Colonial Discourse in the Cold War: Negotiations Between António de Oliveira Salazar and John F. Kennedy over Angolan Independence and the Azores Base from 1961 to 1963

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over Angolan Independence and the Azores Base from 1961 to 1963

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Honors Director: Dr. Ronald Granieri; Faculty Advisor: Dr. Bruce Kuklick
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................i
Preface............................................................................................................................iii

**Introduction: Lusotropicalismo and Modernization as Ideologies.**.................. 1

**Part 1: The Development of an Alliance.**............................................................ 4
Chapter 1: The Azores as the Beginnings of an Alliance........................................... 5
Chapter 2: Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance: Portugal and the United States as Partners.......................................................... 19

**Part 2: Lusotropicalismo and Modernization as Ideologies.**.......................... 43
Chapter 3: Salazar, the *Estado Novo*, and Portuguese *Lusotropicalismo*........... 44
Chapter 4: Support Any Friend, Oppose Any Foe: Kennedy and the Start of a New Era................................................................................................................ 64

**Part 3: The Diplomatic Rift.**.............................................................................. 83
Chapter 5: Portugal and the United States, the Diplomatic Rift: *Lusotropicalismo* vs. Modernization Theory........................................... 84

**Conclusion.**............................................................................................................ 93
Salazar and Kennedy on the Eve of Decolonization............................................... 94

Maps and Illustrations............................................................................................... 97

Bibliography............................................................................................................... 101
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This project was motivated by time spent abroad in Angola, a country characterized by political strife, and still so much suffering after the civil war ended only in 2002. While I was there, it was the 2008 elections in the U.S. Many Angolans expressed hopes and expectations about Obama’s promises, envisioning him as a kind of savior. Two years later, Angolans say they are largely disappointed by the juxtaposition between campaign rhetoric and policy. My fascination, and indeed, often obsession, with Angola, led me to study the promises we have made to Angola in the past about how its fate should be determined. In doing so, I came to travel to and to explore the connections between Portugal, Angola, and Washington D.C. I found at the heart of this intersection, the Kennedy family.

Following Senator Edward Kennedy’s passing this year on August 25, 2009, African media outlet All Africa reported that, “Today Africa mourns the death of Senator Edward Kennedy because he is a Kennedy, because the Kennedys represented, no matter how dim it appeared, a glimmer of hope in a still colonial world.”¹ For many Africans, the Kennedy family symbolized a promise for change; a promise to give Africans a voice in shaping their own futures. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy attempted to charter a new course for the United States’ African policy, a vision that he had set in mind long before running for presidency. President Kennedy fervently believed in self-determination, and sought to support independence movements all over Africa.

When talking about Cyprus on October 15 of 1956 at the Junior Chamber of Commerce Dinner in Richmond, Virginia, then Senator John Kennedy declared, “I have high hopes that 1956 will offer the voters a far saner, a far sounder discussion of foreign policy issues than 1952. After all, as the result of the change in administrations both parties should now be able to concentrate on current policies instead of berating and distorting the distant past…or the old battle of Asia-first vs. Europe-first…We proclaim our sympathy to the end of Colonialism but abstain from voting on specific issues… But this kind of indecision, compromise and half-heartedness, which has characterized Democratic Administrations in election years, also, has tragic consequences.”

Yet, the young Massachusetts senator’s words would come to haunt him in 1962. After broadcasting his sympathy for the end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola, 1962 was the year when the Kennedy administration was to discontinue its support for Angolan independence at the United Nations. Kennedy would go back on his very words.

To this end, this thesis is thus an attempt to look beyond simply how decisions were made within the American foreign policy bureaucracy (Figure 1 shows a comic depiction of this statement by Jack

![Figure 1 Cartoon by Jack Ohman: Careerists vs. Academics](image-url)
but rather, to give primacy the real-world consequences of these policies. Rather, I seek to make use of foreign-language material to gain a better understanding of what Portuguese politicians and intellectuals were saying about Kennedy’s colonial rhetoric, and how it shaped their policy and attitudes towards the United States. This thesis is an attempt to understand colonial discourse in a Cold War context and the subsequent effects for Salazar and Kennedy’s foreign relations. I have thus tried to explore these questions through the lens of different historical subfields, not only diplomatic, so that we might be better equipped to understand the intellectual origins behind policy-making, what the actual policy was, and how this was interpreted abroad.
INTRODUCTION:
LUSOTROPICALISMO AND MODERNIZATION AS IDEOLOGIES

“Not long ago the Western man ruled the world, today he studies it”
- Dankart Rustow

The intersection between decolonization and the Cold War provides a lens into tensions between two critical themes. The subject raises important questions relating to Cold War foreign policy, the development of nationalist movements, and superpower rivalry. Following World War II, there was “a wave” of decolonization. The dismantling of European empires, as Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Odd Arne Westad emphasize, was both a product of the Cold War and affected the way in which it played out.¹ The junction between decolonization and the Cold War has drawn an array of scholars to study why the United States defined its foreign policy towards the colonial world the way it did in a Cold War context. This thesis is an attempt to go beyond the traditional diplomatic history approach where “scholarly work on the intersection between American foreign policy and decolonization…has hinged on whether U.S. policy in the third world was motivated by economic opportunity or Cold War security interests.”² As Michael Latham argues in Chapter 1 of his book, Modernization as Ideology, while such arguments have great merit in “finding interests hidden behind the rhetoric of idealism and benevolence – interests grounded either in terms of Cold War security goals or, alternatively capitalist demands,” they also “marginalize the significance of ideas and culture in shaping the

objectives of national policy.”³ In his review of Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns’ collection, *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*⁴, Latham instead invites us to explore the “wider intellectual and cultural framework through which U.S. officials sought to make sense of a complex, decolonizing world.”⁵ This thesis thus attempts to explore the wider intellectual and cultural framework of both Portuguese officials of the *Estado Novo* and U.S. officials within the Kennedy administration as they tried to make sense of the subject of Angolan decolonization. In exploring the intellectual and cultural frameworks of both the *Estado Novo* and the Kennedy administration, this thesis seeks to understand how these frameworks clashed and led to a diplomatic rift between two NATO allies.

Part 1 focuses on the development of the alliance between Portugal and the United States. Chapter 1 highlights how the Azores played a key role as early as the 1770s in fostering bilateral relations between Portugal and the United States. Chapter 2 details the birth of the United States and Portugal as NATO allies. To analyze relationship between the United States and Portugal as NATO allies, this chapter also looks at the historic impulse behind the creation of NATO, and why Portugal was invited to be a founding member. By analyzing the development of the bilateral relationship between Portugal and the United States within the NATO framework, this sets the stage to see how these partners would face a schism in their alliance in later years.

Part 2 focuses on the wider intellectual and cultural framework of the *Estado Novo* and the Kennedy administration as they tried to make sense of Angolan decolonization. Chapter 3 explores how the ideology of Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar, the cultural policies enforced by Propaganda Minister, António Ferro, and the ideas such as state-sponsored *lusotropicalismo*, were appropriated into national policy on colonialism and Angolan decolonization. Chapter 4 also explores the intellectual and cultural framework towards colonialism and Angolan decolonization, but on the part of the Kennedy administration. To do so, this chapter looks at the speeches of President John F. Kennedy, the influence of the African-American Civil Rights Movement, and Latham’s concept of “modernization as ideology”.

Part 3 focuses on the diplomatic rift between Portugal and the United States which emerged most prominently in 1962 over the colonial question. This chapter sees to show the actual consequences of different intellectual and cultural frameworks towards colonialism and decolonization between two NATO allies.

The last section, the conclusion, discusses this episode in terms of the culture of the Cold War, and draws upon what we can understand from a partnership between two NATO allies that turned sour during the Cold War.
PART ONE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLIANCE
CHAPTER ONE:
THE AZORES AS THE BEGINNING OF AN ALLIANCE

This chapter looks at the Azores archipelago in the development of the alliance between Portugal and the United States. The geopolitical position of Portugal arouses considerable interest amongst foreign powers. Portugal is near Gibraltar, borders the entrance to the Mediterranean, and is situated on the Iberian Peninsula allowing it to influence Spain. The Azores sits 1,400 miles east of New York, and 750 miles west of Gibraltar in the Atlantic Ocean: it is heralded as the geopolitical prize of Portugal. In 1944, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff classified the Azores as one of the six vital bases to maintain in the post-war period. One year later, the Department of War and the Department of Navy deemed the Azores critical for what was known as the “defense perimeter” from Greenland to the South Pacific. Yet there is a precedent to the significance of the Azores bases in American strategic thinking that long precedes World War II, dating as far back as the founding of the United States. This chapter seeks to explore the role of the Azores in American strategic thinking, and to understand how the Azores bases became tied to the question of Portuguese sovereignty. Why was the Azores so critical to the United States over time, and how did Salazar seek to take advantage of strategic use of the Portuguese archipelago by brokering conditioned deals about its use?

As early as the 1770s, the Continental Congress cooperated with the Azores to facilitate travel of emissaries who sought backing from Europe for the American

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Revolution. In 1795, President George Washington approved the application of John Street as the first American Consul to the Azores. This consulate has been maintained without closure since its founding in 1795, and is the oldest continuously existing U.S. consulate worldwide. The Spanish-American War set the stage for viewing the Azores in a strategic context. On April 19, 1898, Minster Townsend in Lisbon sent an official announcement alerting Washington D.C. that Lisbon decided to remain neutral in the Spanish-American war. Portuguese neutrality was only revealed to Washington by means of cable service transmissions from the Azores, as Washington struggled to learn whether Portuguese Prime Minister José Luciano de Castro had taken sides. Until the radio was invented, these cables were the main source of rapid long distance communications. The Azores thus attracted attention from France, Germany, and the United States as a site for cable networks.

During World War I, the Azores would continue to play an important strategic function. Both the United States and Germany had hopes for the Azores as a coaling

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12 See: José Medeiros Ferreira, “José Bruno Carreiro, Admiral Dunn, and President Wilson: The Triangle that Never Existed?” Franklin Roosevelt e os Açores nas Duas Guerras Mundiais (Lisbon: Fundação Luso-Americanica, 2008), 279-297, for an overview of the international importance of the Azores since 1898.
station for a trans-Atlantic German attack. When German U-boat attacks plagued the Azores in 1917, American sailors and officers were celebrated as heroes for remaining vigilant while the Portuguese authorities let control slip. In the year that followed on April 11 of 1918, the United States established a naval base in the Azores. The New York Times announced that this naval base would serve “American submarines, destroyers, and other small craft with the consent of Portugal in order to protect Atlantic trade routes to southern Europe.” American officers stationed on the Azores islands would continue to garner favor amongst locals. Azoreans even dedicated a song to the American naval officers serving under Admiral Dunn to show their gratitude:

The people of São Miguel, the people of the Azores
Applaud your gesture, your boundless kindness!
You are a noble race, oh American people!
You understand human suffering!
In your foreign strength and colossal wealth,
You do not forget the road of duty
Our heartfelt Portuguese gratitude to you
will be external, forever shall it live!

The Azoreans felt that Lisbon had abandoned the islands, and valued the attention the Americans lavished upon the archipelago. Respect for Americans stationed on the island reached the extent that there was discussion of Azores separating from Portugal to become a part of the United States. Though this proposal never materialized, it shows the strong relationship between the Azores and the United States from early on.

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15 This was made aware to me courtesy of Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff from the chapter on German-American war plans by Holger Herwig and D.F. Trask from: Paul M. Kennedy, *The War plans of the great powers, 1880-1914* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1979).
17 “Base In The Azores For American Navy Will Also Be Homing Station For Naval Planes, Some Which Are Already There,” New York Times, April 12, 1918.
19 Ibid, 308.
1918, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) visited Ponta Delegada the Azores as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Approximately ninety years later, the Regional Government of the Azores and the Luso-American Foundation would hold the first **Franklin D. Roosevelt Azorean Forum** in Ponta Delegada with representatives from Portugal and the United States to commemorate FDR’s stay in the Azores. The forum epitomized FDR’s stopover in the Azores as an indication that the islands were “both symbolically and politically important for the transatlantic relationship.” As President Roosevelt led the United States through World War II, the Azores would continue to be a key in American strategic thinking about geopolitics and security.

**Allied Strategic Thinking about the Azores in World War II and its Aftermath**

According to historian Adam Seipp, the development of America’s World War II base system in the European Theater came about in three stages: the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement to protect American shipping and win the Battle of the Atlantic; bases in Britain which allowed the Allies to fight the war in continental Europe from the air; and facilities built after 1943 to support invasions of southern and western Europe. As with the Spanish-American War, Portugal decided to assume a position of neutrality in World War II. However, this position of neutrality has also been described as


22 For a comprehensive discussion about Portuguese neutrality in WWII and why “Portugal, in principle, could not take a side during the war and how Salazar used these wartime negotiations to ensure the survival of his regime,” see: Melissa Teixeira, “Caught on the Periphery: Portuguese Neutrality during World War II and Anglo-American Negotiations with Salazar” (History honors thesis, University of Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons, 2008).
“collaborationist” by some historians since Salazar had “granted concessions of a military nature…to the Allies…namely to the British in 1943 on Terceira Island and to the Americans in 1944 on the island of Santa Maria.”

The American bases at Ponta Delegada were used as an “advance post for the defense of continental America and as a secondary base from which to project U.S. power towards Europe.” How precisely did these agreement between Washington, London, and Lisbon come about, and what were its implications for American-Portuguese relations during the sixties?

In 1939, FDR and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle concurred that if Hitler triumphed over the Allied war effort, then they could assume that he would next try to secure bases in the Azores and Cape Verde to launch an attack against America. The Azores were critical for trans-shipment and refueling, and served to balance against Hitler’s relations with Franco. The Allies were thus alarmed by the possibility that Hitler might occupy the Azores. If such a scenario arose, Hitler might be able to take control of the entire central Atlantic. As such, the Allies found it of utmost importance to quickly secure control the Azores. The initiative for this would come on the part of the United Kingdom, which could appeal to its historic alliance with Portugal since 1373 for bargaining power.

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On June 16, 1943, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, the British Ambassador to Portugal, wrote to Salazar, petitioning him to lease the Azores to the United Kingdom. Sir Campbell argued that though the threat of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula had come to naught, the German submarine campaign expanded to the point that it was impeding full deployment of UN forces on the battlefield. In light of this, Sir Campbell implored Salazar to permit the United Kingdom use of facilities in the Azores for “the operation of aircraft and surface vessels [which] would be a decisive factor in the early defeat of the German submarine campaign in the Atlantic and, consequently, a vital contribution to an early victory of the United Nations.” The Azorean islands of São Miguel and Teceira would be used to operate general reconnaissance aircraft, with unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at São Miguel or Fayal. In order to persuade Salazar to allow the British use of facilities in the Azores, Sir Campbell made this request of Salazar in the name of the Alliance which had existed between Portugal and Great Britain for six hundred centuries. Now, Sir Campbell also made other calculated assurances to assuage any hesitation on the part of Salazar. He firstly assured Salazar that should any threat arise to Portugal or her Empire due to leasing of the Azores, then the United Kingdom would guarantee withdrawal of British forces from the Azores. Sir Campbell secondly pledged that above and beyond this, the United Kingdom was prepared to “give assurances regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all the Portuguese colonies.” The ambassador indicated that the Union of South Africa had also given its word on such assurances, and found reason to believe that the

27 Top secret note from Sir Ronald H. Campbell of the British Embassy to Dr. Salazar dated June, 16, 1943 and delivered on June 18, 1943, AOS/CLB/FA-1/P-4.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
United States would make a similar pledge with respect to Portuguese sovereignty over her colonies. The origins of the linkages between the Azores and the Portuguese Empire can thus be seen in this mere note from Sir Campbell.

