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The purpose of the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication (SAVICOM) is to bring together and support researchers, scholars and practitioners who are studying human behavior in context through visual means and who are interested in: the study, use and production of anthropological films, and photography for research and teaching; the analysis of visual symbolic forms from a cultural-historical framework; visual theories, technologies and methodologies for recording and analyzing behavior and the relationships among the different modes of communication; the analysis of the structuring of reality as evidenced by visual productions and artifacts; the cross-cultural study of art and artifacts from a social, cultural, historical and aesthetic point of view; the relationship of cultural and visual perception; the study of the forms of social organization surrounding the planning, production and use of visual symbolic forms; the support of urgent ethnographic filming; and/or the use of the media in cultural feedback.

The Society's primary tasks are coordination and promotion of interests and activities outlined above. To that end, it publishes Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication, occasional Special Publications and a Filmography. (See inside back cover for a list of publications available from the Society and for Information to Authors.)

SAVICOM works closely with the Anthropological Film Research Institute, a committee of anthropologists concerned with the creation of a national anthropological film archive and research center at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC.

SAVICOM's annual business meeting is held during the American Anthropological Association meetings (usually held in late November). All SAVICOM members are encouraged to attend. During the AAA meetings SAVICOM sponsors a number of symposia and is responsible for the program of film screenings. Members are encouraged to develop symposia and to suggest films for screening at the annual meeting, and for review in the audiovisuals section of the American Anthropologist or in Studies.

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The Society is open to all interested persons. To become a member write to SAVICOM, 1703 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009 for an application form. For further information or questions concerning the Society, write to the President at the address listed above.

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Volume One, Number One of a new publication is always an ambiguous event. On the one hand there is no question that adding to the unending stream of publications is in itself always suspect; on the other hand grown men and women devote unusual amounts of energy for no economic, and very little social compensation, in order to start, sustain, and nourish such new ventures.

This publication, with its long and awkward name, is the result of several years of discussion by the Directors, Advisors, and members of the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication. It was felt that despite the inherent dangers of starting a new publication there was, and had been, so much interest shown by so many people, for so many years, in the relationship between the study of culture and society and such things as painting, the graphic arts, sculpture, dance, movies, photographs, television, and so on, that the time had come to create a common forum where scholars and practitioners interested in the visual media and society could come together to show and discuss what they were doing.

In recent years the terms "Visual Anthropology" and "Ethnographic Film" have gained great currency. Indeed most of us still have a fondness for those two terms—both linguistic and functional—they sound nice, and are fun to do. Our forerunner organization was called the Program in Ethnographic Film and concerned itself with what could be called Visual Anthropology.

Little by little, however, it became clear that all films could be ethnographic (depending on how they were used); and that they could be and were being used by anthropologists for a variety of purposes. It becomes clear that merely attaching the term "ethnographic" did not help us to distinguish between films, or between what was or was not ethnographic. However, knowing what anthropologists did with film, how they used them, made them and analyzed them, did help us to understand not only films, but anthropology, culture, and communication.

The same seemed to hold true for the term Visual Anthropology. In its time, it served to call needed attention to the fact that anthropology was not exclusively verbal, and that culture consisted of more than words. In recent years it has tended to have a somewhat opposite effect; to extoll in a perverse McLuhanish way the attitude that it was the visual not the anthropological, the medium as opposed to man, that was of concern to most of us. Both earlier labels seemed to reflect either an exclusive concern with film and filmmaking as such, or an exclusive concern with visual technology in anthropology. And neither old term seemed to come to grips with the fact that visual forms were and are increasingly being used in social ways, within social and cultural contexts, for communicative and noncommunicative purposes, by artists, artisans, manufacturers, craftsmen, politicians, and social scientists in their roles as researchers as well as teachers. It also seemed to be the case that the term "Program in Ethnographic Film" seemed to emphasize filmmaking, while both that term and "Visual Anthropology" seemed to exclude people in Sociology, Psychology, Art History, Communication, and other related fields, who were also interested in how man thought of, understood, made, communicated by, and used materials and events that were in the visual mode.

The very awkwardness of this new term, The Anthropology of Visual Communication, which we have chosen as the title of our Society and of our publication, might have one important and salutary effect. It can never be made to roll glefully off the tongue as a description of what one does, or of whom one is affiliated with. And it has, it seems to me, several other advantages. It describes a little more clearly—but with plenty of room for disagreement and change—what it is that our Society and our publication is about.

The new title also introduces the terms "communication" and "visual communication" into our self-labeling process. Although these terms are defined in a variety of ways by scholars in many fields, they are also terms that have been used by some of our members for at least 30 years to describe much of their work. It seems to me that Visual Communication is a term that we should finally claim as our own.

A brief glance at the purposes of the Society reprinted on the inside front cover seems to suggest an almost bewildering array of interests, disciplines, methods, purposes, and intellectual styles. And yet most of us are interested in most of the problems and areas suggested in our statement of purpose. It is my personal understanding that the concept of communication is central to, and acts as a link between, all the goals and purposes of the Society. It also, in my view, has both a practical as well as a scholarly connotation in that it refers to the making and showing of visual events, as well as to the study of how they are made, seen, and understood by "real" people in "real" contexts.

The title of this publication is Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication, and two other terms need some words of explanation. Anthropology is included neither to exclude such other terms and interests as Psychology, Sociology, Art History, etc., nor to emphasize any particular methodological, disciplinary, or departmental bias. It is included rather as a reminder of its parent term 'anthropos,' as well as of a field whose historical roots lie not only in the study, but in the presentation of man in all his rich variety.

This is, in my mind at least, related to the term "Studies," which emphasizes the actual examination of problems, questions, and people who make, use, and understand visual events in their and other societies. Apart from a tiny group of workers (starting in the late 1920's and early 1930's) whose work about or with visual materials over the years have served as a model for us all, much of the materials in our field have consisted of prescriptive advice about what needed to be done, how it should be done, and why it should be done.

In recent years our younger colleagues in anthropology and other disciplines have begun to undertake serious studies in visual communication. The old disciplinary distinctions are finally beginning to break down. People in Sociology, in Art History, in Psychology, as well as in Communication and
Anthropology, are addressing themselves to similar problems. Artists in painting as well as photography, film, and television are beginning to join in the studies we are working on (or perhaps it is we who are catching up to them). It is our hope that not only can this Society and its publications act as a meeting place in which we can share ideas, but that we can also assist in the demise of an outdated, overly word oriented, narrowly discipline bound, intellectual community.

The term "studies" does not mean to exclude theory, or critical analysis and discussion of visual events and works. In combination with the terms "anthropology" and "communication" it means to suggest an interest in the reality of cultural life as lived by people and their works which can be studied, understood, and perhaps even helped through an understanding of the visual mode.

This publication therefore is biased toward actual studies as opposed to prescriptive monologues. It reflects also the ideas of the Editor and Editorial Board. This editor was trained as a painter, filmmaker, and professor of communication. One member of the Editorial Board who was trained as a psychologist was also a painter. Another member of our Editorial Board was trained both as an archeologist and as a cultural anthropologist. He wrote reviews of rock and jazz music and now teaches in a Culture and Communication Program. Another is in a Department of Sociology and Anthropology, while still another is a doctoral student getting a degree in ethnomusicology, studying film, making films, and analyzing films.

This first volume (consisting of two issues) of Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication, we hope, reflects not only our biases but the diverse interests of our members, ranging from Becker's discussion of still photographs in social science to Greenberg's article analyzing the design structure of Hopi pottery. We have chosen work by a philosopher who first defines caricature and then studies how people make caricatures in terms of his definitions, as well as work by a sociologist who not only studies the relation between making photographs and studying society, but who is himself a practicing photographer and jazz musician and tries to teach his students of sociology how to present sociological ideas through the photographs that they themselves make. We are also printing an analysis that shows how a symbolic event such as a government produced comic book on drug abuse reveals our underlying social assumptions and attitudes, and a study of how time and space are manipulated through films.

We have in this issue also started a series of translations of Jean Rouch's writings about his films, and about anthropological film in general (we plan to have one major article by Rouch in each of the next four issues of Studies) because we feel that his ideas are unknown to American social scientists and more importantly that his work has been seminal, not only for ethnomfilm, but for film in general. His film "Chronicle of a Summer" influenced such filmmakers as Godard and Truffaut as well as helped to create much of the "cinema verite" style and ideology. Many of us have seen his films, although they are hard to get in this country; his written work, however, was heretofore unavailable in English. Steven Feld, a member of our Editorial Board, is translating and annotating these articles. Those which we will print were chosen by Rouch, and the translations appearing in Studies will have been reviewed by Marielle Delorine and approved by Rouch. Steve Feld has written a short introduction to the series in this issue of Studies.

One of the difficulties with the word "publication" is that it connotes printed words as opposed to still pictures, drawings, films, or television tapes. The Board of Directors and of Advisors of the Society have agreed with us that one of the major goals of this publication shall be the exploration of how visual materials can be "published" for use by scholars—in good quality, at a price that allows students and scholars to buy them.

In the Notes and Correspondence section of this first number of Volume 1 we have started what we hope will be a move toward clarifying the horrible mess involved in using and publishing pictures of any kind. Permission, ownership, responsibility, quality and control, as well as the distribution to and for classroom use, not only of drawings and photographs, but of films and television tapes, has almost no scholarly precedent except through commercial channels. No scholarly group has attempted to publish all forms of visual communications through one channel before. After six months of experience in getting permission to reproduce just the small quantity of materials in this issue, we realize how long a fight we are in for. But somehow making pictures available to our membership seems like a worthwhile effort.

We have also as part of Studies undertaken a special publications program. Our first publication was Edward T. Hall's Handbook for Proxemic Research. Because of our nonprofit printing arrangement, and because we are asking authors of our special publications to accept no royalties on sales to members, we plan to bring out much needed work at prices of $3.00 and $5.00. In the future we plan to publish books of photographs, films, and television tapes, sold and marketed through Studies, with the help of the Executive Office of the American Anthropological Association.

In the long run, editorial justifications for titles, terms, and publications will, I hope, wither away, and prove relatively harmless. The only genuine justification for a publication is the work which it reports and the work which it encourages—by the example of its contents, as well as by providing new work with a place from which it can be seen, used, criticized and replaced by newer, more interesting, and more illuminating work. I hope that Studies can serve to draw together the work that already exists in the Anthropology of Visual Communication and that, more importantly, it can help in the creation of a community of scholars and artists whose new work, perhaps yet unconceived, will become the continuing justification for a Society for the Study of the Anthropology of Visual Communication.

Sol Worth
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
August 14, 1974
PHOTOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

HOWARD S. BECKER
Northwestern University

Photography and sociology have approximately the same birth date, if you count sociology's birth as the publication of Comte's work which gave it its name, and photography's birth as the date in 1839 when Daguerre made public his method for fixing an image on a metal plate.  From the beginning, both worked on a variety of projects. Among these, for both, was the exploration of society.

While sociology has had other ends, moral and metaphysical, sociologists have always wanted to understand how society worked, to map its dimensions and then look into the big sectors and little crannies so mapped. They ordinarily wanted to find things out rigorously and scientifically, and to develop general theories. But some sociologists have made it their main business to describe what has not yet been described, in the style of the ethnographer, to tell the big news, in the style of the journalist, combining these (more or less) with the desire for rigor and general theory.

Sociologists' choice of theories, methods, and topics of research usually reflect the interests and constraints of the intellectual and occupational communities to which they are allied and attached. They often choose research methods, for instance, that appear to have paid off for the natural sciences. They frequently choose research topics which are public concerns of the moment, especially as those are reflected in the allocation of research funds: poverty, drugs, immigration, campus or ghetto disorder, and so on. These faddish tendencies are balanced by a continuing attention to, and respect for, traditional topics and styles of work.

The efforts and projects of photographers have been much more various. In order to understand how photographers go about exploring society when they undertake that job, it will be useful to remember the melange of other jobs photography does. Think of a camera as a machine that records and communicates much as a typewriter does. People use typewriters to do a million different jobs: to write ad copy designed to sell goods, to write newspaper stories, short stories, instruction booklets, lyric poems, biographies and autobiographies, history, scientific papers, letters. . . . The neutral typewriter will do any of these things as well as the skill of its user permits. Because of the persistent myth that the camera simply records whatever is in front of it (about which I will say more below), people often fail to realize that the camera is equally at the disposal of a skilled practitioner and can do any of the above things, in its own way. Photographers have done all of the things suggested above, often in explicit analogue with the verbal model. Different kinds of photographers work in different institutional settings and occupational communities, which affect their product as the institutional settings in which sociologists work affect theirs (Rosenblum 1973).

Photographers have worked to produce advertising illustrations. They have made portraits of the rich and famous, and of ordinary people as well. They have produced pictures for newspapers and magazines. They have produced works of art for galleries, collectors and museums. The constraints of the settings in which they did their work (Becker 1974) affected how they went about it, their habits of seeing, the pictures they made and, when they looked at society, what they saw, what they made of it and the way they presented their results.

From its beginnings, photography has been used as a tool for the exploration of society, and photographers have taken that as one of their tasks. At first, some photographers used the camera to record far-off societies that their contemporaries would otherwise never see and, later, aspects of their own society their contemporaries had no wish to see. Sometimes they even conceived of what they were doing as sociology, especially around the turn of the century when sociologists and photographers agreed on the necessity of exposing the evils of society through words and pictures. Lewis Hine, for instance, was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation in connection with the early surveys of urban life (Gutman 1967). The American Journal of Sociology routinely ran photographs in connection with its muckraking reformist articles for at least the first fifteen years of its existence (Oberschall 1972:215).

Another kind of social exploration grew out of the use of photographs to report the news and to record important social events. Mathew Brady (Horan 1955) and his staff, which included Timothy H. O'Sullivan (Horan 1966) and Alexander Gardner (1959), photographed the Civil War, and Roger Fenton the Crimean War. But it was not until the 1920's that the development of the illustrated weekly in Europe produced a group of photographers who made the photoreportage or photoessay into an instrument of social analysis (Alfred Eisenstaedt and Erich Salomon are among the best-known graduates of these journals) (Gidal 1973). Later, the Picture Post in England and Time, Life, and Fortune in the United States provided outlets for serious photojournalists who worked with the photoessay form: Margaret Bourke-White, Walker Evans, W. Eugene Smith, Robert Capa.

The impulse to photographic social exploration found another expression in the work produced by the photographers Roy Stryker assembled for the photographic unit of the Farm Security Administration during the 1930's (Hurley 1972, 1973; Stryker and Wood 1973). Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, Russell Lee, Arthur Rothstein, and others made it their business to record the poverty and hard times of Depression America, their work very much informed by social science theories of various kinds.

More recently, political involvement has had a hand in shaping the use of photography to explore society. Photo-
Figure 2

—LEWIS HINE
Newsies at Skeeter Branch.
St. Louis, Missouri.
11:00 a.m.,
May 9, 1910
Photographers participated actively in the civil rights movement of the 1960's and brought back photographs which effectively stirred people just as Hine's photographs of child laborers had. They then used those skills in somewhat less immediately political kinds of essays—exploring communities, occupations, subcultures, institutions—that have a sociological intent. These essays combine a journalistic and ethnographic style with a self-conscious and deliberate artistic purpose.

Photography from the beginning strove toward art just as it did toward social exploration. To be sure, earlier photographers in this tradition understood that what they did had an artistic component. They worked hard to produce images that measured up as art. But the artistic element of photography was held at a substantial distance from photography carried on for more mundane purposes, including journalism. Such influential photographers as Edward Weston conceived of their work as something more like painting—they produced for galleries, museums, and private collectors as much as they could—and did very little that could be interpreted in any direct way as an exploration of society.

Art and social exploration describe two ways of working, not two kinds of photographers. Many photographers do both kinds of work in the course of their careers. And even this is an over-simplification since many photographs made by someone whose work is predominantly of one kind have strong overtones of the other. Paul Strand is clearly an art photographer; but his pictures of peasants around the world embody political ideas, and any number of socially concerned photographers do work that is personally expressive and aesthetically interesting quite apart from its subject matter— as, for instance, in Danny Lyon's The Destruction of...
Lower Manhattan (1969) and Larry Clark’s Tulsa (1971).

Photography has thus, like sociology, displayed a shifting variety of characteristic emphases, depending on the currents of interest in the worlds of art, commerce and journalism to which it has been attached. One continuing emphasis has been the exploration of society in ways more or less connected with somewhat similar explorations undertaken by academic sociologists. As sociology became more scientific and less openly political, photography became more personal, more artistic, and continued to be engaged politically. Not surprisingly, then, the two modes of social exploration have ceased to have very much to do with one another.

Sociologists today know little of the work of social documentary photographers and its relevance to what they do. They seldom use photographs as a way of gathering, recording, or presenting data and conclusions. I want to acquaint them with this tradition and show them how they can make use of the styles of work and techniques common in photography. Many social scientists have already been active photographically, and what I say will not be news to them (Barndt 1974).

Many photographers have undertaken projects which produce results that parallel those of sociology, and make claims that in some ways parallel the claims to truth and representativeness of sociology. Insofar as their work has this character, I intend to show them how a knowledge of some of the ideas and techniques of academic sociology can be of help to them.

I do not want to make photographers of social scientists or impose a social science imperialism on photographers (not that there is any chance such attempts would be successful). Many sociologists will find the work and methods I describe hopelessly unscientific, although I hope that this discussion will cause them to reconsider their own methods. Many photographers will find my suggestions academically arrogant; satisfied with the way they now work, they will see no advantage in alien ideas and procedures.

What I say is most directly addressed to those social scientists and photographers who are sufficiently dissatisfied with what they are doing to want to try something new, who find difficulties in their present procedures and are interested in seeing whether people in other fields know something that might help. Ideally, it is directed to the growing number of people, whatever their professional background, who are concerned with producing photographic explorations of society.

In addition, I have tried to show how even those sociologists who have no interest in photographic work can learn something from the light shed on conventional research methods by a comparison with photographic methods. Some general problems of social exploration profit from the light the comparison generates.

I will not be concerned with every aspect of the use of visual materials in social science in this paper. Specifically, I will not consider three major areas of work to which social scientists have devoted themselves: (1) the use of film to preserve nonverbal data for later analysis, as in the analyses of gesture and body movement by such scholars as Birdwhistell, Ekman, Hall, and Lennard; (2) the analysis of the visual productions of “native seers” for their cultural and social meanings, as in the Worth-Adair (1972) study of Navaho filmmakers; (3) the use of photographs as historical documents, whether they have been taken by artless amateurs and preserved in family albums, as in Richard Lesy’s Wisconsin Death Trip (1973). All three are interesting and important areas of work, but differ from the use of photographs to study organizations, institutions, and communities that I have in mind. There is considerable overlap, of course, and I do not insist on the distinction.

Anyone who gets into a new field must pay some dues. Photographers who want to pursue the matter further will have to read some social science prose, and many will probably find that too steep a price; some will find a viable solution in a working partnership with a social scientist (as in the fruitful collaboration of Euan Duff and Dennis Marsden in an as yet unpublished study of unemployed men and their families in Britain).

The price to social scientists is less painful. They must acquaint themselves with the extensive photographic literature; I have reproduced some examples here and will provide a brief guide to more. In addition, they will have to learn to look at photographs more attentively than they ordinarily do. Laymen learn to read photographs the way they do
headlines, skipping over them quickly to get the gist of what is being said. Photographers, on the other hand, study them with the care and attention to detail one might give to a difficult scientific paper or a complicated poem. Every part of the photographic image carries some information that contributes to its total statement; the viewer's responsibility is to see, in the most literal way, everything that is there and respond to it. To put it another way, the statement the image makes—not just what it shows you, but the mood, moral evaluation and causal connections it suggests—is built up from those details. A proper “reading” of a photograph sees and responds to them consciously.

Photographers learn to interpret photographs in that technical way because they want to understand and use that “language” themselves (just as musicians learn a more technical musical language than the layman needs). Social scientists who want to work with visual materials will have to learn to approach them in this more studious and time-consuming way. The following exercise, taught to me by Philip Perkis, is a way of seeing what is involved:

Take some genuinely good picture; the ones reproduced in this article will do. Using a watch with a second hand, look at the photograph intently for two minutes. Don’t stare and thus stop looking; look actively. It will be hard to do, and you’ll find it useful to take up the time by naming everything in the picture to yourself: this is a man, this is his arm, this is the finger on his hand, this is the shadow his hand makes, this is the cloth of his sleeve, and so on. Once you have done this for two minutes, build it up to five, following the naming of things with a period of fantasy, telling yourself a story about the people and things in the picture. The story needn’t be true; it’s just a device for externalizing and making clear to yourself the emotion and mood the picture has evoked, both part of its statement.

When you have done this exercise many times, a more careful way of looking will become habitual. Two things result. You will realize that ordinarily you have not consciously seen most of what is in an image even though you have been responding to it. You will also find that you can now remember the photographs you have studied much as you can remember a book you have taken careful notes on. They become part of a mental collection available for further work. (When you do this exercise a number of times you will acquire new habits of seeing and won’t have to spend as much time looking at a new print.)

I hope this does not sound mystical. Black and white still photographs use visual conventions that everyone brought up in a world of illustrated newspapers and magazines learns just as they learn to talk. We are not ordinarily aware of the grammar and syntax of these conventions, though we use them, just as we may not know the grammar and syntax of our verbal language though we speak and understand it. We can learn that language through study and analysis, just as we can learn to understand music and poetry by making technical analyses of harmony and counterpoint or of prosody. We don’t have a large amount of such photographic analysis available, especially as it relates to the concerns of social scientists. But it is absolutely prerequisite to any analysis and discussion that you practice looking at photographs long and hard, so that you have something to analyze.
THE PHOTOGRAPHIC LITERATURE

Topics of Study

One reason sociologists should be interested in the work of social documentary photographers is that photographers have covered many of the subjects that are persistent foci of sociological concern. Some have done their work for the government, some on assignment, or speculatively, for magazines and newspapers, some supported by foundations, some as the "private" work they do between paying jobs, or as a hobby. Describing the variety of topics photographers share with sociologists will provide the opportunity to acquaint those unfamiliar with the photographic literature with some of the most interesting and important work.

In dealing with the topics they share with sociologists, photographers say what they have to say in many ways. Without giving many examples, or offering an extended description of the various forms of photographic statements, I'll simply suggest the following as among the possibilities now in use. A photographer may make his statement in the form of an aphorism or witticism, a photographic one-liner (see Fig. 7) that may be no more than a joke (in the case of Elliot Erwitt 1972, for example) or may be of considerable depth (as in the work of André Kertész 1972). He may produce slogans. He may be saying “Look at that!” in wonder at some natural phenomenon (Ansel Adams' pictures of Yosemite seem to say that), or in revulsion from some disgusting work of man (McCullin 1973). He may tell a story or, finally, he may produce something that implicitly or explicitly offers an analysis of a person, an artifact, an activity or a society. It stretches ordinary usage to speak of these projects as "studies," as though they were sociological research projects; but the exaggeration emphasizes, as I want to, the continuity between the two kinds of work.

Both photographers and sociologists have described communities. There is nothing in photography quite like such major works of social science as Warner’s Yankee City Series, Lynd’s Middletown and Middletown in Transition, and Hughes’ French Canada in Transition. Photographers have recently produced more modest efforts, such as Bill Owens’ Suburbia (1973) and George Tice’s Paterson (1972), both describing smaller communities through a hundred or so images of buildings, houses, natural features, public scenes and (in Owens’ book) family life. A number of photographers have accumulated massive numbers of negatives of one city, as Eugène Atget (Abbott 1964) did in his attempt to record all of Paris or Berenice Abbott (1973) or Weegee (1945), the great news photographer, did, each in their way, of New York; but only small selections from the larger body of work are available, and we usually see only a few of the images at a time.

Like sociologists, photographers have been interested in contemporary social problems: immigration, poverty, race, social unrest. In that great photographic tradition, one typically describes in order to expose evils and call for action to correct them. Lewis Hine, who called himself a sociologist, put credo succinctly: “I want to photograph what needs to be appreciated; I want to photograph what needs to be corrected.” His greatest project showed conditions of child labor in the United States in a way that is thought to have helped the passage of remedial legislation. Somewhat earlier, Jacob Riis (1971), a reporter, photographed the slums of New York and exhibited the results in How the Other Half Lives. I have already mentioned the photographs of rural poverty by the members of Stryker’s FSA photographic unit and might add to that the collaboration of Bourke-White and Erskine Caldwell (1937) in You Have Seen Their Faces. Life in Black ghettos has been photographed, from the inside, by men like James Van Der Zee (DeCock and McGhee 1973) (among other things the official photographer for Marcus Garvey) and Roy de Carava (de Carava and Hughes 1967); from the outside, by Bruce Davidson (1970) and many others. Dramatic confrontations of the races make news, and many photographers have covered such stories (Hansberry 1964) and gone on to more extended explorations of the matter. W. Eugene Smith (1974) has recently published a major essay on pollution, its victims, and the politics surrounding it in Japan.

Other photographic work deals with less controversial problems, in the style of the sociological ethnography. Sociologists have studied occupations and the related institutions of work, and photographers have too: Smith (1969) did major essays on a country doctor and a Black midwife; Wendy Snyder (1970) has a book on Boston’s produce market, and Geoff Winningham (1971) produced a book-length study of professional wrestling. Photographers have also investigated social movements, as in Paul Fusco’s (1970) book on Cesar Chavez and the UFW, Marion Palfi’s (1973) work on civil rights, or Smith’s classic essay on the Ku Klux Klan (1969). They have shared with sociologists an interest in exotic subcultures: Danny Lyon’s (1968) work on

Figure 7  —ANDRÉ KERTÉSZ
On the quais; 1926, Paris

STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION
motorcycle gangs and Brassai’s (Museum of Modern Art 1968) studies of the Parisian demi-monde, for instance.

Photographers have been as alert as sociologists and cultural commentators to call attention to the rise of new social classes or to forgotten groups in society. Two recent books try to do this, using Detroit as the laboratory. Alwyn Scott Turner’s (1970) Photographs of the Detroit People concentrates on the working class, in front of their homes, in the parks, streets and churches, at parades and rallies. Enrico Natali’s (1972) New American People does something similar for the rising middle class.

Many photographers have worked at depicting the ambience of urban life in a way reminiscent of the long tradition of theorizing about cities by sociologists from Simmel to Goffman. Walker Evans’ (1966) Many Are Called consists of portraits made on the New York subway with a hidden camera. Lee Friedlander, Garry Winogrand (Davidson et al. 1966) and a host of others have photographed “behavior in public places,” creating in the mood of their images a sense of alienation and strain, maybe even a little anomic. Euan Duff’s (1971) How We Are systematically covers major aspects of urban British life.

In addition to these relatively conventional analogues of sociological investigation, photographers have also been concerned with the discovery of cultural themes, modal personalities, social types, and the ambience of characteristic social situations. Thus, Robert Frank’s (1969) enormously influential The Americans is in ways reminiscent both of Tocqueville’s analysis of American institutions and of the analysis of cultural themes by Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict. Frank presents photographs made in scattered places around the country, returning again and again to such themes as the flag, the automobile, race, restaurants—eventually turning those artifacts, by the weight of the associations in which he embeds them, into profound and meaningful symbols of American culture.

The long tradition of the photographic portrait has led photographers to attempt, in a way sociologists have seldom tried (despite the tradition of the life history document), to depict societies and cultures by portraits of representative types. The most systematic attempt must be August Sander’s Men Without Masks, which characterizes Germany in hundreds of portraits of Germans of every social class, occupation, ethnic, regional, and religious group. Paul Strand’s (1971) portraits of peasants from France, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Canada, and elsewhere, though surrounded by other images of places and artifacts, attempt the same thing, as to Elaine Mayes’ (1970) portraits from the Haight-Ashbury.

Photographers have seldom, constrained as they are by time limitations built into the institutions they work in, attempted longitudinal studies. One recent project of this kind suggests how it can happen. Larry Clark’s (1971) Tulsa tells the story of a group of young men in that city who begin using intravenous amphetamine. It follows them from an idyllic hunting-and-fishing youth into drugs, police trouble, and death. Clark was one of the group and visited his old friends periodically as the story unfolded, thus producing a unique inside view of an exotic subculture.

Photographers like to capsize their understanding of people, situations, even countries, in one compelling image.

Cartier-Bresson (1952) coined the phrase “the decisive moment” to refer to that moment when things fall into place in the viewfinder in such a way as to tell the story just right. It sounds mystical, but many of his pictures (e.g., “Exposing a stool pigeon for the Gestapo in a displaced persons camp,” Dessau 1945) accomplish just that.

Modes of Presentation

Photographers present the results of their explorations of society in a variety of ways, using varying quantities of images to make different kinds of statements. One might, at one extreme, present a single image, capturing in it all that needs to be shown about something from some point of view. Stieglitz’ “The Steerage,” for instance, seems to make a self-sufficient statement about the experience of European immigrants, showing both the masses Emma Lazarus wrote about, crowded onto the deck of the ship, but also a brilliantly lit gangway that seems to lead to better things. (Ironically, the ship was actually headed east, to Europe.)

