

SALLUST'S *HISTORIES* AND TRIUMVIRAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Sallust's *Histories* and Triumviral Historiography

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For Rocky.

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## ABSTRACT

### SALLUST'S *HISTORIES* AND TRIUMVIRAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

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This dissertation explores echoes of the triumviral period in Sallust's *Histories* and demonstrates how, through analogical historiography, Sallust presents himself as a new type of historian whose “exempla” are flawed and morally ambiguous, and who rejects the notion of a triumphant, ascendant Rome perpetuated by the triumvirs. Just as Sallust's unusual prose style is calculated to shake his reader out of complacency and force critical engagement with the reading process, his analogical historiography requires the reader to work through multiple layers of interpretation to reach the core arguments. In the *De Legibus*, Cicero lamented the lack of great Roman historians, and frequently implied that he might take up the task himself. He had a clear sense of what history *ought* to be : encomiastic and exemplary, reflecting a conception of Roman history as a triumphant story populated by glorious protagonists. In Sallust's view, however, the novel political circumstances of the triumviral period called for a new type of historiography. To create a portrait of moral clarity is, Sallust suggests, ineffective, because Romans have been too corrupted by *ambitio* and *avaritia* to follow the good examples of the past. In the *Histories*, Sallust offers new “anti-exempla” for the

triumviral period : morally ambiguous characters who refuse to show readers a clear portrait of “good” or “bad”. Sallust's new historiography also forces readers to look beyond the claims of Roman peace and glory which were perpetuated by Cicero and the triumvirs. By alluding to the triumviral period in his dark narrative of the 70s and 60s, Sallust suggests that the pretext of *concordia* perpetuated by the triumvirs is specious, and that underneath this flimsy pretext is a Rome as troubled by civil strife as were the years of the late republic.

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## Chapter 1 : Introduction

This dissertation explores echoes of the triumviral period in Sallust's *Histories* and demonstrates how, through analogical historiography, Sallust presents himself as a new type of historian whose “*exempla*” are flawed and morally ambiguous, and who rejects the notion of a triumphant, ascendant Rome perpetuated by the triumvirs. Just as Sallust's unusual prose style is calculated to shake his reader out of complacency and force critical engagement with the reading process, his analogical historiography requires the reader to work through multiple layers of interpretation to reach the core arguments. In the *De Legibus*, Cicero lamented the lack of great Roman historians, and frequently implied that he might take up the task himself. He had a clear sense of what history *ought* to be : encomiastic and exemplary, reflecting a conception of Roman history as a triumphant story populated by glorious protagonists<sup>1</sup>. In Sallust's view, however, the novel political circumstances of the triumviral period called for a new type of historiography. To create a portrait of moral clarity is, Sallust suggests, ineffective, because Romans have been too corrupted by *ambitio* and *avaritia* to follow the good examples of the past. In the *Histories*, Sallust offers new “*anti-exempla*” for the triumviral period : morally ambiguous characters who refuse to show readers a clear portrait of “good” or “bad”. Sallust's new historiography also forces readers to look beyond the claims of Roman peace and glory which were perpetuated by Cicero and the triumvirs. By alluding to the triumviral period in his dark narrative of the 70s and 60s, Sallust suggests that the pretext of *concordia* perpetuated by the triumvirs is specious,

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<sup>1</sup> See section 1.3.

and that underneath this flimsy pretext is a Rome as troubled by civil strife as were the years of the late republic.

In this introduction, I establish the Ciceronian conceptions of history to which Sallust reacts, as well as my methodology for working with the fragmentary text of the *Histories*; also included here is a review of relevant scholarship. The three main chapters focus on three major figures of the *Histories* : Sertorius, Spartacus, and Pompey. Each is used by Sallust to forge a thematic link between the period of the *Histories*' narrative and its time of composition; Sallust also uses these characters as ciphers for the historian-figure to examine various challenges to the writer of history under the triumvirate. In Chapters Two and Three, I present Sertorius and Spartacus as complementary historian-figures. Sertorius is characterized by Sallust as a *miles gloriosus*, showing off battle wounds and actively fashioning a public persona. Sertorius' ability to “write” his own history recalls the efforts of the triumvirs to create their own version of “history” through propaganda and other public posturing; this characterization suggests that, in Sallust's view, the practice of history-writing was at risk of irrelevance under the triumvirate. However, by elevating Spartacus, a Thracian gladiator, to a major role in his *magnum opus*, Sallust demonstrates that the historian still has the ability to magnify or obscure as he sees fit. Sertorius thus challenges the historian, while Spartacus offers hope; in Chapter Four, I demonstrate that Sallust's Pompey poses the greatest challenge to history-writing by dismissing the value of recording *res gestae* altogether. In his letter to the senate, Pompey essentially makes the case that language is too corrupt to be effective; words now have to be backed with threats of action to achieve any results. For Sallust,

this is the greatest obstacle to writing the *Histories* : overcoming the devaluation and perversion of language in the context of civil war.

### 1.1. The Career of Sallust

Little is known about the life of Gaius Sallustius Crispus before his appearance on the political scene as a tribune in 52 BCE. He is traditionally believed to have been born in 86 BCE to a politically prominent family from Amiternum, in Sabine territory, and to have died around 35.<sup>2</sup> Sallust's political career was as eventful as it was brief. His tribunate began inauspiciously; P. Clodius was killed by T. Annius Milo's henchmen in January 52 BCE, just after Sallust took up the office. According to Asconius' commentary on Cicero's *Pro Milone*, Sallust participated in the prosecution of Milo, targeting Cicero along the way. During this period, Sallust was allied with two of his fellow tribunes, Munatius Plancus Bursa and Pompeius Rufus; the following year, Plancus and Pompeius Rufus were successfully prosecuted by Cicero for their part in the violence following Clodius' murder, but there is no evidence that Sallust was brought to trial at that time.

However, in 50 BCE, Sallust was expelled from the senate. Dio asserts that Sallust was among those subjected to the censor Appius Claudius's political purge, while other sources suggest that something more scandalous had occurred.<sup>3</sup> Sallust was then appointed quaestor by Caesar in 49. Although Sallust appears nowhere in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, later sources (Orosius, Appian, and Cassius Dio) report his participation

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<sup>2</sup> On the strength of Jerome's testimony; see Syme 1964, 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the author of the pseudo-Ciceronian invective against Sallust accuses Sallust of unspecified sexual transgressions (13) and participation in the cult activities of Nigidius Figulus (14).



on Caesar's side in the civil war. He commanded a Caesarian legion in Illyricum in 48<sup>4</sup>, and in 47, was sent to quell the mutiny in Campania; unsuccessful, he was nearly killed by the mutinous troops.<sup>5</sup> Sallust achieved some success at Cercina in 46, where he seized control of Pompeian food supplies.<sup>6</sup> After Caesar's victory, Sallust was rewarded for his efforts with the governorship of Africa Nova. Sallust's return to politics, however, ended as disgracefully as the first part of his career had; in 45, he was brought up on charges of extortion. After Caesar's assassination in 44, Sallust exited public life. His first work, the *Bellum Catilinae*, may have been published in 42, and the *Bellum Jugurthinum* followed shortly thereafter; the *Histories*, probably begun around 38, were most probably unfinished at the time of Sallust's death around 35.<sup>7</sup>

## 1.2 Sallust and Cicero<sup>8</sup>

As this brief overview of Sallust's career indicates, Sallust and Cicero crossed paths politically; the intersections of their literary careers form the background of this dissertation. Sallust and Cicero were contemporaries, but (for our current purposes) their similarities end with this chronological coincidence; the two authors diverge significantly in their conception of the purpose and best method of writing history. Woodman, referring to Cicero's infamous letter to Luceius (discussed in more detail below), has remarked that Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* is in many ways exactly the opposite of the

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<sup>4</sup> Orosius 6.15.8.

<sup>5</sup> Appian *BC* 2.387; Dio 42.52.

<sup>6</sup> *Bell. Afr.* 8.3; 34.

<sup>7</sup> See Ramsey 1984 for a summary of the arguments surrounding the date of the *BC*, and Paul 1984 for discussion of the date of the *BJ*. On the date of *Histories*, see McGushin 1992.

<sup>8</sup> There is a vast body of literature on historiography in Cicero's works, Cicero's views on history, and so forth; in this section, it will only be possible to scratch the surface of this area of Ciceronian scholarship. For a more comprehensive recent bibliography on Cicero and history-writing, see Fox 2008.

account of Cicero's consulship which Cicero had desired : “It is almost as if Sallust had read Cicero's letter and, in the standard rhetorical manner, treated the same subject with a different *color*, thus giving it a different 'complexion', 'angle', or 'slant.’”<sup>9</sup> It is unlikely that Sallust really *had* read the letter to Luceius,<sup>10</sup> but he was probably familiar with Cicero's views on history-writing as expressed in works published during Sallust's lifetime.<sup>11</sup>

In this section, I will discuss Sallust's rejection of two basic aspects of Cicero's theories of historiography. First, I demonstrate Sallust's rejection of the encomiastic or exemplary style of history which Cicero seems to recommend. Cicero suggests that one of history's main tasks is to provide the *exempla* from which Romans could learn how to live and govern; Sallust, however, perceives the inability of his contemporaries to correctly interpret *exempla*, and offers in their place a series of failed “*exempla*,” morally ambiguous figures who reflect the disrupted morality of the triumviral period. As I discuss in the second part of this section, Sallust not only rejects Cicero's conceptualization of the proper themes and content of history, but his stylistic prescriptions, as well. Sallust's resistance to the historical prose style advised by Cicero – clear, balanced, flowing – reflects his resistance to Cicero's larger view of Roman history and historiography. The style adopted instead by Sallust – obscure, unbalanced, abrupt – mirrors his conception of Roman history; as I demonstrate throughout this dissertation,

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<sup>9</sup> Woodman 1988, 125.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero's letters *ad familiares* were probably published after Sallust's death; for a summary of arguments surrounding the date of publication, see Shackleton Bailey 1977.

<sup>11</sup> For the current purposes, I address Sallust and Cicero's different historiographical philosophies from a primarily literary perspective. It is clear (especially from the *BC*) that the tension between Sallust and Cicero encompasses conflicting concerns about politics, philosophy, and literature. Although drawing a distinction between the “literary” and these other areas may seem both artificial and possibly fallacious, it is necessary in order to limit the scope of this dissertation.

both the content and the style of the *Histories* are characterized by complexity, ambiguity, and discord.

### 1.2.1 Exemplarity/Ambiguity

History, according to Cicero, is responsible for granting immortality to great men;<sup>12</sup> more importantly, those great men in turn should supply *exempla* from which readers can draw inspiration and practical advice on how to become great men themselves. Two fragments of Cicero's lost *Hortensius* suggest that in this text Cicero discussed his theory of exemplary history in some detail. Cicero's Lucullus seems to have given a speech in defense of history-writing :

unde aut ad agendum aut ad dicendum copia depromi maior  
gravissimorum exemplorum, quasi incorruptorum testimoniorum potest?  
(Straume-Zimmerman F 27)

From where is it possible for a greater wealth of the most weighty  
examples for acting or speaking to be derived like incorruptible  
evidence?

Unde autem facilius quam ex annalium monumentis aut bellicae res aut  
omnis rei publicae disciplina cognoscitur? (Straume-Zimmerman F 28)

From where, moreover, is the business of war or the whole science of the  
state better understood than from the records of the annals?

Since the real Lucullus is known to have spent his retirement attempting to write history,

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<sup>12</sup> For example, in the opening scene of the *De Legibus*, Cicero's Atticus laments the lack of a sufficient history of Rome and tries to persuade Cicero to undertake the task. Atticus claims that, if Cicero were to consent to the many voices clamoring for him to write history, he would at once perform two important tasks : to sing the praises of his friend Pompey Magnus and, of course, to celebrate his own consulship (*De Leg.* 1.8). In the letter to Luceius (*ad Fam.* 5.12), Cicero suggests that his own career (particularly the suppression of the Catilinarian revolt) has been critical to Rome's continued glory and success, and so he is worthy of historical commemoration. In this letter, Cicero manages to equate his own worthiness of commemoration with that of Alexander the Great, the Spartan king Agesilaus, and the Athenian diplomat Themistocles (5.12.7).

it is reasonable to posit that, in his speech in the *Hortensius*, Cicero's Lucullus is speaking in defense of this new undertaking. If Lucullus does refer to history here, he seems to be arguing that one of history's important tasks is to provide *exempla*; it is from history we find our examples of how to conduct ourselves and the business of the *res publica*.

Cicero himself makes a case for the exemplary value of history elsewhere.. In the *Pro Archia*, Cicero argues that one of the most important tasks of literature in general is to preserve examples of virtue from the past, in order that they might be imitated :

Sed pleni omnes sunt libri, plenae sapientium voces, plena exemplorum vetustas: quae iacerent in tenebris omnia, nisi litterarum lumen accederet. Quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum, verum etiam ad imitandum fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt? (*Pro Archia* 14)

But all books and the sayings of wise men and antiquity are full of *exempla* – which would all lay hidden in shadows, if the light of literature did not illuminate them. How many detailed images of the greatest men have writers, both Greek and Latin, left us, not only for examination, but indeed also for imitation?

Since the *Pro Archia* is the defense of a poet, we might assume that Cicero here refers primarily to the works of poets, but *scriptores* is general. The message here is similar to that in the *Hortensius* passages above : we should model our actions on those of the great men of the past, actions which have been handed down to us by authors (including historians).

The desired result of these *exempla*, of course, is that readers will live virtuously by imitating these virtuous men of the past. In the speech on behalf of Rabirius Postumus, Cicero argues that it is incumbent upon men from great families to imitate

their great ancestors, and offers examples of individuals who successfully did this :

. . .praesertim, iudices, cum sit hoc generi hominum prope natura datum ut, <si> qua in familia laus aliqua forte floruerit, hanc fere qui sint eius stirpis, quod sermone hominum ac memoria patrum virtutes celebrantur, cupidissime persequantur, si quidem non modo in gloria rei militaris Paulum Scipio ac Maximus filii, sed etiam in devotione vitae et in ipso genere mortis imitatus est P. Decium filius. (*Rab. Post.* 2)

. . .especially, judges, since it is granted as if by nature to the human race that if some praise has by chance flowered in a family, since the virtues of their fathers are celebrated in the conversation and memory of men, those who are of this line follow their ancestors most eagerly; not only did his sons Scipio and Maximus imitate Paulus in military glory, but his son also imitated P. Decius in the sacrifice of his life and in the very manner of his death.

Scipio and Maximus successfully completed the exemplary cycle : they correctly interpreted positive *exempla* from the past, and imitated the exemplified virtues (*gloria rei militaris* and *devotio vitae*).

The problem with encomiastic or exemplary history, from Sallust's perspective, is that in order for *exempla* to work, the audience must be capable of responding appropriately by imitating good *exempla* and rejecting bad *exempla*; that is, the reader should, as in the example cited above, be eager to celebrate and imitate the virtues of the men of the past. However, in the prologues of both monographs and the *Histories*, Sallust portrays Rome as a state which has already passed its peak of glory, and is rapidly descending into a moral abyss. In the preface of the *BC*, Sallust explains that, since his subject matter will demonstrate the corrupt morals of his contemporary Rome, he should give some account of the process of gradual but certain decline which led to this point :

Res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam de moribus civitatis tempus admonuit, supra repetere ac paucis instituta maiorum domi militiaeque, quo modo rem publicam habuerint quantamque reliquerint, ut paulatim immutata ex pulcherruma <atque optuma> pessuma ac flagitiosissima facta sit, disserere (*BC* 5.9)

The subject itself seems to advise, since the occasion reminds me of the morals of the state, that I reach farther back and briefly discuss the institutions of our ancestors both domestic and military, in what way they governed the republic and how great it was when they left it to us, and how, gradually changing, from the most noble and the greatest it became the most base and most disgraceful.

Sallust does not claim that the state was *always* rotten. After the expulsion of the kings, he argues, Romans contested each other only in discipline, duty, and courage; good morals were practiced by all and harmony among citizens prevailed (*BC* 7, 9). After the destruction of Carthage, however, the Romans grew overbold and avaricious, and vice spread through the city “like a plague (*contagio quasi pestilentia invasit*, *BC* 10.6). Sallust appears to have expressed similar sentiments about the decline of Rome in the prologue of the *Histories* :

1.11 M Res Romana plurimum imperio valuit Servio Sulpicio et Marco Marcello consulibus omni Gallia cis Rhenum atque inter mare nostrum et Oceanum, nisi qua paludibus invia fuit, perdomita. Optumis autem moribus et maxuma concordia egit inter secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginiense. . .

The Roman state was strongest in power during the consulship of Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Marcellus [51 BCE], having gained dominion over all Gaul this side of the Rhine and between our sea and the Ocean, except where it was impassable with swamps. The state conducted itself, however, with the greatest morals and greatest concord in between the second and final Punic wars. . .

1.16 M Ex quo tempore maiorum mores non paulatim ut antea, sed

torrentis modo praecipitati

From that point, the morals of our ancestors were thrown headlong not gradually, as before, but headlong like a torrent.

As Rome's territory has expanded, Sallust claims, its moral strength at home has decayed; while Rome was greatest in power during Sallust's lifetime, it had reached its moral apex a century before and had been in moral decline ever since, even as its dominion increased. The trajectory described in the *Histories* is similar to that described in the *BC* : once the fear of an external threat was removed after the last Punic war, internal strife increased along with concomitant moral degeneration.<sup>13</sup>

Given Sallust's view of the trajectory of Roman history and the corrupt state of Roman morals, it is difficult to believe that Sallust believed exemplarity was functional. As Roller has pointed out, for an *exemplum* to come “full circle” and serve its purpose, imitation is critical<sup>14</sup>; in such a corrupt city (*tam corrupta civitate*, *BC* 14.1), however, there was a dearth of individuals capable of imitating noble *exempla*. In the prologue of the *BJ*, Sallust suggests not only that completing the cycle of exemplarity is no longer possible, but also that it is no longer even desirable in the eyes of his contemporaries. Maximus and Scipio (cited by Cicero in the passage above) may have been inspired to virtue by their noble ancestor, but, Sallust says, his contemporaries only sought to outdo their predecessors in profligacy :

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<sup>13</sup> On *metus hostilis/metus Punicus* as a deterrent for moral degradation, see Bonnamente 1975 and Latta 1989. McGushin 1992 suggests that Sallust's identification of 146 BCE as the turning point for Roman morality is an innovation, rejecting the tradition that by the mid-second century morality had already decayed (Polybius suggests 168 BCE as the turning point, L. Piso gives 154, Livy gives 187) – but subsequent writers (including Velleius Paterculus, Pliny the Elder, Florus, Augustine, Orosius) followed Sallust.

<sup>14</sup> Roller 2004, 5-6.

At contra quis est omnium his moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis contendat? (*BJ* 4.6-7)

But who is there in the current state of morals who does not vie with his ancestors in riches and profligacy rather than in probity and diligence?

Exemplary history may have worked in the past, Sallust suggests, at a time when men were virtuous enough to be both willing and able to imitate the good *exempla* from Roman history. At the time of the *BJ*'s composition, however, Romans have been corrupted to such a point that exemplarity is wasted on them; they cannot (or will not) complete the exemplary cycle by imitating noble actions. Accordingly, Sallust does not supply his reader with clear *exempla*. Instead, he supplies ambiguous figures whose exemplary value is undercut by troubling qualities, and whose moral ambiguity mirrors the moral chaos of the triumviral period. In the *BJ*, for example, Sallust's character sketch of Sulla illustrates his refusal to show his readers a tidy portrait of either "good" or "bad". Sallust lists Sulla's admirable qualities : he was intellectually curious and acute, he was dutiful (although perhaps not to his wife), he was generous, he was brave. Exemplary enough on these counts. The accumulation of praise collapses, however, as Sallust reminds us of Sulla's later career :

nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere (*BJ* 95.4)

The things which he did later – I do not know whether it more shames me or saddens me to discuss them.

Sallust's Sulla *could* have been an *exemplum*, but he is not. We should imitate some of



his qualities, but obviously not all of them. Was he a good man? Was he a bad man?

Sallust, at least, is not going to give his readers the answers.

The *Histories*, too, are filled with cases of ambiguous “*exempla*.” Sallust's Lepidus, for example, in his speech to the *populus Romanus*, accuses Sulla's satellites, the descendants of noble family lines, of failing to imitate their ancestral *exempla* :

1.55.2-3 M satellites quidem eius, homines maximi nominis, optimis maiorum exemplis, nequeo satis mirari, qui dominationis in vos servitium suum mercedem dant et utrumque per iniuriam malunt quam optumo iure liberi agere: praeclara Brutorum atque Aemiliorum et Lutatorum proles, geniti ad ea, quae maiores virtute peperere, subvortunda!

At his satellites, men of the greatest family names, with great *exempla* among their ancestors, I cannot marvel enough – these men who pay for domination over you with their servitude and who prefer to act through injustice than to act as free men with the greatest rights - famous scions of the Brutii and Aemilii and Lutatii, born to overthrow the things which their ancestors won with virtue!

The accusation is in a character's voice and not Sallust's own, but the suggestion is the same : *exempla* (and, by implication, exemplary history) have become worthless, because good examples are no longer imitated.<sup>15</sup> Worse yet, those good examples are being completely overturned (*subvortunda*) by those who ought to uphold them.

Other characters in the *Histories* demonstrate the neglect of *exempla*. Metellus, for example, being feted upon his return to his province after a campaigning season in the war with Sertorius, indulged himself in excessive self-celebration, including wearing a

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<sup>15</sup> It is generally agreed that Sallust's speeches are original compositions (see, for example, Skard 1941; Büchner 1961, 241-242; Grethlein 2006, 140). The extent to which Sallust's characters may be understood to speak for the author, however, varies widely. The speech of Marius in the *BJ*, for example, echoes concerns about *virtus* and *memoria rerum gestarum* expressed elsewhere in Sallust's own narrative voice (see Grethlein 2006); Adler 2006 suggests that Sallust uses the letter of Mithridates (4.69 M) to give vent to his own criticisms of Roman foreign policy.

crown and demanding to be worshipped as a god (2.70 M); according to Sallust, Metellus' actions were an affront to previous generations :

2.70 M quis rebus aliquantam partem gloriae dempserat, maxumeque  
apud veteres et sanctos viros superba illa, gravia, indigna Romano  
imperio aestumantis

With these actions he lost quite a bit of glory, especially in the eyes of the older generation, venerable men, who judged this to be arrogant, oppressive, and unworthy of Roman rule.

According to the judgment of the *veteres et sancti viri* cited by Sallust, Metellus' behavior shows a rejection of (or, at the very least, ignorance of) the good *exempla* from Rome's past. Even worse, Metellus has disgraced a familial *exemplum*, as well. The elder Metellus is described by Sallust in the *BJ* as possessing an “unblemished reputation (*fama. . .inviolata*, *BJ* 43.1).” Given that, according to Sallust, Metellus was known to have a “mind superior to riches (*advorsum divitias invictum animum*, 43.5), the younger Metellus' overindulgent celebration seems particularly insulting to the family *exemplum*.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, as I discuss in the following chapters of this dissertation, the characters of Sertorius, Spartacus, and Pompey also offer Sallust opportunities to present clear-cut moral pictures, but Sallust declines to do so; all three are portrayed ambiguously, and none serves as a clear example of what should be imitated or rejected.

### 1.2.2 Style

In his monographs and the *Histories*, Sallust reacts not only to Cicero's theories

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<sup>16</sup> Even this Metellus is hardly an unambiguous *exemplum*; see section 1.3, in which I discuss the connections drawn by Sallust between Metellus' march to Thula and Cato's march across the African desert.

about the *content* of history (*rerum ratio*), but also to his theories about its style (*verborum ratio*). Sallust countered Cicero's prescriptions for smooth, balanced, flowing Latin with abrupt, imbalanced prose measured to arrest and surprise the reader at every turn, a style described by Woodman as “calculated inelegance.”<sup>17</sup> Syme observes that Sallust appears to be “out to destroy balance and harmony”; in other words, Sallust's writing reads as if he is intentionally challenging every one of Cicero's prescriptions for the proper style of historical prose.<sup>18</sup> Sallust not only challenges Cicero's conception of history, however, but also intentionally adopts a style which is as unbalanced and ambiguous as the morality in the text and as fractured as the Roman state.<sup>19</sup>

The features of Sallust's prose style and Sallust's resistance to the tenets of Ciceronian prose have been adequately discussed by scholars and need only be summarized here.<sup>20</sup> The basic features of the style of historical prose advised by Cicero are long, balanced periods, parallelism, fluency, and smoothness. In the *De Oratore*, Cicero's Antonius advises that history be written in a smooth, flowing style (*verborum autem ratio et genus orationis fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate quadam aequabili profluens, sine hac iudiciali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensium aculeis persequendum est*, “The style and type of the language, moreover, should be broad and drawn out, flowing with a certain steady calm, without the harshness of the court and prickliness of forensic speeches,” *de Or.* 2.64); this prescription is echoed in the *Orator* (*interponuntur etiam contiones et hortationes, sed in his tracta quaedam et fluens*

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<sup>17</sup> Woodman 1988, 124.

<sup>18</sup> Syme 1964, 295.

<sup>19</sup> De Meo 1970 and Batstone 2010, focusing primarily on the monographs, discuss Sallust's prose style as an enactment of his conception of the moral state of contemporary Rome.

<sup>20</sup> For analysis of Sallust's style, see, for example, von Albrecht 1989, 68-85, Syme 1964, 240-273; for specific comparison with Cicero's style see Woodman 1988, 117-128.

*expetitur, non haec contorta et acris oratio*, “Speeches and exhortations are also included [in historical texts], but in these a certain drawn-out and flowing manner of speech is sought, not this contorted and harsh one,” *Or.* 66). As Woodman has observed, Cicero's ideal historical style as described here corresponds closely with his characterization of Herodotus' style (*sine ullis salebris quasi sedatus amnis fluit*, “it flows without any roughness, like a gentle river”); it is no surprise, then, that Sallust took as his Greek model not Herodotus, but Thucydides, described by Cicero as “rushing violently” (*incitatio fertur, Or.* 39)” and whose speeches were accused by the same of being “scarcely intelligible” (*vix ut intellegantur, Or.* 30)

Sallust's historical prose challenges Cicero's advice on nearly every count. Sallust's disavowal of Ciceronian prose begins with the very spelling of his words; in both the monographs and the *Histories*, Sallust shows a marked preference for archaic orthography and diction. He rejects the *i*-spelling popularized by Caesar and Cicero in favor of the more archaic *u*-spelling (e.g., *maxume* for *maxime*, *optumus* for *optimus*).<sup>21</sup> Sallust also frequently borrows vocabulary from archaic authors, particularly Cato.<sup>22</sup> For example, Sallust may have inherited from Cato his predilection for nouns ending in *-tudo*, a form which Gellius claims added *dignitas* to a work (17.2.19).<sup>23</sup> Sallust owes an obvious debt to Thucydides, too, for many of the stylistic features of his prose; the influence of the Greek historian is frequently evident in both Sallust's lexical choices and in his syntax.<sup>24</sup> Dionysius' description of the brevity of Thucydides' prose could just as

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<sup>21</sup> Von Albrecht 1989, 68.

<sup>22</sup> Syme 1964, 261.

<sup>23</sup> Syme 1964, 262.

<sup>24</sup> For more detailed discussions of Thucydides' influence on Sallust, see Perrochat 1947 and Scanlon 1980.

easily apply to Sallust :

ἐκδηλότατα δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ χαρακτηρισκώτατά ἐστι τό τε πειρᾶσθαι δι’  
ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλεῖστα σημαίνειν πράγματα καὶ πολλὰ συντιθέναι  
νοήματα εἰς ἓν, καὶ  $\leq \tau \acute{o} \geq$  ἔτι προσδεχόμενον τι τὸν ἀκροατὴν  
ἀκούσεσθαι καταλείπειν· ὅφ’ ὧν ἀσαφὲς γίνεται τὸ βραχύ. (*Thuc.*  
24.363)

[Thucydides'] most conspicuous and characteristic traits are his attempt to say the largest number of things in the fewest words and his compression of many thoughts into one, and the fact that he leaves the listener expecting to hear something more. By all of these things, his brevity is rendered obscure.

Likewise, Seneca on Sallust : “abbreviated thoughts and words falling away unexpectedly and incomprehensible brevity (*amputatae sententiae et verba ante expectatum cadentia et obscura brevitās*, *Ep. ad Lucilium* 114.17).” Sallust's brevity is achieved by his use of a variety of constructions, including ellipsis, asyndeton (especially in strings of nouns or historical infinitives), and the omission of verbs. Sallust also adopts Thucydides' frequent use of neuter adjectives and participles as abstract substantives.<sup>25</sup> The overall flow of Sallust's prose is very similar to Thucydides', insofar as it displays very little “flow” at all; it is abrupt and imbalanced, calculated to prevent his reader from becoming complacent. Common parallel phrases (e.g., *pars. . . pars, alii. . . alii*) are thrown off balance (*pars. . . alii*), plural verbs are paired with singular collective subjects, and what appear to be clear antitheses are, on closer inspection, untidy and unsymmetrical.<sup>26</sup> If the overall effects advised by Cicero are balance, flow, and symmetry, Sallust achieves exactly their opposites.

<sup>25</sup> Scanlon 1980, 73-4, 186-8.

<sup>26</sup> Von Albrecht 1989, 74-5.

If it is the case that an author's prose style betrays something of his worldview, Cicero's recommended style of historical prose - the balanced, stately style which Cicero himself employed in his writings - suggests a confident, secure author whose prose reflects the perceived harmony of his world. Or, as Woodman claims : "To Sallust it must therefore have seemed that Cicero's own style – characterized by balance, amplitude, and corresponsion – did indeed reflect a complacency and conservatism which were utterly at odds with the attitude adopted in the *Bellum Catilinae*."<sup>27</sup> Sallust's chosen style can in turn be seen as a reflection of his view of Roman affairs. His unbalanced and abrupt prose mirrors his conception of Rome as discordant and morally ambiguous; furthermore, his use of unexpected vocabulary and constructions forces his audience to pay keen attention and thus to reject the complacency allowed by Cicero's harmonious style.

### **1.3 Historical Allusions : Finding the Thirties in the Seventies**

We turn from style to back to content. In this dissertation, I argue that Sallust uses the period of the *Histories'* narrative – the 70s and early 60s BCE – as a lens through which to examine the state of Rome at the time of the *Histories'* composition (early 30s BCE). One technique employed by Sallust is historical allusion; although his narrative covers the 70s and the 60s, Sallust frequently evokes the state of contemporary Rome. He does this in a variety of ways, as I discuss throughout this dissertation; for example, civil war appears in unexpected or anachronistic contexts, and characters from the period of the narrative act conspicuously like the major players from the triumviral period. One

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<sup>27</sup> Woodman 1988, 126.

allusion taken individually might be explained away as historical coincidence (the two situations just happened to unfold in the same way or to share some characteristic) or as the repetition of a historiographical trope, but the aggregation of examples is difficult to ignore.

Sallust employs this analogical approach to history, I argue, for several reasons. Perhaps most obviously, critiquing the current state of Roman politics indirectly through analogy and allusion rather than directly offers Sallust plausible deniability; in this way, he avoids directly criticizing the triumvirs. Although the triumvirs do not seem to have pursued literary dissenters as aggressively as did, for example, Nero, Sallust was certainly aware of the possibility of another round of land confiscations or proscriptions. Although Antony's persecution of Cicero is not perfectly analogous,<sup>28</sup> it may well have served as a warning to Sallust and his contemporaries about the dangers of a direct attack on the triumvirs. Denying that the *Histories* were intended in any way as a reflection on contemporary Rome might be seen as slightly disingenuous, but the cover (albeit thin) provided by the use of allusion may have been enough to satisfy those in power. Sallust here may thus employ what Stephen Hinds calls the “hermeneutic alibi.”<sup>29</sup> The existence of multiple plausible interpretations of the *Histories* (i.e. a straightforward chronicle of the events of the 70s and early 60s, a covert critique of contemporary politics) provides Sallust a cover; the superficial reader will not see a critique of the triumvirate, although it is there to be found by the more critical interpreter. In the *BJ*, Sallust expressed his disapproval of Sisenna's restrained treatment of Sulla (*persecutus parum mihi libero ore*

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<sup>28</sup> Much of Antony and Cicero's rivalry was played out in the political sphere, a venue no longer available to Sallust by the time he began his literary career.

<sup>29</sup> Hinds 1987, 26.

*locutus videtur*, BJ 95), suggesting that the earlier historian refrained from critique of the dictator in order to avoid the ire of Sullan supporters (and perhaps Sulla himself, depending on how early Sisenna began work on his *Histories*<sup>30</sup>). Sallust, perhaps, saw allusion and analogy as methods by which he could avoid both the danger of an open attack on the triumvirs and the accusation of speaking *parum libero ore*.

Second, by using the Rome of the seventies as a lens through which to examine present-day Rome, Sallust reinforces the assertion of his model Thucydides that *stasis* is bound to recur as long as human nature stays the same (ἔως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, 3.82). Sallust's suggestion that Rome is re-enacting its discordant past also represents another element in his reaction to Cicero's notions of Roman history. In his second speech against Catiline, Cicero suggested that Rome had learned its lessons during the Sullan period and would not again endure proscriptions and dictatorships :

Tantus enim illorum temporum dolor inustus est civitati, ut iam ista non modo homines, sed ne pecudes quidem mihi passurae esse videantur  
(*Cat.* 2.20)

For such a horror of those times is burned into the state that now not only men, but it seems to me not even beasts would endure them now.

Cicero is, of course, wrong. The *Catilinarians* were delivered in 63 BCE; in the next two decades, Rome would again endure both a dictatorship and proscriptions. We might wonder whether Sallust had this overconfident pronouncement of Cicero in mind as he wrote the prologue of the *BC* :

Omnis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus summa ope

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<sup>30</sup> Rawson 1979.



niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora. . . (BC 1.1)

It is fitting that all men who wish to surpass the other animals strive with the greatest effort not to pass through life in silence like beasts. . .

The beasts are now *pecora* rather than *pecudes*; Sallust has perhaps appropriated and altered a Ciceronian expression. The audience of the *BC*, contrary to Cicero's prediction, had not only endured a civil war in the years since Cicero's speech, but were, at the time of the *BC*'s composition, in the midst of another. Cicero may have “saved the republic” during his consulship,<sup>31</sup> the liberators may have “saved the republic” by assassinating Julius Caesar,<sup>32</sup> the triumvirs may have formed their coalition “for the sake of restoring the republic,”<sup>33</sup> but the political situation at Rome was, in reality, just as discordant and rotten in the early 30s as it was in the 70s, because powerful men still acted out of greed and self-interest, and factionalism still prevailed.

Finally, and I suggest most importantly, Sallust's allusions to the triumviral period in his account of the seventies force his audience to be careful, critical readers who are constantly engaged with the text. Sallust has no use for either the uncritical reader or the uncritical Roman. Just as Sallust's style is calculated to shake his reader out of complacency and forces that reader to engage more critically in the reading process, his analogical approach to history requires the reader to work through multiple layers of interpretation to reach the core of Sallust's argument and analysis. This, in turn, is how Sallust wants his readers to approach contemporary Rome. The reader should refuse to

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<sup>31</sup> To Metellus in 62 BCE : *cum rem publicam conservassem (ad Fam. 5.2.7); mihi togato senatus non ut multis bene gesta, sed ut nemini conservata re publica (In Pisonem 6).*

<sup>32</sup> To Brutus in 43 BCE : *Ita enim sperant atque confidunt, ut antea rege sic hoc tempore regno te rem publicam liberaturum (ad Fam. 11.8)*

<sup>33</sup> *triumvirum rei publicae constituendae fui (RGDA 7)*

accept the self-satisfied presentation of a triumphant Rome perpetuated by men like Cicero; they should dig more deeply to expose the speciousness of claims of Roman peace and concord.

I offer now a few examples of historical allusions in Sallust's works (in addition to those which are discussed throughout this dissertation) to suggest that Sallust is constantly engaged both with the history in his narratives and with Roman history at large, including the state of Rome at the time of composition.

In the *BJ*, Sallust's account of the division of the Numidians after the assassination of Hiempsal probably would have, for Sallust's audience, at once evoked memories of the relatively recent war between Caesar and Pompey and reminded them of the current political situation. After Micipsa's death, Jugurtha and Micipsa's two sons were left to govern Numidia; they decided to partition the kingdom among themselves. Jugurtha, however, ordered the assassination of Hiempsal and prepared to take arms against Adherbal next :

In duas partis discedunt Numidae : plures Adherbalem secuntur, sed illum alterum bello meliores (*BJ* 13.1)

The Numidians split into two factions : most followed Adherbal, but those more skilled in war followed the other.

A ruling triumvirate is established, one of the members is eliminated, and the remaining two lead factions into civil war; this is a story which is all too familiar to Sallust's audience. The so-called “first triumvirate” was broken by the death of Crassus in Parthia in 53 BCE; the relationship between Caesar and Pompey rapidly declined after the third

party was removed, and in 49 the growing conflict matured into open civil war.

Although Sallust's account of the civil discord between the heirs of Micipsa probably reflects the reality of the course of events in Numidia, it is difficult to imagine he did not also have the splintering of the Roman triumvirate in mind here, as well. At the time of the *BJ*'s composition, Rome was once again under a triumviral government, which must have given the episode even greater resonance with Sallust's audience; if the Numidian triumvirate failed, and the first Roman triumvirate failed, how much confidence could be placed in the stability of the new triumvirate?

