olímpica 2012a). Borne out of the Favela-Bairro program, residents are chafing against Morar Carioca’s aggressive hierarchical model of governmental involvement.

The processes of displacement manifest themselves on two fronts: direct evictions of residents from land intended for the Olympics are coupled with indirect displacement mediated via gentrification or overzealous governmental interference in the social fabric of a community. These are programs framed to help develop the city, argues Mayor Eduardo Paes — “By 2020 we pledge that Rio will be urbanized, creating a city for all” — but the sad reality is that many people are being left behind in the rhetoric of inclusiveness (Selvanayagam 2010).
This analysis is concerned primarily with the people living in Rio’s favelas, and how the dynamics of urban planning, economic growth and globalization affect them. The Olympic works in Rio are too focused on improvements to the physical space, and are not paying enough attention to the local residents in the neighborhoods. This analysis aims to refocus the attention on the people and the lives being affected.

### 3.1 Direct evictions

While housing secretary Pierre Batista claims that “absolutely all of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro will benefit” from the Morar Carioca project, a number are in fact being totally razed (Selvanayagam 2010). Communities like Vila das Torres, 53-years old with 300 families, Jacarepaguá, 75-years-old with 28 families, and Campinho, 33 years old and with 65 families are all facing complete demolition to make way for the TransOlímpica highway (Table 1). After being informed by the government that Morar Carioca neighborhood improvements would take place in the favela, the 2,000 residents of the 26-year-old Vila União de Curicica, were then informed that their neighborhood would instead be demolished to make way for the TransOlímpica highway (Osborn 2012). Table 1 offers a sample of a number of projects leading to evictions, offering a sense of the extent of displacement and its varied causes. Figure 1 charts these neighborhoods onto the physical landscape of the city to illustrate the magnitude of evictions and to demonstrate the clear correlation between the displaced neighborhoods and the Olympic works.

A secondary dynamic of direct eviction is the governmental removal of people living in landslide risk areas. Neighborhoods like Trabajaras and Pavão Pavãozinho, as
well as Providência, have been identified as geologically precarious areas, and residents are thus being removed (Cidade Olímpica 2012a).

The government has framed the works around the delivery of citizen rights and is describing it as a collaborative project between the government and residents. “All of the work will be done with a permanent dialogue with the communities, in line with the established principles of city administration: democratic management and participative construction,” said Housing Secretary Pierre Batista’s in an interview (Selvanayagam 2010). But this rhetoric has not been employed in practice. Citizens’ rights to information are being violated — “the city enters the community, paints the house with X and people do not know why,” notes UN rapporteur on adequate housing Raquel Rolnik (2012). “Most communities are not informed of the development projects before they are removed. They have no chance to debate and present alternatives.”

Further, the financial remunerations offered by the government pale in comparison to the original value of the homes, if compensation is offered at all. Considering the updates and residents have invested in their houses, the 5,000 reais, about US$2,500, that the government is offering does not match all invested costs (Rolnik 2012). It is not enough money to enable a family to relocate and purchase another comparable home in terms of quality and location.

The projects based in Olympic areas reveal contrasts of effort, where the touristic areas receive more investments, and the peripheral neighborhoods receive less or no attention. These projects emphasize the social isolation, touristic performance and control of people in this very segregated city.
3.2 Morar Carioca

This social program is the leading cause of indirect displacement via gentrification and infrastructure works framed as neighborhood improvements. The Morar Carioca plan, launched in 2010, was borne out of an earlier project called Favela-Bairro, which aimed to integrate favelas into the urban fabric of Rio de Janeiro. Morar Carioca is a 10-year program that aims to update the urban infrastructure surrounding 240,000 homes in the city’s favelas and incorporate them into the governmentally recognized urban grid (Daflon 2011). Roughly translating to “to live as a resident of Rio de Janeiro,” Morar Carioca addresses outdated water and sewage pipes, road pavements, wider streets, and transportation (Cidade Olímpica 2012a). It is being run by the government in conjunction with the Instituto do Arquiteto do Brasil, IAB-RJ (Selvanayagam 2010).

The rhetoric surrounding Morar Carioca promises integration and inclusion of favelados. “Morar Carioca has the objective of guaranteeing the access to dignified living and urban infrastructure for lower income earners — which is a basic social right,” notes housing secretary Batista (Selvanayagam 2010). From this perspective, the program aims to be inclusive of the less developed neighborhoods of the city and to leverage the excitement around the Olympics to distribute development benefits across the entire. The program’s aims are to increase the standard of living and to reduce crimes — goals welcomed by the favela residents.