Usually, however, photographers exploring society give us more than one striking image. They explore a topic more thoroughly, sometimes in one concentrated burst of attention and activity, sometimes (on a timetable more like that of the social scientist) over a period of a few years, sometimes as the preoccupation of a lifetime. The concentrated burst occurs when the conditions of work—a magazine assignment, for instance—make it unlikely that you will be able to return to the subject again. It may occur when circumstances make a brief visit possible to an ordinarily inaccessible place (Bourke-White’s visit to Russia). Photographers can seldom get the support for more long-term projects, certainly not on a routine basis, so a great deal of important work has been done in this concentrated way and many prized photographic skills consist of doing good work despite the lack of sufficient time.

Probably because of the connection with magazine work, such photographic studies typically saw publication as a photoessay. The form, pioneered in Europe, reached maturity in Fortune and Life. Bourke-White, Smith, and others developed a form in which a few to as many as thirty photographs, spread with an accompanying text over four to
eight or ten pages, explored a subject in some detail, giving more space and attention to a subject than a conventional journalistic treatment allowed. Photoessays often, like good sociological studies, showed the great variety of people and situations involved in the subject under study. Of course, magazine editors played a decisive part in the selection and arrangement of the materials, and photographers frequently objected to their interference. Gene Smith resigned from *Life* over this issue.

When a photographer finds it possible to pursue a subject for a longer time—a year or more—he may accumulate sufficient material for a more extended presentation. Guggenheim grants and other fellowship and foundation funds have supported many such projects (Bruce Davidson’s *East 100th Street*, many of Marion Palfi’s studies, Smith’s work on Pittsburgh). The government has supported others: the FSA projects, Hine’s exposes of child labor. Or the project may be the photographer’s private affair, supported by work of an entirely different kind.

In any event, photographers who work over a more extended period accumulate a large pool of images from which they can choose those that best express their understanding of their topic. Choices are made from that pool of images for specific uses, often in consultation with or entirely by others: editors, curators and the like. The selection so made may have more or less organization and coherence. The work of the FSA photographers, for instance, typically appears simply as a collection of variable size and made up of a variety of combinations from the entire body of work they produced.

Larger selections of work usually appear either as books, museum exhibits or both. They may contain anywhere from thirty to four or five hundred prints. Especially when they appear as books, the projects often take on a more organized and sequential format. Such formats allow, and almost require, a more analytic stance than a simple collection, and suggest statements that overlap considerably with those found in sociological ethnography.

The function of text in a photographic book is not clear. Photographic books may contain no text at all (e.g.,
Davidson’s *East 100th Street*). In others, photographs are presented with a brief identifying label, often no more than a place and date, as in Frank’s *The Americans*. Some contain a paragraph or so of commentary on many of the images, as in Leonard Freed’s (1970) *Made in Germany*. Still others contain large chunks of independent text—as in Danny Lyon’s *Bikeriders* (1968) or *Conversations with the Dead* (1971) or Winningham’s studies of wrestlers (1971) and rodeos (1972)—taken from extant documents or tape-recorded interviews. Finally, as in Smith’s essay on pollution in Minamata, the photographer may include an extensive explanatory and analytic text.

**THEORY IN PHOTOGRAPHY**

Close study of the work of social documentary photographers provokes a double reaction. At first, you find that they call attention to a wealth of detail from which an interested sociologist could develop useful ideas about whose meaning he could spin interesting speculations. A collection of photographs on the same topic—a photographic essay or book—seems to explore the subject completely. Greater familiarity leads to a scaling down of admiration. While the photographs do have those virtues, they also tend to restrict themselves to a few reiterated simple statements. Rhetorically important as a strategy of proof, the repetition leads to work that is intellectually and analytically thin.

Many sociologists and photographers will find those judgments irrelevant. Some sociologists work with equally simple ideas; but those who are responsive to the tradition of ethnographic fieldwork will want photographic explorations to produce results as rich and interesting as their own descriptions. Some photographers are content to produce a few compelling images. But many of the book-length projects just described aspire to more than that, whether they make the aspiration explicit or not. Their authors are sensitive to the currents of thought and interest in the larger cultural community, and want to do work that is thought of as more than a beautiful illustration. Photographers and sociologists who don’t share these traditions and sensitivities will find what follows of little use.

The problem, then, is why photographic exploration of society is so often intellectually thin. A subsidiary question of interest to photographers and to sociologists who may take a photographic approach to their work, is: what can be done to make that work intellectually denser?

The answer to these questions lies in understanding the role of theory in making photographs of social phenomena. Most sociologists accept the folk notion that the camera records objectively what is there for it to record, no matter what the ideas of the person who pushes the button. Laymen may believe this, but photographers know better. To be sure, something real has to emit light rays in order to produce an image on film or paper, and whatever is real that is emitting light rays where they can go through the lens will make some kind of image. That constraint exists, so that John Collier, Jr. (*Friends of Photography* 1972:49) is right to say that “The camera constantly trips up the artist by loyalty going on being a recorder of reality.”

Nevertheless, the photographer exerts enormous control over the final image and the information and message it contains. The choice of film, development and paper, of lens and camera, of exposure and framing, of moment and relation with subjects—all of these, directly under the photographer’s control, shape the end product. The way he controls it—what he decides to make it into—depends in the first instance on professional traditions and conditions of work. The kind of photograph he has learned to value and the possibilities for making them provided by the institutions he works in influence his decisions in general. Thus, for example, the short time periods magazine editors allotted to projects meant that photographers could not produce pictures that require lengthy acquaintance with the subject. Newspaper photographers do not, as a rule, make pictures that contain large blurred areas, because editors prefer pictures sharp enough to look good in newspaper reproduction (*Rosenblum* 1973).

A second influence on the image the photographer produces is his theory about what he is looking at, his understanding of what he is investigating. Saul Warkov says: “The camera is a wonderful mechanism. It will reproduce, exactly, what is going on inside of your head.” That is, it will make the picture (given a modicum of technique) look just the way the photographer thinks it should look. Think of it this way: as you look through the viewfinder you wait until what you see “looks right,” until the composition and the moment make sense, until you see something that corresponds to your conception of what’s going on. Similarly, when prior to making the exposure you choose a lens and film, an f-stop and a shutter speed, you do so with the same considerations in mind. If you make exposures that look some other way than what makes sense to you, you probably will not choose them for printing or exhibition. Thus, what you expect to see and what, even if you did not expect it, you can understand and make sense of—your theory—shape the images you finally produce.

Since the skilled photographer can make the image look as he wants it to, and knows he can, photographers should be aware of the social content of their photographs and be able to talk about it at length. As a rule, they are not. One of the foremost recorders of the urban scene, Lee Friedlander, asked to verbalize the explicit social criticism his pictures seem to make, answered by saying, “I was taught that one picture was worth a thousand words, weren’t you?” (*Friends of Photography* 1972:10). (And the recorder of the exchange adds that the audience of photographers and photography buffs burst into applause.) It is as though the criticism is there, but the photographer doesn’t want to verbalize it directly, preferring to rely on intuition. In my limited experience with photographers, I have found that Friedlander’s attitude, while not universal, is very common.

If the above remarks are accurate, then when social documentary photography is not analytically dense the reason may be that photographers use theories that are overly simple. They do not acquire a deep, differentiated and sophisticated knowledge of the people and activities they investigate. Conversely, when their work gives a satisfyingly complex understanding of a subject, it is because they have acquired a sufficiently elaborate theory to alert them to the visual manifestations of that complexity. In short, the way to
change and improve photographic images lies less in technical considerations than in improving your comprehension of what you are photographing—your theory. For photographic projects concerned with exploring society it means learning to understand society better. Insofar as sociology possesses some understanding of society (a very large if), then a knowledge of sociology, its theories, and the way they can be applied to specific situations might improve the work of both photographers and photographic sociologists.

A sociological theory, whether large scale abstract theory or a specific theory about some empirical phenomenon, is a set of ideas with which you can make sense of a situation while you photograph it. The theory tells you when an image contains information of value, when it communicates something worth communicating. It furnishes the criteria by which worthwhile data and statements can be separated from those that contain nothing of value, that do not increase our knowledge of society.

The work of social documentary photographers suffers then from its failure to use explicit theories, such as might be found in social science. This does not, of course, mean that their work embodies no theory at all. If they had no theory, they would have no basis on which to make the choices through which they produce their images. They have a theory, one which, because it is not explicit, is not available to them for conscious use, criticism, or development. Since they do not make explicit use of a theory designed to explore the phenomena they are interested in, they end up relying implicitly on some other kind of theory. The arguments that have attended the publication of some of the major works of obvious social import (e.g., Davidson's East 100th Street) indicate that the theories photographers rely on are, not surprisingly, lay theories, the commonplaces of everyday life in the intellectual and artistic circles they move in. Since photographers, for all their public inarticulateness, tend to be in touch (via their connections in journalism and art, and increasingly, through their location in academia), with contemporary cultural currents, they use the ideas and attitudes that are making the rounds in order to organize their own seeing.

That is probably overly harsh, since often enough photographers contribute images that help to shape those attitudes. Nevertheless, photographs of Harlem residents tend to revolve around such ideas as "Look how these people suffer" and "Look how noble these people are in the face of their suffering" (it might be argued that the latter was the twist Davidson relied on for the originality of his work). It is not that these things are incorrect or that for any reason they should not be said. But they are not sufficiently complex to sustain the weight of a real exploration of society, which will inevitably show that things are more complicated. In fact, the complications provide a great deal of the interest and points of active growth for social science thinking.

Training in social science, which presumably fills your head with social science theories, will not necessarily improve the social science content of your photographs. Knowledge does not automatically shape what you do, but works only when it is deliberately put to work, when it is consciously brought into play. Ruby (1972) argues that the pictures anthropologists take in the field are really vacation pictures, no different from the ones they take on any other vacation or that non-anthropologist vacationers take, focusing on what seems exotic and out of the way. Anthropological thinking does not affect the pictures. Photographic sophistication does. An unsophisticated photographer will produce a lot of isolated images while a sophisticated one will go after sequences of action.

Sociologists are probably like anthropologists. As they become more photographically sophisticated they will produce more interesting images, but not necessarily ones that have sociological content. Similarly, giving photographers a course in sociology or a list of suggested readings will not make their pictures sociologically more sophisticated. Learning some of what sociologists know will be necessary for improving the sociological content of their work, but it will not be sufficient.

How can sociological ideas and theory be brought to bear, in a practical way, on photographic explorations of society? The example of sociological fieldwork, as that has been described by a number of writers, (e.g., Lofland 1970; Schatzman and Strauss 1973), provides a useful model in the procedure of sequential analysis. I'm not referring to anything very esoteric, just to the procedure which allows you to make use of what you learn one day in your data-gathering the next day.

In some social science and photographic styles of work, you defer analysis until all the materials have been gathered. In a large-scale survey experiment, the researcher can seldom change the way he gathers his data once he has begun; the inability to apply knowledge gained to the gaining of more knowledge is the price of standardized precision. (To be sure, one can apply the lessons of one survey or experiment to the next one, and workers in these styles usually do.) Photographers' failure to apply the lessons they learn at the beginning of a project to its later phases is more likely due to the photojournalistic emphasis on short intense trips to places one would not otherwise ordinarily be in, or getting the shooting done as rapidly as possible to cut down on expenses, and the great value placed on personal intuition, all of which have been elevated in some versions of photographic work to operating norms. (Like sociologists, photographers of course bring what they have learned in previous projects to bear on the next one.) Working in this style, photographers take advantage of their temporary presence in a situation to shoot a great deal, waiting until they have left the field to develop film, make contact sheets, and edit their results.

Fieldworkers work differently, in a way immediately adaptable to photographic projects. As they write up the descriptions and verbatim accounts that constitute their field notes, they simultaneously or shortly thereafter make preliminary analyses of that information (Lofland 1970; Schatzman and Strauss 1973). What is there in what they have recorded that they don't understand? How can they find out more about it? What ideas does it suggest about the organization they are studying and the people's experience in it? What patterns of interaction, of cause and effect, of interrelationship are suggested by what they now know? If the rest of what they observe is like this, what generalizations will they be able to make? Where should they look to find evidence that these preliminary ideas are wrong (or right)? In short, they develop tentative hypotheses about the object of
their study, setting it in a context of theories and other data, and then orient their next day’s observations and interviews along the lines suggested by the analysis. They try out different observable indicators of various sociological concepts. The concepts, embedded in theories, suggest links with other concepts and hence with other events observable in the situation, which can then be searched for, to provide both confirming and disconfirming evidence relevant to these provisional ideas. The analysis is continuous and contemporaneous with the data-gathering.

The photographer can do the same thing. To do so requires a longer time perspective than many photographic projects envision: certainly as much as the two years Davidson spent in Harlem, probably more than the seven months Winningham spent with wrestlers, or the couple of weeks that are even more common. To spend that much time requires establishing relationships with the people being photographed of a different order than those that photojournalists usually establish; it requires something akin to the research bargain sociologists make with the people they study. It means that the photographer has to find some way to support the long-term effort he is going to undertake.

Supposing that all this has been taken care of, let us consider how a sociologist photographer might go about such a sequentially organized project. He could begin by shooting almost anything he sees in the situation (the community, organization, or group), trying to cover whatever seems in a common-sense way to be worth looking at. The result is likely to be incoherent, visually as well as cognitively. The investigator will be learning how to work in the spatial arrangements and light situations in which what he is studying occurs. He will also be learning what is occurring, who the people are, what they are doing, why they are doing it. He learns the first by intensive study of his contact sheets and work prints; he should make plenty of work prints, in order to have something to study and hypothesize about. He learns the second in part in the same way. He looks at his work prints in a careful, detailed way, asking who all those people are and what they are up to. (Photographers tend to be satisfied with quick answers to these questions, and I think sociologists who would otherwise know better are just as likely to do that when they start working with a camera.)

He should pay careful attention to details that don’t make sense. For example, if people seem to be dressed in several distinctive ways, it pays to find out what status differences that marks, and then to ask in what other ways those groups differ. If people get into an argument which makes for a visually exciting image, it pays to find out why they are arguing. What is worth arguing about in that organization? What breach of expectations led to this argument? Do those circumstances occur frequently? If not, why not? Bourke-White (1972:26), on photographing Ghandi, notes: “If you want to photograph a man spinning, give some thought to why he spins. Understanding is as important for a photographer as the equipment he uses. In the case of Ghandi, the spinning wheel is laden with meaning. For millions of Indians, it was the symbol of their fight for independence.”

The photographer pursues these questions with his camera, but also by asking people about what he has seen and by observing closely and listening carefully as the everyday activities of the group go on around him. He should not keep away from the people he is working with, shooting from a distance with a long lens, but rather should get up close and establish a working relationship with them, such that they expect him to be there and accept that he has some sort of right to be there which he will probably exercise most

![Figure 11](image)

MARGARET BOURKE-WHITE
The Spinner, India, 1946

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of the time. (Aside from the visual considerations, photographers doing this kind of research might want to use a wide-angle lens, perhaps 35mm, as standard equipment, because it will force them up close where they ought to be.) The photographer can also get more data by showing people the pictures he has already taken. He probably will have no choice, because people will want to see what he's up to. This will give him the chance to use the photo elicitation technique Collier (1967) describes so well: showing the pictures to people who know the situations under study and letting them talk about them, answer questions, suggest other things that need to be photographed, and so on.6

If the photographer has some sociological ideas available, he can apply them to these more or less commonsense questions and answers. Much of what I've described so far is only what any reasonable curious person might want to know. Nevertheless, basic sociological theory is involved, one compatible with most varieties of sociology in current use. Let me put it in the form of a list of questions to be answered in the field, cautioning that the answers don't come all at once, but through a process of progressive refinement and constant testing against new information. This formulation of the questions a sociological-photographic study could usefully orient itself to is not original; it has been heavily influenced by Everett Hughes (1971).

1. What are the different kinds of people in the situation? They may or may not look different; they will certainly be called by different names.

2. What expectations does each kind of person—members of each status group—have about how members of other groups ought to behave? What are the recurring situations around which such expectations grow up?

3. What are the typical breaches of those expectations? What kinds of gripes and complaints do people have? (A complaint is a sign of a violated expectation; "He's supposed to do X and he hasn't.")

4. What happens when expectations are violated? What can people do to those who do the violating? Is there a standard way of settling these conflicts?

These questions put in a commonsense way ideas integral to almost any sociological analysis. (1) refers to what a sociologist might call status groups; (2) to norms, rules, or common understandings; (3) to deviance or rule violations; (4) to sanctions and conflict resolution. The advantage of the translation is that these concepts are linked in such a way that if you identify something you have seen as an instance of one of them you then know that you ought to look for other things that will embody the ideas it is connected to in the theory. If, for instance, you see someone reward or punish someone else, the theory directs you to look for the expectations that have been violated in this case, and for the status groups to whom those expectations apply. Anyone exploring society photographically can ask these questions, both visually and verbally. Each day's data provide some provisional answers and some new questions, both discovered by careful inspection and analysis of the material.

The photographic investigator can supplement his visual material with a running verbal record. Depending on his intentions, this might be a full set of field notes such as a sociologist doing a conventional field study would keep, complete with verbatim conversations, or a record of a few outstanding thoughts and remarks. Some photographers (e.g., Winningham and Lyon) have tape recorded interviews with the people they photograph. Some (e.g., Owens) have recorded the responses of people to their photographs.

As the work progresses the photographer will be alert for visual embodiments of his ideas, for images that contain and communicate the understanding he is developing. That doesn't mean that he will let his theories dominate his vision, especially at the moment of shooting, but rather that his theories will inform his vision and influence what he finds interesting and worth making pictures of. His theories will help him to photograph what he might otherwise have ignored. Simultaneously he will let what he finds in his photographs direct his theory-building, the pictures and ideas becoming closer and closer approximations of one another. Like the sociological fieldworker, who finds much of his later understanding latent in his early data (Geer 1964), he will probably find that his early contact sheets, as he looks back through them, contain the basic ideas that now need to be stated more precisely.

The photographer, like the sociologist who builds more and more comprehensive models of what he is studying (Diesing 1971), will arrange the visual material into the patterns and sequences that are the visual analogue of propositions and causal statements. He will consider the problems of convincing other people that his understanding is not idiosyncratic but rather represents a believable likeness of that aspect of the world he has chosen to explore, a reasonable answer to the questions he has asked about it.

**SOME COMMON PROBLEMS**

Whether they start as sociologists or photographers, anyone who undertakes the kind of project I have just described will run into certain problems, which are common both in being frequent and ubiquitous and in being shared by the two vocations. In some cases, sociologists have ways of dealing with problems that photographers might find useful; in others, the way photographers deal with those problems will throw a new light on sociologists' troubles.

**Truth and Proof**

Insofar as a photograph or group of them purports to be "true," the particular meaning of that ambiguous claim needs to be specified. Once we know the kind of truth a picture claims, we can assess how far we accept the claim and how much of the statement it makes we want to believe.

Photographs (barring those that have been obviously manipulated to produce multiple images and the like) minimally claim to be true in that what they show actually existed in front of the camera for at least the time necessary to make the exposure. Photographs in the social documentary style claim more than that, presenting themselves as pictures of something that was not done just for the photographer's benefit, but rather as something that occurs routinely as part of the ordinary course of events. Or the photograph suggests that what we see is, if not ordinary, characteristic in some deeper sense, portraying some essential
feature of the phenomenon photographed. When people speak of a photograph having “captured” something, they generally mean that it displays some such characteristic feature. Frequently, though not always, the photograph suggests that what it shows, while characteristic, is ordinarily hidden from view, so that we might never know its particular truth if the photographer did not show it to us.

Many photographers make no such claims, at least explicitly, preferring to avoid the responsibilities that accompany the claims by describing their pictures as containing only the truth of “how it felt to me.” This makes the photograph the visual analogue of something like a lyric poem, its author’s sole responsibility to have rendered honestly his own feelings and responses. Such work can be interesting and moving; we often feel that, because we trust and feel some empathy with the lyricist’s sensibility, we have learned something about the world from his response to it. The lyric poem or photograph need not give us that bonus, however, and its maker needn’t satisfy any requirements of truth or objectivity.

Photographers frequently find themselves troubled because, after they have shown us some way of seeing a part of society, someone else accuses them of not having told the truth. Perhaps the photographs are not what they claim to be: though they appear to be “candid” portrayals of everyday events, the people or objects in the picture never really appeared that way, and only did so at the time of the photograph because the photographer posed them (as in the case of the flag-raising at Iwo Jima or the controversy over Arthur Rothstein’s picture of a skull on parched Dust Bowl earth (Hurlay 1972:86-92), where opponents said he had made an old skull appear to be the product of the recent drought). Photographers often feel the accusation that they set up a shot, rather than photographing something that occurred naturally, to be damaging. When they do, they reveal the degree to which they are claiming something more than subjective truth for their work.

In a commonsense way, people make judgments about that threat to the validity of a photograph (to paraphrase Donald Campbell’s useful notion of the threat to the validity of a hypothesis). We may base the judgment on evidence contained in the photograph, recognizing that we have seen similar things elsewhere, so that their existence is not in question; the photographer has simply called our attention to something we already know. The photograph may have been made in a place so public and accessible to independent checks that we reason the photographer would not fake something whose phoniness could so easily be discovered. We may rely on the established reputation of the journal the photograph appears in, being sure that Life would not risk its reputation for accuracy just for the sake of this one picture. How we establish the credibility of a photograph is a problem in commonsense reasoning I won’t pursue further here.

When the validity of the individual photographs is not in doubt, a more serious question about the “truth” of a presentation remains. Couldn’t someone else have photographed the same people, places or events and produced a quite different statement about that social reality? Any collection of photographs is a selection from a much larger population of photographs that have been or could be taken, and the answer to the question is necessarily yes, that reality could have been presented in another way. I don’t know why photographers are as sensitive as they are about this, since they do not claim to be the whole truth, or objectivity.

Another version of the same problem arises when, having assured ourselves that the photographs are valid and that, while they claim to be true, they do not claim to be the whole truth, we ask: if we had gathered our data at some other time, or from some other part of the universe our assertion applies to, would we get essentially the same result? Put it another way: if I know what I do about these people and places at this time, what else can I be reasonably sure I know about? Sampling problems have two aspects: (1) what procedures shall I follow to maximize the generality of my findings? and (2) how can I convince others that my findings have that generality? The first question is procedural, the second rhetorical. Social scientists often deal with the two questions simultaneously. They use a certified technique whose logic is well known; by asserting that the appropriate procedure has been used, they assure readers that their conclusions follow logically. For photographers, the two questions more frequently arise separately.

Photographers are seldom concerned with quantitative generalizations, or with covering some theoretical map adequately. But they often present their material in a way that suggests they believe that what they show us applies to a far wider area and population than the one they have covered, that were we to look at a different part of the same whole, we would see more of the same. I don’t know what procedures photographers use to assure themselves about these matters. Sociological fieldworkers use some simple procedures that would serve the double function of maximizing generality and thus responding to such queries, and simultaneously enlarging the possibility of getting un-
Fieldworkers may use crude time-sampling devices: checking up on someone or someplace every half-hour, or on different days of the week, or different times of the year. Some avoid “leaving things out” by attaching themselves to one person at a time and following that person through his entire daily (and nightly) round. They may ask people under study who else they ought to talk to or observe. As they become aware of categories or situations that deserve special study, they can systematically choose some to observe or they can observe all of them. Fieldworkers follow the discipline of recording everything they see and hear while making these observations.

Photographers could do all of these things, but they would need to observe some discipline equivalent to incorporating everything into the field notes, for a photographer’s data do not exist unless they expose some film. In following someone around for a day, they might for instance adopt some such convention as exposing at least one roll of film every hour or so, adapting the time period to the character of what they were observing. They would thus avoid waiting until “something interesting” happened, and increase the chance that things that don’t as yet fit into the photographer’s developing understanding would nevertheless get into the record. They might similarly photograph certain activities or places on some schedule that interferes with their tendency not to shoot what does not seem visually interesting. Any kind of theory of the kind discussed earlier would likewise direct the photographer to things his intuition and visual sense might not call to his attention. Remember that theory is itself a sampling device, specifying what must be incorporated into a full description.

Shooting what seems interesting usually satisfies the photographer’s need for a method. However, they often realize, if they are sensitive to their own work, that they are producing essentially the same pictures in a variety of settings, because their notion of what is visually interesting has become divorced from the social reality they are working in. If they are not sensitive to that possibility, others might point it out. A technique that breaks up their established visual habits guards against this. In addition, photographers often find that they are slow to discover and shoot things they later realize they need for a more complete visual understanding. The same techniques of randomized and theoretically informed sampling may help. The object of all this is not to turn photographers into sociologists or enslave them in mad sociological rituals, but rather to suggest how sociological tricks might solve problems of photographic exploration.

Sociologists try to convince their readers that generalizations from findings are legitimate by indicating that they have used a conventionally approved technique. The scientific community has already inspected the logic of that technique, so it is sufficient to indicate that it has been appropriately used. Readers who accept that convention are automatically convinced.

No photographer uses such standardized devices, and I’m sure that none would be interested in pursuing such techniques as probability sampling. They have their own devices, however, worth exploring because these produce conviction in the viewers of photographic work similar to that produced by sampling designs in sociological readers. Since sociological procedures are, to quote Campbell again, “radically underjustified,” it is worth considering photographers’ methods, even though they may appear even more underjustified to sociological readers.

Figure 12

—ROBERT FRANK
Ranch market—Hollywood
The chief device photographers use is to identify their photographs by place and sometimes by date. The photographs in Frank’s *The Americans* are identified simply by a generic organizational type and a town: “Bar–Gallup, New Mexico,” “Elevator–Miami Beach,” “Bank–Houston, Texas.” Dennis Stock’s (1970) *California Trip* identifies the individual images by town and/or neighborhood: “Sunset Strip,” or “North Beach, San Francisco.” These labels, coupled with a reiteration of themes, so that one sees the same kind of place or thing or person from half a dozen widely scattered places in the country, imply the conclusion that if you can find it in that many places, it is really very widespread. Thus, when Frank shows you luncheonettes, diners, and coffee shops from Indianapolis, Detroit, San Francisco, Hollywood, Butte, and Columbia, South Carolina, all of which share a gritty plastic impersonality, you are prepared to accept that image as something that must be incorporated into your view of American culture. The logic
Reactivity

The problem of the reactivity of data-gathering procedures is very similar in ethnographic and photographic work. Does the sample of behavior observed and recorded accurately reflect how people ordinarily act or is it largely a response to the observer's presence and activities? Both sociologists and photographers frequently deal with this by cultivating the art of being unobtrusive. Many people know how to manipulate their bodies and expressions so that, in the absence of any reason to pay special attention to them, the people they are observing ignore them; how they actually do this is not explicitly known, and deserves investigation. It is probably easier to be unobtrusive in public places where you are not known as an investigator and it may or may not be easier if you are carrying a camera. In many situations carrying a camera validates your right to be there; as a tourist, as a member of the group recording the scene for their purposes, or as a representative of the media. Under many circumstances, observing or photographing is commonplace and expected; many other people are doing it. Your presence does not change anyone's behavior since observers and photographers are part of the situation. You should, of course, include their presence in your observations and photographs.

In many situations, the people being observed are engaged in activities of considerable importance to them and cannot change what they are doing for an observer's benefit even if they would like to. Reactivity depends on the freedom of those observed to respond to the observer's (or photographer's) presence. If they are enmeshed in the constraints of the social structure in which they carry on their normal activities, they will have to carry on as they ordinarily do for whatever reasons cause them to do that ordinarily (Becker 1970). They may be well aware that they are being observed or photographed, but not be free to change what they do. Photographers routinely make use of this possibility. I once watched Michael Alexander photograph a woman fighting with her small child in a playground. Alexander was practically on top of her, but the child was kicking and screaming and, though she had no idea who he was, she felt she had no choice but to deal with her child despite the unwelcome recording going on.

A third solution recognizes that the reactivity often reflects fears about what will be done with the information of this deserves further analysis, since it is convincing (there are other such devices which need to be described and analyzed).

Figure 7

ROBERT FRANK. Cafeteria, San Francisco

Figure 16

ROBERT FRANK. Drugstore—Detroit
or photographs. If the observer gives evidence that these will not be used to harm the people he is observing, they may decide to ignore him, or to cooperate, for instance, by pointing out things that need to be investigated or photographed, or by keeping him up to date on things that have happened while he was not around.

Photographers make use of a fourth possibility that sociologists seldom employ, though it is the chief element in studies of experimenter bias and similar problems. They encourage reactivity and make it the basis of their exploration of people and events. The photographs become a record of their relationship with the people they photograph, and the reaction of the people to being photographed becomes the chief evidence used in analyzing them. Sociologists make use of this possibility when they look at the difficulties of gaining access as revelatory of the social structure to which access is sought (e.g., Gardner and Whyte 1946).

**Getting Access**

Sociologists have increasingly worried about the conditions under which they will be allowed to gather data and then make their research results public. Science requires that data and operations be open to public inspection and independent verification. Unconstrained, scientists would (and should) make all their data public. But they are constrained by both legal and moral considerations from doing so, and ordinarily take substantial precautions to avoid harming anyone by revealing who furnished information for or are the subjects of research. They may simply change the names of people, organizations, and places, or use elaborate coding procedures to preserve the anonymity of survey respondents.

