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Abstract

The Housing and Slum Clearance Act of 1949 transformed the planning profession. It had profound effects in six areas: the demand for planners, the exercise of planning techniques, the planners’ self-image, the trappings of the profession, professional qualifying standards and the field’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In the end, the single most important effect of the Act was its confirming in planners the desire to make the environment a better place.

Keywords: planning profession, urban planning, urban renewal, city and regional planning history

Introduction

July 15, 1949 was a hot, humid day in Washington, D.C. when President Harry S. Truman, surrounded by more than twenty guests, solemnly signed the housing bill providing $1.5 billion in loans and grants to localities for slum clearance, pledging to build 810,000 units of low cost shelter in the next six years and committing to a program of housing research to improve construction methods while reducing costs. As he handed the single pen used in the signing to David Lawrence, the legendary mayor of Pittsburgh, he called for the work to begin immediately. (New York Times, July 16, 1949).

This ceremony marked the culmination of a multi-year battle to bring attention and dollars to bear on several of the nation’s more pressing problems: substandard housing, slums and blight and, by implication, center-city decentralization. The law incorporated a formula engaging the federal, state and local governments in partnerships to attack the visible, physical evidence of obsolete land uses in American cities. A working coalition of social reformers, labor unions, chambers of commerce, city mayors, city planners, urban realtors and landowners, lawyers, economists and public administrators had contributed their knowledge, experience and values in forging and supporting the legislation. Furthermore, each group had its own understanding of the law’s purpose and potential – the city planners were especially outspoken about their views (Wheaton,

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1 Also included were commitments of $325 million for farm housing and a $500 million increase in the permitted amount of FHA mortgage insurance for single- and multi-family housing.
However, they all had a common belief that the American know-how and industrial techniques that had helped win World War Two could be employed in peacetime to clear up a serious but certainly (in their view) correctable problem. Without reservation, they saw large-scale housing development undertaken by the private sector following rational land-use planning as the formula to rebuild the nation’s tired cities as modern metropolises. They also believed that the public sector played an essential role in enabling site assemblage and reducing cost barriers presented by expensive but blighted land. This philosophy was the basis the Housing and Slum Clearance Act of 1949.

Performance Under the 1949 Act

For a generation, the federal government would subscribe to and refine this approach. By 1962, William Slayton, Commissioner, Urban Renewal Administration, would report that the feds were supporting 1,210 renewal projects in 636 cities to the tune of $3 billion (Slayton, 1962). Ten years later, James Lynn, Secretary of the U. S Department of Housing and Urban Development claimed 2,515 projects having a “total redevelopment value of improvements [in] excess of $12.4 billion, 400,000 units of subsidized affordable housing and 236 cities spending $22.5 million for planning grants. (Foote, 74; Lynn, 39).

Although a small program relative to other government expenditures – defense spending dwarfed it – it became a lightning rod for criticism. The highly visible projects took more time to complete than anyone had imagined. Well-publicized failures in judgment regarding site acquisition revealed swaths of cleared but unsold land lying fallow in many cities. Poor choice of architects led to unattractive designs. And ineffective relocation programs destroyed some strong communities. Critics, such as conservative economist, Martin Anderson, used the program as whipping boy to forward a non-interventionist agenda while others such as writer Jane Jacobs who challenged its urban design assumptions, and sociologist Herbert Gans who questioned the contemporary definition of slums, launched an attack on the whole approach, especially the planners’ implementation efforts (Teaford, 1999; Jacobs, 1961; Gans, 1965).

For twenty years, Congress modified the Act dramatically, attempting to refine it according to expert advice. Administrators, working by trial and error, tinkered with incentives. Theoreticians, especially planners and housing experts, forwarded substantial adjustments in technique. Various interest groups pushed an expanded scope to include them. The Housing Acts of 1954, 1959, 1965 and 1968 presented such significant changes that by the early Seventies, the legislation was a shadow of the original. In the end, it allowed up to 35% of the funding to be used for non-residential projects including central business district investment; favored such urban institutions as universities, hospitals and cultural centers in land purchases; funded city planning efforts mandating

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2 Wheaton reveled in the legislation: “The adoption of the Housing Act of 1949 is the most significant event in the development of city planning...It makes possible the replanning and reconstruction of American cities on a scale that was undreamed of a short decade ago.... This is an unparalleled challenge to local government and the city planning profession. For the first time, financial aids are available, broad in scope and adequate in amount to begin construction and reconstruction of cities in accordance with sound city plans” (Wheaton, 36).
master plans and community renewal programs (citywide redevelopment strategies); recognized citizen needs in required relocation and participation programs; initiated administrative reforms such as the Neighborhood Development Program allowing flexible, annual payments, and “Operation Breakthrough,” bucking building code requirements; experimented with numerous financial incentives for investment in affordable housing and, most important, moved from reliance on project-oriented, large scale clearance schemes to area-wide rehabilitation and conservation efforts.

Nonetheless, by 1973, the high hopes of a quick fix had faded. The criticism of the Sixties had taken its toll. Bitter debates among politicians and policy analysts regarding appropriate methods remained unresolved. All concerned admitted that urban problems were more complex and intractable than the early diagnosticians had thought. The nation, with its now-dominant suburban majority had little sympathy for urban problems, especially those that either affected poor minorities or appeared to be soluble through decentralization. In this climate, a Republican president called a halt to the programs that had evolved from the 1949 Act and refashioned a new strategy embodied in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. It substituted federal block grants allocated by formula and used for locally determined projects. Labeled “devolution” by the Nineties, this approach restructured intergovernmental relations to reduce direct federal financial influence in cities. In general, the new solutions for urban problems emphasized people- not place-based policy with regard to poverty initiatives and considered the city only one functional element among many in a large metropolitan area. Emblematic were the switch from supply-creation to demand-enhancing housing strategies and the empowerment of the poor through support of neighborhood community development corporations (Winnick, 1995; Vidal, 1997). Also characteristic was the targeting of downtowns and controlling suburban development through growth management (Burchell, 1999).