Later in the *BJ*, Sallust describes Metellus' pursuit of Jugurtha across the desert to Thala :

quae postquam Metello conperta sunt, quamquam inter Thalam flumenque proximum in spatio milium quinquaginta loca arida atque vasta esse cognoverat, tamen spe patrandi belli, si eius oppidi potitus foret, omnis asperitates supervadere ac naturam etiam vincere adgreditur (*BJ* 75.2)

When these things were learned by Metellus, although he knew that between Thala and the nearest river were fifty miles of dry and barren territory, in the hope of ending the war if he overtook that town, he decided to surpass every difficulty and to conquer even nature.

Here, Sallust depicts a Roman general crossing an African desert presumed to be uncrossable; it is hard to imagine that a Roman reader in the 30s would not be reminded of the flight of the younger Cato across Africa after the Caesarian victory at Pharsalus. Metellus' capture of Thala was of limited glory to begin with. He crossed the desert, “conquered nature,” and took the town, but the inhabitants, anticipating the inevitable, denied the Romans any booty by burning all their riches in the palace (76.6); furthermore,

Metellus' inability to close out the war led to his displacement by his lieutenant Marius (86-88). The association with Cato here further diminishes Metellus' meager glory; Sallust sets Metellus and Cato together as stubborn aristocrats who refuse to acknowledge defeat and indulge themselves in vain hopes, "conquering nature" but failing politically and militarily. By assimilating this episode in Metellus' career with the final phase of Cato's life, Sallust frames Metellus' final major military victory as a futile last stand.

Turning from the monographs to the *Histories* : the attack on Lepidus in the speech of Philippus, in which Philippus accuses Lepidus of fomenting civil strife, must have evoked memories of Julius Caesar's invasion of Italy in 49 BCE. In 78, Lepidus had encouraged an uprising of Etrurian landowners displaced by Sulla's land confiscations; in 77, relying on the support he had built up in Etruria, Lepidus attempted to march on Rome. In his speech, Sallust's Philippus argues in favor of a *senatus consultum ultimum* against Lepidus on the grounds that he is attempting to stir up a civil war :

1.77.10 M An expectatis dum exercitu rursus admoto ferro atque flamma urbem invadat?

Or are you waiting until he [Lepidus] invades the city again with his army and drawn sword and fire?

For Sallust's audience, the image of a Roman general marching with his army into the city of Rome must have called to mind not only the memory of Sulla (whom Philippus accuses Lepidus of imitating), but the more recent memory of Caesar crossing the Rubicon with his army, or of one of Octavian's marches on Rome. There are other, perhaps more subtle, echoes of Julius Caesar in the speech :

1.77.4 M quoniam ex rapinis consulatum, ob seditionem provinciam cum exercitu adeptus est, quid ille ob bene facta cepisset, cuius sceleribus tanta praemia tribuistis?

Since he obtained his consulship by robbery and his province (along with his army) through sedition, what would he have gotten through good acts, he whose crimes you have rewarded with such prizes?

Here Philippus accuses Lepidus of encouraging civil strife and increasing his power through criminal means; similarly, Julius Caesar was accused of extending his proconsulship in Gaul illegally to avoid prosecution for crimes committed during his consulship, and, of course, agitating for civil war. The connection between Lepidus and Caesar is further suggested by the fact that the province Lepidus is accused of obtaining through *sedition* is Transalpine Gaul. Caesar was originally given command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, and only obtained Transalpine Gaul when Pompey (then his triumviral colleague) pressured the senate to add the province to Caesar's already exceptional command upon the death of the previous governor.

Elsewhere in the *Histories*, Sallust seems to allude to the contemporary political situation at Rome by invoking the image of civil war in unexpected or inappropriate contexts. The speech of the tribune Macer, for example, is set in 73 BCE; at this time, Rome was certainly troubled by factionalism (in his speech, Macer encourages the plebs to defend their rapidly eroding rights against the attacks of the nobility), but not by open civil war. However, that is exactly how Macer characterizes the current conflict :

3.48.11 M . . . praesertim quom his civilibus armis dicta alia, sed certatum utrimque de dominatione in vobis sit

. . . especially since in this civil war other things were said, but the real contest on both sides was about tyranny over you.

To Sallust's audience, who had lived through civil war proper (the war between Caesar and Pompey) and who were currently living in a state made turbulent by factionalism but not yet embroiled in open civil war between Octavian and Antony, Macer's characterization of Rome in 73 as in a state of civil war may have been troubling. If Macer could credibly refer to that period as civil war, the triumvirs' attempts to obfuscate any appearance of civil war under their rule become less plausible.

One of the challenges of the search for historical allusions is distinguishing between allusions to an *event* and allusions to an *account* of an event.<sup>34</sup> This ambiguity presents an issue in cases where Sallust seems to allude to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, as in the example of Philippus' speech above; by the time of the *Histories'* composition, Sallust would have had access to written sources for this period (Caesar's *commentarii* and the speeches of Cicero, at the very least), to which he may be specifically alluding. However, in the case of Sallust and the 30s (the primary focus of this dissertation), this may be less problematic; since Sallust is frequently invoking the contemporary state of Rome, there may not yet have been a textual account to which to allude. Political pamphlets may be an exception to this; propaganda in the form of pamphleteering was popular during the triumviral period, and was presumably employed by the triumvirs (as well as others, including Sextus Pompey). Without any extant

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<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Damon 2009 (375) on intertextuality in the works of Tacitus : “The effect of both allusions is similar – to align two deaths marking the end of their respective worlds – so does the reader need to decide which is the relevant 'intertext'? Is it even possible to decide?”

examples of these works, however, it is difficult to say what role they might have played in Sallust's use of intertextuality.

#### 1.4 Periodization

This dissertation is predicated on the notion that the “triumviral period” is a discrete, unique period bridging the years between the end of the Roman republic and the establishment of the Augustan principate. It is generally agreed that, while the periodization of political or literary history is inevitably artificial, it provides a convenient and necessary framework.<sup>35</sup> Periodization requires that we impose a structure which, of course, would be unrecognizable to those living during the years covered, who, not knowing what comes next, would not have recognized their own time as “transitional” or as a prelude to some later period. Periodization is thus imperfect, but inevitable, and for the purposes of this dissertation I will use the establishment of the triumvirate by the *lex Titia* in 43 BCE to define the beginning of “the triumviral period.” Although the end of this period could plausibly, I think, be placed in 31 upon Octavian's defeat of Antony at Actium, Sallust's death in 35 provides the practical *terminus ante quem* for material covered in this project.

Although scholars have recently become more amenable to the idea of a distinct “triumviral period,” these years were long treated as a transitional period in Roman history which did not merit attention in their own right. The years between the defeat of

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<sup>35</sup> For example, Perkins 1992 : “At present, we tend to regard periods as necessary fictions. They are necessary because. . .one cannot write history or literary history without periodizing. Moreover, we require the concept of a unified period in order to deny it, and thus make apparent the particularity, local difference, heterogeneity, fluctuation, discontinuity, and strife that are now our preferred categories for understanding any moment of the past (65).” Syme 1968 : “Periodization cannot be avoided, and it has plain advantages (169).” See also Crane 1971.

the Republican forces at Philippi and the outbreak of open warfare between Antony and Octavian fit awkwardly in a periodization of Roman history which marks the assassination of Julius Caesar as the end of the Republic and Octavian's victory at Actium as the beginning of the Principate. This is true in literary periodization, as well; falling between the death of Cicero and the composition of the *Aeneid*, the triumviral years are generally glossed over in literary histories. In this dissertation, I primarily follow the work of Flower and Osgood, as discussed below, in treating the triumviral period as a discrete period in both Roman political and literary history.

#### **1.4.1. Historical Periodization**

In traditional periodizations, the triumviral years were long absorbed into either the late Republic (on the grounds that they were not characterized by one-man rule) or the early principate (on the grounds that the crossing of the Rubicon or the dictatorship of Julius Caesar marked the “end of the republic”). The *Cambridge Ancient History* series, for example, uses the death of Cicero in 43 BCE as the point of demarcation between the “Last Age of the Roman Republic” and the “Augustan Empire”.<sup>36</sup> The editors of Volume 9 claim that “Cicero's death symbolizes, now as it did then, the death of the republic,” and so marks the appropriate end of their volume;<sup>37</sup> a chapter on the triumviral period opens the latter volume, although it is difficult (and the editors do not try) to make the case that the years of the triumvirate can be said to belong to the “Augustan Empire.” In a work of such a large chronological scope, of course, divisions are necessarily made with a chainsaw, not a scalpel, and a period of less than fifteen years does not warrant its

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<sup>36</sup> *Cambridge Ancient History* 9 (1992) and 10 (1996).

<sup>37</sup> *CAH* 9, xiii



own volume; in this project, however, I have the freedom (and obligation) to draw finer distinctions.

Scholars have recently begun to recognize that the unique political circumstances of the triumviral period should prevent its elision into either the “late republic” or “early empire.” Flower has recently challenged the deeply entrenched, traditional image of a monolithic Roman Republic which extended from the expulsion of the kings in 509 BCE until sometime in the first century BCE.<sup>38</sup> In particular, she addresses the difficulty of choosing a date to represent the “end of the Republic.” “Too often,” she argues, “the Republic’ has been defined simply as ‘not a system of one-man rule.’”<sup>39</sup> One of the problems with the tendency to define “the republic” in this way is that it absorbs the triumviral years into the republic by default. Although the regular magistracies and the senate continued to function in some capacity under the triumvirate, the establishment of this ruling coalition dramatically shifted the balance of power in government; this “republic” can hardly be said to look anything like “the republic” of the second and early first century. On the other hand, if the “end of the Republic” is marked by the crossing of the Rubicon or the death of Julius Caesar, the triumviral years must be folded into the principate, which seems equally unfitting; the principate is defined by the sole rule of a *princeps*, which does not apply during the triumviral period. Flower’s solution is to erase the “simplistic and sharply drawn dichotomy”<sup>40</sup> between republic and empire and articulate instead a series of republics and allow for several periods of transition, which

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<sup>38</sup> Flower 2010, 9 : “509 to 49, or 43, or 27,” reflecting popular variations on the date of the end of the Republic (the crossing of the Rubicon, the establishment of the triumvirate, the establishment of the Augustan principate).

<sup>39</sup> Flower 2010, 13.

<sup>40</sup> Flower 2010, 15.

better reflects the constancy of change during the second and first centuries than the traditional periodization does. This solution also eliminates the need to identify one moment as the break between one “republic” and one “empire.”

Although Flower's study ends with the year 49 and so does not cover the years during which the triumvirate was in power, her articulation of several periods of transition between “republics” favors my treatment of the triumviral period as a discrete period independent of either the republic or the empire. In fact, although Flower's analysis focuses only on the years up to 49 BCE, she provides a timeline extending through 33; in this timeline she labels 43-33 as the triumviral period and marks 33 as the beginning of a transitional period. Here, I adopt Flower's position in favor of a series of “republics” and transitions; this type of periodization allows for the acknowledgment that the unique political circumstances of the triumviral period should prevent its elision into either a monolithic “republic” or “empire.”

#### **1.4.2 Literary Periodization**

It is, perhaps, even more difficult to carve out a discrete “triumviral period” in the literary periodization of Rome in the first century BCE, because Cicero and Vergil have served for so long as immovable anchors for the literature of republic and the empire. It has been considered convenient, perhaps, to refer to late republican literature as belonging to “the Age of Cicero” and early imperial literature as “the Age of Vergil,” and gloss over the period between Cicero's death and the composition of the *Aeneid*; works of the triumviral period are assigned to either the republic or the empire (for example, the

*Philippics* become republican, while the *Eclogues* become Augustan/imperial). This phenomenon is especially pronounced with respect to the triumviral careers of the so-called Augustan poets, whose earlier works are often treated as the first steps on a path toward their inevitable Augustan incarnations. In light of the literary importance of works like Vergil's *Aeneid* and Horace's *Odes*, this sort of teleological reading is difficult to avoid, but it risks minimizing the importance of triumviral period works.

Syme, at least, recognized decades ago that the triumviral period produced a vast body of literature which was original in both content and form and which is difficult to assimilate with either “late republican” or “early imperial” literature;<sup>41</sup> it is worth noting that Syme cited Sallust, in particular, as a specific example of an author whose career is ill-placed in either the end of the republic or the beginning of the empire.<sup>42</sup> Scholars have been slow, however, to adopt Syme's argument that the triumviral years constitute a discrete and unique period of literary history as well as political history. Most handbooks of Latin literature gloss over the triumviral years, absorbing them into either the late republic or early imperial period. Conte, for example, avoids directly addressing the triumviral period by moving from “The Late Republic” directly to “The Age of Augustus,” including Sallust in the former section, but Vergil and Horace, for example, in the latter, despite their activity during the triumviral years.<sup>43</sup> Von Albrecht follows the same structure, moving from a chapter on “Literature of the Republican Period” to “Literature of the Augustan Period,” thus apparently classifying Sallust's works more

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<sup>41</sup> “Something might be said in favor of a new and novel period, from the institution of the triumvirate in 43 BC to the return of normal government in 28 BC,” Syme 1978, 169; see also Syme 1964, 274-5.

<sup>42</sup> “The consequences are sometimes perilous, as happens when standard manuals deposit the historian Sallust in the former period. He is better regarded as proto-imperial,” Syme 1978, 169.

<sup>43</sup> Conte 1994.

closely with those of Livius Andronicus and the comedic playwrights than those of, for example, Vergil and Livy.<sup>44</sup> Conte and von Albrecht most certainly did not *actually* conceive of “The Republic” as a unified whole, and both were constrained for practical purposes by the handbook format; because of its convenience, however, this broad categorization has very much shaped the way in which scholars approach Latin literature.

Some scholars, however, have recently begun to recognize, like Syme, that the literature of the triumviral period is rich and varied, and often reflects the turbulence of the years in which it was produced. Farrell, for example, suggests carving out the years 44-29 BCE as a distinct phase in literary development.<sup>45</sup> “These years,” he says, “are often considered the death-throes of the Republic, but to the historian of literature, they are an integral and formative phase of the Augustan period (45).” Although this formulation still defines the triumviral period in relation to the republic and the empire, it acknowledges that there is something distinctive about the development of literature during this period. Or, as Osgood describes the triumviral years : “This tumultuous period produced a number of the most highly regarded works of Latin literature, all of them haunted by the contemporary civil war and ready to confront it in creative ways.”<sup>46</sup> Indeed, the specter of civil war is one of the central themes of triumviral literature, a body of work permeated by resignation and hopelessness. In Osgood's words, again :

Creating a “Triumviral Period” of literature brings into focus specific themes that occur throughout the history of these fifteen years – the disgust felt at the meteoric careers of social upstarts, for instance, or the fear that Rome's men were losing their manliness. More generally, its

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<sup>44</sup> Von Albrecht 1997.

<sup>45</sup> Farrell 2005, especially 44-45.

<sup>46</sup> Osgood 2006, 4.

often somber tone – its sense, above all, that Rome's problems might be totally insoluble – offers a contrast to the more muted pessimism of late Republican literature. Triumviral literature is full of dashed expectations and wasted effort.<sup>47</sup>

Although several of the major works composed during these years have not survived (for example, Asinius Pollio's history, Varius' tragedies, and, of course, Sallust's *Histories*), the body of literature which has come down to us is varied and complex. Vergil began his career during this period, writing the *Eclogues* between 42 and 39 BCE; these Theocritean poems contain poignant depictions of Italian suffering during the triumvirs' land confiscations.<sup>48</sup> In the *Georgics*, completed in 29, Vergil alludes to the triumvirs' other violent fund-raising program, the proscriptions, and the conflicts between Rome and Italy that characterized the triumviral years.<sup>49</sup> Horace, too, composed his earliest works during these years, writing the *Epodes* between 41 and 30 and publishing the first book of the *Satires* around 35. The *Epodes*, in particular, openly confront the civil war and triumviral politics.<sup>50</sup> Another major “Augustan” poet was, perhaps, at work on his earliest publications during the triumviral years : Propertius' first book of elegies was probably published in 28, just as Octavian was consolidating sole power. Propertius' early work “betrays no sign that Rome and Italy have been rescued from the menace and the foreign queen, no word for the savior and hero”<sup>51</sup>; in other words, this work can

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<sup>47</sup> Osgood 2006, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Particularly *Eclogues* 1 and 9.

<sup>49</sup> See, for example, *Georgics* 2.505-512 : *hic petit excidiis Urbem miserosque penatis / ut gemma bibat et Sarrano dormiat ostro; / condit opes alius defossoque incubat auro; / hic stupet attonitus rostris, hunc plausus hiantem; per cuneos geminatus enim plebisque patrumque / corripuit; gaudent perfusi sanguine fratrum / exsilioque domos et dulcia limina mutant / atque alio patriam quaereunt sub sole iacentem*

<sup>50</sup> Particularly *Epodes* 7, 9, and 16.

<sup>51</sup> Syme 1964, 275.

hardly be thought to belong to the empire. The book's final poem is a lament for the casualties of the Perusine War of 41/40 BCE, a war which highlighted both the tensions between the triumvirs and the tensions between Rome and Italy.

Some works of the triumviral period from genres other than poetry also survive. The biographies of Cornelius Nepos, published in the early 30s, attempted to bring moral clarity to a turbulent period by presenting great men from Greek and Roman history as *exempla*; Nepos instructed his readers that “in general, each man's morals determine his fortune (*suos cuique mores plerumque conciliare fortunam*, *Atticus* 19.1)”. Although most of Varro's vast corpus has not survived, the three books entitled *Res Rusticae*, probably completed in 37, are intact.<sup>52</sup> Osgood has suggested that even oratory, traditionally thought to have languished and declined under the autocratic rule of the triumvirs, actually continued to function at a high level, adapting to the evolving political circumstances.<sup>53</sup> Although the orations discussed by Osgood are not extant and are known only from later testimonia, the last of Cicero's *Philippics* and his final letters were composed during the opening months of the triumvirate and the final months of Cicero's life.

It is clear, then, that it is possible to identify the triumviral period as a discrete period in both Roman political history and Latin literary history. The association of Sallust with the republic is not absurd (after all, much of his life and all of his political career was spent under the republic), but Sallust's literary career is more appropriately defined as “triumviral” than “republican” or “Augustan/imperial” both chronologically

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<sup>52</sup> We also possess portions of *De Lingua Latina*, probably composed between 45 and sometime before Cicero's death; its composition thus seems to have spilled into the triumviral years, but a great deal of it must have been composed during Caesar's dictatorship as well.

<sup>53</sup> Osgood 2007.

and thematically. The monographs appeared in the late 40s, while the *Histories* were probably begun in 38 and terminated with Sallust's death in 35, all squarely within the triumviral years. Unlike the careers of Vergil and Cicero, for example, Sallust's literary career has no pre- or post-triumviral phase; while his political career took place under the republic, all of Sallust's known literary works belong to the triumviral period. As I will discuss throughout this dissertation, Sallust is constantly engaged with contemporary themes and issues throughout the *Histories*; although Sallust narrates the events of the late seventies and early sixties, he also confronts, by allusion and analogy, the civil wars, the decay of traditional *mores*, and the violent and self-serving careers of the triumvirs themselves.

### 1.5 Reading the *Histories*

Because the *Histories* are a fragmentary text, the process of reading and interpreting the work is complex. The *Histories* survive in over five hundred fragments transmitted both directly and indirectly; nearly all of the surviving text (essentially, everything but the speeches and letters) comes down to us in brief quotations by grammarians, mostly three lines or fewer in length.<sup>54</sup> One of the chief problems posed by the fragments of the *Histories* is the transmission of these fragments by grammarians in particular. Generally speaking, these quotations have been preserved for their syntactic, orthographic, or linguistic interest, and may not reflect the major themes and plot points of the narrative. How, then, do we fill in the gaps, both structural and thematic, enough to discuss the work as a whole?

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<sup>54</sup> McGushin Vol. 1., 8-9.

### 1.5.1 The *Histories* and the Monographs

The *Histories* are, in many ways, much more accessible to the modern scholar than are most other fragmentary texts. We possess some information about Sallust's political career and character, while the monographs reveal a great deal about his attitude toward contemporary Rome. The *Bellum Catilinae* and *Bellum Jugurthinum* are both securely attributed to Sallust, and we can see in them strong indications of the historian's attitudes toward both Rome's history and his own times. From these works, we can confidently create at least a brief catalogue of the main themes that interest him : *ambitio*, *avaritia*, *discordia*. Since these themes appear in the introduction of the *Histories*, as well,<sup>55</sup> it is reasonable to conclude that they will be important in the various episodes of the *Histories*. I refer to the monographs throughout this dissertation, comparing Sallust's use of individual words or grammatical constructions, as well as examining recurring themes.<sup>56</sup>

### 1.5.2 Reconstructing the Narrative : Sallust and Plutarch

Because the *Histories* are so fragmentary, it is difficult to be certain about the shape of the work as a whole; editors of the text have needed to use whatever resources are available in their attempts to recreate the work's original structure. Transmitted book numbers, while not infallible, have provided a starting point; editors have also relied on the narratives of later authors who are likely to have used the *Histories* as a source. For

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<sup>55</sup> M 1.11 *At discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala. . .*

<sup>56</sup> For more on the relationship between the monographs and the *Histories*, see literature review in this chapter (section 1.6).



example, Plutarch (*Life of Crassus*) and Appian (*Bellum Civile*) are both thought to have looked to Sallust as their main source on the revolt of Spartacus<sup>57</sup>; Livy (Per. 95-97), Florus (2.8.1-14), Eutroipus (6.7.1S), and Orosius (5.24.1-8) also include the slave rebellion in their narratives. None of these sources is, on its own, particularly reliable with respect to chronology; however, where many or all agree, it is not unreasonable to attribute that agreement to a shared source. Besides the *Histories*, few historical sources for the 70s and 60s would have been available to these authors (especially the earliest, Livy); Sisenna's histories ended with the death of Sulla, while Asinius Pollio's histories probably began around 60 BCE. In light of the dearth of known available accounts of this time period, it seems reasonable to posit the *Histories* as a common source, and arrange the fragments accordingly.

The method of collating later accounts of an event and trying to tease out a narrative which may be attributed to a shared source, probably the *Histories*, helps to establish a working superstructure for the work, but that is not the task of this dissertation; I have adopted Maurenbrecher's arrangement of the fragments unless otherwise noted. Closely parallel passages can also help reconstruct the details of specific episodes, as well. Plutarch appears to have relied heavily on the *Histories* as a source for his *Lives*; the *Lives* of Sertorius, Crassus, Pompey, and Lucullus particularly show Sallust's influence. We need not only guess that Plutarch follows Sallust; the historian is occasionally cited by name, and in numerous places, Plutarch's Greek text is very nearly a translation of Sallust's Latin. Plutarch explicitly names Sallust as his source

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<sup>57</sup> For a detailed discussion of ancient sources' reliance on the *Histories* for their characterization of Spartacus, see van Hooff 1984 and section 3.2 of this dissertation.

twice in the *Life of Lucullus* :

Σαλουστίου δὲ θαυμάζω, τότε πρῶτον ὤφθαι Ῥωμαίοις καμήλους  
λέγοντος (*Luc.* 11.4; 3.42 M)

I marvel at Sallust when he says that camels were then seen by Romans  
for the first time.

Σαλούστιος μὲν οὖν φησι χαλεπῶς διατεθῆναι τοὺς στρατιώτας πρὸς  
αὐτὸν εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς Κυζίκῳ καὶ πάλιν πρὸς Ἀμισῶ,  
δύο χειμῶνας ἐξῆς ἐν χάρακι διαγαγεῖν ἀναγκασθέντας (*Luc.* 33.3; 5.10  
M)

Sallust says that the soldiers were ill-disposed to him already at the  
beginning of the war, at Cyzicus, and again at Amisus, because they were  
forced to spend two consecutive winters in camp.

In both of these examples, Plutarch identifies Sallust as the source of his account; neither  
example appears in either monograph and both are chronologically or thematically  
appropriate to the *Histories*, so we may reasonably assume Plutarch is referring to this  
text.

More frequently, Plutarch does not name Sallust, but his narrative is close enough  
to Sallust's that it seems probable that Plutarch's account is directly modeled on that of  
the historian. Here, I offer just a few illustrative examples of apparent correspondence  
between Plutarch's *Lives* and the *Histories*. As was mentioned above, Plutarch seems to  
have based his account of the Spartacus revolt in the *Life of Crassus* on Sallust's version.

4.40 M Cum interim lumine etiamtum incerto duae Galliae mulieres  
conventum vitantes ad menstrua solvenda montem ascendunt

When, meanwhile, when the light of day was still dim, two Gallic  
women, avoiding contact, climb the hill to spend their menstruation  
period there.

οἱ δ' ἐπειρῶντο μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποκρύπτειν, τὰ κράνη καταμπέχοντες,  
ὀφθέντες δ' ὑπὸ δυεῖν γυναικῶν προθυομένων τοῖς πολεμίοις  
ἐκινδύνευσαν (*Crass.* 11.3)

They were attempting to hide themselves against observation, covering their helmets, but happened to be seen by two women who were making sacrifices for the enemy.

It is difficult to imagine a context for the appearance of these two Gallic women in the *Histories*, unless we suppose they are the women who, according to Plutarch, spotted Crassus' men as they attempted to ambush the rebel slaves led by Castricius and Castus. The main difference between these passages is the activity of the women, a difference which can be attributed to Plutarch's misunderstanding of Sallust's Latin. As McGushin, following Gerlach, points out, this fragment is the only example of *ad menstrua solvenda* meaning “sacrificing monthly” given in major lexica, and its inclusion is probably based on the assumption that Plutarch's understanding of the phrase was correct.<sup>58</sup> Parallels in Lucretius (*DRN* 6.794-6) and Tacitus (*Hist.* 5.6) suggest that the phrase should be taken as referring to the women's menstrual cycle, as I have translated it above. It seems likely, then, that this passage in the *Life of Crassus* was based on Sallust's account of this phase of the Spartacus revolt, although Plutarch mis-translated *ad menstrua solvenda*.

Plutarch's remarks about the anxiety among Pompey's political adversaries that Pompey intended to court the favor of the plebs at the expense of the interests of the senate also appear to have been influenced by Sallust's version :

4.42 M Multisque suspicionibus volentia plebi facturus habebatur

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<sup>58</sup> McGushin 1994 *ad loc.*

He was believed, according to the suspicions of many, to be intending to carry out the wishes of the plebs.

ἐν αἰτιᾷσθαι τοῖς βασκαίνουσι περιῆν ὑπόλοιπον, ὅτι τῷ δήμῳ προσνέμει μᾶλλον ἑαυτὸν ἢ τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ τὸ τῆς δημαρχίας ἀξίωμα, Σύλλα καταβαλόντος, ἔγνωκεν ἀνιστάναι καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές. (*Pomp.* 21.4)

Once thing remained for his disparagers to charge, that he was devoting himself more to the people than to the senate, and that he intended to restore the authority of the tribunate, which Sulla had overthrown, and that he intended to fulfill the wishes of the many (which was true).

Here, Plutarch's account reflects Sallust's suggestion that Pompey's rapid rise to prominence was accompanied by rising paranoia among the *nobiles* that Pompey was unduly interested in maintaining his popularity and currying the favor of the common people; χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς may be read as parallel to *volentia plebi facturus*.

As a final example, I offer parallel passages from Book 1 of the *Histories* and Plutarch's *Life of Sertorius*, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation :

1.88 M Magna gloria tribunus militum in Hispania T. Didio imperante, magno usui bello Marsico paratu militum et armorum fuit, multaque tum ductu eius <manu>que patrata primo per ignobilitatem, deinde per invidiam scriptorum incelebrata sunt, quae vivos facie sua ostentabat aliquot advorsis cicatricibus et effosso oculo.

As a military tribune, he achieved great glory in Spain under the command of Titus Didius, and was of great use in the Marsic War in the assembly of soldiers and arms, and many things that were done at that time under his leadership and by his hand are unrecorded, first because of his ignoble background, then through the ill-will of writers; deeds which, while he was alive, he used to show off with his appearance, with a number of scars on the front of his body and a hollow eye-socket.

οὐ μὴν ὑφίκατο τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τόλμης εἰς ἀξίωμα προεληλυθὼς

ἡγεμόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειρὸς ἀποδεικνύμενος ἔργα θαυμαστὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα  
τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἀφειδῶς ἐπιδιδούς, τῶν ὄψεων ἀπέβαλε τὴν ἑτέραν  
ἐκκοπεῖσιν (*Sert.* 4.3).

In fact, when he had become general, he did not give up his soldierly  
daring, but displaying marvelous deeds of his own hand, and also  
unsparingly offering up his body in battle, he lost one of his eyes when it  
was knocked out.

As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, Reynolds suggested <manu>*que patrata* for the  
manuscripts' *que rapta* on the strength of the similarity of these two passages. Plutarch's  
reliance on Sallust thus not only helps us reconstruct the macrostructure of Sallust's  
narrative, but can also aid in the reconstruction of individual fragments, when necessary.

While Plutarch's biographies may thus be useful for trying to reconstruct the form  
and content of Sallust's narrative, as scholars have recognized (or not) to varying degrees,  
it is important that we not assume a perfect correspondence between Plutarch's and  
Sallust's attitudes toward their shared characters. Syme warns : "Sallust is known, or  
rather divined, largely through Plutarch. It is premature and hazardous to equate the two  
writers."<sup>59</sup> Büchner advises caution, as well : "In Sertorius den letzten grossen  
Ideenpolitiker nach den Gracchen dargestellt zu finden, hat in den erhaltenen Fragmenten  
ebensowenig Stütze wie die Annahme einer Verherrlichung von Heldengestalten wie  
Mithridates und Spartacus. Hier hat vielfach Plutarch getäuscht. Wenn dieser Sallust als  
Quelle benützt, ist es doch nicht erlaubt, die plutarchischen Urteilstkategorien Sallust zu  
imputieren."<sup>60</sup> Generally speaking, Plutarchan biography shows encomiastic and  
moralizing tendencies; as I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, the *Histories*  
are intentionally bereft of such moral clarity. Thus, while Plutarch's narratives are a

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<sup>59</sup> Syme 1964, 205.

<sup>60</sup> Büchner 1982, 263. See also the note of caution sounded by Konrad 1994, xlv.

useful source from which to extrapolate the structure of the *Histories* and even the details of particular passages, we must not be tempted to use the biographies as the basis for any assumptions about Sallust's attitude toward a particular subject or about the tenor of his narrative.

### **1.5.3 Editions of the *Histories***

Selecting an edition of a text on which to base one's analysis is, perhaps, a more fraught decision when dealing with a fragmentary text than with a complete one; the quality of the text is critical when so much of an argument's weight rests on so few words. For this project, I have decided to use the 1991 OCT text of Reynolds; unfortunately, Reynolds only includes selected fragments, so where necessary I supplement the OCT with Maurenbrecher's text. Unless otherwise noted, I follow Reynolds in following Maurenbrecher's numbering of the fragments; the following discussion outlines the reasons for my selection of Reynolds' text.

### **Early Editions and the Fleury Palimpsest**

Although I have only seriously considered editions published after the decipherment of the Fleury manuscript (a decision I discuss below), here I briefly review the major earlier editions of the *Histories*. De Brosses' 1777 edition contains all the fragments known at that time, but the editor opted to disregard transmitted book numbers and organized the fragments in what he believed to be chronological order based on the text alone; several fragments appear more than once. Gerlach (1831) also generally ignored the transmitted book numbers, arranging the text according to a twelve-year

annalistic structure. In his 1853 edition, Kritz restored the transmitted book numbers and arranged the fragments within each book according to topic or event. Dietsch (1859) took a more conservative approach than previous editors, and consequently ended up with an extensive collection of *fragmenta incertae sedis*.<sup>61</sup>

I have limited my choices to editions published after Heuler's deciphering of the Fleury palimpsest in 1886. This manuscript contains fragments which strongly suggest that Sallust arranged his material in annalistic fashion; that is, wars and other events lasting more than one year were narrated not continuously but year-by-year, with the events of each year in chronological order. For example :

2.98D M Haec litterae principio sequentis anni recitatae in senatu. Sed consules decretas a patribus provincias inter se paravere : Cotta Galliam citeriorem habuit, Ciliciam Octavius. Dein proximi consules L. Lucullus et M. Cotta litteris nuntiisque Pompei graviter perculsi. . .

These reports were read in the senate at the beginning of the following year. But the consuls distributed between themselves provinces decreed by the senators : Cotta had Nearer Gaul, Octavius had Cilicia. Then the new consuls, Lucullus and M. Cotta, acutely alarmed at the reports and the pronouncements of Pompey. . .

In this fragment, covering, the transition from the year 75 to 74 BCE, Sallust appears to be following the conventions of annalistic structure, ending one year and opening the next with the outgoing and incoming consuls. The Fleury manuscript also contains passages (M 2.92-3) which strongly suggest that, in Thucydidean fashion, Sallust divided the longer campaigns and his account of them into campaigning seasons, and accordingly gave the year's activity in two separate passages.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> For a more detailed discussion of these editions, see McGushin 1994, p. 10-11.

<sup>62</sup> Bloch 1961 discusses these fragments in more detail.

These fragments have profound implications for our understanding of the structure of Sallust's text. While I am prepared to confront the occasional dubiously numbered fragment in the course of this dissertation, I believe the present project requires an edition which takes into account the strong indications in the Fleury manuscript that the *Histories* were composed in Thucydidean and annalistic fashion. Since this dissertation aims to make sense of the *Histories* as a whole, it is necessary to use the text which most closely demonstrates the structure of the work. Since editors before Maurenbrecher did not have the benefit of these passages to inform their arrangement of the fragments, Maurenbrecher's is the earliest edition I have considered as a candidate for use.

### **Maurenbrecher 1893**

Since its publication, Maurenbrecher's edition has served as the standard text of the fragments of the *Histories*. Maurenbrecher's text is divided into five books, each of which contains several "chapters" into which he has allocated fragments covering a particular event or phase (*capita a me facta*, vi). Maurenbrecher points out in his introduction that, given the evidence for the annalistic structure of the *Histories* found in the Fleury manuscript, Kritz's decision to combine all phases of a particular matter into a single continuous passage is no longer universally tenable. He explains that he will only follow this practice in the case of "minor affairs" and "urban affairs," confining each of these to their own chapter in each year, while the "more serious wars" will be narrated year-by-year (that is, not continuously).<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Maurenbrecher 1893 vi "Itaque hac in difficultate eum secutus sum modum, ut bella graviora per annos



Bloch refers to this edition as “a work which, for its time, deserves high praise,” a gently backhanded compliment. One of the stronger arguments in its favor is that it is comprehensive; the edition includes all the text available to Maurenbrecher at the time of publication. Furthermore, subsequent editors have generally adopted Maurenbrecher's arrangement of the fragments with only minor alterations. McGushin, however, has raised the reasonable objection that, if Sallust were truly imitating Thucydidean structure, the *res minores* which Maurenbrecher has compiled into a continuous narrative should also be split into annual installments. This, however, may not be a major impediment to the present project. As was stated above, Maurenbrecher's ordering has been adopted, for the most part, by subsequent editors, and there is no reason to think his arrangement is fundamentally flawed; in the event that Maurenbrecher's consolidation of the *res minores* hinders my analysis, I will be able to consult McGushin's translation, as well.

Maurenbrecher omits or gives excessively economical citations of some of the ancient testimonia, remarking in his introduction that he will only include those which are necessary for “establishing Sallust's wording or for the interpretation of the fragment (*verba non descripsi nisi quae aut ad Sallustii orationem constituendam aut ad interpretationem fragmenti necessaria sunt*, vii).” While this alone does not disqualify Maurenbrecher's edition from use, the ideal text for this project would be more inclusive, allowing the reader to judge for herself what is “necessary for the interpretation of the fragment.” Maurenbrecher also indicates that, in his desire to pare down the commentary (*commentarios quam maxime coartare volui*, vii), he included only the “most important

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disponerem, monoribus vero in rebus etiam complurium annorum gesta in unum plerumque caput comprehenderem, res denique urbanas per annos ita distribuerem, ut eiusdem anni omnes uno capite continerentur.”

(*gravissima*)” remarks of previous editors, but has omitted their “false conjectures (*falsas eorum coniecturas*, vii); again, it might be preferable for the reader to have more conjectures available for the purpose of comparison.

### **Reynolds 1991 (OCT)**

Reynolds' 1991 OCT of Sallust contains the *BC*, *BJ*, select fragments of the *Histories*, and an appendix with the spurious *Epistulae ad Caesarem Senem*. As with the Teubner edition (discussed below), a major drawback of Reynolds' text is that it is incomplete. The OCT contains 77 fragments of the *Histories*, including the letters and speeches. In his introduction to the text, Reynolds laments that he is unable to furnish a complete collection of the fragments in this edition, and explains that he has tried to select the “fuller and more useful” from among them; this, he hopes, will be enough for readers who do not need the comprehensive text of Maurenbrecher to at least “get a taste” of the *Histories*.<sup>64</sup> Although it is regrettable he was forced to make such a choice, Reynolds chose well; much of the excised material consists of very short ( $\leq 1$  line) fragments, and the included material contains the majority of the passages to be discussed in this dissertation. Furthermore, Reynolds restores many of the ancient testimonia elided by Maurenbrecher, giving the reader a fuller understanding of the transmission and possible interpretation of each fragment.