People sociologists write about seldom sue them (though my colleagues and I were once threatened with a libel action by the administrator of an organization we studied). Consequently, they worry more about ethical than legal problems. Though a substantial literature debating these problems has grown up, the situation is confused and sociologists do not agree on procedures or relevant ethical principles. They tend to agree on generalities—“We should not do harm to the subjects of our research”—but not on the application of such crucial terms as “harm.” To take one example: Are organizations, and especially such public ones as governmental agencies or schools, entitled to the same privacy as individuals, or is not social science research part of the public review to which they are necessarily subject? Another: Where do you draw the line between inconvenience or embarrassment and substantial harm?

Photographers have been considerably more interested in legal problems. When they make simplified analyses of the problems they explore, they can take an equally simplified view of the ethical problems. Having no trouble telling the good guys from the bad guys, they have not had to worry so much about ethical questions. If their work hurts the bad guys on behalf of the good guys—well, that was the point. But they have had to worry about being sued for invasion of privacy, and libel. The law here seems to be as ambiguous as the ethical standards of sociologists. Photographers know they can be sued and often take the ritual precaution of having people sign standard release forms, though these may not be as useful as supposed. They also try to maintain friendly relations with the people they photograph, in much the same spirit as the advice I heard given to medical students: if you are good friends with your patients they won’t sue you for malpractice. Alternatively, they rely on this being a large, differentiated society in which it is relatively unlikely that anyone will see the picture of him you put in a book or exhibit.

Everett Hughes’ (1971) idea of the research bargain provides the terms for a useful comparison. What bargain do
investigator and investigated make? In both photographic and sociological investigations, it is fair to say, the people investigated probably do not know what they are getting into. They may give their consent, but it is not an informed consent. From an ethical and perhaps a legal point of view, the bargain is not fully valid. Sociologists are generally very cautious about this, at least in public discussion, and I think they might consider seriously a view more common among photographers: people can and should take care of their own interests and once the investigator has honestly described his intentions he has fulfilled his obligations. I don’t propose that we accept this view uncritically, but we might think hard about why we should not. Journalists have long operated with a different ethic and there is perhaps as much reason to adopt their practice as that of physicians, which has tended to be the one sociologists orient themselves to.

Photographers have probably taken a tougher line because they can’t use some of the devices sociologists do. Unless you block out faces and other identifying marks, everyone in a photograph is identifiable and there is no possibility of preserving anonymity. That is the strength of the medium, and no one would sacrifice it for ethical considerations. The strength of photographic work may not depend on the people and organizations studied being identified specifically, since the implicit argument is that what you see is characteristic of a large class; so the people in the individual prints are in effect anonymous, though they might be known to some who see the pictures and others could conceivably find out who they are if it seemed important. (But see Alwyn Scott Turner’s Photographs of the Detroit People, in which a great many people photographed are not only named but their approximate addresses are given, too.)

The other aspect of the photographer’s situation that leads him not to worry so much about ethical considerations is that when he is not photographing anonymous people who will be made to stand for some more general aspect of the human condition he is usually photographing people who, because they are public figures, expect to be photographed and only complain when it is grotesquely overdone, as in the case of Jacqueline Onassis. These people epitomize the rationale I mentioned earlier: perfectly capable of defending their own interests, they accept their photographic burden as one of the costs of being a public figure, whether they like it or not.

Both these strategies offer possibilities for social researchers. Sociologists frequently disguise names of people and organizations without thinking why, and might often be able to identify them, particularly when what they have said or done is no more than ordinarily discreditable and when (as is inevitable in social research) a long time elapses between getting the information and putting it into print. Studs Terkel has done that in his books on Chicago and on the Depression to good effect and without doing anyone harm.

Similarly, we might treat public figures as just that, justifying our observations, interviews, and quotations on the grounds that we are entitled to them as citizens and need no special social science warrant for our actions. A good example appears in a study by a combined legal and social science research staff of public access to information (Northwestern University Law Review 1973). As part of an elaborate experiment, researchers visited a number of public offices in search of information to which their access was guaranteed by law. Information holders often refused them or evaded their requests with transparent devices; the researchers in providing evidence for their conclusions, described their encounters with public officials, identified by name and office. I see no reason why that device should not be used more often than it is.

Concepts and Indicators, or Ideas and Images

Sociologists tend to deal in large, abstract ideas and move from them (if they do) to specific observable phenomena that can be seen as embodiments, indicators, or indices of those ideas. Photographers, conversely, work with specific images and move from them (if they do) to somewhat larger ideas. Both movements involve the same operation of connecting an idea with something observable, but where you start makes a difference. Granting, and even insisting as I already have, on the conceptual element in photographs, it still is quite different to start with something immediately observed and try to bend ideas to fit it than to start with an idea and try to find or create something observable that embodies it. Sociologists have something to learn from photography’s inextricable connection with specific imagery.

Many sociological concepts, whose meaning seems intuitively clear, would be very hard to portray visually. Consider the notion of status integration. Defined as a congruence (or lack of it) between two or more indicators of social rank (education and income, for instance), its human meaning seems obvious. A man who made $100,000 a year but had never finished grade school would, we can imagine, have troubles another man with the same income who had completed college would never know. Does it have a visual counterpart? Can we imagine what a person in either of those states would look like, what we might see him doing, what his possessions and environment would consist of? The answer, to both questions, is probably no.

We cannot imagine the visual counterpart of status integration, I think, because the concept has been defined by the rules for calculating a status integration score from numerical indicators of specific ranks. The human meaning of the concept has been left to be evoked intuitively from the label applied to the results of that operation. As a result, no one can be sure what an instance of status integration would look like and thus no one can photograph it.

Obviously, every sociological idea need not be connectable to a visual image to be valid or useful. On the other hand, consider this. Some sociologists describe a basic problem of empirical research as one of finding empirical indicators (things observable in real life) to measure a concept whose meaning they have already decided. A sizable literature discusses the logic by which the two can be defensibly connected. But, as the example of status integration suggests, a third element is involved: the basic imagery we intuitively supply to fill out the meaning of an abstract concept operationally defined. We seldom consider the logic by which we connect concepts and indicators to that basic imagery, or the procedures by which we can develop that imagery explicitly and connect it defensibly to concepts and indicators. While, to repeat, sociological ideas needn’t evoke a clear visual image to be defensible, considering the
processes by which photographic imagery arises may help us understand what is involved.

The gap that develops between concept and indicator, on the one hand, and basic underlying imagery, on the other, is nicely illustrated by a device Blanche Geer uses in teaching fieldwork to graduate students. They are given to talking in rather grand theoretical terms when asked to describe what they have seen, and she counters this by asking if any of them have observed a status (or norm or social structure or whatever). When someone claims to have observed such a thing, she asks what it looked like, what it said, how it acted. She thus hopes to make students understand that such terms are shorthand for a class of observable phenomena that can be described, and have no more reality or meaning than they get from the collection of phenomena so described and the resemblances among them.

The imagery underlying a sociological concept implies, if it does not state explicitly, a picture of people acting together. It may picture them engaged in familiar forms of social interaction, or it may imply a more mechanistic vision (as when people are conceptualized as members of an aggregate rather than an interactive group, in which case the imagery may be of something like social molecules engaged in an analogue of Brownian movement). In either case, the concept and its indicators evoke (even when they use the language of operationally defined variables) an image of social life. The fidelity of that imagery to the realities of social life is, as Blumer (1969) has emphasized, an important issue in assessing the utility of a concept.

When the imagery underlying a concept is explicit, it can more easily be criticized and revised. Durkheim (1951) for example, gives very explicit and vivid descriptions of the collective and individual states which he defines abstractly as embodying the theoretically defined quality of anomie. We can easily judge for ourselves how well the abstract concept and the empirical indicators mesh with the imagery. Where the underlying imagery is left implicit, the reader invents his own and the critical assessment of that relationship tends not to occur.

We might expect, as a result, more dispute over the meaning of theoretical concepts than there is, because differing underlying images lead to a different understanding of a concept’s meaning, use, and appropriate measure. One reason for the lack of dispute is the sociologist’s tendency to discuss concepts in a purely verbal and logical way divorced from any close relation to empirical materials. When they do that they play on the underlying imagery without taking responsibility for it. Several generations of psychologists have played that game with the concept of intelligence, defining it operationally, saying “Well, let’s call it X” when its validity was questioned, but never calling it X because they would then lose the meaning imparted by the imagery associated with “intelligence.” (They thus paved the way for the excesses of Jensen, Herrnstein, and Shockley.) If we cannot imagine or discover a visual image that embodies our understanding of a concept, we might take that as a warning that the concept is not explicitly related to its underlying imagery. Looking for an appropriate visual image might help clarify the relationship.

Photographers, of course, do not have this problem. They work in the opposite direction, needing to find concepts that adequately convey what is important in what they give us to see, the explicit conceptualization working for both photographers and viewers to provide a framework for their joint work of making sense of what they see. I’ve already discussed how the failure to use explicit concepts and theories hampers the development of photographic analyses and how sociological ideas might be brought to bear on the development of photographic projects. What photographers do very well, however, is to refine over a period of time the image they create of something. They may photograph people, places, and situations again and again, seeking to make the resulting image express more clearly, concisely, and unambiguously their basic understanding of those things. They tend to approach this task visually, stripping away extraneous elements so that the statement the image makes communicates its substance efficiently and emphatically to the viewer.

Sociologists might well work at the job of continuously refining not only their concepts and measures but also their basic imagery, relying on that refinement more than they have to clear up theoretical and technical muddles. Blumer has often recommended something like this, though he hasn’t been very explicit about what is involved, so his advice sounds mystical. I don’t at this time have any less mystical and more specific suggestions. The basic idea, however, is to clarify how you think things really are, using the imagery you develop as a touchstone against which to test concepts and indicators as these develop.

**Boundaries, Limits, and Framing**

No intellectual or artistic enterprise can include everything. Scientific studies tend to make clear that they have a limited area of responsibility, that they are only studying *these* phenomena, *this* area, the relationship between *these* variables and *those*; while other things may be important too, they will be left out, since you can’t study everything at once. Scientists often contrast their practice in this respect with that of artists or novelists who they caricature as striving to include “everything” in their works, as though most artists were super-realist or as though even super-realist actually included “everything” or thought they did. In fact, artists leave things out too. But their selectivity is more conscious, and they often use as an artistic resource the necessity to choose between what will be included and excluded. They make the selection itself an artistic act. They rely on the viewer’s tendency to supply in imagination what is not present to make allusion work in the total statement, so that what lies beyond the frame becomes an integral part of the work. For photographers, “framing”—choosing what will go inside the bright line of the viewfinder—is one of the key decisions.

The choice of the boundaries of a study has an enormous effect on the results. For social science, it has among other things a strong political effect. What we choose not to study becomes a given in our research. We rule out the possibility of taking its variations into account (though we can of course focus on them in some other study, so the tendency I am talking about is only a tendency, not a rigid constraint). We may thus come to regard what we choose to see as fixed as being in fact unchanging. We see this tendency at work, for instance, in any statement which suggests that an organiza-
tion must do some particular thing (e.g., satisfy some particular need or requirement) if it is to survive. The statement is misleading unless we interpret it as shorthand for the cumbersome proposition that it will change from its present form of organization and level of performance in various ways if the particular need or requirement is met at some other level or in some other way than that specified. When we put it that way, we recognize that survival, which the simpler statement treats as a given, can be made problematic and variable. The political effect comes about when we take what we have defined, for scientific convenience, as unchanging, as in fact, unchangeable. We thus implicitly or explicitly, suggest to those who think that some particular change is the way to solve a pressing problem, that their solution is utopian and unworkable. What we are really saying, in such a case, is that the phenomenon in question can only be affected by changing something so difficult to change that only extraordinary effort and power can accomplish the feat. The mobilization of effort and power might be accomplished, if only in a way that the analyst might think unlikely or distasteful (e.g., violent revolution).

Likewise, when sociologists fail to consider some people and some aspects of a situation and do not gather data about them, they forego the possibility of finding out that some things said by or about those people are not true, that their informants’ descriptions of their own actions may be self-servingly misleading. For social scientists, this choice usually results in studying subordinate echelons in an organization or community, while taking the descriptions by superiors of their own activities as adequate and trustworthy and therefore not needing any investigation. This lack of scientific skepticism is a political choice and has political consequences (Becker 1967; Blumer 1967; Becker and Horowitz 1972).

Since photographers seldom produce explicit analyses of social problems, they are less likely to confront this problem directly. But their idea of who should be photographed and who should not may have the same consequences as the sociologist’s decision about who is to be studied, the photographer thereby giving us great informational detail about some people, and suggesting that others either do not exist or can be filled in from the viewer’s imagination. How, for instance, would Hine’s documentation of the problem of child labor have been affected had he included among his portraits of exploited children portraits of the men and women who owned the factories, profited from that exploited labor, and lived in extravagant luxury on the profits? It might have given a more damning indictment of the entire system, though it is questionable that his work would then have had greater effect. One could also argue that the machines and factory buildings present in his pictures convincingly evoke the owners and their power (though not the luxury of their lives), or that other photographers provided that material, e.g., Steichen’s (1963:31) portrait of J. P. Morgan.

Another aspect of framing is that we can either include all of what we do show within the picture’s frame, and thus indicate that it is self-contained, or include parts of things that extend beyond the frame and thus evoke the world into which they extend, or things that stand for and evoke worlds and situations which lie beyond. Portraits, for instance, can contain all of the person’s body and thus indicate that it is not necessary to know more, or they can contain only parts and thus indicate that there are other parts the viewer must supply from his imagination. Likewise, a portrait can contain some chunk of the person’s ordinary environment—an artist’s studio, a scientist’s laboratory—which evokes a world of activity not pictured, but there. Or it may simply show some setting (home or whatever) in such a way as to suggest more about the person. Andre Kertesz (1972:118-119), for instance, has a portrait of Mondrian that faces a picture of Mondrian’s house, which arguably conveys a more Mondrianish spirit than the portrait of the artist himself.

In any event, photographers do understand and use what lies beyond the portion of reality they actually show. In this they differ from social scientists who prefer not to discuss explicitly what they cannot claim to have studied scientifically. In that sense, social scientists make themselves ignorant about matters that lie beyond their frame, ignoring even what they do know by casual observation or in some other informal way. Instead of building such partial knowledge(156,777),(337,826) into their analyses, they rely on time-honored verbal formulae (e.g., “all other things being equal”) to limit and frame their analyses. These formulae, like legal formulae, have been revised and refined so as to say exactly what is meant, what is defensible, and no more. A large number of these conventions exist, part of the rhetoric of contemporary science.

In any event, when social scientists fail to deal with the reality that lies beyond the frame they placed around their study, they do not get rid of it. The reader, as with photographs, fills in what is hinted at but not described with his own knowledge and stereotypes, attaching these to whatever cues he can find in the information given. Since readers will do this, whatever verbal formulae are used to attempt to evade the consequences, sociologists might as well understand the process and control it, rather than being its victims.

Personal Expression and Style

Sociologists like to think of science as impersonal. However, they recognize that people work differently, that some have easily recognizable styles of work, that some work has an elegance missing in other research. In short, they recognize a personally expressive component in sociological research and writing. They seldom discuss that component (I suppose because it contradicts the imagery of impersonal science). When they do discuss it, they usually describe it as a flaw. For instance, critics frequently complain of Erving Goffman’s jaundiced view of the world, of modern society, and especially of personal relationships. They characterize that view as overly calculating, as cynical and even as paranoid. Similarly, some critics of so-called “labelling theory” criticize it for being overly skeptical about established organizations, their operations and records.

Both Goffman and labelling theorists have the elements these criticisms single out. So does every other theory and style of work. The critical analysis errs only in suggesting that some theories and studies have such components while others are properly impersonal, as befits scientific activity. But Blau and Duncan’s (1967) study of the occupational
structure of the United States, to take a random example, likewise contains a personally expressive element, both in its view of the nature of people and society and in the way it handles and presents data, even if we see that element minimally, as a non-sharing of the Goffman view. The style of scientific impersonality is also a style.

Photographers typically accept responsibility for the personally expressive component in their work as a natural accompaniment of its status as art. Accepting that status also allows them the quasi-mystical retreat from analyzing the social components of their work and the emphasis on intuitive inarticulateness I criticized earlier. Nevertheless, they understand something sociologists need to learn more about, so they can work with it consciously and control it.

We can approach the serious analysis of the personal component in sociological work by looking at specific devices through which it is expressed. There is a dictionary of the expressive language of photography yet to be compiled; at present, I can only find occasional ad hoc discussions.

Here is an example of the stylistic devices that express the personal component in photographs. Paul Strand (1971) is famous for his portraits of peasants from all over the world: Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Romania, the Gaspé, the Hebrides. The portraits overwhelmingly convey an attitude of respect for the people portrayed, describing them as strong, sturdy, enduring, good people who have the traditional virtues despite the difficult circumstances of their lives. This is quite a different description from that of ethnographers as various as Tax and Banfield, who depict people who are meaner, more cunning, more spiteful. Strand has chosen to portray them that way. He has not simply conveyed the reality of peasant life. He conveys his view by habitually photographing his subjects at eye level, directly facing the camera, thus treating them as equals. He does not suggest that he has caught them in an unguarded moment; on the contrary, he has allowed them to compose themselves for the occasion, to put their best foot forward. The stability implied in their formal postures, the honesty suggested by the openness with which they gaze into the camera, all help to suggest peasant virtues. Likewise, by photographing them in natural light and utilizing a wide tonal range, Strand conveys an attitude that respects their reality, that makes them look fully human.

Frank Cancian's (1971) photographs of Mexican peasants use different devices to convey a view of peasants which is (not surprisingly, since Cancian is himself an anthropologist) much more like that of earlier ethnographic descriptions. His Zinacantecos occasionally show the nobility Strand emphasizes, but more frequently seem less noble and more human. They grin, smile slyly, bargain shrewdly, drink hard. The photographs view them from a variety of angles, show them in blurred motion, in a variety of light conditions, all of which express somewhat less respectful distance and somewhat more knowledgeable familiarity than Strand’s pictures. The difference in knowledge of and attitude toward the people being photographed is conveyed by the choice of topics too, of course, but the stylistic elements play an important role.

I’m not sure where we might find the expressive devices characteristic of sociological work. One place is in the use of adjectives. Sociologists frequently, perhaps in an attempt to achieve a little literary grace, apply adjectives to the people
and organizations they write about, these adjectives implying judgments and generalizations not justified by the data they present or required for the scientific points they are making. A variety of other devices known to literary analysts likewise convey attitudes and moral evaluations. Goffman, for instance, often achieves ironic effects by using perspective by incongruity, and many people use a Veblenesque deadpan translation of evaluative statements into mock-objective academese to the same end.

Sociologists use a variety of devices, interestingly, to hide the personal attitudes, evaluations, and other components in their work. Chief among these are the incessant use of the passive voice and the first person plural to blur recognition of what is obvious: that one person is in fact responsible for the research and results being reported. Even more interesting to me is how do various styles of handling quantitative data contribute to a rhetorical effect of impersonal fact? What are the aesthetics of tabular presentation? These questions, to which I have no answers, lay out an area of work still to be done.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper is made up of notes from work in progress, and what I have said is necessarily preliminary and incomplete. The kind of work it intends to encourage barely exists as yet, though the common and converging interests of social scientists and photographers, often in the same person, suggest that we don’t have long to wait. I hope the paper will provoke further discussion and work on the problems it proposes.

NOTES

1 Work on this paper has been supported by the Russell Sage Foundation. A book-length version of the material is in preparation. I am grateful to Marie Czach, Blanche Geer, Walter Klink, Alexander J. Morin, and Clarice Stoll for their useful comments on an earlier version.

2 I have found Newhall (1964) and Lyons (1966) useful background references.

3 Alexander Blumenstiel now edits a journal called *Videosociology*.

4 See, for instance, the quote from Bresson in Lyons (1966:41), and the descriptions of magazine work in Bourke-White (1972).

5 Collier’s book is a classic, and required reading for anyone interested in these problems.

6 Boccioletti (1972) deals with a number of common photographic legal problems and refers to *Photography and the Law* by G. Chernoff and H. Sarbin (Amphoto: nd.), which I have not seen.

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SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF "DRUG ABUSE": A MASS COMMUNICATION APPROACH

GEORGE GERBNER

Communication research is typically concerned with systems of messages and the patterns of thinking, action, and policy that such systems tend to cultivate. "Image" is one of the most versatile terms of such research. It stands both for a mental construct and the cultural artifact that sustains it. The transaction that we might call "imaging" (imagining without its connotation of "unreality") is to the brain what breathing is to the lungs. Both involve an exchange of energies with environmental systems common—and vital—to all humans.

The environmental system we call culture is entirely artifactual and largely symbolic. Its common images—structures of words, pictures, sounds, movements, and other forms of expression or representation—create for most members of a culture the basic common assumptions that define the contours of reality and the range of issues to agree or disagree about. The ability to select, order, and weight these according to some perspective is the substance of human identity and integrity. The ability to do that on a mass scale for large and heterogeneous publics is the essence of culture power.

Mass communication is the mass production of images and their discharge into the mainstream of the common symbolic environment (Gerbner 1972a). The ability to print the Book and distribute it to laymen was necessary to break up a rigidly land-based religious order. The ability to mass-produce and disseminate a total symbolic link that binds far-flung communities together has loosened the hold of all traditional religions on mental life and has created a new religion out of the merger of technology and culture power. The critical culture nexus of modern governance is no longer church and state; it is mass media and state. Study of the pictorial component is of course an integral part of the investigation of popular movies, comics, television, and other visual-verbal media products (Hansen and Parsons 1968:61-67). Such investigations provide fruitful opportunities for the discovery of definitional and assumptive patterns implicit in complex and dynamic message systems. The typical purpose of the investigation is to find the aggregate, repetitive, and cumulative patterns to which entire communities are exposed. These patterns are the sum total of all individual selections; they are not necessarily similar to any single individual selective pattern of media use. They form the symbolic links of community and the bases for interaction among publics that never meet face-to-face. They are the foundations of policy formation, maintenance, and control in modern societies. For example, our studies of the confession magazine cover design revealed how the the image of the radiant "cover girl" in the lurid verbal context served the symbolic functions prescribed for the working-class reader in a consumer society (Gerbner 1958a, 1958b). Cross-cultural studies of media portrayal of the formal educational institutions suggested the existence of different symbolic functions of the "teacher image" in different societies (Gerbner 1973). Our continuing analysis of violence in television drama shows how a differential pattern of victimization suffered by different sex, age, ethnic, and other groups demonstrates a structure of social power and cultivates assumptions and fears conducive to the acceptance of that structure (Gerbner 1972b).

In sum, the mass production of popular imagery changed the nature of the social process. No more can we speak of "sheer" ignorance or apathy. In the midst of a symbol-rich environment ignorance and apathy are manufactured products. No cultural definition of any aspect of the human condition survives unless its continued manufacturing serves some market and some purpose. What may be seen as irrationality, superstition, "neglect" of public institutions of education and welfare, the persistence of ghettoes of the "underprivileged" and the "underdeveloped," and periodic wars upon those who try to break out of them—all these and other "crises" of the physical, social, and symbolic environment are sustained by the greatest mobilization of information, wealth, and power in human history.

Drug addiction is one of these "problems." Its cultural definitions and those of the ways to combat it serve markets and purposes other than just therapeutic; they may even function to perpetuate the very "abuses" they are put to conquer.

Not so long ago, narcotics in the U.S. were a luxury for the idle rich to enjoy in relative obscurity. It was only after World War II that the ghettoes of America reached the level of becoming lucrative markets for a commodity that helps to enslave its customers.

When a certain type of practice crosses class lines it may become vulgar or illegal or otherwise usable for stigmatization and control. Obscenity is Saxon peasant idiom intruding into the speech of Norman nobles. Crime is the ruled trying to act like rulers.

Congress made the sentencing of federal narcotics offenders mandatory in 1951. The number of arrests doubled within ten years. The largest outbreaks continued to occur in low-income neighborhoods, even if suburbs and campuses were to get the most publicity. Stiffer penalties speeded the process. By the mid-sixties it took only four years to double the rate of arrests. Most of them were—and still are—made in the areas where most of all arrests are made: the "under-privileged" neighborhoods. In July 1972 it was reported that President Nixon ordered arrests doubled in one year:

During a meeting in his Oval Office, Mr. Nixon pointed to a chart showing 16,144 arrests in fiscal 1972—compared with the 1969 figure of 8,465—and said, "I'd like to see this number doubled next year."

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"We very likely may do that," responded Myles Ambrose, special consultant to the President and director of the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement [Philadelphia Inquirer 1972].

The same week, long-suppressed government reports revealed that narcotics investigators saw "no prospect" of halting smuggling into the U.S. Despite daily reports of "record" seizures less than one percent of the heroin flow was intercepted. "It's nonsense to me to keep reading these stories about how we're going to stop it from growing," said Mr. Ambrose. "The fact of the matter is that we're not thinking so much about the addicts as the 10 million other people they might infect," he added (New York Times 1972).

The estimate of ten million may turn out to be modest. The history of drug traffic intermingles with that of global and—wherever it took hold—domestic imperialism. Tough inefficiency reward high-risk capital and its official protectors at society. We may be the first country to use advanced stories about how we're going to stop it through control of the opium trade. Making the trade illegal the astounding insight, and the ability to right all wrongs—yours that helps sustain a multi-billion dollar international industry largely on money siphoned off from the poorest sector of social control.

"The creation of Captain America is prophetic. In the first issue of the comic, the scientist examines a youthful "98 pound weakling." "Observe this young man closely," he says. "Today he volunteered for army service and was refused because of his unfit condition! His chance to serve his country seemed gone!!"

The next frame is a close-up of the scientist lifting up a giant hypodermic needle, and the caption: "Don't be afraid son... you are about to become one of America's saviors!!" Then the narration: "Calmly the young man allows himself to be inoculated with the strange seething liquid. Little does he realize that the serum coursing through his blood is rapidly building his body and brain tissues, until his stature and intelligence increase to an amazing degree!" (Feiffer 1965).

Frederick Leaman, a member of my graduate communication research seminar, conducted an informal study of the hidden message of comic books. He visited three large drugstores in different sections of Philadelphia and asked for their best-selling comics. From a list of 204 titles, he selected all stories that depicted different casts of characters in order to diversify the sample and avoid having the same heroes in most books. From this group of 26 stories and 87 characters, he constructed a composite image of the world of popular (mostly action-adventure type) comics.

The world he found is a world of conflict and contest. Its stories endlessly reiterate brutal lessons of transgression and sin. Of all the main themes contained in every 10 stories, 8 depict the foul deeds of criminals, 7 show the magic of science, 6 demonstrate how the forces of righteousness smash criminals or evil scientists, 5 percent miraculous transformations through drugs, and 4 relate some hair-raising lesson about "power-hungry" politicians.

"The fictional population is male 4 to 1 (the usual representation of the sexes in the mass media), and predominantly young, white, middle-majority. Of every ten characters, 7 commit some crime, the same number fall victim of violence, and 6 inflict violence. Killers represent 13 percent of the population and their fatal victims 7 percent. Virtually all stories present problems of life and death.

THE SCENARIO: ACT I

Of all the symbolic quests that test human frailty few are as persistent as the lure of potent potions of pleasure, power, and profit. Over the last hundred years or so, this venerable motif has been finessed by the peddlers of drugs and nostrums who have subsidized so much of our emergent mass culture, and then by virtually the entire myth-making apparatus of the new populist commercialism. The cult of instant private gratification made into an article of democratic faith suggests and supports drug use (or "abuse") as the ideal style of life for the dutiful consumer literally addicted to his purchasing habits.

The nearest to outright promises of magic transformation from scrawny youngsters to dashing musclemen and Amazons are the elixir and health-gadget ads in comic books and similar materials. The more subtle attractions of sophisticated advertising are not too different. The clearest expressions of the basic appeal come from those ideal types of mass-produced culture heroes described in Jules Feiffer's book, The Great Comic Book Heroes:

That strange bubbly world of test tubes and gobbledy-gook which had, in the past, done such great work in bringing the dead back to life in the form of monsters—why couldn't it also make men super. Thus Joe Higgins went into his laboratory and came out as the Shield; and John Sterling went into his laboratory and came out as Steel Sterling; and Steve Rogers went into the laboratory of kindly Professor Reinsten and came out as Captain America; and kindly Professor Horton went into his laboratory and came out with a synthetic man, named, illogically, the Human Torch (Feiffer 1965).

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But the real name of the social-symbolic game is power. It takes super-power and super-consciousness to wrest the world about. In more than half (54%) of the stories, the key to super-status is the consumption of some chemical substance that can affect a drastic transformation.

On the whole, one out of every 5 characters uses drugs to seek super-power, ultra-intelligence, or eternal life. Scientists, as a group, are heavy users; some of them become (or try to become) super-heroes. Scientists administer the drugs even more frequently. While 28 percent of all scientists take drugs, 36 percent administer drugs. By comparison, 21 percent of all super-heroes use but only 4 percent give drugs. Here we begin to see a role differentiation between those who can bestow and those who may use the gift of superhuman insight and power. Of all users, 33% are super-heroes, 28% are scientists, and the rest is divided among other characters. Of all those who administer drugs, 56% are scientists and 33% are super-heroes.

Positive, active, violent characters use drugs most. The heroes of the comic book world comprise 67% of all drug-takers. Only 17% of their antagonists, the villains of the comic book world, use drugs. When it comes to administering drugs, heroes are less important (but still in the majority), while villains double their representation. In other words, 67% of all drug users but only 56% of drug givers are heroes, while only 17% of all drug users but 33% of drug givers are villains. The role of the drug user is thus relatively untainted by villainy. Heroes use drugs in a good cause. The drug giver is more likely to be evil, and also more likely to be a scientist.