The Role of Planners

Planners are an important part of this 50-year epic. The passage of the Housing and Slum Clearance Act of 1949 brought them – for better or worse – to a new level of prominence in American life. They were heavily involved in all of the activities enumerated above. And on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the law, an examination of its effects on the urban planning profession is appropriate. Such a review scrutinizes the complex interplay among policy-makers, urban renewal administrators and practitioners and educators – many of whom have multiple roles in this story. It also traces the growth of the profession in all its dimensions

Six Effects of the 1949 Act on Planning

The Act had a profound influence on the planning profession. In fact, it transformed it entirely. This change is embodied in six features. First, the Act and its subsequent amendments created an unparalleled demand for trained planners. This, in turn, stimulated the expansion of educational capacity and, ultimately, altered the nature of instruction. Second, it allowed planners to exercise their techniques in a wide arena,
applying known methods and pushing hard to invent new ones. This led to the enrichment of the technical approaches and the growth of research and publications, especially in the areas of theory and evaluation. It accelerated already existing tensions in the field especially those pertaining to the profession’s claim to be an art and a science. It stimulated new competition among private and public sector employees. Third, at the same time, it encouraged the singularly naïve belief that its programs (and the planners who implemented them) could solve massive urban problems through physical, policy, economic or social planning. Its failure to achieve such an ambitious goal led to a massive loss of confidence in the field. Fourth, it made the profession become more “professional” adopting a code of ethics, articulating visions of the public interest (variously defined) and searching for means to guarantee the transmission of expertise. Fifth, it forced the profession to open its membership to a more demographically and academically diverse population (including minorities, economically disadvantaged, women and people from a wider range of disciplines) and to a greater range of occupations (redevelopment experts, housing administrators and others). Sixth, it coerced the profession to evaluate, adapt and self-correct itself, and in the end, contributed to today’s more nuanced understanding of urbanism.

Clearly, these six features did not emerge only because of the passage of the law; many were already evident in the late Thirties. However, existence of the 1949 Act and its amendments advanced and crystallized the elements. For the urban redevelopment program not only targeted more dollars into planning than the field had ever commanded but also endowed practitioners with more authority and responsibility than they had ever had. The quest for solutions challenged a new public policy and administrative network engaging foundations, governments and the private sector. Finally, the “urban renewal” experience in all of its dimensions deeply etched the hearts and minds of its participants and those who followed leaving the planning profession entirely transformed.

To illustrate the six features, this paper focuses on two periods relating to the evolution of profession and the development of urban redevelopment policy in the postwar era. The first, “Slum Clearance to Urban Renewal: 1945 to 1959,” portrays the profession against a background of the development and refinement of the 1949 approach. The second, “The Urban Uproar: 1960 to 1979,” documents major changes in the profession as the nation executed and ultimately rejected the slum clearance/urban renewal formula with special emphasis on planning education. It concludes with “Urban Planning Redefined: 1980 to the Present,” a brief assessment of today’s profession measured against the heritage of the Act.

**Slum Clearance to Urban Renewal: 1945 to 1959**

Even before the end of the Second World War, many reformers worked to bring national attention to urban issues. They had three concerns: providing homes for the returning veterans, eliminating costly slums and blight and restoring worn-out downtowns and to arrest deconcentration of central city business and industry. (Survey Graphic, 1940). Their solution for these problems – slum clearance and reconstruction – dated from the Progressive era and evolved through New Deal period. Early references to the concepts had appeared in the discussions at the first National Conference of City Planning in 1909.
as represented by planner George Ford’s proffering of a comprehensive street schemes that provided the “fundamental requisites of good housing...sunlight, air, cleanliness, privacy, cheerful and bright surroundings and in the recommendations of the 1912 Pittsburgh Survey that honed in on the redesign and construction of the Point, the central business district and the clearance of substandard housing in the city’s most congested areas (Proceedings, 79; Kellogg, 22). These elements formed the basis of what its advocates would label “large scale development,” an idea that became dogma by the early Thirties. Although promoted in many places, the report of the President’s Conference on Homebuilding and Homeownership offers one of the most complete statements of this approach (Gries and Ford, 1932). Citing its economic, efficient, community-supportive and universal applicability for all land uses, the report outlined what would be the entire rationale and approach of the 1949 Act:

The present methods of small-scale housing have failed to meet the present need both in quality and cost. Large-scale housing by eliminating wasteful practices, thus cutting costs, and by creating a home environment in which all of the functions provided by the old-fashioned home can be preserved under new conditions, offers a technique and a promise of improvement. A place to live is views as something more than windows, heat and modern fixtures. It is seen in the light of improved family life. Facilities such as nursery schools, supervised outdoor and indoor play space and other community activities for the parents and children can be provided only when their cost is spread over many homes. In the use of land, in financing, planning, construction and management large-scale operation offers a different approach to the problem.... By this method.... [t]he land is treated in large blocks and is developed in one continuous operation. The community plan can be adopted specifically to the purposes it will serve providing for gardens, a playground, and a recreational center and, in larger schemes for shops, schools and other community buildings.... Under large-scale operation methods, a group of one-family homes or a large block of apartments is designed as a single unit....utilizing to the maximum all space inside and outside...and making possible beauty of design.... Large-scale operations will offer a safeguard to investments. It dispenses with a multitude of small financial operations, reduces the volume of detailed work and permits careful scrutiny and appraisal. By creating neighborhoods of a homogeneous character, it guards against the possibilities of deterioration through spotty or inadequate development and preserves value for a longer time than does our present method.... Loans on a greater percentage of value, with longer periods of amortization and a smaller interest rate are possible in large-scale operations...[and] should mean a large saving in the monthly payments for those who rent or purchase such houses.... One of the major problems in the application of large-scale operations arises from the necessity of assembling large areas of land at reasonable cost. More necessary than all other requirements for the application of large-scale operation is a plentiful supply of money.... [And] to put large-scale operation programs into force will require the mobilization of the interests and resources of private and public agencies of the city, state and Nation.... To begin to accomplish all this, there is an immediate need for an aggressive national housing agency or institute with direct Federal Government affiliation (Gries and Ford, 70-88).