Reviews of Reynolds' edition are largely positive, although they primarily focus on his treatment of the monographs. While Schierling wonders if Reynolds' conjectures

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<sup>64</sup> Reynolds 1991 xxv : “Paenitet tam pauca fragmenta ex illo magno thesauro elegisse et spes lectorum hoc aut illud fragmentum desiderantium decipere; operae pretium tamen esse visum est aliqua ex longioribus vel utilioribus fragmentis studiosis offerre, ut ei qui editionis Maurenbrechianae ubertatem non requirerent hoc insigne Sallustiani ingenii opus aliquo modo delibare atque degustare possent.”

often rest too heavily on his interpretation of Sallust's style, he states that “Reynolds has considered, in an orderly and consistent fashion, the readings of the manuscripts balanced with quotations of ancient authors and the choices of prior editors,” and concludes that the Reynolds has “rendered the text cleaner and more consistent (99).” Comparing the OCT to Kurfess' Teubner (discussed below), Oakley remarks that he “struggled to find even a handful of passages in which Kurfess' reading seemed preferable (58).” Oakley points out that Reynolds' edition might be improved by including more conjectures in the apparatus (60); this note is, however, his only objection to Reynolds' treatment of the *Histories* fragments.

### **Funari 1996**

Funari's two-volume 1996 critical edition of the *Histories* contains all the fragments excluding the speeches and letters, and is accompanied by commentary (in Italian). The exclusion of the speeches and letters is not troubling in light of the relative accessibility of those passages in comparison with the remainder of the fragments. The edition has two main components : the text and the commentary. Funari explains that the fragments discovered since Maurenbrecher's publication and the newer editions of the texts in which many of the fragments are preserved (Donatus, Aulus Gellius, vel sim.) require a fresh look at the text of the *Histories*. He deviates from the practice of earlier editors, however, by stripping away past conjectures and offering few of his own in an effort to reconstruct as closely as possible the original state of the manuscripts, rather than emending the text to create a coherent narrative.<sup>65</sup> Funari criticizes the “optimism”

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<sup>65</sup> Funari 1996, ii : “L'intento primo è stato soprattutto quello di depurare il testo dalle molte e sovente

of previous editors, whose confidence, Funari believes, in making emendations exceeds the degree of confidence allowed by the condition of the text; not enough remains, he argues, to make serious judgments about the sense of the narrative. Funari also differs from his predecessors in his presentation of the fragments insofar as he includes all known indirect sources for each fragment, rather than giving the text of the one fullest or least corrupt transmitted version and only citing the others. As for the commentary, Funari explains that he intends to deal primarily with issues of language and style, and his work is designed to fill a perceived gap in the scholarship on the *Histories*; the editor makes clear, however, that he will not attempt to sort out any of the major historical issues which arise in the text.<sup>66</sup>

### **Other Editions Post-Maurenbrecher**

There have been several other published editions of the *Histories* since Maurenbrecher, but these may be dismissed for various reasons. Kurfess' 1968 Teubner contains the *BC*, *BJ*, and “*fragmenta ampliora*” of the *Histories*. This edition contains all the speeches and letters of the *Histories*, but only the fragments which were handed down through direct transmission, and none of those preserved by the grammarians and scholiasts (2.42-43, 45-47, 87A-D, 92-93, 3.5-6, 96A-D, 98A-D M). Although Kurfess' treatment of the monographs received favorable reviews, the text of the *Histories* here is

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arbitrarie concrezioni del lavoro congetturale dei filologi ottocenteschi, e restituire agli studiosi un testo che fedelmente, nei limiti del possibile, offra un'idea del preciso stato in cui il frammento ci è pervenuto attraverso la tradizione manoscritta dei testimoni. Questo criterio editoriale vuol prendere nettamente le distanze dal principio che ispirò precedenti editori, i quali piuttosto ebbero in animo di far tornare i conti della questione testuale con gli imperativi categorici della ricostruzione storica generale.”

<sup>66</sup> Funari 1996, iii : “Di queste vestigia a noi interessò soprattutto la lingua, la sintassi, la compagine letteraria. Altri potranno indagarvi meglio le tracce più strettamente storiche : anche a tale riguardo molto lavoro resta da fare, in aggiunta o a rettifica dei pur meritori studi che stanno alla base delle principali edizioni.”

simply too incomplete to be used as the primary edition for this dissertation. Opitz (1894), Ernout (1946), and Paladini (1956) contain only the speeches and letters. Frassinetti's 1991 text and facing translation contains all our fragments with very limited commentary (as well as the *BC* and *BJ*), but no makes no reference to the sources of each fragment.

The decision, then, is among the three post-Fleury critical editions which contain all (or most) of the fragments : Maurenbrecher, Reynolds, and Funari. Maurenbrecher and Funari contain only the *Histories*, while Reynolds' OCT covers both monographs as well as the selected fragments; the ideal text for this project would be devoted solely to the *Histories*. While Funari's inclusion of all the sources of indirect transmission may prove useful, his attempt to render the closest possible approximation to the original manuscript does not produce an ideal text for this dissertation. If the goal of the dissertation were to produce a new critical edition of the *Histories*, Funari's text would provide an ideal canvas on which to work, but it is more useful for the actual purposes of this dissertation to work with a text that is both well edited and readable. On these grounds, Reynolds' text is the best available choice.

It seems, therefore, that no single edition on its own is sufficient to meet all the needs of this dissertation; each has positive aspects, but each has drawbacks, as well. I have thus used several texts in writing this dissertation. Reynolds' OCT is the primary text used for the fragments included therein. For the passages excluded by Reynolds, I have relied on Maurenbrecher's text; Funari's commentary has been a useful supplement to these texts.

## 1.6 Review of Scholarship

Scholarship on Sallust is extensive and wide-ranging; the following survey focuses on the studies which are most relevant to the questions raised in this dissertation. I first discuss general works on Sallust and studies of Sallustian style and historical technique, paying particular attention to works which address the relationship between the monographs and the *Histories*; I then turn to scholarship primarily focused on the *Histories*.

Several general works on Sallust provide overviews of Sallust's career and works with varying levels of detail and depth; these general works (with the exception of Syme 1964) exemplify the lack of scholarly attention paid to the *Histories* in comparison with the monographs. One of the primary contributions of this dissertation is to demonstrate that with careful analysis of the fragments, we can get a sense of the *Histories* as a whole, and that this, in turn, reveals a great deal about Sallust's conception of the purpose and limitations of historiography. Previous scholars, however, have been hesitant to attempt to make sense of the work as a whole, and any such attempts have been perfunctory at best, focusing on the speeches and letters but largely disregarding the shorter (but, as I show, equally rich) fragments. Among the general works on Sallust, Büchner 1961 is particularly illustrative of this. First, although ample space is devoted to the spurious *Invectiva* and *Epistulae* (as well as the monographs), the *Histories* are touched upon only briefly. Second, the main body of book, the section on Sallust *der Historiker*, is organized around self-contained entities of the works (e.g., speeches, letters, digressions).

This encourages the (in my opinion, erroneous) view that it is sufficient to examine Sallust's works as the sum of constituent parts and not as an integrated whole. As this literature review demonstrates, the *Histories*, in particular, have suffered from this treatment; Sallust's magnum opus is most often treated as six disconnected speeches and letters.

Syme 1964 gives the *Histories* more credit, attempting to discuss the program of the work as a whole. Syme gives too much weight, I think, to the question of Sallust's personal opinion of particular individuals (especially Sertorius and Pompey); he does not give much credence to the possibility that these figures were intended more as literary devices than accurate “historical” representations. Although he does not pursue this observation in depth, Syme notes that parallels between the triumviral period and the years after Sulla can be detected in the *Histories*; this claim is fundamental to my argument for Sallust's use of “analogical historiography.” Overall, Syme's work, while in many respects outdated, still gives a useful overview of Sallust's life and career, particularly the political context in which Sallust's works were composed. Syme is above all a historian, and in this work is more interested in historical and political questions than literary and historiographical ones; Syme does, however, devote some space to Sallust's style and literary antecedents, as I discuss below.<sup>67</sup>

Many of my arguments in this dissertation are based on Sallust's prose style, syntax, and vocabulary; I build on earlier scholars' identification of the features of Sallustian style by suggesting ways in which Sallust deploys this unique style as part of his broader historiographical program. Richter 1983 and Von Albrecht 1989 use close

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<sup>67</sup> Other general works : Schur 1934; Latte 1935; Schmal 2001.

readings of selected passages to provide overviews of the characteristic features of Sallust's prose style : *inconcinnitas*, *brevitas*, *velocitas*, Grecisms and archaisms.<sup>68</sup> Other works on particular elements of Sallust's style (for example, the historical infinitive) are useful when those elements are encountered in the fragments.<sup>69</sup> Funari 1996 offers the only full-scale grammatical and stylistic commentary on the *Histories*; although Funari does not include the speeches and letters, his analysis of the other fragments is exhaustive.

As I demonstrate at various points in this dissertation, Sallust's conception of the purpose and methods of historiography seems to have evolved between the composition of the monographs and the *Histories*; this evolution of historiographical philosophy was accompanied by an evolution of prose style. I take as a foundation the argument presented by De Meo 1970 that Sallust's unbalanced prose style may be read as a reflection of Sallust's view of Rome itself as morally unbalanced. I argue, however, that Sallust's difficult style not only signals this, but functions as an element of Sallust's new historiography, creating yet another layer of interpretive complexity through which the reader must find his way. Previous scholars have documented in detail the developments in Sallust's style, although these developments have not previously been attributed to Sallust's evolving historiographical program. Kunze 1897 and Löfstedt 1933 examine the development of Sallust's style from *BC* to *BJ* and *Histories*, cataloguing, for example, Sallust's increased use of Grecisms and his increasing affinity for particular words or types of words. Among other studies of Sallust's style, Syme's appendix on the

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<sup>68</sup> Latte 1935 offers a less detailed but still useful overview of the features of Sallust's style.

<sup>69</sup> Steele 1891 on chiasmus; Muhr 1971 on the preposition *per*; Hessen 1984 on the historical infinitive; Fuchs 1994 on zeugma.



developments in Sallust's prose is especially relevant to my arguments. Syme here presents a list of typically Ciceronian words which do not appear in Sallust's works (e.g., *gravitas*, *priscus*, *vetustus*). It is possible that Sallust simply happened not to use these words; however, in light of the significant evidence (which I present in this dissertation) for Sallust's overall rejection of Ciceronian style and historiography, it is fair to interpret his avoidance of Cicero's vocabulary as intentional. Syme's other lists illustrate the evolution of Sallust's vocabulary across his three works. One list shows the rising frequency of particular words from the *BC* to the *BJ* (for example, *metus* increases in appearances from 9 to 30, *reor* from 4 to 22, *tempto* from 4 to 23).<sup>70</sup> Syme also compiles lists of words first appearing in the *BJ* and the *Histories* (48 words appear in Sallust for the first time in the *Histories*, including, for example, *dedecor*, *gnarus*, and *scaevus*).<sup>71</sup>

Not only does Sallust deploy a unique prose style as part of his innovative historiographical method, he also uses conventional features of historiography in unconventional ways, as I demonstrate in this dissertation. Scholars have addressed specific features of Sallustian historiography such as character sketches and geographical digressions, although these discussions have not done much to acknowledge Sallust's innovative use of these devices.<sup>72</sup> For example, scholars have offered different

<sup>70</sup> The *BC* comprises approximately 9,600 words; the *BJ* is approximately 19,000.

<sup>71</sup> More focused discussions of particular elements of Sallust's style have supplied much of the raw material for my discussion of these phenomena in the *Histories*. One stylistic method by which Sallust surprises and challenges his reader is the borrowing of poetic and archaic language. Funari identifies passages where Sallust appears to have drawn from the vocabulary of previous writers (especially Terence, Plautus, Ennius, and Cato); see also Skard 1956 for examination of the influence of tragedy, epic, and the works of Cato on Sallust. Aili 1979's study of prose rhythms in Sallust and Livy explores another component of Sallust's rejection of Ciceronian style, namely, Sallust's adoption of un-Ciceronian clausulae. Sallust, according to Aili, favored only one clausula commonly found in Cicero, and generally speaking showed a much wider variety of rhythms than Cicero did.

<sup>72</sup> On character sketches, see Blänsdorf 2007. Discussion of the geographical digressions is typically focused on Sallust's sources (for example, Posidonius' influence on the digression on Sardinia in Book Two of the *Histories*); see Tiffou 1974; Keyser 1991; Oniga 1995.

interpretations of Sallust's digression on the Blessed Isles in Book One of the *Histories*.<sup>73</sup> None, however, have examined the fact that the very existence of this digression is anomalous. Geographical excursus are traditionally employed to introduce a change of narrative theatre, but Sertorius never actually travels to the Blessed Isles; convention alone cannot explain Sallust's inclusion of this digression.<sup>74</sup>

As I discuss below, each of the speeches in the *Histories* has received some scholarly attention. Most of the focus on Sallust's use of speeches, however, is centered on the monographs; in particular, the debate between Caesar and Cato and the *synkrisis* of the characters in the *BC* has been extensively discussed. Some scholars have made claims that Caesar is portrayed as the superior figure,<sup>75</sup> others, Cato.<sup>76</sup> Batstone 1988 has rightly argued that approaching the *synkrisis* in this fashion (arguing that Sallust “preferred” one character over the other) yields few interesting results. Sklenář 1995 argues that Sallust erases the distinctive and well-known oratorical styles of both Caesar and Cato by composing both speeches in his own style; Sallust also, according to Sklenář, ascribes to the two speakers arguments based on different aspects of Sallust's own “ethical scheme (206).” The resulting autologomachy reveals Sallust's contradictory conception of the *mos maiorum*. Sallust's Caesar claims that his contemporaries' inability to uphold the *mos maiorum* signals their moral decline; Sallust's Cato suggests that in the context of *stasis*, the very idea of the *mos maiorum* is no longer functional. The self-contradictory and ambiguous Sallust Sklenář thus finds in the *BC* is a clear forerunner of the Sallust of the *Histories* as presented in this dissertation.

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<sup>73</sup> See especially Katz 1984.

<sup>74</sup> I discuss this passage in section 2.1

<sup>75</sup> For example, Syme 1964.

<sup>76</sup> E.g., Schwartz 1897 and Schur 1934.

In addition to general works and studies of Sallust's style, another category of Sallustian scholarship attempts political interpretations of Sallust's works. It is, as I have previously noted, difficult to disentangle the “literary” from the “political” in Sallust's works, but it has been necessary to limit the scope of this dissertation in some way; I do not, therefore, address in depth questions of Sallust's political views,<sup>77</sup> Caesarian partisanship,<sup>78</sup> and so forth, although these are openings for potentially fruitful future inquiry.<sup>79</sup>

Although there is an abundance of scholarship on Sallust's works, very little of it

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<sup>77</sup> Most political interpretations of Sallust's works focus on the monographs. Earl 1961, for example, argues that Sallust's political thought is focused on the tension between personal and hereditary *virtus* as the central element of the tension between the aristocratic class and the *novi homines*. Sallust's view of the decline of Rome, according to Earl, is characterized by three stages : *ambitio* (which employs *ingenium malum* rather than the *bonae artes* of *virtus*), *avaritia*, and *luxuria*. Earl's treatment of the *Histories* is brief and focuses on the speeches and letters in isolation; however, Earl's insistence that the *Histories* are too fragmentary to be subjected to rigorous thematic inquiry limits the utility of his discussion of the work.

<sup>78</sup> On Sallust's own political or partisan agenda in his works: Mommsen 1856 and Schwartz 1897 argued that Sallust's Caesarian partisanship colored his work, and that the *BC* was intended primarily to absolve Caesar of accusations of sympathy for Catiline's cause; the *BJ* was, first and foremost, an assault on the *nobilitas*. Mommsen and Schwartz' argument for Sallust the Caesarian apologist was challenged during the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, although supporters of their reading also spoke up. Today, scholars (correctly, I think) recognize the multiplicity of political, philosophical, and literary influences on Sallust, and his works are no longer considered to be purely partisan pamphlets. Similarly, in this dissertation I approach Sallust's work as a corpus shaped by eclectic influences and which defies simple categorization as “Caesarian” or anything else.

<sup>79</sup> Other political interpretations address aspects of Sallust's political worldview beyond the issue of partisanship. Broughton 1936 argues that Sallust displays no overt bias against Cicero in the *BC*, but also avoids openly praising him. This, Broughton claims, suggests that the *BC* was composed after the establishment of the triumvirate; Sallust's circumspect treatment of Cicero is calculated to avoid provoking Mark Antony and his new colleagues. Broughton's conclusion vis-à-vis Sallust and the triumvirs is provocative, although I think Sallust's nuanced portrait of Cicero is grounded in more than a desire to avoid political ire; as I argue in this dissertation, Sallust's works are characterized by ambiguity, allusion, and indirect criticism. La Penna 1968 is heavily informed by the scholar's Marxist approach to Roman history; his approach to the *Histories* focuses on issues of class conflict. Sertorius, he argues, is an idealized symbol of the Italian upper class, representing that group's resistance toward Rome. La Penna struggles to reconcile Sallust's portrayal of Pompey with his class-based reading of the *Histories*; Sallust should have presented Pompey as the champion of the landed Italian class. La Penna argues that Sallust's apparent antipathy toward Pompey must be explained by his Caesarian partisanship. Several other studies focus on particular terms of Sallust's political vocabulary. See Paananen 1972 on *pauci* in the speech of Lepidus; Christensen 1976 on *solii innocentes* in the speech of Macer, Valvo 2006 on *corrumpo* and related terms.

is focused specifically on the *Histories*. McGushin 1992 (Books 1-2) and 1994 (Books 3-5) are the only available English translations and commentaries of the full text of the *Histories*. The commentary's focus is primarily historical; in this area, McGushin has been useful for this dissertation, but significantly less so for issues of style, grammar, and literary context, which are generally not discussed by McGushin and which are more relevant to this project.

The prologues of the monographs have been extensively discussed, but the prologue of the *Histories* has been comparatively understudied. Since one of my goals in this dissertation is to demonstrate ways in which Sallust's *Histories* represent an innovative style of historiography, I am particularly interested in the relationship between the prologues of the monographs and the *Histories*, and how Sallust's explicit claims about the project of writing history evolve from work to work. Discussions of the prologue of the *Histories* generally focus on the structure of the prologue and the ordering of the fragments. Several scholars suggest revisions to Maurenbrecher's ordering of the prologue fragments. The suggested revisions are typically minor (that is, rearrangement of fragments already included in the preface by Maurenbrecher rather than the inclusion of new fragments); these changes, however, can clarify the structure of the prologue. For example, Cugusi 1992 proposes that 1.22 M should be placed earlier in the prologue, separating the “proemio vero e proprio” from the “archeologia,” a move which brings the structure of the *Histories'* prologue more closely in line with the prologues of the monographs, which Cugusi (following Tiffou 1974) recognizes as falling into two distinct parts : Sallust's statements of literary and political philosophy and the

archaeology.<sup>80</sup>

While scholars have been willing to engage with textual and structural questions about the *Histories'* prologue, they have been more hesitant to examine the broader themes introduced therein. This reticence (perhaps a symptom of the broader scholarly reluctance to deal with the *Histories*) is, perhaps, excessive; as I demonstrate in this dissertation, careful philological analysis of the fragments of the prologue and comparison with the prefaces of Sallust's earlier works suggests that Sallust's views of historiography evolved significantly between the composition of the monographs and the *Histories*. Among previous scholars, Scanlon 1998 has undertaken the most rigorous analysis of the *Histories'* prologue. Although I disagree with some of his conclusions (as I discuss below), Scanlon shares my general interest in Sallust's self-presentation as a historian and his concern for the purpose of historiography. Scanlon discusses the relationship of the *Histories'* preface with the prefaces of earlier historians (Cato, Coelius Antipater, and Sempronius Asellio) to demonstrate that the self-reflectiveness and meta-historical consideration demonstrated by Sallust represent an innovation in historiographical tradition. Scanlon notes that the *Histories*, unlike the *BC* and *BJ*, contain no explicit defense of the project of writing history. The author offers two explanations for the omission : that by his third work, Sallust thought the utility of historiography was too obvious to require explanation, or that the *Histories* did contain such a defense and it is simply not contained in the transmitted fragments. In this dissertation, I argue for a third option : Sallust did not include a defense of historiography

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<sup>80</sup> Pasoli 1975, Castorina 1975, and Petrone 1976 also suggest revisions to the arrangement of the prologue fragments.

in the *Histories* because the project itself is intended, in part, as an extended meditation on the utility of historiography, in which Sallust uses his main characters as ciphers for the historian-figure.<sup>81</sup>

The major figures of the *Histories* have all received some scholarly attention, although most often studies have focused on Sallust's "opinion" of the individual; that is, scholars have asked whether each character is presented in a "positive" or "negative" light. While these studies often yield useful observations, the question of "good" versus "bad" is, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, one of limited utility. Sallust's Sertorius, it is generally agreed (although I challenge this characterization in Chapter Two), is presented as a positive figure. Syme 1964 remarks that Sallust "speaks warmly" of Sertorius, and that his portrait is idealized at the expense of veracity<sup>82</sup>; Berve 1929, Schur 1934, and Katz 1983 agree that Sallust presented Sertorius in a positive light. Büchner 1960, on the other hand, argues that Sallust's portrait was hostile, depicting Sertorius as a traitor or foreign enemy. Spann 1987 takes a more moderate position; he dismisses Büchner's interpretation as based on passages "either uninformative, misinterpreted, or nonexistent" but suggests Syme and others have exaggerated the laudatory character of Sallust's depiction of Sertorius. Gillis 1969 examines the "tradition of partisanship" surrounding Sertorius; Gillis suggests that Sallust admired many of Sertorius' qualities,

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<sup>81</sup> Scholars have also discussed the theme of *metus hostilis* in the preface. Latta 1989 argues that Sallust's conception of history fundamentally changed between the *BJ* and the *Histories*; focusing on fragment 1.11 M, Latta suggests that, by the time he was writing the *Histories*, Sallust had lost confidence in *metus hostilis* as a deterrent for corruption. Although in this project I do not explore the theme of *metus hostilis* in detail, I do discuss the evolution of Sallust's thought between the composition of the monographs and the *Histories*, and Latta's work offers one perspective from which to examine that evolution. Other works useful for general study of the *Histories* but with less direct relevance to this project: Alfonsi 1969 and 1973 detects the influence of Aristotle and Plato (perhaps by way of Posidonius) in the presentation of *metus Punicus*; on *metus Punicus* see also Bonamente 1975.

<sup>82</sup> Syme 1964, 203.

but acknowledges that the fragmentary nature of the *Histories* makes it difficult to assert anything more. In this dissertation, I argue that Sallust's characters do not function as traditional *exempla*, and so the question of “good” or “bad” is irrelevant; the works cited above are useful, however, insofar as their diverse positions illustrate my point that the main characters of the *Histories* (including Sertorius) resist simple characterization.

Beyond the question of “positive” or “negative” portrayal : Katz 1981 explores parallels between Julius Caesar and Sallust's Sertorius. Sallust, he suggests, exploited their obvious similarities (for example, both were enemies of Sulla and Pompey, and both were assassinated, targeted by conspiracies among their purported friends). Caesar may have imitated Sertorius in some respects, Katz suggests; Sallust acknowledged these parallels, but “presented Sertorius as, in some ways at least, superior (313).” Although in this dissertation I do not pursue in detail Katz's link between Caesar and Sallust's Sertorius, our approaches are methodologically sympathetic; in this project, I take a similar approach, insofar as I search literary characters for echoes of historical figures. Sertorian scholarship also addresses Plutarch's use of the *Histories* as a source for his *Life of Sertorius*; Konrad's 1994 commentary on the Life of Sertorius contains good discussions of Sallust's influence both in the introduction and throughout the notes. Studies of Plutarch's use of Sallust's text are especially useful for the present project insofar as the *Lives* are an important source for reconstructing the *Histories*' narrative; for more on Sallust and Plutarch, see section 1.5 of this introduction.<sup>83</sup> Other scholarship uses Sallust's account of Sertorius to answer specific historical questions, such as

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<sup>83</sup> On Sallust and Plutarch's *Sertorius* see also Stenten 1969, Scardigli 1971 and 1974. On Sallust's account of the Blessed Isles as a source for Plutarch (as well as Horace), see Rebuffat 1974.

Sertorius' date of birth<sup>84</sup> and the identification of battle locations.<sup>85</sup>

As an individual character, Sallust's Spartacus has received comparatively little attention, although scholars have examined Sallust's overall treatment of the Spartacus War, focusing especially on the influence of Sallust's narrative on later accounts. Shaw 2001 presents a translated collection of narratives of the Spartacus revolt from antiquity, beginning with Sallust's and stretching to the late antique period. Levi 1972 and Stampacchia 1976 trace the development of the Spartacus tradition from Sallust to Orosius; Levi and Stampacchia discuss the inconsistency of portraits of Spartacus in Roman sources, and the resulting difficulty of tracing the path of the tradition as it developed.

Baldwin 1967 suggests that Sallust's portrait of Spartacus may have been sympathetic; Tiffou 1978 argues that, although Sallust was probably opposed to the rebellion in principle, he portrayed the revolt in a favorable light in order to highlight Rome's later state of degradation by comparison. This approach supports my reading of the *Histories* as “analogical historiography”; in both Tiffou's and my conceptions of Sallust, the historian's critique of contemporary Rome is indirect and allusive. Scholars have also used Sallust's account of the slave rebellion to examine the nature of the revolt and try to determine whether it was a loosely-organized servile insurrection primarily intended to secure freedom for its participants or a more organized collaboration between the Spartacus-led runaway slaves and Italian communities still smarting from their defeat in the Social War and looking for revenge against Rome.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Katz 1983a, Spann 1987.

<sup>85</sup> On Segontia vs. Seguntum as the location of Sertorius' final full-scale battle against the Romans in 75 BCE, see Spann 1984 and Konrad 1994.

<sup>86</sup> See Guarino 1979 for the servile insurrection argument, Rubinsohn 1971 for the argument in favor of a



Scholarly discussions of Sallust's Lucullus have primarily focused on Plutarch's use of the *Histories* as a source for his *Life of Lucullus*. Tröster 2008 suggests that Plutarch's "double-edged" interpretation of Lucullus' political and military careers is inspired by Sallust's ambiguous portrayal of the general; Tröster claims that, given Sallust's "most unfavourable attitude" toward Pompey, the historian was probably not inclined to "one-sidedly criticize Lucullus' *ambitio* and *avaritia*."<sup>87</sup> I find Tröster's argument about the relationship between Sallust's Lucullus and Pompey unconvincing; as I argue in Chapter 4, although Sallust's portrait of Pompey is unfavorable in some ways, it is not straightforwardly so; I do not think either Sallust's Lucullus or Sallust's Pompey is so easily definable that one can be read as directly in contrast with the other. I agree, however, that Sallust's Lucullus was an ambiguous figure, a judgment which Plutarch apparently shared.

It is generally agreed that Sallust's portrait of Pompey was negative; scholars have devoted extensive discussions to "proving" Sallust's antipathy for Pompey. Syme 1964, for example claims that Sallust intended that Pompey would be the central figure of the *Histories* (201), and suggests that Sallust's "malice" toward and "denigration" of Pompey may have been due to a personal conflict (212). Katz 1982 assumes as his starting point that Sallust displayed an unmitigated hatred for Pompey : "Sallust's attitude toward Pompey is manifest : he loathed the man (76)."<sup>88</sup> As I discuss throughout this project, however, Sallust's portrait of Pompey is more complex than some scholars allow, and the catalogues of "evidence" of Sallust's attitude cited above have limited utility for this

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more structured uprising.

<sup>87</sup> Tröster 2008, 116. See also Keaveney 1992.

<sup>88</sup> On Sallust's "negative portrait" of Pompey see also McGushin 1992.

project.

The Pompey of the *Histories* differs from the characters discussed above (Sertorius, Spartacus, and Lucullus) in that Sallust allows his Pompey to speak for himself. Previous scholars have addressed the themes of the letter itself, but not many have attempted to relate the letter's themes to the *Histories* as a whole, and none has examined the letter as a meditation on the value of historiography, as I do in Chapter Four. Two works in particular stand out for their attempts to use the letter as a lens through which to examine the broader project of the *Histories*. Meyer 2010 examines allusions to Thucydides' letter of Nicias in the letter of Pompey. Sallust uses these allusions, she argues, not only to highlight the contrast between Pompey and Nicias as diplomats and commanders, but also the similarities between Pompey and Nicias' young rival Alcibiades.<sup>89</sup> Meyer argues that the comparison between Pompey and Nicias also reveals something about the audience of each letter (the assembly at Athens and the Roman senate). The Athenians' rapid and unanimous support and the senate's capitulation (unanimous, but out of self-interest on the part of individuals) were both unexpected and dangerous, she claims: "Only with the contrast, and the parallel visible behind the contrast, do Roman indifference, fear, and ferocity become not just historical facts but razor-sharp shards of a mirror that should have been whole, the reflection on its unshattered surface that of a single, powerful entity capable of blinding its challengers (113)." Meyer's discussion thus lends support to the arguments in this dissertation for complex, multifaceted literary and historical allusions in the *Histories*. Wirth 1984 discusses Pompey's role as a figure bridging the transition from one period in Roman

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<sup>89</sup> In addition, Shackleton Bailey 1981 and Diggle 1983 address textual issues in the letter of Pompey.

history (the Sullan republic) to the next (the late republic). Wirth argues that, although he is a contemporary of Pompey, Sallust has already recognized Pompey as a transitional figure. The letter of Pompey, in particular, looks both to the past and the present; Pompey's threats to march on Rome recall the actions both of his predecessor Sulla and of his later rival Caesar, while the foreboding emphasis on *quies* (2.98.7 and 10) suggests a “calm before the storm” or a transitional period between civil wars.

The speeches of Lepidus, Philippus, Cotta, and Macer and the letter of Mithridates have been discussed in a variety of contexts. Since I do not address these passages in detail in this dissertation, I limit my discussion here to two works which deal with thematic issues raised in the speeches and the letter to Mithridates.<sup>90</sup> First, Raditsa 1969/70 argues that Mithridates' claim that Asia was occupied by the Romans at the time the letter purports to have been written represents a challenge to Rome's presentation of its provinces not as conquered subjects but as allies who benefitted from their relationship with Rome.<sup>91</sup> Although Raditsa does not expand his argument beyond the letter of Mithridates, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, the *Histories* are characterized throughout by Sallust's resistance to “official” representations not only of Rome's relationship with its nominal allies, but representations of stability within the state, as well. Adler 2006 explores the interpretive complexities of a Roman author placing a

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<sup>90</sup> Most work has been concentrated on fairly specific issues, such as questions of dramatic date and identification of individuals mentioned. See Perl 2005 on the date of Cotta's speech and the letter of Mithridates; Spann 1987 on the identification of the Cotta who was defeated by Sertorius at Mellaria. Historical commentaries on the speech of Lepidus (Criniti 1969a) and the letter of Mithridates (Raditsa 1969) address similar questions as well as discuss the historical context of the passages more generally, while general studies on the revolt of Lepidus use Sallust as a historical source (Hayne 1972 and Labruna 1976). Also on the speech of Lepidus, but of limited relevance to the present project : Paananen 1972 examines Lepidus' use of *pauci*; Questa (1975/6) and Pasoli (1974) discuss references to the speech in Tacitus and Juvenal, respectively.

<sup>91</sup> See also Perl 2005 on the dramatic date of the letter.

critique of Rome in the mouth of a foreigner. The method described by Adler – criticizing Rome in the voice of Mithridates rather than in Sallust's own voice – can be read as an example of Sallust's “analogical historiography” as described in this dissertation; like analogy, indirect criticism allows Sallust to maintain the “hermeneutic alibi” and forces the reader to work through multiple interpretive layers.

Section 1.5 of this introduction contains a comprehensive review of editions of the text of the *Histories*. Reynolds 1983 provides a thorough overview of the direct transmission of the *Histories*, while others have discussed various aspects of the *Histories'* indirect transmission through the grammarians.<sup>92</sup> Scholars have also addressed a variety of specific textual details of individual fragments.<sup>93</sup>

The Sallust of the *Histories* as revealed in this dissertation clearly recognizes that he is writing at a pivotal moment, both in literary and political history. Through close reading of the fragments, I explore Sallust's anxiety about the trajectory of both Roman history and historiography; it is unclear whether he fears more for the direction of history-writing or the fate of the *res publica*. He recognizes that current prescriptions for writing history (as articulated by Cicero) are no longer useful under the triumvirate : exemplarity cannot function as the dominant mode of moral discourse in historiography, since the historian's audience is incapable of correctly interpreting *exempla*. At the same time, Sallust also recognizes that, despite their claims to the contrary, the triumvirs have

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<sup>92</sup> General studies of the indirect transmission : de Nonno 1993. On Nonius : Garbugino 1978, Keyser 1996. On other sources : Crniti 1969b, Della Casa 1975, Marinone 1975, Di Salvo 1982, La Penna 1985a and b, Ehrhardt 1986

<sup>93</sup> See, for example, Pecere 1969; Garbugino 1983 and 1987; Perl 2002 and 2005. On the Rylands papyrus : Cavallo 1996.

not established peace or restored the republic, but rather are continuing the civil wars that have plagued Rome for most of the century. Estranged from public life, Sallust cannot solve the political problem; by emphasizing the parallels between the 70s and the triumviral period, Sallust suggests that the *res publica* is still trapped by the *ambitio*, *avaritia*, and *luxuria* of its leading men. Sallust does, however, propose a solution to the literary problem by offering a new type of historiography in the *Histories*. As this dissertation demonstrates, Sallust's new historiography rejects complacency and embraces ambiguity and contradiction, reflecting the disjunction between pretense and reality and the moral confusion of the time of composition.

## Chapter 2 : Sertorius

### 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the role of the Sertorian War in the narrative of the *Histories*, paying particular attention to the ways in which Sallust's characterization of Sertorius echoes figures and elements of the triumviral period, as well as ways in which Sallust's Sertorius represents challenges to Cicero's conception of the practice and purpose of historiography. First, I discuss the longest remnant of Sallust's character-portrait of Sertorius, and how this fragment reflects the author's anxiety about the role of history-writing under the triumvirate. 1.88 M reveals a Sertorius who shows off his battle wounds and actively fashions his public persona; just as this Sertorius does not need historians to create his legacy, the members of the triumvirate (Antony and Octavian, in particular) also tightly controlled their own public images. The second section of this chapter addresses the relevance of Rome itself as a seat of power and the threats posed to the city's legitimacy during times of civil war.

In the prologues of both the *BC* and the *BJ*, Sallust argues for the necessity of history-writing; without writers to record the deeds of actors, those deeds will be consigned to oblivion. Writers controlled both *what* was remembered and *how* it was remembered; the greatness of one's *memoria* was entirely dependent on the skill of the writers in whose hands it rested.

Atheniensium res gestae, sicuti ego aestumo, satis amplae magnificaeque  
fuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen, quam fama feruntur. Sed quia  
provenire ibi scriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem  
Atheniensium facta pro maxumis celebrantur. Ita eorum, qui fecere,  
virtus tanta habetur, quantum eam verbis potuere extollere praeclara

ingenia (BC 8).

The affairs of the Athenians, as I see it, were great and splendid enough, but nevertheless somewhat lesser in reality than they are declared by their reputation. But because great talents of writers were produced there, the deeds of the Athenians are celebrated throughout the world as the very greatest. Thus, the virtue of those who acted is considered great to the extent that distinguished talents were able to exalt it.<sup>94</sup>

By the triumviral period, however, public figures had begun to take a very active role in constructing their own self-image. Self-promotion was not a new practice, of course; Rome's "great men" had long been conscious of creating a lasting legacy for themselves.<sup>95</sup> By the late republic, however, it has become an inescapable facet of public life. Julius Caesar's "*commentarii*" represent, perhaps, a tightening of the reins on *memoria*. Although ostensibly written to provide the raw material for the accounts of later historians,<sup>96</sup> Caesar's narratives in the *Bellum Gallicum* and *Bellum Civile* are hardly skeletal, but rather composed with sophisticated rhetorical and literary technique.<sup>97</sup> After Caesar's assassination, the triumvirs (Octavian and Mark Antony in particular) used a combination of coinage, iconography, and written works to both create their own portraits and try to shape public perception of each other and their rivals (e.g., Sextus Pompey).

By the time Sallust began to compose the *Histories*, then, the role of the historian was necessarily changing; if political actors were aggressively "writing" their own histories through various forms of propaganda, the historian's text was now nothing but

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<sup>94</sup> The allusion to Thucydides is clear here. Scanlon 1980 provides the most thorough and persuasive discussion of Thucydidean allusions in Sallust's programmatic statements; see also Marincola 1997.

<sup>95</sup> Fulvius Nobilior, for example, was rebuked by the elder Cato for bringing Ennius on his Aetolian campaign; Cato was, no doubt, aggrieved that Fulvius' weak victory over Ambracia was redeemed not only in Ennius' *Annales* but in the lost play *Ambracia* as well. See Goldberg 1989.