Personality ratings provide a further clue to the dynamics of comic book power. Figure 1 shows the mean ratings of all 87 comic book characters on a series of personality traits. The broken line (marked "A" for "Administers drugs") shows the aggregate personality profile of all characters who dispense or inject the drugs in comparison with those who ingest them (dotted line) and those who neither give nor take them (solid line). The givers are relatively intelligent, but also relatively weak, effeminate, elderly, and peaceful. The takers as a group are (or become) more youthful and strong, and demonstrate through violence the power that flows from the potent potion, powder, or serum. The independent intellect—sand in the gears of any consciousness industry—is neutralized by showing scientists or teachers as generally benign but impotent except to serve others. When they move outside the reach of responsible corporate service and control, and grab the powers they should bestow on others, they usually turn vicious or go mad. For example, in one comic book story of our sample the left-leaning professor of biochemistry, Derek Willden, neglects his attractive wife Sylvia to spend all his time in the laboratory working on a serum of eternal life. Scholarly but athletic professor Ross Cochran is named head of the department, but Derek doesn't care. "They're FOOLS!" ... he snorts, as he tells Sylvia his secret. "Oh really!" she retorts. "If you know the secret of the Universe, Derek, then why did Ross get promoted?" "This bourgeois materialistic thinking doesn't become you dear," he replies. "Soon ... I shall be VINDICATED! Then ... just you and me, Sylvia! Together FOREVER!"

But the elixir lacks one ingredient, a human gland, which Derek obtains by killing Ross who had by now become Sylvia's lover. The potion is now ready and he gulps it down—only to be arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment—forever!

Act I of the scenario is for everyone. Although comics spell it out most clearly, it is implicit in much of general news, advertisement, fiction, and drama. It is a ritual of power and of its promise through some individual act or intervention. The siren song warns against political solutions or the application of rationality as doomed to failure; power flows from the barrel of a gun or the hypodermic syringe.

**ACT II: "TEEN-AGE BOOBY TRAP"**

Act II is for those—the most disaffected, uprooted, powerless—who yield to the siren song that enthralls so many, "Try It, You'll Like It"—and now you're hooked. Our case in point is the widely used anti-drug booklet entitled "Teen-Age Boozy Trap." It was produced in comic book style by Commercial Comics, Inc., of Washington, D.C., whose President, Malcolm W. Ater describes the effort in these words:

To be sure we produced the right kind of brochure—one which would be well received by the intended audience of children of junior and high school age—we sought the support and helpful guidance of experts in this field. I do not mean "self-styled" experts, but authorities whose counseling I could depend on for the best kind of evaluation. Major contributors in an editorial way were the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Senate Judiciary Sub-committee on Juvenile Delinquency and the U.S. Department of Defense (Education) and we also had editorial approval of the American Pharmaceutical Association and the

**Figure 1**

Personality Profiles of All Comic Book Characters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Stupid</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
<th>Elderly</th>
<th>Violent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = No Connection  
T = Takes Drugs  
A = Administers Drugs

**SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF "DRUG ABUSE"** 29
National Coordinating Council on Drug Abuse and Education. All the above named approved the copy before the magazines were first printed. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ordered a substantial quantity twice and the Department of Defense purchased 625,000 copies only after they had made an evaluation study of the cross-section of 18-25 year olds representative of their troops. The study was made by an independent organization outside the government and showed overwhelming acceptance of both the technique and the contents. I repeat, it was only because of this very high approval of the brochure that DOD made its purchase.

We have sold millions of copies and have filled orders for as low as 250 copies for school systems. The praise has not stopped coming in for this brochure [Ater 1972].

Let us examine this widely praised and well-tested work, approved by the highest authorities (except for a few “self-styled” experts). Again we shall probe for the lessons implicit in the world of people and events that the booklet reveals to its readers.

On the 32 pages and 57 frames of the booklet, about 142 persons are portrayed. More than half are males, and 13 percent are nonwhite. Active professional help or service comes mostly from males, nearly all white. Even nurses and hospital attendants are mostly male and all white. In fact, practically all work is performed by males; men are shown as scientists, teachers, doctors, farmers, firemen, and drivers. Women and nonwhites are portrayed only as drug addicts, or as listening to white males give lectures or orders.

Figure 2

Although in the booklet male and female drug addicts number the same, they differ in their respective proportions of their own sex. Half of all women, but only 35 percent of the men are shown as victims of drugs, despite the fact that real-life drug addiction is much more prevalent among males. The male addicts are somber, tragic figures engaged in serious business. The women—mostly blond and scantily clad—are just hysterical. Blacks and whites are also different in ways we shall see as we examine some of the illustrations.

The cover (Figure 2) reveals the shadowy world of drug abuse. A bushy-haired young man smirks contentedly as he is about to puff on a joint. A demure blond reaches for a syringe about the size of a short bicycle pump. An equally oversized bottle of pills rests on the table between them. Through the window we can see the sunlit campus scene, supporting popular assumptions about the prevalence of drug use on campus. In fact, however, the survey of Drugs and American Youth by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research (1972) found less drug abuse on campus than off. The highest rate of conversion to drugs occurred after leaving high school and among the groups most likely to enter military service rather than college.

A few pages later our eyes fall on three faces of Blondie (Figure 3). She goes into wide-eyed, full-lipped hystericis, and then hallucinates with eyes closed, mouth wide open. The male user, on the other hand, is doing a man's work. He is a

Figure 3
truck driver in work clothes, union buttons on his cap, using stimulants to keep awake at night on the road.

Next comes a lesson in comic-book history (Figure 4). It begins with the Western fantasy of exotic oriental religious ceremonies complete with monster-gods, inscrutable faces, and gyrating belly-dancers. Dipping even farther back into the mists of prehistory, we see a “nomadic tribe in Southern Russia” sniff poppy seed around the campfire. (For the edification of Boy Scouts?)

On the next page we come upon the drug-crazed hordes of Southeast Asia, so hopped-up on the hashish that they rush headlong into their deaths (Figure 5). The story served the British Empire and the Foreign Legion even before American troops (with their drug problems) fought and killed Southeast Asians on their own native soil. These ape-like creatures, and the two ceremonial dancing girls on the previous page, are the only nonwhite drug users portrayed in the book. A favored media “solution” to the delicate problem of overtly unfavorable portrayal is to take nonwhites back into “history” where they can be shown as naturally savage fanatics and primitives. Contrast the savagery on top of Figure 5 with the nobility in the bottom frame. Cannons and guns (in white hands) indicate that we are now in civilized times. Here drugs are used not to send ape-men into mindless slaughter but to “relieve suffering.” Unfortunately, explains the caption, many of the soldiers thus treated returned to civilian life as addicts. They were considered sick men.

By burning dried poppy plants and inhaling the smoke they were able to experience the intoxicating effects of the opium narcotic.

As early as 500 B.C., the Scythians, a nomadic tribe in Southern Russia, also had learned about opium.

Figure 4

In Southeast Asia, young warriors were sometimes keyed up for battle to the point where they rushed headlong to their deaths due to the psychoactive effects of hashish, a concentrated preparation of marijuana.

By the time of the Civil War, opium was used as a pain killer. Wounded soldiers were treated with morphine, the major constituent of opium, to relieve suffering.

...Unfortunately, many of them returned to civilian life with an addiction not then understood, but commonly referred to as “Soldier’s Disease.”

Figure 5

But not for long. The next headline (Figure 6) marks the transition from sickness to crime. The picture supplies what illustrated manuals call the “how-to-do-it,” showing the well-aimed shot being self-administered into the powerful fist.

Soon addicts become criminals in the cultural as well as the legal sense. The cultural function of this category is to stigmatize a variety of presumably associated transgressions. The bottom frame of Figure 6 illustrates that function. A glassy-eyed bearded hippie addict wearing a peace symbol is shown panhandling a well-dressed young woman. The tendency to piggyback an overtly political message onto the drug education story recurs a few pages later.

After some frames showing pushers, an anxiety-ridden female addict, policemen grabbing a hopped-up bank robber, a white male teacher lecturing to a mixed audience, marijuana plants, and how to roll a joint, we come to a pot party. This time Blondie wears the peace symbol (Figure 7). As the caption speaks of “impairment of judgment and confusion,” she passes the joint to two intellectual types as other sophisticates cavort in the background. The bottom frame gives examples of further hazards of marijuana smoking, some of them misleading.

The next page below introduces a sequence of frames in horror-comic style (Figure 8). A chief social function of horror as a cultural ritual is the scaring of women to (and
IS DRUG ABUSE A SICKNESS OR A CRIME?

When heroin, a derivative of morphine, was introduced late in the 19th century it was believed that injection of the drug into a vein rather than having it ingested through the stomach would prevent people from becoming "enslaved by the habit."

At first, heroin was even believed to be a cure for addiction to morphine. It turned out that heroin produced an even stronger addiction.

With the nature of addiction poorly understood, public opinion accused the drug rather than the user. Perhaps this attitude stemmed from the fact that so many had unwittingly become dependent upon drugs. As a result, addicts at that time were pitied more than they were condemned.

A marijuana cigarette burns rapidly and is often shared by several persons. It produces varying effects such as hilarity, distortion of sensations and perception, impairment of judgment and confusion.

The fogging up of a marijuana user's concepts of time and space is similar to that of a person who misuses alcohol. But where an excess of alcohol can cause a person to "pass out" and remove himself as a social hazard, heavy use of marijuana simply further distorts the senses and allows the abuser to become a greater hazard to himself and others.

STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION

Figure 6

A marijuana cigarette burns rapidly and is often shared by several persons. It produces varying effects such as hilarity, distortion of sensations and perception, impairment of judgment and confusion.

Figure 7

LSD, nicknamed "acid", is a chemical in the family of hallucinogens. Like other hallucinogens, LSD brings to the user an escape from realism.

Figure 8

with) death. The ultimate sexual put-down, rape by a beast, is usually part of the fun. Here we see all faces of Blondie shrieking in psychedelic horror as monsters fall upon her. A giant bird descends with claws ready and long sharp beak and tongue poised for action. A death head puts a bony finger on her curly locks.

The sex-role message is further developed through frames (not shown here) depicting one woman raging and two others buying and using amphetamines while a male druggist looks worried and a male scientist is engaged in laboratory research.

Next we see Blondie green with terror (Figure 9). She is caught in an imaginary cobweb, with fantasy insects crawling over her curvaceous body. She is clad in a negligee and is writhing on a sofa, agonizing over how best to scratch the itch. Underneath that scene, the Male Thinker sits in a torn work shirt, silhouetted against a beam of light, contemplating suicide. To be or not to be, that is his question.

After frames of another male scientist, two male doctors, two female nurses, and "drug abusers" of both sexes (not shown), we come to Blondie again (Figure 10). She has shed her negligee and moved from the sofa into bed, alluring as ever, still itching and twitching in horror. The insects, skeleton, and long-beaked bird now become a giant snake-dragon with fangs and a forked tongue, literally enveloping and ready to rape the terrified woman victim. "The torture of one horrible withdrawal," state the bottom caption "far outweighs any possible pleasure . . . ."
Next are frames (not shown here) depicting a poppy field, another male physician, three firemen, three male underworld characters, and another hysterical woman. Later, as if one snake would not have been enough, we see six slimy tentacles of a hairy monster grab Blondie in the arms, legs, and thigh (Figure 11).

In the lower half of the page, the male figure is doing difficult, dangerous work. The sadistic imagery of the female victim again contrasts with the male self-image in serious (if illicit) business. While furry tentacles wrap around her body, he reaches for pearls and precious stones “to feed his ugly habit.”

Soon we come to the first and only picture in which Blondie is not an alluring, if hysterical, sex symbol (Figure 12). The potent potions worked their magic too well. She is sitting on a park bench suggestively near a trash can, looking poor, sloppy, stupid, and pregnant.

Woman’s fate is biology; man’s is society. She is sentenced for life and more; “she knows,” claims the caption, that “the baby may be born an addict.” The Male Thinker pays for his mistake in jail and risks “chances for employment and promotion.” Culture sets each his or her own “booby trap.”

THE HIDDEN MESSAGE AND HOW TO COUNTER IT

The hidden message of “drug abuse” is that it all depends on who you are: man or woman, white or black, native American or foreigner, rich or poor, solid citizen or...
longhaired hippy peacenik. “It is unfortunate,” warns the last caption, “that those who choose to fool around . . . learn too late that to be a drug abuser is to be a sure loser.” For, you see, there are winners and there are losers; follow no siren song promising easy passage.

The implicit lesson recalls the paradox of commodity culture preaching salvation through the consumption of illusions for a price. The tragic hero of that culture is the dutiful consumer chained to his purchasing habits, including the ultimate delusion of liberation through potent potions for pleasure, power, and profit.

This way of dealing with “drug abuse” can only generate increasing misery and conflict until its cultural sources and social uses are recognized and altered. That will not be easy or painless, because the sources run deep and the uses benefit powerful groups in our society. Of course, any useful therapy and all alleviation of suffering and destructive dependency are to be supported. But a counter-scenario is needed that would be of sufficient sweep and scope to begin to turn the tide.

First, all advertising, and not only patent medicine and other drug commercials, would have to be scrutinized by their producers to avoid promising spurious values and unrealistic expectations of the achievement of feelings of mastery and power. Similarly, teachers, parents, and critics should oppose the celebration of irrationality and the attribution of magic or superhuman virtues to be derived from any mechanical or chemical intervention. I am not suggesting that such (or any) subjects are not legitimate material for fiction and drama, but rather that our critical sensibilities should be attuned to these symbol systems in the same way as they are to many other themes of sensitive human relevance. And, finally, the implicit social content and covert communication of all types of imagery, especially “drug abuse” literature, must be examined for the unwitting reinforcement of the very pressures that make dangerous drugs so attractive a risk to so many.

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1972 (July 25)
Philadelphia Inquirer
1972 (July 25)
AVANT PROPOS: JEAN ROUCH

STEVE FELD

In its first four issues, *Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication* will publish my translations of articles by the French ethnographer and filmmaker, Jean Rouch. Owing to the fact that Rouch may be unfamiliar to the readers of this journal who are not involved in the anthropology filmmaking field, Sol Worth has asked me to provide a short introduction to these papers.

I should begin by noting what will be published. Rouch has had a varied career; his contribution to visual anthropology is apparent in four areas of involvement with film. The history and theory of anthropology film is the subject of "The Camera and Man," the initial piece in the series. In it Rouch outlines his belief in a "shared" anthropology, achieved by using the camera to catalyze the process of mutual understanding, within and across cultures. The second article, on the situation of the African cinema, reviews the social dimensions of the ways Europeans and Africans have imaged Africa on film. The article is both a contribution to the history of world cinema, as well as an ideological critique of the documentary film in the colonial period. A third piece, stemming from the time of *Chronique d’un été* (1960), the classic cinéma-vérité film that Rouch made in collaboration with Edgar Morin, deals with the notions of cinéma-vérité, cinéma-direct, and the issues of "staging" and "reality" in the cinema. Finally, there will be a piece concerning the unique brand of feature length ethnographic "fiction" films that Rouch has created with *Moi, Un Noir* (1957), *La Pyramide Humaine* (1959), *Jaguar* (1954-67), and *Petit à Petit* (1971).

If we try to fit Rouch into the context of anthropology film that is familiar to American readers, the initial issue is that of training and skills. We are generally familiar with three ways that the disciplines of anthropology and filmmaking articulate to produce films. One way is when professional filmmakers become interested in ethnographic subject matter (i.e., filming non-Western cultures). Another way is when field working ethnographers take up an interest in film technology for recording and presenting their work. A third possibility is when there is a collaboration between two professionals with specifically different skills, ethnographic and cinematic. There is obviously no consensus on the best way to resolve this issue (if indeed there is one way), as clearly indicated by the different types of training programs found at the Anthropology Film Center, Annenberg School of Communications, Brandeis University, San Francisco State College, Temple University, University of California at Los Angeles, or University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

Rouch presents another alternative. He is a skilled and experienced ethnographer and filmmaker simultaneously, and his presence in the field constitutes a strong argument that the uniquely combined skills of the ethnographic filmmaker can and should be packaged in a single person.

Two things support the feasibility of Rouch's position. First, multidisciplinary training is hardly new to anthropology. If we consider, for instance, the field of anthropological linguistics, it is immediately clear that the skills involved create a unique synthesis of the two disciplines in a way that contributes both to culture theory (e.g., cognitive anthropology today) and autonomous linguistics proper (e.g., aspects of the semantics and sociolinguistics counter-revolution). In the same fashion it is certainly reasonable to think of the anthropological filmmaker as a person whose dual competence creates the kind of unique synthesis that is significant both ethnographically and filmically.

The second supporting factor, not theoretical but concrete, is the singular synthesis that Rouch has created in the last 25 years. The ethnographic depth, sophistication, and rapport obvious in his films (e.g., *Les Maîtres Fous*) makes many ethnographic films, by comparison, seem as superficial as adventure stories do when compared to ethnographic monograph studies. Moreover, he is the only practitioner of anthropological film whose name is consistently associated with critical theoretical issues in filmmaking (viz. cinéma-vérité and cinéma-direct) that have origins in anthropological thinking but have ramifications far beyond the use of film as a collecting, presentation, and teaching device for anthropology.

Rouch's cinema is neither sophomoric anthropology tacked onto pretty pictures nor clumsy attempts to make visual illustrations of ethnographic facts—two kinds of films that many of us have become so familiar and so dissatisfied with. Rather, it is an attempt to create a cinematic language appropriate to the tasks of ethnographic description and explication, in other words, a cinematic language that goes beyond pretty pictures to the heart of making ethnography cinematic. The assumption here is that the trained ethnographer-filmmaker is in fact the only person who knows the appropriate way to use the film perception-translation-communication process to image an event in a truly explicative way.

A further aspect of Rouch's work attitude that is significant is the insistence on authorship and personal up-frontness that marks his filmic style. For Rouch the camera is not a voyeur through which one culture may peer at another; it is a catalyst through which the ethnographer-filmmaker, as author, creates a statement about the human interaction that is the basis of the ethnographic experience. When Rouch uses narrations, they are personal, subjective, self-reflexive. On a recent track (*Tourou et Bitti*) he

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introduces what is to follow as a film in the “first person.” He never relies on crews, but prefers direct contact, walking into the action with his eye behind the camera. In films that he is not shooting, he frequently appears on the screen, talking to the actors, stimulating the action, explaining what the film is becoming (e.g., La Pyramide Humaine, Chronique d’un été, Rose et Landry). His films are authored: the ethnographer attempts not to hide his involvement but, rather, insists on directly claiming responsibility for what the viewer is seeing/hearing, and the interpretative choices and selective perceptions that make the film the unique statement that it is.

Two consequences of Rouch’s authorship directly affect his use of film language. At present, Rouch has evolved a shooting style which resolves for him the question of editing. Recent films including Yenendi de Gangel, Funerailles du Hogon, Architectes Ayourou, and Tourou et Bitti, are shot in the style of continuous take shot-sequences that are sometimes as long as an entire 400-foot magazine. The most exciting example is Tourou et Bitti, a 12-minute one-shot film, in which Rouch penetrates a village possession dance, walking continuously with the action, using only a fixed focal length lens. The synchronized film and sound, edited as it was shot, is a complete statement, showing us exactly how the author chose to see the event and explicate it at the moment of its occurrence.

A second consequence is the creation of a largely improvised fictional cinema, based on ethnographic realities (e.g., Jaguar, based on Rouch’s early ethnographic studies of West African migrations). All of these films involve the personal touch and spirited style that emerges when Rouch films his friends, however their techniques vary from direct sync improvised shooting (Petit à Petit) to Rouch’s old pre-sync style of having the actors improvise a commentary as they view the edited version of the silent footage (Moi, Un Noir, Jaguar). In addition to raising the question of alternate ways of presenting ethnography, these films are extremely important because of their potential in the theatrical feature film area not usually tapped by ethnographic subject matter.

A final aspect of Rouch’s work, concerning film analysis, needs to be explicitly stated. Rouch does not generate film for micro-cultural analysis (e.g., kinesics, proxemics, choreometrics), nor has he been concerned with traditional film research areas, like culture and personality or childrearing. He stands strongly behind the position that “ethnographic films must be films” and is thus not interested in the single frame analysis of short out of context film clips, or in the mythology of “completely objective” filmmaking (locked-off cameras behind one-way mirrors). But this is not to say that he is not interested in the potential of ethnographic film for research. In fact, two recent films made in collaboration with ethnomusicologist Gilbert Rouget illustrate the importance of sync filming for the cross-cultural study of music and dance pattern in context. Batteries Dogon (see Rouget 1965), a study of Dogon drumming, breaks down and reconstructs several Dogon rhythm patterns, so that the motor organization and articulation of multipart rhythms can be studied. More recently, Danses des Reines à Porto-Novo (see Rouget 1971) includes slow motion sync sequences of music and dance together, using a process whereby the music is kept at pitch, while the image is accelerated to 48 frames per second. Thus while Rouch never attempts to justify his work on “scientific” grounds, he clearly understands the importance of film for creating basic data for analysis.

“The Camera and Man” was written in March 1973 as “Le Camera et les Hommes” and presented the following September to the IX International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, in Chicago. A volume of Congress papers, Principles of Visual Anthropology, which Paul Hockings is editing for Mouton, will also contain an English version. In Paris, in May 1974, I read this translation in galleys, and feeling that it was weak, gave the Comité du Film Ethnographique a copy of my own informally prepared translation. That version, slightly revised and kindly reviewed for me by Ms. Marielle Delorme, the Comité’s administrative secretary, is what appears here. Notes have been added to explicate translation matters, or to place films in context.

Finally, I should note that I am an anthropology filmmaker and not a professional translator, and have thus paid more attention to what Rouch is saying than to word to word correspondences. I have tried to bring out as much as possible of the witty and acute style that marks Rouch’s original.

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THE CAMERA AND MAN

JEAN ROUCH

In 1948, when André Leroi-Gourhan organized the first ethnographic film congress at the Musée de l'Homme, he asked himself, "Does the ethnographic film actually exist?" He could only respond, "It exists, since we project it" (Leroi-Gourhan 1948).

And in 1962, Luc de Heusch quite justly wrote: To brandish the concept of the "sociological film," isolating it within immense world production, is this not a chimerical and academic exercise? The very notion of sociology is fluid, varying by country and local tradition. The term does not apply itself to the same research in Russia, the United States, or Europe. Is it not, on the other hand, the helpless mania of our time to catalogue, to cut up into arbitrary categories, the mixture of confused ideas, of moral values, and aesthetic research on which these artists, who are the creators of films, feed with such extraordinary avidity (de Heusch 1962).

These two statements take on a particular value in 1973. It derives, on the one hand, from the shameful situation in which anthropologists (and increasingly sociologists, too) find their discipline, and on the other, from the unwillingness of filmmakers to face up to their creative responsibilities. Ethnographic film has never been so contested, and the authored film has never been so questioned. And yet, year after year, the number and quality of ethnographic films continues to grow.

It is not my concern here to pursue polemic, but simply to state the paradox: the more these films are attacked from the exterior or the interior (i.e., by the actors and viewers or by the directors and researchers), the more they seem to develop and affirm themselves. It is as if their total marginality was a way of escaping the reassuring orbit of all the daring attempts of today.

Jean Rouch is an ethnographer and filmmaker. He has lived extensively in West African communities of Mali, Ghana, and Niger, and has published many ethnographic studies, including La Religion et la Magie Songhay (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960). He has made over 30 ethnographic films since 1948, and was instrumental in organizing the Comité International de Film Ethnologique et Sociologique (CIFES), recently reorganized as the Comité International des Films de l'Homme (CIFH). Currently he is a director of research in the French Centre National de l'Homme (C!FH). Currently he is secretary-general of the Comité du Film Ethnographique of the Musée de l'Homme. Four of his films, Les Maîtres Fous (1955), Jaguar (1954-67), La chasse au lion à l'arc (1965; English title The Lion Hunters), and Chronique d'un été (1960; in collaboration with Edgar Morin) are available in the United States.

For example: Since 1969, when ethnographers were compared (rather skillfully) to "salesmen of black culture," and sociologists to "indirect exploiters of the working class" by angry delegates at the Montreal African Studies Association meetings, or the Pan African Festival in Algiers, there have never been so many enrollments of new students in university departments of sociology and anthropology.

For example: Since young anthropological filmmakers declared that films on rituals and traditional life were out of date, there have never been so many films depicting primitive cultures, and so few on the problems of development.

For example: Since the creation of film collectives, there have never been so many authored films in cinema and human sciences, and, simultaneously, so much decadence on the part of filmmakers participating in these collectives.

In short, if ethnographic film is attacked, it is because it is in good health, and because, from now on, the camera has found its place among man.

100 YEARS OF FILMS OF MAN

The Pioneers

The arduous route that brought us here began in 1872, when Edward Muybridge made the first chronophotograph in San Francisco in order to settle an argument over the manner in which horses trot. Muybridge was able to reconstruct movement by decomposing it with a series of still images, which is to say, to "cinematograph" it.

From the beginning, after animals and horses it was man: the horseman or horsewoman (nude for reasons of muscular observation), the walker, the crawler, the athlete, or Muybridge himself—all with their hair blowing in the wind, twirling about in front of 30 automatic still cameras. In those fertile images, American West Coast society 100 years ago exposed more of itself than any Western could. They were horsemen of course, but white, violent, muscular, harmoniously impudent, ready to give the world the virus of good will, and, as a bonus, the "American way of life."

Twelve years later, in 1888, when Marey used Edison's new pliable film and enclosed Muybridge's apparatus in his "chronophotographic rifle," it was again man who was the target. And in 1895, 40 years before Marcel Mauss would write his unforgettable essay "Les Techniques du Corps," Doctor Felix Regnault, a young anthropologist, decided to use chronophotography for a comparative study of human behavior, including "ways of walking, squatting, and climbing" of a Peul, a Wolof, a Diola, or a Madagascan.

In 1900, Regnault and his colleague Azouley (who was the first to use Edison cylinders for recording sound) conceived the first audiovisual museum of man: "Ethnographic museums must contain chronophotographs. It is not enough to have a loom, a wheel, a spear. One must know the way they operate, and the only way to know this precisely is by means of the chronophotograph." Alas, some 70 years later, such an ethnographic museum of films and recordings is still a dream.

After the appearance of the animated image with the cinema of Lumiere, it was still man who was the principal subject.

Film archives of this century began with naive films. Was the cinema going to be an objective instrument capable of capturing
the life and behavior of man? The marvellous ingenuity of Lumière's "Sortie des Usines" ("Leaving the Factory"), "Déjeuner de Bébés" ("Baby's Lunch"), and "Pêche à la Crevette" ("Shrimp Fishing") permitted one to believe that it could [de Huesch 1962].

But from the beginning, the camera was equally revealed to be a "thief of reflections." Perhaps those workers hardly paid attention to Lumière's little cranking box as they left the factory. But some days later, upon seeing the projection of the brief images, they suddenly became conscious of an unknown magical ritual—that old fear of the fatal meeting with one's double.

Then, "the illusionists" came along, and "uprooted this new type of microscope from scholars and turned it into a toy" (de Huesch 1962). And so, film viewers preferred Melies' trick optical version of the eruption of the Pelée Mountain volcano to the terrifying documents that Lumière's crews brought back from the China wars.

**The First Geniuses**

It took the turmoil of 1914-18, the thorough questioning of values, the Russian Revolution, and the European intellectual revolution for the camera to reframe its place among man.

At that point, our discipline was invented by two geniuses. One, Robert Flaherty, was a geographer-explorer who was doing ethnography without knowing it. The other, Dziga Vertov, was a futurist poet who was doing sociology, equally without knowing it. The two never met, but both craved cinema "reality." And ethnographers and sociologists who were inventing their new disciplines in the very midst of these two incredible observers had no contact with either of them. Yet, it is to these two men that we owe everything that we are trying to do today.

For Flaherty, in 1920, filming the life of the Northern Eskimos meant filming a particular Eskimo—not filming things, but filming an individual. And the basic honesty of the endeavor meant showing that individual all the footage he had shot. When Flaherty built his developing lab at Hudson Bay and projected his images for Nanook, he had no idea that he was inventing, at that very instant, "participant observation" (a concept still used by ethnographers and sociologists 50 years later) and "feedback" (an idea with which we are just now clumsily experimenting).

If Flaherty and Nanook were able to tell the difficult story of the struggle of man against a thriftless but beneficial nature, it was because there was a third party with them. This small, temperamental, but faithful machine, with an infallible visual memory, let Nanook see his own images in proportion to their birth. It is this camera that Luc de Huesch so perfectly called the "participatory camera."

And undoubtedly, when Flaherty developed those rushes in his cabin, no one realized that he was condemning to death more than 90% of film documents that would follow. No one realized that they would have to wait some 40 years before someone would follow the still new example of the old master of 1921.

For Dziga Vertov, at the same period of time, it was a question of filming the revolution. It was no longer an issue of staging, or adventures, but of recording little patches of reality. Vertov the poet thus became Vertov the militant, and perceiving the archaic structure of the newsreel film, invented the kinok, the "ciné-eye."