Sources of Urban Redevelopment Techniques

This philosophy had many sources – European and domestic, social work, public health, planning and real estate. Its support came from an early version of the kind of coalition that would support urban revitalization programs throughout the twentieth century (Mollenkopf, 1983). Representing the prevailing thought, New Dealers incorporated it

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3 The group who endorsed the presidential report is representative. It included housing reformers such as Edith Elmer Wood and Catherine Bauer; foundation leaders such as Alfred K. Stern, director, Julius
in various initiatives. For example, the National Industrial Recovery Act (1932) and succeeding public works acts that sponsored temporary programs for slum clearance and low cost housing construction; the National Housing Act (1934) that created mortgage insurance supervised by the Federal Housing Administration and the Housing Act of 1937 that established arrangements for a permanent federal/local partnership for public housing, favored large-scale development techniques (Birch, 1976; Federal Housing Administration, 1939).

Meanwhile in the Forties, twenty states including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois, experimented with urban redevelopment legislation to authorize local condemnation of slums and/or blighted areas and their re-planning and reconstruction with local financial support including tax abatements and bond-based expenditures. (Menhinick, 1948) Under legal challenge, the courts approved the use of these powers for redevelopment purposes. (Murray et al. v. LaGuardia, 1943; People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 1946). Several experiments, including Stuyvesant Town, New York’s showpiece 18-acre-8, 800-unit project that replaced hundreds of substandard tenement buildings with 35 fourteen story apartment buildings and several acres of landscaped open space, demonstrated the benefits of large-scale operations. (Jackson, 1134). The Housing and Slum Clearance Act in 1949 was a natural add-on in the lengthy evolution of these approaches.

**The Rise of Planning in the Twentieth Century**

During the course of these events, the planning emerged and grew stronger. At the turn of the century, municipalities concerned with their sorry plights created planning commissions to oversee growth and development. Hartford, Connecticut led the way in 1907, six years later Massachusetts required them of all cities having a population of 10,000 and by 1922 there were 185 commissions in the United States, prompting the U.S. Department of Commerce to distribute a model for city planning enabling legislation so that other communities could follow (Goodman, 1968). By 1961, 96% of all cities of 10,000 or more would have planning commissions (Gold, 1965). The early commissions tended to be composed of unpaid volunteers who had no staff. They used their limited municipal budget allocations to contract private consultants. Between 1936 and 1948 annual spending for city planning increased from $1.6 million to $4.4 million. By 1953 17 U.S. cities dedicated $100,000 or more for this purpose – with New York, Philadelphia and Chicago budgeting at least $400,000 and by 1961 New York and Chicago had budgets of more than $1,000,000 (Gold, 44).

By 1917, twenty-four practitioners – predominantly consultants – formed a unit, the American Institute of City Planning (AICP), to explore professional issues (Birch, 1980).
Until the New Deal, the AICP focused on perfecting practice focused on organizing land use and zoning and designing traffic systems, open space and civic centers (Cincinnati Planning Commission, 1925). By the late Thirties, the proliferation of national programs in housing, infrastructure construction, regional development and resource analysis provided new opportunities for planners. While the private consultants was important, the public sector employee acquired prominence— the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Public Works Administration (PWA), Works Progress Administration (WPA), Resettlement Administration (RA), National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) offered exciting opportunities to test planning techniques. And if planners were not working for the federal government, they found staff jobs in localities. In 1939 alone, “the WPA furnished staff for more than a hundred studies carried out by planning agencies ” (Goodman, 26).

The AICP soon reflected the changing scope of its members by becoming the AIP, the American Institute of Planners, deleting the word “city” in its title. In addition, 1934 saw the founding of the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) which included public officials and citizens as well as the AIP practitioner. These associations through annual meetings, publications (Journal of the American Institute of Planners [JAIP], ASPO Newsletter) and committee work became key arenas for discussion of the profession’s expertise. The AIP retained authority over professional behavior, adopting a code of professional conduct in 1948, guidelines for professional consultants in 1952 and creating a “recognition” system for educational programs in 1956 (JAIP, 1946, 3-6; JAIP, 1952, 1-6).

**The Nature of the Profession**

Despite the expanded sources of employment and the acquisition of professional characteristics, the profession was small. Although the 104-person AIP-roster of the Thirties expanded to 171 in 1940, grew to 754 in 1950 and surged to 2,565 in 1960 planners were still a tiny group operating in a populous, urbanizing country (Annual Report, 1952, AIP Newsletter, 1961). In 1940 Americans numbered 132 million – 56% urban – Americans; 151 million – 64% urban in 1950 and 179 million – 70% urban in 1960 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998). Or in another view, in 1940 the nation had approximately 1,077 urban places with populations ranging from 10,000 to more than a million – a “place-to-planner-ratio” of 6 (or 6 cities for every planner) while in 1960 it had 2,165 urban places yielding about one city per planner (U.S. Census, 1968). In actuality, up through the early Sixties, planning was “primarily a big city activity in terms of its acceptance as a professional staff function” in municipal government. For example, in 1961, the median number of planners in cities having a population of 500,000 or more was 20 while for those of 50-100,000 it was 1. In the same year, 57% of AIP membership centered in eight highly urbanized states – California alone had 17% of the members (Gold, 46-48).

From the Forties through the Sixties, planners, like most other professionals, were white and male. Most had undergraduate training in design or engineering. At first, a few may have earned post-graduate degrees in one of the nation’s five planning schools (Harvard,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell, Columbia or the University of Chicago) but most entered the field through practice applying their training in architecture, landscape architecture, engineering, law, or possibly economics and geography to the “broader field of planning” (Report of Committee on Education, 1942). By the end of the Fifties, more would have specialized training as ten more schools began post-graduate planning programs.

In the twenty-year period between 1940 and 1960, planners struggled with training issues. In three successive AIP-sponsored studies on education, two common themes emerged: the shortage of personnel for the jobs waiting and quality control (Gaus, 1942; Adams, 1954 Perloff, 1957). In 1954 MIT program chair Frederick Adams reported that schools of planning (undergraduate and graduate) were graduating only about 300 planners annually. This finding prompted the editor of the Journal of the American Institute of Planning to observe:

Without adequate and responsible planners the Urban Redevelopment and Renewal programs of the Housing Act of 1949 and 1954...are going to be empty dreams and nothing worthwhile will be accomplished...It is easy to be critical of the compromises with sound planning principles, which the public official makes these days. Get him the technical help he needs, inside and outside his staff and we can be sure that these compromises will diminish...Such technical help, at this moment in our professional history, will not be found within the presently recognized planning fraternity. (Editorial, 172-174)

What constituted adequate training solidified into a two-year program emphasizing core courses centered on land-use planning. By 1957, studies also included specializations in one of four areas: social survey research, transportation, urban design and administration and law (Perloff, 1957). The inclusion of social surveys and administration among the specializations directly resulted from the new occupational opportunities derived from the federal programs. By the end of the Fifties, the AIP recommended but did not mandate this educational prescription. It could enforce it, however, through its “recognition” program developed to clarify membership standards. Becoming a full member of the AIP called for a candidate to document professional education and practical experience. Possession of a degree from a “recognized” program reduced the required number of years of work.