Some communities, like Barreira do Vasco, are leveraging the government’s interest in development and are observing positive change in their neighborhood. This particular community is seeking running water and electricity and sanitation updates, as
well as wider alleyways to improve air circulation and to allow for wheelchairs to pass (Clarke 2013).

But the Morar Carioca program has all-too-frequently resulted in population displacement, either by gentrification or by a more direct and forceful removal to make way for infrastructure updates. Real estate prices have shot up in some favelas, pricing out long-term residents. In Recreio and Barra da Tijuca, for example, property prices increased more than 50 percent in 2010 when Morar Carioca work started in these areas (Schwambach 2012). In Providência, the value of commercial real estate grew 20 percent in the first two months of 2013. This is twice the rate recorded in the rest of the city over the same period of time (Barbosa 2013).

Another fundamental problem with the Morar Carioca project is its top-down approach. The fate of a neighborhood is being handed down by the government in conjunction with the Instituto do Arquitetos do Brasil, rather than being produced through community-government collaboration. This is in direct conflict with the Morar Carioca program’s rhetorical goal of favela integration. I discuss the perils of this approach in the specific case of Providência in further detail below.

3.3 UPP (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora — Police Pacification Units)

Closely linked to the Morar Carioca program is the Police Pacification Unit (UPP), which is a governmental program aimed at pacifying neighborhoods and reclaiming territories from drug gangs. The program was launched in 2008, just before Rio was named host to the World Cup and Olympics, but pacification efforts were
ramped up with Olympic developments. Thirteen UPPs have been constructed and installed in neighborhoods around Olympic venues since Rio was awarded its bid.

The police units have been widely acknowledged to be effective in reducing crime in the areas in which they have been implemented. Pacified favelas have homes made of brick and concrete, have higher levels of employment, and have high levels of resident retention (Williamson 2012). Further, they provide the “invaluable public service of security,” (Williamson 2012).

But it is unclear if the poor residents of pacified neighborhoods will be able to stay and enjoy the benefits. Pacification has lead to gentrification in neighborhoods like Vigidal, where rich foreigners are moving in to enjoy the hillside views of Copacabana Beach (Vitali 2013). “Only the middle class favela dwellers will be able to afford to stay in these locations,” notes Theresa Williamson (2012), director of the community blog RioOnWatch.

Another group that is missing out on the safety provided by the UPPs are residents of favelas not in close proximity to the Olympic venues (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 2011). This suggests, again, that the government’s focus is not on the wellbeing of its residents, but rather, on the projection of an image of security to the incoming international community. Only the touristic neighborhoods need to be safe to make the entire city seem safe.

“Pacification can only be understood from analysis about who the spectators of this state performance are,” notes anthropologist Marcella Carvalho de Araujo Silva (2011). “Pacification leaves the still-violent favelas out of the urban imaginary… and turns wide areas of the city invisible” (18). This practice recalls the walling off of the
“poor and violent reality” of the favelas in preparation for the 2007 Pan American Games and again in preparation for the Olympics to project a tranquil image of Rio for place-promotion (Curi et al 2011).

To effectively address the problems in favelas across the city, the government would have to acknowledge them. And, as Carvalho de Araujo Silva (2011) argues, an acknowledgement of the persistent problems would “deprive the government of its investments in the elaborate process of Rio’s representation as a safe city and its valorization in the global market” (18).

The UPP’s may be effective in their Olympic-area neighborhoods, but they function as much for the performance of safety in particular areas as they do for effecting real change. “In order to deconstruct Rio de Janeiro’s representation as a violent city, it has been made an effort to convey the reverse image, namely, of a safe city” (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 2011). The intersection between the UPP program and the upcoming mega-events is one of performance and display, conforming to international expectations rather than acting purely in the interest of favelados across the city.

In Providência, deemed worthy of governmental intervention due to its proximity to the Olympic Venues, 208 officers with the 7th UPP, established itself in April, 2010. Residents have chafed with police officers over the right to express themselves — a July 2011 protest over the removal of the Plaza América Brum was shut down by the police, not only denying residents their right to public space but also to their right to protest its removal (De Rose 2011).
3.4 Porto Maravilha

A third branch of Olympic development is the Porto Maravilha project, which is focused on encouraging economic growth specifically in the Port region near the city center. Similar to the other projects, it aims to update infrastructure and provide higher quality public services, but this project also puts a heavy emphasis on economic development (Porto Maravilha 2013). The project includes piers for cruise ships, an extension of the Plaza Mauá and creating more open space (Porto Maravilha 2013).

It has proven to be one of the most disruptive programs, displacing almost 600 people in the area (Figure 1; Table 1). In the same pattern as we see with Morar Carioca, the economic development orientation of this program has lead this project to too heavily privilege improvements of the physical space rather than improvements over the well-being of residents. "The public funds are being invested in a “fast-paced process of gentrification” (Williamson 2012).