Two days later, Salazar sent a secret letter to the Portuguese Ambassador in London.\(^{30}\) In this letter, Salazar stated that his reading of the documents received concerning the Azores put forth too optimistic and simplistic a vision of the German war efforts. One hypothesis would be to assume eventual peace between Russia and Germany. Yet, if this was to occur, millions of German men fighting would be available not only for defensive operations but for an offensive too. This would lead to the other alternative hypothesis: war between Germany and Russia, which did not seem impossible for Stalin to declare better conditions than the peace of an Allied victory. The Portuguese Embassy in London conjectured that the only case in which Russia would undermine the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and conclude a separate peace with Germany at this stage of the war would be if there were severe defeats suffered by Soviet forces, or if the Allies weakened efforts against the common enemy.\(^{31}\) However, the Portuguese diplomatic corps stationed in London also discerned that Soviet forces were well-trained and well-armed, with high morale shared by citizens whose “hatred against the Germans for their atrocities [was] intense.”\(^{32}\) For Portuguese diplomats, it thus seemed absurd that Stalin should consider a separate peace with Germany. As one diplomat questioned, “What terms…could Germany offer which would be acceptable to Russia???”\(^{33}\)

\(^{30}\) Secret Letter from Salazar to the Portuguese Ambassador in London, June 18, 1943, AOS/CLB/FA-1/P-3/17J.

\(^{31}\) Telegram 235 from the Portuguese Embassy in London, June 24, 1943, AOS/CLB/FA-1/P-4.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Ibid. I preserve the original punctuation emphasized in the telegram from the Portuguese Embassy in London.
Despite his private shunning of the British and American predictions for Germany and Russia, Salazar sent an official reply to the British ambassador devoid of any such criticism and solely addressed the Azores request. Salazar reminded London that Portugal had adopted a position of neutrality during World War II. Despite this, Sir Campbell’s invocation of the six-hundred century-old alliance seemed to have made an impact on Salazar. Salazar decided that in principle, he accepted Campbell’s proposal, and the technicalities would be worked out between London and Lisbon. That said, he took particular notice of Sir Campbell’s pledged guarantees and made a point that to inform Sir Campbell that he expected the United Kingdom to keep her word. Salazar impressed upon Sir Campbell his gratitude for the British guarantee to respect territorial integrity and Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies. He also praised the similar assurances received from South Africa. In his final remark to Campbell, Salazar hinted that the governments of the United States and Australia had also offered such assurances with respect to possessions in the East. It took Sir Campbell nearly two months to formulate his response to Salazar. When he finally replied, Sir Campbell informed Salazar that a delegation of British experts had been sent to Portugal in early July to facilitate conversations between the two governments on the Azores. The conversations between the visiting delegation and Lisbon led to an agreement permitting British use of facilities in Azores on October 8, 1943.

The final accord pertaining to use of facilities in the Azores was signed in Lisbon on August 17, 1943 by Vice-Admiral Alfredo Botelho de Sousa acting on behalf of

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Lisbon, and British Air Vice-Marshal Sir Charles Medhurst. According to the terms of the accord, the United Kingdom was granted:

(i) facilities without restrictions for resupplying fuel, water, renewal and repairs, as compatible with local resources in the Port of Horta;
(ii) use of the port of Ponta Delegada restricted to facilities normally granted to a belligerent for a neutral state as outlined by the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, in Section XIII of the 1907 Hague Convention;
(iii) unrestricted use of the field in Lajes on the island of Terceira for aviation of the British Commonwealth; (iv) use of facilities in the port and bases of Terceira, necessary for the resupplying and maintenance of the Lajes Field;36
(iv) use of facilities for planes of the British Commonwealth in the field of Rabo de Peixe on the island of São Miguel as a field site for forced landings when fuel was lacking or for other circumstances which would not permit a plane to reach the Lajes field;
(v) facilities for occasional refueling in the Port of Horta;
(vi) permission to use the facilities for British Commonwealth and UN ships; and
(vii) permission to launch a submarine communications cable between Horta and Terceira for military communication during the war.

Though the accord had been signed, Salazar vacillated, finding that the assurances were perhaps not enough. He wanted the Commonwealth of Australia to acknowledge Portuguese sovereignty over the colonies as the United Kingdom and South Africa had done. Acting on behalf of the British Embassy in Lisbon, Sir H.L. Hopkinson reassured Salazar that the Australian government had reported it was happy to follow suit with such assurances. According to the Australian Department of External Affairs, they were amenable to offering these guarantees due to the proximity of Australia to Portuguese Timor, where Australian forces were “giving up their lives in the struggle against Japanese invaders.”37 In actuality, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin had confessed

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36 Included in this was the protection of merchant ships, whether British or Allied.
37 Letter from H.L. Hopkinson to Salazar, September 14 1943, Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 24-27.
to his Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, Curtin that Australia had no objections whatsoever to agreeing to a post-war colonial settlement whereby Portuguese colonial sovereignty was maintained. However, seeing as the issue was of such declared importance to Salazar, Prime Minister Curtin noted that this presented Australia with a “favorable opportunity for raising the issue of the special rights which we desire as regards Timor.” As such, Canberra expressed hopes that in return for respect of its colonial sovereignty, Portugal would participate with UN forces to expel the Japanese forces in Timor, and accept a “general commercial agreement covering inter allia air communications between Australia and Timor.” This trade seemed favorable enough to Salazar, and he responded affirmatively to Sir Campbell on October 4, 1943.

George Kennan, the father of the 1946 Long Telegram and famous 1947 X Article, arrived in Lisbon nearly a year earlier on September 13, 1942. In June of that year, Kennan had been appointed as U.S. Counselor in Lisbon. As these exchanges between the governments of Portugal, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Australia materialized, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reflected about what stance of the United States should take on board. By October of 1943, the Roosevelt administration had come to a decision, and Kennan was instructed to send a letter to Salazar on the matter. Kennan declared that “in connection with the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and

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38 Top Secret Cablegram L53 [1] CANBERRA from Prime Minister Curtin to Minister of External Affairs Evatt, July 3, 1943, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Defence: MP1217, Box 652, Defence Of Portuguese Timor-Staff Conversations.
40 Letter from Salazar to Sir Campbell, October 4 1943, Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 28-29.
Great Britain, the Government of the United States of America undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies." This special agreement mandating American respect for Portuguese sovereignty in association with Allied use of the Azores would be invoked by Lisbon three presidencies after Roosevelt.

As time unfolded, Salazar became increasingly irked by the Japanese forces which had occupied Portuguese Timor. The Japanese occupation began in February of 1942, and Timor had become a battleground for Japanese, Australian and Dutch troops. For Portuguese authorities, not only was this a breach of Lisbon’s declared neutrality, but also an insult to Portuguese sovereignty. Sir Campbell convinced Salazar that to effectively expel the Japanese from Timor, two steps were needed. The first would involve direct intervention by Portuguese forces. The second would call for “indirect participation, by the concession to the Government of the United States of facilities for the construction, use and control of an air base on the Island of Santa Maria, for the purpose of facilitating movement of American forces to the theatre of war in the Pacific.” The exact terms for this concession would be determined in a special agreement between Lisbon and Washington. The U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, R. Henry Norweb, was charged with heading these negotiations. On November 28, 1944, Salazar and Mr. Norweb signed the Accord between the Government of Portugal and the Government of the United States Establishing the form of indirect participation of Portugal in Operations in the Pacific. The accord authorized the development of an

42 Letter from Kennan to Salazar, October 25, 1943, Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 30.
43 Letter from Sir Campbell to Salazar, November 28, 1944, lidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 35-36.
44 Acordo entre o Governo Português e o Governo dos Estados Unidos estabelecendo a forma de participação indirecta de Portugal em operações do Pacífico, Documentos relativos aos acordos entre
aerodrome on the Azorean island of Santa Maria, which would serve the air base. Under Article 2, the accord granted unrestricted use of the Santa Maria air base to the United States, and control would fall under the command of the American Air Force. The British Commonwealth, as an Allied power of both the United States and Portugal, was given equal use of the airfield. Mr. Norweb was careful to specify that American “control” of the Santa Maria air base did not imply that the United States was seeking “jurisdiction in matters within the sovereign prerogatives of Portugal.”

On May 30, 1946, Herman B. Baruch, the American ambassador in Lisbon confirmed to Salazar that the United States and the United Kingdom would be formally transferring the Santa Maria and Lajes airfields and their respective installations to Portugal on June 2, 1946. However, Truman and Churchill wanted to retain some privileges in the Azores due to the threat from German and Japanese occupation forces. Salazar agreed that in light of this threat, American and British forces would be permitted passage through the Lajes airfield for a duration of not more than eighteen months following the transfer. This aircraft would be allowed to temporarily pass either through the Santa Maria airfield or the Lajes airfield, until Portugal set up a military aviation unit in Lajes. The transition period would last 120 days before withdrawal from the islands began.

In March of 1947, President Truman stood before Congress, outlining what became known as the Truman Doctrine. He declared that, “It must be the policy of the

Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensia Nacional, 1946), 47.

45 Letter from R. Henry Norweb to Salazar, November 28, 1944, Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensia Nacional, 1946), 50.

United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This would be followed by the 1947 European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. In 1948, Washington and Lisbon signed another agreement granting the United States continued use of the Azores base “thereby guaranteeing U.S. air communications to Greece, Turkey, and other points.”47 As the reporter stressed, at this time, the Azores were vital as a “stopover in the Mediterranean…where the United States recently reactivated the Mellaha airbase outside of Tripoli on the United States line of communications to the Middle East.”48

The Azores would continue to play an imperative role during the Berlin Airlift from June 1948 to May 1949, codenamed Operation Vittles. Throughout Vittles, the Azores was necessary for C-47, DC-4, and C-54 aircraft transiting Lajes Field en route to Germany; maintenance and repair of Vittles aircraft; and support for personnel returning from airlift duties.49 As the historical records of the U.S. Consulate in the Azores indicate, “At this time officials realized that Lajes was an important strategic link to counter Soviet aggression during the Cold War. This was seen in March 1949, when four KB-29 tankers staged from Lajes to refuel a B-50, (the Lucky Lady II) on the first non-stop around the world flight.”50 Consequently, it was on November 28, 1949, that U.S. Major General Laurence S. Kuter, Commander of the Military Air Transport Service wrote to Secretary of State Acheson “recommending that the Secretary of State make strong representations to reopen negotiations regarding long-term use of the Lajes

48 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Acheson was able to negotiate an extension of two years for the American rights to facilities at Lajes.

A precedent for the importance of the Azores had been set by its historically strategic value, recent Anglo-American strategic thinking about the archipelago during World War II, and defense arrangements established in the aftermath of war. The bases were a vital part of containment strategy and would be the Portuguese “ticket” to the NATO club. Upon joining NATO, this would set the stage for a formal alliance between Portugal and the United States as NATO partners.

51 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO:
BIRTH OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
PORTUGAL AND THE UNITED STATES AS PARTNERS

"To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down"
- First NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay

This chapter looks at the formal establishment of Portugal and the United States as NATO allies to set the context for the diplomatic rift in 1962. In order to understand the historical context of this NATO partnership, this chapter explores Portuguese and American objectives for alliance within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework established 1949. Why was Portugal invited to join NATO despite its authoritarian rule under the dictatorship of Salazar, and under what terms? I trace the rationale back to American strategic thinking about how the Azores bases used in World War II were deemed critical for Cold War defense against communism. I
explore Portuguese-American negotiations over the terms of Portugal’s entry into NATO, and conclude that American policymakers sought Portugal as a NATO ally due to geostrategic importance of the Azores base.

On April 4 of 1949, twenty-three representatives from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Portugal gathered in Washington D.C. to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Upon signing the Treaty, Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, José Caeiro da Matta, remarked that Portugal had not signed due to “considerations of her own security…[but rather because] it is necessary to defend the principles and positions which those peoples that are the depository of the ideals of Western civilization occupy in the world.”¹ This public statement proclaimed that Portugal had tied itself to the alliance on the basis of an ideological commitment to the West, as opposed to strategic considerations. Yet with hindsight, we see a different narrative as we study the connections between history and strategy. What did the architects of the North Atlantic Treaty envision for the alliance, and what were the debates when constructing the Treaty and determining which nations would be invited as original signatories?

“Soviet Power Is Impervious to The Logic Of Reason”: Kennan and Containment

Back home, folks knew George Kennan a Milwaukee kind of “career man” who worked at the State Department. The introverted Kennan would go on to voice his opinions in a 5,345-word telegram to Secretary of State James Byrnes. At the very outset of this telegram, George contended that “Soviet power is impervious to the logic of

reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force.”\(^2\) Kennan would later lament how this was interpreted to mean a new military policy rather than a political one. As he remarked, “If none of my previous literary efforts had seemed to evoke even the faintest tinkle of the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating.”\(^3\) In this telegram, Kennan attributed the Kremlin’s “neurotic view of world affairs” to a “traditional and Russian sense of insecurity.”\(^4\)

Kennan noted that based on these premises, one could deduce that for Soviet foreign policy makers, “Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an “imperialist” war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.”\(^5\) Kennan also made important predictions about Soviet policy vis-à-vis colonies. For him, it was clear that “toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements.”\(^6\)

\(^3\) Ibid, 354.
\(^5\) Ibid, Page 3 of the original telegram from Kennan.
\(^6\) Ibid, Pages 9-10 of the original telegram from Kennan.
Kennan’s telegram landed on the desk of U.S. Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. A former investment banker, Forrestal was brought in by Truman during World War II to reorganize the military. Ernest Havemann of Life magazine described him as “one of the toughest-looking officials in all of Washington…the sharp-featured type of Irishman, with small, piercing eyes, lips compressed into a thin, straight line and a deep horizontal chin furrow which gave an air of perpetual intense concentration.” During World War I, Forrestal remained highly suspicious of Russian aims, and argued with FDR over Russian demands for materiel. When William Bullitt, the former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1936, authored a memorandum on January 29, 1943 advising FDR on his take of Soviet war aims and pressing the administration to acquire postwar concessions, these suggestions were tossed aside by FDR. Forrestal supported Bullitt’s outlook on Soviet war aims, yet was shooed away by FDR who pronounced to him: “Oh, you’re just a businessman.” Upon receipt of Kennan’s telegram, Forrestal was enthusiastic that someone finally seemed to be proposing a harder policy towards the Soviet Union. Forrestal quickly worked to bring back Kennan to Washington, proposing that Kennan turn the telegram into a policy article. Foreign Affairs anonymously published this article as The Sources of Soviet Conduct, otherwise known as the “X” article. Exclaimed Forrestal to Kennan: “I am most grateful for your paper. It is extremely well done.” Yet Forrestal had in mind a different vision for policy outcomes of containment as prescribed by Kennan. Whereas Kennan saw himself as a

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7 “Close-up: Forrestal,” Life, October 6, 1947, p. 66-78
Base In The Azores For American Navy Will Also Be Homing Station For Naval Planes, Some Which Are Already There,” New York Times, April 12, 1918.
political strategist, Forrestal “saw the Red Army as the enforcing instrument of a group animated by a fanatical ideology and bent upon global conquest.” For Kennan, the application of containment strategy to the establishment of NATO was over-militarization of his original strategy.