The Planners’ Knowledge Base in the Late Forties

Whether AIP planners possessed a post-graduate degree or practical experience, they had knowledge of a planning process that included research and analysis, policy and plan formulation and implementation and administration (AIP Membership, July 1968). Their competencies included knowing how to conduct basic planning studies (population projections, primitive economic base analysis and land use and transportation surveys) and to how devise a city plan, labeled a “master” or “general” plan, that had a twenty or thirty year scope. The plan mapped existing and future residential, commercial and industrial land use, streets and infrastructure schemes, public building arrangements and outlined various implementing strategies including zoning and subdivision regulations, capital budgeting and public education (Cincinnati City Planning Commission, 1948).
Planning consultant Ladisloe Segoe codified these approaches in the profession’s first comprehensive textbook, *The Practice of Local Planning Administration* (1941), re-issued in 1948 and 1959. These publications, known at the Green Books due to the color of their covers, illustrated field’s evolving views and knowledge. In the 1948 edition urban redevelopment covered two pages in a longer chapter on district planning while the 1959 version had a 40-page chapter on the subject.

The 1948 coverage of “urban redevelopment,” located in a chapter entitled “Planning Residential, Business and Industrial Districts,” summarized what was happening at the time – essentially legislation in about twenty states. The association of redevelopment with district planning, however, emphasized the planners’ concentration on the technical aspects of city building based on the most up-to-date research. The thinking drew heavily on Homer Hoyt’s sector theory to explain city organization, turned to Harland Bartholomew’s Urban Land Uses to show how to allocate land among the districts, endorsed Clarence Perry’s neighborhood unit and quoted Catherine Bauer’s interpretation that good living environments were planned as “complete new communities designed … as functional units and constructed by large scale methods” (Hoyt, 1939; Bartholomew, 1932; Perry, 1929, 1939; Bauer, 1934). Knowledge of slums and blighted areas came from Edith Elmer Wood and Mabel Walker (Wood, 1936; Walker, 1938). Their key finding underlined the contemporary approach:

...Clearance and redevelopment provide the only solution. Because of the contagious character of urban blight, and because of the helplessness of the individual property owner facing it, it is a condition that cannot be remedied by improving individual structures, but only by the simultaneous redevelopment of sizeable areas. A central problem in the redevelopment of such areas is the assembly of a sufficient area of land to permit a planned and coordinated redevelopment project. The project must be large enough so it will be practically immune from the possible blighting influence of adjacent unreconstructed areas (214).

Notably, the book was neither oblivious nor insensitive to social issues in district planning. It simply took the stance that these were not planners’ concerns. The practitioner should give technical advice and leave larger policy issues to others:

When a city undertakes...programs of public housing or redevelopment, it is squarely faced with the question of how far it wishes – and how far it is socially desirable – to maintain the homogeneity of its neighborhoods. This question is extremely difficult for two reasons. First, stratification or the lack of it may have important and far-reaching social effects about which there has been some speculation, but on which there is almost no factual evidence.... Second, the issue touches directly upon deep-seated attitudes and prejudices of the city’s people. Members of the dominant national and racial groups may staunchly defend their demands to exclude minorities from their neighborhoods, while these minorities may be equally opposed to the establishment of “ghettos.”

Since this question has to do with the substance rather than with the administration of city plans it will not be discussed further here. It is mentioned in order to emphasize that the planning of residential neighborhoods is not a purely technical problem to be solved by experts in planning but involves policy questions of the most fundamental sort.

In the remainder of the discussion of residential planning, it will be assumed that the “neighborhood” idea has validity, at least to the extent that definite residential areas need to be
marked off in order to plan community facilities, including school, shopping centers and the street pattern. (Menhinick, 200).

New Views of the Fifties

When the third edition of the Green Book appeared ten years later the environment for planning had changed entirely. Congress had passed the Housing and Slum Clearance Act of 1949 plus three amendments that added rehabilitation to the mix and mandated new local responsibilities in a seven-point “Workable Program.” (Before releasing renewal funds, the federal government required localities to have programs for housing code enforcement, neighborhood and comprehensive planning, relocation programs and citizen participation). The U.S. Supreme Court had upheld urban renewal in the landmark Berman v. Parker (348 U.S.26 1954). Finally, in 1959, the amended Housing Act funded Community Renewal Programs (CRP), citywide assessments of blight and comprehensive plans that anticipated the demand for different land uses and resources required to address the most pressing demands within a staged – 3 to 30 year period (Goodman, 514-515).

And as time went on, planners derived substantial financial benefits from the 1949 and subsequent acts that funded not only basic research and but also master plans. The U.S. Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA) research division headed by economist Richard Ratcliffe had an annual budget that started at about $1.5 million in 1950. It awarded grants on a wide range of housing and renewal topics to planners, especially academicians. The HHFA also supervised the 701 program, funding for local planning activities, that in its first ten years spent $79 million in 4,462 localities for this purpose (Goodman, 355). This work fueled foundation and other government agency spending as well. The Ford Foundation’s Grey Area’s project, the Spelman Fund’s urban renewal study, the National Institute of Mental Health’s five-year research project on relocation and mental health – the one that paid for Herbert Gans’ Urban Villagers – are examples of the attention. The products, works such as Coleman Woodbury’s Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment (1953); Harvey Perloff’s Urban Renewal in a Chicago Neighborhood, An Appraisal of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Renewal Program (1955) helped shape the Act’s amendments.