<sup>96</sup> At least, according to Aulus Hirtius (*BG* 8, preface); see section 2.2.1 below.

<sup>97</sup> On the classification of Caesar's texts, see, for example, Rüpke 1992 and ; Scholz 1999.

another version of the story. In what remains of the prologue of the *Histories*, Sallust says nothing about the value of writing history; nowhere in the extant passages does he try to justify his career or make a case for the necessity of *scriptores*. Just the opposite : in fragment 1.88, Sertorius, far from needing writers to create lasting *memoria*, is portrayed as “writing” his own history; all the evidence he needs of his accomplishments is contained in his war wounds, which he parades before his fellow soldiers. In this fragment, we see Sertorius performing another historiographical function, as well : he represents an element of Sallust's resistance to Cicero's notion of history's exemplary function. As one of the major figures of the *Histories*, Sertorius offered Sallust the opportunity to craft an *exemplum*, either positive or negative. The character with which we end up, however, is neither manifestly good nor bad; he is a morally ambiguous figure, an *exemplum* for a community which now fails to interpret and imitate *exempla* correctly.

The second section of this chapter discusses the challenges of external forces against Rome's authority ; this section focuses on threats to the city as a locus of power, especially during times of internal conflict. What does it mean to be the center of a state rent by civil discord? And how much authority resides in the city itself, rather than in the associated people and institutions? In this section, I argue that Sallust uses the Spanish *altera res publica* of Sertorius to allude to recent and contemporary threats to strip the city of Rome of its role as the center of the state, specifically, to Julius Caesar's rumored attempt to move the capital to Troy, and Mark Antony's apparent intention to govern his provinces from Alexandria, possibly with an eye toward eventually ruling all of Rome



from that city, if Octavian could be disposed of. The *altera res publica* not only reflects Sallust's awareness of contemporary anxieties about Rome's continued relevance as the *caput mundi*, it also represents another element of Sallust's challenge to Cicero, for whom the strength and importance of the city of Rome itself was inextricably linked with the stability of Roman power, and in whose view any threat to move the business of the city elsewhere was impious and disgraceful.

Sallust's account of the Sertorian War begins, chronologically, well outside the purview of the *Histories*; in Book 1, he gives a character sketch (discussed below) and overview of Sertorius' early career, including his service in the Social War. In this background survey, Sallust also gives an account of Sertorius' governorship in Spain in 82-81, as well as his nautical adventures in 81-80, when he escaped the legions sent after him on Sulla's orders and eventually returned to Spain. Sallust returns to the Sertorian War in Book 2, picking up the narrative with the arrival of Pompey in Spain in 76.<sup>98</sup> 2.29-37 M appear to cover the battle between Sertorius and Pompey for Lauro, a city near Saguntum, probably on the river Palantia; Sertorius' forces successfully ambushed and defeated the legion of Decimus Laelius, Pompey's legate, and repelled Pompey and his own army.<sup>99</sup> The following year, Metellus overcame the Sertorians under Hirtuleius at Segovia<sup>100</sup>; Sertorius and Pompey squared off in two battles along the eastern coast, in Valentia,<sup>101</sup> and at the Sucro, before Sertorius' catastrophic loss to Metellus at

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<sup>98</sup> Frassinetti 1975 has challenged this traditional date for Pompey's entrance to the Sertorian War, suggesting that he arrived in Spain a year earlier, but this does not have much impact on the present inquiry; see McGushin 1992, vol. 1 p. 198 for further discussion of the question and bibliography.

<sup>99</sup> M 2.29-31.

<sup>100</sup> M 2.58-59

<sup>101</sup> M 2.54-56

Saguntum.<sup>102</sup> Sallust concludes his account of the Sertorian War with two sections in Book 3. McGushin assigns four fragments to the events of 74 (McG 3.30-33 = 3.43, 3.44, 2.28, 3.46 M); two cover the movements of Perperna in Callaecia, one describes Metellus' difficult winter in Corduba, and the fourth describes the crop failures in Transalpine Gaul, where Pompey and his troops were wintering. The final section on the Sertorian War (3.81-89 M) covers the conspiracy against and assassination of Sertorius in 72; the longest fragment, preserved by Servius, narrates the scene of the murder (3.83 M)

Despite the patchy condition of Sallust's Sertorian narrative (and the ambiguity of what remains, as discussed below), scholars have not hesitated to ascribe to the author strong opinions about Sertorius' character; this is, indeed, the most well-trodden path of inquiry on Sallust's Sertorius. Some have suggested that Sallust's portrait was laudatory and idealized, even at the expense of veracity<sup>103</sup>; others have argued that Sallust treated Sertorius as a traitor or foreign enemy.<sup>104</sup> The vagaries of transmission have left us little on which to base such strong assertions. Although 1.88 M, discussed below, is often used to support the claim that the historian intended a positive portrayal of Sertorius, the argument that Sallust's picture was idealized rests primarily on one fragment :

1.90 M dum inter arma civilia aequi bonique famas petit.

...during civil war he seeks the reputation of a just and good man.

Passages from the monographs, as well as the preface of the *Histories*, suggest that Sallust believed that scarcely any of his contemporaries even bothered to *try to appear*

<sup>102</sup> M 2. 60-63, 66-7; 2.102 (McGushin plausibly groups these together as 2.51-57).

<sup>103</sup> Berve 1929, Katz 1981, Gillis 1969, Schur 1934, and Schulten 1926.

<sup>104</sup> In particular, see Büchner 1960.

good and just in the midst of civil war or in its aftermath :

Postquam divitiae honori esse coepere et eas gloria, imperium, potentia sequebatur, hebescere virtus, paupertas probro haberi, innocentia pro malivolentia duci coepit (BC 12.1)

After wealth began to be a source of honor, and glory, rule, and power attended it, virtue was weakened, poverty began to be considered cause for reproach, and innocence started to be seen as malice.

At contra quis est omnium, his moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis contendat? Etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur (BJ 4.7).

But, on the other hand, who is there at all under these circumstances who does not compete with his ancestors in riches and expenditures rather than in honesty and diligence? Even the 'new men,' who were accustomed before to outdo the nobility in virtue, compete for power and honors through stealth and robbery rather than virtue.

1.13. M Omniumque partium decus in mercedem corruptum erat

The dignity of all parties had been corrupted into a good for sale.

So far, Sertorius seems more praiseworthy than most according Sallust's worldview. It is worth noting, however, the difference between *being* a good and just man and desiring (*famas petit*) to be seen as one; Sallust was well aware of the gap between perception in reality :

esse quam videri bonus malebat; ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur. (BC 54.6)

[Cato] preferred to *be* good rather than to *seem* it; and so the less he sought glory, the more it followed him.

Even after this very brief investigation, then, the portrait of Sertorius does not

appear unambiguously positive. In fact, the repetition of *peto* in the Sertorius passage echoes this characterization of Cato in a way that is unflattering to Sertorius; pursuing the reputation of a good man during civil war is, perhaps, a degree or two less noble than actually being one. Ultimately, the question of whether Sallust “admired” Sertorius or not tells us very little about the way in which this character functions in the *Histories*; the answer must be more complicated than “he did” or “he didn't.” Syme argues that Sallust's portrait of Sertorius is generally positive, but criticizes the historian on the grounds that Sallust has created a largely fictional character, and so has failed at the historian's task of objective reporting. “Has not the author embellished the personality of Sertorius and magnified his importance – with dire repercussions in historical and ethical writing ever after?” Syme asks (203). Although he concedes that it is hazardous to assume too much of Sallust's opinion of Sertorius from Plutarch's biography, and that Sallust's account was “very different from an encomiastic biography (205),” he argues that Sertorius has achieved a reputation that exceeds both his individual greatness and the significance of his deeds, and that Sallust's account paved the way for this character inflation : “Sallust has to bear a share of the responsibility for these aberrations. He went too far (205).” This may be true. Without a wealth of other reliable sources for Sertorius' activities in Spain, it is difficult to fact-check Sallust. However, it is not an impediment to the present inquiry if Sallust's Sertorius is, to a great degree, a literary invention, since the question is not whether the “real” Sertorius prefigured some element of the triumviral period, but how Sallust's depiction of him might have echoed themes of Sallust's own day; in fact, for this project, the more the Sertorius of the *Histories* is a Sallustian

creation, the better.

Although the Sertorian narrative is fragmentary, the evidence we *do* have suggests that Sallust's Sertorius and Sertorian War were crafted with an eye toward the present day. In particular, Sallust's account of Sertorius' contemplated flight to the Isles of the Blest seems to have alluded to the contemporary political situation and reflected themes of other triumviral literature. I briefly discuss this episode in order to show the ways in which it suggests that Sallust's Sertorius should be read as a central figure in Sallust's program of analogical historiography.

Plutarch gives the fullest account of Sertorius' near-retirement to the Blessed Isles. In 81 BCE, after barely escaping an attack by Sulla's agent C. Annius Luscus and a violent ten-day storm, Sertorius encountered a group of sailors who had just returned from the Atlantic Islands, also known as the "Isles of the Blest." These islands were reported to be a natural paradise, where the weather was mild and the earth fecund, located far off the coast of Africa on the very edge of the known world (1.100 M, Plut. *Sert.* 8). According to Plutarch, upon hearing the sailors' description of the islands, Sertorius "was seized with an amazing desire to dwell in the islands and live in quiet, freed from tyranny and wars that would never end (Ταῦθ' ὁ Σεπτώριος ἀκούσας ἔρωτα θαυμαστὸν ἔσχεν οἰκῆσαι τὰς νήσους καὶ ζῆν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, τυραννίδος ἀπαλλαγεῖς καὶ πολέμων ἀπαύστων, *Sert.* 9.1)". Sertorius did not, of course, act upon this desire; after a brief excursion to Africa, he returned to Spain at the request of the Lusitanians, who sought him as their leader (*Sert.* 10.1).

Four fragments (1.100-103 M) of this section of Sallust's narrative survive :

1.100 M Quas duas insulas propinquas inter se et decem <milia>  
stadium a Gadibus sitas, constabat suoapte ingenio alimenta mortalibus  
gignere

It was said that these two neighboring islands, situated ten thousand  
states from Gades, produced food for humans entirely by their own  
accord.

1.101 M Serv. ad *Aen.* 5.735 : “Secundum philosophos elysium est  
insulae fortunatae, *quas ait Sallustius inclitas esse Homeri carminibus*”

According to philosophers, Elysium is the “Fortunate Isles,” which  
Sallust said are famous from the songs of Homer.

1.102 M Traditur fugam in Oceani longinqua agitavisse

It is said that he had been planning flight into distant parts of the Ocean.

1.103 M More humanae cupidinis ignara visendi

. . .out of the habit of human desire for seeing unknown things

From these fragments, we can assume that Sallust gave some account of the Blessed Isles  
episode, although it is difficult to determine the scope of that account; Plutarch's detailed  
treatment, however, suggests that the episode was not an unimportant one in the  
*Histories*.<sup>105</sup>

The Blessed Isles also feature prominently in Horace's 16<sup>th</sup> *Epode*, in which the  
poet explicitly describes the Blessed Isles as a refuge from the civil discord of the  
triumviral period. In this poem, Horace exhorts war-weary Romans to follow him to the  
islands, where they will find release from their present troubles. The precise date of this  
epode is vigorously contested, as is its date relative to the equally fantastical *Eclogue* 4.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> On Plutarch's use of Sallust for the Blessed Isles episode (and the *Life of Sertorius* more generally), see  
La Penna 1963, Konrad 1994, Spann 1987, and Maurenbrecher and Funari *ad loc.*

<sup>106</sup> For bibliography, see Setaioli 1981.

Regardless of when, precisely, *Epode* 16 was composed, it certainly falls within the triumviral period and so belongs to the same literary context as the *Histories*. The poem addresses triumviral politics straightforwardly and straightaway. “Yet another generation is being worn down by civil wars (*altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas*, 16.1-2),” Horace laments, and Rome, which has survived so many and varied external threats, is on the verge of destroying itself (3-10). What should Romans do (or, at least, the *melior pars* of them)? They should flee Rome in favor of islands to the west, where the Golden Age is, apparently, still in progress :

nos manet Oceanus circumvagus : arva beata  
petamus, arva divites et insulas,  
reddit ubi Cererem tellus inarata quotannis  
et imputata floret usque vinea,  
germinat et numquam fallentis termes olivae  
suamque pulla ficus ornat arborem,  
mella cava manant ex ilice, montibus altis  
levis crepante lymphæ desilit pede.  
Illic iniussae veniunt ad mulctra capellae  
refertque tenta grex amicus ubera,  
nec vespertinus circumgemit ursus ovile,  
nec intumescit alta viperis humus. (16.41-52)

Surrounding Ocean awaits us; let us seek  
fertile fields, fields and the rich islands,  
where the untilled earth gives forth grain every year  
and the unpruned vine flowers continuously,  
and the bough of the unfailing olive tree grows  
and the dusky fig graces its own tree,  
honey drips from the hollow oak, and from the high mountains  
a gentle stream leaps under the tapping foot.  
There the she-goats come unbidden to the milkpail  
and the herd willingly offers distended udders,  
and the evening bear does not growl around the sheep-pen  
nor does the deep earth teem with snakes.

Horace's description of this island escape from civil war matches closely with Sallust's depiction of the Isles of the Blest. This place, according to Horace, frozen in time in the Golden Age by Jupiter, will provide a safe haven for the "pious people (*piae. . .genti*, 16.63)." It is unlikely that Horace's exhortation was intended as a serious attempt to convince the Roman people to abandon the city and sail to unknown islands; Klingner and Setaioli interpret the ode instead as a metaphorical exhortation for the *melior pars* of Roman society to "retreat" from public life to intellectual life.<sup>107</sup> Whatever the precise symbolic function of the Blessed Isles for Horace or Sallust,<sup>108</sup> the parallel references in the *Histories* and *Epode* 16 suggest that this was a *topos* of the triumviral period, representing a desire to escape from the civil turmoil plaguing Rome.

One further, more speculative note : Sallust's depiction of the Blessed Isles episode seems possibly to have reminded at least one later commentator of the triumviral period. Consider the context in which 1.102 M is preserved. In addition to Servius' comment at *Aeneid* 2.640, this passage is also cited by the anonymous commentator at *Georgics* 2.197 (*saltus et saturi petito longinqua Tarenti*, "Search for the far-off glades of rich Tarentum"); here, it is quoted to show a parallel usage of *longinqua* (*LONGINQUA porro sita, ut apud Sallustium in primo*). As Funari points out in his commentary on this fragment, the use of the substantive neuter plural *longinqua* with the partitive genitive is not especially common in classical Latin; it does, however, appear in at least Accius and Ennius, as well. Why, then, might a commentator select this particular passage from this particular author to illustrate the word? Considering the relevant passage of the *Georgics*

<sup>107</sup> Klingner 1956, p 355 and Setaioli 1981.

<sup>108</sup> A question which certainly demands future inquiry but which is outside the focus of this dissertation.



in full rather than the commented line alone may offer an explanation for why the scholiast turned to Sallust here; this may, in turn, have implications for our reading of the *Histories* as a whole. The passage comes from Vergil's discussion of different types and qualities of soil :

Sin armenta magis studium vitulosque tueri,  
aut ovium fetum aut urentis culta capellas,  
saltus et saturi petito longinqua Tarenti,  
et qualem infelix amisit Mantua campum,  
pascentem niveos herboso flumine cynchos : (*Georgics* 2.195-199)

But if your business is, rather, looking after herds and calves,  
or the offspring of sheep or the she-goats who destroy crops,  
seek the far-off glades of rich Tarentum,  
and the sort of field which unhappy Mantua lost,  
which feeds the snowy swans in its grassy river.

No mention of Mantua by this poet is ever insignificant, but the description of the city here as *infelix* encourages the reader to take particular note of this passage. The triumvirate's land confiscations, by which Vergil's family, of course, was displaced, were a recurring theme of the poet's early works.<sup>109</sup> Although this passage of the *Georgics* is ostensibly about agriculture, Line 198 clearly evokes the memory of the land confiscations. This context might help explain why the scholiast quotes the *Histories* at 2.197 rather than some other passage illustrating the use of *longinqua*, and might, in turn, help us make sense of Sallust's depiction of Sertorius; this may imply that allusions to the triumviral context of composition in Sallust's account of the Sertorian War were obvious, or at least perceptible, to ancient audiences. This quotation, in addition to the parallel

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<sup>109</sup> E.g., *Eclogue* 9.26-29 : *immo haec quae Varo, necdum perfecta, canebat* / “*Vare, tuom nomen, superet modo Mantua nobis* / *Mantua vae miserae nimium vicina Cremonae* / *cantantes sublime ferent ad sidera cycni*”

with *Epode* 16, strongly suggests that Sallust's Sertorius represents a thematic link between the time of composition and the time of the narrative, and should encourage us to look more closely at the Sertorian War for evidence of Sallust's method of analogical historiography.

## 2.2 Fragment 1.88

The extant fragments of *Histories* suggest that Sallust covered the entirety of the Sertorian War. In a digression in Book 1, Sallust supplies background information on the earlier career of Sertorius. Sallust frequently introduced major characters to his narrative with a character sketch. He devotes a full chapter of the opening of the *BC* to an assessment of Catiline's character (*BC* 5); the *BC* also contains Sallust's famous *synkrisis* of the characters of Caesar and Cato (*BC* 53-54). Sempronia, too, arrives with a colorful characterization (*BC* 25). Marius is introduced to the narrative of the *BJ* with a passage giving an overview of his background and character (*BJ* 63); Sulla is also the subject of a character-portrait (*BJ* 94.3-96). In Book Two of the *Histories*, we have what appears to be a character sketch of Pompey when he first enters the text upon his appointment against Sertorius in 77<sup>110</sup>; 4.70 M may be from a character description of Lucullus. The description of Sertorius in Book One, then, could have been part of a longer passage introducing Sertorius to the text with a brief biography of his early life and a discussion of his personal characteristics and career.

The longest fragment in this section covers Sertorius' service as military tribune in Spain under Titus Didius (c. 97-94 BCE) and his exploits in Italy during the Marsic War

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<sup>110</sup> The assignment of these fragments is debated; see section 4.3. On Sallust's use of character portraits more generally, see Blänsdorf 2007.

(91-88 BCE).

Magna gloria tribunus militum in Hispania T. Didio imperante, magno usui bello Marsico paratu militum et armorum fuit, multaque tum ductu eius <manu>que patrata primo per ignobilitatem, deinde per invidiam scriptorum incelebrata sunt, quae vivos facie sua ostentabat aliquot advorsis cicatricibus et effosso oculo. Quin ille dehonestamento corporis maxime laetabatur neque illis anxius, quia relicua gloriosius retinebat. (OCT 1.88)

As a military tribune, he achieved great glory in Spain under the command of Titus Didius, and was of great use in the Marsic War in the assembly of soldiers and arms, and many things that were done at that time under his leadership and by his hand are unrecorded, first because of his ignoble background, then through the ill-will of writers; deeds which, while he was alive, he used to show off with his appearance, with a number of scars on the front of his body and a hollow eye-socket. He was, rather, rejoicing most greatly in the disfigurement of his body, and was not troubled by those things, because he preserved the rest with greater glory.

This passage comes down to us from two sources : Aulus Gellius preserves the entire passage (2.27), while Donatus quotes *dehonestamento*. . . *laetabatur* at Terence, *Eunuch* 482; I discuss the context of each quotation below. Gellius 2.27 survives in four manuscripts in two branches, *A* and *VPR*.

magna gloria tribunus militum in Hispania T. Didio imperante, magno usui bello Marsico paratu militum et armorum fuit, multaque tum ductu eius †que rapta† primo per ignobilitatem, deinde per invidiam scriptorum †celebrata† sunt, quae vivus facie sua ostentabat aliquot adversis cicatricibus et effosso oculo, quin ille dehonestamento corporis maxime laetabatur, neque illis anxius, quia reliqua gloriosius retinebat (F 1.88)

Two places in this passage require emendation, *que rapta* and *celebrata*.

Reynolds' emendation of <manu>que here, following Linker, is based on a nearly identical passage in Plutarch, which is almost certainly modeled on Sallust's text :

οὐ μὴν ὑφήκατο τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τόλμης εἰς ἀξίωμα προεληλυθὼς  
ἡγεμόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειρὸς ἀποδεικνύμενος ἔργα θαυμαστὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα  
τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἀφειδῶς ἐπιδιδούς, τῶν ὄψεων ἀπέβαλε τὴν ἑτέραν  
ἐκκοπεῖσαν (*Sert.* 4.3).

In fact, when he had become general, he did not give up his soldierly  
daring, but displaying marvelous deeds of his own hand, and also  
unsparingly offering up his body in battle, he lost one of his eyes when it  
was knocked out.

The closeness of this passage in Plutarch to Sallust's text suggests dependence.<sup>111</sup>

Some similar passages may be attributed to a common source. Given the vast number of  
ways in which Plutarch could represent an idea as broad as Sertorius' bravery, however,  
the fact that he remained so close to Sallust's text is noteworthy, and Reynolds'  
emendation, which brings the text of 1.88 even more in line with the passage in Plutarch,  
seems reasonable. This parallel also solves the problems presented by both *que* and  
*rapta*; *manu* can reasonably be connected to *ductu* with *que*, and the emendation  
eliminates *rapta*, which is difficult to make sense of in this context. Reynolds also  
emends *celebrata* to *incelebrata*. Contextually, this makes sense; the point of the passage  
seems to be that Sertorius' deeds are *unrecorded*, not that they *are* recorded. Haverkamp's  
*celata*, however, fits the context equally well, as a near-antonym of *celebrata*. The latter  
emendation requires a more minor change to the text; it requires a more modest stretch of  
imagination to suppose a scribe dropped three letters from the middle of a word than to  
imagine one replacing a word (*celebrata*) with its opposite (*incelebrata*).

Maurenbrecher dismisses Linker's emendation of *manuque* for *que rapta* as  
“*falsissimum*,” on the grounds that, at this point in the text, Sallust is not yet discussing

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<sup>111</sup> Konrad 1994 agrees; see note *ad loc.*

the things personally done by Sertorius, just the things done under his command (“namque de rebus fortiter manu gestis omnino nondum loquitur Sallustius”).

Maurenbrecher instead replaces *que rapta* with *peracta*, eliminating the *-que* altogether rather than creating another noun to finish the connective phrase. He also, like Reynolds, corrects *celebrata* to *incelebrata* :

1.88 M Magna gloria tribunus militum in Hispania T. Didio imperante, magno usui bellorum Marsico paratu militum et armorum fuit, multaque tum ductu eius peracta primo per ignobilitatem, deinde per invidiam scriptorum incelebrata sunt : quae vivos facie sua ostentabat aliquot adversis cicatricibus et effosso oculo. Neque illis anxius, quin ille dehonestamento corporis maxime laetabatur, quia reliqua gloriosius retinebat.

Maurenbrecher also transposes *quin ille dehonestamento corporis maxime laetabatur* and *neque illis anxius*, arguing that the *quin* ought to follow more closely on the negative *neque*.<sup>112</sup> The resulting proximity of *illis* to *cicatricibus* and *oculo* in Maurenbrecher's text suggests that those nouns should be taken as the antecedents of the pronoun : “And he was not troubled by [his scars and gouged-out eye]; nay, rather. . .” Reynolds' text leaves *illis* more open to interpretation. *Illis* could refer to *cicatricibus* and *oculo* there, as well, but because word order does not clearly direct us to this, we might also construe *illis* with *ignobilitatem* and *invidiam* : “And he was not troubled by [his lack of status and the hostility of writers].” Rendered more liberally, the antecedent could also be *quae* : “And he was not troubled by [these things – namely, the fact that they were unrecorded].” Whether *illis* refers to *ignobilitatem* and *invidiam* or to *quae*, if we follow Reynolds' text, Sallust seems to be creating a portrait of a Sertorius who is

<sup>112</sup> Maurenbrecher 1893 I.27, n 3 : “neque illis anxius' transposui, quoniam post 'maxime laetabatur' nullam fere habent vim et vox 'quin' negationem antecedentem postulare videtur.”

acutely self-conscious of his position (or lack thereof) in the historiographical tradition.

This reading of *illis*, then, might help to explain *vivus*. Without *scriptores* recording his deeds, Sertorius will have no enduring *memoria*, except for what survives with and is handed down by eyewitnesses. If Sertorius wishes to be remembered, then, the onus is on him to create, while he is still alive, an image of himself memorable enough to be handed down to future generations. In 1.88, at least, he appears to have embraced the task, boastfully showing off his old injuries,<sup>113</sup> the context in which the fragment is transmitted further supports this reading. Aulus Gellius (2.27) preserves this passage in a discussion of the remarks of one Titus Castricius, who compares the description of Sertorius with a description of Philip in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* :

Ἐώρων δ' αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ὁ ἀγὼν ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ  
δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν  
χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὅτι βουλευθείη μέρος ἢ τύχη τοῦ  
σώματος παρελῆσθαι, τοῦτο προιέμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ  
δόξης ζῆν (On the Crown 67).

I saw that Philip himself, against whom we are in conflict for the sake of command and power, having had an eye knocked out, having broken his collarbone, and having been maimed in his hand and his leg, whatever part of his body which chanced wished to take, he would offer this so that he might live the rest of his life with honor and good reputation.

Sallust's description of Sertorius, according to Gellius, was intended in imitation of or rivalry with Demosthenes' account of Philip (*haec aemulari volens Sallustius de Sertorio duce in Historiis ita scripit*, 2.27.2). Titus Castricius points out that Sertorius is shown to be actually *rejoicing* in his bodily disfigurement, while Philip merely accepts these

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<sup>113</sup> The theme of war wounds as “proof” is a trope of later historiography, particularly in Livy; see, for example, 2.23, 2.27, 6.14, 6.20, 45.39. See Leigh 1995 and Roller 2004 on the phenomenon of the war wound in Roman rhetoric and historiography more generally.

injuries as the price of the pursuit of honor and glory :

“Quibus verbis,” inquit, “ostenditur Philippus, non, ut Sertorius, corporis dehonestamento laetus, quod est,” inquit, “insolens et immodicum, sed prae studio laudis et honoris iacturarum damnorumque corporis contemptor, qui singulos artus suos fortunae prodigendos daret quaestu atque compendio gloriarum.” (2.27.5)

“With these words,” he says, “Philip is not shown to be, as Sertorius is, happy because of the disfigurement of his body, which is unusual and excessive, but one who scorns sacrifices and injuries to his body out of his eagerness for praise and honor, a man who would give his own limbs to fortune to be squandered for the pursuit and acquisition of glory.”

Philip, then, according to Titus Castricius, is not ashamed of his wounded body, because it arrived at that condition in the pursuit of worthy ends (τίμη and δόξα). Sertorius, on the other hand, actually takes a perverse pleasure in showing off his scars. Titus Castricius is right to call attention to this; *laetor* is a loaded word in the Sallustian corpus. In Caesar's speech in the *BC*, for example, the speaker uses “*laetari*” to describe the response of the Athenians to the actions of the Thirty in 404; the Thirty enacted a series of executions without trials, and the people rejoiced (*Ei primo coepere pessimum quemque et omnibus invisum indemnatum necare. Ea populus laetari et merito dicere fieri*, “They first began to put to death without trial each of the worst men, the most hateful to all. The people celebrated this and said it was done justly,” 51.29). Although the executed individuals are depicted as those worthy of punishment (*pessimum quemque*), Sallust's indication of the lack of a trial (*indemnatum*) underscores the excessive and cruel reaction of the Athenians. Barbarians in the *BJ* pass the night in wild exultation (*dein, crebris ignibus factis, plerumque noctis barbari more suo laetari*,

*exultare, strepere vocibus*. . ., “Then, after many fires had been started, the barbarians celebrated through most of the night according to their custom, making a commotion with their shouts. . .”, 98.6); after the Vagenses massacred a group of Roman soldiers, on holiday and unarmed, they rejoiced in their treachery (for two days, until Metellus exacted revenge for the slaughter) : *ita Vagenses biduom modo ex perfidia laetati*, “Thus the Vagenses only celebrated on account of their treachery for two days,” 69.3). In light of these examples of *laetor* in the Sallustian corpus, as Titus Castricius points out, it does not seem to be the case that Sertorius is simply willing to accept his scars and wounds as the price of victory, but rather he delights in calling attention to them and uses them as a tool for self-promotion.

In addition to Gellius, Donatus has preserved part of 1.88. Commenting on *Eunuch* 482, Donatus references Sallust's description of Sertorius :

Parmeno : Atque haec qui misit non sibi soli postulat [480]  
te vivere et sua causa excludi ceteros,  
neque pugnās narrat neque cicatrices suas  
ostentat neque tibi obstat, quod quidam facit

Donatus : Haec sunt virtutis insignia, ut Sallustius quoque fatetur :  
“dehonestamento [tamen esse] corporis maxime laetabatur.”

In this scene, Parmeno, a slave, jokingly praises Chaerea, who is disguised as a eunuch, for not displaying the characteristic tendencies of the *miles gloriosus* : he doesn't make excessive demands of his beloved, and, more importantly for our comparison with Sertorius, does not bore others with boasts about his war experience and does not show off his battle scars. That this remark reminded Donatus of Sallust's characterization of Sertorius reinforces the idea, as proposed above, that Sertorius is portrayed in 1.88 as



somewhat reminiscent of the *miles gloriosus*, creating his own *memoria* during his lifetime by fashioning himself as a larger-than-life character.

Plutarch's account of the white doe episode, which may or may not have come from Sallust,<sup>114</sup> further supports the image of Sertorius as a self-conscious showman acutely concerned with controlling his public *persona*. He had, according to Plutarch, a tame white doe as a pet, a present from one Spanus; Sertorius convinced his Spanish soldiers that the doe was a gift from Diana herself, and thus impressed them with his claim to divine favor (*Sert.* 11.2-3). The doe went missing after the battle at the Sucro; Sertorius was disheartened, because he had thus lost one of his methods of influencing his barbarian troops. When the doe was found nearby, Sertorius paid the men who had found her to conceal her recovery. Several days afterward, he addressed his troops, announcing that a god had assured him in his dream that some good fortune was imminent; the men who had been paid to hide the doe released her then, and the bystanders rejoiced that their leader was so marvelous and dear to the gods (ὥς δαίμονιον ἄνδρα καὶ θεοῖς φίλον, *Sert.* 20.5). While we cannot be certain that Plutarch found this anecdote in the *Histories*, Sertorius' theatrics in this episode accord well with the image of Sertorius in 1.88.

Back to 1.88 : *relicua* remains a bit mysterious; Sertorius retained the remaining *what*? In his translation, McGushin takes *relicua* to refer to the *unwounded* parts of Sertorius' body : “Far from being worried about them, he took the greatest delight in these disfigurements in so far as he was keeping, to his greater glory, the rest of his body

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<sup>114</sup> Admittedly, it does not appear in the fragments, but as Maurenbrecher, Spann, Konrad, and others have convincingly demonstrated, Sallust was Plutarch's main source for the *Life of Sertorius*; I think it is thus not unreasonable to consider the possibility Sallust was the source for the white doe, as long as we regard the passage with caution.

intact.” That is, the fact that Sertorius was still alive to show off his wounds is a testament to his battle and survival skills; he has sacrificed parts of his body to preserve the whole, and what is left (*relicua*) serves as a reminder of Sertorius' courage and resilience. Frassinetti also understands *relicua* to refer to the unharmed “rest” of Sertorius' body : “E, lungi dall'angustiarsene, si allietava invece oltremodo per quella mutilazione, in quanto piu gloriosa gli riusciva l'integrità del resto del corpo.”

Since, as was discussed above, Plutarch modeled a parallel passage very closely on Sallust's text, he may give us more clues as to the interpretation of *relicua*.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ καὶ καλλωπιζόμενος ἀεὶ διετέλει· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους οὐκ ἀεὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν ἀριστείων περιφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποτίθεσθαι, στρεπτὰ καὶ δόρατα καὶ στεφάνους, αὐτῷ δὲ τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας παραμένειν τὰ γνωρίσματα, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμα καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς θεατάς (*Sert.* 4.2)

And indeed he always continued to make a display of himself in this way; for he said that others did not always carry around the proofs of their noble deeds, but they set aside their necklaces, spears, and wreaths; but the tokens of courage remained with him, and he had the same witnesses of both his virtue and his misfortune.

Although the translators cited above assumed that *relicua* refers to the unwounded parts of Sertorius' body, in light of Plutarch's account, it seems instead to refer to his *adversis cicatricibus* and *effosso oculo*. Sertorius' *relicua* are his wounds, the γνωρίσματα of his ἀνδραγαθία; these are what he showed off. καλλωπιζόμενος ἀεὶ διετέλει is parallel with Sallust's *laetabatur*, while ἀποτίθεσθαι forms an antithesis with *retinebat*. Others were forced to set aside (ἀποτίθεσθαι) the tokens of their courage, because they had only material objects, while Sertorius kept (*retinebat*, parallel with παραμένειν) something

more enduring, because it was literally part of himself.

We find more support for this reading in the *BJ*, where Sallust accorded Marius an extensive direct speech in his own defense as a *novus homo* against the attacks of the *nobilitas*; here, Marius seems to echo Sertorius :

Non possum fidei causa imagines neque triumphos aut consulatus maiorum meorum ostentare, at, si res postulet, hastas, vexillum, phaleras, alia militaria dona, praeterea cicatrices advorso corpore. Hae sunt meae imagines, haec nobilitas, non hereditate relicta, ut illa illis, sed quae ego meis plurimis laboribus et periculis quaesivi (*BJ* 85.29-30).

I am not able to show the *imagines* nor the triumphs or consulships of my ancestors for the sake of gaining your confidence, but, if the occasion should demand, I could show spears, the banner, ornaments, and other military rewards - moreover, the very scars on the front of my body. These are my *imagines*, these are my *nobilitas*, not left as an inheritance, as those things of others, but things which I myself sought through my great efforts and dangers.

Marius argues that his proven *virtus* should outweigh his lack of distinguished lineage; he has fought his way to prominence by means of the quality of his actions, just as the ancestors of even the *nobilitas* did (*quod si iure me despiciunt, faciant idem maioribus suis, quibus, uti mihi, ex virtute nobilitas coepit*, “But if they look down on me justly, let them do the same toward their own ancestors, in whom, as in my case, nobility rose from virtue,” *BJ* 85.17). Like Sertorius, Marius considers the scars on his body a suitable replacement for traditional *imagines*; what he lacks in *genus*, he makes up for with the proofs of his *virtus* carved into his very body.

The phrase *invidia scriptorum* is another that stands out of this fragment as potentially loaded. Accusations of *invidia* seem to be an occupational hazard of

*scriptores* in Sallust's world; this passage is not the first in which Sallust shows concern about *invidia* (or the appearance of it) among writers. This is one of the factors which makes writing such a difficult task, he claims in the preface to the *BC*: if an author describes the faults of an actor in his narrative, he puts himself at risk of being accused of malevolence :

ac mihi quidem, tametsi haud quaquam par gloria sequitur scriptorem et auctorem rerum, tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere; primum quod facta dictis exaequanda sunt, dehinc quia plerique quae delicta reprehenderis malivolentia et invidia dicta putant (*BC* 3.2)

But indeed, although not at all equal glory follows the recorder and the performer of deeds, it nevertheless seems to me that writing history is quite difficult; first, because the things that were done have to be equaled by the narration, and second, because many assume that the faults you criticize are mentioned out of malevolence or jealousy.

It is worth noting here that Sallust's view of the relationship between historians and historical actors seems to contradict Cicero's view of the same relationship (at least as expressed in the letter to Luceius). Cicero, no doubt seeking to flatter Luceius into taking Cicero as his subject, suggests that writers of history benefit from the reflected glory of their subjects, just as Apelles and Lysippus gained as much for painting and sculpting Alexander as he did from being depicted by them (*ad Fam.* 5.12.7). Whereas Sallust describes the position of the historian as inherently defensive, Cicero focuses on the potential for glory for the historian as well as his subject.

The concern expressed in *BC* 3.2 is also closely related to the charge Sallust has leveled against previous *scriptores* who let the deeds of Sertorius remain *incelebrata* (or *celata*). As Sallust observes later in the preface of the *BC*, the fame or obscurity of all

things are entirely dependent on both the skill and whim of those recording them; *invidia scriptorum* has the potential to damn entire events and people to silence.

Sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur; ea res cunctas ex lubidine magis quam ex vero celebrat obscuratque. Atheniensium res gestae, sicuti ego aestumo, satis amplae magnificaeque fuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen, quam fama feruntur. Sed quia provenire ibi scriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem Atheniensium facta pro maxumis celebrantur. Ita eorum, qui fecere, virtus tanta habetur, quantum eam verbis potuere extollere praeclara ingenia. At populo Romano numquam ea copia fuit, quia prudentissimus quisque maxime negotiosus erat: ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat, optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefacta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat (*BC* 8).

But, indeed, fortune dominates in every matter; it celebrates and obscures all things out of caprice rather than truth. The affairs of the Athenians, as I see it, were great and splendid enough, but nevertheless somewhat lesser in reality than they are declared by their reputation. But because great talents of writers were produced there, the deeds of the Athenians are celebrated throughout the world as the very greatest. Thus, the virtue of those who acted is considered great to the extent that distinguished talents were able to exalt it. But there was never this abundance of talent among the Roman people, because each most sensible man was always entirely devoted to business: no one worked the mind without the body, each great man preferred to act rather than to speak, and preferred that his own good deeds be praised by others rather than that he himself narrate those of other men.