I am the ciné-eye, I am the mechanical eye, I am the machine that shows you the world as only a machine can see it. From now on, I will be liberated from immobility. I am in perpetual movement. I draw near to things, I move myself away from them, I enter into them, I travel toward the snout of a racing horse. I move through crowds at top speed, I precede soldiers on attack, I take off with airplanes, I flip over on my back, I fall down and stand back up as bodies fall down and stand back up.1

This pioneering visionary thus foresaw the era of ciné-vérité. "Cinéma-vérité is a new type of art; the art of life itself. The ciné-eye includes: all shooting techniques, all moving pictures, all methods—without exception—which will allow us to reach the truth—the truth in movement" (Kinok Manifesto).

Vertov was talking about the "camera in its natural state"—not in its egotism but in its willingness to show people without makeup, to seize the moment. "It is not sufficient to put partial fragments of truth on the screen, as if they were scattered crumbs. These fragments must be elaborated into an organic collective, which, in turn, constitutes thematic truth" (Kinok Manifesto).

In these feverish declarations we find everything of today's cinema: all the problems of ethnographic film, of documentary TV film, of the "living cameras" we make use of today. And yet, no filmmaker in the world has been so poorly received, no seeker so inspired has been so unrecognized. We had to wait until the 1960's for directors and theoreticians to get back on the track of the Kinoks, those "ciné-eyes" who made "films which produced films."

In 1920, when Flaherty and Vertov were trying to resolve the same problems that today's filmmakers face, camera equipment and techniques were elementary, and the making of a film required more craft than industry. The camera used for Nanook, forerunner of the "eyemo" had no motor, though it did already have a reflex viewer through coupled lenses. The camera of the "ciné-eyes" that brought us "Man with a Movie Camera" was also hand-cranked, and continually rested on a tripod. Vertov's "eye in movement" was only able to move about in an open topped car. Flaherty was alone, as cameraman, director, lab technician, editor, and projectionist. Vertov worked only through another cameraman, and had a small family crew, with his brother Michael shooting and his wife editing. Later on, Flaherty too had a family crew, with his brother David operating the second camera and his wife Frances as assistant.

And perhaps it was due to such simplicity and naïvete that these pioneers discovered the essential questions that we still ask ourselves today: Must one "stage" reality (the staging of "real life") as did Flaherty, or should one, like Vertov, film "without awareness" ("seizing improvised life")?

**The Eclipse of the Cinema Industry**

In 1930, technical progress (the change from silent films to "talkies") transformed the cinema art and industry. No one asked anyone else what was happening, and nobody took the time to figure out what was really going on. But it was then that a white, cannibalistic cinema emerged. It was the time of exoticism, Tarzan, and white heroes among the wild savages. Making films then meant crews of ten technicians,
tons of camera and sound equipment, and responsibility for thousands of dollars. So it was obviously simpler to bring man to the studio and place him in front of the camera than to take the camera out to man. Johnny Weissmuller, the most famous king of the jungle, never left the sacred Hollywood forest; it was the African beasts and feathered Tubi's that were brought onto the camera set.

You had to be crazy, as some ethnographers apparently were, to take such forbidden tools to the field. And today, when one watches the first clumsy attempts of Marcel Griaule (Au Pays du Dogon and Sous les Masques Noirs, both shot in 1938) or Patrick O'Reilly (Bougainville, shot in 1934 and later retitled Popoko, the Wild Island), one can easily understand the discouraging results of their efforts. For after rather admirable camera documents were brought back, they were "made" into films with insensitive editing, Oriental music, and a newscast style commentary more befitting of a sportscast. It was this betrayal that Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson managed to avoid at the same point in time (1936-38) with their "Character Formation" series (1. Bathing Babies, 2. Childhood Rivalry in Bali and New Guinea, 3. First Days in the Life of a New Guinea Baby). Here, thanks to American university financial aide, it was understood (before it was understood by other universities) that it was absurd to try to mix research and commercialism.

The Post-War Technical Revolution: Lightweight Cinema

New technical developments brought about by the war—the arrival of the 16mm format—allowed for the revival of ethnographic film. The American Army used lightweight cameras in the field; they were no longer 35mm monsters but precise and robust tools, born directly of amateur cinema. Thus at the close of the 1940's, young anthropologists, following Marcel Mauss' manual to the letter ("You will film all techniques"), brought the camera to man. And although some expeditions continued the dream of 35mm super-productions (such as the admirable Pays des Pygmees, brought back in 1947 along with the first authentic sound discs recorded in the Equatorial forest), 16mm would not be far behind in asserting itself.

From then on things happened quickly. In 1951 the first self-governing tape recorders appeared. And even though they had crank motors and weighed 70 pounds, they replaced a sound truck of several tons. Yet no one except a few anthropologists initiated themselves into the mania of these bizarre tools, which no professional in the film industry would even look at. And so, a few ethnographers simultaneously made themselves director, cameraman, sound recordist, editor, and also producer. Curiously, Luc de Heusch, Ivan Polunin, Henri Brandt, John Marshall, and I realized that as a by-product, we were inventing a new language. In the summer of 1955, at the Venice Festival, I was thus led to characterize ethnographic film in the following way for the journal, Positif:

What are these films, and by what weird name shall we distinguish them from other films? Do they actually exist? I still don't know, but I do know that there are those rare moments when the spectator can suddenly understand an unknown language without the gimmick of subtitles, moments when he can participate in strange ceremonies, move through a village, and cross places he has never seen before but nonetheless recognizes perfectly well. Only the cinema can produce this miracle, but no particular aesthetic gives it the means to do so, and no special technique uniquely provokes it. Neither the learned counterpoint of a cut nor the use of stereophonic cinerama can cause such a wonder. Often this mysterious contact is established in the middle of the most banal film, in the savage mincemeat of a current events newscast, or in the meanderings of amateur cinema. Perhaps it is the closeup of an African smile, a Mexican winking his eye for the camera, or a European gesture so common that nobody would imagine filming it; things like these force a bewildering view of reality on us. It is as if there were no cameraman, soundman, or lightmeter there; no longer that mass of technicians and accessories that make up the great ritual of classical cinema. But today's filmmakers prefer not to adventure on these dangerous paths. It is only masters, fools, or children who dare push these forbidden buttons...

But soon, the flashing development of TV gave professional status to our silly tools. And it was then, in working to satisfy our needs (lightweight, durable construction, quality), that manufacturers gave us their first marvelous portable silent sync cameras and automatic tape recorders. The first crews4 to use the equipment were those of Ricky Leacock (Primary and Indianapolis) in the United States, and that of Edgar Morin, Michel Brault, and myself (Chronique d'un Eté) in France.

ETHNOGRAPHIC CINEMA TODAY

Hence today we have extraordinary equipment at our disposal, and the number of ethnographic films has grown each year since 1960 (evidenced by the fact that more than 70 recent films were send to the selection committee of the first Venezia Genti festival in 1972). Yet ethnographic film has not found its voice. Having solved all of its technical problems, it has yet failed to reinvent for us, as Flaherty and Vertov once did in 1920, the rules of a new film language which will permit the opening of frontiers between all civilizations. It is not my aim here to make a statement summarizing all experiments and trends, but simply to report on those which appear to me to be the most pertinent.

Ethnographic Film and Commercial Cinema

Even though the technical barriers no longer exist, it is rare that an ethnographic film finds commercial distribution. However, the majority of ethnographic films made in recent years share the same format as productions made for commercial release: credits, background music, sophisticated editing, narration addressed to the general public, proper duration, etc. For the most part, the result is a hybrid product that neither satisfies scientific rigor nor cinematic art. Of course, some major works or original films escape this inevitable trap (as ethnographers consider film like a book, and an ethnographic book is no different from an ordinary book).

The outcome is a notorious increase in the cost of these films, which makes even more annoying their almost total lack of distribution (except when the cinema market is open to sensational films like Mondo Cane). The solution to the problem is to study the film distribution networks. Only when universities, cultural agencies, and TV networks cease their need to make our documents conform to their other
products, and learn to accept the differences, will a new type of ethnographic film, with specific criteria, be able to develop.

Filmmaker-Ethnographer or Filmmaker and Ethnographer Teams

It is for similar reasons, and in order to make the most of technical possibilities that ethnographers have recently preferred not to film by themselves but to call on a crew of technicians. (Actually, it is sometimes the production crew, sent out by a TV company, which calls on the anthropologist.)

Personally, unless forced into it, I am violently opposed to crews. The reasons are many. The soundman must absolutely be able to understand the language of the people being recorded; it is thus indispensable that he be a member of the group being filmed, and, of course, he be trained in all aspects of his work. Moreover, in today's manner of shooting sync sound direct cinema, the director can only be the cameraman. It is the ethnographer alone, to my mind, who really knows when, where, and how to film—in other words, to "direct." Finally, and this is without a doubt the decisive factor, the ethnographer must spend a long time in the field before beginning to shoot. This period of reflection, apprenticeship, and mutual awareness might be quite long (Flaherty spent a year in the Solomons before rolling a foot of film), and is thus incompatible with the schedules and salaries of a crew of technicians.

But, of course, there are always a few exceptions: The Hadza, shot by the young filmmaker Sean Hudson in close collaboration with ethnologist James Woodburn; or Emu Ritual at Ruguri and the rest of director-filmmaker Roger Sandall's Australian series, made in conjunction with anthropologists; or The Feast, where Timothy Asch was completely integrated in Napoleon Chagnon's study of the Yanomamo.

Yet the Eskimo films of Asen Balkici, and Ian Dunlop's recent series on the New Guinea Baruya are for me examples of what should never happen again—the intrusion of a group of first rate technicians into a difficult field situation, even with the aid of an anthropologist. Every time a film is made there is a cultural disruption. But when the anthropologist-filmmaker is alone he cannot push what problems may arise onto his crew, and must assume responsibility himself. (We must remember that two whites in an African village are enough to constitute a solid foreign body, and hence to risk rejection.) And I've always wondered how that small group of Eskimos reacted to those crazy whites who made them clean out their camp of all that good canned food!

This ambiguity doesn't appear in Dunlop's earlier Desert People series, owing no doubt to the "piece of trail" shared by the filmmakers and the aboriginal family they met. But it naturally manifests itself in the New Guinea film. Here, at a most extraordinary moment at the end of the ceremony, the group responsible for the initiation asks their anthropologist friend to limit the film's distribution, so that it will not be shown inside New Guinea (a posteriori rejection). In cases like these, it is the awkwardness of the crew's presence which creates the obstacle to a "participating camera."

This is why it appears to me essential that we teach students of ethnography film and sound recording skills. And even if their films are technically far inferior to those of professionals, they will nevertheless have that irreplaceable quality of the real contact between those who film and those who are filmed.

Handheld vs. Tripod Shooting; Zoom vs. Fixed Focal Lens

After the war, when American TV was searching for films, (especially the "Adventure" series) Sol Lesser, and that of CBS) the idea of shooting without a tripod was almost prohibited by the desire for steadiness. Yet most of the 16mm war footage (including the extraordinary Memphis Bell, the adventures of a flying fortress and the first film blown up to 35mm) had been shot handheld. But when we took the example of the old pioneers and filmed without a tripod, it was principally due to economy of means, and to permit rapid movement between two cameras. Most of the time, however, the camera remained fixed, occasionally panning, and only exceptionally moving about (for example, in "crane" effects achieved by crouching, or when traveling in a car).

It took the audacity of a young crew from the Montreal Canadian Film Board to liberate the camera from its immobility. Koenig and Kroiter's Corral (1954) opened the way for the traveling shot, more definitively developed in the classic scene in Bientôt Noël (1959) where the camera follows the bank guard's revolver. When Michel Brault came from Canada to Paris to shoot Chronique d'un Été, this technique was a revelation to all of us, and for the TV cameramen as well. The classic example of this style is now undoubtedly the shot in Primary where Leacock follows the entrance of John F. Kennedy. Since then (1960), camera manufacturers have made considerable efforts to improve the balance and manageability of their products. And today, all cameramen who shoot direct cinema know how to walk with their cameras, thus transforming them into "living cameras," the "ciné-eyes" envisioned by Vertov.

This technique is particularly useful in ethnographic filming, for it allows the cameraman to adapt to the action as a function of the spatial layout. He is thus able to penetrate into the reality, rather than leaving it to unroll itself in front of the observer.

Yet some directors have continued the general use of the tripod, always for the sake of technical rigor. This is to my mind the major fault in the films of Roger Sandall and the last New Guinea film by Ian Dunlop. (Perhaps it is not coincidental that we’re talking here of Australian directors, since the best tripods and pan heads are made in Sydney!) The physical immobility of a tripod fixed camera is thought to be compensated for by the wide use of variable focal length lenses (zoom lenses), which create an optical imitation of a dolly shot. But in fact, these lenses don't allow one to forget the unseen rigidity of the camera, because the zooming is always from a single point of view. Although these casual ballets may appear seductive, one must recognize that they only bring the camera and man together optically, because the camera always rests at a distance. Actually, this type of shooting more closely resembles a voyeur looking at something from a faraway perch, and zooming in for the details.

This involuntary arrogance on the part of the camera is not only resented a posteriori by the attentive viewer, but...
also by the people who are filmed, because it is like an observation post.

For me then, the only way to film is to walk with the camera, taking it where it is most effective and improvising another type of ballet with it, trying to make it as alive as the people it is filming. I consider this dynamic improvisation to be a first synthesis of Vertov’s “ciné-eye” and Flaherty’s “participating camera.” And I often compare it to the improvisation of the bullfighter in front of the bull. Here, as there, nothing is known in advance; the smoothness of a faena is just like the harmony of a traveling shot that articulates perfectly with the movements of those being filmed. In both cases as well, it is a matter of training, mastering reflexes as would a gymnast. Thus, instead of using the zoom, the cameraman-director can really get into the subject. Leading or following a dancer, priest, or craftsman, he is no longer himself, but a mechanical eye accompanied by an electronic ear. It is this strange state of transformation that takes place in the filmmaker that I have called, analogously to possession phenomena, “ciné-trance.”

**Editing**

The director-cameraman who shoots direct cinema is his own first spectator in the viewfinder of the camera. All of his bodily improvisations (camera movement, framing, shot lengths) finally result in editing while shooting. Here again we are back to Vertov’s idea: “The ciné-eye is: I edit when I choose my subject (from among millions of possible subjects). I edit when I observe (i.e., film) my subject (making a choice among millions of possible observations)” (A.B.C. of the Kinoks).

It is this aspect of fieldwork that marks the uniqueness of the ethno­graphic filmmaker: instead of elaborating and editing his notes after returning from the field, he must, under penalty of failure, make his synthesis at the exact moment of observation. In other words, he must create his cinematic report, bending it or stopping it, at the time of the event itself. There is no such thing here as writing cuts in advance, or fixing the order of sequences. Rather, it is a risky game where each shot is determined by the one preceding, and determines the one to follow. And, obviously, this type of shooting requires perfect coordination of the cameraman and soundman (who, I repeat, must perfectly understand the language of the group being filmed, and who plays an essential role in the adventure.) If this ‘ciné-eye-ear’ team is well trained, all technical matters (e.g., focus, f-stops) are simply reduced to reflexes, and the two are free to spontaneously create. “Ciné-eye = ciné-l see (I see with the camera) + ciné-l write (I record with the camera on film) + ciné-l organize (I edit)” (A.B.C. of the Kinoks).

And when they are shooting, this team immediately knows, from the simple image in the viewfinder or the sound in the headphones, the quality of what they’ve recorded. If there is a problem they can stop and take another course; if things are all right they can continue, linking together the sentences of a story which creates itself simultaneously with the action. This is what I would call the “participating camera.”

The second spectator is the editor. He must never participate in the shooting, but be the second “ciné-eye.” Knowing nothing of the context, he can only see and hear what has been recorded, that which has been intentionally brought back by the director. Editing, then, is a dialogue between the subjective author and the objective editor; it is a rough and difficult job, but the film depends on it. And here too there is no recipe, but “Association (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, bracketing) of similar film pieces. Uninterrupted permutation of bits of images until the right ones fall together in a rhythmic order where chains of meaning coincide with chains of pictures” (A.B.C. of the Kinoks).

A supplementary stage, not foreseen by Vertov, appears indispensable. Namely, the presentation of the rough cut, from head to tail, for the people who were filmed. For me, their participation is essential (more on that point later on).

**Narration, Subtitles, Music**

It is not possible to decode two sound sources simultaneously, as one will always be heard to the detriment of the other. The ideal then, would be to make films only with original sync sound. Unfortunately, however, ethnographic films usually present foreign cultures where a language unknown to most viewers is spoken.

Narration, born of silent and lecture-type films, seemed the most simple solution. It is the direct discourse of the director, mediating between the viewer and himself. But this discourse, which should be subjective, is most often objective, and makes out to be a sort of scientific exposition, a manual providing the maximum amount of information possible. Thus instead of clarifying the images, the track simply obscures them, masking them until it finally substitutes itself completely for them. And so the film ceases to be a film and becomes a lecture; a demonstration based on visual designs rather than a demonstration actually made by the images themselves. Rare indeed are ethnographic films where the commentary is in direct counterpart to the images. Two examples come to mind: one is Luis Buñuel’s *Las Hurdes* (“Land without Bread”), where Pierre Unik’s objectively subjective text brings the necessary oral cruelty to match the unbearably cruel visuals. And the other is John Marshall’s *The Hunters*, where the director leads us down the trail of the giraffes and their hunters with a very simple story. In doing so the film becomes as much the adventure of the filmmaker as that of the hunters themselves.

With the use of sync equipment, ethnographic films (like all direct cinema) became chattery, and narration attempted the impossible operation of dubbing a second language. More and more, actors were called upon to recite the narrations, always in the anxiety of approaching the norms of commercial cinema. With a few rare exceptions, the results were pitiable. Far from translating, transmitting, or reconciling, this type of discourse betrayed the communication, making it even more remote. And personally, after a bad experience with the American version of *La Chasse au Lion à l’arc* (“The Lion Hunters”), I prefer to recite myself, even in bad English and with a bad accent, the texts of the foreign versions of my films (e.g., *Les Maîtres Fous*).

It would be interesting to make a study of the style of narration in ethnographic films since the 1930’s. One would see how they passed from baroque colonialism to adventurous exoticism to the dryness of scientific statement and, most recently, to ideological discourse in which the
The Ethnographic Film Public: Research and Distribution Films

A final notion, which viewed in terms of intention is really the first point, is to my mind essential for ethnographic film today. Because in Africa, in the universities, at the cultural centers, the scientific research centers, or the cinémathèques, the first question asked after the projection of an ethnographic film is, “For whom, and why, have you made this film?”

For whom, and why, take the camera among mankind? My first response will always, strangely, be the same: “For me.” Not because it is some type of drug whose habit must be regularly satisfied, but because I find that in certain places, close to certain people, the camera, and especially the sync camera, seems necessary. Of course it will always be possible to justify this type of filmmaking scientifically (creation of archives of changing or disappearing cultures), politically (sharing in the revolt against an intolerable situation), or aesthetically (discovery of the fragile mastery of a landscape, of a face, or of a movement that is irresistible). But in fact, what is there is that sudden intuition about the necessity to film, or conversely, the certainty that one should not film.

The frequenting of movie theaters, and the intempestuous use of audiovisual equipment, makes it clear that we are today’s Vertovian kinoki, “ciné-eyes” who were formerly the “pen-hands” (Rimbaud) who could not resist writing: “I was there, so many things happened to me...” (La Fontaine). And if the “ciné-voyeur” of his own society will always be able to justify himself by this particular militarism, what reason can we, anthropologists, give when we pin our subjects up against the wall?

The chief of the hunters demanded that the filmmaker shares with others the revolt that he can no longer contain within himself. One would thus obtain a series of profiles, characteristic in time and space, of the investigators of our discipline; profiles that no book or lecture could better reveal.

Tilting and subtitled appeared the most sensible way to escape the trap of narration. It was John Marshall, if I’m right, who was the first to use this process for his Peabody Museum “Kalahari” series. The Pond, a very simple sync film depicting the gossiping and verbal flirting of Bushmen at a waterhole, is a model of this genre. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the problems involved. Besides muting the image, the most difficult problem is screen time, for as in commercial cinema, the subtitles cannot condense and cover everything that is said. I tried to use subtitles for a sync film on lion hunting (Un Lion Nommé l’Americain) but it was impossible to satisfactorily transcribe the difficult translation of the text (praises to the arrow’s poison recited at the moment the lion dies) within the given screen time. I thus made a version where I say the text (the hearing time is shorter) superimposed over the sync sound original. But in fact, the result here is also deceiving, for although the text takes on an esoteric and poetic value at the moment it is recited, it actually does not bring any complementary information into the film. So I have gone back to a version with neither narration nor subtitles, feeling that in the long run it would be miraculous indeed if in 20 minutes one could gain access to the complex knowledge and techniques that demand some ten years of apprenticeship from the hunters themselves. In this case the film can be no more than an open door to this science, those who want to know more can refer to a pamphlet, which, like the exemplary “ethnographic film” (modular publications) should henceforth accompany all ethnographic films.

I should mention, to close my discussion of titles and subtitles, the excellent attempt made by Timothy Asch in The Feast. The film begins with a preamble of freeze frame condensations of the principal sequences, and indispensable explanations are given, a priori, on the soundtrack. The film is then titled in order to tell who is doing what, and discreetly subtitled. Of course, this process demystifies the film from the start, but to my mind it is the most original attempt to deal with the problem that has been made until now.

I will just say a few words about musical accompaniment. Original music was, and still is, the basic stuff of the soundtrack of most documentary films, as well as pre-sync sound ethnographic films. This was simply “how films were made.” I learned the heresy of doing this early on (1953) when showing my film Batouille sur le Grand Fleuve to hippopotamus hunters in Niger among whom I shot it two years earlier. At the moment of the chase, I put a very moving hunting air, played on a one stringed bowed lute, on the soundtrack; I found this theme particularly well suited to the visuals. The result of the playback, however, was deplorable. The chief of the hunters demanded that I remove the music because the hunt must be absolutely silent. Since that adventure, I have paid much attention to the way music is used in my films.

Today I have the conviction that even in commercial cinema, the use of music follows nothing but an outdated theatrical convention. Music envelops, puts us to sleep, helps bad cuts pass unnoticed, and gives an artificial rhythm to pictures that don’t have, and never will have, any rhythm of their own. In short, music is the opium of the cinema. TV has now seized the mediocrity of the process as well, and I find the admirable Japanese ethnographic films Papua New Life and Kula, Argonauts of the Pacific to be spoiled by the musical sauce with which they are served. On the other hand, we should be aided by music which really supports an action, be it ritual, everyday, work rhythm, or dance. And although it is out of the scope of this paper, I must mention the importance that sync filming will have in the field of ethnomusicology.

Sound editing (background, speech, music) is undoubtedly as complex as picture editing. I believe that we still have enormous progress to make here in order to rid ourselves of prejudices we’ve come to via radio, prejudices which have led us to treat sound with more respect than image. I find many recent direct cinema films ruined by the incredible amount of attention paid to chattering, as if the oral statement were more important than the visual one. Where a director would never hesitate to cut on a movement, he wouldn’t dare cut in the middle of a sentence or even a word, much less cut a musical theme before its final note. I believe that it won’t be long before this archaic habit (TV is the current prime offender) will slowly disappear and the image will regain priority.

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This question is obviously addressed to all anthropologists, but anthropological writing has never been contested the way anthropological film has. And that’s where I get my second response to “for whom, and why?” Film is the only means I have to show someone else how I see him. For me, after the pleasure of the “ciné-trance” in shooting and editing, my first public is the other, those whom I’ve filmed.

The situation is clearly this: the anthropologist has at his disposal the only tool (the “participating camera”) which offers him the extraordinary possibility of direct communication with the group he studies—the film he has made about them. Of course there are still some technical hangups here, and the projection of film in the field is still at an experimental stage. The development of the super-8 sync sound projector with a 12-volt battery will doubtless be serious progress in this area. But my experiences with a 16mm projector and a small portable 300-watt battery have been conclusive enough. The projection of my film Sigui 1969 in the village of Bongo where it was shot brought considerable reaction from the Dogon (Bandiagara Cliffs, Mali) and the demand for more films; a “Sigui” series is now in progress. And the projection of my film Horendi on the initiation of possession dancers in Niger also brought demands for more films. By studying this film on a movicscop with my informants I was able to gather more information in two weeks than I could get in three months of direct observation and interview. This type of a posteriori working is just the beginning of what is already a new type of relationship between the anthropologist and the group he studies, the first step in what some of us have labelled “shared anthropology.”? Finally then, the observer has left the ivory tower; his camera, tape recorder, and projector have driven him, by a strange road of initiation, to the heart of knowledge itself. And for the first time, the work is not judged by a thesis committee but by the very people the anthropologist went out to observe.

This extraordinary technique of “feedback” (which I would translate as “audiosvisual reciprocity”) has certainly not yet revealed all of its possibilities. But already, thanks to it, the anthropologist has ceased to be a sort of entomologist observing others as if they were insects (thus putting them down) and has become a stimulator of mutual awareness (hence dignity).

This type of totally participatory research, as idealistic as it may seem, appears to me to be the only morally and scientifically feasible anthropological attitude today. And it is to the development of its technical aspects (e.g., super-8 and video) that today’s equipment manufacturers should dedicate maximum effort.

But at the same time it is obviously absurd to condemn ethnographic film to such a closed information circuit. That is why my third response to the question “for whom, and why” is “for everyone, for the largest viewing public possible.” I believe that if the distribution of ethnographic film is, with rare exceptions, limited to university networks, cultural organizations, and scholarly societies, the fault is more our own than that of commercial cinema. The time has come for ethnographic films to become films.

I don’t think that this is impossible, as long as a film’s essential quality of being the unique statement of one or two people is preserved. If exploration lectures and TV travelogues are a success, it is, I repeat, due to the fact that behind the clumsy images there is the presence of the person who shot them. If for reasons of science, or ideological shame, anthropological filmmakers insist on hiding behind their comfortable incognito, they will irrevocably castrate their films and doom them to an existence in archives, where they will be reserved only for specialists. The success of pocketbook editions of ethnographies once confined to a small scientific library network is an example which ethnographic film should follow.

And so now we find ourselves awaiting the appearance of true ethnographic films; films which “join scientific rigor and cinematographic language,” a definition we gave them nearly 20 years ago. Meanwhile, at the Venezia Gentii festival of 1972, the International Committee of Ethnographic and Sociological Films decided to create, with the help of UNESCO, a true network for the conservation, documentation, and distribution of “films of man.” Why? Because we are people who believe that the world of tomorrow, the world we are in the process of building, cannot be viable without a regard for cultural differences; the other cannot be denied as his image transforms. For this it is necessary to be aware, and for that knowledge there is no better tool than ethnographic film. This is not just a pious vow, and a similar example comes to us from Japan, where a TV company, in an effort to broaden Japanese perspectives, has decided to broadcast an hour of ethnographic film each week for three years.

**CONCLUSION: SHARED CINE-ANTHROPOLOGY**

Now we are at the close of our story of the place of the camera among man, yesterday and today. And for the moment, the only conclusion that one can draw is that ethnographic film has not yet passed the experimental stage. Although anthropologists have this fabulous tool at their disposal, they still haven’t figured out how to make it best serve their needs.

For the moment no “schools” of ethnographic film exist; there are only tendencies. Personally, I hope this marginal situation will prolong itself so that our young discipline can avoid sclerosis in an iron collar, or in sterile bureaucracy. It is good that there are differences in American, Canadian, Japanese, Brazilian, Australian, British, Dutch, and French ethnographic films. Within the universality of concepts in the scientific approach we maintain a multiplicity of orientations: if the “ciné-eyes” of all countries are ready to unite, it is not simply to have one point of view. Thus film in the human sciences is, in a certain respect, in the avant-garde of film research. And if one finds similar features in the diversity of recent films, such as the multiplication of shot-sequences (I have asked a manufacturer of lightweight cameras to make a 1000-foot magazine so that shooting can go for half an hour), it is because our experiences have led us to similar conclusions, and thus, have given birth to a new cinema language.

And tomorrow? ... Tomorrow will be the time of color video portapacks, video editing, and of instant replay (“instant feedback“). Which is to say, the time of the joint dream of Vertov and Flaherty, of a “mechanical ciné-eye-
ear” and of a camera that can so totally “participate” that it will automatically pass into the hands of those who, until now, have always been in front of the lens. At that point, anthropologists will no longer control the monopoly on observation; their culture and they themselves will be observed and recorded. And it is in that way that eth­nographic film will help us to “share” anthropology.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTES

1 An exact reference for this text, and for other Vertov materials quoted later, is not given. French translations of Vertov can be found in Cahiers du Cinéma numbers 144 (June 1963), 146 (August 1963), and 220/221 (May-June 1970).

2 The name of the early 35mm Bell & Howell hand-held camera which was the ethnographer’s and newsmen’s staple camera the world over.

3 The French is “équipe,” literally “team”; Rouch and Morin were not “crew” in the English sense of the term. Rouch credits Michel Brault of the French Unit of the Canadian Film Board as the first cameraman to bring the new shooting techniques to France. Other sections of Chronique were shot by Roger Morilletre, Raoul Coutard, and Jean-Jacques Tarbes.