In these favorable circumstances, researchers and practitioners stretched to delineate and codify appropriate approaches. The Journal of the American Institute of Planners served as an important vehicle for the work. Between 1948 and 1959, it published more than twenty articles on the renewal practices as a sampling of JAIP titles reveal: “Criteria Used in Delimiting Redevelopment Areas,” (1950) with contributions from Edmund Bacon, Executive Director of the Philadelphia Planning Commission, and other administrators; “The Church in the City Plan,” (1950), “Technique for Determining the Relative Housing Quality” (1950), “Rethinking Redevelopment, The Viewpoint of a Small City” (1953). Planners produced thousands of master plans under the 701 grants. They also kindled the simulation field with models funded under CRP – San Francisco and Pittsburgh stand out – joining with others focusing on transportation paid for by the Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1956 (Harris, 1965).
The real result of the planning work began to appear in the changing landscape of the nation’s cities. New York’s Lincoln Center, Boston’s Government Center, Philadelphia’s Society Hill, Providence’s Benefit Street, Pittsburgh’s Gateway Plaza, Washington DC’s Southwest section, San Francisco’s Embarcadero Center, revitalized university campuses such as New York University, Pratt Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Drexel and Temple universities were but a few of the thousands of projects underway.⁴

**Perfection of Planners’ Techniques**

The Green Book’s chapter, “Urban Renewal,” reflected these events tracing the law’s changing emphasis and outlining acceptable implementation tools.⁵ Most important, it showed planners how to go about fulfilling the Workable Program requirements. It outlined the necessary work including population projections, economic assessments, housing quality and blight analysis, comparative neighborhood studies, sketch plans, windshield surveys and others. It discussed “Standards for Healthful Housing,” detailed criteria for evaluating existing and future residential projects (American Public Health Association, 1947, 1960). This effort, reflected the influence of planning thought and employed a definition of health that encompassed “not only sanitation and safety from physical hazards but also those qualities of comfort and convenience and aesthetic satisfaction for emotional and social well-being to and safety from physical hazards but also those qualities of comfort and convenience and aesthetic satisfaction for emotional and social well-being” to demonstrate how the “application of new techniques in construction, of the growing science of planning and of sound methods of financing [will] rebuild our cities (American Public Health, v.).⁶

Not surprisingly, these authoritative guidelines endorsed the neighborhood unit, set numerical density standards and provided elaborate site planning instructions, spinning out the detailed specifications for streets, opens space, community facilities as well as for dwelling units. These principles found life in numerous residential urban renewal projects. During this period, planners also became conversant in conservation techniques. In 1952 attendees at the AIP conference scrutinized Baltimore’s rehabilitation effort in the Waverly Plan (1940), and translated these and other experiences into the teachings of the Green Book. Planners, long committed to large-scale development, endorsed this approach cautiously warning:

Rehabilitation – bringing deteriorated buildings and their deteriorating neighborhoods back to standard – is the newest aspect of the urban renewal program. Getting people to expend funds for renovation of structures in neighborhood rehabilitation, either as investors for rental income or as property owners, is to some extent an educational job. The idea that neighborhoods can “come back” must be sold to the citizens and to the mortgage bankers, who must have faith in the deteriorated area to risk long-term loans.... Among the factors in determining the economic

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⁴ In fact, by the mid-Sixties, the Act would be assisting 120 colleges and 75 hospitals nationwide (Goodman, 497).

⁵ It attributed the term, “urban renewal,” to Lewis Mumford who employed it in The Culture of Cities (1938) and its modern definition to Miles Colean who described it as “a continuous and co-ordinated process of growth, maintenance, and replacement of the urban structure” in Renewing Our Cities (1953).

⁶ Planners composed at least 1/3 of the committee membership. Included were Frederick Adams (MIT), Stuart Chapin (UNC) Robert Mitchell (Penn) John T. Howard (MIT) and others.
feasibility of rehabilitating neighborhoods are: cohesiveness of the neighborhood, so that the property owners will act as a group; physical barriers strong enough that detrimental contiguous areas will not adversely affect the rehabilitation neighborhood; and the possibility, if there are many non-conforming property uses, of converting them to conforming uses. The general rule of thumb is that the value of the properties rehabilitated should equal or exceed the demolition and salvage value (178).

The Green Book insisted that urban renewal required rational, technical approaches undertaken by multi-disciplinary teams. It reinforced the idea that the planner had a special strength in physical matters but needed to call on other experts on the range of other matters involved in this work. Above all, the planners' role was advisory, politically neutral and always in the service of the public interest.

The planner in urban renewal can profit by developing a practical working knowledge of real estate economics, an appreciation of social problems, and skill in governmental relationships. He must also bear in mind, however, that his specialty is the physical environment and the distribution of activities within it. He is the one who proposes the form. In the last analysis, he works as a team-member with the sociologist, the economist, the civil engineer, the housing specialist and the other professions that are involved in making the city function for its people (188).

Cracks in the Façade

Although mainstream planners moved ahead on all fronts, confident of their skills and techniques, others provided evidence that their approaches might be flawed, cracking the façade of expertise. In 1948, Chicago planner Reginald Isaacs challenged the neighborhood unit asserting that it contributed to segregation. (Isaacs, 17). In 1955 Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield maintained that the concept of the public interest meant different things to different people and was thus difficult for the planner to pursue. Four years later, Norton Long attacked the planners' self-image as an apolitical technician asserting: "No longer can the planner take refuge in the neutrality of the objectivity of the personally involved scientist ...the planner is in the thick of [politics]" (Long, 168). In the same year Herbert Gans in a JAP article "The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning" picked away at the planners' definition of slums charging that clearance was not in the public interest "when its outcome was the replacement of a low income population with a higher one" (Gans, 26).

The Urban Uproar: 1960-1979

As the Fifties merged into the Sixties planning began to react to a variety of forces - some resulting from external national trends and others coming from internal questioning and repeated examination of the planners' role in the programs stimulated by the 1949 Act. Against a socially tense background regarding race relations, the War in Vietnam, women's rights and an economy in transition from an industrial to service base, the mixed results of the urban renewal programs and a rising level of discontent with contemporary planning techniques would crystallize into a major redirection of the profession.
The completion of enough projects to allow observers to distinguish what worked and what did not work, the horrified discovery of the enormity of the problems, a growing belief that planners had pinned their work on a flawed theoretical basis led practitioners, researchers and educators to discredit the profession's dependence on rationality and expert-driven solutions premised on physical planning and large scale development. (Schon, 1970; Jacobs, 1961; Meyerson, 1955; Lindblom, 1959).