To an even greater extent than with the case of Morar Carioca, Porto Maravilha is adopting exclusive development approaches only designed for the rich. Urban planner Karin Schwambach argues that this development is exclusively targeted at upper-class consumers. “At the present time, low-income families occupy the area and the project does not present concrete plans including these people. The project aims to renovate the area, bringing ‘new people,’” which is coded language for an exclusive gentrification process (Schwambach 2012:7).

This Port Region, which is already economically healthy, is not the area of the city that needs development and attention. The city is “strengthening the centrality of this
middle class area and benefitting few,” notes Rolnik in a 2011 interview with Carolina Derivi about her research in Rio. “The Port is not the Rio that most needs urban intervention.”

3.5 Morro da Providência: a case study

I chose Providência as my case study primarily because of the long history of the neighborhood and the integral role it has played in Rio de Janeiro for 115 years. In a land property system where “history often confers legitimacy,” not even Latin America’s oldest favela can survive the force of Olympic works. Having resisted over a century of concerted favela removal attempts, it is falling victim to a carefully orchestrated Olympic eviction program that will remove 832 neighborhood’s residents in favor of a tourism-focused cable car.

3.5.1 The cable car

Through a joint effort between Morar Carioca and Porto Maravilha, governmental construction work in Providência aims to invest R$131 million (~US$ 65 million) in reurbanization and revitalization in this area, where 5,500 residents live in 1,720 households. “When the works are finished it will be more accurate to call Providência a bairro, not a favela” said Jorge Bittar, municipal housing secretary, to the publication O Globo (Daflon 2011).

Non-invasive infrastructure updates to water pipes, street paving, and sewage and drainage have not been met with much resistance in the neighborhood, but a controversial project to build a cable car linking the favela to the city center has proven very divisive and disruptive. The cable car is set to open in May 2013 and will displace 832
families in the process of its construction. It is framed by the government as a transport system that will connect the residents of Providência — those who remain — with the Central do Brasil, the city’s transit hub, but residents would rather keep their homes [Figure 2].

In theory, capitalizing on Olympics construction to provide transit infrastructure to link the favelados of Providência to the city center sounds like a reasonable plan. But the government’s rhetoric falls flat — the tramway is framed as a connecting artery to better integrate favelados in Providência to the rest of the city, but as a transportation project, the sky tram has unclear benefits. Many residents feel the new line is unnecessary: Providência is only a 15-minute walk to the Central station, and there are already roads providing access to the community (Roller 2011). Residents also feel that if the work is truly intended to better integrate the community, the government’s work is incomplete: the new line runs halfway up the hill and does not reach the people who live at Cruzeiro, the highest point of the favela (Roller 2011). Further, the volume of travelers for which the tramway is designed — up to 3,000 people per hour — is out of line with the number of Providência residents, which numbered 5,000 total before a third of the neighborhood’s residents were slated to be removed (Williamson and Hora 2012).

Thus, the gondola, which will provide beautiful views of the city, seems to be designed more for tourists than for residents. Ironically, Victor Ricardo, an engineer for the Secretary of Municipal Housing, hails the project as a success. “It’ll be easier to get home now,” he says (Cidade Olímpica 2012). This may be true for the Providência residents that remain, but certainly not for the 832 families that will be displaced. The air tram is framed as an improvement to residents’ quality of life but it is evicting residents
and tearing down important community spaces like the Américo Brum Square, a recreational space and place of historical memory for Rio’s oldest favela and its residents. These changes are deeply detrimental to community life.

Community members were not involved in the generation of plans for this project and they feel it will not adequately fit their needs. The Providência Residents Commission cites a similar project that installed a cable car in Complexo de Alemão that is underused and is out of line with the community needs (Providência Residents Commission 2012). The general perception held by Providência residents is that the city sees the gorgeous views from Providência as a nice spot for tourists to view the city and has no genuine interests in improving their neighborhood.

3.5.2 Evictions and inadequate compensation

832 households living in Latin America’s oldest favela, the 115-year-old Morro da Providência, are at risk of eviction in this neighborhood. A third of the population faces eviction. 317 houses are being destroyed to make way for the cable car that will provide Olympics visitors nice views of the city; another 515 have been deemed located in geologically risky areas and are thus being demolished (Providência Residents Commission 2012).

The government has identified the houses on the western side of the famous staircase that divides the neighborhood in half as at risk of a landslide (Grem-Nielsen 2013). An independent study by local engineers found that the city’s reports of geological risk were unfounded: the city’s study was incomplete and inaccurate, according to the analysis conducted by civil engineers and architects from the Regional Consultants on
Residents detect the contradictory information provided by the government: “they said they were going to protect us by moving us out of our houses but we had other people come in and survey the land and they found no problems,” said Diego (Voices of the Mission).