The Intellectual Origins of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty was founded with the doctrine of containment in mind. Yet the language of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims NATO to be an institution “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” For Salazar, the shortcomings of such a preamble were conspicuously evident. This preamble, he maintained, “is doubtless anything but happy…it is sullied by emptiness and the vagueness of hackneyed and vain formulas…used everywhere with most different meanings.” This ideological masquerade was doubly problematic. As Salazar lambasted, “Their first fault is not in limiting the Pact to a negative content, i.e. anti-Communism, but instead in asserting principles of a civilization it was thought necessary to defend.”

In Salazar’s perspective, the Treaty did not have a narrow enough anti-Communist scope, and the masterminds were naïve to base an alliance stooped in neo-Wilsonian rhetoric. NATO has often been chronicled as such, and this myth persists to the present day. On April 4, 2009, leaders gathered at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-

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11 Schechter, Sacred Secrets, 153.
12 Ibid.
13 Jacques Ploncard d’Assac, Dictionnaire Politique de Salazar (Lisbon: SNI, 1964), 237, as cited in Crollen, Portugal, the U.S. and NATO, 48.
14 Ibid.
Kehl to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of NATO. During the opening remarks at this ceremony, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called upon those present to “reaffirm the fundamental principles of a strong transatlantic community with indivisible security.”\footnote{Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the North Atlantic Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, April 4, 2009, NATO. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_52842.htm.} Yet, was the alliance truly rooted in these principles of a “civilization it thought necessary to defend?” The early debates about the mission and organization of NATO reveal a somewhat different narrative. As White House Counsel Clark Clifford recalled, “At the time the Soviets were pressing and searching and trying to find every soft spot where they could insert themselves. That was the reason for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it was the reason for the Truman Doctrine.”\footnote{Transcript, Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview March 16, 1972, by Jerry N. Hess, Internet Copy, Truman Library.} In a top secret telegram, the Acting Secretary of State disclosed that the purpose of the Atlantic Pact was to act as a “preventive or deterrent to war by [signaling to] the Soviet Union that an attack on any pact member is an attack on all and is an attack on an Atlantic group pledged and ready to act in concert.”\footnote{Top Secret Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Norway, January 14, 1949, \textit{FRUS}, 1949, \textit{IV}:25-26.} Within the State Department, there was consensus with regards to the true mission of the North Atlantic Alliance. As U.S. Ambassador to Sweden Matthews confided, the essential mission of the Atlantic Project was the “vital task of coordinating the defensive strength of all western countries now living in fear of Soviet aggression.”\footnote{Top Secret Telegram from the Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 14, 1949, \textit{FRUS}, 1949, \textit{IV}:25-26.} Accordingly, the treaty sought to “restrain Soviet expansion not by a Maginot line, but by building up in these liberal democratic states a
dynamic counter-attraction to the degrading tenets of totalitarian and materialistic Communism. “

The only reason to disguise the premise of NATO as a regionalized defense pact was because as Mr. Acheson mused, the Pact should be “worded that everybody could readily recognize it as a defense pact. Only in that way would people come to realize that it was not directed in a spirit of aggression against anyone.” Instead, the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty painted the Pact as the “institutional expression of the liberal democratic community.” Doing so was beneficial was because as French Ambassador Bonnet commented: “Proponents and supporters of the United Nations feared that the consultative provision of the Pact constituted a threat to the authority of the Security Council. It was important not to carry the provisions of the Treaty to the point where it might appear to be a competitor of the United Nations.” Thus though NATO had allegedly been created with the UN as its institutional precedent, the two institutions were actually very much at odds. In the first place, unlike the UN, the Soviet Union was never invited to become a member of NATO. NATO thus permitted member-states to pursue a regional policy of defense to advance their Cold War objectives without Soviet interference.

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23 UN Archives Unit Chief Paola Casini noted in conversation that when she previously worked at the NATO archives in Brussels, the documents reflected a distinctly anti-Soviet posture compared to those of the UN archives. Ms. Casini commented that this is linked to the intellectual origins and membership of both the UN and NATO.
At heart of both Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram was the strategy of containment. Where the two differed was in tactics to achieve this objective. As Clifford avowed, “The language of military power is the only language which the disciples of power politics understand.”

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined to Forrestal, who was now Secretary of Defense, that in order to increase security of the North Atlantic area, the Treaty aimed to: (1) make war less likely by confronting any possible aggressor with evidence of collection determination to resist attack on any party; (2) provide for continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid in order better to assure the security of the area; (3) provide for consultation on the request of any party in the event of a threat to or breach of the peace; (4) [ensure that] in the event of an armed attack on any party within the area, all the parties would take such action as might be necessary to restore and assure the security of the area; and (5) provide for consultative machinery, both political and military, and in which each party would be represented, to facilitate its implementation.”

Collective defense embodied in the proposed Pact was “an essential feature of a U.S. policy directed toward preservation of national security” and “consummation of the proposed pact [would] emphasize the need for military strength appropriate to the world situation and to the commitments implicit in the pact.”

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25 Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), January 5, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV:11.
“An Iron Fist With A Velvet Glove”: Salazar, Containment, and Communism

On June 20, 1958, the Milwaukee Journal ran an article about Salazar, the “silent dean of the dictators.”26 Perhaps Salazar was a former Economics professor, and perhaps he might remain reticent in the public realm, but make no mistake: Salazar held steadfast to certain ideas and covered his “iron fist with a velvet glove.”27 In this Friday column, the reporter described Salazar as a “fierce foe of Communism [who] never recognized the Soviet government’s and whose “favorite epithet for whatever political foes he allows in Portugal is that they are inspired by Moscow.”28 At a 1933 Conference, Salazar commended human reason, which he juxtaposed with “strange and doubtful international communism which would mean the giving up of possessions by some and their acquisition by others.”29

For Salazar, Communism was one of the greatest heresies, and its atheistic principles ran counter to his education at the Viseu Catholic Seminary and Via Sacra. Moreover, atheistic Communism contradicted the Estado Novo’s very motto of “God, Country, and Family.” Addressing the newly formed youth movement School Action Vanguard (Acção Escolar Vanguarda)30 at the São Carlos Theatre on January 28, 1934, Salazar spoke of the intellectual crisis in Europe:

“A false philosophy had also begun to influence the minds of men, destroying their adherence to eternal truths and sapping their faith. Whilst this work of destruction was proceeding, we saw with dismay that nothing had taken the place

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27 Ibid. This phrase appeared in a caption below a photograph of Salazar with his hands in his pockets in the article.
28 Ibid.
of those guiding lights which, in life’s pilgrimage, are meant for our comfort and encouragement. In the name of materialism, skepticism, pragmatism, epicurism, and of a thousand and one bewildering systems, men have denied God, positive knowledge, truth, justice, and morality, and have created a void which cannot easily be filled.”

Distressed, Salazar then argued that this intellectual crisis had been the basis of why it was possible for Communism to exist. Putting on his Economics professor hat, Salazar reasoned that Communism was fundamentally an economic doctrine, but had been transformed into a totalitarian way of life because it was “incapable of adapting itself to the complicated economics of civilized people.”

Anticipating that some might criticize his regime as being likewise totalitarian, Salazar conceded that flaws existed within Portugal. Yet it was due to the existence of such “inequalities, injustices, imperfections, falsehoods, contradictions, and unhappiness” that the revolution was necessary in Portugal. What was the difference with the Communist way of life, then? Salazar rationalized, “Communism tends to overthrow everything, and in its destructive fury does not distinguish between error and truth, between good and bad, and between justice and injustice. It puts little value on history; on the everyday experiences of mankind; on life and the dignity of the intellect; on the noblest ideals of family life; on the honor and respect due to womenkind [sic]; and on the existence and greatness of other nations; provided that, with its false conceptions of humanity, it can procure the subjection of man and his complete denegation.”

Salazar also scoffed at what he saw as the “snobbery” of “communistic effervescence” in trying to arouse the passions of the poor people: These “gentlemen…in
silken array and immaculate attire, anticipate a future Utopia, and...are hail-fellow-well-met with those from whom, for the time being, they exact the greatest deference.”

Salazar acknowledged that some of these idealists might be sincere, but for the most part, they were still “full of illusions” in their pursuit of “a peace and justice among mankind which is just as abstract and illusionary as the ideas they have of humanity.”

During the early days of January 1949, the Estado Novo held the Second Conference of Leaders of the National Union in the city of Porto. Salazar spoke plainly of his views on Communism: “Soviet communism, multifaceted in its doctrinal identity, adopts as its children nationalism in Asia and internationalism in Europe. The vast movements in the Far East erupting with zeal can be attributed to diverse causes yet certainly have in their emergence roots in Russia, with a system of sympathy, support, and protection. If Soviet communism triumphs there, it will not delay the fire that has ignited in Africa.” Salazar, by this time, was also discovering that Communism presented setbacks for the Portuguese empire. Yet as he trumpeted in public: “We do not fear Communism...for we have a gospel and we are a force.”

Salazar’s anti-Communist stance and past collaboration with the Allies during and after World War II would lead to Portugal becoming a fundamental part of containment strategy. As Dr. Herman Baruch, the former U.S. Ambassador in Portugal, announced upon his transfer to the embassy in Holland: “Between the United States and European

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countries, there must be an excellent collaboration based upon a real friendship. We cannot consider the United States as if it were a Saint Nicholas.”

Portugal’s Invitation to NATO

Portugal was first approached about NATO by a British diplomat on October 4 of 1948. Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Caeiro da Matta, promptly put this memorandum in his personal folder, where he forgot about it for several weeks. When Ambassador António de Faria passed through London later during the month, he was questioned about the Portuguese opinion on NATO. Upon return to Lisbon, Faria consulted Minister da Matta, and the two read through the British memorandum. Lisbon sent an official reply to the London and Washington on December 30, 1948. The main issue was Spain: for Lisbon, a defensive alliance in Europe without its Iberian neighbor did not make sense. Beyond this, Salazar had deep concerns with the allusion to the UN, an institution which had excluded Portugal from membership, and ascribed to a conception of parliamentary democracy Salazar rejected.

In the third place, Salazar was suspicious of what seemed to him a move towards integration and supranationality, and surmised that the real Anglo-American objective was to gain control of the Azores during peacetime. Finally, Salazar called attention to the twenty-year period the Pact was

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38 Monsieur Baruch rend une visite aux Pays-Bas, Haagsche Courant (journal liberal), February 24, 1952, MNE, P.E.A. 1
39 António José Telo, Portugal e a NATO: O Reencontro da Tradição Atlântica (Lisbon: Edições, 1996), 64.
40 Ibid. Original citation as: Personal interview with Ambassador António de Faria (who was responsible for MNE mail) by author.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, 67.
supposed to last; this was a long commitment to an alliance, considering Portuguese neutrality during World War II!44

To allay any fears, an old hand at diplomacy, U.S. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, was summoned. Ambassador MacVeagh’s first step was to send a top secret aide-mémoire to Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs Jose Caeiro da Matta.45 Instead of relegating diplomacy solely to the paper-pushing ways of Washington, Ambassador MacVeagh followed up with a face-to-face conversation. MacVeagh reassured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that collective security did not imply European integration, or any abrogation of sovereignty. The Treaty would be in “no way…be applicable to the colonial possessions of any party except through providing for consultation should they be threatened.”46 On the question of Spain, MacVeagh said that in fact, the United States was not opposed to Spain’s inclusion in NATO, however this was not politically acceptable to other European countries for the time being. The American Ambassador acknowledged that London had sent a similar Aide-Mémoire to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs. With respect to the British position, MacVeagh emphasized that the United States shared the opinion that strategic bases would be essential to the security of the North Atlantic area, though it was not a stipulation that NATO member-states grant such facilities. Moreover, alluded MacVeagh, perhaps Portugal could deal with Spain more effectively by joining NATO.

London and Washington had both mustered their diplomatic reserve so that they might persuade Portugal to join the North Atlantic Alliance; now they could only wait for

44 Ibid.
45 Top Secret Aide-Mémoire from American Ambassador (MacVeagh) to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Caeiro da Matta), January 10, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV:19-20.
46 Ibid, 19.
an official response. And wait they did. As U.S. Ambassador Charles Ulbrick Bay complained to the Secretary of State, the Portuguese were “procrastinating.”47 The official response finally came in March of 1949. The concerns were four-fold: Portugal did not want to get entrenched in European affairs for 20 years; Spain should join NATO in the near future; the Pact excluded colonial territories albeit admitting the possibility of consultation should there be an attack (a question which Portugal found most interesting and wanted clarification on the American position); and lastly, a guarantee of territorial integrity embracing the colonies and combating eventual autonomy was desired.48 Ten days after the first official response, Lisbon echoed their reservations once again to MacVeagh. MacVeagh felt frustrated that he had not yet exacted a positive outcome from the negotiations: “I have used every possible argument [to] persuade [the] Portuguese Government [to] sign pact as stands, both in general interest and that of Portugal itself.”49 At the end of this telegram, there remained a short, unprinted warning from MacVeagh who urged that if “Portugal were not adequately supplied with ECA funds, his local leadership and prestige would be impaired and negotiations on such matters as the Azores might be seriously jeopardized.”50 Distraught, the next day, Ambassador MacVeagh sent another telegram to Washington.51 In it, he expressed his shared sentiment with the British Ambassador to Portugal, Sir Nigel Ronald. Both felt that Portugal was likely to

47 Telegram from the Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Secretary of State, February 24, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV: 121-122.
48 Memorando português entregue na embaixada americana e inglesa e dataado de 8 de Março. MNE Proc. 70 P.150, cited in Telo, Portugal e a NATO: O Reencontro da Tradiçáo Atlântica, 68.
49 Top Secret Urgent Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, March 18, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV: 237-238
50 Last unpublished sentence of Telegram no. 87, as cited in the first footnote of: Top Secret Urgent Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, March 18, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV, 238.
51 Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State, March 19, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV: 239.
reject the invitation to join NATO if the Pact could not (1) be limited to ten rather than twenty years; (2) signed with reservations if the former was not permissible; or (3) future accession to the Treaty with the same reservation. MacVeagh recommended that higher-level diplomatic channels were necessary: Secretary Acheson should address Salazar in a personal message “emphasizing maximum unity among Atlantic Powers…[and] playing up…characteristic Portuguese susceptibilities.”

Acheson took heed of this advice, and on March 21, 1949, sent a personal telegram to Dr. Salazar. In a skillfully worded telegram, Acheson soothed the Portuguese leader that the United States also had the same initial reservations about the Pact’s duration, and it was truth be told, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg who originally suggested a fifty-year Pact. These European countries had eventually came around to a period of twenty years after. This twenty-year commitment would not be negotiable, or it would otherwise weaken confidence in the alliance. Acheson ended by referencing the Azores: “The arrangements so happily concluded concerning facilities in the Azores are concrete testimony of Portugal’s interest in, and contribution to, the security of the area. The proposed Treaty provides an unprecedented opportunity for our two countries to join in a mutually beneficial security arrangement. In these circumstances I strongly hope that Portugal will decide to join.”

Weighing up all the arguments, Salazar finally made a decision. Portugal would join NATO. Membership in this new “club” would christen the Estado Novo with a sense of legitimacy, both abroad and at home. As Luc Crollen cited in a study on Portugal and NATO, “What better argument against the liberal opposition would the government

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52 Ibid.
produce than the admission of Portugal to the community of democratic nations?"\(^{54}\) NATO membership would give Portugal a “new face…that of a timeless defender of Western values and practices.”\(^{55}\) However, many found it curious that Portugal had been invited to join NATO, yet not the UN. As a journalist would exclaim in *Africa Today* nearly twenty years later, “United States sponsored Portugal's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization despite the fact that the Portuguese military dictatorship contradicts NATO's principles.”\(^{56}\) Why then, had been Portugal been invited to join NATO if such a contradiction was possible?