Rejection of Planners' Approaches

Early evaluations seemed to reveal substantial conceptual weaknesses in the urban renewal programs and that planners' approaches were, in fact, inappropriate and wrong-headed. Sociologist John R. Seeley maintained that, contrary to professional opinion, some slums could be socially useful for households in transition (Seeley, 1959). Harvard researcher Chester Hartman, asserted that as planners implemented the Act, they exacerbated the suffering of low-income populations (Hartman, 1964). Lawyer-planner Paul Davidoff faulted practitioners for neglecting to represent the interests of many players in the urban renewal game (Davidoff, 1965). Inflamed by what he viewed as dysfunctional, undemocratic performance on the part of the planners and federal urban renewal administrators, he presented a paradigm-breaking solution: advocacy planning, featuring politically active professionals using their expertise to give voice to the poor and minorities in plan-making.

Two other discoveries shook planners' confidence in their approaches. When University of Pennsylvania professor William Wheaton estimated the total cost of rebuilding the blighted and obsolete areas of cities, he found the number -- $1,300 billion -- impossible to comprehend and unrealistic to expect in a nation whose annual budget was a fraction of this. (Philadelphia Housing Association, 1961). More shocking for planners was the Report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) blamed urban renewal and public housing for the increasing racial segregation and economic hardship of minorities in American cities, phenomena contributing substantially to the riots of the late Sixties (President's Commission, 1968). Furthermore, it asserted that some of the worst violence occurred in places having high levels of government investment in redevelopment.

More National Legislation Supports Planning Activities

Ironically, as the cracks deepened to fissures regarding planners' urban renewal approaches, Congress passed several pieces of legislation that supported planning. In addition to important amendments in the Housing Acts of 1961, 1965 and 1968, the Urban Mass Transit Act (1964), Equal Opportunities Act (1965) and associated War on Poverty programs, and National Environmental Policy Act (1969) and succeeding water and air pollution legislation all had planning components. It also created the U.S. Department of Housing and urban Development (1965) with substantial funds for planning. Finally, it experimented with blending physical and social planning in the Demonstration Cities Act (1966).
This legislation stimulated huge employment opportunities for planners. For example, in the mid Sixties, one observer noted that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development would need to fill 1,800 jobs in two years (Willman, 1967). Yet there were relatively few professionals equipped to take them. Between 1929 and 1954, only 538 people earned degrees in city planning (Hartman, 229).

Planning Education Twists and Turns to Defend its Legitimacy

So many universities rushed to fill the gap that between 1960 and 1980 more than 50 masters and 19 doctoral programs emerged. In 1969 alone, 875 people earned planning degrees (Hartman, 229). Meanwhile, with the proliferation of university programs — by the end of the Eighties there were about 80—the demand for professors to fill teaching positions was enormous. Planners, who had a high tolerance for other disciplines and who were shaken by the apparent failures of many of their approaches, welcomed scholars from other fields into their departments thinking that they could add to the profession’s knowledge base. Furthermore, in many institutions, especially those where planning programs were lodged outside of their traditional location in design schools, the rigor of academic hiring policies led to the appointment of Ph.D-bearing scholars who had little or no practice experience. In fact, since the new faculty were drawn heavily from the social sciences, they applied their disciplines to analyzing planning outcomes or processes rather than teaching planning techniques.

Many found that the field lacked what they considered a proper theoretical basis and sought to remedy the situation. The first discussions on planning theory date from 1957 but do not accelerate until the Sixties, with landmark essays appearing in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners (Handler, 1957; Davidoff and Reiner, 1962) Trained in scientific methods, the newcomers were not “socialized” into planning and tended to be skeptical of professions in general. A widespread attack on the legitimacy of the field emerged in a scattering of articles appearing in intellectual journals fitting planning into larger discussions of professions in American life. In 1963, Harvard professor William Alonso, writing for Daedalus condemned planners for their “lagging understanding of the changes...that...has led us to try remedies which are unsuited to the ills of urban areas” while in 1974 Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer wrote in Minerva that planning, along with social work, education, divinity and librarianship, was a “minor profession” characterized by its lack of intellectual rigor and dependence on supposedly superior disciplines of economics or political science for structure.7

These assertions had their counterparts inside the field. In a special education issue of the Journal of the American Institute of Planners. Visiting Professor at MIT, Donald Schon reiterated the belief that the field was intellectually bankrupt:

7 For a full discussion of this topic see Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
The settled technologies associated with city and regional planning have come to seem increasingly inadequate. There is increasing dissatisfaction, for example, with our inability to integrate physical and social planning. Urban renewal and public housing failed because they are unable to anticipate or confront the social consequences of certain changes in the physical environment. ... We do not have effective ways of forecasting and planning for events twenty to thirty years hence (Hartman, 220).

John Kain, professor of economics at Harvard, took an even harder line when he claimed that “after several years of observing city planners in school and on the job, I am not convinced that ... professional concepts and skills exist” (Hartman, 223). Kain went on to attack the newest angle in the field, advocacy planning and the outgrowth interests devoted to the elimination of poverty and social inequality. He scathingly dismissed planners' efforts: “To an increasing number of students and faculty the traditional concerns [of physical planning and urban design] are simply irrelevant. They perceive poverty, racial discrimination, unemployment, inadequate education, crime and delinquency as critical.... Departments of city and regional planning have little special competence in dealing with these questions” (Hartman, 223).

These statements, coming from faculty from institutions having the longest traditions in planning education, cast a pall over the field. Although a young MIT associate professor Langley Keyes tried to rally the troops around a focus on traditional interests he lost credibility when he took an unpopular position against advocacy planning:

What may be called the ‘exhortation’ side of the planning profession ... rather than to promote what might be characterized as the ‘nuts and bolts’ side of planning ... Advocacy tends to be concerned ... with the negative – how to stop this renewal project or that highway. It is not often capable of getting specific development programs off the ground. Only by studying the details of urban renewal, code enforcement, a highway network or housing development can one learn what has been successful or unsuccessful, what went wrong and how ... these urban development efforts could be improved (Hartman, 225).