While evictions are not compulsory, the demolition of properties in the immediate vicinity leaves unbearable conditions of rubble and desolation for those who choose to stay behind (Tapley 2012a).

The city has plans to construct 639 housing units to make up for those lost through the Minha Casa Minha Vida housing program (Providência Residents Commission). The housing is located just blocks away from the original homes of the residents, which marks a significant improvement from early patterns of favela removal that forced residents miles away from their former homes and workplaces. But there will be a 193-unit shortage, assuming that home currently occupied only houses one family. This is often not the case: multiple generations, or different families, often cohabitate under one roof (Pino 1997a). The new homes are designed for single-family units, so the shortage is likely to be much higher. Only 170 units are currently under construction, and as of March 2013 the projects were stalled, as some housing units were found structurally sound and are now being slated for demolition (Carvalho 2013). Further, it remains to be seen if these new homes, once complete, will be affordable to the displaced community.

The compensation provided to the evicted families is insufficient — “ridiculous,” according to Raquel Rolnik — to account for their losses. The R$3800 (about US$2,000) that the government is offering residents until new homes have been constructed for
them is not enough to purchase a new home. Raquel Rolnik, UN rapporteur on adequate housing, found that the municipality only compensates residents for improvements made on the land — the property built — without considering the value of the land on which it is located, despite what is outlined in the Constitution and the Statute of Cities (Rolnik 2011). This compensation figure is significantly lower than what the residents deserve, and further, housing prices have already begun to rise as the government constructs new, modern housing (Plataforma Dhesca 2011). In the vicinity of Morro da Providência, the square meter in new buildings increased from R$500 ten years ago to about R$1,200 this past year, a 240 percent increase (Colbert 2012). One resident, who accepted governmental compensation, bought land located 2.5 hours away in Guartiba because she could not afford anything closer (Grem-Nielsen 2013).

The city violated a number of procedural requirements before starting the work in Providência. It did not conduct a compulsory report on the environmental impact study and neighborhood relations that the construction would have on the neighborhood before construction started, though this analysis is required by municipal law (Public Defender of the State of Rio de Janeiro). Further, the municipality is required to host a public hearing to provide residents with “ample access” to information regarding the timeframe of the construction, the compensation evicted residents should receive, and a fair forewarning before they would be evicted (Tapley 2012a). This procedure was completely ignored by the municipal government.
3.5.3 United Nations findings

The City of Rio de Janeiro, in conjunction with the UN Department on Human Rights is in the process of investigating the impacts of construction for the World Cup and the Olympics in Rio. The Plataforma Brasileira de Direitos Humanos Econômicos, Sociais, Culturais e Ambientais (Dhesca) found that citizens most frequently expressed frustration with the lack of transparency and lack of information provided by the government. “The communities denounced the lack of transparency on the part of public bodies, because they lack access to public information and no right to participate in decisions about the areas where they live” (Plataforma Dhesca 2011).

“They marked my house with no explanation or information — just a mark,” explained Luis, a lifetime Providência resident. “And they gave me until he end of the month to leave — what am I supposed to do?” (Voices of the Mission)

Rolnik’s reporting for the UN found similar results. Providência residents have been denied “the right to information, transparency and participation. These are the basic rights that make up the right to housing and they are being systematically violated in Rio” (2011). In some cases, families were evicted overnight — according to the Providência Residents Commission (2012), 60 families living on Ladeira do Farias were informed that they had to move the following day in 2012.

3.5.4 A top-down approach

Further frustration of Providência residents is grounded in the government’s narrow top-down approach to the works. Residents were not involved in the planning of this major construction in their community. “They never asked us what we think… they
didn’t show us the blueprint,” explained Rosiette, a Providência resident (Voices of the Mission).

The case of the Américo Brum Square is telling — this was the center of community activity for Providência and an important space for community interaction for groups of all ages. “One of the oldest public spaces in the community, Américo Brum Square was the only recreation area in the favela and was part of the affective memory of generations of residents” (Bahia 2012). “All of the community’s parties were at Américo Brum Square,” said Marcia de Deus, a Providência resident who has lived there for 20 years. “Now all that’s finished. Streets were closed without consulting residents. They came in here and they don’t care about anything” (Bahia 2012).

The square has been demolished, and is now the site of a cable car station. Construction in the site was disruptive: it ran every day, including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays (Bahia 2012). Residents protested the removal of Américo Brum Square, but the UPP officers forcefully blocked the protest and the demolition of the square was quickly completed.