*The Azores as the Ticket to NATO*

During discussions amongst the architects of the North Atlantic Treaty, there was dispute about who to invite to the club. Canada, Denmark, and Norway protested inviting Portugal in the Pact, arguing that the *Estado Novo* was “clearly violating the basic norms of democracy and human rights.”\(^{57}\) Canada felt strongly about this, and ultimately voted against admitting Portugal into NATO.\(^{58}\) However, the Azores was the ticket to Portuguese membership. In a conversation between representatives from the State Department and the Danish Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Povl Bang Jensen, over the framing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Mr. Bang-Jensen inquired of his American counterparts.

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\(^{55}\) Sapega, *Consensus and Debate in Salazar’s Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-1945*, 149.  
\(^{57}\) Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War*, 39.  
what difference it would make whether a country were an original member or a later adherent.\textsuperscript{59} Director John D. Hickerson of the Office of European Affairs at the State Department reported that it would not make a difference but “obviously [for] a North Atlantic Pact to be worthwhile [it] must include those countries in the area whose position was of strategic importance to the group as a whole.”\textsuperscript{60} Debates over who to include as an original signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty were permeated by the question of Portugal and Italy. Neither Portugal nor Italy was a member-state of the United Nations, yet both had been invited to NATO. Ambassador of the Soviet Union Panyuekin articulated how he found this paradox problematic\textsuperscript{61} given President Truman’s declaration that the North Atlantic Treaty was an “expression of international affairs in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”\textsuperscript{62} From the beginning, the founding member-states of NATO were selected upon the basis of their instrumental value to NATO. In a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, U.S. Navy Admiral Louis Denfeld reported that the “the primary reasons for Italy’s inclusion in either the North Atlantic or Brussels Pact, the forerunner of NATO, would appear to be political in nature…there is no military necessity for Italy being included in the North Atlantic point.”\textsuperscript{63} Portugal was a different case: it was a country whose position would be of military “strategic importance” to the North Atlantic Treaty community due to its 910 square mile strip archipelago: the Azores islands. Along

\textsuperscript{59} Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), January 5, 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949, IV: 1-3.}
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Memorandum from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Panyuehkin) to the Secretary of State (Informal Translation from Russian), March 31, 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949, IV: 261-265.}
\textsuperscript{62} Address on the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, Historical Speeches and Audio.
\textsuperscript{63} Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), January 5, 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949, IV: 19-20.}
with Greece and Turkey, Portugal would constitute NATO’s “southern flank.”\textsuperscript{64} To some within the U.S. government, the Azores were “the most vital single spot in the world except for the war zone and the United States itself.”\textsuperscript{65}

\textit{Containment Strategy Evolves: U.S. Military Base Policy in the 1950s}

As Kenneth G. Weiss noted in a study for the Center for Naval Analyses: “Both during and after World War II, the islands were intimately related to American security needs. At first American policy makers saw the islands as important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the prosecution of the war, but then increasingly in relation to the exercise of American influence for peace and security beyond the Atlantic in the postwar period.”\textsuperscript{66} Why did the United States decide continue to acquire military bases abroad in the 1950s, and how did U.S. military base policy fit in with broader Cold War strategic thinking?

On September 6 of 1951, the United States and Portugal concluded a bilateral agreement concerning the right to use military facilities in the Azores, as stipulated within the framework of NATO. Under Article 6 of the bilateral treaty, “the transit of American military aircraft through the Lagens Airdrome continues to be permitted and there will be authorized on that base, during the same periods, the training of United States aviation and naval personnel, and United States military and civilian personnel stationed there may be increased up to the necessary.”\textsuperscript{67} The treaty also stipulated that

\textsuperscript{64} Wright, \textit{Destruction of a Nation}, 20.
\textsuperscript{65} Wright, \textit{Destruction of A Nation}, 20.
some U.S. military aircraft would eventually be permitted to pass through the Santa Maria airdrome.

In the post-World War II era, American strategic thinking during the 1950s privileged a system of American and British bases, seen as “the keystones of the West’s defense strategy.”68 In August of 1951, the Portuguese Embassy in Washington sent an article to Lisbon that it found particularly expressive of American thinking about bases in Portugal and elsewhere. In the article, a large map was spread out across the page. This map depicted the extensive network of what had been labeled “Free World bases,” spread across Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Iceland, France, Spain, Morocco, Malta, Libya, West Germany, Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Singapore, Philippines, Okinawa, Formosa (Taiwan), South Korea, Japan, and the Aleutians.69 A Portuguese consular officer noted that for the Russians, this American system of bases was like a “ring of iron” which constituted one of the means the free world used to confront any threat.”70 This network of bases was linked to the National Security Council strategy of dissuasion, the “belief that while the West controlled three of the world’s four industrial centers then its long-term advantage would be secure and it would have no interest in provoking war.”71 In the scenario that the Soviet Union showed signs of provoking war, American policy makers “anticipated a gradual withdrawal from Europe,

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69 Ibid.
70 Article on American air bases from the Portuguese Embassy in Washington D.C. to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 11, 1951. Política Interna e Externa dos Estados Unidos da America 1951: Accords between the USA and other countries concerning the concession of bases by U.S. forces.
accompanied by a nuclear strike and conventional strategic air offensive, while it mobilized its forces.”

Portuguese diplomats posted at embassies abroad took careful note of the development of American bases in other countries in their telegrams. During the 1950s, a great deal of correspondence between the *Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros* and Portuguese embassies abroad centered upon the status of American bases around the globe. In a letter to the *Palácio* on September 19, 1952, the Portuguese Embassy in Washington notified Lisbon that the United States was constructing a military base in Thule, Greenland. This base would act as an American outpost for defense and as a staging ground for Air Force intercontinental bombers. The military bases in Greenland were a part of the American “polar strategic airbase.” At this time, NATO member-states were flying polar routes more frequently which offered strategic targeting of key enemy targets. These polar routes permitted long-range bombing attacks in the case of war, with the airstrip “2,752 statute miles to Moscow, 3,199 to Omsk, 3,367 to Stalinsk and 4,115 to Vladivostok.” The only probable rival Russian air base was thought to be in the Franz Josef islands.

Nearly a year later, the Portuguese embassy in Washington noted that Athens and Washington signed an accord giving the United States joint use of numerous air and

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72 Ibid, 409-410.
76 Ibid.
According to a State Department communiqué, this Greek-American accord served to fortify the security of the North Atlantic area, to maintain international peace via the integration of Greek territory in defensive territory of NATO. The letter from the Portuguese Embassy also emphasized that this accord was signed in fulfillment of mutual responsibilities and in harmony of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, of which Portugal was also a member. Under Article 3, signatories agreed that, “in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

The Azores was the only base south of Iceland that the United States had in the Atlantic. Operated by 7,000 service men, this base was fundamental for maintenance of the defense perimeter. The Azores was particularly important due to problems with other American bases abroad. Originally, five more bases in Morocco were to be built in 1953, however due to political problems in Morocco, and congressional chiding at excess spending, only three out of the two were built. The American press at this time also commended bases acquired as key assets. As one reporter described, bases bequeathed the United States with “key take-off points from which American bombers could strike at the heart of Eastern Europe and Russia, radar stations capable of detecting enemy planes headed for America, valuable airstrips for fighters, interceptors and patrol planes, and landing fields that [could] be quickly activated into major bases for heavy bombers in

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79 Ibid.
time of war.” When protests erupted in 1956 over American bases in the Pacific, President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon flew to the Pacific in an attempt to negotiate retention of bases viewed as critical for the defense perimeter running from the North Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.

**A Fixed NATO Partnership: Sovereignty for Strategic Bases**

By the late 1950s, Salazar’s Estado Novo had moved from a position of neutrality during World War II to joining a military alliance in 1949. At a time when the international community thought of Salazar as a dictator, why was Portugal invited to this club seemingly predicated upon a preamble which expressed liberal democratic norms? What was in it for Salazar to align his country with the Western Union and the United States? These contradictions seem puzzling, but are illuminated by studying the intellectual debates in both Portugal and the United States at the time about the North Atlantic Alliance and foreign policy during the early Cold War. For the American and British architects of NATO, World War II was still fresh in their minds as they began discussions about the North Atlantic Pact. In particular, the role the Azores had played during World War II was still remnant in Anglo-American strategic thinking. As such, though one might find it hypocritical to extend an invitation to Salazar, Portuguese participation was necessary for the Anglo-American vision of postwar security.

For Salazar, Portuguese incorporation into Anglo-American containment strategy was in part tactical and in part ideological. On one level, joining the NATO club gave the Estado Novo a sense of domestic and external legitimacy, and put Portugal on the map in international affairs. However, solely relegating Salazar’s reasoning to tactical maneuvers...
to bolster the regime is simplistic. Such an analysis overlooks that ideological rationalization was also at hand. Salazar was staunchly anti-Communist. In this military alliance, Portugal could work tougher with her allies to stop the Red threat. In a conversation between Salazar and Theodore Xanthaky, Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador in Portugal, Salazar asked “why it had taken so many years, with loss of precious time, for [the United States] to realize what the Russians were up to.”\textsuperscript{82} Beyond this, diplomatic maneuvering and assurances on the part of the Anglo-Americans also made committing to the North Atlantic Pact more amenable to Salazar.

The early debates about the purpose of NATO and Portuguese inclusion thus reflect how in contrast to the preamble, the founders of NATO envisioned the institution as a part of containment strategy. The Azores base was a critical part of executing this strategy and its utility had been made apparent during World War II. For London and Washington, such an asset could not afford to be lost if the Soviet Union was to be contained. Yet in concluding these defense arrangements with Lisbon, Salazar wanted assurances for his five-century old empire. The first connections between the Azores and Portuguese sovereignty can be traced to such assurances made during the August 17, 1943 accord signed between Portugal and the United Kingdom. Ambassador Campbell acknowledged that in exchange for British rights to military facilities in the Azores, the United Kingdom would not infringe upon Portuguese sovereignty. Australia, the United States, and South Africa made similar guarantees. Salazar had in essence, “obtained a critical \textit{quid pro quo} from Washington which committed the United States respect the

\textsuperscript{82} Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Theodore Xanthaky and Salazar, November 25, 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949, IV}: 714.
territorial integrity of Portuguese colonies in return for access to the Azores faculties.”

Ultimately, to gain access to the Azores and ensure Portuguese participation in NATO, the United States paid a price: it agreed to “it undertook to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all the Portuguese colonies.” As U.S. Africa policy evolved throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration, in Salazar’s eyes, they would have done well to remember such promises.

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PART TWO:
LUSOTROPICALISMO AND MODERNIZATION AS IDEOLOGIES
CHAPTER THREE
SALAZAR, THE ESTADO NOVO, AND PORTUGUESE LUSOTROPICALISMO

In the district of Belém in Lisbon, the architecture boasts of an imperial past. The Jerónimos Monastery and Tower of Belém proudly commemorate the Portuguese Empire. The ground in this area is adorned with a map of the world labeled with former Portuguese colonies and dates of conquest. Nearby, the Monument of the Discoveries memorializes the Portuguese explorers, Vasco da Gama, Pedro Álvares Cabral, and Fernão Magalhães. Azulejos, or ceramic tiles, figure throughout Belém, often depicting Portuguese ships, known as caravels, returning from exploration voyages afar. Portuguese explorers during the Ages of Discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries.
commonly sailed in these caravels to explore West Africa and the Atlantic. The caravels frequently figure in ceramic tiles (azulejos) and paintings around Portugal, and are emblematic of the prowess of the Portuguese Empire. As French writer, Christine Garnier, interviewed António de Oliveira Salazar in 1954 for a biography she was writing about him, they stumbled across such azulejos.¹ Salazar looked down to one azulejo inscribed with the words of poet Luis Vaz de Camões, and made a point to read aloud to Garnier:

Here, so to speak
is the crown of all of Europe’s head,
the kingdom of Lusitania,
where the Earth comes to an end
and there stretches forth that sea into which the setting sun will sink.²

The words that Salazar had chosen to read aloud to Garnier were from Camões’ epic poem, Os Lusíadas, describing the Portuguese Voyages of Discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries. During the Age of Discoveries, Portugal established colonies in Africa, trade routes in Asia, and discovered Brazil. For Salazar, the Portuguese Empire carried historically symbolic weight. When Salazar became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1932, he became the leader not only of the Portuguese mainland, but also of an Empire which stretched beyond Portugal to Africa and Asia, and had been carefully maintained since the 15th century. To give an idea of the extent of this reach, continental Portugal spanned 89,106 square kilometers, yet Salazar also exercised control over another 2,078,965 square kilometers when including Cape Verde, Guiné, São Tomé and Principe, Angola,

² Garnier, Salazar in Portugal: An Intimate Portrait, 15.
Mozambique, Goa, Macau, and Timor.\textsuperscript{3} As Salazar would declare in an address on May 17, 1931 before crowds at the Coliseu dos Recreios, Portugal has “displayed an endless energy and firm determination, discovering new territories to colonize, to civilize, and to incorporate in its own national being…We are children of that past.”\textsuperscript{4}

The intellectual formation of Salazar’s ideas about Empire played a key role in informing the colonial ideology of the Estado Novo during his tenure from 1932 to 1968. Throughout these thirty-six years as Prime Minister, Salazar would come to deal with six different American Presidents: Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson. Each of these American presidents brought new ideas about Empire, race, the American relationship with Europe, and Portugal’s place in the world. Each of these American presidents also found themselves presented with different domestic and foreign policy contexts. As Salazar watched these six American presidents enter and leave office, it was his relationship with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy which aroused the most debate. Historian Luís Nuno Rodrigues has characterized this relationship as \textit{a crise de uma aliança}, or “the crisis of an alliance.”\textsuperscript{5} In order to understand what brought about this crisis between two allies, I first aim to explore the colonial ideology of António de Oliveira Salazar and the administration of the \textit{Estado Novo}.

\textsuperscript{3} Figures calculated from \textit{Superfície do Império Colonial Portugués comparada com o dos principais países da Europa} from the Political Propganda of the Estado Novo Photo Collection. Salazar: Biographia. António de Oliveira Salazar Digital Archive, online version: www.oliveirasalazar.org.


Salazar: The Early Years

Salazar remains a complex historiographical case: while some have regarded him as a “semi-fascist dictator,”⁶ he was simultaneously hailed as the greatest Portuguese figure in a public poll broadcast organized by Rádio e Televisão de Portugal.⁷ These conflicting historical interpretations render it difficult to decide where to begin when analyzing Salazar. Perhaps the best point of departure is where Salazar himself directed his biographer, Christine Garnier. As Salazar once confessed in an interview with Garnier, there were three important phases in his life which contributed to the formation of his personality: the village of Vimeiro where he was from; the Catholic Seminary of Viseu where he was educated; and the University of Coimbra which he attended and where he then taught.⁸

Salazar was born on April 28, 1889 to a poor, agricultural family in the freguesia, or civil parish, of Vimeiro in central Portugal. From Vimeiro, the young Salazar then headed to the Catholic Seminary in Viseu to study Theology from 1900 to 1908. He was called the “Little Priest” by his mother. Religion was paramount to Salazar, who once espoused that “religion is incompatible with some forms of government…it is much superior to politics, it hovers in areas much higher…that withstanding, it should inform and direct political acts…it is inconceivable that someone could be Catholic in the Church and atheist by the ballot box.”⁹ In a story on Salazar in Time magazine in 1946,

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⁸ José Carvalho, A Formação de Salazar e O Seu Tempo (Lisbon: Via Occidentalis, 2008), 77.
⁹ «A religião não é incompatível com forma alguma de governo… está muito superior à política, paira noutras regiões mais altas, embora haja de informar e dirigir os actos da política… não se concebendo que alguém possa ser católico na Igreja e ateu junto à urna». 