Indeed, by Sallust's day, Rome had *not* had an abundance of historical writers rivaling those of Greece. The elder Cato, one of Sallust's literary models,<sup>115</sup> expressed a similar sentiment in the *Origines* :

Sed idem benefactum quo in loco ponas, nimium interest. Leonides Laco, qui simile apud Thermopylas fecit, propter eius virtutes omnis Graecia gloriam atque gratiam praecipuam claritudinis inclitissimae decoravere monumentis: signis, statuis, elogiis, historiis aliisque rebus

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<sup>115</sup> On Cato's influence on Sallust's style, see Syme 1964, especially 54-56.

gratissimum id eius factum habuere; at tribuno militum parva laus pro factis relictā, qui idem fecerat atque rem servaverat." (Peter fr. 83)

But it matters very much where you locate this same good deed. As for Leonidas the Spartan, who did something similar at Thermopylae : on account of his virtues all Greece embellished his glory and outstanding service with monuments of most celebrated distinction : with images, statues, inscriptions, histories and other works, they considered this deed of his most welcome. But praise slight in proportion to his deeds is left for the military tribune, who had done the same thing and saved the situation.

In this passage (preserved by Gellius 3.7), Cato recounts the efforts of one Q. Caedicius, a military tribune, during the first Punic War. Gellius summarizes Cato's account of Caedicius' feat : he and four hundred Roman soldiers sacrificed themselves to hold a particular pass against the Carthaginians long enough for the consul and his army to escape to safer ground. Gellius then quotes Cato's assessment of the tribune's reputation (or lack thereof). Caedicius' actions, Cato argues, are no less praiseworthy than those of Leonidas at Thermopylae, but have gone unsung in comparison with the achievement of the Spartan; the most noble deeds, it seems, are forgotten or rendered meaningless unless memorialized in physical monuments or in writing. At first glance, then, in 1.88 Sallust seems to be announcing his intention to perform this service for Sertorius. As the great Athenian historians did for Athens and as Cato did for Q. Caedicius, Sallust's account of Sertorius' exploits will prevent his acts from remaining *celata*. Does Sertorius actually *need* Sallust, though? Although writers before Sallust had failed to record his deeds, as was discussed above, all the evidence of valor Sertorius needed was on his person; the scars and missing eye testified to the magnitude of the battles he had faced, and the very fact that he was alive to display these marks was even greater proof of his prowess.

Sertorius, then, has already seized for himself the task of the historian by creating his own *memoria*; Sallust is just making sure that it sticks.<sup>116</sup>

Several turbulent years<sup>117</sup> passed between the composition of the *BC* and the *Histories*; the interim saw the rise of the triumvirs, with their enormous concern for their respective public images. Public figures had always taken various measures to shape their own public persona (issuing coinage, for example); Julius Caesar had taken self-promotion a step further with his carefully written *commentarii*, which, despite Hirtius' claim that the work was “written so that information about such great events would not be lacking from the historians (*qui sunt editi ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset*, *BG* 8, preface)”, left little room for historians to embellish or adapt. It is also arguable that Octavian's program of anti-Antony propaganda after Actium was far more aggressive than anything created by the triumvirs during the late 40s and early 30s. However, during the triumviral years, there were numerous occasions on which the triumvirs (Octavian, in particular) actively created a specific image of themselves or an opponent. During this period of domestic unrest, one of the public relations challenges faced by the triumvirate was the need to make what were, in reality, civil conflicts look like battles against foreign enemies; war against non-Romans was more palatable than intestine war, especially so soon after the conflict between Caesar and Pompey. During the Perusine War, for example, through various edicts and even invective poetry<sup>118</sup>,

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<sup>116</sup> See Grethlein 2006 on Sallust's notion of the relationship between *memoria* and historiography. Grethlein argues, and I accept as an assumption, that for Sallust, historiography is one of a set of media of historical memory, distinct from and yet parallel to forms of physical “commemoration” such as scars.

<sup>117</sup> Probably between four and six years; McGushin 1992 summarizes the problems with dating Sallust's works.

<sup>118</sup> Martial 11.20 purports to quote Octavian's insult poetry directed at Fulvia.

Octavian cleverly framed the conflict as being against Fulvia (a woman, not a “real Roman”) rather than violence against the Italians who had suffered through the civil wars and the land confiscations; Fulvia was, of course, a Roman, but following a woman into war against other citizens was hardly a “Roman” act. Octavian would later use similar methods against Cleopatra in order to frame his conflict with Mark Antony as a war against a foreign dynast rather than a civil war.

As I discuss in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Sextus Pompey was also a target of Octavian's propaganda. Just a decade after the war between Caesar and Pompey, Octavian knew that the conflict between himself – Caesar's adopted son – and Pompey's son might appear to Romans as a resumption of the earlier war, which he and Antony purportedly brought to a close after the battles at Philippi; Octavian thus needed to frame his campaign against Sextus in such a way that it appeared like something other than civil war. By portraying Sextus and his adherents as raiding and plundering *latrones*, the triumvir downplayed the fact that he was pursuing a fellow Roman citizen (and not just any Roman, but the son of Pompeius Magnus). In the case of both the Perusine War and the war against Sextus, then, Octavian took over the role of the historian, “writing” the story of the conflicts as wars against non-citizens or non-Romans, rather than as civil wars. The triumvirs' efforts to “write” their own histories were not limited to just the portrayal of enemies. After Fulvia's death and the signing of the Peace of Brundisium, Mark Antony was married to Octavian's sister Octavia, which provided an occasion on which the triumvirs could actively create a public image of their regime. In this case, the message was *concordia* : just as Caesar's daughter Julia had represented a peaceful bond



between Caesar and Pompey, Octavia served as a symbol of unity between the two men. Each issued coinage with the other's image, as well as Octavia's.<sup>119</sup> The marriage and its subsequent promotion were clearly intended to reassure the Roman public that any perceived factions were not, in fact, in conflict, and that the state was not on the verge of any kind of civil disturbance. Octavian was not a historian proper (his autobiography and the *Res Gestae* are the closest he came to writing history), but in these examples is shown to attempt to dictate the version of events which he wanted historians to record.

In this context, what kind of “historian” is Sertorius, and what does Sallust's use of this figure suggest about Sallust's conception of the role of historiography under the triumvirate? As I have already suggested, Sertorius represents the threat posed by the triumvirs to the historian's craft. Whereas in the *BC* Sallust expresses belief in the power of the historian's words to manipulate memory (for better or worse), in *Histories* 1.88, he seems to acknowledge that actors themselves are capable of controlling their own *memoria*, as Sertorius did by boasting and parading his war wounds; Sertorius is not *illis anxius*, because he is “writing” his own history (*relicua gloriosius retinebat*). Similarly, the triumvirate, and Octavian in particular, actively and aggressively created their own public image and a picture of a legal and stable form of government. In a system which created its own *memoria*, then, what use was the historian? Sallust's change in attitude toward the purpose of writing history between the composition of the *BC* and the *Histories* may reflect concern over the role of the historian under a triumvirate which so carefully wrote its own story.

The figure of Sertorius also represents Sallust's resistance to at least one facet of

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<sup>119</sup> *RRC* 527-529; Osgood 189.

Ciceronian historiography. Although the prominent character offered Sallust the opportunity to present an *exemplum*, either positive or negative, Sallust instead crafts a morally ambiguous character, characterized at once by worthy as well as troubling qualities. As some scholars have noted,<sup>120</sup> Sallust's presentation of Sertorius seems to be positive. Admirable qualities are suggested :

1.94 M modicoque et eleganti imperio percarus fuit

He was beloved for his moderate and fastidious command

As I noted previously, the argument for a laudatory portrait of Sertorius relies heavily on one fragment :

1.90 M Dum inter arma civilia aequi bonique famas petit

Although, as was discussed above in the introduction to this chapter, scholars have generally interpreted fragment 1.90 as evidence of Sallust's admiration for Sertorius, this reading is far from certain. In particular, the conjunction *dum* leaves open multiple interpretive possibilities; without the context from which the fragment is excerpted, it is impossible to know the precise valence of *dum*. It could be, as scholars seem to have interpreted it and as McGushin translates, generally temporal : “He seeks a reputation of a just and good man whilst in the middle of civil war.” However, it could also be adversative, contrasting how Sertorius *wanted* to be perceived with how he actually behaved : “He slaughtered many citizens/harmed the republic/dishonored his command while seeking the reputation of a good and just man during civil war.” Such a distinction

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<sup>120</sup> See introduction to this chapter.

between pretense and reality would be characteristically Sallustian.<sup>121</sup> The fragment is cited by the younger Seneca to explain the use of *famae* by the historian Arruntius; the citation does not, however, provide any clues regarding the context or connotation of the fragment.<sup>122</sup> *Dum* remains unresolved, and so does the real meaning of 1.90 M.

The fragment on which Syme, Katz, and others based their assumptions about Sallust's admiration for Sertorius thus loses some of its moral clarity. If we set aside 1.90, what kind of Sertorius is left? We have a Sertorius who distinguished himself during the Marsic War (admirable), but who could be considered either to be prolonging the Sullan civil war (not admirable) or to be starting his own civil war by leading the Lusitani in their rebellion against the Romans (even worse). Given what we can deduce about Sallust's opinion of Sulla, however, would prolonging or renewing a civil war against Sulla have been disgraceful in Sallust's eyes, or an unfortunate means to a noble end? Sertorius is, then, neither a positive *exemplum* nor a negative one; with this character, Sallust has the opportunity to present a clear moral picture with which to educate his audience, but declines to do so. In Cicero's eyes, this would have defied the exemplary purpose of historiography : Sertorius should have been a symbol of *virtus* in warfare, or the horrors of civil war, but not of both.

The wounds mentioned in 1.88 further complicate Sallust's picture of Sertorius. By drawing attention to Sertorius' loss of an eye (*effosso oculo*), in particular, Sallust places his Sertorius within the tradition of famously-one eyed generals : Antigonus, Philip of Macedon, and Hannibal, *monophthalmoi* all.<sup>123</sup> There are several ways in which

<sup>121</sup> See Scanlon 1980 on Sallust's adoption of Thucydides' concern for the disparity between *logos* and *ergon*; see also section 4.4.2 of this dissertation.

<sup>122</sup> *Ep.* 114.

<sup>123</sup> Africa 1970.

this association may be read. Sallust may have been trying to draw particular attention to Sertorius' military greatness by using this anecdote as an illustration of his feats and by associating him with great generals of the past. Sallust also may have simply been invoking the historiographical formula of the grizzled war veteran; *adversi cicatrices* were a typical component of the descriptions of these characters (see, for example, *BJ* 85.29; Livy 2.23.4, 45.39.16; Valerius Maximus 7.7.1). An association with Hannibal, in particular, could be noteworthy in this context. The evocation of Hannibal, as the Roman arch-nemesis *par excellence*, would suggest that Sertorius represents to Sallust a great threat to Rome; although the association between the two is not apparent elsewhere in the *Histories*, it is worth noting that, according to Appian, the Celtiberians actually called Sertorius “Hannibal,” because Hannibal was the “bravest and most clever general they had ever known to exist among them (ὄν θρασύτατόν τε καὶ ἀπατηλότετον στρατηγὸν παρὰ σφίσις ἐδόκουν γενέσθαι, *BC* 1.112).”

This characterization also supports Büchner's argument (dismissed by Spann) that Sallust's Sertorius is portrayed as a *Staatsfeind* or *hostis*. Büchner cites Macer's vague reference to an alliance between Sertorius and Mithridates (3.48.18) as evidence that Sallust considered Sertorius a traitor<sup>124</sup>; he also argues that Plutarch's refutation of claims of the savagery Sertorius showed toward his hostages (*Sert.* 10.3) is directed at remarks made by Sallust.<sup>125</sup> We have no such remarks about Sertorius in the extant passages of the *Histories*, and such an *argumentum ex silentio* must be made with caution, but it is certainly possible that Plutarch's defensiveness is a reaction to notes of tyranny or

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<sup>124</sup> Büchner 419 n 178.

<sup>125</sup> Büchner 420 n 184.

treachery in Sallust's Sertorius. Sallust might have intended to draw a parallel between Sertorius and Julius Caesar, whom Cicero likened to the Punic general (*utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur?*, “Are we talking about a commander of the Roman people, or about Hannibal?” *Att.* 7.11.1), a characterization later exploited by Lucan in the *Bellum Civile*.<sup>126</sup> Whether we are convinced by Buchner's characterization, or by Spann's dismissal of it, or neither, the valuable point here is that Sallust's Sertorius is ambiguous enough that he can plausibly be read as either a champion of the *res publica* or a *hostis*. A proper *exemplum*, on the other hand, should leave no doubt.

It is also worth noting that Hannibal is not just any foreign enemy, but an African one, and this could not have been overlooked by a Roman audience watching Mark Antony become more and more involved with affairs in Egypt after 41 BCE. We might thus read this version of Sertorius as “middle step” connecting Hannibal – the African bane of the Romans – and Antony, who, by the early 30s BCE, was beginning to look like a potential invader himself. This reading is even more plausible in light of other parallels between Sertorius and Antony, which I discuss in the next section.

### 2.3 The *altera res publica*

Sertorius' *altera res publica* consisted of a patchwork “Senate” established from among the numbers of Romans who fled to Spain to support his cause; according to

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<sup>126</sup> On echoes of Julius Caesar in Sallust's portrayal of Sertorius, see Katz 1981. Katz's argument rests heavily on biographical similarities between the two (e.g., close relationships with their mothers, conflicts with Pompey, assassinations). The parallels he points out are worth nothing, although, as I argue in this chapter, Sallust's Sertorius is not neatly analogous to any one figure; Katz' assertion that “Sallust, loathing Pompey and admiring Sertorius, fitted his hero into this sequence,” seems a little too forceful.

Appian, this group may have had some three hundred members.<sup>127</sup> Among this number were perhaps as many as one hundred genuine Roman senators, along with others of equestrian rank or younger men of senatorial families.<sup>128</sup> In addition to creating this Spanish “Senate,” Sertorius trained the Iberian soldiers who joined his cause in Roman methods of warfare, and coaxed their loyalty by furnishing them with assorted ornamentation and sharing in their love of fine things (χορηγῶν εἰς ταῦτα καὶ συμφιλοκαλῶν, Plut. *Sert.* 14.3); by adding these Spanish soldiers to those who had accompanied him from Italy into exile, Sertorius created his own pseudo-Roman army (Plut. *Sert.* 14.1-2). He also founded a school at Osca for the children of the Iberian nobility, at which the children were educated by teachers with education in Greek and Roman subjects (“διδασκάλους ἐπιστήσας Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῶν μαθημάτων”); the students dressed like young Romans and were encouraged by promises of future offices and appointments (Plut. *Sert.* 14.3). Sertorius thus, in effect, appeared to be creating a new Rome in Spain, with its own government and military force, as well as making provisions for the future of the community by raising a generation of pseudo-Roman children.

Sallust's narrative of events in Spain in fall 77, the time at which most modern scholars agree Sertorius assembled his “Senate,” is sparse. Several fragments covering the fighting between Sertorius and Metellus in Lusitania survive,<sup>129</sup> but the narrative breaks off in early 77. The fullest accounts of this period are found in Appian and Plutarch.

Plutarch depicts the establishment of the “Senate” in Spain as an eminently patriotic act,

<sup>127</sup> Appian 1.108. See Spann 1987 on the difficulty of believing this number; an estimate closer to 150 or 200 seems more probable.

<sup>128</sup> Konrad 1994, 184.

<sup>129</sup> Grouped by McGushin as 1.93-114.

one which demonstrated that Sertorius was “a man who loved his country and had a great longing to return there (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἀνὴρ φιλόπατρις καὶ πολὺν ἔχων ἥμερον τοῦ κατελθεῖν, 22.7).” In Plutarch's version, Sertorius collected those of senatorial rank who had fled to his camp and recognized them as the Senate (Μεγαλοφροσύνης δὲ τοῦ Σερτωρίου πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοὺς φεύγοντας ἀπὸ Ῥώμης βουλευτὰς καὶ παρ’ αὐτῷ διατρίβοντας σύγκλητον ἀναγορεῦσαι, “Sertorius first showed his pride by calling the exiles from Rome who were spending their time with him by the title of ‘the Senate’,” 22.5), appointing quaestors and praetors from among them “in accordance with the forms of Roman tradition (ταμίας τε καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ πάντα τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις τὰ τοιαῦτα κοσμεῖν, 22.5).” Furthermore, Plutarch points out, while Sertorius was willing to take advantage of the economic and human capital provided by the Iberians, he did not intend to renounce his Roman identity or lead a Spanish War against Rome :

ἔπειτα τὸ χρώμενον ὄπλοις καὶ χρήμασι καὶ πόλεσι ταῖς Ἰβήρων μηδ’ ἄχρι λόγου τῆς ἄκρας ἐξουσίας ὑφίστασθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, Ῥωμαίους δὲ καθιστάναι στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν, ὥς Ῥωμαίοις ἀνακτῶμενον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, οὐκ ἐκείνους αὖξοντα κατὰ Ῥωμαίων (*Sert.* 22.6).

Although he made use of the arms, the resources, and the cities of the Iberians, he did not go so far as to say he would yield ultimate authority to them, but rather appointed Romans as their generals and officers, on the grounds that he was returning to the Romans their freedom, not increasing them [the Iberians] against the Romans.

In order to make sense of Sertorius' justification for rejecting Rome as a center of authority, we must take into consideration the chaotic state of affairs back in the city. So long as Sulla was alive, it was impossible for Sertorius to return to Rome; after his death

in 78, however, Sertorius may have seen an opportunity to come back to the city. During this year, he engaged in unsuccessful negotiations with both Metellus and Pompey, requesting that an armistice be struck and that he be granted permission to return to Rome (Plut. *Sert.* 22.5). Metellus, however, embarrassed and frustrated after two years of failed attempts to put down the Sertorian uprising, not only refused these requests, but responded by escalating his pursuit : a financial reward was offered to any Roman who killed or captured Sertorius, and, to any exile who could accomplish the task, amnesty and free right of return to the city (Plut. *Sert.* 22.1), a tempting offer for exiles who longed to return home. Clearly, at this point, Rome was not an option for Sertorius. Even beyond the obstacles posed by Metellus and Pompey, the situation in the city was unwelcoming. Lepidus may have reached out to Sertorius late in 78, when the consul realized that Sertorius' troops could provide him much-needed support for suppressing the Faesulan revolt.<sup>130</sup> Given the ongoing threat posed by Metellus, however, and Lepidus' unstable position, it made no sense for Sertorius to return to Italy to aid the consul; at any rate, at this point the bulk of his forces consisted of Spanish troops, who would probably not be eager to abandon their territory for a cause irrelevant to their own interests (although that depends on what rewards Sertorius had promised).<sup>131</sup>

The Spanish Senate makes more sense in light of all this. In Plutarch's version, Sertorius still clearly identifies himself as a Roman acting in the interests of the Roman state, even though he was barred from return to the city itself. Perhaps most importantly, according to the biographer, Sertorius did not envision Spain as the permanent seat of

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<sup>130</sup> 1.77.8, 22 M

<sup>131</sup> Spann 1987, 76.



Roman power, should he be successful in the war : “ἐν δὲ ταῖς νίκαις διεπέμπετο πρὸς Μέτελλον καὶ πρὸς Πομπήϊον, ἕτοιμος ὢν τὰ ὄπλα καταθέσθαι καὶ βιοῦν ιδιώτης καθόδου τυχόν· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐθέλειν ἀσημότατος ἐν Ῥώμῃ πολίτης ἢ φεύγων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοκράτωρ ἀναγορεύεσθαι,” “But in victory, he was sending to Metellus and Pompey that he was ready to set aside his weapons and live out his life as a private citizen if he received right of return; for he would rather be the most undistinguished citizen at Rome rather than, as a fugitive from his country, be hailed as the sole ruler of all other places at once (22.7-8).” The *altera res publica* was only a temporary solution to Sertorius' alienation from Rome; presumably, had he been victorious, Sertorius would have eventually returned to Rome and resumed his career there. This is an important difference between Sertorius' attempt to “unfound” Rome and the later attempts by Caesar and Mark Antony, as is discussed below.

The biographer's Sertorius thus assembles his Spanish Senate in an attempt to maintain his Roman-ness even though it was at that time impossible for him or his followers to return safely to the city itself. Appian, on the other hand, portrays Sertorius' Senate as an act of mockery, in the style of Alcibiades' pseudo-Mysteries or Peter the Great's Most Holy Drunken Synod. Sertorius, he claims, named his group after the Roman Senate “as an insult toward the real one (περιώνυμος δὲ ὢν ἐπὶ τόλμῃ, βουλὴν κατέλεξεν ἐκ τῶν συνόντων οἱ φίλων τριακοσίους καὶ τήνδε ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν Ῥωμαίων βουλὴν καὶ ἐς ὕβριν ἐκείνης σύγκλητον ἐκάλει, “Known for his daring, he collected together a council of three hundred of those friends who were around him and he said that this was the Roman Senate and named this assembly thus as an insult toward the real

one,” 108).” Without any text remaining of Sallust's account of the Spanish Senate, it is difficult to say whether Plutarch's or Appian's representation is more closely based on the *Histories* : was Sallust's Sertorius attempting to create a serious political body under the auspices of which he could enjoy the illusion of Rome, or was the Spanish Senate part of Sertorius' program of ostentatious displays? If we assume for the moment that Sallust depicted Sertorius' *altera res publica* as, at the very least, a semi-serious answer to the standing government at Rome, this evokes the memory of other threats to the city's authority as the locus of state power during periods of domestic instability; more importantly, this echoes concerns of the triumviral period in particular, when Mark Antony was building his power base in Alexandria.

The idea of conducting the main business of the city elsewhere was not unprecedented; abandoning the capital in a tactical retreat in warfare was, historically, a viable but controversial last resort. The Athenians had set the precedent during the Persian Wars when, having learned that the Peloponnesians were focusing their efforts on fortifying the isthmus rather than trying to hold Boeotia, they abandoned the city and fled to Troizen, Aegina, and Salamis. This was a drastic move; only truly desperate circumstances could lead a community whose belief in its own autochthony was central to its civic identity to abandon its traditional home. Yet, the Athenians were forced to decide that whatever it was that made Athenians *Athenians* was something intrinsic to the people themselves, not the location. Athens could be wherever there were Athenians, at least when there was no good alternative.

The Persian Wars, of course, were ancient history to Sallust; the historian saw

during his own lifetime, however, a similar displacement of the standing government in the face of an imminent invasion : the flight of the Pompeians to Greece in 49 BCE. Although he would eventually join the Pompeians in flight, Cicero expressed grave reservations about Pompey's retreat, which he described as “most disgraceful” in a letter to Atticus (*Att.* 7.21). In Lucan's poetic version of the flight of the Senate, Pompey's adherents, gathered at Epirus, continue to try to act as Rome's governing body, despite their removal to a “foreign and lowly place (5.9).” The character Lentulus gives a speech in which he claims (5.18-29) that Rome's authority remains unchanged wherever the Senate convenes; Rome, in the eyes of Lucan's Senate, is not tied as strongly to the place itself as it is to its institutions and traditions. The entity called “Rome” can exist apart from the location, at least according to characters trying to justify their flight. Although this is a much later source, it is possible that the poet was drawing from attitudes expressed in late Republican sources; more on this below.

In both examples above, the Athenians and the Pompeian Senate, the flight was both forced and temporary (or at least intended to be so). Voluntarily abandoning the traditional capital city under non-emergency circumstances is, however, very different from making a “tactical retreat.” Although they raise the same questions about the true location of the city's authority, attempts to move the capital for any reason of less gravity than imminent danger were traditionally not well received at Rome. Livy's Camillus supplies a famous example. After the Roman defeat of the Gauls in 386, according to Livy, there was a popular movement to abandon the destroyed city and move the capital to Veii; Camillus, opposed to the proposal, decided to retain his dictatorship after his

triumph long enough to pass decrees ordering the restoration of Rome's sacred buildings and attempt to dissuade the people from this plan. It is not enough, he argues, to carry on the rites and institutions of Rome in another location; these are too closely linked with their traditional setting (*in Iovis epulo num alibi quam in Capitolio pulvinar suscipi potest?* “Could the couch for the feast of Jupiter be prepared anywhere other than the Capitolium?” 5.52.6). For Camillus, abandoning the city is tantamount to abandoning its gods; it is a renunciation of the very essence of *Romanitas*. The speech of Camillus is thought to be a Livian creation. If the first pentad of the *AUC* was composed during the triumviral period or shortly thereafter (even if it was not published until later), Livy and Sallust were at work on their major historical volumes during roughly the same period, and so were probably hearing and reacting to the same conversations; whatever contemporary issues Sallust's Sertorius was crafted in reaction to may have had an influence of Livy's Camillus, as well. I will return to this shortly.

Such attempts to transplant Roman power into a new location voluntarily were not limited to the distant past. According to Suetonius, there were persistent rumors that Caesar intended to move himself and the state's resources to either Troy or Alexandria, exhausting Italy by levies and leaving the city under the charge of his friends (*quin etiam varia fama percrebruit migraturum Alexandriam vel Ilium, translatis simul opibus imperii exhaustaque Italia dilectibus et procuratione urbis amicis permissa*, “Nay, rather, various rumors became widespread, that he intended to move to Alexandria or Troy, with the resources of the empire being transferred, Italy drained by levies, and the oversight of the city being handed off to his friends,” 79.3). Suetonius claims that this, along with

Cotta's reported intention to propose that Caesar assume the title *rex*, was among the primary motivations of the conspirators of 44. The desire for kingship was the hubristic over-reach *par excellence* of the Roman republic; at least according to the biographer, Caesar's contemplation of a move from Rome was considered to be a comparable transgression. The gravity of a threat to abandon Rome voluntarily is implied by Suetonius' juxtaposition of this charge with the rumors of Caesar's desire for kingship.

Horace may allude to this same alleged plot in *Ode* 3.3, in which the poet celebrates the spread of Roman rule. In a mythological digression, Juno warns the Romans to not fall prey to zealotry or overconfidence; she specifically advises that they should avoid the impulse to rebuild Troy (*sed bellicosus fata Quiritibus / hac lege dico, ne nimium pii / rebusque fidentes avitae / tecta velint reparare Troiae*, “But I declare their fate to the warlike citizens, according to this rule : let them not, being excessively pious and confident in their position, wish to repair the walls of ancient Troy,” 3.3.57-60). The allusion to Troy may be purely symbolic, the fall of Troy representing the archetypal collapse of a great civilization, but it is also possible that Horace means to evoke the rumors about Caesar and Troy. The poem is generally dated to 27 BCE, and might be thought to offer advice to the new *princeps* on how to conduct himself in power; the young ruler ought to beware the mistakes of his adoptive father, including trying to revive Troy to serve as the seat of Roman power.<sup>132</sup> Vergil may also allude to this plan in *Aeneid*

12.826-828 : *sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges / sit Romana potens Italia virtute*

<sup>132</sup> Fraenkel 1957 gently suggests that a political or propagandistic reading of the *Ode* is misguided; the hypothesis that the poem serves as a warning to Octavian “is still adhered to by a few scholars; the majority, however, no longer attempt to read a political allegory into the text of the ode (268).” However, I am convinced more recent work on Horace's relationship to historiography, politics, and propaganda (see in particular Oliensis 1998 and Damon 2002) that it is worthwhile to pursue these themes in the *Odes* as well as the *Epodes*.

*propago / occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia*, “Let Latium be, let there be Alban kings through the ages, let there be a Roman line, powerful with Italian virtue; Troy has fallen, you must let her remain fallen along with her name.” A reference to Troy here is obviously appropriate to the story of the poem, but also may be meant to evoke Caesar's plan and serve as a warning to his heir. Lucan, too, links Caesar and Troy; whatever rumors were current during the triumviral period and early principate were apparently persistent. In pursuit of Pompey after the battle of Pharsalus, Lucan's Caesar detours to visit the ruins of Troy (9.964 - 979). Again here, the destroyed city is laden with symbolism, as the vestige of a ruined civilization (*exustae nomen memorabile Troiae*, “the memorable name of burned Troy,” 9.964) and the distant origin of the one this version Caesar is about to destroy. It is possible, however, that this scene too is an allusion to Caesar's alleged relocation scheme.

Since Herodotus' day, then, Roman and Greek authors had explored the relationship between the location of a city and its actual seat of power, and contemplated the implications of threats to that relationship. As Ogilvie 1965 claims, “In the minds of Romans of the late Republic, the fortunes of Rome were associated with the continued existence of the city as the capital. Hence there was always a sinister undertone of rumour that the capital was to be transferred (742).” During the triumviral period, in particular, we see an abundance of interest in the issue : Livy, Horace, and Sallust all take on the topic, although in the guise of mythological or non-contemporary historical circumstances. Why the sudden concern about how to define the *caput mundi*? The shared anxiety of these three texts suggests that the authors were responding to a common

source, whether a rumor or an actual event. The topic had been on Roman minds since at least the period of the Social Wars. The town of Corfinium had served as the capital of Italy during the war; Corfinium (renamed “Italica”<sup>133</sup>) became the seat of the Italian “senate,” loosely modeled on Rome’s senate.<sup>134</sup> As De Sanctis 1976 points out, the Italian “senate” at Corfinium represented the interests of its constituents better than the Roman senate did, and the capital appears to have been established with an eye toward permanent status (40-41). The Italian threat had subsided by the time of Caesar’s dictatorship, but remained in recent enough memory that the rumors about Caesar’s intentions to move the capital to Alexandria or Troy provoked a strong and hostile reaction (Suet. *Life of Caesar* 79).

So, Sallust, Horace, and Livy emerged on the literary scene at a time when the memory of threats to Rome as the *caput mundi* was still relatively fresh; at least twice in the last half-century, the city had been challenged and forced to reassert itself as the center of the state. At the time of the composition of the *Histories*, however, a new threat to Rome’s primacy existed : the egyptophilic triumvir Mark Antony. Sallust did not live to see Antony’s most exuberant adoption of Alexandria as home; his Armenian triumph was not celebrated until 34, after Sallust’s death ceased work on the *Histories*. Although the popular image of Antony as a degenerate, besotted, self-styled Eastern monarch is largely derived from the final years of Antony’s life and Octavian’s forceful campaign of propaganda following his victory at Actium, there were signs in both his actions and modes of self-presentation that, even earlier in the triumviral period, Antony had begun

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<sup>133</sup> Velleius Paterculus 2.16.4 : *caput imperii sui Corfinium legerant atque appellarant Italiam*.

<sup>134</sup> De Sanctis 1976, 39-44; Wulff Alonso 2002, 118.

regarding the east as at least a semi-permanent base.

After his acquisition of the eastern provinces after the battles of Philippi, Antony's relationship with Cleopatra became close and complex both politically and personally. Anticipating the need to secure his friendship with Egypt and his access to its resources for a potential campaign against the Parthians, in the summer of 41, during his tour of the eastern provinces, Antony summoned Cleopatra to a meeting at Tarsus in Cilicia. Although Plutarch portrayed this meeting as the dramatic beginning to their love affair, at which Antony was seized by an immediate and all-consuming passion, the goals and outcome of the meeting were decidedly more practical in nature. Antony made several moves to secure Cleopatra's allegiance with an eye toward establishing an Egyptian base for his Parthian campaign.<sup>135</sup>

Antony then spent the winter of 41/40 in Alexandria. The birth of Cleopatra's twins less than a year later suggests the manner in which Antony spent at least some of that time; although he did not formally claim paternity for another several years, considering their lack of effort to conceal their affair, we might reasonably suppose that he was believed to be the father of the children. He did not, however, show at that time an inclination to stay in Egypt permanently, and in 40 departed, confronted by simultaneous threats to Asia Minor by the Parthians and to stability in Italy itself by the Perusine uprising. However, Antony's marriage to Octavian's sister Octavia in 40 BCE confirmed, at least apparently, his alliance with his fellow triumvir and his commitment

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<sup>135</sup> According to Plutarch, Antony ordered the seizure and execution of Cleopatra's sister Arsinoe, who had been granted sanctuary by Julius Caesar in the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus despite her resistance against the Romans in the Alexandrian War. Antony also ordered the Tyrians to produce Serapion for punishment for his support of the Republican forces after Caesar's assassination. It is difficult to determine whether he gave these orders as a subservient lover, as Octavian and later authors would represent, or out of pragmatic interest with an eye toward funding a Parthian war, or some combination thereof.



to the *res publica*; this image of solid Roman *concordia* was represented in Antony's series of gold coinage depicting himself on the obverse and either Octavian or Octavia on the reverse.<sup>136</sup>

Antony returned to Alexandria after meeting Cleopatra in Syria sometime late in 37. The year 36 saw a marked increase in Cleopatra's territory under Antony's influence. During this time she obtained control of regions in Phoenicia, Nabatean Arabia, Judea, Ituraea, Crete, and Cyrene; she then leased some of that territory to Herod and Malchus of Arabia at a steep profit.<sup>137</sup> The personal relationship between Antony and Cleopatra also obviously deepened during this year. Their son Ptolemy Philadelphus was born; Antony also publicly acknowledged paternity of the four-year-old twins Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios. Furthermore, Antony and Cleopatra jointly issued coinage with both their images, an unprecedented display linking a Roman commander with an eastern colleague.<sup>138</sup> Although Antony was still nominally married to Octavia, and although he did not consent to all of Cleopatra's political demands<sup>139</sup>, it was clear that his Egyptian lover was the most prominent influence in his life.

Altogether, these efforts to strengthen Cleopatra's position and his increased personal involvement with the queen suggest that Antony was beginning to think seriously at this time about strengthening his own position in Egypt and the east generally, perhaps with an eye toward remaining there long-term, certainly with an eye toward establishing a base for an invasion of Parthia solidifying eastern support in the

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<sup>136</sup> Osgood 189-191; *RRC* 527-529.

<sup>137</sup> Pelling 30.

<sup>138</sup> Osgood 245; *RPC* 1.4094-96, 4501-02, 4510, 4529-30, 4741-42, 4752, 4771-3, 4781, 4783, 4866-68.

<sup>139</sup> Pelling 30; Antony still refused to grant the sections of Judea, Phoenicia, Syria, and Arabia which Cleopatra demanded, at least creating the appearance that she received no greater favor than any of his other eastern allies.

event of a war with Octavian. Despite Antony's preparations, the Parthian campaign was a colossal failure. Antony's siege of Phraata was stymied when he anticipated his siege-engines, which never actually arrived; he lost around a third of his army between the siege and the ensuing difficult retreat.<sup>140</sup> Antony returned to Alexandria and Cleopatra to regroup and re-evaluate his plans for the east.

If Antony's intentions for taking up permanent residence with Cleopatra at Alexandria had been unclear to this point, by 35, the picture had surely clarified. Late in 36, Octavia sailed from Rome to Athens with reinforcements for Antony's intended campaign against Armenia. According to both Plutarch and Dio, Octavia herself provided the impetus for the journey.<sup>141</sup> Whether he was simply supporting his sister's plan or, as seems more probable, concocted it himself, Octavian stood to benefit if Antony refused to see Octavia (as he ultimately did). If Antony turned away his legitimate Roman wife, Octavian would have a reasonable pretext for war; if he received her and the supplies, Octavian would, at the very least, have made some progress in paying off the debts to Antony he had incurred during his war against Sextus Pompey. Antony must have known this, and by rejecting Octavia, stated clearly his allegiance to Cleopatra and Alexandria.

So, at the time of the composition of the *Histories* (as well as Horace's *Ode* 3.3 and the first pentad of Livy's *AUC*), it was not unreasonable for Romans to be concerned about Antony's intentions for the east and how this might affect the stability of the triumvirate, as Octavian continued to fortify his own position in Italy. Even if Antony

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<sup>140</sup> Pelling 33-4; Plut. *Ant.* 38.4.

<sup>141</sup> Plut. *Ant.* 53.1, Dio 49.33.

had intended to maintain Rome as the power center of the state had he been successful in subduing Octavian, it was distressing enough that, at least in the late 40s and early 30s BCE, he appeared to be positioning Alexandria as a viable threat to Rome's authority. In the *Histories*, Sallust created a Sertorius acting in the far west very much as Antony was in the east. They are not perfect analogues. Sallust's Sertorius, for example, in addition to cultivating resources to continue his resistance to the Sullans, seems to have been creating a substitute Rome to satisfy his longing for home until he could safely return to a city, while Antony appears to have been more seriously considering a permanent relocation to Cleopatra's palace; still, the Sertorius of the *Histories* embodies the general anxiety of the triumviral period about Rome's place in the world.

Sallust's version of Sertorius' *altera res publica* can thus be read as a response to the historical and political context of the *Histories*' composition; it is also relevant to Sallust's historiographical program, particularly his resistance to Cicero. By presenting Sertorius' Spanish Senate as a potential alternative to the city of Rome as the seat of the republic's power, Sallust strikes at the heart of one of Cicero's anxieties. For Cicero, the city itself was symbolically crucial; the stability of the state was grounded in the physical city itself. This theme recurs frequently in Cicero's works, over a long period of time and in varying genres, which suggests that, to him, it was an important question. For example, in Book Two of the *De Re Publica*, Cicero recounts the story of the foundation of Rome, particularly praising Romulus' selection of a site for his city :

urbi autem locum, quod est ei, qui diuturnam rem publicam serere  
conatur diligentissime providendum, incredibili oportunitate delegit.  
(*De Re Publica* 2.3.5)

Moreover, the site of the city, the sort of matter which must be most carefully considered if one is striving to found a lasting republic, he chose to incredible advantage.