Luiz Fernandez Janot argues that public squares are a community right, and an important space for equitable social interaction and a place for communities to autonomously determine their social space (De Rose 2011). In this context, the loss of Américo Brum Square is a further violation of rights. It is also a violation of the right to the city, of the ability to “change our world after our heart’s desire” (Harvey 2003:939).

The municipal government acknowledges the importance of community spaces — it has plans to construct a new cultural center for Providência, as well as a child development center and an employment center (Cidade Olímpica). But the fundamental
issue many community residents are raising with this model is that it is a top-down approach, providing services to the community that the government deems necessary, rather than programs asked for or designed by the community itself. The community is also starting work on an employment organization called the Commerce Work Group. The government should be encouraging and supporting this program, rather than undermining the work of the community by constructing a separate employment center that will serve a similar purpose (Clarke 2012).

The government claims to be inclusive in its approach. “We have been spending a considerable amount of time within the favelas to gain a detailed understanding of the true needs as well as building long term relationships with the well-established social projects operating in the communities,” said Sonia Lopes of the IAb-RJ, the construction firm working with the city government (Selvanayagam 2010).

But this is not what community members are saying — they’re protesting against the uncollaborative nature of the projects. “I’m not against the works,” noted Cosme Felipe, a 23-year old who has lived in Providência his whole life. “We’re against the city authorities and the workers’ approach. The lack of information, the lack of consulting people that live there on how to do this, what to do, whether we want it… It is not just information we want, we want interaction between the people and the secretariats of housing and works to know what’s happening and also make proposals” (Providência Residents Commission).

What community members are asking for is a dialogue between themselves and the government as a means of empowerment. Brazilian education theorist Paulo Friere describes the need for a dialogical model at great length in his seminal work Pedagogy of
the Oppressed (1970). He argues that dialogue is the only path to liberation: “leaders who do not act dialogically, but insist on imposing their decisions, do not organize the people, they manipulate them. They do not liberate, nor are they liberated: they oppress” (127).

“We want a transformation of the favela but everyone wants this transformation to be participatory,” says Mauricio Hora, Providência resident and photographer organizing a public arts movement in protest. “When authorities come into the community, they should understand what the residents want. We have nothing against improvements and development of our city, but we are worried that Rio’s government is not hearing our concerns” (Assefa).

The top-down work is highly performative, evoking the problems with the Porto Maravilha and Morar Carioca projects. Luis, a resident of Morro da Providência, detects the performative nature of the works, observing that the work is purely aesthetic. “They’re working on cosmetics. These projects aren’t for the community; they’re for foreigners to come see. Why didn’t they build a health clinic?” he asks (Voices of the Mission).

The surface-level changes do not reflect what the community members need or want, but rather represent what the outside world wants to see. “Rio suffers from the chronic problem of flashy public works projects when in reality what most residents need and want are service and utility improvements that are less visible as marketing platforms (Grem-Nielsen 2013).

3.5.5 Perceptions of displacement

They want us to leave. It is like they’re indirectly ordering you to get out… They’re not thinking about residents. They’re thinking about the works. — Cosme Felipe, 23, law student and Providência resident (Tapley 2012a)
They are trying to deliberately evict us so they can build something else, and we don’t even know what that is. They came here thinking their project would be successful whether we want it or not, and we have to accept it. It will be a port for tourists. Tourists are going to be coming here because of the proximity and the view we have of this entire area. But we’re still fighting. —Diego, 23, Providência resident (Voices of the Mission)

This lack of agency felt by many residents is underlined by a perception of displacement and dispossession that the residents are experiencing. “The government is trying to destroy Morro da Providência,” said Iraci, a resident of Morro da Providência, to Plataforma Dhesca’s Rapporteur on the Human right to the City (Voices of the Mission). “I was born here. My mother was born here and died here. They’re going to put an end to the community and I don’t know what to do. I’m fighting for the place where I was born.”

There’s an intangible connection to place that cannot be compensated, especially when residents built their houses with their own hands. “Every brick you see in my house, I made myself,” notes Luis, who was informed he had a month to move out of his home (Voices of the Mission).

This is a complete disruption of life for people who have lived in Providência their whole lives. “Most residents have been here for more than 20 years. Our entire life is here, our children’s lives, our grandchildren’s. Everything is nearby: school, hospitals, work, the market, recreation, etc. We believe the City government is largely responsible for all this trouble, and we are coming together to guarantee that no more houses will be torn down, and that the improvements will actually benefit us,” notes the Providência Residents Commission’s open letter.
3.5.6 Resistance

Providência residents have not taken the aggressive removal campaigns lying down. The community response to the evictions in Providência has been mediated through judicial, social and artistic protest.