4 The English release of Biènêtô ô Noël was titled The Days Until Christmas; the cameraman was Michel Brault.

5 Un Lion Nommé l’Americain (“A Lion Named the American”) was finished in 1971 and is a sequel to La Chase au Lion à l’arc (“The Lion Hunters”). It tells the story of the lion who escaped the hunters in the first film.


7 The French is “partagé” which I have translated as “shared”; the full sense of “partager” is actually “to share by dividing in equal halves.” The point of view Rouch is speaking of is roughly similar to what is called “self-reflexive” anthropology in the States.

8 Here Rouch uses the English word “feedback” in quotes and refers to the way he would translate the notion into French with “contredon audio-visuel.”
TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL TRANSITIONS IN AMERICAN FICTION FILMS

JOHN CAREY

This study examines the communication code structure of temporal and spatial transitions in feature length, American fiction films. By these transitions I mean simply, the rules, principles or conventions by which a filmmaker communicates to his audience that the shot or scene they are currently viewing is at a different point in time and/or space than the previous shot or scene. For example, if we are watching a scene that depicts an apartment in New York, and the filmmaker wants to follow this with a scene depicting an apartment in Chicago three days later, how does he communicate this transition to us?

A number of related structural issues will not be treated here. I shall however, mention a few of these briefly, to clarify the scope of my investigation. I am not concerned with the relation between real time and film time. For example, a filmmaker may compress the real time it takes a person to walk across a field by use of a cutaway or change in camera angles. Thus while it takes the actor two minutes to perform the action, the film time for that movement may be fifteen seconds. With rare exception, a filmmaker does not intend to communicate a speeded-up action by his editing of such a movement, and his audience will not infer such a meaning.

Similarly, the stretching or lengthening of real time in a film, for example, Eisenstein's "raising of the bridge" sequence in October, where the bridge seems to rise almost endlessly, or Hitchcock's lengthening of real time in The Lodger, where we see a close shot of the killer switching off the light, followed by a long shot in which the light goes out, are outside the scope of my investigation. In these cases, the filmmaker does indeed attach meaning to his manipulation of real time, but typically, he does not imply a temporal transition. Rather, a viewer will infer "heightened tension," "boredom," or some other feeling from the temporal manipulation.

In addition, I will not consider how a filmmaker constructs temporal and spatial units in a film from elements shot at disparate points in time and space. Pudovkin (1949:88), among others, discusses the process of joining several shots, each filmed in a different place, at a different time, so that a viewer will infer a single, clear, uninterrupted action. This is an important structural issue, but it relates to the construction of film time and space from "real" life, not the communication process between filmmaker and audience.

I am dealing exclusively with the process and conventions whereby a filmmaker intends to convey to his audience that the scene within the ongoing film has shifted in time and space. These conventions may be broadly divided into two groups: single element and multiple element transitions. Single element transitions occur when the previous scene is connected directly to the following scene, with no intermediate shots. For example, we are watching a shot of a room, and the film cuts directly to a shot of a park; or, we are watching a shot of a room and the screen gradually becomes darker, until it is totally black, followed by a gradual lightening of the screen which reveals a new scene in a park (this mechanism is called a fade); or, we are watching a room and the shot of the park gradually dissolves through, replacing the previous shot; or, we are watching a room and the shot of a park starts to move across the screen and seems to push the first shot out of the frame (called a wipe). The cut, fade, dissolve, and wipe are the most common transition mechanisms in the films we will be discussing. The second broad category, multiple element transitions, also use cuts, fades, wipes, and dissolves to link the previous and subsequent scene, but in addition they insert a shot or shots that are part of the transition itself. For example, a scene dissolves through to a shot of a calendar, with pages flipping off a wall, which dissolves through to the next scene; or, a scene in a room dissolves to a long shot of a boat crossing the Atlantic which dissolves to a new scene at another point in time and space.

The study was reduced to this scope in order to deal more clearly with a particular communication problem: how does a filmmaker imply meaning by a structural mechanism in his film, and how does an audience infer meaning? What is the nature of the code they share that allows communication to occur? Bateson (1969) argues that the business of communication is a continuous learning to communicate, and that codes and languages are not static systems which can be learned once and for all, but rather, shifting systems of pacts and premises which govern how messages are to be made and interpreted. Gombrich, an art historian, (1960:370-375) focuses more specifically on visual communication, when he argues that images attain meaning because creator and viewer share a set of conventions by which expressions about visual reality can be coded and decoded. He says an artist discovers "schemata" or a set of conventions known by people at a particular time, in a particular culture, and uses them to create meaning in a visual form. Similarly, Worth (1975:37-40) argues that visual communication takes place not because people are commonly attuned to a universal "reality," but because they have learned the conventions, rules, forms, and structure of a social group. We infer meaning from visual communication not by matching its correspondence to how the world is made but by interpreting it against our knowledge of "how people make pictures, how they made them in the past, how they make them now, and how they will make them for various purposes in various contexts" (Worth 1975:39). I sought to examine these issues within a narrowly defined code.

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The Gombrich-Worth position has not been widely shared among those who have talked about temporal and spatial transitions in film, particularly in the instructional primers on film techniques. Most have treated these mechanisms as a static grammar, an invariant set of rules based on the "innate" properties of visual reality. Arnheim (1957, 1966) provides the theoretical impetus for the commonly held view, with his position that there is an organized world to which we are biologically and perceptually attuned and to which we can respond instantly. Since man is biologically attuned to a "deep visual structure," he does not have to negotiate a system of arbitrary symbolic forms that must be learned by an audience. Rather, a visual stimulus, which has a character of its own and contains objective properties, will steer the organizational properties within the brain and determine the form and meaning of surface structures in a work of art or a film. Thus, the particular use of a fade or dissolve or combination of elements is most frequently considered a surface manifestation of a universal deep visual structure.

There has been little discussion, and less research, about possible variations in code structure diachronically, across cultures, or across film subjects. Some have made judgments about particular transition mechanisms as "more filmic" and therefore good, while other transition mechanisms are judged as weak or uncreative because they are "borrowed" from other modes such as literature, the stage, etc. Balázs, for example, bitterly opposes the wipe as a crude imitation of the stage:

When a director wants a change of scene but does not want to show intermediate scenes, he often has a curtain of shadow, technically termed a "wipe", drawn across the picture. In other words, he begins a new scene by means of a device borrowed from the stage. This admission of impotence, this barbarian bit of laziness, is so contrary to the spirit of film art that the only thing to be said in its defense is that it is nevertheless preferable to a picture cut in without dramaturgical motivation [1970:143].

Similarly, though with an absence of venom, Arnheim (1957:119) likens the fade to a theater curtain changing scenes in a play.

It has also been suggested that fades, dissolves, and wipes may be the equivalent of linguistic mechanisms. Again, Balázs (1970:143), only now talking about the fade:

Sometimes its effect is like that of a dash in a written text, sometimes like a row of full stops after a sentence, leaving it open . . . .

In addition, various mood feelings have been attributed to these mechanisms. The fade is said to produce sadness; the dissolve, thought-like weightlessness. This suggests that the use of a particular mechanism might correlate with the mood of a scene or the subject of a film.

One can also ask to what degree does the use of a particular temporal-spatial transition mechanism reflect the technological availability of that mechanism to a filmmaker. Goffman (1974:259), talking about the theater, observes that,

The introduction of gaslight in London theaters in 1817 and the introduction of electric spark lighters for gas in the 1850s made it technically possible to dim and extinguish lights in the auditorium, thereby providing a signal for the beginning and ending of action within the theatrical frame.

While nearly all of the mechanisms used in temporal and spatial transitions were available by the 1920s, we really don't know the shifting costs or work habits of optical houses and production companies over the years. It is interesting to observe the recent increased use of the wipe as a transition mechanism in children's television programming, at a time when much of the editing has shifted to video tape where the wipe is readily available by virtue of editing console design.

We face the possibility that temporal and spatial transition mechanisms may represent: (1) a static system of invariant rules determined by the innate deep structure of visual reality; (2) the visual equivalent of linguistic structure; (3) borrowing from other modes such as theater or literature; (4) technological availability; and/or (5) stylistic variation based on the content of films or the mood of particular scenes.

As a first step in assaying some of these possible explanations, and to place them within a communication framework, I sought to map the temporal-spatial transition mechanisms used by filmmakers diachronically. My sample consisted of three basic categories of fiction films within each decade, beginning with the 1920s: (1) adventure-science fiction, (2) situation drama, and (3) comedy (the sample was limited to American films). I was concerned primarily with the structural features of a transition—fade or wipe, single element or multiple element transition, time necessary to complete the transition, etc. I also noted semantic features of the transition, e.g., a face dissolving to a flag, insert shots of calendar pages flipping off a wall, or seasons changing, and mood features in scenes where the transition occurs.

The basic pattern shows marked changes in the mechanisms for accomplishing temporal and spatial transitions over time, and yet a consistency in the pattern of using these mechanisms within any period. Filmmakers observe the conventions used by contemporary films, not a set of invariant rules. Further, variations from the code at any point are themselves patterned and accounted for by the code. (See Table I.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
<th>SINGLE ELEMENT TRANSITIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>46 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>27 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>13 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
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</table>

*Mean percent for all categories of film within each decade.

Considering first, single element transitions (i.e., a simple dissolve from one scene to another, or a simple fade down on one scene and fade up on another, with no inserted titles or shots within the transition), the data shows a heavy use of the fade in the 1930s (approximately 46% of all single element transitions in the sample employed a fade), con-
siderable use of the dissolve (approximately 44% of the single element transitions were a dissolve), and occasional use of the wipe (9%). In the 1940s, the major figures shift significantly: 27% of the single element transitions employ a fade; 64% are dissolves; use of the wipe declines slightly to 5%; and we encounter a few examples of straight cut transitions (3%). In the 1950s, the trend continues. Fades drop to 13% of all single element transitions; dissolves account for 66%; and the straight cut emerges with 21% of the transitions. By the 1960s, the fade is used in only 3% of the single element transitions; 38% are dissolves; the straight cut increases in usage to 58%; and there was one case where a shift in focus (i.e., the scene goes out of focus, and then returns to a sharp focus revealing a new scene at a different point in time and space) signaled a transition.

There were no significant differences across film subjects—comedy, drama, etc. Variations from the general pattern by individual films are accounted for, primarily, by the number of "expressive" transitions in the film (this will be discussed later). Data on silent films of the 1920s was not included here because they depend heavily on multiple element transitions. (See Table II.)

**TABLE II**

| TRANSITION TIME |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Seconds**     | **Multiple Element** | **Single Element** |
| 1920s           | 6.7             | 33 (41)         |
| 1930s           | 4.8             | 77 (114)        |
| 1940s           | 3.1             | 82 (146)        |
| 1950s           | 1.8             | 87 (138)        |
| 1960s           | 4.4             | 97 (134)        |

*Mean time for all transitions, single element and multiple element.

The length of time employed in completing a transition shows a similar trend diachronically, with a consistency among films within a period. Considering all transitions, single element and multiple element, the mean time for completing a transition declines steadily from the 1920s through the 1950s. The sharp drop in mean time during the 1960s reflects a sharp decrease in the use of multiple element transitions.

Within a film, variation in length of time to complete a transition is clearly patterned. If a filmmaker wishes to make a transition, but not attach "expressive" meaning (I will be using the term "expressive" to cover a variety of mood feelings the filmmaker wishes to imply, e.g., sadness, as well as dramaturgical meaning such as "this is an important transition"), he completes the transition within a time that is close to the mean time for that period. "Expressive" meaning is attached by employing the mean transition time of earlier films (which, it turns out, is always longer). For example, if the typical single element transition takes one second, and the filmmaker employs a 1.5 or 2 second transition, it will imply some "expressive" meaning. A viewer notices this as an "overlong" dissolve or "overlong" fade that accompanies an important transition in the film. For example, A Man For All Seasons (1966), uses "overlong" dissolves when there is a temporal-spatial transition at moments of heightened dramatic tension.

In some films of the 1920s and 1930s it also appears to be the case that variations in the length of a transition served as an analogue for the amount of time that had passed or the distance that had been spanned. Thus a transition which took longer than normal implied that much time had passed, and a short transition implied that only a brief amount of time had passed. The use of this convention appears to diminish by the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. However, the passage of much time or any shift back in time (the flashback) is still typically characterized by an "overlong" transition. (See Table III.)

**TABLE III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULTIPLE vs. SINGLE ELEMENT TRANSITIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple Element</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong> (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
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*Mean percent for all categories of film within each decade.

If we look at the number of multiple element transitions (i.e., where one or more shots are inserted within the transition itself) against the total number of transitions in a film, we find a marked dependence on multiple element transitions in the 1920s (66%), a leveling off between 18-23% from the 1930s through the 1950s, and a sharp drop to only 3% in the 1960s.

The multiple element transition often serves two functions: it implies a transition in time and space, and it raises the information state of the audience. That is, while the filmmaker is stepping "outside" the film, to make a temporal-spatial transition, he will frequently use the occasion to tell us some detail about a character or the action that we could not or might not have inferred from the film. In the 1920s, this was accomplished predominantly through the use of titles: "Later, our hero waits anxiously for the letter to arrive." In The King of Kings (1927), the inserted title is sometimes a quote from the bible, so the moral message of the scene is rather explicitly reinforced. Such dependence on lexical information, in a medium (silent film) praised for the sophistication of its visual code is not often pointed out.

The function of multiple element transitions in the 1930s was quite similar. However, the title insert was now replaced (often) by inserts of a newspaper headline, a note written by one of the characters, a program from a play one of the characters was about to attend, etc. For example, a scene dissolves to a newspaper headline—"Strike Vote Due Tomorrow"—which dissolves to a sub-headline—"Violence is Predicted"—which dissolves to a scene outside a factory with workers and police about to confront each other. By the
1940s, we still see a few lexical inserts, but more and more, the inserts are symbolic visuals: a worn-out boot, a bottle that is nearly empty, a ship sinking. By the 1950s, inserts within multiple element transitions carry less information. It appears that the information state of the audience is raised merely by the use of a multiple element transition. The filmmaker does not have to insert an explicit visual to imply something about a character or the action. The structure itself implies "expressive" meaning. For example, in *A Hatful of Rain* (1957), a multiple element transition occurs when Eva Marie Saint is going home to tell her husband (a drug addict) that she is through with him. The visual inserts within the transition are neither dramatic, nor are they necessary to give the viewer information about the transition. The presence of the multiple element transition *form*, rare both for the late 1950s and this film, serves to heighten the tension of the expected confrontation.

Thus, the symbolic encoding attached to a title in the 1920s, moved to a telegram or newspaper headline in the 1930s, a visual symbol in the 1940s, and a visual structure in the 1950s. By the 1950s, audiences had learned to associate "expressive information" with multiple element transition structures, so a filmmaker, in drawing upon that structure, could imply expressive information without the explicit inserts that were necessary earlier.

By the 1960s, multiple element transitions decline sharply, and the non-temporal-spatial information that was encoded in titles, visuals, or the multiple element transition structure itself, moves, in part, to the shots immediately preceding or succeeding the transition—shots that are part of the ongoing film. For example, in the 1940s we might have a sequence in which we see a character in a room. This shot then dissolves to a pair of new boots, dissolving to a shot of a pair of worn out old boots, which then dissolves to a shot of the character later in life, old and run down. On the other hand, in the 1960s, a filmmaker might show us the same sequence of a character in a room but have the camera panning from his face to a pair of new boots in the corner of the room. There would then be a straight cut to a pair of old boots in a matching frame, and a pan back to the character, old and run down. Here, the meaning-laden insert within the multiple element transition of the 1940s, moves to the pre­and post-transition scenes. In this new position, the symbolic encoding must function at two levels. The "boots" must function as a proper element within the ongoing film, plus carry a special meaning by virtue of their proximity to a temporal-spatial transition. I believe we can draw a limited analogy, in terms of information state, with the theater. It's similar to the difference Goffman (1974:232-233) notes between an aside in a play spoken directly to the audience, which is outside the official information state of all the characters (except the characters speaking the line) and therefore only has meaning to the audience, and a line between two characters in the play which has one meaning for the characters and a second, special meaning to the audience because they have a different information state than the (official) information state of the characters in the play.

Thus far, we have been considering the non-temporal-spatial information imbedded in multiple element transition mechanisms. However, temporal and spatial in­formation follows a similar development. We find a title in the 1920s saying, "Years later on their 25th anniversary"; a telegram in the 1930s, "Dear Mary . . . Stop . . . Happy 25th Anniversary . . . Stop . . . George"; a cake in the 1940s, with "Happy 25th Anniversary" spelled out in candles. By the 1950s, the multiple element transition structure itself would likely carry the expressive information that much time had passed, and the explicit information that it is their 25th anniversary would probably not be conveyed within the transition, but revealed in the subsequent scene.

With the decline of multiple element transitions in the 1960s, and increased use of the straight cut to imply a temporal-spatial transition, we can ask, how do people know that a transition has occurred? What is the difference between a cut within a scene and a cut that signals a temporal-spatial transition? Just as the meaning-laden insert within multiple element transitions moved to the scenes before and after the transition, information signalling a temporal-spatial transition in the 1960s often moves into the scenes before and after a cut. This is the kind of transition popularized in the TV series *Mission Impossible*: a camera zooms in on an ash tray; there is a cut to another ash tray; and the camera zooms out to another scene. Similarly, in *Planet of the Apes* (1968) the camera pans up to the sun; there is a cut to another shot of the sun from a slightly different angle; and the camera pans down to another scene at another point in time and space. In each of these instances, the ash tray or the camera movement functions within the ongoing scene, and implies a second meaning by virtue of the shared structural knowledge between filmmaker and audience that this pattern signals a temporal-spatial transition.

It should be noted that one can observe similar patterns of temporal and spatial transitions much earlier. However, in the past such patterns were accompanied by other structural information (e.g., a fade or dissolve) which implied the temporal-spatial transition. A straight cut does not imply a temporal-spatial transition in all contexts.

Finally, we may consider some of the patterned variations within a given film that point toward the process of code change. If we look at the first element in a multiple element transition, and the first four single element transitions in a film, there is a tendency to use the convention patterns of earlier films. For example, in the 1940s, the general pattern shows 27% of the single element transitions are fades, and 64% dissolves. However, at the beginning of films in the 1940s (i.e., the first four temporal-spatial transitions) the pattern is 42% fades and 54% dissolves. Similarly, the pattern at the beginning of a multiple element transition is 36% fades and 48% dissolves. In both of these situations, the pattern is closer to the convention of the 1930s. The filmmaker, at the beginning of his film or at the beginning of a complex, multiple element transition, relies to a greater degree on earlier conventions that are more likely to be understood by the widest possible audience. As his film progresses, his transition structure moves toward the mean for that period. Also, he may begin to experiment with new forms. In time, the mean transition mechanism of a period and filmmakers' experimentations become more deeply understood by wider audiences, which allows these transitions to be invoked at the beginning of a film to clearly establish a scene, at moments
when there is a complex transition, and at moments of "expressive" meaning (there is a tendency to use the older convention mechanism for expressive meaning, just as we saw a tendency to use the earlier mean time for expressive transitions). This process would allow the code to evolve.

We can also see the process of code change in the way a filmmaker uses a new visual symbol as an insert in multiple element transitions, or an unconventional structural mechanism in a single element transition. During the 1930s and 1940s, there were a number of conventional inserts for multiple element transitions, e.g., a clock with rotating hands, a ship crossing the Atlantic, a train going around the bend, a flower blossoming, etc. If a filmmaker drew upon such a conventional symbol, he could expect that his audience would infer what he meant without additional information (other than the multiple element transition structure). The audience could refer to their knowledge of other films where that symbol had a particular meaning, and thereby know what he meant. However, the filmmaker was also free to create a unique symbol for his film. When he wanted to use a symbol of his own, he had to negotiate this new code item with his audience. He did this by initially using the symbol in a fuller context that told the audience what he meant, then repeating it later without the fuller context. For example, in Lloyd's of London (1936), a shot of a ship's bell is used throughout the film to imply a temporal-spatial transition. The first time the bell is used, we see its full context: it's an old ship's bell in a tavern. When news comes in, they ring the bell and post the news on a blackboard. Later, the bell is used without its full context to imply a transition in time and to fill in news. An audience can then refer the code item to its fuller context (which they experienced early in the film) and thus infer meaning just as they do by referring a conventional code item to the larger context they have learned from watching films.

Similarly, if a filmmaker wishes to use an unconventional mechanism in single element transitions, he typically introduces it in a setting that clearly establishes how he is using it and what it means. Later, he can repeat the mechanism without this additional information. For example, in The Outsider (1962) a swish pan (i.e., where the camera pans across a scene very rapidly, causing the image to blur) is employed to signal a temporal-spatial transition. When the audience first sees this mechanism, it is clear from the context that a transition has taken place. Also, film viewers readily infer that expressive meaning has been attached to the swish pan—it suggests that a character is becoming confused and losing control of the situations in which he finds himself. Later in the film, the swish pan can be used to imply both a transition and expressive information about the character's loss of control over situations. Audiences refer subsequent experience with the transition mechanism to earlier experiences in the film, where they learned what it meant.

Some preliminary conclusions about a few of the explanations for temporal-spatial transition mechanisms suggested earlier can now be suggested. There appear to be no significant variations in transition patterns by category of fiction film. There are variations within a film that relate to the mood a filmmaker wants to imply. However, mood is implied by deviance from the convention at a given period (typically, toward the earlier convention), not in a code item such as fade, per se. Similarly, a film may vary from the conventions at a given period to identify with an earlier group of films, and align the audience's expectations with those earlier films. For example, a "grade B" western made in the 1960s, but following the typical story line of a 1940 western, may employ several multiple element transitions, inserts of newspaper headlines, etc. We have discovered no universal rules. In fact, our evidence points toward the conclusion that film structure (at least, regarding temporal and spatial transitions) is subject to constant renegotiation between filmmakers and their audiences.

It does appear that some mode borrowing occurred early in the history of film, via titles, the wipe, the fade, etc. and these structural mechanisms diminished in use as the film code evolved.

This investigation provides no evidence about possible linguistic determination of the film code. Similarly, the study provides no evidence about technological influence on film structure. However, I would argue that while technology may introduce a new transition mechanism or create some incentive for an existing one, the change in code convention would have to be negotiated between filmmakers and their audience in a manner similar to other code changes.

Second, the investigation points to the evolution of a more symbolic visual code for temporal and spatial transitions. Filmmakers no longer have to "tell" their audiences that a temporal-spatial transition is taking place. We saw the use of titles in the 1920s evolve to visual objects with lexical information (i.e., the cake which spells out "Happy Anniversary"), which evolved to visual objects alone, and then to visual structure. All along, the code has become more efficient, in the sense of accomplishing the transition in less time, and we have seen the development of code items which serve dual functions, i.e., the visual object or camera movement which exists within the ongoing film scene and has a meaning in relation to that scene, while having a second meaning by virtue of its proximity to a temporal-spatial transition and its structural similarity to another object or camera movement in a subsequent scene. Thus, more of the meaning is encoded in structural relations and less in explicit linguistic or pictographic terms. This suggests that mass audiences have grown in their level of understanding the film code. That is, not only have they adapted to changes in transition mechanisms, but they have learned to perceive and understand code items of a more symbolic nature in considerably less time.

Third, investigation of this narrowly defined code appears to support Bateson's general position that communication codes are not static systems, but negotiated conventions. Focusing more specifically on film communication, I would modify Worth's position slightly (see earlier), and argue that a filmmaker must constantly refer what he proposes to do and the meaning he would attach to it, with what other films do at that time, what earlier films have done, and the set of expectations an audience will likely apply to his film. He must provide his audience not only with a code item that implies the meaning he desires, but he must give them sufficient information so they can refer the code item to the proper set of conventions and contexts in which this code item has the meaning he intends to communicate.

For example, if I see a film today that has a shot of
calendar pages flipping off a wall (during a multiple element transition), and I know the film was made in the 1930s, I will likely infer that it is a perfectly reasonable transition; if something in the film suggests to me that it was produced in the 1950s, the calendar pages shot may seem incongruent; if something in the film suggests it was produced in the late 1960s, I might laugh—at the filmmaker if I felt he intended a non-expressive transition, and with him if I felt he intentionally used a convention from the 1930s for a comic effect. More generally, a filmmaker must communicate to his audience (through camera angles, lighting, sound, etc., as well as transition mechanisms) that he is adhering to the viewers’ patterned expectations of code conventions for the period of time when the film was made; deviating from those conventions toward another set of conventions the audience knows (e.g., a modern gangster film about the 1930s may borrow certain code items from films of the 1930s); or deviating in a unique way, in which case he must not only teach them the new code item but provide the contextual references that will give the code item a meaning he intends when the audience encounters it again in the film or in some future film.

The study reported here suggests some directions for future research. (1) If we are correct in arguing that structural codes in film do not represent the surface manifestation of a universal deep visual structure, but negotiated conventions, it would follow that children must learn them. By studying how they acquire such knowledge and become competent viewers, we may learn a great deal about the codes themselves. (2) We have been able to show some features of one element in the film code, for American mass audiences, but we cannot assume that all audiences and filmmakers (i.e., in all cultures, or even sub-groups within one culture) share the same set of conventions. Rather, the boundaries for groups of filmmakers and audiences in different cultures, over time, and across other relevant dimensions, must be discovered. (3) The need for a great deal more systematic investigation of film structure is clearly indicated. Those of us who hope to conduct comparative studies of film and linguistic codes are forced to recognize that our present knowledge of film structure is inadequate for the task.

NOTES

1 This is not to imply that an audience “naturally” understands this. A viewer must learn the conventions that allow him to infer no meaning. Further, this code issue has fascinating implications for crosscultural investigations. Montagu (1964:127) points out that pre

1950 Chinese films never speeded up such movement—the audience had not yet learned the conventions.

2 The filmmaker does not intend to communicate any meaning from such a construction, and the audience does not know that the shots were filmed in different places, at different times.

3 Three films for each category were selected, totaling nine films per decade. Films were chosen generally toward the middle of each decade, and an attempt was made to avoid both avant-garde and grade B films. Thus the sample was primarily standard Hollywood fare. There is no suggestion here that a decade is a natural unit for film structure. It is an arbitrary grouping that will, hopefully, give way to natural units (when they are discovered). Further, the small size and selectivity of the sample places some limitations on the generalizability of the findings. Clearly a large sample would be helpful to account for the widest possible range of films, grade B to avant-garde, feature length to TV commercial.

4 There is a reliability problem in noting certain semantic features. Since I was the only coder, a mood feature like “sadness” is subject to the systematic bias of my observation. Therefore, all mood features and dramaturgical meaning like “this is an important transition” were placed in one broad category—“expressive.”

5 The same principle is true for sound symbols used in transitions. The structure of auditory transition mechanisms, generally, will be reported in a later paper.

6 It should be noted that the swish pan was not unique at this point (it simply was not present in the sampled films), and has since become well understood by a wide audience through use in many television series during the 1960s.

7 Also, a modern film about the 1930s may employ the transition mechanisms common in films of the 1930s.

8 Amos Vogel (personal communication) suggests that many of the transition patterns used in Hollywood features of the 1960s and 1970s were borrowed from earlier avant-garde films.

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ART HISTORY AS ETHNOGRAPHY AND AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS: A REVIEW ESSAY

LARRY GROSS

A review essay of Painting and Experience in 15th Century Italy. Michael Baxandall, Oxford University Press, 1972. 165 pp., illus. $11.95 (cloth), $3.50 (paper).

It is a reasonable proposition that anthropologists (and, certainly, the readers of this journal) need hardly be instructed by the truism that the study of a culture and of its art are mutually enriching enterprises. The history of ethnographic description and analysis is a continual reminder of the fact that an understanding of the artistic products of a culture can only arise on the basis of insight into the contexts and conditions which govern the articulation and interpretation of symbolic objects and events in that culture. Also well known (in theory if not as often in practice), is the corollary that an understanding of the artistic styles and patterns that characterize a given culture offers one of the clearest avenues to an understanding of the material and spiritual basis of that culture.

Granting this proposition, this review essay is motivated by two related considerations. The first is, quite simply, to expose to an audience that is mostly likely unfamiliar with it, a particularly fine example of what might be termed art historical ethnography. The second, more complex intention, is to suggest the necessity of such historical studies for the understanding of our own culture. Here, I am afraid, one can not be sanguine about the intuitive sophistication of anthropologists nor even, alas, of the readership of this journal. In fact, and this is an occasion for hope rather than lamentation, the birth of this journal is a reflection of the growing recognition that during the course of the fifteenth century the second labor of the artist.

I will begin, however, with the first, and simpler task. One rather nice definition of the artistic process suggests that artists succeed in evoking appropriate responses by actions in which they:

(1) employ symbols that have established emotional associations; (2) depict emotion-arousing events, persons, or supernatural entities; (3) enlist the spectator’s vicarious participation in the artist’s solution of his problems of design and technical execution; (4) employ particular combinations of line, mass, color, etc., that seem capable of arousing emotions in themselves [Stout 1971].