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Daniella Nicole Mak, College ‘10
the author noted that, “if despotism could be benevolent, Salazar’s character was ideal material for “the good dictator.””

After eight years at the Seminary, Salazar became a prefect at the Via Sacra secondary school in Viseu under the direction of Father António Barreiros. It was at Via Sacra that Salazar became acquainted with the works of Brazilian President Afonso Augusto Moreira Pena, and came to adopt Pena’s motto of “Deus, Pátria e Família,” which would be the fundamental slogan of the Estado Novo. As Salazar wished to continue teaching after Via Sacra, the Church sent him to university to complete his education. Salazar entered the University of Coimbra at age twenty-one in 1910 to study law. At Coimbra, Salazar became part of a movement of prominent Catholic intellectuals, known as the Academic Center of Christian Democracy. Salazar’s involvement with the Center would be his first foray into political life. In a speech for the Center on December 8, 1912, he asserted, “We may call ourselves, gentlemen, Christian Democrats, but that does not mean we should recognize as a true democracy any that is not founded on Christianity, because we do not understand what liberty, equality, and human fraternity can mean outside Christianity.” Yet it would be a simplification to seek to understand Salazar solely through the lens of his devout religious beliefs, and his association with the Academic Center of Christian Democracy. For as Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses has articulated, Salazar was “more than a Christian-Democrat…he was a reformer…while at

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10 “How Bad is the Best?” Time Magazine, July 22, 1946.
11 “God, Homeland, and Family,” the motto of the Estado Novo incorporated from Afonso Pena.
12 Carvalho, A Formação de Salazar e O Seu Tempo, 81.
the same time recuperating, enshrining, and protecting values which he associated with Portugal and its past glories.”

Salazar quickly excelled in Coimbra, and matriculated with nineteen out of twenty points from the Faculty of Law on August 15, 1914, receiving honors in Colonial Administration, Special Procedures, Judicial Practice, first honors in Criminal Procedure, and honors in International Law. His academic distinctions were legendary, and paved his road into the world of academia. On March 12, 1916, Salazar completed his first dissertation, *The Cereal Question: Wheat* «*Questão Cerealífera: O Trigo*» on wheat, and his second dissertation *The Premium on Gold: Its Nature and Causes, 1891-1915 «O Ágio do Ouro, sua natureza e suas causas (1891-1915)*» in 1917 on the premium on gold. He was subsequently invited to become a professor of political and financial economy at the University of Coimbra at the tender age of twenty-eight.

On May 28, 1926, a military coup d’état in Portugal led by General Manuel Gomes da Costa dissolved the Portuguese First Republic, and established the *Ditadura Nacional*. Salazar was sought for his academic expertise, and invited to be the Minister of Finance of the new regime. However, Salazar’s stint as Finance Minister was short-lived, and lasted a mere thirteen days before he resigned from his position. After a

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16 In his first dissertation, “The Cereal Question: Wheat,” Salazar analyzed the economics of wheat agriculture in Portugal. He observed that it did not make economic sense to grow wheat in Portugal given the poor soil and climate. Salazar then argued that gradual agricultural reform was necessary, and economic self-sufficiency would play a key role in putting Portugal on the map to progress.
18 “National Dictatorship” describing the regime following the May 28 1928 Revolution until the formal establishment of the Estado Novo under the 1933 Constitution.
series of unstable events, 1926 saw the transfer of power from José Mendes Cabeçadas, to Manuel Gomes da Costa, to Óscar Carmona. However his reputation in handling Portugal’s financial affairs was well-established in 1928, and President Óscar Carmona called on him to become the new Minister of Finance. Salazar took a leave of absence from his teaching position at Coimbra in 1928 upon this invitation, after being reminded of his mother’s words: “Accept, my son. If they call you, it is because they need you.”

During his time as Minister of Finance under Carmona, Salazar began to develop some of his ideas about colonial administration. He was highly successful at eliminating Portugal’s financial deficit by raising taxes and reducing public expenditure. He thus sought to apply these principles of finance to the colonies. When giving a speech in Sala do Risco on May 28, 1930 to Army and Naval officers concerning the work of the Ditadura Nacional during the fourth anniversary of the regime, Minister of Finance Salazar declared that, “This task of financial and economic reconstruction which must be extended to the colonies, is indisputably connected with the very existence of Portugal and with the needs for its development. However, it is evident, that, as in the case of this country, the colonial problem cannot be dealt with to any great extent except after a thorough financial cleansing.” Salazar thus promptly cut down on financial support to the colonies from Lisbon, and proffered a solution forcing colonies to be more economically self-sufficient. Politically, however, Salazar advocated greater control

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over the colonies. This was a markedly different posture from past policy, when Portuguese colonial thinking had tended toward decentralization and local autonomy.23

Salazar’s official entry into colonial policymaking commenced in 1930, when he assumed the position of Minister of Colonies. During his brief five-month term as Minister of Colonies, Salazar passed the Colonial Act in May of 1930. Under Article 3 of this piece of legislation, the overseas dominions were renamed colonies, and constituted the “Portuguese Colonial Empire.” The text of the 1930 Colonial Act provides interesting reflections on Salazar’s attitudes towards the colonies. As Salazar proclaimed, this act “in accordance with our historic, nationalistic, and civilizing traditions...laid down the following urgent requirements: the establishment of order in the administration and government of the colonies, and in the settlement of our colonial debts; the institution of an orderly and methodical financial system like our own; the dispatch of technical advisors to Angola; the founding of the Banco de Fomento; the completion of contracts with issuing banks; and the organization of an economy which shall be aggressive, systematic, and stable.”24 While a great deal of the 1930 Colonial Act addresses reduced spending on the colonies, we can still glean some idea of Salazar’s ideas about the quintessence of the Portuguese Empire and what he posited its relationship to the metropole should be. Title 2, Article 2 of the Colonial Act argued that it is “the basic essence of the Portuguese Nation to perform the historical role of possessing and colonizing overseas areas and to civilize the indigenous people which it encounters,

thereby exercising the moral influence attached to it by the Padroado of the East.” The language throughout the Colonial Act painted the Portuguese Empire with a sense of nostalgic longing, saudades, for the heyday of Empire, imbued in moralizing terms. This would set the tone for Salazar’s colonial ideology during the Estado Novo.

The Estado Novo

A month after passing the 1930 Colonial Act, Salazar stood before crowds in the hall of the Council of State on June 30th of 1930. He was there to deliver a speech on his political doctrines, sketching the fundamental principles of Portugal’s new Constitution. Salazar laid out his plans for a stronger, more centralized government. He also echoed some of his key ideas about colonies that had been expressed in the 1930 Colonial Act in more concrete terms. Specifically, Salazar alluded to the “spiritual heritage overseas” of Portugal, recasting Portugal’s imperial past in a glorified manner. He spoke of Portugal and her civilizing mission in the colonies, arguing that it was the “moral force of our independence and expansion…to extend our dominions and to show the world our civilizing talents.” For Salazar, the rationale for empire was thus moral, and the impulse historic.

As the 1930s unfolded, Salazar began to expound upon his colonial ideology. With each subsequent speech, he displayed a firmer notion of his personal authority

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25 Treaty between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Portugal (and of Spain), whereby administration of local churches lay in the power of the kings. By a papal decree in 1497, Pope Alexander VI designated the East under the diocese of Lisbon, Portugal for missionary activities.
27 Saudades is a word particular to Portuguese and Brazilian culture that carries specific connotations of a kind of nostalgic longing for the past. It is said to originate from 13th century Portuguese poetry by Cancioneiro da Ajuda and was also commonly deployed in poetry during the Portuguese Great Discoveries of overseas lands.
within the political scene, and made bolder statements about the Portuguese colonies. In an address at the Coliseu dos Recreios on May 17, 1931, Salazar stood before thousands, and enlightened the crowds of his plans. The former Economics professor began with his first solution for the internal strife of Portugal: financial stabilization. For Salazar, the financial crisis in Portugal and the fate of her colonies were inextricably linked. Salazar had been very struck by the references to Portugal and her Empire in the recently published memoirs of Prince von Bülow, Chancellor of the German Empire from 1900 to 1909. In these memoirs, von Bülow recalled an agreement signed October 1898 whereby Portugal would sell or pledge her possessions to Germany and Britain in an attempt to stave off enormous debt. Plans were allegedly made by foreign nations to partition the Portuguese Empire in the wake of her debt. For Salazar, any such repeated episode was unthinkable. The solution was clear in his mind: financial stabilization would prevent competitive threats to the Portuguese Empire.

In the later part of his speech, Salazar elaborated on the current state of international politics: he proposed that there were powers who favored a confused kind of internationalism, which did not properly understand the collaboration between countries. For Salazar, this was not at all representative of the Portuguese Empire. He made known that, “[Portuguese] claims both here and overseas are accordingly supported by our rights of discovery, of conquest, and of settlement; by our colonizing efforts; by our right of inheritance; by the blood we have shed; by our labor…by the rights that have accrued to us from our commercial, educational, and other activities in the cause of peace. We claim
these rights because it is the will of the people, and the urgent demand of our national conscience.”\(^{29}\)

In 1932, Salazar was nominated to the position of the President of the Council of Ministers.\(^{30}\) He then introduced a new Constitution for Portugal in 1933, formally promulgated on April 9, 1933. The 1933 Constitution marked the beginning of the *Estado Novo*, or New State, and Salazar’s rule as Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic.

Appended to the new Constitution was the 1930 Colonial Act. On June 13, 1933, only two months into his term as Prime Minister, Salazar convened Portugal’s first Imperial Conference in the chamber of the National Assembly.

All colonial governors of the Portuguese territories were present. Salazar affirmed that the Portuguese conception of empire did not represent an expansionist tendency, but rather aimed at destroying the mind of the world the false conception that Portugal is a small country.

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Portugal was the third colonial power in the world, and Salazar intended for other countries to recognize this. At the conference, Salazar chided other nations for interfering in the domestic affairs of others. Portugal, he said, was “one of the few countries which, to-day, claims to advance without harming or restricting the possessions of others, or those rights usually recognized as conquests of modern civilization.”

Salazar discussed borders in great detail: he campaigned for Portuguese nationalism predicated upon a natural framework within which nations existed as separate units. His conception of the nation-state was comprised of these distinct, separate social units, “independent, and with sovereign powers; having the right to decree as it may think fit the division and administration of its territories, regardless of their geographical positions.” Based on this framework, Salazar contended that “Angola, Mozambique, and our possessions in India are equally with our provinces of Minho or Beira under the same single authority of the State.” Drawing once again upon the moral authority of Portugal to rule, Salazar ended his opening address at the Imperial Conference by reminding the colonial governors that the “safeguarding the interests of those inferior races…under the influences of Christianity is one of the greatest and most daring achievements of Portuguese colonization.”

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“glorious but heavy burden” and “predestination” for good measure, and on that note, closed his speech.

António Ferro and the Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional (SPN)

After consolidating his power, Salazar set the wheels in motion for the establishment of the National Propaganda Secretariat (Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional, SPN) in 1933. While this institution was for the general purpose of dissemination and control of public information, it would also come to be the brainchild of Portuguese cultural policy in support of the colonial ideology of the Estado Novo. At the headquarters of the SPN on October 26, 1933, Salazar advanced his thesis that “in international affairs…everyone protests against the injustice of the way in which foreign journalists, writers, and politicians speak of Portugal.”35 While it is not quite clear who Salazar meant by “everyone” or if this was simply a rhetorical flourish, we can deduce that Salazar was not particularly pleased with public perceptions of the Estado Novo. In Salazar’s eyes, the SPN would set the record straight: it would be the fountain of information on Portuguese life, history, monuments, education, science, literature, art, economics, finance, and politics, and the beacon in a haze of lies, ignorance, and inaccuracies.

António Ferro, a leading public intellectual, popular journalist, and author, was selected to head the SPN. Ferro was former editor of the Portuguese daily newspaper, O Século, and had directed Ilustração Portuguesa, an illustrated journal which covered the evolution of Portuguese society, and which was a remarkable document reflecting

During his journalistic career, Ferro had interviewed various leaders, such as Mussolini, Miguel Primo de Riveira, Mustafa Kemal, Pope Pius XI, and Gabriel D'Annunzio, all men who he held in high regard. In 1927, Ferro published a book called *Travel to the Dictatorships (Viagem a Volta das Ditaduras)*, eulogizing the dictators he had previously interviewed. Soon after, Ferro was invited to conduct five interviews with Salazar for the Portuguese newspaper, *Diario de Noticias*. These were published in December of 1932, and eventually compiled into a biography of the Prime Minister.\(^\text{37}\)

Ferro’s past portfolio in both colonial affairs and arts and culture made him an ideal candidate to head the SPN. Ferro had served in Angola under colonial administrator, Filomeno da Câmara, a man he held in high esteem. Ferro was also well-embedded within the cultural milieu, associating with renowned Portuguese literary figures such as Alfredo Pimenta João Ameal, Fernando Pessoa, Vitorino Nemésio, and Tomás Ribeiro Colaço.\(^\text{38}\) In 1917, he held a conference called “The Big Tragedies of Silence,” on Portuguese cinematography of the *arte novo* style, and later published a piece on “The Age of the Jazz Band.”\(^\text{39}\) His candidacy to head the SPN was strong.

In the 1920s, Ferro embarked on a mission to present his vision of Portugal to his fellow Portuguese countrymen by means of popular dance, costumes, and regional dresses. This was the antecedent for the policy he championed in 1932 known as *a política do espírito*, or “the policy of the spirit”. *A política do espírito* was based on three pillars: one, the use of culture as a medium of propaganda; two, the reconciliation of old

\(^{36}\) Fernando Guedes, *António Ferro e A Sua Política do Espírito* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1997), 16-17.


\(^{38}\) Ibid.

traditions and values with modernity to create a nationalist ideology; and three, the establishment of a national and popular culture rooted in the ideals of the regime. The importance attached to the colonies and the ways in which Salazar and the Estado Novo perceived notions of empire is illuminated when one examines the cultural policies of the SPN under Ferro. As Ferro articulated to Salazar, “art, literature, and the sciences constitute the great façade of the nation, what the viewers from the outside see.”

Throughout the 1930s and up until 1968, Ferro organized at least 32 colonial exhibitions around the world, designed to prop up support for Portuguese imperialism. Out of these exhibitions, one of the most important was the First Portuguese Colonial Exhibition held from June 16 to September 30 of 1934 in the gardens of the Crystal Palace in O Porto. The exhibition was supported by the Ministry of Colonies, the Navy, the Ministry of War, Ministry of Colonies, the governors of Cabo Verde, Guiné, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Goa, Macau, Timor, as well as various societies and universities. In the preface of the official album catalog documenting the exhibition, the technical director, Captain Henrique Galvão, pronounced that the Exhibition was the “first big act of colonial propaganda in the Metropole...[as] the majority of Portuguese do not even have the slightest idea about the reality of the grandeur [of the colonies], and points of view concerning its moral, political, and spiritual basis, resulting from the historical fact of Colonization for five centuries, from the

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42 Exposição Colonial do Porto, 1934, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Henceforth abbreviated as Arquivo Salazar), AOS/UL-1B, cx. 741, pt.16.
contemporary fact that we have preserved a great Empire, and the knowledge we possess to elevate the level in which we find the colonies.”

The exhibition was divided into two principal sections: an official section and one dedicated to private initiatives. Various exhibits on display featured Portuguese colonial history since 1415, the state of Portuguese colonies during the last forty years, ethnographic representation, war, monuments, zoological parks, state-sponsored theatre and cinema, a colonial bookstore, products from the colonies, conferences and congresses, and medical aid to the natives.