Community activists came together to form the Providência Residents’ Commission and the Providência Housing Rights Commission. The Residents’ Commission wrote an open letter to the city describing the violations they have suffered to raise awareness. They see the municipal government as “largely responsible for all this trouble,” but see their collective organizational power as proportionally strong to respond to it (Providência Residents Commission 2012). “We are coming together to guarantee that no more houses will be torn down, and that the improvements will actually benefit us,” the letter says (2012).

Photographer Mauricio Hora, founder of Favelarte, launched a successful protest through images. He took portraits of residents threatened with eviction and pasted large prints of their faces to the sides of their homes, putting a literal face to the evictions [Figure 5]. The faces humanized the process and created a forum for residents to “show their indignation,” as Hora described it (Assefa 2012). The effort was a success: the city did not demolish any of the houses it had marked for eviction that had been wrapped in residents’ portraits.

In a city where visibility is so crucial, Hora’s efforts to give a face to the Providência favela were crucial in the project’s success. “I consider photography a tool
that I can use to give the people from Providência visibility, give them a face, in these important changing times for Rio” (Maresch 2011).

Smaller groups of neighbors are coming together and organizing micro-protests of the physical evictions. Marcia Regina de Deus is refusing to move out of the apartment on Ladeira do Barroso, where she has lived for 20 years. The apartment building, built in 1938, is directly located in the line of work of the cable car. Of the nine families that occupied the building prior to eviction, four other families are standing their ground with her.

The Providência Residents Commission has also partnered with citywide coalitions like the Comité Popular Rio Copa e Olimpíadas (Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics) to increase its power. Forming coalitions with other favelas has been effective in strengthening the voice of the evicted favelados. Coalitions are widely viewed by community organizers as effective in generating more power and visibility for awareness and resistance campaigns (Bobo et al 2010:98).

The Residents Commission is also engaging in media activism. Working through preexisting communications structures, it has raised awareness about the evictions in its neighborhood. The media activist blog Rio Olympics Neighborhood Watch (RioOnWatch) has provided an outlet for evicted favelados from across the city to express themselves. It’s a forum for community organizers and residents to voice their frustrations and experiences, and to demonstrate trends across neighborhoods.

Resident-based resistance has also taken hold on the judicial level. Neuzimar, a Providência resident who has been threatened with eviction from the home she shares with her elderly mother, took the municipal government to court in September 2012 to
contest the works (Tapley 2012a). Her complaint echoed the concerns voiced by her neighbors: she cited the highly disruptive nature of the evictions, and focused on her frustration at the lack of communication between the city and Providência residents.

The court ruled in Neuzimar’s favor: the 2nd Court of Public Finance Capital ordered the city to shut down work in the Providência.

The decision determines the municipality to shut down or suspend the works of the “Morar Carioca” project in Providência, and to refrain from any act of demolition or disturbance of premises occupied by residents until they are remedied by the municipality. (Public Defender of the State of Rio de Janeiro.)

The municipal government will be fined R$50,000 daily for noncompliance.

The decision centered on a number of procedural failures by the municipal government. The government did not prepare an Environmental Impact Study or a Report on the Neighborhood impact for Providência, though it was legally required to do so. Though the government conducted a public hearing to announce the works, the meeting did not convey the legally required information. The city is mandated to “efficiently deliver the right information with the mechanisms for broad access to community information on the progress of the work and claims by affected residents, and to provide prior notice to residents before eviction” which it did not do. It did not provide prior notification to residents about eviction. Many residents first became aware of their eviction when the government marked their home with SMH — Municipal Housing Secretary — the sign of demolition [Figure 4]. Further, it did not inform residents facing eviction of their right to monetary compensation. Raquel Rolnik’s findings in Providência support this conclusion: “There is no place where you can see
exactly who will be removed and how much they will be compensated for, and what the alternatives are to removal” (2012).

All work is currently suspended, but because the municipal government appealed the decision, it is likely that a higher court will declare special circumstances for the Games. This is the case that a robust and expensive team of lawyers for the municipal government is arguing (Fórum Comunitário do Porto 2012). “Brazilian law is adapting to carry out the Games, rather than the Games adapting to fit the law,” said Alex Magalhães, professor at Rio’s Federal University, in an interview on the topic with Simon Romero of The New York Times (2012). The work may not be completed on time, but it will most likely be completed and 832 residents in Providência will be forced out of their homes.

This case illustrates that there are legal channels for favelados to exploit to fight for their rights, but that the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities in the legal system render the practical delivery of these rights untenable.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Summary of key findings

Rio de Janeiro is not ready to host the Olympics. The Games put acute pressure on the existing structures of the host city, and the race to prepare for the Olympiad strains the fault lines in the city’s systems. Mega-events pressure developing cities to create infrastructure at a rate that outpaces and strains the political and social realms.