In listing these distinct, but not mutually exclusive procedures, Stout points out that anthropologists have rightly understood the importance of focusing on the first three as practically and theoretically prior to any attempt to deal with the fourth. As he also points out, an understanding of the first two requires a knowledge of the belief and value systems of a culture and the third requires a knowledge of its technical and material resources and limitations. These are cautions which few anthropologists have ignored. The history of art criticism and aesthetics, however, is replete with the work of those who took as their mission the delineation of the ways in which artists of many periods and persuasions can be molded to the Procrustean demands of various formalistic definitions of absolute aesthetic value. Needless to say, such efforts leave as their most valuable residue their exemplification of the values and beliefs of the historians’ and critics’ own time and place. Baxandall’s more sophisticated endeavor represents precisely the sort of investigation advocated by Stout and embodied in the work of anthropologists from Boas (1927) onward.

Baxandall prefaces his work with the statement that the style of pictures is a proper material of social history:

“Social facts... lead to the development of distinctive skills and habits; and these visual skills and habits become identifiable elements in the painter’s style.” There is, however, no explanation of what constitutes the social facts that are the subject of the painter’s response. The contribution of the book is in the demonstration of this thesis through the description and analysis of the historical, technical, and aesthetic contexts of fifteenth century Italian painting.

Baxandall begins by establishing a social and economic framework for an understanding of the period. “… in the 15th century painting was still too important to be left to the painters.” This was a period in which artists and clients operated within institutions and conventions which were mutually understood and accepted. The client was a period in which artists and clients operated within institutions and conventions which were mutually understood and accepted. The case in modern society. “The better sort of 15th century painting was made on a bespoke basis, the client asking for a manufacture after his own specifications.”

This relationship between artist and client is ingeniously illustrated by Baxandall through a singularly interesting institution—contracts that were drawn up to signify the mutual obligations of the participants in these social exchanges:

Wednesday 3 August 1485:

At the chapel of S. Spirito seventy-eight florins fifteen soldi in payment of seventy-five florins in gold, paid to Sandro Botticelli on his reckoning, as follows: two florins for ultramarine, thirty-eight florins for gold and preparation of the panel, and thirty-five florins for his brush.

The two primary concerns of such contracts are represented here—the quality of the materials (in particular the gold leaf and the expensive blue pigments) and the skill and labor of the artist. Central to Baxandall’s argument is the fact that during the course of the fifteenth century the second ingredient, that of the skill of the artist, came to be the dominant focus of the agreement. There are three inter-
related elements involved in this shift of emphasis but Baxandall chooses to discuss only two of these. The three elements I am referring to are (1) a "general shift away from gild splendour" and the replacement of material conspicuous consumption by "an equally conspicuous consumption of something else—skill"; (2) a growing insistence upon obtaining this skill—embodied explicitly in the recognition of "the very great relative difference, in any manufacture, in the value of the master's and the assistants' time within each workshop," (e.g., "no painter shall put his hand to the brush other than Piero [della Francesca] himself."); and (3) a gradual alteration in the image and role of the painter from that of a craftsman and guild member to that of an original creative artist, an alteration "which corresponds to the desire of artists at this time to shake themselves free from the accusation of being merely craftsmen, manual labor being considered in the society of the Renaissance as ignoble as it had been in the Middle Ages" (Blunt 1940:54).

As a non-specialist I am unable to decide whether Baxandall's lack of attention to the third element referred to above represents a choice dictated by his interest in explaining "the customer's participation" in fifteenth century painting or if, in fact, as he occasionally suggests, he is rejecting what seems to be an accepted view of the changing role of the artist. In either case, however, it seems to me that the basic thrust of this "accepted view" provides relevant support for Baxandall's arguments in that it explicates the shift from an emphasis upon materials and labor to an emphasis upon the special skill of the artist.

In their discussion of the relationship between the Renaissance artist and his patron the Wittkowers note that a kind of stigma marked artists as long as they, like craftsmen or journeymen, received daily or weekly wages or as long as their earnings depended on extraneous matters such as the amount of gold and azure used, the numbers of figures represented, the size of the work, and the time spent on it .... When people began to take cognizance of the difference between craftsmen and artists the old terms of regulating payments slowly broke down. There are clear indications to this effect in fifteenth century Florence .... A reflection of such discussions is to be found as early as the middle of the fifteenth century in the following passage from the pen of Archbishop St. Antonino of Florence (1389-1459): "Painters claim, more or less reasonably, to be paid for their art not only according to the amount of work involved, but rather according to the degree of their application and experience" (Wittkower and Wittkower 1963:22f).

By the end of the fifteenth century the increased valuation of the artist's skill has gradually strengthened his hand in negotiating with clients and patrons: "The other obligations binding on the artist are defined more and more loosely and vaguely in the contracts" (Hauser 1957:59). As the Wittkowers put it, there was a volte-face in the relation between artist and patron, "and the patron then approached the artist as petitioner." The social and economic consequences of this turn of events is evidenced by the increasing importance of the best known and appreciated artists who could pick and choose their assignments to a much greater extent than had been previously possible, and whose ability to command high fees soon raised their material and social standing well above the level of their less successful colleagues. "For the first time, there began to be real differences in the payments made to artists" (Hauser 1957:61).

The emerging freedom of the important artist to choose his own tasks is a critical feature of the shift in focus from the art to the artist who creates works of "genius":

The fundamentally new element in the Renaissance conception of art is the discovery of the concept of genius, and the idea that the work of art is the creation of an autocratic personality, that this personality transcends tradition, theory and rules, even the work itself .... (Hauser 1957:69).

We shall return to this point later. For the moment it will serve to underscore the centrality of the issue with which Baxandall is concerned—the ability of the fifteenth century viewer to respond sensitively to the skill of the artist as it is revealed in his work—for the increased appreciation for the skill of a master is based in the perception, discrimination and evaluation of the elements of skill in the performance of the artist.

In emphasizing the shift of concern from the material value of the gold leaf and other pigments to the less tangible value of the artist's skill Baxandall lands smack in the middle of his central thesis. For he argues that a 15th century man looking at a picture was curiously on his mettle. He was aware that the good picture embodied skill and he was frequently assured that it was the part of the cultivated beholder to make discriminations about that skill, and sometimes to do so verbally.

In raising this issue Baxandall evokes a view of the aesthetic response to which I am particularly sympathetic, having claimed that "the most quintessentially human form of pleasure is that which derives from the exercise of creative and appreciative skills" (Gross 1973a). Moreover, his further analysis of the bases for the appreciative skill of the fifteenth century viewer provides comforting support for my contention that full appreciation of artistic performances involves sufficient knowledge of the code and the style to be able to infer correctly the implied meanings and to perceive and evaluate the skill of the artist in choosing, transforming and ordering elements in order to articulate and convey these meanings and emotions (Gross 1973b).

Beyond providing aid and comfort for my views, however, Baxandall succeeds in demonstrating a number of more important points.

First, he argues convincingly that the skills which were exercised and appreciated through the work of fifteenth century painters can be seen as natural extensions of the everyday technical and social skills of that society. Second, he raises the important caution that the continuities between Renaissance and modern Western visual cultures may blind us to many of the very aspects he is dealing with by making it "difficult to realize how much of our comprehension depends on what we bring to the picture." Third, he reminds us of the ever more critical discontinuities that separate us from the detailed iconographic and thematic sophistication which the fifteenth century artist could take for granted: "(Piero della Francesca) could depend on the beholder to recognize the Annunciation subject promptly enough for him to accent, vary and adjust it in rather advanced ways."

The richness, variety and detail of Baxandall's analysis of the foundations of artistic style and skill in the visual habits
of the fifteenth century defy the constraints of this essay and tempt one to endless quotations. I will, therefore, limit myself to three examples of the ways in which he establishes the points I have mentioned:

(1) In addition to the rich and detailed iconography of themes and symbols alluded to above, the fifteenth century painter drew upon a shared knowledge of the meanings of movements and gestures drawn, in part, from dance and from the practices of preachers and orators. Many of these gestures were codified and formalized in contemporary documents ("when thou speakest of a solemn matra to stand up ryghte with lytell meynge of thy body, but poynnyng the wyth thy fore fynger," from an English source of the 1520s) and Baxandall shows how they were utilized by painters to articulate the figures in their work.

A relatively accessible instance is the secular gesture of invitation—the palm of the right hand is "slightly raised and the fingers are allowed to fan slightly downwards." This gesture can be clearly seen in Botticelli's Primavera: "The central figure of Venus is not beating time to the dance of the Graces but inviting us with hand and glance into her kingdom. We miss the point of the picture if we mistake the gesture."

(2) The second example more clearly illustrates the inter-penetration of the everyday visual skills and the artists' special skills. Here Baxandall brings in the mathematical and geometric skills that were central to fifteenth century commercial life: "It is an important fact of art history that commodities have come regularly in standard-sized containers only since the 19th century." Prior to that point it was a requirement of commercial transactions that one be able to gauge the volume of various containers with speed and accuracy, and the Italians did this "with geometry and phi."

As Baxandall demonstrates, Quattrocento education laid particular emphasis on the training of certain mathematical and geometric skills that were suited to this task, and "this specialization constituted a disposition to address visual experience, in or out of pictures, in special ways; to attend to the structure of complex forms as combinations of regular geometrical bodies and as intervals comprehensible in series." The fact that the painter Piero della Francesca was the author of a mathematical handbook for merchants is only one of the facts Baxandall gives to support his view that "there is a continuity between the mathematical skills used by commerical people and those used by the painter to produce the pictorial proportionality and lucid solidity that strike us as so remarkable now."

(3) The two examples just given—the "language" of gestures and the visual assessment of shapes and volumes—are the sort of cultural conventions and skills that anthropologists are used to dealing with in their attempts to delineate the contexts and codes that underlie the artistic practices of preliterate cultures. Baxandall, however, is dealing with a highly literate society; one which was in the process of developing a body of critical terms and evaluative criteria for the description and assessment of the achievements of its artists. The last third of the book is devoted, therefore, to a discussion and analysis of these terms and of the meanings they held for Quattrocento artists and viewers. Many of these terms are still used in contemporary aesthetic analysis; however, as his discussion clearly establishes, we cannot therefore assume a simple continuity of meaning—"Quattrocento intentions happened in Quattrocento terms, not in ours."

The value for us in understanding these terms is twofold. They have

the advantage of embodying in themselves the unity between the pictures and the society they emerged from. Some (of the terms) relate the public experience of pictures to what craftsmen were thinking about in the workshops: "perspective" or "design". Others relate public experience of pictures to experience of other sides of Quattrocento life: "devoutness" or "graciousness". And still others point to a force which was quietly changing the literate consciousness at this time.

The force that Baxandall is referring to raises the second point—the emergence of the classical system of literary criticism. This process, he notes, was "an important part of the lasting classicization of European culture in the Renaissance ... experience was being re-categorized—through systems of words dividing it up in new ways—and so reorganized."

The primary vehicle Baxandall uses in this discussion of fifteenth century art criticism is the writings of Cristoforo Landino, "the best of the Quattrocento art critics—as opposed to art theorists." Landino was a scholar and a philosopher, a lecturer in poetry and rhetoric; and he was a friend of Alberti (the leading art theorist of the Quattrocento) and the translator of Pliny's Natural History which "includes...the fullest critical history of classical art to survive from antiquity." Landino's critical analyses reflect these influences.

He used not Pliny's terms, with their reference to a general culture very different from that of Florence in 1480, but the method of Pliny's terms. Like Pliny he used metaphors, whether of his own coinage or of his own culture, referring aspects of the pictorial style of his time—"prompt", "devout" and "ornate", for instance. Like Pliny too he uses terms from the artists' workshop, not so technical as to be unknown by the general reader, but yet carrying the painter's own authority—"design", "perspective" and "relief", for instance. These are the two methods of Landino's criticism. 6

It is relevant to our earlier discussion of the emergence of the artist as an individual creator to note that the critical analyses cited by Baxandall tend to be in the form of evaluative descriptions of the work of specifically identified artists. The text from which Baxandall derives his examples of Landino's critical method and terminology is a short, patriotic introduction to his commentary on Dante, in which Landino praises and characterizes four Florentine painters (Masaccio, Filippo Lippi, Andrea del Castagno, Fra Angelico) ad maiorem civitatis gloriam, as it were.

This last point brings me back to my opening statement of intentions. The first, that of suggesting the potential fascination of art historical ethnography, will have been amply realized if I have succeeded in conveying enough of the character of Baxandall's work to motivate the reader to discover how little justice I have done to its charm and richness. The second intention, as stated, was to suggest the importance of such studies for the understanding of our own culture. By this I mean more than the fact, important in itself, that Baxandall provides an example which might fruitfully be followed in describing and analyzing contemporary visual habits and artistic practices and styles.
Rather, I am concerned with the importance of understanding the artistic, epistemological, social, and psychological revolutions that characterize the shift in Western culture from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance as a critical step in achieving an understanding of the dynamics of modern industrial culture. Here I mean something more than the fairly obvious fact that history helps us to understand the present, for this isn't just any point in history, but in many ways a crucial turning point.

In a fascinating discussion of art and culture, Lévi-Strauss tries to bring his experience as an anthropologist to bear upon the relationship of art to Western culture:

An anthropologist would feel perfectly at ease, and on familiar ground, with Greek art before the 5th century B.C. and even with Italian painting, at least up to the time of the school of Siena. Where we might feel on less safe ground and might get an impression of strangeness would be with 5th century Greek art and Italian painting from the Quattrocento onwards.. . . . (It) seems to me that the difference is related to facts of two quite different kinds: on the one hand, what might be called the individualization of artistic output and, on the other, its increasingly figurative or representational character. . . . It seems to me that, in the so-called primitive arts, owing to the rather rudimentary technological skills of the people concerned, there is always a disparity between the technical means at the artist's disposal and the resistance of the materials he has to master, and this prevents him, as it were, even if his conscious intention were different—and more often than not it isn't—from turning the work of art into a straightforward copy. He can not, or does not wish to, reproduce his model in its entirety, and he is therefore obliged to suggest its sign-value, His art instead of being representational, is a system of signs. Yet on reflection, it seems quite clear that the two phenomena—the individualization of art on the one hand and the disappearance of its mimetic function on the other—are functionally linked, and the reason for this is simple: for language to exist, there must be a group [quoted in Charbonnier 1969:57ff].

We have already noted the emergence of the artist as an individual aesthetic entrepreneur. It is important to see, however, that there is also a shift in the cultural notions of aesthetic achievement. The increasing emphasis on the skill of the artist which Baxandall documents did more than allow their less skilled contemporaries as they cast a reflected glory upon their age. It also focused the attention of the artists and of the public upon the role of the artist as formal innovator, "The change in the Renaissance attitude to classical art and literature is to be ascribed . . . to the transference of interest from the material content to the formal elements of representation" (Hauser 1957:74).

The goal of the artist is to observe nature and to represent it "objectively"—for the fifteenth century thought it possessed the means to apply the objectivity of science to the task of visual representation. "In the early Renaissance the truth of art is made dependent upon scientific criteria . . . " (Hauser 1957:75). The achievements in perspective, relief, coloring, etc., are seen as advances which allow artists to come closer to conformity with God's design as it is revealed in nature. Dürer writes:

Therefore observe (nature) industriously, conform to it, and do not deviate from it, thinking that you know how to find it better by yourself, for then you are misled. For truly art is in nature, whoever can distill it therefrom has it . . . . Therefore never imagine that you could or should create something better than God has given His created nature power to effect . . . . For if it is against nature, then it is evil . . . " [Quoted in Huizinga 1959].

One of the consequences of this notion that artists should learn from science and nature is the notion that they have less to learn from other artists. In the sixteenth century Paggi claims that "art can very well be learned without a master because the foremost requirement for its study is a knowledge of theory, based on mathematics, geometry, arithmetic, philosophy and other noble sciences which can be gleaned from books" (Wittkower and Wittkower 1963:11). Leonardo asserted that artists must study nature, not art, lest they be the grandparents rather than the children of nature.

Here we have the two elements that Lévi-Strauss identified as characterizing much of Western art since the Renaissance—the individualization of the artist and the definition of his goal as that of achieving an objective representation of nature.

A prime corollary of this view, however, is the loss of the symbolic role of art:

By freeing art from the chains of convention and harnessing it to the bandwagon of science, Western culture has lost the means by which it could maintain the integrity of the iconic mode, and abdicated responsibility for the cultivation of one of the most important symbolic modes. The identification of art with objective truth carried with it the peculiar Western concept of progress and cumulative cultural evolution; a concept which legitimates innovation and change as inherently valuable, in contrast with cultures in which the new and non-traditional is illegitimate by definition. The justification for this alteration in the basis of aesthetic evaluation lay in the assumption that the task of the artist was to obey the laws of nature and that, as with science and technology, the arts would come steadily closer to perfect truth. Change, therefore, was the essential embodiment of progress. To require art to obey past or even existing conventions would be to doom it to stagnation and failure [Gross 1974].

The artist comes to be seen, like the scientist, as a lone explorer going up against nature and prying out the secret hidden in her deepest recesses. But then, to the extent that he succeeds he does so by overcoming and rejecting the errors of the past. So that, even when artists abandoned the goal of mimetic fidelity in favor of other concepts of the true insight into the nature of artistic vision and its representation, the culture was left with a fixed belief in the innovative originality of the creative genius. The conditions that characterize the relationship of the modern artist to his culture are those of inevitable dislocation and alienation as he attempts to overcome what he has been told, in effect, to view as the limitations of the past.

Paggi's views are echoed 350 years later by Courbet in his opposition to the teaching of art in the academy:

I cannot teach my art, nor the art of any school, since I deny that art can be taught, or as I maintain, in other words, that art is strictly individual and is for each artist precisely the talent resulting from his own inspiration and from his own studies of tradition [Gauss 1949].

The modern artist expects to be misunderstood by his culture, it is the proof of his success in going beyond the achievements of the past and the present. Stendhal was perhaps prototypical in his correct prediction in 1830 that his work would not be read before 1880 nor appreciated before 1935. But this is a heavy price to pay.

We would never manage to understand each other if, within our society, we formed a series of coteries, each one of which had
its own particular language, or if we allowed constant changes and revolutions to take place in language, like those that we have been able to observe now for a number of years in the fine arts.... [We] are left with nothing but a system of signs, but "outside language" since the sign-system is created by a single individual, and he is liable to change his own system fairly frequently [Lévi-Strauss, in Carbonnier 1969].

Whatever the valuable and positive consequences of these (and other) shifts in Western epistemology—and there are many undeniable spiritual, social and material benefits that have derived from them—it is, I believe, equally clear that they have played a major role in laying the foundations for the growing alienation of modern culture from the symbolic skills which enrich and nourish the arts and which used to bind the artist and his audience in a net of shared meanings and evaluative criteria.

Clearly, this is not an appropriate context for the full elaboration or substantiation of such a broad and possibly controversial generalization. In part I have attempted this elsewhere (Gross 1974). I would like to conclude this essay by suggesting that the line of reasoning that I am proposing is one which argues that the very sort of common understanding and shared knowledge of skills, conventions and meanings that Baxandall so delightfully describes as characterizing the relationship between the Quattrocento painter and his audience is precisely the kind of cultural richness and spiritual satisfaction that is unavailable to the members of our modern industrial societies. The effort to understand, investigate and describe the reasons for this is, I believe, a central moral obligation for those of us who are concerned with the potential and the realities of human symbolic skills and achievements. This effort can be crucially aided by detailed analyses of the richness and complexity represented in Baxandall's book; but we will be fulfilling that obligation only when we can bring such knowledge and such analytic skills to bear upon our own culture.

NOTES

1Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from Baxandall.

2In the memoirs of a contemporary of Cosimo de Medici it is noted that Cosimo appreciated the work of Donatello and, "as it seemed to him, that there was little work available for the latter and as he was sorry that Donatello should remain inactive, he entrusted him with the pulpits and doors of the sacristy in San Lorenzo" (quoted in Hauser 1957:44). In 1438 Domenico Veneziano wrote to Cosimo's son, Piero: I have just heard that Cosimo has resolved to commission... an altarpiece, and that he desires a magnificent work. This pleases me much, and it would please me even more if it would, with your help be possible for me to paint it" (quoted in Wittkower and Wittkower 1963:34). In 1501, the Marchioness Isabella d'Este, an important collector, wrote to the Carmelite Vicar-General of Florence: "Your Reverence might find out if (Leonardo) would undertake to paint a picture for our studio. If he consents, we would leave the subject and the time to him; but if he declines, you might at least induce him to paint a little picture of the Madonna, as sweet and holy as his own nature" (Wittkower and Wittkower 1963:35). She never got her picture.

3This is a point which holds considerable relevance to and support for Lomax' recent discussion of the relationship between the work and social organization patterns and the styles of song and dance in many cultures (1959, 1962, 1972). It is also an approach which is clearly resonant with Boas' pioneering studies of primitive art: "The very fact that the manufactures of man in each and every part of the world have pronounced style proves that a feeling for form develops with technical activities. There is nothing to show that the mere contemplation of nature or of natural objects develops a sense of fixed form... Without stability of form of objects, manufactured or in common use, there is no style; and stability of form depends upon the development of a high technique... The manufactures of man the world over prove that the ideal forms are based essentially on standards developed by expert technicians." (1927:11f) Boas states his belief that "there is a close connection between the development of skill in an industry and artistic activity. Ornamental art has developed in those industries in which the greatest skill is attained. Artistic productivity and skill are closely correlated. Productive artists are found among those who have mastered a technique... aside from all adventitious form elements, the product of an experienced worker in any handicraft has an artistic value" (1927:19).

The difference between the approaches of Baxandall and Boas, and it is not unimportant, lies in the fact that Boas was mainly concerned with the tendency for aesthetic considerations to become central to the manufacture of utilitarian implements, whereas Baxandall is discussing the generalization or spill-over of technical and commercial skills into the creation and appreciation of specifically artistic products. This is not to imply that Boas was unaware of the existence of "non-utilitarian" art objects, nor even that he fails to discuss their manufacture, but rather to suggest the complementarity as well as the parallel aspects of Baxandall's analysis.

4...if one did not know about the Annunciation it would be difficult to know quite what was happening in Piero's painting; as a critic once pointed out, if all we knew of the Angel Gabriel was that he was a man we could well suppose that both figures, the Angel Gabriel and Mary, were directing their attention to the column... In this case, Mary's stance frontal to us serves various purposes: first, it is a device Piero uses to induce participation by the beholder; second, it counters on this occasion the fact that its position in the chapel at Arezzo causes the beholder to see the fresco rather from the right; third, it helps to register particular moments in Mary's story; that as she now moves towards the Angel previous to her final submission to her destiny. For fifteenth-century people differentiated more sharply than us between successive stages of the Annunciation, and the sort of nuance we now miss in Quattrocentro representations is one of the things that will have to engage us later."

5From a mathematical handbook for merchants by Piero della Francesca. There is a barrel, each of its ends being 2 bracci in diameter; the diameter at its bung and halfway between bung and end is 2 2/9 bracci. The barrel is 2 bracci long. What is the cubic measure? This is like a picture of truncated cones. Square the diameter at the ends: 2 × 2 = 4. Then square the median diameter 2/9 × 2/9 = 4 76/81. Add them together: 8 76/81. Multiply 2 × 2/9 = 4 4/9. Add this to 8 76/81 = 13 31/81. Divide by 3 = 4 112/243. Now square 2/9 × 2/9 × 2/9 = 9/16. Add this to the previous sum: 15 1/129. Divide by 3: 5 1/3888. Add it to the first result: 4 112/243 + 5 1/3888 = 9 1792/3888. Multiply this by 11 and then divide by 14 (ie, multiply by phi): the final result is 7 23600/54432. This is the cubic measure of the barrel. "To the commercial man almost anything was reducible to geometrical figures underlying any surface irregularities—the pile of grain reduced to a cone, the barrel to a cylinder or to a compound of truncated cones... and so on. This habit of analysis is very close to the painter's analysis of appearances. As a man gauged a bale, a painter surveyed a figure. In both cases there is a conscious reduction of irregular masses and voids to combinations of manageable geometric bodies. A painter who left traces of such analysis in his painting was leaving cues his public was well equipped to pick up."

6An interesting example is Landino's use of the term composition: "Composition, in the sense of a systematic harmonization of every element in a picture towards one total desired effect, was invented by Alberti in 1435: it is from him that Landino takes the concept. Alberti found his model in the classic literary criticism of the humanists, for whom composizione was the way in which a sentence was made up, with a hierarchy of four levels: (word/phrase/clause/sentence). Alberti transferred the word and model to painting: (plane/member/body/picture). Pictures are composed of bodies, which are composed of parts, which are composed of plane surfaces: planes are composed into members, members into bodies, bodies into pictures. With this notion the Quattrocento could analyse the
make-up of a picture very thoroughly, scrutinizing its articulation, rejecting the superfluous, relating formal means to narrative ends.”

For readers with an appetite for primary source “ethnographic” data, some good sources are: D. S. Chambers, *Patrons and Artists in the Italian Renaissance*, University of South Carolina Press, 1971 (available in paperback and probably the best available source in English); C. Seymour, Jr., *Michelangelo’s David*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967 (extensive documentation dealing primarily with the dealings of Donatello and Michelangelo with the Operai of the Duomo of Florence, and a fascinating record of public hearings on the question of where the David should be displayed); for those with access to more extensive libraries than those of the University of Pennsylvania, two studies I have been unable to locate seem to be unusually interesting—M. Wackernagel, *Der Lebensraum des Kunstlers in der Florentinischen Renaissance*, Leipzig, 1938; and H. Lerner-Lehkmuhl, *Zur Struktur und Geschichte des Florentinischen Kunstmarktes*, Wattenscheid, 1936.

For readers with an interest in the philosophical and epistemological currents of the period, particularly as they relate to aesthetic practices and criteria, I would strongly recommend Wittkower’s *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* (Random House, 1965) and Cassirer’s *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy* (Harper Torchbooks, 1964), as well as many of Gombrich’s papers on the Renaissance (e.g., *Norm and Form*, Phaidon, 1966).

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The main thesis of Akeret's *Photoanalysis* is an important one, one that deserves additional study by students of visual communication. He asserts that more attention should be given to photographic images that we either take ourselves, pose for, or merely look at on a day-to-day basis. However, the author fails to build upon this notion sufficiently. Beyond this obvious assertion of the need for attention, the book has little to offer communication scholars other than to serve as a good "bad example" of how to think (or not to think) about photographic communication.

The book's eleven chapters are divided into three parts. The first nine chapters, roughly the first half of the book, are devoted to analyzing personal photographs. Akeret describes photoanalysis as "the study of photographs to arrive at personal and interpersonal insight . . . . It is a psychologically sound method of increasing self-awareness, and . . . it can help anyone become visually sensitive to the nuances of personality and interpersonal relationships that are recorded in photographs" (p. 9). Akeret additionally states that photoanalysis is "a discipline with specific guidelines and workable techniques; but it is a skill that can be learned by anyone" (p. 9).

Akeret developed his methods in his private practice of psychoanalysis over a 20-year period of time. He states: "The results of that work have led me to the conclusion that all photographs of people have some kind of psychological story to tell" (p. 17).

In the early chapters, Akeret offers several examples of how he has used photographs of the family album or snapshot genre in his psychoanalytic interviews and therapy sessions. For instance, he asked patients if they either carried personal photographs or if they could bring several photographs from their family album to a later session. Akeret then began "to ask questions and make relevant observations: 'Does your father always look so depressed?' or 'No one seems to touch anyone' or 'Your parents look very pleased with you' . . . . While seeking answers, I am also encouraging the person to ask his own questions and make his own observations about the photos" (p. 17).

Akeret continues by outlining the therapeutic potential of photoanalysis. For instance, he states that "Photoanalysis can help determine the reality of present and past experiences, and can aid the individual in a more precise and accurate recollection of those experiences" (p. 20); "Photoanalysis can activate those psychological resources of an individual that are beyond awareness" (p. 24); and "Photoanalysis can be extremely useful in uncovering the subtleties and complexities of an individual's relationship with other people" (p. 27). Again, the author uses several interesting examples from his practice to illustrate these points.

Akeret then discusses the actual procedure of photoanalysis by giving readers a list of questions and instructions to apply to any photograph. This long list includes such questions as: "What is your immediate impression? Who and what do you see?" "How do the people in the photo feel about their bodies?" "What do you notice about the emotional state of each person? Is he: shy, compliant, aloof . . . . angry, weak . . . bright, curious, sexy . . . bemused, correct . . . satisfied, depressed?" and "Do you see love present?" (p. 35). Akeret instructs students of photoanalysis to "learn to read any photo as you would read a book, from left to right, then downward. Go over it again and again . . . ." (p. 35).

In the second half of the book Akeret applies a similar set of analytic notions in order to discuss "what public photos actually reveal." Public photographs are those that appear in the context of mass communications such as books, magazines, or newspapers. Akeret also includes photographs that were originally produced for private or personal use and have been put in a public context (see photograph of Charlie Whitman, standing with two rifles on a beach [p. 174], and childhood photographs of Henry Luce [p. 176], Harry Truman [p. 178], and Lyndon Johnson [p. 181]). Akeret admits that he is less certain of his analysis of these photographs as compared with personal photographs which could be validated in interviews with his patients.

The concluding chapter offers a series of photographic images which readers can analyze for themselves. As a last note, Akeret invites his readers to compare their observations with his by writing to the publisher for a complimentary copy of his observations of the same photographs.

The early chapters of the book contain several attempts to develop a systematic framework for studying photographic images in a photoanalytic mode. As I have summarized, Akeret offers discussions of some procedures and guidelines for photoanalysis. However, the latter sections of the book are little more than an anecdotal annotated picture book. The book's 241 photographs, however, are generally well reproduced. It is too bad that in a few examples, it is almost impossible to see the important behavioral cues that Akeret describes.