In this climate, many departments sought new curricular directions. Above all, they thoroughly discredited past educational patterns. Some championed the application of policy planning, vaguely defined as a process or way of thinking, to all problems in American society. They were in complete agreement with Herbert Gans who asserted:

... In the past, the profession was not really planning, but advocating an ideal community and that only now is it learning to plan. By planning, I mean a method and process of decision-making that proposes or identifies goal (ends) and determines effective policies (or means) – those which can be shown analytically to achieve the goals while minimizing undesirable financial, social and other consequences (Hartman, 223).

Many scholars favored developing planning theories at the expense of contributing to technically-based field work. Others rejected the traditional basis of instruction: the studio with its physical planning associations. In fact, in tenure and promotion decisions the academy began to reject applied work as a legitimate scholarly activity (ASCP, 1986; Checkoway, 1998).
Planning students soon expressed their discontent with the state of professional education. In part, they reflected the general unrest experienced in many institutions of higher learning where student strikes had disrupted academic work and, in part, they were caught in the middle of faculty disagreement about curriculum. The bottom line was that many formerly stable and quietly performing planning programs became the scenes of violent quarrels and other unpleasantness leading Harvard planning professor William A. Doebele to remark that “There is no doubt that graduate professional education for city and regional planning in the United States has fallen on difficult days” (Hartman, 269).

*Tales of MIT*

This phenomenon hit MIT, the bastion of planning education, especially hard but other programs had similar experiences. By 1970, the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* printed the chilling details of the MIT story whose woes included student revolts, deep faculty rifts regarding curriculum and seemingly, a “lack of clear educational direction” (Hartman, 244). MIT’s problems occurred at a time when the department was at its height in terms of student applications (there were ten for each place) and research awards (contract research increased eleven times in three years). With such a bright horizon and with the demand for planners seemingly endless, the already large faculty almost doubled in size – from 15 to 29 – and the student body grew to 90 up from 55.

However, faculty and students attracted to the field were quite different from earlier years. Whereas the original instructors were practitioners who were also engaged in formulating and implementing plans and projects especially in urban renewal programs; the newcomers tended move “away from applied empiricism...toward a theoretical orientation” and had primary interests in specialized research not practice. As the field’s intellectual leaders they searched for replacements for the old dogma and urban-based scholarship flourished in the hundreds of journal articles and monographs pouring out of academia. However, at the time, scholars, inside and outside the field really had nothing to exchange for the sure, but now considered irrelevant, professional knowledge of prior generations.

In addition, the master’s candidates of the past who had sought entry into profession that was confident of its teachings, expertise centered on land use, were replaced by a new group whose questions and accusations of failure flummoxed their faculty mentors. They wanted a field that could solve the “urban crisis” (Hartman, 246). Like their peers nationwide, they were politically active, anti-establishment and ready to take education into their own hands. They challenged the department to come up with a better curriculum, demanded participation in faculty meetings and contributed to the discussions about future educational directions. At the same time, they lamented their fate:

Most students come to MIT to encounter a more turbulent environment, and while they recognize that a highly formalized education would be inappropriate given the present state of planning, they cannot help but feel a sense of loss (Hartman, 245).
Chastened by the virulent and repeated attacks on traditional planning thought, the Department had turned to other disciplines for hiring. Although the new instructors contributed refreshing (and sometimes difficult) points of view, they reoriented the Department “from planning to urban studies.” Additionally, the newcomers tended “to identify more strongly with their professional colleagues in other departments...than with the planning staff” thus creating painful, internal generational and intellectual schisms (Hartman, 244).

By the late Sixties, the faculty dramatically refashioned the program. They eliminated the core curriculum and studio requirements. This freed students to pursue their interests in other departments and schools. But it also had the unfortunate affect, according to witnesses, “of reducing dialogue on basic issues in and out of planning...[and] led to the fragmentation of the department...as an intellectual community (Hartman, 244). The resulting situation echoed in one student’s complaint:

“I don’t understand...I’ve heard a lot about how good MIT’s planning program is supposed to be but now I come here and find no required courses, no student organization and hardly anyone around the department. What kind of programs is this?” (Hartman, 242).8

Soon, Jack Dyckman, professor of city planning at the University of Pennsylvania and later at the University of California, Berkeley, diagnosed the emerging conflicts, capturing divisions that remain in the field today. His seminal essay, “Three Crises in American Planning,” warned of the difficulties inherent in 1.) the growing division between educators and practitioners, 2.) the need for educators to be “intellectually defensible” in the university by espousing an organizing theory of their discipline and 3.) the role of planning within the American democratic system (Burchell and Sternlieb, 1978).

Stresses and Strains Affect the Professional Association

By the early Seventies, the American Institute of Planners was also in an uproar. An influx of new members, often considerably younger and more politically liberal than the leadership pushed the rolls to about 4,400 in 1967, 6,000 in 1970 and 11,500 in 1977. Not only did the AIP favor those holding master of city planning degrees – they needed only two years of planning experience as opposed to the five years demanded of college graduate – but also it allowed a broader selection of areas of concentration to qualify in the oral examination required for membership. Candidates could now prove competency in renewal planning, economic planning, social planning, fields unheard of a decade before. (“AIP’s Oral Membership,” 1969).

In addition, by the late Sixties, the AIP had completely revised its mission statement, to excise all references to land use and insert the concept of multiple kinds of planning – economic and social as well as physical, encompassing a wider variety geographic areas

8 Notably, despite the angst reflected in this quotation, the author citing it rushed to defend MIT observing that “it is difficult to find a student who wishes he were elsewhere.” Nonetheless, he went on to relate a series of horror stories that would make a PAB accreditation team of today take notice!
including neighborhoods, spanning short-term as well as long-term time horizons. It reflected these findings in all of its initiatives.

Like the educational institutions, the AIP struggled with internal divisions related to the proper role of planners in American society. On one side, a subset, the Planners for Equal Opportunity, emerged to challenge the association’s politically neutral stance, insisting that the AIP Board of Governors proactively promote a number of political issues including calling for economic and social equity for minorities and poor and issuing statements against the War in Vietnam. These efforts, a direct outcome of the advocacy planning movement, split the association. Letters for and against appeared in the monthly newsletter. Contested elections and write-in candidates became common. The AIP leadership responded slowly. It supported lobbying efforts for HUD sponsorship of planning fellowships for underrepresented groups but it refused to have the AIP take public positions on national issues. It took on an assessment of its ethics statements eventually including the following provision in its 1975 edition of the Code of Responsibility and Rules of Procedure:

A planner shall seek to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons and shall urge the alteration of policies, institutions and decisions which militate against such objectives (American Institute of Planners, 1975).