Cicero continues to detail the ways in which the location of Rome is strategically sound.

This digression comes in the context of Cicero's praise for the establishment of the Roman constitution; this suggests that, at least in Cicero's mind, the vitality of the state and the location of the state are inextricably connected.

I have already discussed Cicero's resistance to the Pompeian flight to Greece; although he eventually joined the Pompeians in Greece, Cicero condemned the retreat as “most disgraceful (*turpissimam*, *Ad Att.* 7.21)”. Fleeing for safety was one thing – Cicero himself laid low at his villa at Formia during the beginning of 40 BCE – but attempting to move the entire business of the republic outside the city was another thing entirely. Almost fifteen years prior to the war between Pompey and Caesar, during his consulship, Cicero had voiced a similar concern about proposed plans to develop a colony at Capua as a rival city to Rome. In his first speech *De Lege Agraria*, among Cicero's complaints against the tribune Publius Servilius Rullus, he claims that the decemvirs established under Rullus' proposed law would attempt to build Capua into a rival capital :

Capuam deduci colonos volunt, illam urbem huic urbi rursus opponere, illuc opes suas deferre et imperi nomen transferre cogitant (1.18)

They want settlers to be sent to Capua, to set that city against this one as an opponent, and they are planning to take their wealth there and transfer the name of empire to that place.

By this action, Cicero argued, the decemvirs would demonstrate that “the name of the

republic, the seat of this city and empire, that even this temple of the best and greatest Jupiter and this citadel of all nations is hateful to them (*iam aperte ostendent sibi nomen huius rei publicae, sedem urbis atque imperi, denique hoc templum Iovis optimi maximi atque hanc arcem omnium gentium displicere*).” In Cicero's eyes, a threat to the physical city itself was a threat to the *res publica* the capital represented, and to abandon the city was to insult everything for which it stood. Again discussing the proposal about Capua, he reiterates this view in the second speech *De Lege Agraria* :

In id oppidum homines nefarie rem publicam vestram transferre conantur, quo in oppido maiores nostri nullam omnino rem publicam esse voluerunt, qui tris solum urbis in terris omnibus, Carthaginem, Corinthum, Capuam, statuerunt posse imperi gravitatem ac nomen sustinere. . . (2.87)

Men are impiously attempting to transfer your republic to that town in which our ancestors wished that there be no republic at all, ancestors who decided that there were three cities alone in the whole world – Carthage, Corinth, and Capua – able to bear the name and burden of empire. . .

At the very end of his career, Cicero once again raised theme of the city's relevance, although here somewhat indirectly. In the thirteenth *Philippic*, Cicero sneers that he would rather see the city itself moved than see the Antonii plague Rome any further :

Moveri sedibus huic urbi melius est atque in alias, si fieri possit, terras demigrare, unde Antoniorum 'nec facta nec nomen audiat', quam illos Caesaris virtute eiectos, Bruti retentos intra haec moenia videre (*Phil.* 13.49)

It would be better for the city to be lifted from its foundation and to move into another land, if it were possible for that to happen, where it would hear of neither the deeds nor the name of the Antonii, than for it to see those men who were cast out by the virtue of Caesar, and kept

inside these walls by the virtue of Brutus.

Hyperbole, to be sure, but Cicero's choice of example matters. The Antonii have become so intolerable that enduring their presence in the city is the near-equivalent of committing what Cicero considers to be one of the most shameful crimes against the *res publica*; better that the city not exist in its current form than be subjected to the family of Cicero's enemy. The *altera res publica* may thus not only be read as Sallust's reaction to the general anxiety of the triumviral period regarding Rome's place in the world and continued necessity, but also as a response to the concerns articulated here by Cicero, in particular.

## 2.4 Conclusions

Sallust's portrayal of Sertorius in 1.88 as actively creating his own public image and legacy even in the absence of *scriptores* to record his deeds suggests that, as he composed the *Histories*, the author was in the process of confronting the changing meaning and role of history-writing under the triumvirate. The prologues of the monographs show some optimism about the value of this pursuit.

Pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est. . . (BC 3.1)

It is a fine thing to act well on behalf of the republic; moreover, it is hardly useless to speak well on its behalf. . .

Ceterum ex aliis negotiis quae ingenio exercentur in primis magno usui est memoria rerum gestarum. Cuius de virtute quia multi dixere, praetereundum puto, simul ne per insolentiam quis existimet memet studium meum laudando extollere. (BJ 4.1-2).

But out of those pursuits which are conducted with the mind, the recording of things that have happened is of the greatest use. Concerning the value of this, because many have spoken about it, I think it can be passed over (also, in order that no one think that, out of pride, I am elevating my own interest by praising it.

Here and elsewhere in the prologues,<sup>142</sup> Sallust asserts the complementary relationship of acting and recording. Without writers to commemorate deeds, it is as if those deeds were never accomplished; furthermore, those things which are memorialized in text are only elevated to the same level as the skill of the author himself. In the world of the monographs, history is thus a necessary profession. The extant fragments of the opening of the *Histories*, however, do not contain any like reflections on the project itself; as far as we can see, Sallust tells us nothing about his reasons for writing, nor does he try to justify his efforts as he did in the *BC* and *BJ*. It is, of course, impossible to assert that such a passage never existed, but if we suppose it did not, this reveals a dramatic change of perspective from Sallust's earlier works. Perhaps by his third work, he simply no longer felt compelled to justify his profession, but, in light of the evidence discussed above, it seems more probable that Sallust's understanding of the value of history-writing had evolved with the changing political situation. Furthermore, the Sertorius of 1.88 also poses a challenge to Ciceronian historiography; as an *exemplum*, he is designed to fail, offering no clear moral lesson to an audience too corrupt to know what to do with an *exemplum* anyhow.

Sertorius' *altera res publica* may have taken one of many different forms : an attempt to mount serious opposition to the standing Roman government, a homesick

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<sup>142</sup> See *BC* 3.2 and 8, cited above.

gesture toward making the best of his effective banishment from the city, a tongue-in-cheek act of mockery. Whatever Sertorius' "real" motivation, Sallust's account of the Spanish Senate must have evoked contemporary threats to Rome's position as the *caput mundi*, particularly Mark Antony's recent gestures toward taking up more permanent residence in Alexandria. This, in turn, emphasizes the uncertainty of life under civil war. Does it mean anything at all to be the center of a state rent by civil discord? This depends, in part, on how closely the city's authority is tied to the place itself, rather than to people, practices, or institutions. Sertorius, by successfully creating a miniature Rome in his exile in Spain, seems to argue that, in civil war, Rome itself becomes irrelevant. This suggestion, in turn, represents another element of Sallust's resistance to Cicero; Sertorius' *altera res publica* is an insult to Cicero's insistence that the stability of the state is dependent on the continued primacy of the city of Rome itself.



## Chapter 3 : Spartacus and the Slave Revolt

### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the role of the Spartacus War in the narrative of the *Histories*, paying particular attention to the ways in which Sallust's characterizations of Spartacus and the revolt echo figures and elements of the triumviral period. I focus on three elements of the Spartacus narrative : first, I examine why Sallust broke with historiographical tradition to elevate a slave to a prominent figure in his text; then, I discuss Sallust's portrayal of the breakdown of the rebel coalition as a quasi-civil war; finally, I analyze Sallust's characterization of Spartacus and his followers as *latrones*, examining how this echoes invective and propaganda of the triumviral period. Including the Vatican fragments, thirty-nine fragments of Sallust's narrative of the Spartacus War survive. Seventeen (3.90-106 M) of these fragments are assigned by Maurenbrecher to Book Three; two (3.90 and 91 M) seem to belong to a character-sketch of Spartacus, while 3.92-3.106 are from Sallust's account of the movements of the rebels and their confrontation with Varinius in 73 BCE. Maurenbrecher assigned the remaining twenty-two of the Spartacus fragments, covering the events of 72-1 BCE, to Book Four (4.20-41 M). Fragments 4.23-29 are from a geographical excursus on Sicily; the remaining fragments belong to Crassus' appointment to the command against Spartacus and the final confrontation between Crassus and Spartacus in 71 BCE. The vast majority of these fragments contain five lines of text or fewer, with the exception of the Vatican fragments. The Vatican fragments were transmitted as part of the Fleury manuscript, a fifth-century codex; 3.96 and 3.98 M are contained on one bifolium cut down at some point for

binding.

As was discussed in Chapter Two, Sallust uses the figure of Sertorius to play out his anxieties about the changing role of historiography under the triumvirate; Sertorius overcomes *invidia scriptorum* to “write” his own history, reflecting Sallust's concern that the triumvirs, who so tightly controlled their own public image, intended to leave little room for historians to create a public record. I argue in this chapter that while Sallust's Sertorius represents a growing pessimism about the future of historiography, Sallust's Spartacus represents potential hope. At the time of the *Histories'* composition, leaders of slave rebellions tended to remain undifferentiated as individuals in historical narratives. For example, the leaders of the first two Sicilian slave revolts were portrayed by Diodorus as essentially the same character : a trouble-making foreigner. Rather than following this tradition, Sallust seems to have given Spartacus a prominent role in the *Histories*, portraying him like a Roman commander waging a *iustum bellum* rather than a barbarian waging a *servile bellum*. Sallust's Spartacus, then, suggests that, even during the triumviral period, the historian still has the ability to elevate or bring down, to magnify or conceal according to his desire. Furthermore, like Sertorius, Spartacus functions as an ambiguous *exemplum*; like Sertorius, Spartacus offered a chance for Sallust to craft an exemplary character, and as in the case of Sertorius, Sallust again declines to do so. Spartacus is thus another morally ambivalent figure for Sallust's triumviral audience, rendered even more complex by his status as a gladiator, a figure which occupied the extremes of the Roman imagination.

In the next section, I examine Sallust's depiction of the breakdown of leadership

of the slave revolt. At the start of the revolt, Spartacus shared power with two other runaway slaves, Crixus and Oenomaus; the rebels split into two factions in 73 BCE, and the detachment under Crixus and Oenomaus was defeated. The remaining group split again, with Spartacus at the head of one faction and Caius Canicius and Castus at the head of the other; the latter were quickly tracked down and defeated by Crassus. In this section, I demonstrate how Sallust's account of this factionalism echoes the contemporary political situation at Rome. Despite their attempts to create an appearance of unity, the triumvirs were in near-constant conflict; furthermore, Rome was just a generation removed from the so-called first triumvirate, which was similarly discordant. By portraying the slave revolt in a way that reminded his audience of Rome's current state of civil disturbance despite proclamations of *concordia*, Sallust seems to suggest by analogy that the 70s, like the 30s, were only nominally a period of peace, and in reality were plagued by continual *stasis*. Here we also once again see an element of Sallust's reaction to Cicero's worldview and conception of history; whereas Cicero claims that *seditio* can be a healthy and necessary means to political change (*De. Or.* 2.199), Sallust's depiction of the downfall of the Spartacus revolt emphasizes that, in his view, *seditio* is part of the process of political and societal decay.

In the final section, I discuss Sallust's portrayal of the participants in the Spartacus revolt as *latrones*, and show the ways in which that echoes the political rhetoric of the triumviral period. Sextus Pompey and Mark Antony were both frequently portrayed as or explicitly called *latrones* by their political rivals. By depicting the rebel gladiators in a way that echoes the contemporary political context at Rome, Sallust again creates a link

between the seventies and the triumviral period. Sallust's depiction of Spartacus also seems to challenge and complicate Cicero's characterization of Mark Antony as a *latro* and a *furiosus gladiator*.

### 3.2 Spartacus' Prominence in the *Histories*

Even during antiquity, the slave revolt of 73-71 BCE was commonly known as the “Spartacus War,” taking its name from the Thracian gladiator credited with leading the escape from a Capuan training school; Spartacus has remained a figure of fascination from the Roman period until the present day, the subject of media ranging from Marxist propaganda to novels to films. In light of Spartacus' oversize presence in all these accounts of the revolt, it is easy to forget that Sallust was the first author to write Spartacus as a leading character.<sup>143</sup> It is also easy to forget how remarkable it was for an individual of this sort – a slave – to play as important a role in Sallust's *Histories* as, for example, Crassus. It is important to note that the Spartacus War was not elevated to such a level of prominence in the Roman imagination solely because of its historical significance. Although the revolt alarmed and challenged a state which underestimated its severity and thus failed to make an appropriate initial response, and although it marked an important moment in the careers of rivals and future triumvirs Crassus and Pompey, the war's ultimate impact on the Roman state was not catastrophic. The war tied up Roman resources over two years, but was brought to a relatively swift conclusion under Crassus' command, with no significant lasting damage to the state other than any

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<sup>143</sup> For a detailed discussion of ancient sources' reliance on the *Histories* for their characterization of Spartacus, see Hooff 1984.

feelings of insecurity it produced. In this section, I discuss the role of Spartacus and the Spartacus War in the *Histories*, and examine why Sallust may have allotted them disproportionately extensive and detailed treatment in his narrative.

### **3.2.1 The Slave Wars and Spartacus before Sallust**

The Roman world had faced two major slave revolts before the Spartacus War, both in Sicily, the first from 135-132 BCE and the second from 104-100. Although ancient accounts placed some emphasis on the actions of individuals (as is discussed below), neither of the early revolts came to be defined by one participant in the way the Spartacus War did; after all, the first two revolts came to be known as the First and Second Slave Wars, not the Eunus and Salvius Wars. When individual actors are cited in pre-Sallustian accounts of either Sicilian War, they are stock-characters rather than well-developed, multi-faceted individuals; as I discuss in this section, the leaders of the rebelling slaves in the First and Second Slave Wars are standard Eastern foreigner-types, portrayed as mystics or magicians.

Two versions of Diodorus Siculus' account of the First Sicilian Slave War are preserved by Byzantine authors, one by Photius and one by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Although we obviously must use caution in drawing firm conclusions about Diodorus' account based on these very late synopses, the two accounts agree closely enough on the major details that we may assume they preserve the sense of the original passage reasonably well. In Photius' version, the individual character who stands out is the Syrian slave Eunus, whom Diodorus singles out as the leader of the initial

outbreak. Eunos “acted like a magician and a wonder-worker. This man pretended to predict things that were going to happen based on orders received from the gods in his sleep (ἄνθρωπος μάγος καὶ τερατουργὸς τὸν τρόπον. οὗτος προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγμασι καθ’ ὕπνον προλέγειν τὰ μέλλοντα, 34/35.2.5).” Eunos had become famous for performing absurd feats like pretending to breathe fire and making predictions about the future (which occasionally and randomly proved correct); because of this influence, he was approached by a group of slaves plotting against their owner Damophilos. Eunos convinced them that the gods favored their undertaking and led them on a violent raid on the city of Enna; after Damophilos was executed, the rebels named Eunos their king (“Next, Eunos was chosen as king, not because of his courage or for his military skill, but because of his singular wonder-working and because he started the revolt, and at the same time because of his name, as if bearing some good omen toward the good-fortune of their undertakings,” Ἐκεῖθεν αἰρεῖται βασιλεὺς ὁ Εὐνους οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, διὰ δὲ μόνην τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οἰονεῖ τινα καλὸν οἰωνὸν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποτακτομένων εὐνοίαν, 34/35.2.14).

In Photios' version of Diodorus' account, then, Eunos, the only noteworthy individual, is portrayed as decidedly un-Roman; by emphasizing his use of magic (or the appearance of magic) to deceive his fellow slaves, Diodorus positions Eunos as a frightening outsider, a non-specific “other” in stark contrast with those against whom the slaves revolt. Eunos is much the same, if somewhat less developed, in Constantine Porphyrogenetus' synopsis of Diodorus. Here, as in Photios' narrative, Eunos is known

among the slaves as a mystic, and they approach him to see whether their plan for revolt has the gods' approval; again here, he is named king, although Constantine does not explain the slaves' rationale for choosing him, as Photios does. Other contemporary and near-contemporary accounts give even less information about Eunus or any other individual rebel. Athenaeus' summary of Posidonius' account names no individual rebels (Jacoby *FgrH*, F7). In his speeches *In Verrem*, Cicero briefly cites the events of the First Slave War, but does not mention any of the slaves by name.

Eunus, then, is the only individual slave among the participants in the revolt who seems to play any role in the first-century tradition surrounding the First Slave War, and even he is limited to the role of generically menacing outsider rather than being portrayed as a particularly nuanced individual. Accounts of the Second Slave War from the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE emphasize the roles of individuals even less than the narratives of the First Slave War. In Photios' version of Diodorus' account, one Varius is singled out as leading an early outbreak in the revolt,<sup>144</sup> but drops out of the narrative thereafter. The character Salvius, chosen as king by the rebels after their defeat of Marcus Titinius' troops, bears striking resemblance to Diodorus' Eunus (“. . . known to be skilled at telling the future, and a flute player at women's religious festivals,” δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θεαῖς αὐλομανοῦντα, 36.4.4). Their depictions are similar enough to suggest that Salvius is either modeled on Eunus, or that both are versions of the stereotypical mystic foreigner.

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<sup>144</sup> ἐκεῖθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλμης ἐκδήλου γινομένης, πρῶτοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντεποίησαντο κατὰ τὴν Ἀλικυαίων χώραν ἀδελφῶν δυεῖν μεγαλοπλούτων οἰκέται τριάκοντα, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ὀάριος ὄνομα, “From there, although the audacity of the slaves became obvious in many places, thirty men who lived near the country around Halicyae and were owned by two very rich brothers first sought freedom, [slaves] whom a man named Varius led,” *DS* 36.3.4

Salvius is portrayed in similar fashion in Constantine Porphyrogenetos' version of Diodorus. In this version, however, the author includes the detail that Salvius pretended to be the Seleucid king Tryphon, who had usurped the Syrian throne in 142 BCE; Salvius, then, is connected with the east (specifically Syria), as was Eunus.<sup>145</sup> Eunus and Salvius are the most conspicuous individuals among the rebelling slaves in first-century accounts of the First and Second Slave Wars, but neither enjoys a lasting reputation at all comparable to the *fama* of Spartacus, perhaps in part because both characters stick closely to the familiar stereotype of the eastern magician.<sup>146</sup>

Sallust's *Histories* are our earliest (originally) complete account of the Spartacus War; the fullest summaries, those of Plutarch and Appian, are much later and probably used the *Histories* as their source.<sup>147</sup> When the war is mentioned by near-contemporaries of Sallust, however, Spartacus does not appear to have been as important a figure as in the *Histories*. For example, Diodorus Siculus mentions Spartacus ("Wherefore Spartacus the barbarian, having received a favor from someone, was manifestly grateful to the man. For nature is self-taught, even among barbarians, to show reciprocal favor to benefactors," "Ὅτι ὁ Σπάρτακος ὁ βάρβαρος εὐεργετηθεὶς παρὰ τινος εὐχάριστος ἐφάνη πρὸς αὐτόν· αὐτοδίδακτος γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἡ φύσις πρὸς ἀμοιβὴν χάριτος τοῖς εὐεργέταις, 38/39.21), but this section of Diodorus' text is fragmentary, surviving only in Constantine's citations; it is thus difficult to draw firm conclusions about

<sup>145</sup> As for other 1<sup>st</sup> century accounts, Cicero references the Second Slave War twice in the *In Verrem*; he mentions Athenion, leader of a band of slaves in Sicily during the revolt, but only briefly (2.3.66).

<sup>146</sup> A primary function of the emphasis on magic in the descriptions of Eunus and Salvius is to mark them as non-Roman; Cicero, for example, claims that Roman *pietas* and *religio* are what sets the Roman people apart from and above the superstitious barbarian peoples (*De Har. Resp.* 19). On the Roman conception of eastern foreigners, in particular, as magicians, see Dickie 2001, especially 124-141.

<sup>147</sup> On Plutarch and Sallust, see section 1.5 of the introduction; on Appian, see Gowing 1992.



Diodorus' overall portrait of Spartacus.

In the *In Verrem*, Cicero attacks Verres' governorship of Sicily in the late 70s, blaming Verres (among other charges) for either being oblivious to or deliberately concealing seditious activity among the slave populations on Sicily :

Quid igitur? nulline motus in Sicilia servorum Verre praetore, nullaene consensiones factae esse dicuntur? Nihil sane quod ad senatum populumque Romanum pervenerit, nihil quod iste publice Romam scripserit; et tamen coeptum esse in Sicilia moveri aliquot locis servitium suspicor (2.5.9)

What then? Are no uprisings of slaves in Sicily when Verres was praetor, nor any conspiracies said to have happened? Certainly nothing which came to the attention of the senate and the Roman people, nothing which that man wrote officially to Rome; but nevertheless I suspect that the slaves began to be stirred in numerous places in Sicily.

Although Verres had actually managed to keep any potential rebellions on Sicily in check for the duration of the Spartacus War, in this speech Cicero downplays Verres' efforts by implying that Sicily's slaves were always on the brink of revolt, and it was mere chance that no actual uprising occurred. More relevant to the present discussion : Cicero never mentions Spartacus by name in this speech. *Argumenta ex silentio* are, of course, tenuous, but the absence of Spartacus' name from this near-contemporary account suggests that, at this point (70 BCE), soon after the conclusion of the war but prior to the composition of Sallust's version of it, the character of Spartacus had not yet taken hold in the Roman imagination as the defining figure of a slave war.

### 3.2.2 Sallust's Spartacus

The image of the Spartacus War as a serious threat to the stability of Rome and the image of Spartacus as a figure of complexity and importance thus most probably originated in the *Histories*. In that case, what do we make of Sallust's Spartacus? Although little text describing or narrating the actions of Spartacus himself remains, it is possible to draw some conclusions about Sallust's depiction of Spartacus by closely analyzing the extant passages and by looking to the later authors who used the *Histories* as a source for their own accounts.

First, with such limited evidence, how do we know that Spartacus played a major role in the *Histories* compared to other first century texts? The significance of the Spartacus War in the narrative is suggested by the Vatican fragments, the two folios of the Fleury palimpsest which contain part of Sallust's account of the final conflict between Spartacus and Varinius; that Sallust allotted what seems to have been a significant amount of text to just one episode in the war implies that the war as a whole probably received fairly detailed treatment.<sup>148</sup> As for Spartacus himself, we may begin to reconstruct the scope of his role in the *Histories* by comparing what remains of Sallust's depiction of Spartacus with his treatment of other major characters in the text. As was discussed in Chapter 2 (regarding Sertorius), character-portraits are one method by which Sallust highlights the importance of an individual in the narrative. McGushin speculates that 3.91 M was part of a Sallustian character-portrait of Spartacus<sup>149</sup> :

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<sup>148</sup> Although the fragmentary condition of the *Histories* makes it difficult to judge the relative length and detail of this episode, comparison with other significant battle scenes in Sallust and other Roman historians suggests that the battle with Varinius was a major event in the text. For example, Sallust's account of the battle between Metellus and Jugurtha after Metellus' occupation of Vaga occupies approximately five OCT pages (*BJ* 47-53); the Vatican fragments (M 3.96 and 3.98), representing a small section of the battle, comprise nearly four pages. Cf. the final battle between Tacfarinas and Dolabella, just two Teubner pages (Tacitus *Annals* 4.23-25).

<sup>149</sup> McGushin 1994 *ad loc.*

3.91 M Ingens ipse virium atque animi.

He was great in strength and spirit.<sup>150</sup>

Kritz, noting the similarity of this remark to Sallust's characterization of Mithridates (e.g., *Mithridates corpore ingenti, perinde armatus*, 2.77 M), assigned this fragment to the introduction of Mithridates to the text; Maurenbrecher, on the other hand, re-assigned 3.91 to the Spartacus passage based on its similarity to Plutarch's description of Spartacus :

ἡγεμόνας εἵλοντο τρεῖς, ὧν πρῶτος ἦν Σπάρτακος, ἀνὴρ Θρᾷξ τοῦ Μαιδικοῦ γένους, οὐ μόνον φρόνημα μέγα καὶ ῥώμην ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέσει καὶ πραότητι τῆς τύχης ἀμείνων καὶ τοῦ γένους ἑλληνικώτερος. (Plut. *Crassus* 8.2).

They chose three leaders, of whom Spartacus was first, a Thracian man of the Maedi tribe, possessing not only great courage and strength, but also greater than his fortune in intelligence and kindness, and more Hellenic than his people.

Funari agrees that this fragment is most plausibly attributed to a character-portrait of Spartacus, but argues that the similarity with the Plutarchean passage is not sufficient evidence to assign 3.91 with certainty (“Probabile, ma non certa, l'attribuzione del fr. a un ritratto di Spartaco, e la conseguente collocazione all'interno del settore narrativo sulla rivolta di Spartaco. Neppure il confronto, assai pertinente, con Plutarch, *Crass.* 8, può comprovare tale ipotesi.”). If we assume, however, that Plutarch follows the *Histories* as closely here as in, for example, his account of the Sertorian revolt, it follows that 3.91

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<sup>150</sup> This fragment is preserved in Arusianus Messius' *Exempla Elocutionum* (p. 480 K VII) as an example of *ingens'* use with the genitive case.

was part of a longer character-sketch similar to Plutarch's account.

It is also worth noting that this fragment is quite similar to parts of Sallust's other character-portraits; if this is the type of statement Sallust used in sketches of other major figures in his narratives, it suggests that this fragment, too, was part of a longer portrait. Sallust frequently uses *ingens* in his character descriptions to emphasize the magnitude of his subjects (e.g., 2.77 M on Mithridates, cited above; *BJ* 63.2, on Marius : *At illum iam antea consulatus ingens cupido exagitabat, ad quem capiundum praeter vetustatem familiae alia omnia abunde erant*; *BJ* 95.3, on Sulla : *Igitur Sulla gentis patriciae nobilis fuit, familia prope iam extincta maiorum ignavia, litteris Graecis et Latinis iuxta atque doctissime eruditus, animo ingenti, cupidus voluptatum sed gloriae cupidior, otio luxurioso esse*; *BC* 53.6 *sed memoria mea ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus fuere viri duo, M. Cato et C. Caesar*). In language, then, this fragment is similar to Sallust's character portraits of major figures in his works.

McGushin used 3.91 as the foundation of an argument that Sallust's portrait of Spartacus was favorable, even laudatory. As was discussed with respect to Sertorius in Chapter Two, this should not be the final question about Sallust's portrayal of Spartacus. It may very well be the case that Sallust found qualities to admire in the slave leader; to be described as *ingens virium et animi* seems complimentary enough. However, Spartacus also embodies more troubling characteristics; as I will discuss in the next section, Spartacus, like Sertorius, functions as an ambiguous *exemplum* who defies simple interpretation. On the present point, however, the value of Spartacus' character in the *Histories* is less important than its magnitude. Regardless of whether Sallust meant to

write Spartacus as an admirable character, a disgraceful one, or something in between, it must be noted that he wrote Spartacus as a *major* figure, one who (if we extrapolate from 3.91) may have received individual attention on par with that of the great Roman generals of the narrative.

### 3.2.3 Spartacus, Sallust, and Historiography

Sallust, then, unexpectedly elevates a Thracian gladiator to a starring role in his *Histories*, creating a well-developed, complex figure out of an individual whom we might expect to be minimized or portrayed according to tropes in the same way as Eunus or Salvius of the earlier slave revolts. Sallust's use of Spartacus, however, makes more sense when examined in comparison with the historian's treatment of Sertorius, as discussed in Chapter Two. In 1.88, Sallust's Sertorius is shown in the process of overcoming *invidia scriptorum* and “writing” his own history through his boastful display of war wounds. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Sertorius' rejection of the need for *scriptores* to create a lasting account of his accomplishments reflects the author's anxiety about the changing role of historiography under the triumvirate. Under a regime which so tightly controlled its public image, what need was there for historians? Were not the triumvirs, like Sertorius, just going to write the story themselves?

Sallust's Spartacus, however, arriving on the narrative scene just after Sertorius' departure, is much less effective at, or at least less engaged in, self-promotion. In the narrative itself, Spartacus is depicted as struggling to maintain authority over the rebelling slaves, hardly possessing the spirit to parade around showing off wounds like Sertorius. 3.96 M, from the Vatican Fragment, shows Spartacus pitted against Crixus

regarding the best response to Varinius and his troops, who were advancing on the rebels' camp :

3.96D M Atque illi certamine consilii inter se iuxta seditionem erant,  
Crixo et gentis eiusdem Gallis atque Germanis obviam ire et ultro  
<of>ferre pugnam cupientibus, contra Sparta<co>. . .

But they <the fugitives> were close to riot among themselves because of a dispute over the plan, with Crixus and the Gauls of his race and the Germans desiring to go directly and willingly offer battle; Spartacus, on the other hand . . .

According to McGushin, Sallust is the only source on the war to dramatize a confrontation between Spartacus and Crixus.<sup>151</sup> The separation of the rebels into factions shortly after this episode (early 72 BCE) suggests that some kind of conflict between the leaders may have occurred at this time; Plutarch follows Sallust in suggesting that Spartacus was losing control of his position (οἱ δὲ πλήθει τ' ὄντες ἰσχυροὶ καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντες, οὐχ ὑπήκουον, ἀλλ' ἐπόρθουν ἐπιπορευόμενοι τὴν Ἰταλίαν, “But they, being strong in number and very bold, did not obey, but set out for plunder, roaming around Italy,” *Crass.* 9.6) . The other passage of the Vatican Fragment shows Spartacus yet more despondent :

3.98C neque sanctum aut nefandum quicquam fuit irae barbarorum et servili ingenio. Quae Spartacus nequiens prohibere, multis precibus quom oraret, celeritate praeverterent. . .

Nothing was sacred or unspeakable in the face of the anger and servile spirit of the barbarians. Spartacus, unable to prevent these things, although he begged with many entreaties that they should anticipate with speed. . .

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<sup>151</sup> McGushin 1994 *ad loc.*

Sallust's Spartacus, then, becomes a desperate and helpless figure. This Spartacus does not have the luxury of worrying about his *memoria*. He is unable to help his own historiographical cause; unlike Sertorius, he does not even seem to realize he is a character in a historical text. Nevertheless, as was discussed above, Spartacus plays a significant role in the *Histories*, receiving narrative treatment on par with that of major Roman figures, because Sallust elevates him to this position. It is probable that, even without Sallust as *auctor*, Sertorius would have overcome *invidia scriptorum* and made it into the historical record; a traitorous proconsul who mounted an extensive resistance to the state could not be completely ignored. Furthermore, although he was a *novus homo* and not of the senatorial class, Sertorius was far from a barbarian slave, and so stood a better chance than Spartacus of achieving individual *memoria* on this count, as well. Spartacus, however, was hardly guaranteed a lasting place in history as an individual. The slave revolt had a significant enough impact on the Roman state to be included in historical texts<sup>152</sup>, but Spartacus could have remained anonymous or only as developed a character as Eunus or Salvius. Sallust, as historian, singled him out and elevated him to a major player in the *Histories*.

If Sallust's Sertorius represents the author's anxieties about the changing role of historiography under the triumvirate, his portrait of Spartacus may represent some residual optimism about the continuing value of history-writing. As was noted in Chapter Two, the confident pronouncements of the monographs about the necessity of the

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<sup>152</sup> Unfortunately, while we have several narrative accounts by historians, official state records pertaining to the war do not survive. The conflict with Spartacus is not recorded in the *fasti consulares* for the year 73 BCE, but the text for the years 72 and 71 is lost; all three years are lost from the *fasti triumphales*. This does not indicate, I think, that the war had an insignificant effect on the Roman state; the rebellion's inclusion in the major historical narrative covering its time period implies otherwise.

historian's craft are absent from what remains of the *Histories*; Spartacus, however, is a sign that Sallust has not abandoned all hope. Life under the triumvirate required a delicate touch; the composition of bold programmatic statements might have been too direct. By showing his power to elevate a Thracian gladiator to a major role in his *magnum opus*, Sallust demonstrates that the historian still has the ability to magnify or obscure as he sees fit. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the apparent absence of a justification of history-writing from the prologue of the *Histories* has typically been attributed either to the vagaries of transmission or to the assumption that, by his third work, Sallust no longer found such explanations necessary.<sup>153</sup> I argue, however, that if Sallust did decline to make a statement about the value of historiography in the preface of the *Histories*, it is a reflection not of overconfidence but of anxiety; no longer certain enough to make dogmatic assertions about his *negotium*, Sallust plays out his uncertainty about the value of the writing of history through the characters of Sertorius and Spartacus.

This, in turn, helps us derive new meaning from a fragment which has generally been assumed to primarily express Sallust's admiration for Spartacus (McGushin, for example : “Words which may be part of a Sallustian character-sketch of Spartacus in which his courage and sense of honor are stressed.”).

M 4.41 Haud impigre neque inultus occiditur.

He fell, most energetically and not unavenged.<sup>154</sup>

<sup>153</sup> See, for example, Scanlon 1998.

<sup>154</sup> This fragment is preserved without book number by Donatus in his commentary on Terence's *Andria* at line 205 as an example of the use of “triple negatives” (*duae negativae unam consentivam faciunt; tres negativae pro una negativa accipiuntur; ut hic “neque haud non”*. Sallustius. . . ).



Maurenbrecher assigns the fragment to the end of the Spartacus War and follows de Broses and Kritz in assuming that it describes Spartacus himself; Maurenbrecher cites the similarity of the fragment to the parallel passage in Plutarch's *Life of Crassus* (τέλος δὲ φευγόντων τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, αὐτὸς ἐστὼς καὶ κυκλωθεὶς ὑπὸ πολλῶν, ἀμυνόμενος κατεκόπη, “At the end, when those around him had fled, he himself, having stood his ground and having been surrounded by many, was killed while still fighting back”, 11.10). As La Penna and Funari observe, the lack of transmitted book number makes the assignment of this fragment difficult, especially because the narrative suffers no shortage of opportunities for scenes of heroic death in battle. The content itself is not specific enough to either confirm or challenge Maurenbrecher's assignment.

If we assume, however, on the strength of the comparison with Plutarch, Maurenbrecher has assigned the fragment correctly, this passage contributes significantly to our understanding of Spartacus' role in the text. What does it mean that Spartacus died “not unavenged”? On a literal level, *inultus* may be meant as Plutarch interprets it, that Spartacus avenged his own death by taking out Roman soldiers on his way down; the same term is used in this way by Sallust in Catiline's speech to his followers in the *BC* (*cavete inulti animam amittatis*, “Beware lest you die unavenged”, *BC* 58.21) and to describe Cotta's troops in the *Histories* (*dedecores inultique terga ab hostibus caedebantur*, “Disgraced and unavenged, they were being struck on the back by the enemy,” *M* 3.24). It is possible, however, to also read *inultus* on a meta-literary level. Sallust himself is Spartacus' *ultor*, saving him from the indignity of oblivion by writing him into his history.

A parallel usage of *ultor* is found in the first book of Horace's *Epistles*. In the nineteenth *Epistle*, to Maecenas, Horace takes to task his *imitatores* and laments that his poems have not found ideal readers.

non ego uentosae plebis suffragia uenor  
impensis cenarum et tritae munere uestis;  
non ego nobilium scriptorum auditor et ultor  
grammaticas ambire tribus et pulpita dignor. 1.19.37-40

I do not purchase the applause of the fickle mob  
with the funding of feasts and the gift of a worn cloak;  
I, the audience and avenger of great writers,  
do not deign to canvass the tribes of grammarians and their desks.

Fraenkel has argued that *nobilium scriptorum* here refers to Archilochus, Alcaeus, and the rest of the early lyricists on whose poems Horace modeled his work; Horace, according to Fraenkel, was responsible for the revival of works which were threatened with oblivion (“Alcaeus and the other lyric poets of the classical period – that at any rate is Horace's thought – were buried in oblivion until he resuscitated their songs in his own odes.”).<sup>155</sup> Although Horace portrays himself as “avenging” or “resuscitating” previous poets rather than historical figures, as in the case of Sallust and Spartacus, this passage at least suggests that the author could be considered a sort of literary *ultor*.

Cicero, too, had used the language of vindication to describe the author's ability to “avenge” figures of the past through writing :

vel me hercule etiam ut laudem eorum iam prope senescentem, quantum

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<sup>155</sup> Fraenkel 1957, 349. Gilbert 1976 proposes a reading of *scriptorum* as the genitive plural of *scripta* rather than *scriptores*, and also the emendation of *auditor* to *adiutor*, suggesting the translation “supporter and avenger of noble writings.” I find this reading somewhat more convoluted than Fraenkel's; in either case, however, the force of *ultor* here is comparable, I argue, to its meaning in M 4.41.

ego possem, ab oblivione hominum atque a silentio vindicarem. Nam si ex scriptis cognosci ipsi suis potuissent, minus hoc fortasse mihi esse putassem laborandum. . . (*De orat.* 2.7-8)

. . .and, moreover, [my purpose was] that, to the extent I am able, I rescue the glory of these men, already near decline, from the forgetfulness of men and from silence. For if they were able to be remembered from their own writings, I perhaps would have thought this task less necessary to be undertaken. . .