Minister of Colonies Armindo Monteiro pronounced that the Portuguese Colonial Exposition proudly displayed “the marvelous proof and secular work of the Portuguese in four parts of the world,” and that it was from the Exhibition that the *Estado Novo* could commemorate its pride for its discoveries, and its work overseas. This was shortly followed by the Portuguese World Exhibition from June 2 to December 3 of 1940, which was an even grander design staged to reframe perceptions about Portuguese imperialism. The 1940 Exhibition took place in Lisbon, and intended to represent colonial subjects as “either…staunch defenders of Portuguese sovereignty in Africa or as innocents grateful for the privilege of having been admitted into the empire.”

Under the *Estado Novo*, public memory became a politicized space in which Salazar and Ferro could control how others perceived of the empire. Salazar revived the

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47 Sapega, *Consensus and debate in Salazar's Portugal*, 27.
Academy of History in 1934 with the duty of reinterpreting the past along the party line.\textsuperscript{48} In this light, Ferro commissioned books and films all under the payroll of the SPN. Copies were purchased of the \textit{Grandes Portugueses} (Great Portuguese), focusing on Portuguese national figures during the Age of Discovery, such as Eleanor of Viseu, and Filipa de Vilenha.\textsuperscript{49} Under Article 3.1 of Law 2:027 of the National Assembly, the Ministry of Colonies was able to appoint a delegate to the Cinema Council.\textsuperscript{50} Portuguese film director, António Lopes Ribeiro, became closely associated with the colonial propaganda of the \textit{Estado Novo}. The \textit{Agência Geral do Ultramar} sponsored a series of his films, the most famous one being \textit{O Feitiço do Império} (The Spell of the Empire), which detailed Salazar’s trip to the colonies in 1938.\textsuperscript{51} Other colonial films included \textit{Revolução de Maio} (1938) centering on the battle to win the love of a colonialist’s daughter, \textit{Chikwembo – Sortilégio Africano} (1953), and \textit{O Costa de África} (1954). The images and plot from these colonial films attempted to weave a discourse in which Portugal was a benevolent, non-racist colonizer whose presence was mandated to civilize the natives.\textsuperscript{52} This was reinforced by Salazar sanctioning \textit{lusotropicalismo} as the official ideology of the regime.

\textit{Gilberto Freyre and Luso-tropicalismo}

In 1933, Brazilian sociologist and cultural anthropologist, Gilberto Freyre, argued that Brazil was a “racial democracy” in his text \textit{Casa grande e senzala} (The

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{49} Publicação "Grandes portugueses,"\textit{Arquivo Salazar}. SNI 5789, Part 15.
\end{small}
Masters and Slave). Freyre argued that Brazil was exempt from the issues of racial discrimination which plagued the rest of the world by virtue of its racial mixing. According to this logic, miscegenation of the races with the Portuguese had led to whitening of Amerindians and Africans and created a superior meta-race. In 1940, Freyre published *O mundo que o português criou* (The World the Portuguese Created), in which he argued that the Portuguese colonizer was unique and led to the “democratization of human societies through the mixing of races, interbreeding and miscegenation.”

In Lisbon, Freyre’s ideas pleased António Salazar, who used this discourse to justify why Portuguese colonization was legitimate. Thus began the birth of the *lusotropicalismo* movement as Freyre’s ideas about Brazil as a multiracial democracy were extended to Portugal. Freyre was sought out in 1950 by Portuguese Minister of Colonies Manuel Maria Sarmento Rodrigues to travel to Angola, Cabo Verde, Goa, Portuguese Guiné, and Mozambique and record his observations, all on the budget of the *Estado Novo.* Afterwards, Freyre published his observations in both *Aventura e Rotina* (1953) and *Um Brasileiro em Terras Portuguesas* (1953). As Freyre remarked in a letter to the Portuguese *Ministério do Ultramar* in January 1952, “I never thought that a man of fifty years of age could learn so much, in one trip, as I have, after finishing this work on the Portuguese Overseas Territories, per suggestion of José Osório de Oliveira and by the invitation of Your Excellency.” Freyre would go on to argue that the Portuguese were

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“like no other European people, in the experience of peoples [they] integrated, values and techniques worthy of European esteem and Christian appreciation…values and techniques that would permit them to lead in hot lands a life of fellowship with a nature different from the European…assimilated…in intimate harmony.”

Conclusions

As historian Alan K. Smith has emphasized, Salazar was “instrumental in initiating important reversals in Portuguese colonial policy.” Even prior to taking office as Prime Minister, Salazar’s speeches and enactment of legislation such as the 1930 Colonial Act reflect his belief in the economic and political unity of Portugal and her colonies. He had also expressed from early on justification for the Portuguese colonies based on historic and moral grounds. With the advent of the Estado Novo, Salazar sought to defend these principles in practice, by enforcing cultural policies under the SPN and Ferro, and by creating a discourse of lusotropicalismo where non-racist, and benevolent Portugal was uniquely qualified to rule over the colonies. Salazar’s beliefs in the colonial purpose had been deeply embedded in his mind by the 1960s. As those abroad proposed alternative visions about the nature of Portuguese colonialism, Salazar cautioned that the Portuguese “never lack the ability to establish the validity of our case, nor the will-power to resist attack.” Addressing his colonial critics, Salazar forewarned that though “the problem of colonial possessions is in the order of the day…people who are devoting themselves to the study of the subject are distraught by its difficulties, can cause serious

trouble amongst the nations by giving expression to their thoughts and suggestions.” The Kennedy administration would confront such trouble in the 1960s as it tried to challenge the colonial ideology espoused by the *Estado Novo*. 
CHAPTER FOUR: SUPPORT ANY FRIEND, OPPOSE ANY FOE: KENNEDY AND THE PROMISE OF A NEW ERA

The previous chapter explored the intellectual and cultural framework of Portuguese leader António de Oliveira Salazar and the *Estado Novo* when making sense of the colonial question. In a similar vein, this chapter seeks to explore the intellectual and cultural framework of the Kennedy administration when approaching the question of colonialism. This chapter analyzes Kennedy’s speeches, Africanists like ‘Soapy’ Williams, the influence of the Civil Rights Movement, and concepts such as modernization theory to understand intellectual and cultural framework of the Kennedy administration vis-à-vis the colonial question. Though the emergence of modernization theory and the Civil Rights Movement can be traced back to the Eisenhower era, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how these ideas were appropriated into actual policy during the Kennedy Administration when trying to make sense of the colonial question.

*Eisenhower and Dulles: The “European Men”*

From 1953 to 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower served two consecutive terms in office. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles faced the collapse of European empires in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and the rise of revolutionary movements in Latin America. The Eisenhower administration often failed to differentiate between nationalist movements and communist movements, attempting to overthrow these movements through covert operations. Such was the case in Guatemala, and Iran where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency arranged the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán and Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh respectively. Eisenhower
and Dulles also confronted the emergence of the non-aligned movement marked by the
Bandung Conference in 1955. Secretary Dulles found non-alignment to be “an immoral
and short-sighted conception.”¹ Dulles would label Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s neutralism both immoral and intolerable. In Vietnam, historian Gareth Porter
argues that contrary to popular interpretations, Eisenhower tried to avoid military
confrontation in order to save the French.² After the French withdrew from Vietnam,
Eisenhower rejected signing the Geneva Conference Accords. In doing so, the
Eisenhower administration’s endorsement of conservative elites, opposition to structural
reforms, backing of repressive regimes, and use of covert operations “alienated
nationalists, damaged the prospects for democracy, and helped to fan the very kind of
revolutionary violence that U.S. officials most feared.”³

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated on January 20, 1961. This date is often
seen as a radical departure from past U.S. policy towards Africa. Yet, Steven Metz has
argued that 1961 does not represent a radical shift, and that instead “American
perceptions of the decolonization issue underwent a gradual evolution during the entire
period from 1952 to 1962.”⁴ For one, the United States had been making rhetorical
pronouncements about self-determination before both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations. President Woodrow Wilson put forward his Fourteen Points in 1918, and
in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt committed to “respect

¹ Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A Biography Of The Short-Lived Third World (New Delhi:
² Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (London,
University of California Press, 2005), 69.
³ Michael E. Latham. “Review of the Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization
of the Cold War.” Review of The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the
Cold War, collection edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns. Journal of Cold War Studies 10.1
(2008), 175.
⁴ Steven Metz, “American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa,” Political Science Quarterly,
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.”

Yet in foreign policy, there is a difference between rhetoric and policy. In practice, President Woodrow Wilson supported U.S. occupation of the Philippines, believed in the trusteeship of non-Europeans to pave the way for self-determination, and did not lay out concrete plans for the realization of self-determination. During the Truman administration, the Philippines gained independence in 1946, and Truman rhetorically called for European decolonization. Yet in policy, Truman often wavered between “anti-imperialist rhetoric and pro-colonialism especially where American economic interests counted.”

Granted, Eisenhower did engage in private discussions about the pace of decolonization with European powers. After a March 1957 trip to Africa, Vice President Nixon also recommended the creation of a separate Africa Bureau within the State Department to tackle issues independently from Arab affairs leading to its creation in 1958. On July 7, 1958 and on August 21, 1959, Eisenhower also approved statehood for Alaska and Hawaii respectively. As Metz observes, public sentiment towards Africa was also shifting before President Kennedy’s inauguration. Eisenhower led the United States as the African-American Civil Rights Movement emerged in the mid-1950s pushing for change from below. Chester Bowles and G. Mennen Williams were also making

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statements on a new direction for U.S. African policy long before serving the State Department during the Kennedy administration.

Yet a distinction must be made between contemporary ideas that called for a new U.S. Africa policy and actual policy. While the momentum for a change in U.S. African policy was present before President Kennedy’s inauguration, in practice, the Eisenhower administration, still tended to prioritize Europe over Africa. Despite the impetus for change in U.S. African policy from the Civil Rights Movement, it would take a while for what Borstelmann called the “color line” to change during the Cold War. African diplomats recalled that the wives of U.S. diplomats regularly put their gloves on before shaking hands.¹⁰ In the prologue to *The Cold War and the Color Line*, Thomas Borstelmann notes that when Malick Sow, Chadian Ambassador to the United States, asked for a cup of coffee at the Bonnie Brae Diner, he was told he could not be served because the waitress thought Ambassador Sow “looked like just an ordinary run of the mill nigger…I couldn’t tell he was an ambassador.”¹¹ Despite the creation of a new Africa Bureau, it also took time for the State Department to put forth a new foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. The newly created Bureau received negligible funding relative to other regional bureaus, and the Bureau of European Affairs continued to handle affairs for most of colonial Africa.¹² The changes on the part of the Eisenhower administration

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were, in practice, were symbolic as opposed to “substantive[ly] reorganiz[ing] the foreign policy bureaucracy.”

As such, beyond a “basic recognition of the inexorable character of anticolonial independence movements…Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, Foster Dulles…were men of Europe.” On January 22, 1942, Dwight David Eisenhower scrawled to himself: “We’ve got to go to Europe and fight, and we’ve got to quit wasting resources all over the world – and still worse – wasting time.” In World War II, Eisenhower served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of Europe, and was appointed as the first Supreme Commander of NATO by President Truman in December 1950. During the presidential campaign of 1952, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles emphasized a policy of Europe-first internationalism. As for Dulles, observers often noted that “with the exception of his work on the Japanese peace treaty, Dulles’ extensive background in foreign affairs had focused primarily on Europe before 1953,” and that his “general opposition to European colonialism in the 1950s derived from his understanding of U.S. interests in the Cold War, not from sympathy with nonwhite liberation fighters.” Nearly a year into the presidency, Secretary of State Dulles published an article titled “Evolution of Foreign Policy” in the Department of State Bulletin. In a State Department press release, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs,

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Henry A. Byroade, remarked that “premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive, and destructive.”\(^\text{19}\) Dulles argued that the United States needed “allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective less costly.” The Eisenhower administration looked to Europe to accomplish these goals. In its public rhetoric, the Soviet Union tried to capitalize on what it saw as the Europe-first strategy of the Eisenhower administration and its support of the “colonizers.” The episode that is most salient of this Soviet strategy was that of the Goa Incident of 1955.

At a news conference on December 6, 1955 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles alleged that Russia was attempting to pressure India into using force over its dispute with Portugal concerning Goa.\(^\text{20}\) During a visit to India and Burma earlier, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party, had made anti-Western statements.\(^\text{21}\) At a city hall meeting in Rangoon, Khrushchev stated, “colonizers can in no way reconcile themselves to the loss” of the colonized.\(^\text{22}\) Before large crowds at a Calcutta rally in India, Khrushchev announced that it was his deep belief that Goa would soon be “liberated” from Portuguese rule and able to unite with India. Khrushchev also used this opportunity to address the nuclear question: “we have to influence the reactionary forces and try to compel them to ban atomic weapons.”\(^\text{23}\) Premier Bulganin spoke of Portuguese colonial


\(^{20}\) Ibid.


\(^{22}\) “Says Remarks by Red Leaders Add to Tension,” December 6, 1955, AHD-MNE 2P A1 M506

rule as a “shame toward civilized people,” and underscored that the Soviet Union supported nationalism against the Portuguese colonialists.\textsuperscript{24} In contrast, Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet Union followed the five principles of coexistence as laid out by Nehru and the Chinese Communist Party leader Zhou En-Lai.

According to Dulles, such Soviet statements were intended to provoke use of force by Goa, and showed no willingness to reduce East-West tensions.\textsuperscript{25} The censure of the West also led Dulles to believe that the Soviet Union was in fact, not serious about the 1955 Geneva Summit commitments to reduce tensions. Dulles thus believed it was “appropriate to express feelings on Soviet statements aimed at fomenting trouble in the Goa area.” A joint communiqué was issued by Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Cunha issued condemning the statements of Khrushchev and Bulganian during their Burma-India tour, for trying to incite hostilities between the East and West. However, in this joint public statement, Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Cunha called Goa a “Portuguese province.” Such language outraged Indians, who were adamant that Goa was not a province, but an “unwilling Portuguese colony which should be turned over to India.”\textsuperscript{26} For many Indians, Dulles’ choice of words reflected support for Portugal rather than support for Goa in its quest for independence. American Ambassador to India John Sherman Cooper found himself in a clumsy situation: though he had worked to improve U.S.-Indian bilateral relations during his term, one sound bite threw it all down the drain, aligning the United

\textsuperscript{24} “Statement by U.S. Portugal Arouses India,” AHD-MNE MNE2P A1 M506.
\textsuperscript{25} “Red Chief Stirring Up Hate: Dulles, Ottumwa (Iowa) Daily Newspaper, December 8, 1956, AHD-MNE 2P A1 M506.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
States “squarely with the unpopular colonial powers.” The Indians were quick to follow up with the Americans. Indian Foreign Secretary Submial Dutt called Cooper at 5 p.m. and invited Cooper to a thirty-minute private conference to resolve for what the Indians, was an unacceptable term to define their political status in relation to Portugal. As Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pronounced, this episode was one which India found “an important matter of far consequences.” According to Indian press, the Dulles-Cunha joint communiqué was the “biggest diplomatic blunder the United States could have made and…it inflamed the Indians more than U.S. aid to Pakistan.”

The “Goa incident” reflected the Europe-first thinking of the Eisenhower administration towards Portugal and her colonies. By using the word “province” to describe Goa as Salazar had imposed since 1946, the Eisenhower administration firmly aligned itself with the colonial ideology of the *Estado Novo*. Before leaving office, Eisenhower left a note bidding Portuguese President Américo Tomaz a personal farewell. Eisenhower remarked that association with Portugal provided him with “deeper insight into Portugal’s national character…the essence of her strength and greatness.” In turn, Salazar thanked Ike and the United States for “the bonds of confidence and mutual respect which were thereby greatly strengthened…through cooperation as friends and allies.”