Brazil’s legal, social and political structures are not yet equipped support the demands of the Olympics. The inefficiencies in the Brazilian legal regulation of property intensify the standard conflict of Olympic and local interests on the real estate level. The
Olympics stand to exacerbate preexisting economic inequality and socio-political tensions between the favelas and the government.

Olympic development especially evokes a long and difficult relationship between the informal housing sector and the municipal government. This work represents a continuation of previous housing policies rather than a rupture. “Rio’s Olympic branding has fostered new projects with old ambitions,” as anthropologist Marcella Carvalho de Araujo Silva (2011) describes it. The frenzy, excitement and pressure created by the Olympics heightens existing tensions in the favela-government relationship as the municipality comes up against non-negotiable deadlines and is forced to make quick decisions about the fastest way to get the work done. Because the government has always seen favelas as expendable and undesirable, they are an easy choice to make way for exciting Olympic projects. The 7,000 families that have faced or will face eviction are just the latest victims of an aggressive government whose aim has always been to remove the city’s favelas.

In addition to recalling past problems, it also remains to be seen what the legacy of the Games will be in Rio after the Closing Ceremony ends. Such tumultuous preparations for the Olympiad do not bode well for a positive legacy.

The Olympics bring the acute tension between global and local interests to the fore. Rio’s municipal government should be “looking for the equilibrium between success in the global arena and solutions for local social problems,” rather than focusing exclusively on developing for tourism (Curi et. al 2011).

The Olympic works are focused on improving the physical space of Rio’s favelas — of raising property value and the physical infrastructure of the neighborhoods — but
not enough attention has been lent to improving the living conditions of the people who live in those spaces.

In a dynamic of visibility and performance, the projects are for touristic display — for painting an image of Rio de Janeiro to the outside world that conforms with Saskia Sassen’s criteria for a global city. If the welfare of the people were the primary motivator, then people would not be forced out of their homes and provided minimal compensation.

Recent efforts at integration — which seem surface-level and highly rhetorical at best — have been misguided. The government’s top-down approach is destined to fail; a horizontal model that incorporates community members who voice their own opinions would be more effective. What Rio needs instead are community-driven organizations that mobilize not only in response to adversity but also organize to effect positive change in their communities. Further, it needs to bolster the legal channels in its judicial system to better support the poor.

As long as the government views its work as “help” rather than a mutually beneficial project aimed at improving the city as a whole, the location of power will remain in the hands of the government and Rio will continue to suffer from paralyzing inequality. The city is on the starting blocks, primed to take off, but it cannot realize its full potential until the government and the poor work together. As the maxim goes, “If you’ve come here to help me, you’re wasting your time. But if you’ve come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together.” The entire city stands to benefit from economic development, but a collaborative and participatory approach is essential to this work.
4.2 Significance of findings

The case of Rio 2016 highlights the tensions and pitfalls of employing the Olympics as a mechanism for social and economic development. It’s an instructive case for future mega-event hosts, especially those in developing countries like Qatar and Russia. The structural strains of inequality on the social fabric of the city, combined with the major infrastructure projects that the city is undertaking show that the city is simply not ready to host the Games in a way that is beneficial to its residents across all social strata. Mega-sports events like the Olympics have not yet proven to be an effective means for inclusive economic and social growth in developing countries.

Rio 2016 shows us that the Olympics need to fit into a larger development scheme. The Olympics cannot be the development a city seeks, but rather must be a byproduct of successful and inclusive growth. The Olympics need to be transparent, participatory and just.

There is still time for Rio to learn from its mistakes, to respond to the voices of the community that are rising up in protest and integrate the real needs of favelas — community engagement, inclusive growth, affordable housing and viable integration models — into its development plans. The judiciary could uphold the 2nd court’s ruling on Providência, choosing not to capitulate to the finances of the government. With a little less than three years to go until the Opening Ceremony, there is still time for reevaluation and redirection.

If Rio learns from its early missteps, this will truly be a Games to celebrate. Rio 2016 stands to provide a compelling Olympic legacy and a mega-sports event model to
the rest of the developing world for inclusive development. If the city finds a successful and effective model improves the quality of life in its favelas, it can offer important lessons to the world, where three billion people will be living in slums by 2050 (UN-Habitat). The problems Rio faces are not unique, and it does not face them alone: the world has a lot to learn from a successful slum management project in Rio.