Here, Cicero uses the language of vindication to describe his ability as a writer to prevent the eloquence of Crassus and Antony from oblivion; his role is all the more necessary because Antony and Crassus have not left their own written records. Although Cicero does not here use *ultor* or its cognates, as Fraenkel observes, *vindicare* is closely related to the vocabulary used by both Horace and Sallust.

It seems, then, both from Sallust's explicit remarks in the prologues (especially *BC* 8; see Chapter 2) and *M* 4.41, that the historian recognizes the power of the written record; writers have the ability to magnify or diminish, elevate or conceal according to their pleasure. Grethlein 2006 has argued that, in the *BJ* in particular, Sallust presents the relationship between *res gestae* and *memoria rerum gestarum* as dialectical : “According to Sallust, in earlier times there was a reciprocal balance between history and memory. As the historical record is obliged to match history, history imitated the *memoria rerum gestarum*. This relation of mutual imitation has been disturbed in the crisis of the republic : due to the inherent dialectic, that disruption has consequences for both history and *memoria* (140).” In the past, history and memory had been balanced : records of the past were “faithfully modeled after history (145),” while historical events were driven by those imitating the records of the past. The neglect of good examples from the past is one

of the factors that leads to a decline in the conduct of the state, but the ways in which the memory of the past and its examples had previously been maintained (for example, the reverence felt at the sight of the *imagines maiorum*) were no longer effective. This, Grethlein argues, is part of Sallust's justification of the need for historiography; his historical works and the *exempla* therein will provide new material for imitation, which, in turn, might set the makers of history back on the right path.

However, Grethlein has failed to account for the moral bankruptcy of the triumviral period; he correctly identifies the problem, but misreads Sallust's "solution." Although he could, Sallust does not supply *exempla* of the traditional type. As was the case with Sertorius, Spartacus is a morally ambiguous figure. He manages to stymie Roman forces for the better part of three years, but loses control over his own followers; he shows bravery in battle, but, as I discuss in the next section, is depicted by Sallust as a participant in civil war. The gladiator's paradoxical role in the Roman imagination adds interpretive complexity to Sallust's use of Spartacus in particular as an ambivalent *exemplum*. The gladiator embodied both laudable qualities (e.g., courage, physical strength) and troubling ones (foreignness, criminality). Barton 1993 explores the Roman use of the gladiator-figure (as well as the monster-figure) as "figures through which [the] extremes of emotions were enacted and expressed (3)." As Barton demonstrates, the gladiator was admired for his bravery and discipline in battle, while at the same time he embodied a frightening hopelessness and the "awful consequences" of desire : "the flouting of social conventions, the dismantling of hierarchy, the confusion of categories, the breaking of the food chain, the unleashing of chaos, of conflagration, of the *universus*

*interitus* (49).”<sup>156</sup>

A gladiator's prospects for survival were contingent upon both skill and bravery in battle, military qualities to which the Romans aspired. Furthermore, gladiators displayed these qualities even though their battles were just for the entertainment of others; Roman citizens, then, should have been expected to display equal or greater *virtus* in defense of the *res publica*. Cicero makes this very claim in the *Pro Milone*, arguing that if gladiators, among the most base of men, are cheered for facing death bravely, Roman citizens who do the same should be praised all the more highly :

etenim si in gladiatoriiis pugnis et <in> infimi generis hominum  
condicione atque fortuna timidos et supplices et ut vivere liceat  
obsecrantis etiam odisse solemus, fortis et animosos et se acriter ipsos  
morti offerentis servari cupimus, eorumque nos magis miseret qui  
nostram misericordiam non requirunt quam qui illam efflagitant, quanto  
hoc magis in fortissimis civibus facere debemus! (*Pro Mil.* 92)

And, in fact, if in gladiatorial battles and among the lowest group of men in both condition and fortune we are accustomed to hate those who are timid and suppliant and begging that they be permitted to live, and if we wish that the brave and spirited and the ones who are offering themselves most fiercely to death be saved, and if we pity more the ones who are not asking for our pity than those who beg for it, how much more we should feel this way about our bravest citizens!

In the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, Cicero again uses gladiators as examples of courage in the face of danger or death, and suggests that in this regard, at least, they are to be emulated by Romans :

Gladiatores, aut perditii homines aut barbari, quas plagas perferunt! Quo

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<sup>156</sup> Barton's work challenges the reader's patience and credulity in many ways (most conspicuously, her use of jargon-filled and affected language and her uncritical treatment of primary sources), but the dichotomy she articulates between the noble and base images of the gladiator is useful insofar as it underscores the mutable and often self-contradictory nature of the gladiator-figure.

modo illi, qui bene instituti sunt, accipere plagam malunt quam turpiter vitare! Quam saepe apparet nihil eos malle quam vel domino satis facere vel populo! Mittunt etiam vulneribus confecti ad dominos, qui quaerant quid velint : si satis is factum sit, se velle decumbere. Quis mediocris gladiator ingemuit, quis vultum mutavit umquam? Quis non modo stetit, verum etiam decubuit turpiter? Quis, cum decubisset, ferrum recipere iussus collum contraxit? Tantum exercitatio meditatio consuetudo valet. (*Tusc.* 2.41)

Gladiators, either the worst of men or barbarians – what blows they endure! How those who have been well-trained prefer to receive a blow than to shamefully avoid it! How often it is made clear that they prefer nothing more than to please their master or the people! Moreover, when they are finished off by wounds, they send to their masters to ask what they wish : if he [the master] is satisfied, he [the gladiator] is willing to lay down his life. What gladiator, even an undistinguished one, ever groaned aloud, what gladiator ever changed his expression? Who not only stood, but also fell shamefully? Who, when he had fallen, concealed his neck when ordered to receive the blow? So great is their discipline, consideration, and custom.

Cicero's remarks in both the *Pro Milone* and *Tusculanae Disputationes* thus demonstrate that, at the time of the *Histories*' composition, the image of the gladiator could be evoked as a good *exemplum*; they may have been *perditii homines*, but their *virtus* in battle should be imitated by Roman citizens, who have something even greater for which to fight : the *res publica*. The gladiator remained a useful figure for Roman authors into the imperial period, as well; for Seneca, the gladiator represented an ideal to which the Stoic *sapiens* should aspire.<sup>157</sup> The gladiator, he says, faces the inevitability of death with courage :

Mors enim admota etiam inperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia;  
sic gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et

<sup>157</sup> See Cagniat 2000 on the gladiator's role in the works of Seneca, and Parker 1998 on the phenomenon of slaves (more generally defined) as positive *exempla*.

errantem gladium sibi adtemperat. (*Ep.* 30.8)

For death, when it moves close, does give to even inexperienced men the spirit not to avoid the inevitable; so even the most timid gladiator in the whole fight offers his throat to his opponent and fits the wavering sword to himself.

Not only does the gladiator overcome his emotions to display *virtus* even at the moment of death, he even solicits challenges for the sake of greater glory:

Ignominiam iudicat gladiator cum inferiore componi et scit eum sine gloria uinci qui sine periculo uincitur. (*De prov.* 3.4)

The gladiator judges it to be a disgrace to be set against an inferior, and he knows that he who is conquered without danger is conquered without glory.

The gladiator, then, was sometimes held up by Roman authors as a positive *exemplum*, embodying discipline and bravery in the face of death.<sup>158</sup> On the other hand, the gladiator often served as a symbol of criminality or baseness; as Barton observes, “[t]he epithet 'gladiator' was used to brand an enemy as the most degraded or vicious of voluptuaries (48).” Despite his praise for elements of the gladiator-figure in the *Pro Milone* and *Tusculanae Disputationes* (cited above), Cicero particularly favored this use of “gladiator” as a slur in his invectives.<sup>159</sup> In Cicero's speeches, the term essentially becomes a synonym for “depraved criminal” :

erat ipse sceleratus, erat gladiator, cum scelerato tamen et cum pari gladiatore pugnabat (*In Pisonem* 28)

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<sup>158</sup> For more praise of gladiators in the imperial period, see also Pliny's *Pangyricus* 33.2.

<sup>159</sup> Antony is called a *furius gladiator* (*Phil.* 13.16) and a *gladiatorum dux* (*Phil.* 13.20); these passages are discussed in more detail in section 3.4 below.

He himself was a criminal, he was a gladiator, but he was fighting against someone who was as much of a gladiator and criminal as he was.

Quis tota Italia veneficus, quis gladiator, quis latro, quis sicarius, quis parricida, quis testamentorum subiecto, quis circumscriptor, quis ganeo, quis nepos, quis adulter, quae mulier infamis, quis corruptor iuventutis, quis corruptus, quis perditus inveniri potest qui se cum Catalina non familiarissime vixisse fateatur? (*In Cat.* 2.4.7)

In all Italy, what poisoner, what gladiator, what *latro*, what murderer, what parricide, what forger of wills, what cheater, what glutton, what spendthrift, what adulterer, what notorious woman, what corrupter of youth, what scoundrel, what base man can be found who would not claim to have been most familiar with Catiline?

Nemo est in ludo gladiatorio paulo ad facinus audacior qui se non intimum Catilinae esse fateatur (*In Cat.* 2.5.9)

There is no one in a gladiatorial school more eager for crime who does not confess that he is an intimate of Catiline.

This characterization of the gladiator persists in imperial sources, as well.<sup>160</sup> The gladiator was, then, a powerful but paradoxical figure in the Roman imagination. He appealed to their better natures as an example of courage in the face of hopeless odds and calm in the face of death; at the same time, he represented base criminality. The multiplicity of resonances made Spartacus a useful figure with which to think for Sallust; here, Sallust takes advantage of the gladiator's positive connotations, while simultaneously taking advantage of his negative connotations, as well. Sallust begins with a problematic figure – the runaway gladiator – and further complicates the “exemplum” by depicting him as morally ambiguous; Spartacus thus joins Sertorius in Sallust's cast of ambivalent *exempla*.

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<sup>160</sup> See, for example, Velleius Paterculus 2.91.3, Dio 74.2.1.



### 3.3 Fractured Power

According to sources based on Sallust's account the Spartacus War (specifically, Plutarch and Appian), the rebel forces underwent two major divisions, each preceding a decisive battle in which one of the rebel detachments was defeated by Roman forces. After the confrontation with Varinius in 73 BCE, the runaway slaves broke into two groups, the Germans and Gauls in a detachment under the leadership of Crixus and Oenomaus, and the rest led by Spartacus; the forces under Crixus and Oenomaus were routed by the Roman army under the praetor Quintus Arrius. Then, in late 72, after the death of Crixus, the remaining rebel slaves under Spartacus split again into two factions; a group following Caius Canicius and Castus, which was soundly defeated by Crassus, and a group which remained with Spartacus until the climactic confrontation with Crassus, in which Spartacus was killed. It thus appears that factionalism and internal discord plagued the rebel coalition throughout much of the war; what remains of Sallust's account supports this, as is discussed below. Rather than co-operating and strengthening their cause with a coalition of shared power, these ambitious individuals competed for primacy, which in turn led to division among their forces; while collectively the rebels posed a great challenge to the Roman army, they were more easily defeated once split into factions. This fracturing of an *ad hoc* coalition of power due to individual ambition and stubbornness in Sallust's *Histories* may have, for a contemporary audience, called to mind more recent Roman parallels; Sallust's generation had seen the failure of the so-called First Triumvirate, and, at the time of the *Histories'* composition, was living under a

dangerously tenuous coalition of power, the alliance between Lepidus, Antony, and Octavian, the instability of which constantly threatened to send Rome back into a state of open civil war.

At the beginning of the revolt, Spartacus and a Gaul named Crixus shared command of the rebel forces (Livy *Per.* 95); Appian (*BC* 1.116), Florus (2.8.20) and Orosius (5.24) name Oenomaus (like Crixus, a Gaul) as a third co-commander. According to Sallust, before the battle with Varinius (in late 73 BCE), the runaway slaves began to quarrel among themselves over the best course of action. Crixus and Spartacus were in conflict over tactics, with Crixus eager to rush into battle, while Spartacus seems to have recommended a more cautious course; the *discordia* apparently trickled down to their followers, as well.

3.96D M Atque illi certamine consilii inter se iuxta seditionem erant,  
Crixo et gentis eiusdem Gallis atque Germanis obviam ire et ultro  
<of>ferre pugnam cupientibus, contra Sparta<co>. . .

But they <the fugitives> were close to mutiny among themselves because of a dispute over the plan, with Crixus and the Gauls of his line and the Germans desiring to go directly and willingly offer battle; Spartacus, on the other hand. . .

Although the passage breaks off before Sallust's account of Spartacus' plan, we may infer from the *contra* that Spartacus did not support Crixus' eagerness for battle, and probably advised a less directly aggressive approach. Sallust is the only ancient source who narrates this debate in any detail.<sup>161</sup> Appian (*BC* 1.117) indicates that by early in 72 BCE, the rebel forces split into two factions, one under Spartacus and one under Crixus and

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<sup>161</sup> McGushin 1994, 118.

Oenomaus, but does not mention the reason for the split. Although it is not possible to be certain, we might interpret Sallust's emphasis on this argument as an indication that it was significant to the course of the war; the timing is such that it would not be unreasonable to assume that the discord depicted in M 3.96 led to the split early the next year. That split proved fatal to Crixus; he was killed, along with two-thirds of his army, when he was tracked down in the Garganus Mountains by the Roman legion under Quintus Arrius (Livy *Per.* 96, Appian *BC* 1.117).

In late republican literature, the term *seditio* often refer to a mutiny or uprising among troops (e.g., *BJ* 72.1, Caesar *BC* 1.87).<sup>162</sup> However, it can have stronger political connotations, denoting something more like civil disturbance, even civil war. Cicero uses *seditio* in this way :

ego vero Solonis, popularis tui et ut puto etiam mei, legem neglegam, qui capite sanxit si qui in seditione non alterius utrius partis fuisset (*ad Att.* 10.1.2)

I, indeed, will disregard the law of Solon (your fellow citizen and, as I suppose, mine), who decreed capital punishment if anyone in a civil conflict was not on either side.

In this letter from 49 BCE, Cicero is seeking Atticus' advice about how to align himself in the war between Caesar and Pompey. He compares the present situation to the civil conflicts mediated by Solon in the 6<sup>th</sup> century, calling those conflicts *seditiones*; this, in turn, characterizes the conflict between Caesar and Pompey as *seditio*.

In the speech of Caesar in the *BC*, Sallust uses *seditio* to refer to the murder of

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<sup>162</sup> *Seditio* is also used metaphorically in poetry, on occasion, to denote a quarrel (outside a military or political context); see, for example, Plautus, *Amphitryo* 1.2.16; Terence, *Andria* 5.1.11; Ovid, *Met.* 9.426.

senators by the anti-Sullan praetor Damasippus, and other similar and contemporary acts :

Nostra memoria victor Sulla cum Damasippum et alios eiusmodi, qui malo rei publicae creverant, iugulari iussit, quis non factum eius laudabat? Homines scelestos et factiosos, qui seditionibus rem publicam exagitaverant, merito necatos aiebant. (*BC* 51.32)

In our own memory, when the conqueror Sulla ordered Damasippus and others of his kind, who had grown powerful to the detriment of the state, to be executed, who did not praise his action? They said that those criminal and seditious men, who had harassed state with civil disturbances, were appropriately killed.

More than just criminal violence, Damasippus' actions were openly political. His victims were pro-Sullan senators, singled out because of their support of the invading general; moreover, Damasippus' violence is characterized as a direct threat to the stability of the *res publica*. Similarly, in the *BJ*, the disruption caused by the tribunes Lucullus and Annius, who disrupted the elections of 110 BCE in an attempt to prolong their term of office, is referred to as *seditio* and identified as a threat to the *res publica* (*ea tempestate Romae seditionibus tribunicis atrociter res publica agitabatur*, “At that time, the state of Rome was being violently disturbed by the sedition of the tribunes,” *BJ* 37.1). In the prologue of the *Histories*, Sallust seems to link *seditio* quite closely with civil war :

1.12 M Postquam remoto metu Punico simultates exercere vacuum fuit, plurimae turbae, seditiones et ad postremum bella civilia orta sunt. . .

Later, when the Punic threat was removed, there was an opening for them to cultivate disputes, there were many riots, civil disturbances, and, at last, civil wars arose.

Here, *seditio* appears to be the immediate predecessor of *bella civilia*, the final step in the breakdown of the *res publica* before the outbreak of open civil war. Sallust uses *seditio* in a similar way in the speech of Philippus, setting it in opposition to *pax* :

1.77.7 M . . . et ad eum concurrere homines omnium ordinum corruptissimi, flagrant inopia et cupidinibus, scelus conscientia exagitati, quibus quies in seditionibus, in pace turbae sunt.

. . . and the most corrupt men of all ranks rushed to him, inflamed by poverty and desires, disturbed by the consciousness of crimes, to whom there was contentment in civil discord, unrest in peace.

In the *Histories*, then, *seditio* can imply something more than riot or mutiny; it can refer, more specifically, to the sort of civil conflict that threatened to bring down the *res publica*. In light of this, the discordant leaders of the slave rebellion look more like competing Roman politicians, or even leaders of rival factions in civil war; their conflict seems to be depicted as one of the series of civil conflicts that disrupted Rome in the 70s BCE.

Sallust's use of *seditio* here may be relevant to his resistance to Cicero and Ciceronian historiography, as well. Cicero, citing the expulsion of the kings and establishment of the tribunate, claimed that *seditiones* were necessary for the vitality and evolution of the republic (here, in the voice of Antonius):

Omnium seditionum genera, vitia, pericula collegi, eamque orationem ex omni rei publicae nostrae temporum varietate repetivi, conclusique ita, ut dicerem, etsi omnes semper molestae seditiones fuissent, iustas tamen fuisse non nullas et prope necessarias (*De Or.* 2.199)

I summed up all the types of *seditio*, their defects and dangers, and I derived that argument from every change of fortune in the history of our

republic, and I concluded thus, as I shall explain, that even though *seditiones* were always troublesome, some had been just and ultimately necessary.

Cicero's Antonius continues to defend the role of *seditio* as critical to the health and dynamism of the state; he cites, for example, the expulsion of the kings and the civil strife which led to the establishment of the tribunate as instances of “productive” *seditio*, discord which was the forebear of necessary change. For Sallust, however, this notion of *seditio* does not obtain. As the passages from the *Histories* cited above suggest (especially 1.12 M), Sallust viewed *seditio* as one of the steps of political decay, leading directly to *bella civilia*. In the *Histories*, Sallust uses the slave revolt to model this process of decay by analogy, depicting the slave revolt as fractured and failing due to the same causes which had fractured the Roman state.

After Crixus' death, the remaining forces did not remain united for long. By the time Crassus caught up with the runaway slaves in Lucania, a group of Spartacus' followers had broken away under the leadership of Gaius Gannicius and Castus (*Crass.* 11.1-2). Maurenbrecher's assignment of Fragment 4.37 to this section of the narrative suggests that this split was, like the split with Crixus and Oenomaus, due to a quarrel between the leaders :

4.37 M Dissidere inter se coepere neque in medium consultare.

They began to be divided among themselves and did not deliberate together.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> This fragment is transmitted with book number by Arusinius as an example of the use of *in medium* as a synonym for *in commune*; he cites this passage of Sallust as a parallel for *Georgics* 1.127 (*in medium quaerebant*) and 4.157 (*et in medium quaesita reponunt*).

Maurenbrecher assigned this fragment to the final stage of the Spartacan War based on reference to a quarrel in the parallel passage in Plutarch's *Life of Crassus* :

Ἐφοβήθη μὲν οὖν ὁ Κράσσοις, μὴ λάβοι τις ὁρμὴ τὸν Σπάρτακον ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην ἐλαύνειν, ἐθάρρησε δὲ πολλῶν ἐκ διαφορᾶς ἀποστάντων αὐτοῦ καὶ στρατοπεδευσασμένων καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Λευκανίδος λίμνης (*Crass.* 11.1)

Crassus was now in fear lest some impulse to march upon Rome should seize Spartacus, but was emboldened when many [of Spartacus' men] revolted after a quarrel with him, and encamped by themselves next to a Lucanian lake.

That the rebel forces split before the final confrontation is also confirmed by the epitome of Livy's Book 97 (cited above in section 3.2). This, in addition to the transmitted book number and similarity with the Plutarch passage, suggests that Maurenbrecher correctly assigned this fragment to the end of Spartacus War. Syme, however, conjectured that the passage in fact refers to conflict between Pompey and Crassus during their joint consulship in 70 BCE, citing Plutarch's references to the strained relationship between the consuls in *Life of Crassus* (12) and *Life of Pompey* (22). The verbal parallels between the fragment and Plutarch's account of the Spartacus quarrel are much more slight than in other passages in which Plutarch follows Sallust (for example, M 3.91 and *Crassus* 8.2); Syme's argument is, however, no stronger in this respect. If we accept Maurenbrecher's assignment, the passage becomes more complicated. Sallust uses *consulto* infrequently, preferring *consulo* (five uses in the monographs and *Histories* compared with 33); when he does use *consulto*, however, it exclusively refers to Romans (e.g., *delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapientia validum erat, rei publicae consultabant*, “The

chosen ones, to whom the body was weak with age but the spirit was strong in wisdom, deliberated about the republic,” *BC* 6.6; “*Res autem monet cavere ab illis magis quam quid in illos statuamus consultare*,” “‘The affair warns us, moreover, to guard against them rather than deliberate about what we should decide about them’,” *BC* 52.3). Sallust's audience would have taken note of this use of the verb to describe the deliberations of runaway slaves.

This applies to Sallust's use of the verb *dissidere* here, as well. Like both *seditio* and *consulto*, *dissideo* can have strong political connotations. This is the only use of *dissidere* in the extant Sallustian corpus, but in contemporary literature, *dissidere*, like *consulto*, belonged to the deliberative sphere<sup>164</sup>; Cicero frequently uses it to describe public quarrels or disagreements (e.g., *De Leg.* 3.35, *Har. Resp.* 54, *In Pisonem* 81).<sup>165</sup> It is striking, then, to see a Roman author apply this term to the behavior of runaway gladiators, but as with *consultare*, this is exactly what Sallust has done.

Republican authors also used *dissidere* to describe political dissent more specifically, in addition to describing a more general difference of opinion. Cicero, for example, in a letter to Atticus from 50 BCE, uses *dissidere* to describe the act of publicly disagreeing with Pompey (*sed rursus hoc permagnum rei publicae malum est et quodam modo mihi praeter ceteros non rectum me in tantis rebus a Pompeio dissidere*, “But, again, it is a very great evil toward the republic, and it is not right, perhaps especially in my case more than in others’, that I separate from Pompey in such matters,” *Att.* 7.6.2). In Cicero's formulation here, to disagree (*dissidere*) with Pompey would be a threat to the

<sup>164</sup> *Dissidere* = sitting (*sedere*) away from (*dis-*); this usage is probably derived from the practice of sitting in the *curia* apart from opponents and with one's allies.

<sup>165</sup> TLL Vol. V.1, 1466.



*res publica* (*permagnum rei publicae malum*); *dissidere*, then, implies a very serious break. In the *Pro Sestio*, Cicero shudders to think what would happen if he had been killed and was unable to protect the republic (*ad arma vocassent, qui ne vestitu quidem defendi rem publicam sissent; a tribuno plebis post interitum dissedissent, qui eandem horam meae pestis et suorum praemiorum esse voluisset*, “They call men to arms who would allow the republic to go undefended, not even by a change of garment; they would have revolted from the tribune of the plebs after my death, those men who wished the hour of my destruction and their reward to be the same,” *Pro Sest.* 44). Once again, Cicero associates the type of dissent denoted by *dissidere* with a threat to the *res publica*; the sort of men who would revolt against the tribune were the sort of men who would fail to guard the state.

Thus, if 4.37 has been correctly assigned to the Spartacus war, Sallust portrays the leaders of the rebellion as if they were Roman politicians (*consultare* and *dissidere*) and as if their internal division were tantamount to a civil war (*dissidere*). It was not unreasonable for Syme to assign this fragment to the contentious joint consulship of Pompey and Crassus; if the vocabulary is consistent with that typically used to describe Roman politics. As I have argued in this chapter, however, Sallust's depiction of Spartacus and the Spartacus War is in no way “typical”; the application of Roman political vocabulary to the slave revolt is exactly the point. If, then, we accept Maurenbrecher's assignment of the fragment, Sallust's account of the Spartacus revolt seems to illustrate the risks of shared power and call to mind on the contemporary political situation at Rome. Infighting twice caused a division in the rebel forces; twice

that division led to the defeat of one of the detachments by Roman forces. It is, of course, impossible to know what the course of the war would have been if Crixus, Oenomaus, and the Gauls and Germans had not split off from Spartacus and his followers, but it is worth noting that before the split, the combined rebel forces had managed to stymie the Roman army for over a year. Just as the triumvirs had initially banded together against the “Republicans,” the leaders of the slave revolt had formed an uneasy *de facto* alliance against the Romans, but were driven apart by their conflicting interests. The *discordia* among Sallust's slave leaders suggests that shared power is doomed, as the entire power structure will break down as factions break off.

The audience of Sallust's *Histories* was not unfamiliar with the risks of shared power. Less than a generation earlier, Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar had joined forces to form an informal coalition; the three men served as the *de facto* joint rulers of Rome after 59 BCE, even though the alliance was never confirmed *de jure*. The alliance was uncertain from the beginning. Crassus and Pompey were old rivals. In 71, after finishing off the Sertorian War, Pompey had hurried back to Italy to attempt to claim a share of the suppression of the Spartacus revolt. Crassus managed to subdue Spartacus before Pompey arrived (although Pompey captured a large group of stragglers), but, as the victor in a servile war, was only eligible for an *ovatio*, while Pompey enjoyed a triumph for his victory over Sertorius (Plut. *Crass.* 11.8); the rivalry grew more fierce from there. The period of the *Histories'* composition was also marked by constant strife between the triumvirs (and Sextus Pompey); although the triumvirate was ostensibly a coalition of shared power, in reality it was an alliance in name only, as each of its members

continually worked against the others to his own advantage. Similarly, the leaders of the slave revolt cooperated only as long as it served the interests of each individual; as soon as they advocated opposing tactics, the leaders abandoned their alliance and pursued their own paths. As Dio observed in his account of the Treaty of Brundisium, such is the nature of power in times of civil unrest :

τοσοῦτος μὲν δὴ καὶ τῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν πολέμων παράλογός ἐστι, δίκη μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν τὰ πράγματα ἔχόντων νομιζόντων, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὰς τε ἀεὶ χρείας καὶ τὰ συμφέροντά σφων τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον ἐξεταζόντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοτὲ μὲν ἐχθροὺς τοτὲ δὲ ἐπιτηδείους σφίσι πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἡγουμένων. (48.29.3)

So great is the paradox of stasis and war; those in charge do not think at all about justice, but consider what is friendly or hostile based on the need of the moment and what is to their advantage, and because of this they consider the same men now to be enemies, now to be friends, as suits the present moment.

Sallust's portrayal of Spartacus and the other rebel leaders, then, may be read as a reflection of contemporary anxieties about the stability (or lack thereof) of the ruling triumvirate. If Sallust's gladiators resemble both triumvirates, discordant and tense coalitions whose breakdown led to civil war, the period of the Spartacus revolt also begins to look like a civil war. This, of course, flies in the face of the efforts of those in power during the 70s, who tried to create the illusion that, with the Sullan civil war in the past, the republic was once again stable and prosperous. After Sulla's "retirement" and death, Lepidus attempted to dismantle the Sullan structure; by moving for the restoration of tribunician powers, the re-enrollment of *equites* in juries, and the repeal of other Sullan acts, Lepidus tried to erase (or at least obscure) Rome's recent past and create the

impression of order restored. However, the 70s were clearly not the decade of peace Lepidus and his colleagues wished to portray them as; Rome was troubled from inside and out, with Mithridates, Sertorius, Spartacus, Catulus and even Lepidus himself staging conflicts which distracted and weakened the state.

Why use the Spartacus revolt, in particular, to illustrate this point? The historical realities of the revolt lend themselves well to Sallust's argument; if, indeed, there really were co-leaders of the revolt, and if the forces split into factions because of the quarrels of those leaders, the similarities between the breakdown of power among the rebels and the breakdown of power among the triumvirs would recommend this episode as a useful comparandum. The choice may be even more pointed, however. The Spartacus revolt was the origin of the long and fierce rivalry between Crassus and Pompey, a rivalry which contributed to the volatility of the "First Triumvirate."

### **3.4 *Latrones***

In this section, I examine Sallust's portrayal of Spartacus and his followers as *latrones*, and demonstrate how this echoes invective and propaganda of the triumviral period, particularly by Cicero against Marcus Antonius in the *Philippics* and by Octavian against Sextus Pompey during their conflict in the early 30s. Although most literally, *latro* is the Latin term for "robber" or "bandit", the label took on a variety of connotations in Roman literature. Surveying the use of *latro* and depictions of *latrones* by Roman writers from the Republic to late antiquity, Grünewald articulated two systems of classifying *latrones*. Categorized according to "what they did," bandits can be divided

into four types : “real bandits”, apolitical violent criminals; “bandit rebels” with political or social motives, including guerillas and leaders of slave rebellions; “bandit rivals,” illegitimate rulers and usurpers; and “bandit avengers,” who tried to gain power through the pretense of avenging the wronged. Categorized according to “how they were seen,” bandits fall under one of two types : the “common bandit,” motivated by love of gain and violence, and the “noble bandit,” motived by love of justice, *vel sim.*<sup>166</sup> We need not accept Grünewald's precise delineation of categories in order to see that they suggest the wide range of possible associations evoked by *latro* and related words. With that being said, it is important to establish here that in this section I am engaged more with the *latro* as a rhetorical and literary *topos* than with the historical phenomenon of banditry; this approach is informed by previous scholarship (for example, van Hoof 1988 and Parker 1988) in which *latrones* are treated as a literary device.

### 3.4.1 Catiline

*Latro* was one of Cicero's favorite terms of political abuse, applied in various contexts to opponents including Clodius, Catiline, Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and Octavian. With this epithet, Cicero attempted to paint his enemies as impoverished, violent, and morally deficient, as criminals who had surrounded themselves by “robber-bands” of cronies. The term also carried with it an accusation of illegitimacy or illegality. Of all the figures cited above, Catiline and Mark Antony were most frequently called *latrones* by Cicero. The question of Cicero's influence on Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* has

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<sup>166</sup> Grünewald 2004, 162.

been widely debated, and generally falls beyond the scope of this dissertation<sup>167</sup>; here, I focus in particular on Sallust's reaction to Cicero's depiction of Catiline as a *latro*. The identification of Catiline as a bandit is central to Cicero's presentation of the conspiracy, yet it is entirely absent from Sallust's account of the same events. This, I argue, is an early manifestation of the larger-scale resistance to Cicero and Ciceronian historiography enacted in the *Histories*.

A basic function of the term *latro* in Cicero's usage is to suggest Catiline's general moral turpitude<sup>168</sup> :

Quis tota Italia veneficus, quis gladiator, quis latro, quis sicarius, quis parricida, quis testamentorum subiecto, quis circumscriptor, quis ganeo, quis nepos, quis adulter, quae mulier infamis, quis corruptor iuventutis, quis corruptus, quis perditus inveniri potest qui se cum Catilina non familiarissime vixisse fateatur? (*In Cat.* 2.7)

In all Italy, what poisoner, what gladiator, what *latro*, what murderer, what parricide, what forger of wills, what cheater, what glutton, what spendthrift, what adulterer, what notorious woman, what corrupter of youth, what scoundrel, what base man can be found who would not claim to have been most familiar with Catiline?

Here, Cicero's accusation that Catiline is on familiar terms with *latrones* suggests that Catiline himself should be included among their number; by equating Catiline with a *latro*, as well as with a number of other morally degenerate characters, Cicero here calls attention to his opponent's corrupt nature. Cicero calls Catiline a *latro* again in the same speech, here to emphasize his desperate financial circumstances :

<sup>167</sup> I agree with those who, like Batstone 2010, perceive Sallust's resistance to Cicero in his account of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Others (with Waters 1970 representing the most extreme view) argue that Sallust generally adopted Cicero's self-representation. Syme 1964 is particularly convinced of Sallust's excessive "credulity." For more detailed discussions of the *BC* and Cicero, see Broughton 1936, Ramsey 1984, Drummond 1995.

<sup>168</sup> See parallel usage of *latro* and/or *latrocinium* at *In Cat.* 1.23, 2.16, 2.22.

Neque ego ceteras copias, ornamenta, praesidia vestra cum illius latronis inopia atque egestate conferre debeo (*In Cat.* 2.24)

And I ought not compare the rest of your troops, equipment, and guards with the lack and poverty of that *latro*.

By calling attention to Catiline's poverty, Cicero implies that greed and selfish desire for gain are his opponent's primary motivations; as Grünewald observes, this is characteristic of *latrones*. For Cicero, this was a particularly useful attack, in light of Catiline's economic platform; Catiline had gained popularity with his proposed policy of *tabulae novae*, a policy which, in the eyes of Cicero and the senate, amounted to little more than robbery.

Another aspect of the *latro* highlighted by Cicero in his characterization of Catiline as such is the tendency toward gang violence. Catiline, like a *latro*, had surrounded himself with a gang of like-minded, equally degenerate thugs<sup>169</sup> :

. . .hunc et huius socios a tuis ceterisque templis, a tectis urbis ac moenibus, a vita fortunisque civium omnium arcebis et homines bonorum inimicos, hostis patriae, latrones Italiae scelerum foedere inter se ac nefaria societate coniunctos aeternis suppliciis vivos mortuosque mactabis. (*In Cat.* 1.33)

. . .and you [Jupiter] will drive off this man and his allies from your temples and others, from the buildings and walls of the city, from the life and fate of all the citizens, and you will torment, dead or alive, with eternal punishments those who are hostile toward good men, the enemies of the state, *latrones* of Italy bound together by the pact and nefarious alliance of crime.

Greed, moral turpitude, and the tendency toward gang association are fairly standard

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<sup>169</sup> Parallels at *In Cat.* 1.31, 3.17.

accusations in political rhetoric; Cicero had numerous terms of abuse at his disposal which would have conveyed his point. *Latro*, however, has more specific political connotations (as expressed by Grünewald with the categories of “bandit rebels” and “bandit rivals”<sup>170</sup>). In particular, Cicero calls Catiline a *latro* to emphasize the illegitimacy of Catiline's uprising<sup>171</sup> :

Tantum profeci, cum te a consulatu reppuli, ut exsul potius temptare quam consul vexare rem publicam posses, atque ut id quod esset a te scelerate susceptum latrocinium potius quam bellum nominaretur. (*In Cat.* 1.27)

I accomplished so much, when I barred you from the consulship, that only as an exile, rather than a consul, were you able to trouble the republic, and that that which was criminally undertaken by you was called banditry rather than war.

As Grünewald argues, the fundamental difference between the *hostis* and the *latro* is legal legitimacy : “The exclusive characteristic of the *hostis* is his capacity to make a declaration of war that is valid under international law. By contrast, all other enemies of the state are *latrones* or, synonymously, *praedones* (16).”<sup>172</sup> If Catiline were a true *hostis* rather than a mere *latro*, his rebellion could be considered a legitimate *bellum*; Cicero belittles his opponent by dismissing the conflict as a *latrocinium*. Calling the Catilinarian conspiracy a *latrocinium* still allowed Cicero to claim the role of the defender of the state

<sup>170</sup> Grünewald 2004, 162.

<sup>171</sup> Parallel usage at *In Cat.* 2.1. See also Cicero's characterization of Julius Caesar as a *latro* at *ad Att.* 7.18.2.

<sup>172</sup> This is consistent with the Roman legal classification of *latrones*, at least according to Pomponius : “*Hostes* are either those who have officially declared war on us, or those on whom we have declared war; the rest are *latrones* or *praedones* (*'hostes' hi sunt, qui nobis aut quibus nos publice bellum decrevimus : ceteri 'latrones' aut 'praedones' sunt*, Dig. 50.16.118).” See also Mommsen 1955, who argues that the distinction between *latrones* and *hostes* is that *hostes* have political standing (“*Latrones*. . .sind die waffenführenden in Truppen vereinigten Banditen, von den *hostes* nur politisch verschieden,” 629 n 4). See also Shaw 1984 on the political standing and legitimacy (or lack thereof) of *latrones* in the empire.



(whatever their legal classification, *latrones* still had the potential to harm and drain the resources of the *res publica*) while at the same time stripping Catiline of political legitimacy and framing his revolt as the act of common criminals rather than an organized political uprising.

Sallust, however, never refers to Catiline as a *latro*, nor to his conspiracy as a *latrocinium*. Instead, he refers to the conflict with Catiline as a *bellum* (e.g., *BC* 26.5, 27.4). A full interpretation of this discrepancy between Sallust and Cicero's portrayals of the Catilinarian revolt is beyond the scope of this project, but the important point here is that Sallust seems to have zeroed in on Cicero's representation of Catiline as a *latro*. This depiction of Catiline is a definitive component of Cicero's representation of the revolt. In his account of the conspiracy, however, Sallust willfully avoids this terminology and characterization.