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30 JFKL
31 Telegram from President Eisenhower to President Américo Tomaz, January 19, 1961, AHD-MNE, 2- A1 M506, Folder on Political Relations with the United States.
32 Telegram from Salazar to President Eisenhower, January 19, 1961, AHD-MNE, 2- A1 M506, Folder on Political Relations with the United States.
In contrast to the intellectual and cultural framework of the Eisenhower administration when it came to the colonial question, John Fitzgerald Kennedy is emblematic of a new way of thinking about the colonial question and Africa. Kennedy had been articulating ideas about colonialism and self-determination since his days in Congress. When talking about Cyprus on September 21 of 1956 at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Luncheon at the Biltmore Hotel, then Senator John Kennedy declared, “I have high hopes that 1956 will offer the voters a far saner, a far sounder discussion of foreign policy issues than 1952. After all, as the result of the change in administrations both parties should now be able to concentrate on current policies instead of berating and distorting the distant past…or the old battle of Asia-first vs. Europe-first…We proclaim our sympathy to the end of Colonialism but abstain from voting on specific issues… But this kind of indecision, compromise and half-heartedness, which has characterized Democratic Administrations in election years, also, has tragic consequences.”

Kennedy would decisively mark himself as an ardent supporter of colonial peoples in the Senate in July of 1957. In doing so, Kennedy proceeded to “alienate the foreign policy establishment” while better his “still-meager standing with party liberals” by vigorously attacking French colonialism in Algeria.

What came to be known as the Algeria speech of July 2, 1957 lambasted U.S. “dependence upon our

33 Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Luncheon at the Biltmore Hotel, September 21, 1956, Speech Transcripts, JFKL.
European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the principles of self-
determination, and our obvious desire not to become involved.”

During the 1960 campaign, the fourth joint television-radio broadcast debate with
candidate Richard Nixon was aired on Friday, October 21. Kennedy reinforced his vision
for a new policy vis-à-vis Africa. He declared that:

Africa is now the emerging area of the world. It contains 25 percent of all the
members of the General Assembly. We didn't even have a Bureau of African
Affairs until 1957. In the Africa, south of the Sahara, which is the major new
section, we have less students from all of Africa in that area studying under
Government auspices today than from the country of Thailand. If there's one thing
Africa needs, it's technical assistance, and yet last year we gave them less than 5
percent of all the technical assistance funds that we distributed around the
world.

The concept of “technical assistance” was an important part of modernization theory that
Kennedy would incorporate into his foreign policy as President. Later during the fourth
debate, Kennedy spoke of the desire of freedom and independence from Europe that
emanated from Africa. Kennedy urged that it was essential for the United States to
identify herself with “that force...as Lincoln --as Wilson did, as Franklin Roosevelt did.
If we become known as the friend of freedom, sustaining freedom, helping freedom,
helping these people in the fight against poverty and ignorance and disease, helping them
build their lives...we can strengthen freedom, we can make it move, we can put the
Communists on the defensive.” The Kennedy administration would later expound upon
these themes when formulating its policy vis-à-vis Angolan independence.

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36 Transcript of Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy Fourth Joint Television-
Radio Broadcast, Friday, October 21, 1960, ABC Studios, New York, New York, October 21, 1960, JFKL.
37 Transcript of Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy Fourth Joint Television-
Radio Broadcast, Friday, October 21, 1960, ABC Studios, New York, New York, October 21, 1960, JFKL.
A New African Policy: The Pre-Presidential Africa Report

Before Kennedy stepped into office, a pre-presidential task force was appointed to recommend a new U.S. policy for Africa. The 160-page report was written by over 20 specialists in African affairs. Whilst it reflected some of Kennedy’s views on Africa before inauguration, this report would also “form the basis of a radically new American policy for Africa.”

The report encompassed a mixed set of responses towards the issue of colonialism, depending upon the colonial power at hand.

With respect to the British and French colonies in Africa, the authors cautioned that the United States would be “doing its European friends an injustice and itself and Africans a disservice if it tried to make political capital out of British and French difficulties.” They thus advised an attitude of qualified sympathy towards Britain’s handling of its African colonial problem, with an extremely reserved and non-committal position concerning the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Towards South Africa, it was recommended that the United States should one, work with Britain, and UN Secretary General U. Thant to push the South African government to alter its racial policies of apartheid and accept UN supervision over South West Africa; and two, oppose any merger between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Although these recommendations marked a sharp departure from the Africa policy of the Eisenhower administration, the authors still aired on the edge of caution when touching upon the issue of French colonialism. Though the American stance against communist aid to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) was quite clear, the report recommended...

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against making public statements on Algeria. The authors acknowledged that President de Gaulle had already underscored a willingness to negotiate with the FLN and this would suffice for now.

When broaching the issue of Portugal, the report condemned the common fancy that the United States backed Portuguese colonialism. Instead, the report described Portuguese rule in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guiné as “intolerable”.

According to the report, such impressions of American support for Portugal had arisen due to one, Portugal’s participation in NATO; two, the American base in the Azores; and three, American backing for Portugal to fill the vacant seat on the UN Security Council in December of 1960 against Liberia’s claim. Instead, the report suggested that the Kennedy administration should firstly, collaborate with Britain to exert strong pressure on Portugal looking towards the emancipation of her African territories, and secondly, cease to accept Portugal’s refusal to report to the UN on her non-self-governing territories. The Report was supported by leading Africanists within the Kennedy administration. Two such prominent characters were G. Mennen Williams, and J. Kenneth Galbraith. Both men lent their support to a radical revision of American policy vis-à-vis Africa and would encourage President Kennedy to support the demands of Angolan nationalists.

The themes of communism and the Cold War were deeply embedded in the language of the pre-presidential Africa Report. The authors noted that despite aversion in Africa to becoming a proxy site for Cold War conflict, the Cold War had indeed inched into Africa with the East and West fighting for friendship. The authors were aware that the Soviets were competing for influence in Africa by means of “economic and cultural

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offensive, especially in Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the Sudan, and Ethiopia,” non-tied aid, and the placement of their technicians in Africa. In an article for Harper’s Magazine in May of 1961, “The Kingdom of Silence: The Truth about Africa’s Most Oppressed Colony,” Bernard Fall asked of his readers, “are the Azores worth it?” He described how prior to gaining membership to the United Nations in 1955, Salazar introduced a change in the Constitution redefining colonies as “overseas provinces.” As the Burmese delegate to the UN put it, Portugal’s colonies are “the Kingdom of Silence…unaccountable to the world.” Fall’s articles were remnant of a shifting prioritization amongst American foreign policy makers in the sixties. Kennedy and his Africanist advisers brought new ideas about how the United States should act not only in rhetoric, but in practice, towards colonized nations.

A New President

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” These famous words from John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s inaugural address on January 20, 1961 are carved into a granite tablet by the foot of his grave, and have become stitched into popular memory. However, what followed after these popularly cited thirty-eight words? During the remainder of his 13 minute and 59 second-long inaugural speech, Kennedy also spoke of alliances, colonialism, the United Nations, and the nuclear race. Addressing “friends” he promised

41 Dulles charges Russia is pushing India to force Goa annexation, Troy O. News, December 6, 1955, AHD-MNE, Folder 334.2
to support, Kennedy declared that, “to those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. Divided, there is little we can do – for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.”

To nations newly independent, Kennedy affirmed that, “to those new States whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom – and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.” What of the nations yet to gain independence? To them, Kennedy pledged his “best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required – not because the communists may be doing it, not [to] seek their votes, but because it is right.”

Upon Kennedy’s election into office, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Marcello Mathías, congratulated him heartedly, and declared that he “look[ed] forward to the continuance of the close cooperation between our two countries in pursuit of the ideals which are common to the Western World. I trust that our respective nations as allies and friends shall find in the struggle for the cause of peace, security and justice the strong bonds which shall still develop and strengthen the close ties already existing.”

*John Kenneth Galbraith: ‘Why the Kennedy Administration is Against Colonialism’*

John Kenneth Galbraith was a former Harvard professor and close adviser to President Kennedy. In a speech on August 8 before the Constitution Club in New Delhi

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44 Inaugural Address, January 21, 1961, JFKL.
– an assemblage of members of the Indian Parliament – Mr. Galbraith elucidated why the Kennedy Administration was against colonialism and why it had supported India as against Portugal when Nehru invaded the Portuguese province of Goa. “Perhaps our reasons for this stand are even more pressing than yours. Africa is the continent most intimately identified with modern colonialism. A very large number of Americans are of African origin,” explained Galbraith. “The Administration which I represent came to power because it enjoyed the overwhelming support of the 19,000,000 Americans – about 10 per cent of the population – of African descent.”46 For Galbraith, this was a matter of principle, but also a question inextricably tied to the voter base back at home. The civil rights movement would also intersect with desire for a new U.S. policy for Africa at home, embodied in the popular slogan “Africa for the Africans!” G. Mennen Williams would laud this catchphrase on a tour to Kenya, and Portuguese diplomats would vigilantly save press articles on this episode as they nervously watched a new American policy vis-à-vis both Africa and colonial powers unfold.

“Soapy” Williams: Africa for the Africans

Gerhard Mennen Williams, otherwise known as “Soapy Williams,” graduated from Princeton in 1933 and received his law degree from the University of Michigan three years later. Soapy wished to make a big impact in politics, pronouncing to his classmate Stan Backus, “If God and Mammon are willing, I'm going to play some part in government. I'm praying to God for brains and faith, and I'm going to try to wrench away some of Mammon's treasure for power to do things.”47 Though he lost the Democratic

nomination to Kennedy in the 1960 Democratic National Convention, Soapy later became the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Kennedy administration. Soapy espoused a new vision for Africa, continuously pronouncing himself in favor of “Africa for the Africans.” In November of 1958, Martin Luther King, Jr. sent Soapy a copy of his book, *Stride Toward Freedom*, with a personal message thanking Soapy for his “great humanitarian concern” and “undeserving devotion to the ideals of freedom and justice.” In the months that followed, Martin Luther King, Jr. exchanged letters with Soapy, advising him on the content of his Africa Freedom Day Speech at Carnegie Hall in New York City. As Soapy Williams declared to Dean Rusk, “There are no African moderates on the twin issues of apartheid and colonialism.”

*Modernization Theory as Ideology*

As with the *lusotropicalismo* of the *Estado Novo*, modernization theory was a discourse that came to both represent and justify the politics of the Kennedy administration. In 1957, Max F. Millikan and Walt Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published their co-authored book, *A Proposal: Key to Effective Foreign Policy*. Millikan and Rostow were two social scientists perplexed by the post-World War II wave of decolonization. In their book, they argued that there were two critical tasks for U.S. foreign policy. The first task was to “meet effectively the threat to our security posed by the danger of overt military aggression, a threat now inherent in the present

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48 Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote this personal message in an inscription of his book *Stride Toward Freedom* (1958) which was mailed to G. Mennen Williams.
49 Letter to G. Mennen Williams from Martin Luther King, Jr., January 28, 1959, THLSr. GMWC-MiU-H: Box 676, Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers Project, Stanford University MLK, Jr. Research and Education Institute.
capabilities and possible future generations of the Communist bloc countries.”\textsuperscript{51}\ The second critical task would be to encourage the advancement of a world in which “threats to our security and, more broadly, to our way of life are less likely to arise.”\textsuperscript{52}

To accomplish this, Millikan and Rostow advocated fostering societies abroad that could be “relied upon not to generate conflict because their own national interests parallel ours and because they are politically healthy and mature.”\textsuperscript{53} Their analysis was drawn upon countries which had just gained independence following World War II and were trying to “cope” with this new “status”. With this came new aspirations for development, while breaking down traditional institutions and culture patterns. Millikan and Rostow saw peril arising from these new trends. They argued that this would sway people to “become convinced that their new aspirations can be realized only through violent change and the renunciation of democratic institutions.”\textsuperscript{54} While there was nothing problematic about this in and of itself, Millikan and Rostow contended that newly independent countries might be more easily exploited by communists. As a caveat, the authors were careful to note that this was not because of any intrinsic value of communist ideology, but because “Communists have recognized their opportunities to exploit the revolution of rising expectations by picturing communism as the road to social opportunity or economic improvement or individual dignity and achievement of national self-respect, whichever fitted a given situation.”\textsuperscript{55}

As a counterbalance, Millikan and Rostow believed that it was imperative for the United States to continue its “dedication to the fundamental principles of national

\textsuperscript{52}\ Ibid, 353.
\textsuperscript{53}\ Ibid, 353.
\textsuperscript{54}\ Ibid, 353.
\textsuperscript{55}\ Ibid, 353-354.
independence and human liberty under law…a mission to see the principles of national independence and human liberty extended on the world scene.” These ideas would be reasserted by Rostow later on and appropriated into the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration. Essentially, colonialism would be substituted for modernization.

Modernization would pave the way for stable, democratic societies in the image of the United States as opposed to the Soviet Union. Yet as Latham argues, by characterizing modernization as “a benevolent, universally valid, scientifically valid and historically documented process, social scientists, policymaker’s and the nation’s media also eluded America’s own imperial past…at a moment when the “forces of nationalism and Marxist social revolution called American assertions sharply into question.” Rostow later served as the 1st U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor, and many of the assumptions of modernization theory would be appropriated into the Kennedy administration’s policy.

In a Presidential Task Force Report on Portuguese Territories, a section on Economic Relations between Portugal and her African Territories concluded that this established economic interdependence gave Portugal benefits, while simultaneously denying African territories to develop along lines indicated by their natural resources and failing to lay the foundation for self-generation. The Report urged evolution of the Portuguese African territories from colonial status to a government of self-determination. The Report also recommended economic and technical assistance to Angola, as well as “training of non-Communist Angolan assimilados and indígenas,” aid for Angolan refugees, and “exposure to Western concepts of justice, democracy, and economics.”

Cold War social scientists thus promoted a cultural project whereby Angola would

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56 Ibid, 353-354.  
57 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 16-17.  
modernize into a stable, democratic society in the image of the United States after decolonization. As the Task Force Report supported, this was in line with “national security objectives denying Sino-Soviet control” of the colonies.”59

Conclusions

Though there was already a shift away from a more ‘Eurocentric’ to ‘Afrocentric’ intellectual and cultural framework prior to President Kennedy’s inauguration, his administration actively appropriated these ideas and cultural references into its foreign policy. Concepts by Cold War social scientists such as modernization theory were embedded in the language of the Presidential Task Force Report on Portuguese Territories and provide insight into why the Kennedy administration would advocate in favor of Angolan self-determination at the United Nations. For the Kennedy administration, it was necessary to support to the desires of colonial peoples pushing for self-determination as helping Angolans fight disease, poverty, and for independence would “put the Communists on the defensive.” By encouraging development in the image of the West, the Kennedy administration hoped to prevent Soviet penetration into the post-colonial state.

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PART THREE: THE DIPLOMATIC RIFT
CHAPTER FIVE:
PORTUGAL AND THE UNITED STATES, THE DIPLOMATIC RIFT:
LUSOTROPICALISMO VS. MODERNIZATION THEORY

Rather than simply laying out the divergent intellectual and cultural frameworks of the *Estado Novo* and the Kennedy administration vis-à-vis Angolan decolonization, this section aims to explore the actual consequences of such a divergence. This section consequently explores the diplomatic rift which emerged between NATO allies Portugal and the United States, and how the Kennedy administration responded to this schism.