Developing nations like Brazil are at a crossroads. As their economies take off, and GDPs grow, governments must focus on ensuring that growth is inclusive and equally accessible to all sectors of society. Rather than perpetuating inequality, becoming a “playground for the rich,” governments like Brazil’s need to promote equitable growth (Williamson and Hora 2012). The poor, for their part, must organize and recognize their agency, and “force a major redistribution of power” (De Soto 2000:103). The government, in return, must respond to the demands of the poor: “once they accept that, they can begin to catch the wave instead of being engulfed by it” (De Soto 2000:103). Encouraging inclusive growth across all sectors of society would ultimately strengthen the economy and empower the city’s marginalized populations (Williamson and Hora 2013).

In the short term, emerging countries should focus on internal growth, on strengthening its systems and structures and encouraging growth among all of its publics. In the long term, developing countries should aim for global economic and cultural ascendancy that incorporates its entire society, so that it can stage a successful and universally beneficial Olympics when it is ready.
5. Methodological appendix

The currency of this case study made for a compelling and exciting analysis, but one that brought with it a host of challenges. I drew heavily on news media for the most up-to-date information, but details of the Providência case study, like the court case that would stop evictions, are still unresolved. Insofar as I gathered firsthand experiences from news interviews and human rights organizations, there is an inherent level of bias in this work. I would have preferred to gather data myself, to get a sense of the environment and mood in Providência throughout these evictions, but logistical, financial and language barriers prevented this approach to data collection.

Very little concrete primary data exists on the case of Rio 2016. This is in part due to the reluctance of city officials to provide a transparent look into its work. This is somewhat balanced by the work of activists like Theresa Williamson, who has synthesized available data onto the RioOnWatch blog, but this analysis has a particular ideological bent to it.

Because the construction in Providência is occurring right now, it is hard to measure the long-term effects that the cable car will have on the neighborhood. Further, the effects of the Games — long-term or short-term — are yet to be seen.

The currency of the events has made it difficult to find peer-reviewed literature on the subject, making independent analyses hard to come by. While there is much merit to first-hand accounts and community organizing commentary, independent experts provide an important perspective that is currently missing from this case. Media that is simultaneously playing a role as informant and activist has its inherent biases. Further,
mainstream Brazilian media in Rio de Janeiro is influenced in part by governmental interests — *O Globo* was very hesitant to give the evictions any coverage (Consentino 2011).

To balance these challenges, I drew heavily on case studies and theory that explored mega-events and community organizing in Brazil. Rio 2016 is not occurring in isolation, but rather is playing into larger trends in Olympic development. But drawing on case studies has its limitations — each Olympiad and mega-event is unique, with historical and social contextual variables leading to its success or failure. To fully understand Rio 2016, we will have to wait to see how this particular case plays out. This analysis of the Games as a current event will be a useful contribution to future studies of the thirty-first Olympiad as a historical event.

There was also a level of selection bias in the case study I analyzed. Providência is one of the more organized and cohesive favelas. The technological and organizational barriers to communication that some residents in Providência faced, as well as residents of other favelas, biases my findings towards a certain demographic. The experiences of unorganized communities are no less valid than those of the outspoken members of Morro da Providência. Not all residents had there wherewithal or legal know-how to take the municipal government to court.

The language barrier proved to be much less of a limitation that I initially suspected. Between Google translate and my fluency in Spanish, I could easily navigate sites written in Portuguese. I had more trouble with spoken interviews, having to rely on second-hand subtitle translations.
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<td>Rua do Livramento</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Porto Maravilha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Quáxima</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>BRT Transcarioca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabajaras</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Risk area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Autódromo</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>BRT Transcarioca*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Harmonia</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>BRT Transoeste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila das Torres</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>total eviction</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Municipal park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Recreio II</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>total eviction</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>BRT Transoeste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Azaleia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>BRT Transolímpica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Taboinha</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Govt land reclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>7,185</td>
<td>Cable car/risk area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: There is a clear correlation between Olympic sites and the favelas facing eviction. Favela eviction points (red) are proportional to the scale of population being evicted to illustrate the magnitude. Adapted from a comprehensive study conducted by the activist organization Comité Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas (2011).
Figure 3: Olympic works in Providência and its surrounding area (top); Location of Providência in larger city context (bottom) (draws from Navarro-Sertich 2011).

Figure 3: Olympic works in Providência and its surrounding area (top); Location of Providência in larger city context (bottom) (draws from Navarro-Sertich 2011).
Figure 3: The route of this cable car cuts through the Providência community. The Ladeira Barroso station sits at the former site of the Américo Brum Square. (Cidade Olímpica 2012).
Figure 4: Photographer Maruicio Hora protested the evictions by posting photos of residents outside their homes that were slated for eviction. The “SMH” marking in the bottom photo is the dreaded sign of the Secretario Municipal de Habitação that signifies a house slated for demolition. (Hora and Williamson 2012).
Figure 5: The Olympics play out through a number of dynamics and interactions (after Preuss 2004).