The book contains several systematic confusions that repeatedly appear. The remainder of my review is directed toward bringing several of these confusions to the surface, and discussing the issues involved. The first difficulty that I have in taking Akeret's work seriously involves his lack of any discernible model of visual communication in general, and photographic communication in particular. In many instances, Akeret describes pictures as "saying" something, "telling us" something, "scream[ing]" warnings (p. 175), and, in some cases, "suggest[ing]" the future" (p. 29). What may be taken as a simple and conventionalized semantic mistake, I think of as a fundamental error, which, in turn, when so consistently made, promotes a false method of interpretation and analysis. A parallel confusion about the
terms employed in describing camera use is diagnosed and clarified in several papers by Paul Byers (1964, 1966), specifically in one entitled “Cameras Don’t Take Pictures” (1966). It is in the sense of that title that photographs also do not “say” anything. Our attention should be directed at what people (both photographers and photograph viewers) say about pictures which, in turn, demands that we know more about modes of perception, conventions of inferring and intending, interpretive strategies and patterns of inference. In other words, a great deal of background work is needed before we can say what is happening (especially in terms of meaning) in any photographic communication event.

The most obvious criticism of Akeret’s method of photoanalysis involves his neglect of contextual information about the photographic “event” that produced a particular single thing that we call a “photograph.” Again the fault lies in having no conceptual framework for visual communication. Throughout the book, repeated reference is made to the manifest content of individual photographs. Akeret sensitizes our perception to examples of kinesic, proxemic and tacesic behavior. For instance, in one photograph of a young person performing cartwheels on a beach, Akeret observes, “She is a superb example of control and freedom blending together in body movement. Some people feel awkward living in their bodies, but this young girl is completely at home in hers” (p. 120). In another instance, while analyzing a photograph of a “typical pre-World War II Swiss public school class,” Akeret suggests that we look at “how the students are packed in like sardines in the last rows, while in the first three rows they are spaced out and less crowded” (p. 62). In a family album photograph of an eleven-member family group (p. 57), our attention is called to how the “older sister is trying to make contact through touch, extending her right hand and arm around her sister’s shoulder. With her left arm, she reaches toward her younger sister’s right arm... Their hands meet and most likely touch. But again the younger sister controls the contact, even limits it with her left hand which she uses as a barrier by clamping it down on her right arm” (p. 56).

Additionally, Akeret asks that we attend to the significance of posture, facial expressions, use of hands, hair length, and so on. In one instance, he shows us three photographs of young girls from different families, and suggests that each of “their facial expressions activates different feelings” (p. 109). Akeret asks that we find one word that best captures the feelings evoked by each photograph. In the case of the second example, Akeret states that he “would say ‘shock’... because the formation of the girl’s mouth indicates that the visual impact of whatever she saw was sudden, extreme, and unexpected” (p. 109). In another series of pictures of three brothers, Akeret observes that “the positioning of their hands and their facial expressions are remarkably different and revealing” (p. 108). Akeret says of the first brother: “The oldest son looks self-absorbed, contained, and controlled. His face shows a faint trace of feeling, but he is not about to share it. His neatly folded hands separate and seal off the world” (p. 108). The author calls our attention to observing hair length in an interesting series of family album photographs spanning a period of three generations. Akeret says of one photograph: “This child has long hair and is a model of feminine attractiveness” (p. 50). Later we read: “The mother now has long hair, braided and in a bun, and is holding her youngest daughter, who gives the impression of being a wild little gypsy” (p. 50).

Later, attention is also called to examples of head tilts (pp. 106-107) and “leggy showmanship” (pp. 116-117). However, because the author fails to acknowledge that much systematic research has been done on these modes of communication (with the exception of brief reference to Birdwhistell and Ruesch), his sensitization remains on a shallow level.

In the above quotations from Akeret’s text, readers should also recognize that the author has gone considerably beyond any sense of objective description of manifest content. The author consistently makes intuitive inferential leaps to produce what I judge to be unsound and unjustified conclusions.

In addition, Akeret’s book suffers from a much more fundamental omission. As “outside” participants in the production of these visual symbolic forms we have little or no information about what we are really looking at. For instance, are we looking at “natural” behavior (in terms of candid on-camera behavior), or are we looking at examples of fabricated or staged behavior that has somehow been coerced to fit someone’s image or model of what appropriately looks “right.” We have no information on what lies outside the borders of the photographic image. Akeret is seemingly aware of this problem when he twice toys with the idea of information missing in cropped photographs (pp. 221-222, and 224-225). In all of his other examples this idea is ignored. Second, he offers no information on any type of verbal interaction involved in the photographic event, such as posing instructions that might have been given by any one of the participants during the photographic event.

Akeret appears to insist that despite all potential sources of influence on-on-camera behavior, a special “truth” quality emerges from a photographer-subject interaction—an event that might contain all the special qualities of the “decisive moment” as described by Cartier-Bresson (1966). To agree or disagree with this proposition, we certainly must seek to learn more about photographic events and the significance of that special moment. Photographic events include interactions between people using cameras and people on-camera as well as interactions between people looking at pictures and the content of the pictures per se. The literature contains very few systematic investigations or even objective accounts of photographic events; reports tend to be written about the technical dimensions of the photographic enterprise rather than behavioral ones that might characterize photography as a process of communication.

Akeret does acknowledge that “every photograph is the result of a complex relationship among photographer, subject, setting and culture” (p. 32), and he later maintains the desirability of knowing something about these components. However, readers must conclude that these remarks are only attempts to cover future criticisms of the book since the author consistently ignores his own good advice and repeatedly makes intuitive psychologically oriented inferences based on no sensitivity to these important contextual factors.

Another source of confusion results from the logical extension of not knowing what we are looking at in the
photographs he shows us. Akeret appears to be unaware of the possibility that we may “handle” or “operate on” (in the cognitive sense) these symbolic forms in different ways. Any statement of meaning must be derived from a minimal understanding of alternative interpretive strategies and culturally structured cognitive frameworks. For instance, we are forced to ask the following important questions. Do we look at and decode all pictorial representations in the same way? Do we operationalize the same interpretive strategy for the “reading” of all visual symbolic forms, such as cartoons, paintings, drawings, photographs, films, etc.? (Gombrich, Hochberg, and Black 1972). Do we activate the same interpretive strategy for understanding situations and behavior that appear in real life versus situations and behavior that are presented in mediated symbolic forms? A subtler distinction that must also be understood and dealt with involves the interpretation of images that we know or assess to be “natural” versus those that we understand or infer to be staged (Worth and Gross 1974; Worth 1974). Thus to say that Akeret has not adequately accounted for contextual factors involves both a consideration of his failure to deal with encoding and decoding activity. Again, I am placing emphasis on the development of a model of visual communication that adequately relates and accounts for these problematic concerns.

In summary, the purpose of Akeret’s analysis is to make statements about meaning from the observation of photographs. The problem remains that photographs as photographs—marks on pieces of paper—do not mean anything. Meanings of mechanically reproduced images are culturally structured overlays, conventional constructs and schemas unique to a particular cultural and human condition about which we know very little.

Akeret’s text does, however, offer us several rather indirect contributions. We are given an object lesson in how little we know about photographic communication and of how little empirical data we have to validate, to contradict or to disconfirm a variety of analyses.

Let me return for a moment to the idea of communicative events. A useful approach to the study of speech events has been developed and outlined by Dell Hymes (1962, 1964), who proposes that these speech events and acts can be described and compared in terms of specific components (participants, settings, topics, etc.) and a variety of functions (referential, expressive, poetic, etc.). For our purposes, the importance of this sociolinguistic framework is that it provides investigators of communicative codes other than speech with a potentially applicable analytic scheme.

In the area of visual communication, Sol Worth (1966, 1972) has developed and applied a model of film communication. Worth describes “vidistics” as that area of study which treats film “as if it were the ‘language’ of visual communication . . . . Film, as if it were language, as studied vidistically, is thus thought of as the study of specific elements, elements in sequence, operations on these elements, and cognitive representations of them that act as a mediating agent in a communication process between human beings—between a filmer and a viewer and between a creator and re-creator” (1966:331).

Combining an understanding of communicative components and functions with a notion of vidistic events can logically lead to what I have elsewhere called “sociovidistics” (1972, 1974). Just as sociolinguistics attempts to understand the use of verbal codes in relationship to social contexts, sociovidistics emphasizes the clarification of the relationship between the content of visual forms and the social context in which these forms are produced and used. This work has been initiated in the study of socio-documentary filmmaking (Chalfen 1972, 1974) and home-moviemaking (Chalfen 1973).

The photography critic Alan D. Coleman titled his review of Photoanalysis “He Could Have Done A Better Job” (1974). I am not sure that anyone will be able to do a better job of using the relationship between meaning and iconic, indexical or symbolic representations of reality, until we better understand the relationship between the act of recording and the situational and cultural factors that structure that recording.

Photoanalysis does contain an interesting array of examples from Akeret’s own therapy sessions that can serve to illustrate a neglected research strategy. John Collier, Jr. (1967) discusses the photo elicitation technique, the use of photographs as a catalyst to elicit information in interviews. Collier presents a more balanced account of the use of photographs, citing several examples of causing more harm than good by introducing photographs into an interview. Akeret only tells us success stories.

The book suffers in one additional comparison. In terms of using photographs to examine patterns of human behavior, much better examples are provided by Bateson and Mead in Balinese Character (1942) and by Mead and Byers in The Small Conference (1968).

Some readers might feel that the critical nature of my review is, in fact, out of context, that the book has been created as a light and humorous addition to standard cocktail talk, and will take its rightful place alongside other examples of this genre, namely Body Language (1971), Is Your VW a Sex Symbol? (1973), and the like. For the serious scholar of visual communication, looking for something different from cocktail party chatter, Photoanalysis will be a great disappointment.

This review, I hasten to add, should not be construed as an attack on drinking, cocktail parties, or coffee table books, all of which have useful purposes in different contexts.

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Another Place is a handsomely printed book with a brief text and 80 black-and-white photographs. On first examination this volume appears to be simply a portfolio of Maya Indian life. It may also be significant because it offers a starting point for reasoning and exploring further the contributions of visual communication for anthropology, for it places focus on the intellectual and creative role of the anthropologist.

Karl G. Heider and the author-photographer, Frank Cancian, are listed as “General Editors.” It is not stated whether this is a single publication or one of a series, but the editorship of Heider suggests that a number of anthropological books based on photography might be planned. Another Place is Cancian’s third publication on Chiapas, the result of contact and research spread over 13 years. Much of the photography was made under grants from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the Latin American Studies Program at Stanford University. The Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences “provided the lifescape necessary to plan the book.”

Why was this book made? And what is the anthropological significance of the title, Another Place? The introduction may suggest the author’s message.

Women pat out countless tortillas and always walk behind men. Chickens are sacrificed to Maya Gods under crosses on a mountain-top overlooking the Catholic church. A proper meal is preceded by rinsing out the mouth as well as hand washing and Zinacantecos die easily of measles, a European disease.

Having spent three of the last thirteen years doing anthropological research among the Zinacantecos, I know that these and similar things provide the form of daily life. But they really make very little difference. Zinacantan is another place where people live [reviewer’s italics].

This observation reminds the reviewer of the opening in a social studies text: “People have to live somewhere, so everywhere where there are some people.”

After dealing with the book’s introduction, the reader searches through the photographs to grasp further meaning of Another Place. But the book has no layout, no sequential relationships; pictures tumble one upon the other with little association. The book begins with a series of Indian portraits and continues with a scattering of photographs of childhood, four pictures of an unidentified European-type school, fiesta images in Zinacantan Center, commercial interaction in the town of San Cristobal de las Casas, back-strap weaving technology, domestic scenes, agricultural activities, photographs of religious life, prayers, and shrines. The book concludes with still more portraits. Pictures are dropped in indiscriminately—portraits, technology, and vistas of landscape—so that this structure is hard to follow through the pages of the book. Based on this design and content, the reader must decide whether this is a book of anthropology, photojournalism of travel in Chiapas, or simply a folio of art images.

None of these categories describe Another Place. Frank Cancian, who is also Chairman of the Department of Anthropology at Stanford, is technically a fine photographer. The book contains superb individual portraits that must reflect the spirit of the Zinacantecos. Yet we do not get an intimate sense of this community or the life of these Indians. If there were no text at all, the pictures would appear to be travel snapshots of a very good cameraman who spent a few weeks in Chiapas.

Considering Frank Cancian’s years of research with Zinacantecos, this impression is absurd and surely misleading. The author must have made thousands of negatives that he has taken over the years in the Chiapas region and an embracing file of photographs made consecutively in 1971 under a Wenner-Gren grant. The shallowness of this volume must rest on the editorial design and focus of the book. Beyond editorialism there also may be doubt in the author’s mind about photography’s place in anthropological research. This would be surprising, for Cancian has done much of his fieldwork with the Harvard Chiapas Project, which has used photography brilliantly in mapping and defining the social structure of Indian villages in the mountainous terrain of Chiapas. In one sense Another Place seems historical. Thirty years ago an anthropological book of this style would have been under-
Another Place, standable. Certainly there was then, and apparently there still is now, conflict and confusion between scientific observation and what can be considered the artistic impressionism of the camera record.

Twenty years ago, as a photographer, I entered the field of visual anthropology over the very issue that is raised by Another Place, the disciplined process of the scientist that has separated him from the sensory and creative role of the popularly conceived artist, writer, or photographer. The issue is not the historical conflict between objective and subjective reason and observation, but the methodological shallowness of traditional anthropology that has obscured the full dimension of human beings. As I write I have Another Place before me and also the manuscript of a forthcoming book by a close colleague of Cancian’s, George Collier, on the acculturation process of Chiapas Indians. George Collier’s text, a comprehensive and provocative work, is expressed in the classical objective language approved by scientific anthropology. Another Place could be Frank Cancian’s effort to go beyond the limitations of scientific expression, a flight into the sensory process of recording with the camera. If indeed this is the motivation, this book is an eye opener of what happens when the anthropologist leaps into the heady stream of art expression.

The space between objective analysis and the often subjective personal recordings of the camera is apparently too broad, for Another Place falls into the limbo between these extremes and demonstrates again the cliche that science and art are wholly incompatible. There are, of course, many of us who believe this is not true and even that the scientific record without the creative process is humanly dead. Visual anthropology is this battleground between the objective materialism of limited scientific investigations and the open process of the intuitive and emotional experience that many insist are wholly the domain of art. We can demonstrate methodologically how the sensual recordings of the camera can be and have been controlled to support the most critical scientific processes. Three decades of anthropologists, beginning with Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, have demonstrated the unique function of photography in anthropological research. Cancian may reply that this is not the issue, and that he was clearly departing from research and seeking another level of both recording and communication. I sincerely feel this was Cancian’s intent. But as an anthropologist, what is he trying to explore in this book? There is certainly one area where this search could lead: to the humanistic and sensual communications about culture, the frontier of ethnographic film.

If this book falls into limbo, it is simply because the author’s use of the medium of photography is confused. But why the confusion? Reasonably this question also asks why did Cancian want to retreat from anthropology? Maybe this answer would be the joint reason for anthropology’s involvement with ethnographic film. In appreciation of Cancian’s efforts, let us point out that many devotees of ethnographic film may be no clearer in their motives. As Cancian states, “I know that these and similar things provide the form of daily life. But they really make very little difference.” In terms of materialistic anthropology they don’t. But in the eyes of visual anthropology they make all the difference. After looking through Another Place, the differences that really seem to matter are the qualities of eyes and the fluency and composure of bodies. These people cannot be found in Liberal, Kansas, or Sleepy Falls, Iowa. What Cancian’s records hold are the human delicacies that many statements in anthropology, for reasons of discipline, have left out. And it is this awareness that makes Cancian and multitudes of anthropologists reach for the camera, an eye that can record these nuances missing from the written anthropological record.

At this point Cancian and all anthropological photographers face the challenge that the technological process of photography by itself communicates nothing. This is as true as the reality that “cameras do not take pictures,” as stated by Paul Byers, “only people do.” In the same reality a scattering of pictures or hundreds of feet of film also may say nothing. Only the coherent eye of the editor-anthropologist can sequence photography into communication. And this is what does not happen in Another Place. Certainly there is communication in these eighty pictures, but we might never know this content unless we took a pair of scissors and went through the creative editing process, unscrambling and uniting all the visual sentences in this book.

There is so much more content to Frank Cancian’s photography than can be experienced in the staggered journey of this book. Surely if Cancian’s thousands of negatives were edited and cut and put back together, as is film, the result would be an outstanding book of visual anthropology that would tell us of all the differences, the complexities, and the humanities of Zinacantecos’ life.

Reference Cited

Collier, George A.

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NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE

□ HISTORIANS FILM COMMITTEE

*Film and History* is a quarterly publication of the Historians Film Committee. It publishes articles by history teachers and film researchers, syllabi of history courses using film, interviews, film reviews, and other information for the teacher interested in using film. Membership rates (fee includes a subscription to the periodical) are $5.00 for individuals, $10.00 for institutions, and $2.00 for graduate students. For further information contact Historians Film Committee, c/o The History Faculty, Newark College of Engineering, Newark, NJ 07102.

□ PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE AVAILABLE ON VIDEOTAPE

Until the proceedings of the Sign Language Conference held April 27, 1974, at Gallaudet College are published in printed form, persons interested may rent with permission to make copies five one-hour one-half-inch black-and-white videotapes of the conference. The fee is $25.00 if the tapes are returned 48 hours from receipt. Write for further information to R. Battison, Linguistics Research Laboratory, Gallaudet College, Washington, DC 20002.

□ FILM REVIEWS

Anyone interested in either reviewing a film or having a film reviewed in the American Anthropologist, should contact Tim Asch, Associate Editor for Audiovisuals, Department of Anthropology, Peabody Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

□ FFAT SUGGESTIONS

Anyone having suggestions for additional entries in Films for Anthropological Teaching, should contact Karl Heider, 466 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025.

□ NEW MUSEUM FOR PHOTOGRAPHY CREATED

A new museum devoted exclusively to photography will open in October, with the photo-journalist Cornell Capa as its executive director. The museum, to be called the International Center of Photography, has acquired Audubon House, a landmark building at Fifth Avenue and 94th Street, as its headquarters. "The center will live up to its name as an exhibition, educational and archival facility," said Mr. Capa, pointing out that no other institution, with the exception of Eastman House in Rochester, deals in depth exclusively with photography. "We are interested in photography as a humanistic visual discipline," he added, noting that the museum will have "a documentary/commentary direction, more than a purely esthetic point of view." A main function will be to serve, as no other institution does, as an archive for negatives—particularly those of photographers "in the documentary tradition." There will be sufficient space in the six-story Audubon House, he added, to provide a permanent print and negative archival facility with a central file and retrieval system. In addition, the building will consolidate under one roof a program that includes exhibitions, education, publications, nationwide lecture series and international traveling shows of the kind organized by the fund for the last eight years. For further information, contact I.F.C.P., 275 5th Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 685-1373.

□ NEW FILM STUDIES PERIODICAL

*Jump Cut*, a review of contemporary cinema, emphasizes reviews of all current films, articles on directors, current film trends, and film books and events. *Jump Cut* is committed to developing film criticism which recognizes: theoretical perspectives such as structuralism, semiology, and Marxism, and film in a social and political context. One year (six issues), $3.00. First issue May-June 1974. *Jump Cut*, 3138 West Schubert, Chicago, IL 60647.

□ NEW SERIES ANNOUNCED

Scrimshaw Press has begun a new series of photographic essays by "artists who practice ethnology." Another Place: Photographs of a Maya Community, by Frank Cancian, is the first in the series. Frank Cancian and Karl Heider are editors. For further information, contact Georgia George, The Scrimshaw Press, 149 9th St., San Francisco, CA 94103.

□ FILM MEMORABILIA

Anyone interested in doing research in popular films realizes how difficult it is sometimes to locate materials. The following is a list of stores which specialize in film memorabilia (mainly American):

1. Cinema Attic, P.O. Box 772, Philadelphia, PA 19107
2. Mark Ricci's Memory Shop, 100 4th Ave., New York, NY
3. Larry Edmund's Bookshop, 6658 Hollywood Blvd, Los Angeles, CA
4. Photo Archives, Room 709, 1472 Broadway, New York, NY
5. Kenneth G. Lawrence's Movie Memorabilia Shop of Hollywood, P.O. Box 29027, Los Angeles, CA 90029
6. Cinemabilia, 10 Cornelia, New York, NY
7. Collectors' Bookstore, 6763 Hollywood, Los Angeles, CA 90028
8. Bond Street Book Store, 1638 Wilcox, Los Angeles, CA
9. Cinefan, 7470 Diversey, Elmwood Park, IL 60635

Most of these stores have catalogs, some of them are free.

□ PUBLICATION ON ARCHIVAL PROCEDURES FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

Anyone who has a collection of historical negatives or
prints that they wish to store should obtain a copy of *Procedures for Processing and Storing Black and White Photographs for Maximum Possible Permanence*, available for 50¢ from East Street Gallery, 723 State St., Box 68, Grinnell, IA 50112.

**DATES SET FOR 1975 AMERICAN FILM FESTIVAL**

The Educational Film Library Association has announced that the 17th Annual American Film Festival will be held June 2-7, 1975, at the New York Hilton Hotel. The American Film Festival is a major non-theatrical film festival in the United States, receiving over 700 entries each year. After preliminary screening, about 300 of these entries are exhibited during the week-long event attended by more than a thousand film librarians, university film department representatives, school media coordinators, teachers, students, consultants, writers, filmmakers, producers, and distributors from all over the United States and Canada. The 1975 American Film Festival will feature five full days of screenings. Film in competition will be shown on Tuesday, June 3, through Friday, June 6. For further information, contact Geraldine Laybourne, E.F.L.A., Festival Coordinator, 17 West 60th St., New York, NY 10023.

**TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH**

*Telecommunications Research in the United States and Selected Foreign Countries: A Preliminary Survey* has just been published in two volumes. It is available from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22151.

**CABLE TELEVISION**

The Cable Television Information Center provides various kinds of information concerning Cable Television. While they are primarily concerned with assisting the public and officials in improving the quality of cable TV, they are a good source of information for people interested in doing research. Their address is 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, DC 20037.

**ITALIAN QUARTERLY**

*Versus*, a multilingual quarterly publishes information on communications research, linguistics, and nonverbal semiotics. It is edited by Umberto Eco. For further information contact Versus, Valentino Bompiani, S.P.A. Via Pisacane, 26 20129, Milan, Italy.

**NEWSREEL ARCHIVE ESTABLISHED**

Universal Pictures has announced that they have transferred rights to their newsreel collection (1929-67) to the federal government. The 30,000 reel Universal collection is available for research and reproduction at the Audiovisual Division of the National Archives in Washington, DC.

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**CONFERENCE ON CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION**

Temple University in conjunction with the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication announces the first Conference on Culture and Communication to be held on March 13-15, 1975. The Conference will consist of symposia, seminars, volunteered papers and media workshops. The purpose of the Conference is to bring together people from many disciplines and professions who recognize the need to explore relationships between patterns and processes of communication and culture. The theme of the first Conference will be: Establishing Directions in Culture and Communication—The Study of Communicative Codes in Cultural Contexts. Persons wishing to read a paper or to organize a symposium, seminar or workshop should write for abstract forms. Presentation and discussion of the use and analysis of media such as still and motion picture photography, sound tape and videotape are encouraged when such have been used as research tools in the study of culturally structured communicative behavior. The Registration Fee for the entire Conference is $20.00 ($15.00 for students and members of the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication). Registration forms, abstract forms and preliminary programs can be obtained by writing to: Richard Chalfen, Conference on Culture and Communication, Department of Anthropology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.
**INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS**

**STYLE.** Issues of the current volume should be consulted, along with the *Manual of Style* of the University of Chicago Press. Major subheadings should be kept to a minimum and, where possible, Roman numerals only should be used. Under no circumstances are second-level subheadings to be used. **MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION.** Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced (including abstract, quotations, notes and references cited) one side only on 8 1/2 x 11 noncorrasable bond, with ample margins for editorial markings (at least one inch on all sides). Do not break words at the ends of lines. Retype any page on which complicated corrections have been made. The original and two copies must be submitted. Author should keep a copy. **ABSTRACT.** The text should be preceded by a 50-75 word abstract and a list of up to five headings under which the paper should be indexed. **FOOTNOTES.** Footnotes appear as “Notes” at the end of articles. Authors are advised to include footnote material in the text wherever possible. Notes are to be numbered consecutively throughout the paper and are to be typed on a separate sheet (double-spaced). **REFERENCES.** The list of references which accompanies an article should be limited to, and inclusive of, those publications actually cited in the text. References are not cited in footnotes but carried within the text in parentheses with author’s last name, the year of original publication, and page, e.g., (Kroeber 1948:205). Titles and publication information on references appear as “References Cited” at the end of the article and should be listed alphabetically by author and chronologically for each author. Write out the names of journals and other publications in full. Provide complete references following the style of recent issues for form of citation, punctuation, capitalization, use of italics, etc. References cited should be typed on a separate page (double-spaced). References not presented in the style required will be returned to the author for revision. **TABLES.** All tabular material should be part of a separately numbered series of “Tables.” Each table must be typed on a separate sheet and identified by a short descriptive title. Footnotes for tables appear at the bottom of the tables and are marked *, †, ‡, §, ¶, etc., according to standard usage. Marginal notation on manuscript should indicate approximately where tables are to appear. **FIGURES.** All illustrative material, drawings, maps, diagrams, and photographs should be included in a single numbered series and designated “Figures.” They must be submitted in a form suitable for publication without redrawing. Drawings should be carefully done with India ink on either hard, white, smooth-surfaced board or good quality tracing paper. Photographs should be glossy prints and should be numbered on the back to key with captions. All figures should be numbered consecutively and all captions should be typed together on a separate sheet of paper (double-spaced). Marginal notations on manuscript should indicate approximately where figures are to appear. **PROOFS.** Galley proofs are sent to authors who are expected to check for typographic mistakes and errors in fact. No part of an article can be rewritten in galley proof. Significant new data or an absolutely necessary comment may sometimes be added as a brief footnote. All changes and addenda submitted by the author on his corrected galley proofs are suggestions only and may be disregarded at the discretion of the Editor. The corrected proofs should be returned to the Editor within 48 hours of receipt. It will be impossible to make corrections not promptly received by the Editor. **REPRINTS** will be supplied to authors who return with payment by the specified deadline reprint order forms mailed to them at the time of publication of the journal.

**BOOK REVIEWS:**

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**EDITOR:**

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**PUBLICATIONS**

The following publications are available from SAVICOM, 1703 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009. Payment must accompany orders.

*Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication*

*Studies* is a publication of the Society. It is published two or three times a year and contains verbal and visual material describing and analyzing research in the areas of interest described under the purposes of the Society. *Studies* also publishes reviews of relevant books and larger review articles of groups of related books and other publications. It contains a section of correspondence and brief communication. The publication committee encourages members as well as non-members to submit written and visual materials for publication. Write to the *Studies* editor for additional instructions for submission.

From time to time SAVICOM will publish special publications related to the interests of its members. The following is a list of current publications:

**Films for Anthropological Teaching**

The fifth edition of Karl Heider’s *Films for Anthropological Teaching* lists over 500 films together with their distributors, bibliographic references and has subject, distributor and author indices. The cost is $3.00 for Society members and $5.00 for non-members and institutions.

**Handbook for Proxemic Research**

Edward T. Hall, author of the *Silent Language, The Hidden Dimension* and other works, is allowing SAVICOM to publish this new handbook detailing his methodology for proxemic research. The *Handbook* includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members and institutions at $5.00. In order to keep the price down for teachers, students and active workers in proxemic research, Hall is not accepting royalties on sales to SAVICOM members. Bookstores, teachers and others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth for special instructions. All others wishing to obtain copies should write directly to SAVICOM.

**News, Notes, Correspondence and Brief Communications**

In addition to the section of correspondence and brief communications which appears in *Studies*, the Society is responsible for a section of news and notes in the *Anthropology Newsletter* of the American Anthropological Association. All interested persons are encouraged to contribute news of fieldwork, announcements of conferences, festivals, training opportunities and any other pertinent news and notes to Jay Ruby, News and Notes Editor, Temple University, Department of Anthropology, Philadelphia, PA 19122. Members of the Society who are not already members of AAA will regularly receive the *Anthropology Newsletter* without additional charge as part of their membership dues.
IN PREPARATION . . .

Volume 1 Number 2 will include “A Definition of Caricature and Caricature and Recognition” by David Perkins (Harvard Project Zero), as well as “Art as a Structural System: A Study of Hopi Pottery Designs” by Laura J. Greenberg. Also in preparation for subsequent issues is a review essay by Phoebe Ellsworth Biebold (Yale University) on Spiegel and Machotka’s Messages of the Body, and papers by Steve Feld (Indiana University), Carroll Williams (Anthropology Film Center, Santa Fe), Gavriel Salomon (Hebrew University), and many others.

HANDBOOK for PROXEMIC RESEARCH

by EDWARD T. HALL

Includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members and institutions at $5.00 per copy. Bookstores, teachers and others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth, editor of Studies, for special instructions. All others wishing to obtain copies should write directly to SAVICOM.