In 1961, American Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, was encouraged to vote in favor of resolutions that supported Portuguese decolonization and Angolan self-determination. Kennedy’s Angola policy from 1961 to mid-1962 was anti-colonial in practice as well as rhetoric. This was reflected by American voting patterns and maneuvering at the United Nations Security Council. On February 20, 1961, the Liberian delegation requested that members convene at the Security Council to deal with the situation developing in the Portuguese colony of Angola.¹ Lisbon was furious, and began to seek support of her NATO allies to ensure that this proposal on Angola would not be placed on the Security Council agenda.² In response, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a telegram to the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) on March 1, 1961 outlining that the United States “should go along with whatever consensus may be re timing of Council meeting” and that possible courses of action [would be]

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suggested to the Liberians…so that U.S. efforts with Portuguese to get them to liberalize their policies will not be seriously jeopardized.”

However, in 1962 the Kennedy administration changed its tune and began to turn a blind eye to Portuguese colonial policies in Angola. In 1962, Kennedy instead ordered Ambassador Stevenson to abstain on two resolutions on Portuguese decolonization. The historical context behind this policy shift must be contextualized within the ideas from a faction of Kennedy’s policy intellectuals who provided reasoning for a change in Angolan policy rather than discourse that would sustain it. They argued anti-colonial rhetoric might compromise Portuguese renewal of the American lease of the Azores base. As these policy intellectuals emphasized the importance of the Azores base for Cold War security, Kennedy shifted his Angolan policy in line with priorities for national security during the Cold War.

American ambassador to Portugal, Bruce Elbrick, was displeased that the USUN was considering voting affirmatively on the Liberian proposal, anticipating an anti-American reaction in Portugal. However, Secretary Rusk, in accord with Kennedy’s logic, believed that USUN affirmation of the Liberian proposal was necessary because “unless steps are taken and bloodshed stopped Soviets may develop increasing inclination send arms to Africa for distribution to Angolan underground.” For both Rusk and Kennedy, to not take a stance against Portuguese rule in Angola would increase the risk of Soviet presence there. The United States wanted to pursue a cultural project in line

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5 Telegram 549 from Lisbon.2 March 1961, FRUS, 1995, XXI:541.

6 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, April 23, 1961, FRUS, 1995, XXI:542.
with Rostow’s modernization theory. Thus, it was only moral for the United States to take into account Angolan demands for independence as opposed to the Soviets manipulating nationalistic feelings. Only recently, at the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly on October 12, 1960, the Head of the USSR delegation had gone so far as to introduce a Declaration on the Question of Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, during which the infamous shoe-banging incident by Nikita Khrushchev occurred. For American strategists, the colonial question was thus tied to containment doctrine. Who would win the hearts and minds of Angolans clamoring for independence? A firm policy commitment to independence by the American Delegation to the United Nations was imperative.

More than that, it was also about the United States keeping her word. Kennedy had made a commitment to support decolonization at the United Nations during his election campaign, and thus the Kennedy administration had an obligation to fulfill As Secretary Rusk cited in his memoir, “Maybe I am old-fashioned, but when the United States pledges its word, that’s a very important thing. We should avoid situations where our pledged word is not taken seriously.”7 American strategists arguing that the United States should advocate on behalf of Angolan independence also invoked the founding principles of the United States and thus her moral obligation by the basis of her very existence. In the March 24, 1961 edition of *Time* Magazine, it was asserted that “the very foundation of the United States’ existence had been an anti-colonialism etched in history by the Founding Fathers, confirmed by fiery speaker after fiery speaker in every Congress since 1776.”8

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8 *Time Magazine, March 24, 1961, pp. 20.*
The *Times* columnist then went on to observe that in contradistinction to these very founding principles, “since World War Two, caught in the intricacies of the Cold War, U.S. policies had become entwined with those of its European allies – Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal – whose economies and emotions were linked to their overseas colonies [so that] time after time, in recent years, the U.S. – sympathetic to colonized peoples everywhere, yet reluctant to vote against a NATO ally – had straddled the issue in the United Nations, abstaining when possible.”

Adlai Stevenson warned sponsors of the Angola resolution – Liberia, Ceylon and the United Arab Republics – that the United States would “not support a strident, hysterical measure,” but once the resolution was diluted, went on to quote the Declaration of Independence, and “chided NATO Partner Portugal for ignoring the obvious signals that could push Angola into the same hideous chaos Belgium had bestowed upon its Congo colony.” On March 15, 1961, the USUN formally supported the Liberian resolution on Angola. Moreover on April 20, it passed “an identical resolution in the General Assembly…and on June 9 in the Security Council supported a still stronger resolution which was adopted by nine votes in favor and two abstentions.”

However, a group of policy intellectuals within the Kennedy administration began to generate a discourse that argued that the assumptions of Kennedy’s Angola policy were flawed. Mainly originating from the Department of Defense, these policy intellectuals saw Kennedy’s Angolan policy as problematic. The views of these policy intellectuals began to circulate around Washington, quickly gaining momentum. In a

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
memorandum from Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, noted that
“with only one more meeting of the Angola task force presently scheduled, the Defense
Department has submitted a Military Annex which invalidates a large portion of the work
already done.”13 Belk went on to explain in this memo that the main policy difference
was related to the question of the Azores base. The Air Force base in Lajes Field in
Azores was used by the American navy P-3 Orion anti-submarine squadrons to patrol the
North Atlantic for Soviet submarines and surface spy vessels. Belk’s memo noted that
“[Department of] State feels strongly that we must maintain our posture as a champion
of self-determination in Africa as set forth in our position on the Angolan problem in the
UN.”14 In contrast, the Department of Defense was concerned that if Portugal was to
retaliate by withdrawing from NATO or demanding American evacuation of the Azores
base, this would “result in an unacceptable reduction of U.S. capabilities to support
required military missions to Berlin, Western Europe, and the Middle East and Africa.”15

The pro-Azores policy intellectuals commissioned a number of intelligence
agencies to conduct reports, finding data which supported their stance. The Central
Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the
Director of the National Security Agency were commissioned to write a report estimating
the short-term outlook for U.S. base rights in the Azores if the United States continued to
exert pressure on Portugal to institute reforms leading towards self-determination for its

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13 Memorandum From Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), June 29, 1961, , FRUS, 1995, XXI:545.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
African territories and to cooperate with the UN. The final report was published in late June of 1961, titled The Outlook for Retention of U.S. Azores Base rights in the Event of Certain Courses of U.S. Action.”16 The conclusions presented in the report provided justification against the United States supporting Angolan self-determination. The report cited that “Salazar’s reaction to two U.S. votes in the UN critical of Portugal and to several U.S. demarches on the subject of his African politics has been one of pained disapproval” and that the United States was “gravely misguided in endorsing African aspirations for self-determination [having] misbehaved as an ally by failing to support actively the Portuguese position.”17 Armed with this data from such intelligence reports, pro-Azores policy intellectuals were better-equipped to pontificate their case.

Over the following months, the pro-Azores policy intellectuals continued to garner support in Washington. Governor Williams met with Chester Bowles, Alexis Johnson, Foy Kohler and other policymakers to discuss and map out a new Angola policy. At the meetings, the pro-Azores camp explicated how loss of Azores would affect planning, mobility and reaction time of American forces stationed in the continental United States and plans for naval control of the Atlantic. The threat of continuing existing Angola policy seemed more acute. The next set of reports commissioned by the pro-Azores policy intellectuals linked the Azores base to the security of Berlin. Reports stressed that loss of the Azores base could compromise future NATO action at a time when it appeared the Berlin crisis could erupt to a limited or general war. The pro-Azores

17 Ibid.
policy intellectuals argued that with these stakes at hand, they did not “intend to bargain base rights for human rights, in Europe, Africa, or elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{18}

Linking of Azores to Cold War security concerns such as the Berlin question caused Kennedy to begin to waver on his original policy. President Kennedy had an aggressive anti-Communist posture. In the 1960 presidential debates against Republican opponent, Richard Nixon, Kennedy was the hawk who attacked Eisenhower’s failure to stop the spread of Communism. Containment through flexible response was critical to his conception of foreign policy and any limiting of U.S. ability to pursue containment was undesirable. 1961 was also a year of foreign policy failures for President Kennedy. President Kennedy faced operational disaster with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. At the June 1961 Vienna Summit, Nikita Khrushchev threatened Kennedy about issue of access to Berlin then proceeded to build the Berlin Wall two months later making Kennedy appear weak. Soon after, a Geneva peace conference led to a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, humiliating Kennedy. Both Kennedy’s staunch anti-Communist commitment and his foreign policy failures 1961 to 1962 accentuated Kennedy’s desire to do all he could to protect American national security interests. Thus now that defense intellectuals had coupled the Azores issue with Cold War security, Kennedy began to consider a shift in his Angolan policy.

The final straw that spurred Kennedy administration to reconsider its Angolan policy was Salazar’s concrete steps to demonstrate his displeasure with USUN support of Angolan decolonization. In an incoming telegram to the Department of State on July 11, 1961, Ambassador Elbrick wrote that he had seen Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco...
Nogueira who had “made it very clear that Portugal would go to bitter end in maintain overseas territories and said that a world war might result.”\(^{19}\) When disturbances broke out at the American embassy in Lisbon, Salazar’s government took little action to confine the riots. Salazar also turned down American request to install a Backscatter radar installation on Portuguese Madeira “in the Atlantic Ocean…with capability for detecting high altitude nuclear tests conducted within the Sino-Soviet bloc.”\(^{20}\) Salazar’s explanation was directly related to USUN support of the Liberian request to place the issue of Angolan decolonization on the Security Council agenda. As Salazar stated, “the attitude taken by the United States government regarding Portuguese overseas territories…advises us…[to] not accede to their requests…[and we] encourage them to be prudent in their relations with us.”\(^{21}\)

The Kennedy administration thus shifted its Angolan policy from mid-1962 onwards. Kennedy asked the USUN to abstain from voting on two U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to Portuguese decolonization in mid-1962. This was a marked departure from his previous Angolan policy. Later in a telephone conversation in April 1963, the Portuguese Ambassador asked Under Secretary of State Ball why the United States had “changed our position.”\(^{22}\) Ball explained that we “took an affirmative position [on the issue of Angolan decolonization] only…in the past.”\(^{23}\) In October of 1962, President Kennedy met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Ambassador Pedro Pereira, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Burke Elbrick, and Assistant

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20 Rodrigues, About-Face: The United States and Portuguese Colonialism in 1961, 8.
21 Ibid.
22 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Portuguese Ambassador (Noguiera), April 4, 1963. FRUS, 1995, XXI: 565.
23 Ibid.
Secretary William Tyler. During the conversation, President Kennedy expressed hope that “ways would be found to reduce the differences between us so that Portugal and the United States could cooperate more closely in the face of many grave problems facing both countries.”

In the backdrop of the Cold War, Kennedy thus tried to reformulate his Angolan policy. His policy of 1961 and early 1962 to support Angolan self-determination led to strains with NATO ally, Portugal. The Kennedy administration wanted to maintain its crucial relationship with NATO ally, Portugal. Defense intellectuals within the Kennedy administration highlighted the strategic value of the Azores bases in Soviet containment. Equally, however, the Kennedy administration tried to advocate in favor of Angolan independence and subsequent modernization to become a stable, developed democracy. This would be fueled by continued U.S. technical aid to Angolan refugees, *assimilados*, and *indígenas*. Ultimately, however, the Kennedy administration could not have it both ways. The Kennedy administration had failed to understand the cultural and intellectual framework of the *Estado Novo* when it came to its cherished 400-year old empire. Fearing the Azores was at stake, Kennedy modified his Angola policy in mid-1962 as defense intellectuals reasoned he should. Yet it was a little too late. The damage had already been done to Portuguese-American relations, and on December 31, 1962, Salazar did not renew the American lease on the Azores base.

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CONCLUSION
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SALAZAR AND KENNEDY ON THE EVE OF DECOLONIZATION

Many argue that the juxtaposition between President Kennedy’s rhetoric and his policies demonstrates his moral hypocrisy. I would argue that there has always been a tension between idealism and realism inherent in American foreign policy. As George Herring has stipulated, “in practice, Kennedy found the world much less susceptible to U.S. influence than his soaring inaugural rhetoric proclaimed.”¹ In 2007, historian Erez Manela published his book, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. With a focus on the cases of Egypt, India, China, and Korea, Manela looked at how Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric sparked upheaval abroad. President Kennedy would deploy similar rhetoric in the sixties when reformulating an American policy towards Africa. Kennedy’s rhetoric, as in the case of President Wilson, also sparked upheaval abroad: with its NATO ally, Portugal. In trying to push forward a new Africa policy, Kennedy failed to understand the colonial ideology of Salazar and the Estado Novo

A diplomatic rift emerged in 1962 due to the divergent intellectual and cultural frameworks of the United States and Portugal that were appropriated into their foreign policy vis-à-vis Angolan decolonization. In both cases of lusotropicalismo as ideology in the Estado Novo, and modernization as ideology in the Kennedy administration, ideology would function in diverse contexts. That is to say, in some cases ideology would function “as a political instrument, in some cases, as an analytical model, at other times, as a

rhetorical tool.” However, of greater consequence, as Michael Latham stresses, was the fact that these cognitive frameworks “unconsciously linked to a system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes, and commitments – in sum, the social consciousness – of a social group.” Though Kennedy wished to maintain strong bilateral relations with Portugal, he had failed to understand the Portuguese system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflex, and commitments – the social consciousness of the Portuguese when it came to its empire. Salazar was not a character who could be easily persuaded to decolonize. Nor was he a political leader who could be enticed to both give up what he saw as Portugal’s historically and morally justified right to empire, while permitting the United States to continue to lease the Azores bases.

Consequently, Salazar sought to maneuver diplomatically to teach Kennedy that the United States could not have access to the Azores and simultaneously compromise Portuguese sovereignty. This deal had been established in 1942 by defensive arrangements with the United Kingdom, the United States, and Portugal. The prominence of the defense intellectuals in the Kennedy administration meant that Kennedy would reverse his policy, to the dismay of the Africanists.

Kennedy realized from practice that the NATO alliance system did not imply that Salazar would align Portugal with the United States in the name of ideological bipolar diplomacy. As we see from the intellectual origins of NATO, the architects of this institution operated with a kind of bipolar conceptual construct in mind with the Soviet Union pitted against the United States. The essence of this defensive alliance was established in opposition to the Soviet Union. Yet the Atlantic Community was not united

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by a unified ideological Western opposition to the Soviets and the Warsaw pact nations. The Cold War was not simply a two-sided arm wrestle on a global scale where Salazar could be expected to accept Kennedy’s policy favoring Angolan self-determination. Instead, diplomacy was more to do with crisis management between NATO allies on different issues, such as the question of colonialism. Cold War diplomacy was more subtle than being merely based on interactions between strictly bipolar alliance systems between the East and West. As Cold War culture historian Douglas Field has argued, “the bipolar vision exaggerated the Soviet threat…the creation of a new “West” masked transatlantic divisions and metaphorical discordance between Washington and the West Europeans.”

4 Up until the very last days before his assassination on November 22, 1963, Kennedy would persist in trying to repair this discordance, yet to no avail.

Figure 1. Map of Angola
Figure 2. Tank left in Bié, Angola from Civil War (Source: Author, 2008)
Figure 3: Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Housing MNE Archives, Lisbon, Portugal
(Source: Author, 2009)
Figure 4: Jerónimos in district of Belém in Lisbon, Portugal commemorating Empire
(Source: Author, 2009)

Figure 5: Portuguese Caravel on an Azulejo tile
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