On another side, it allowed the formation of departments or interest groups (later divisions) within the organization. The Board gave some areas unquestioned support but looked askance at others such as the Planning and Women Division.

The 1949 Act contributed to other tendencies in the field. One was a growing rift among the practitioners generally split along the lines of private consultants and public sector employees. While the Act had heightened the demand for planners and provided sufficient funding for planning activities to enable local and state government to hire permanent staff, in so doing it reduced the need for private consultants. Eventually, public sector workers outnumbered the consultants within the AIP. Faced with a loss of their historical dominance of AIP leadership positions and hence their interests, the consultants broke off to create a separate group, the American Society of Consulting Planners whose expressed purpose was to “advance the public welfare through the recognition and encouragement of the private practice of planning” (ASCP Membership Roster, 1975). The other was the expression of the practitioner/academician split. Earlier, the educators had begun their own interest group, the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) to pursue their interests and by the late Sixties, they declared independence from the professional association opting to have a separate conference and journal. Finally, in 1978 after lengthy deliberations, the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) and the AIP merged into the American Planning Association (APA) and its affiliate, the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP). In part, this alliance derived from the issues related to the blurring of lines regarding the
profession, its credibility and expertise that had emerged as a result of the actions undertaken under the 1949 Act. 9

Urban Planning Redefined: 1980 to Present

In the Eighties, the profession felt the changes set in motion by the Housing Act of 1949. By the Nineties they were embedded in its institutions. The number of planners continued to grow as membership in the APA increased to more than 20,000 and in the AICP to above 10,000. More than seventy universities now offered post-graduate planning programs and by middle nineties; their collective enrollments reached more than 5,000.

Debates over the curriculum began to settle down, especially after the 1984 founding of the Planning Accreditation Board (PAB) to oversee the field’s educational efforts. Jointly shared by the ACSP, AICP and APA the accreditation process has established minimum standards for post-graduate programs including calling for “planning predominance” in the faculty and specifying expectations for knowledge and skills (Dalton, 1999). The theory, cited as lacking in the early Sixties, flourished over the course of a generation. At least three collections serve to document its continuing evolution while the Journal of the American Planning Association and the Journal of Planning Education and Research provide additional outlets (Faludi, 1973; Sternlieb and Burchell, 1978; Mandelbaum, Mazza and Burchell, 1996). The discussions about its current and future directions have proliferated, but increasingly focus on the act of planning – a subject originally made important by the internal and external criticisms of the Housing Act of 1949 (Hall, 1989; Inness, 1999).

The technical or functional aspects of planning have been reborn in the academy and practice as indicated by the activities of the APA Divisions and the outpouring of publications – articles and monographs. The two editions of the Green Book, appeared in 1979 and 1988 and were thick with instructions about the field. In fact, these versions filled two volumes, one focused on local government planning and the other, on state planning. At a minimum, the Housing Act of 1949 gave birth to at least six of today’s specialties: community and economic development, housing and neighborhood planning, citizen participation and community organization, negotiation and conflict resolution, social policy and human services, race and ethnicity in planning and contributed to practice in many others including historic preservation, and physical planning and urban design. 10

Planners now have a more measured understanding of what their profession can contribute to American settlement patterns. While they are still trying to regain their loss of confidence after popular opinion condemned their implementation of the Housing Act

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9 There was a myriad of other issues surrounding the consolidation, not the least of which were financial considerations and duplication of services (Birch, 1980).
10 The Guide to Graduate Education in Urban and Regional Planning (ACSP: 1996) lists these items. Other listings might include the APA Divisions or the subject headings devised by the editors of the Journal of the American Planning Association.
they have taken to heart lesson learned in the earlier period. For example, even with an area as seeming unrelated as environmental planning and its progeny, the Smart Growth movement, planners conduct themselves differently as a result of the 1949 Act. The emergence of environmental justice efforts focusing on disadvantaged communities would never have happened without the consciousness raising stimulated by the 1949 Act. Embedded in the thinking is the restoration of despoiled and depleted inner city neighborhoods – the slums and blighted areas of yesteryear. Today’s planning for these areas now takes for granted the recognition of residents values and views, an approach emanating from the reactions to the 1949 Act.

Along with this more sensitive approach to people and their needs, planners have shaped their profession in response to weaknesses detected during the course of the Act’s implementation. For example, it now has a professional code of ethics that appreciates American pluralism and values diversity among its practitioners. Although the demographic characteristics of the profession have yet approximate the national profile; the group has become much more inclusive than formerly as more minorities and women entered the field. Clearly, the Housing Act played a role in stimulating this change.

Finally, the profession has shown an enormous capacity for productive self-examination. Its adherents have been willing to review and reconstruct its practices to meet contemporary needs. In the critical years of the Sixties they may have resorted to damaging confrontations and internecine battles that injured their public image, but in recent years, they have narrowed the field’s focus, no longer claiming to be all things to all people. In the process they have regained credibility and effectiveness.

This review of the past fifty years clearly reveals that the Housing and Slum Clearance Act of 1949 transformed the planning profession. It demonstrates that planners, as many professionals, have been and continue to be products of their times. They address topical questions and attempt to answer them employing available research and technical skills. It also shows that, fundamentally, planners have been and are still united by a desire to make the environment a better place. The 1949 Act tested this goal. It challenged how planners defined “better” as evaluations of their work under the Act quickly demonstrated. It forced them to confront new values, concepts and approaches. Planners could have withered away in the face of these challenges. But they did not. They changed. The process was difficult, the profession may have faltered as it sought new solutions but it soldiered on committed to unlocking the riddles of contemporary metropolitan life. Indeed, the profession has not abandoned its goal of making the environment a “better” place. And this, above all, is most significant effect of the Housing and Slum Clearance Act on the planning profession. It the ignited, confirmed and perhaps one can say even nurtured the field’s persistent pursuit of this goal.
Selected Bibliography