### 3.4.2 *Latrones in the Histories*

Although Sallust does not explicitly call the rebelling slaves *latrones* in the extant passages of his account of the revolt, the slaves are clearly portrayed as such in the *Histories*; eager for profit and violence, they reject Spartacus' discipline and strategy and run wild in Campania, raping and plundering their way through the countryside. A passage from the Vatican fragment shows the slaves behaving like typical bandits :

3.98 C M Ac statim fugitivi co<n>tra praeceptum ducis rapere ad stuprum virg<i>nes matr<ona>sque et alii c (*desunt duo versus*). . . .  
<n>unc restantes et eludebant, simul nefandum in modum perverso volnere, et interdum lacerum corpus semianimum omittentes; alii in tecta iaciebant ignis multique ex loco servi, quos ingenium socios dabat,

abditā a dominis aut ipsos trahebant ex occulto : neque sanctum aut nefandum quicquam fuit irae barbarorum et servili ingenio.

And straightaway the rebels, contrary to the order of their leader, raped the young girls and women, and some. . . now they were mocking those who were resisting, at once with wounds from behind in unspeakable fashion, sometimes leaving behind a half-dead, mutilated body; others were setting fire to buildings, and many slaves from that place, whom spirit was making allies, were dragging forth things hidden by their masters, or their masters themselves out of hiding : nothing was sacred or unspeakable for the anger of the barbarians and their servile nature.

Here, the rebels display characteristic traits of *latrones* : violence, obviously, but also a resistance to established authority (here in the person of Spartacus). Sallust also underscores their barbaric nature and low status by pointing out their *ira barbarorum* and *servile ingenium*. In addition to attacking towns, as described in 3.98, the runaways also attacked farmers trying to protect their plots :

3.97 M Incidere in colonos Abellanos praesidentis agros suos

They attacked Abellan farmers who were standing guard over their own fields.

This passage is preserved by Arusianus (p. 498 K VII) to illustrate the use of *praesidere* with an accusative object (more on this below). Out of context, it is difficult to know why Sallust singled out the gladiators' attack on the Abellan farmers in particular, and later authors do not give much help, since this particular episode is glossed over in the accounts derived from his; Plutarch, for example, does not single out any particular location in his account of the gladiators' rampage, for which he probably relied on Sallust as a source (*Crassus* 9.4-6). In the context of the triumviral period, however, a reference

to Campanian farmers facing plunder must have evoked the memory of the land appropriations of the late 40s. From this perspective, effect of the runaway soldiers' rampage was like that of the triumvirs' land confiscations; local landowners were violently driven from their properties.

Furthermore, Sallust's use of *praesidere* here is peculiar, and may reveal more about the author's association of the slave revolt and the civil disturbances of the triumviral period. Although *praesidere* most often takes a dative object, Sallust uses it here with the accusative; this construction is peculiar and rare enough that Sallust's reader would surely have taken notice of the sentence.<sup>173</sup> Not only does Sallust use *praesidere* in a syntactically strange way, however, he also seems to be using it in a semantically strange way, as well. *Praesidere* most commonly describes the actions of magistrates, priests, or even gods; it is also frequently used in a military context to describe the actions of soldiers or commanders.<sup>174</sup> Sallust, in fact, uses it this way in the *Histories* :

2.94 M Titurium legatum cum cohortibus quindecim in Celtiberia  
hiemem agere iussit praesidentem socios

He ordered the legate Titurius to spend the winter with fifteen cohorts in  
Celtiberia, guarding over their allies.

If *praesidentis* in 3.97 is read the same way, these Abellan farmers now appear more like military officers or soldiers in a garrison than like rustics protecting their country estates; the rebel slaves appear more like an attacking army than like rampaging barbarians.

Again, Sallust's slave revolt looks a lot like civil war. This is characteristic Sallustian

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<sup>173</sup> TLL vol. X, 2 Fasc. VI, 882, 30-34.

<sup>174</sup> TLL vol. X, 2 Fasc. VI, 878, 60ff.

interpretive complexity and ambiguity : the attacking gladiators are at once *latrones* and soldiers, and the attack is at once a *latrocinium* and a *bellum civile*.

### 3.4.3 Mark Antony

As was mentioned above, in the late Republic, the term *latro* was closely associated with Mark Antony, thanks to Cicero's frequent, near-obsessive use of the term to describe his political arch-nemesis; this association probably continued into at least the early triumviral period. As he had with Catiline, Cicero invoked the image of the *latro* to portray Antony as a violent and greedy criminal acting on behalf of an illegitimate cause.

Cicero depicts Antony as a *latro* to contribute to his portrait of the future triumvir as morally degenerate :

sed, si illa tulimus quae nos necessitas ferre coegit, quae vis quaedam paene fatalis – quae tamen ipsa non tulimus – etiamne huius impuri latronis feremus taeterrimum crudelissimumque dominatum? (*Phil.* 3.29)

But, if we endured those things which necessity compelled us to endure, which some nearly deadly force – the very things which, nevertheless, we did not endure – now are we to endure the most foul and savage rule of this filthy *latro*?

semper eum duo dissimilia genera tenuerunt, lenonum et latronum; ita domesticis stupris, forensibus parricidiis delectatur ut mulieri citius avarissimae paruerit quam senatui populoque Romano. (*Phil.* 6.4)

Two very different types of men have always claimed him, pimps and bandits; he is so delighted by domestic scandals and public murders that he would have sooner obeyed the most covetous woman than the senate and the Roman people.

Furthermore, as in the case of Catiline, Cicero refers to Antony and his followers as

*latrones* to suggest Antony's lack of legitimate claim to power; Antony may have technically been consul, but Cicero refused to acknowledge him as such :

negat hoc D. Brutus imperator, consul designatus, natus rei publicae civis; negat Gallia, negat cuncta Italia, negat senatus, negatis vos. Quis illum igitur consulem nisi latrones putant? (*Phil.* 4.9)

The emperor Decimus Brutus, consul designate, citizen born of the republic, denies this; Gaul denies it, all Italy denies it, the senate denies it, you all deny it. Who, then, except for his *latrones*, considers this man the consul?

It is worth noting, however, that although Cicero is at pains to downplay the legitimacy of Antony's consulship and deny that he has any legal claim to power at all, unlike the conflict with Catiline,<sup>175</sup> the conflict with Antony is referred to as a *bellum* :

bellum inexpiabile infert quattuor consulibus unus omnium latronum taeterrimus; gerit idem bellum cum senatu populoque Romano; omnibus – quamquam ruit ipse suis cladibus – pestem, vastitatem, cruciatum, tormenta denuntiat. (*Phil.* 14.8)

One man, the most foul of all *latrones*, wages an unforgivable war against four consuls; he wages this same war with the senate and Roman people – he threatens disease, destruction, torture, and torment against everyone, although he himself rushes headlong into his own destruction.

Antony is also frequently called a *hostis* as well as a *latro* (e.g., *Phil.* 3.6, 13.21). This may suggest that Cicero saw Antony as a more urgent threat to the *res publica* than Catiline had been; as consul, Antony was, perhaps, in a position to do greater damage than a band of conspirators.

Antony, then, had been so skillfully painted as a *latro* by Cicero in the last months

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<sup>175</sup> See *In Cat.* 1.27 above.

of the republic that the association most probably persisted into the early years of the triumvirate. Sallust's depiction of the rebelling slaves in the *Histories* might have thus evoked the triumvir in the eyes of a contemporary audience, who may have seen allusions to Antony (and, more specifically, to Cicero's portrait of Antony) in this greedy, violent band of *latrones*. By the time of the *Histories'* composition, however, the triumvir had also come to be associated, again mainly due to Cicero, with Spartacus himself (although not the tragic, noble character scholars have insisted Sallust created). Cicero calls Antony a *furiosus gladiator* :

unus furiosus gladiator cum taeterrimorum latronum manu contra patriam, contra deos penatis, contra aras et focos, contra quattuor consules gerit bellum (*Phil.* 13.16)

One raging gladiator with a band of most foul *latrones* wages war against the country, against the household gods, against the altars and hearths, against four consuls.

Cicero could not have been oblivious to the fact that, just a generation before, Rome had sent four consuls against another *furiosus gladiator*; the consuls Gellius and Lentulus had been dispatched against Spartacus with their legions before Crassus and Pompey concluded the war. In the same speech, Antony is a *gladiatorum dux* :

tum me – testor et vos et populum Romanum et omnis deos qui huic urbi praesident – invito et repugnante legati missi tres consulares ad latronum et gladiatorum ducem (*Phil.* 13.20)

. . .at that time – I call you all, and the Roman people, and all the gods who watch over this city, as witnesses – although I was unwilling and resisting, three men of consular rank were sent as legates to that *latro*, that king of gladiators.

These references, from the perspective of Cicero's audience in 43, would surely recall the figure of Spartacus from just a generation earlier. We have no evidence that the picture of the noble-but-doomed resistance hero which took hold in later generations (for example, Plutarch's depiction of Spartacus in the *Life of Crassus*) had yet been fashioned at this time. Cicero intended, rather, to evoke Spartacus as the barbarian slave and criminal who had managed to tie up the Roman state in a violent, extended conflict; the comparison is meant to degrade. In case his meaning is not made clear enough by, for example, *gladiatorum dux*, Cicero dispenses with allusion in the Fourth and Thirteenth *Philippics* and explicitly calls Antony another Spartacus :

Est igitur, Quirites, populo Romano victori omnium gentium omne certamen cum percussore, cum latrone, cum Spartaco (*Phil.* 4.15)

Citizens, the whole struggle for the Roman people, victorious over all nations, is therefore with an assassin, a *latro*, a Spartacus.

O Spartace! Quem enim te potius appellem, cuius propter nefanda scelera tolerabilis videtur fuisse Catilina? (*Phil.* 13.22)

O, Spartacus! For what should I rather call you, because of whose unspeakable crimes Catiline now seems to have been tolerable?

It is possible, then, to find echoes of Antony throughout Sallust's account of the slave revolt, not only among the seditious slaves, but in Spartacus, as well. Furthermore, Sallust seems to be echoing Cicero's version of Antony, in particular. While Sallust's account of the Spartacus revolt evokes Cicero's depiction of Antony as a *gladiatorum dux*, however, it also challenges this characterization. Sallust's Spartacus, as I demonstrated in section 3.2, defies the sort of simple categorization employed by Cicero;

like the other primary figures of the *Histories*, he is too ambiguous to be a villain like Cicero's Antony. Sallust's Spartacus was not the one-note villain Cicero meant to evoke. The Spartacus of the *Histories* may have reminded Sallust's audience of Antony, but the historian's version complicates the definition of a "Spartacus".

#### 3.4.4 Sextus Pompey

Later in the triumviral period, the image of the *latro* would be invoked yet again in a political conflict, this time by a triumvir. Although he remains a relatively obscure character in the literary sources compared with, for example, Mark Antony or Octavian, Sextus Pompey was a major political and military figure during the early years of the triumviral period, probably posing a greater danger to Octavian than Antony did; before Actium, Octavian and Agrippa's defeat of the son of Pompey Magnus was the most significant military achievement of the triumvir's career (besides his participation, however limited, in the victory over Brutus and Cassius).<sup>176</sup> One possible reason such a major player in the triumviral period managed to remain so shadowy in the literary sources is Sextus' relative unsuitability as a target for Octavian's propaganda. Although Octavian was somewhat successful portraying Sextus as a *praedo* or *latro*, his campaign against Sextus' public image was less effective than his efforts against Antony. While Antony's association with Cleopatra and the eastern provinces made it easy for Octavian to paint him as a foreign enemy (or portray him as rejecting proper Roman values), it was difficult to accuse Sextus of the same; the fact that some of Sextus' commanders were

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<sup>176</sup> Sextus Pompey has remained elusive in the secondary literature, as well, although Powell and Welch 2002 provides a wide-ranging collection of essays addressing Sextus' roles as both a historical actor and a literary figure. This volume is a vast improvement on Hadas' 1966 biography as the most comprehensive source on Sextus.



Greek freedmen was obscured, at least in the eyes of the Roman people, by his family name.

In his war against Sextus in the early 30s, lacking recourse to charges of “un-Roman” values, Octavian opted to portray Sextus as a bandit or pirate, perhaps a particular insult to the son of the man who had cleared the sea of *latrones* in 67; as is discussed below, Sextus' behavior during this period made the charge appropriate. In his *Res Gestae*, Augustus boasts that *he* cleared the sea of pirates, a claim that probably refers to his victory over Sextus<sup>177</sup> :

Mare pacavi a praedonibus. Eo bello servorum qui fugerant a dominis suis et arma contra rem publicam ceperant, triginta fere millia capta dominis ad supplicium sumendum tradidi. (*RGDA* 25)

I pacified the sea from pirates. During that war, of the slaves who fled their masters and took up arms against the republic, I sent nearly thirty thousand who had been captured back to their masters for punishment.

Although this document is far too late for Sallust to have had access to it, it is probable that Octavian employed the same image during the years of his campaign against Sextus<sup>178</sup>; portraying Sextus as a *praedo* would have been a convenient method of de-emphasizing his “Roman-ness” and thus downplaying the internecine nature of their

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<sup>177</sup> Scholarly consensus, at any rate, is that Sextus is the main *praedo* targeted by Augustus in this passage. This identification is supported by the mention of *servi*; The crew of Sextus' fleet notoriously included runaway and ex-slaves. This identification also creates a neat symmetry with the second half of section 25, which addresses Augustus' victory over Mark Antony; the victories against Sextus and Antony mark the beginning and culmination of Octavian's ascent to sole power. For recent discussion of the *RGDA*, see Cooley 2009.

<sup>178</sup> At the very least, Octavian portrayed himself after Naulochus as the conqueror of the sea. The senate dedicated a golden statue of Octavian on top of a column covered with the beaks of ships (Appian, *BC* 5.130); Octavian issued coinage featuring the image of the monument (*RIC* I 60 no. 271). Another issue from shortly after Naulochus depicts the nude Octavian triumphantly clutching the stern of a captured ship and resting his foot on a globe, representing his domination of both land and sea (*RRC* 511.3). See Osgood 2006, 300 and Zanker 1988, 39-42.

conflict. Although *praedones* are somewhat different from *latrones*,<sup>179</sup> they both belong to the same villainous sphere; both are obviously violent and profit-driven, and both rely on crews or criminal cohorts. Also, like *latro*, in the context of political invective, the term *praedo* serves to strip its target of its claim to legitimacy.<sup>180</sup>

Livy's books on the triumviral period are also too late to have been available to Sallust, but near enough to contemporary that they may still reflect discussions and ideas of the triumviral period. The *periochae* of the relevant years suggest that Livy's portrayal of Sextus was in line with Augustus' characterization. For example, on Book 128 :

Cum Sex. Pompeius rursus latrociniiis mare infestum redderet nec pacem quam acceperat praestaret, Caesar necessario adversus eum bello suscepto duobus navalibus proeliis cum dubio eventu pugnavit. (*Per.* 128)

When Sextus Pompey, through brigandage, had returned the sea to a dangerous state, and did not uphold the peace to which he had agreed, Caesar, when the war against him [Sextus] had been undertaken out of necessity, fought in two naval battles with unclear outcome.

In Livy's account, then, Sextus appears to have been portrayed as a pirate and a bandit (*praedatus, latrociniiis*), in line with Augustus's characterization of him in the *Res Gestae*. Later, Velleius Paterculus depicted Sextus in a similar way :

hic adulescens erat studiis rudis, sermone barbarus, impetu strenuus, manu promptus, cogitatu celer, fide patri dissimillimus, libertorum suorum libertus servorumque servus, speciosis invidens, ut pareret humillimis. (2.73.1)

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<sup>179</sup> A *praedo* is, properly, a pirate, and thus operates at sea and along the coast, whereas the *latro* works on land. This distinction is not, however, absolute; for example, although they were not associated as strongly with the sea as Sextus Pompey was, Cicero calls Verres (e.g., *In Ver.* II.1.46, 2.17, ) and his associate Apronius (*In Ver.* II. 3.76) *praedones*.

<sup>180</sup> Opelt 1965, 131-137.

This was a young man coarse in his interests, barbarous in speech, vigorous with fury, ready for action, swift in contemplation, most unlike his father in terms of loyalty, the freedman of his own freedmen and the slave of his slaves, jealous of the respectable, with the result that he obeyed the most base.

Here, Velleius particularly emphasizes Sextus' servile nature, despite his noble origins.

This is consistent with contemporary portrayals of Sextus; in particular, it echoes his characterization in Horace's Fourth *Epode* (*servilem manum*, 4.19) and his Ninth (*servis amicus perfidis*, 9.10), discussed below, and Augustus' depiction of the war against Sextus as a slave war in the *Res Gestae*, as was discussed above. Later in the same section, Velleius more directly accuses Sextus of piratical behavior :

Is tum, ut praediximus, occupata Sicilia servitia fugitivosque in numerum exercitus sui recipiens magnum modum legionum effecerat perque Menam et Menecraten paternos libertos, praefectos classium, latrociniiis ac praedationibus infestato mari ad se exercitumque tuendum rapto utebatur, cum eum non depuderet vindicatum armis ac ductu patris sui mare infestare piraticis sceleribus. (2.73.3)

Then, as I have said, when Sicily was occupied, admitting slaves and fugitives into the numbers of his own army, he filled out a great number of legions and, when the sea had been seized, through Menas and Menecrates (his father's freedmen and prefects of the fleet) he used brigandry and piracy to provide for himself and his army, since it did not make him ashamed to infest with piratical crimes the ocean which had been set free by the arms and leadership of his father.

Not only did Sextus associate with servile types, according to Velleius, he engaged in open acts of banditry and piracy (*latrociniiis ac praedationibus*).

Velleius is a late source for the triumviral period, and may reflect more Augustan propaganda than arguments that were current during the actual time of the conflict with

Sextus; the *Epodes* of Horace, however, provide near-contemporary evidence that Sextus was depicted as a *latro* or *praedo* during the triumviral years. The ninth *Epode* was written in celebration of Octavian's victory at Actium, technically placing it just outside the triumviral period, but close enough that it probably reflects rhetoric which had been current for some time. Horace, addressing Maecenas, muses about when and how they will celebrate Octavian's defeat of Antony, and whether that celebration will resemble the one held after Octavian's win over Sextus Pompey at Naulochus five years prior :

ut nuper, actus cum freto Neptunius  
dux fugit ustis navibus,  
minatus Urbi vincla quae detraxerat  
servis amicus perfidis. (*Ep.* 9.7-10)

Just as recently, when the Neptunian leader, driven from the strait, fled in his burned-out ships, having threatened the city with chains which he, as a friend, had dragged off his treacherous slaves.

The phrase *Neptunius dux*, as well as the occasion for the ode, strongly suggest that this passage does, in fact, refer to Sextus. Although he is not explicitly called a *latro* or *praedo* by Horace here, the phrase *servis amicus perfidis* still characterizes Sextus Pompey as such; *servis*, at least, suggests the low social station of the *latro*, while *perfidis* implies the *latro* and *praedo*'s criminal nature. *Vincla* probably refers metaphorically to the famine by which Sextus held the city hostage by blockading the coast and preventing the passage of grain ships; it also emphasizes Sextus' servile nature by evoking the chains by which captives were bound.

It is possible that Horace also alludes to Sextus in the Fourth *Epode* :

quid attinet tot ora navium gravi  
rostrata duci pondere  
contra latrones atque servilem manum  
hoc, hoc tribuno militum? (*Ep.* 4.17-20)

What does it matter that so many beaked faces and heavy ships are led  
against *latrones* and a servile band when this man, this man is a military  
tribune?

The date of this poem is uncertain.<sup>181</sup> If, as is claimed by the ancient commentators, the poem's target is Pompeius Menas, ex-slave of Pompey Magnus and officer of Sextus Pompey, the ode is probably set soon before Naulochus, and that *latrones* refers to Sextus and his navy. Mankin, however, points out that we have no definitive evidence that Pompeius Menas ever served as a *tribunus militum* (as he is described in the final line of the poem); based on this, as well as the poem's position in the book of *Epodes*, he suggests the poem ought to be dated to just prior to Actium. If Mankin's argument is correct that Pompeius Menas is not the specific target, but that the poem is either aimed at another individual or at a stock figure, it is more likely that *Epode* 4 is set just before Actium, and alludes to Mark Antony and his army.<sup>182</sup> Even if the poem can be dated to 31 BCE and directly refers to Antony, the ambiguity may not have been lost on Horace, who may have left this passage deliberately vague to evoke Sextus and Naulochus, as well.

Although the question has attracted significant scholarly attention, for the present discussion, the identity of the particular *tribunus militum* hardly matters; Horace's main point still applies. Rome has spent numerous years and untold resources to put down the

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<sup>181</sup> See Mankin 1995 for a summary of the debate over the dates of the *Epodes*.

<sup>182</sup> Mankin 1995; Jacoby 1914.

rebellions of servile bandits (associated either with Sextus or with Antony), and yet this man of base origins has leave to parade his status. This concern is echoed in Sallust's account of the Roman response to the Spartacus war, which, like the wars against Sextus and Antony, demanded that an overburdened state dig deep for resources :

4.21 M Omnis, quibus senecto corpore animus militaris erat

Everyone, in whom, despite the body being old, existed a military spirit.

This fragment is transmitted (with book number) by Priscianus in two different passages, both illustrating usage of the verb *senesco* (9.49, 10.20). Maurenbrecher assigns this fragment to Sallust's account of the war's events in 72, following De Brosses and arguing that it refers to the levies raised to face Spartacus and his followers (“Spectare haec verba ad dilectum quendam videntur, tunc habitum, cum ingens militum virorumque inopia in civitate orta est; quare in iisdem explicandis Debrossium sequi iubeo et ad autumnum anni 72 refero, quo Crassus contra fugitivos imperator creatus exercitum Romae comparavit,” 167). In 72 BCE, when Crassus was granted his command against Spartacus, it was necessary for him to recruit soldiers for the conflict. At that time, however, Rome's military strength was badly overtaxed; the war with Sertorius was still occupying forces in Spain, while a consular army under Lucius Licinius Lucullus had been despatched to the east to counter the attack of Mithridates VI of Pontus. Crassus succeeded in recruiting six legions, but only after welcoming Sullan veterans, men ten years removed from their military careers re-enlisting to protect their farmland.<sup>183</sup> Sallust's depiction of Rome's response to the Spartacus revolt thus seems to parallel the

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<sup>183</sup> Ward 1977, 86.

response to Sextus Pompey as depicted in *Epode* 9; in both cases, Rome is forced to overtax its resources to deal with servile upstarts. Although the date of *Epode* 9 is too uncertain to make an argument about the direction of influence, it is thus clear that during the triumviral period, there was great concern that the state was forced to spend too much energy putting down the rebellions of *serviles manus*.

Although most of our literary evidence for Octavian's portrayal of Sextus as a pirate or brigand is later than the triumviral period, Horace's poems at least suggest that this image was being cultivated at that time. Sextus' coinage from this period might offer further confirmation; in particular, Sextus' use of the image of Scylla on a *denarius* from c. 42-40 BCE seems to directly address his reputation as the *Siculus pirata*. The imagery of the coin is complex. It reinforces Sextus' claim to the Sicilian coast : the *pharos* on the obverse of this issue has been identified as that of Messana,<sup>184</sup> while Scylla, on the reverse, represents the treacherous strait between the island and the mainland. The helmeted figure depicted at the top of the tower carries a trident; scholars have interpreted this combination as a reference to Sextus' father Pompeius Magnus and to Sextus' claims to have been descended from the god Neptune. Why Scylla, though? If, in fact, the image of Sextus as a *praedo* or naval *latro* was current during his lifetime, and especially if it were being perpetuated at that time by Octavian, the design of this denarius might be a defiant response to accusations of piracy; Scylla, along with her counterpart Charybdis, both mythologically and historically represented one of the sea's great threats to sailors. By appropriating Scylla's image, Sextus seems to announce that he, too, ought to be viewed as a great, destructive force on the high seas.

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<sup>184</sup> Crawford 1974.

Although this denarius has not been firmly dated, it is interesting to note that the probable date of its issue (between 42 and 40 BCE) falls during a period in which both Antony and Octavian toyed with the idea of an alliance with Sextus. Antony, unnerved and weakened by the defeat of his brother Lucius and wife Fulvia in the Perusine War, made overtures to Sextus, who had sheltered Antony's mother during the war. (Appian *BC* 5.52). If the coin does, in fact, date to approximately this time, the image of Scylla might be a coy allusion to a potential alliance with Antony, for in the second *Philippic*, Cicero had famously compared the triumvir to Charybdis (*quae Charybdis tam vorax?* “What Charybdis is so voracious?” *Phil.* 2.66). In that case, Sextus' Scylla issue might have served as a double warning to Octavian : not only was Sextus embracing his image as a *praedo*, he was threatening to join forces with the *latro*, the *furiosus gladiator*.<sup>185</sup>

Scylla and Charbydis, in fact, make an appearance in Sallust's *Histories* as part of the geographical digression on Sicily in Book 4.

4.27 M Scyllam accolae saxum mari imminens appellant simile celebratae formae procul visentibus. Unde et monstruosam speciem fabulae illi dederunt, quasi formam hominis caninis succinctam capitibus, quia collisi ibi fluctus latratus videntur exprimere.

The locals call the rock jutting over the sea “Scylla,” similar to that famous form to those looking on from a distance. For this reason also they ascribed to it the monstrous appearance of the mythical beast, like the form of a human girded with dog heads, because the breaking waves there seem to imitate barking.

4.28 M Charybdis, mare verticosum, quod forte illata navigia sorbens gurgitibus occultis milia sexaginta Tauromenitana ad litora trahit, ubi se laniata naufragia fundo emergunt.

Charybdis, a whirling sea, which, when it drinks in ships drawn by its

<sup>185</sup> A clever warning, perhaps a little too clever, but in light of the care with which figures of this period manipulated their public images, not to be discounted immediately.



hidden currents by chance, drags them sixty miles to the  
Tauromenitanian shores, where the mangled shipwrecks emerge from the  
sea.

This geographical digression has failed to attract much scholarly attention, but warrants closer examination. Generally, when the action of a historical narrative shifted to a new location, particularly a distant or exotic one, the historian would introduce the new setting with an excursus on the region in which he discussed the area's topography, inhabitants, and history.<sup>186</sup> During the final phase of the Spartacus War, the combatants traveled south through Campania and Lucania, perhaps with an eye toward crossing over to Sicily.<sup>187</sup> It would not be surprising, then, for Sallust to include a digression on the geography of Sicily as the action of the text shifted thence, just as he had done, for example, regarding Africa in the *BJ*. One problem with this: the rebel slaves never made it to Sicily. Spartacus and the detachment with him were cut off and defeated by Crassus in Bruttium, while the remaining runaways were finished off by Pompey. If the narrative never arrives in Sicily, then, why does Sallust go out of his way to orient us there?<sup>188</sup> This is another

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<sup>186</sup> By the time of the *Histories'* composition, the geographical excursus was an established part of historiographical practice. Among the Greek historians, Herodotus (Egypt, Scythia) and Thucydides (Sicily) both employed the geographical/ethnographic excursus as a way of providing context, emphasizing themes, and, perhaps more importantly, displaying their own erudition. Although we have a less abundant sample of Roman historical writing prior to Sallust, it is clear from what remains that geographical digressions remained part of the historiographical tradition. For example, from the opening line of Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* (*omnia Gallia. . .*) it is apparent that Caesar's mastery of the geography of the conquered regions is central to the text; later in the text, he gives detailed accounts of the territories of the Gauls (4.1-3), Britons (5.13) and the Germans (6.25).

Geographical excursus had a place in the works of Sallust as well. See, for example, Africa in the *BJ* (17-19); Sardinia and Corsica in Book Two of the *Histories* (2.1-20 M) and the Black Sea region in Book Three (3.61-80 M).

<sup>187</sup> This is what Cicero suspected, at least; see *In Verrem* 2.5.5-6. Furthermore, according to Plutarch, Spartacus had bought the loyalty of Cilician pirates, with whose aid he intended to seize Sicily, but was betrayed by them and forced to abandon this plan (*Crass.* 10)

<sup>188</sup> A parallel to this is found in Book One of the *Histories*, where Sallust composes a geographical excursus on the Blessed Isles, although Sertorius never actually journeys there. Scholars have proposed numerous interpretations for the digression; Katz 1984, for example, suggests that it is an extended Homeric allusion, while I suspect it might represent Sallust's desire for voluntary exile from Rome

way in which Sallust's depiction of Spartacus and the slave revolt is meant to call to mind the threat posed in the triumviral period by Sextus Pompey. As was discussed above, it appears from Sextus' coinage that Sextus associated himself with Scylla, possibly as a way of answering Octavian's charge of piracy or alluding to a potential alliance with Mark Antony. By including in his account a description of the Strait of Messina in his account of the Spartacus rebellion and highlighting the topographical features Scylla and Charbydis, Sallust indirectly manages to associate Sextus with the idea of a slave war, just as Horace had done directly in the *Epodes* and Augustus would later do in the *Res Gestae*.

This also, perhaps, turns our attention back to the 70s in a sort of deflected reference, by linking Sextus Pompey with the Sicilian governor Verres, whom Cicero had compared to Scylla and Charybdis :

Non enim Charybdim tam infestam neque Scyllam nautis quam istum in eodem freto fuisse arbitror; hoc etiam iste infestior, quod multo se pluribus et immanioribus canibus succinxerat (*In Verrem* 2.5.146)

Indeed, I think neither Charybdis nor Scylla was as dangerous as he was to sailors in that strait; he was even more dangerous, moreover, because he had surrounded himself with many more and fiercer dogs.

According to Cicero, as was discussed above in section 3.2, Sicily's slaves were on the verge of uprising throughout Verres' mismanaged governorship, and it was only by chance that no large-scale revolt took place. If Sallust's digression on the straits of Charbydis and Scylla is, then, an allusion to Sextus Pompey, it also brings us full-circle

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during the turbulent years under the triumvirate. In any case, it seems clear that Sallust took advantage of the opportunity to use a geographical digression (although imperfect, because the narrative never actually shifts to the Blessed Isles) as a literary device of some kind.

back to the 70s BCE by connecting Sextus with Verres as twin Sicilian threats to Roman stability.

### 3.5 Conclusions

Sallust's account of the Spartacus slave revolt thus reflects on both Sallust's attitude toward the changing role of historiography under the triumvirate and his attitude toward the false pretense of peace perpetuated during the 70s BCE. In section 3.2, I demonstrated how Sallust's Spartacus begins to answer the challenge posed to historiography's relevance by Sertorius (as was discussed in Chapter Three). Whereas Sertorius used his boastful nature and battle wounds to craft his own *memoria*, the barbarian slave Spartacus is helpless to do so for himself. As historian, however, Sallust steps in to record his *res gestae* and prevent Spartacus from remaining *inultus*; by elevating Spartacus to a prominent role in his narrative, Sallust demonstrates that historiography has not, despite the best efforts of the triumvirs, become an irrelevant task. In this section, I also showed how Sallust's Spartacus, like Sertorius, functions as an ambiguous *exemplum*. Not only is Spartacus ambivalent in-and-of himself, his status as a gladiator, a figure which at once fascinated and repelled the Romans, increases his complexity.

As was discussed in section 3.3, in his narrative of the Spartacus revolt, Sallust underlines echoes of the contemporary political situation of Rome in order to reflect on the events of the 70s; by highlighting parallels between the two periods, he seems to suggest that they are to be viewed as analogous. More specifically, he seems to call

attention to the slippage in both periods between the pretext of peace and the reality of civil war. Both periods began with an uneasy peace following the death of a dictator, and in both periods that peace quickly disintegrated into near-constant conflicts; the civil disturbances of the 70s spilled over into the next two decades until open civil war at last broke out between Caesar and Pompey. Having died in 35 BCE, Sallust did not see the renewal of full-scale civil war during the triumviral period, but his comparison of the 70s with the late 40s and early 30s suggests that he suspected it was imminent. In Sallust's version of Roman history, then, Rome had been in a constant state of civil war from the conflict between Marius and Sulla to Sallust's own day. In section 3.4, I explored the ways in which Sallust employs the image of the *latro*. In particular, I show Sallust's reaction to Cicero's depiction of Mark Antony as a *latro* and a *gladiator*; whereas Cicero uses these epithets to paint Antony as a one-note villain, Sallust's Spartacus (and the other rebelling slaves) is a complex and ambiguous figure. In this section, I also demonstrated the ways in which Sallust's account evokes the contemporary threat of Sextus Pompey; in the next chapter, I turn to Sallust's portrayal of Sextus' father Pompeius Magnus.

## Chapter 4 : The Rise of Pompey

### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the role of Pompey Magnus in the *Histories* and how Sallust portrays Pompey's rapid rise to power during the late 70s and early 60s as precedent-setting for the major figures of triumviral period; I also discuss Pompey's role in Sallust's contemplation of the role of historiography under the triumvirate. Pompey has a stronger presence in the fragments than any other character, including Sertorius and Spartacus; it is, of course, impossible to determine whether this is representative of a greater role in the original and complete text, but it is clear that Pompey was very active in both the political and military spheres during the years covered by the *Histories*, and so we might expect him to play a significant role in the narrative. Whether or not we agree with Syme's assertion that "Sallust intended that Pompeius Magnus should develop into the principal character,"<sup>189</sup> the number of fragments in which Pompey appears, as well as the fact that Sallust includes the text of a fictional letter of Pompey, suggests that Pompey was *a* principal character, if not *the* principal character in the narrative of 78-67 BCE. Three major movements of Pompey's career are included in the *Histories* : the Sertorian War, the Spartacus War, and the passage of the *lex Gabinia*. Pompey appears to enter Sallust's narrative upon his entry into the Sertorian War in 77 BCE, when he was granted proconsular authority by the senate to aid Metellus in his campaign against Sertorius. Four fragments from Book Two (2.15-2.19 M) seem to have been part of a character-sketch of Pompey introducing him to the narrative, a portrait similar in structure to that of

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<sup>189</sup> Syme 1964, 201.

Catiline in the *BC*<sup>190</sup>; Maurenbrecher also assigned fragments 2.20-2.22 M to Sallust's account of Pompey's entry in the Spanish war. Book Two also contains the events of the Sertorian War through 75 BCE, although Pompey only appears twice more, in 2.92 and 2.98 M. 2.92 describes the reaction of the inhabitants of the Celtiberian villages upon hearing of Pompey's approach; 2.98 is the *epistula Pompei ad senatum*.

Any analysis of the character of Pompey in the *Histories* is complicated by the fact that he is one of the characters to whom Sallust allows a direct “voice”; in Book Two, Sallust gives the text of Pompey's letter to the senate from the winter of 75/74 BCE, when Pompey and his army were struggling against Sertorius in Spain, hindered by their depleted numbers and resources. The historical authenticity of the letter is doubtful. Plutarch's account of a letter sent from Pompey to the senate at this time summarizes the demands that appear in Sallust's version, but this confirms nothing, since, as has been discussed in previous chapters, Plutarch relied heavily on the *Histories* as a source. McGushin asserts that it is likely that Sallust was familiar with the original text of Pompey's letter, but argues that Sallust's letter is a literary fabrication, crafted to reinforce his characterization of Pompey elsewhere in the *Histories*: “The language in which the demands are couched, the barely concealed threats they contain are in keeping with the vanity and arrogance which were undoubtedly real traits of Pompeius' personality, even though Sallust, who detested the man, may have taken extra trouble to bring them into sharper focus in this context.”<sup>191</sup> Meyer agrees that the letter is probably, for the most part, a Sallustian invention; like the speeches of Thucydides, it was a combination of

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<sup>190</sup> This character sketch is discussed in more detail in section 4.3 below.

<sup>191</sup> McGushin 1992, 242.

what the author could recall from the original form (speech or text), τὰ δέοντα, and imagination : “Nicias' letter was thus a way for Thucydides to demonstrate the man's self-protective timidity and over-cautious intellect, to show him as a man inferior to Pericles, like all of Pericles' other Athenian successors. Sallust, however, was perhaps using the letter as a way of sharpening a portrait that he had so far sketched only in general terms.”<sup>192</sup> Earl, on the other hand, argues that the letter shows the zeal of an impetuous youth, but carries no greater thematic importance : “[I]n Sallust's view corruption hides behind honorable names and fair excuses. There seems to be no such hidden significance in the letter of Pompey.”<sup>193</sup> Given Earl's pessimism about the possibility of interpreting the *Histories* as a whole,<sup>194</sup> this hesitation to mine the letter for meaning beyond the literal is unsurprising, but, as I discuss in the introduction to this dissertation, misguided. Following McGushin and Meyer, in this chapter I treat the *epistula Cn. Pompei* as a Sallustian creation, perhaps based on Pompey's actual letter but primarily intended to reinforce the themes of the narrative of the *Histories*.

The Sertorian War is concluded in Book Three with the assassination of Sertorius, and Pompey appears here in two fragments, 3.88 and 3.89 M. Fragment 3.88 describes Pompey's emulation of Alexander the Great, while 3.89 gives an account of Pompey's victorious return to Rome from Spain; these are discussed in detail below in sections 4.2 and 4.4, respectively. Although Pompey was involved in the Spartacus War, he does not appear in any of the surviving fragments of Sallust's account of the revolt. Pompey does reappear in the fragments, however, upon his return to Rome after the suppression of the

<sup>192</sup> Meyer 2010, 105-106.

<sup>193</sup> Earl 1966, 109.

<sup>194</sup> Earl 1966, 105 : “The mutilated condition of the text of Sallust's *Historiae*. . . clearly precludes any detailed examination of the relationship between the author's general ideas and his particular narrative.”

rebellion; Maurenbrecher assigned seven fragments (4.42-4.48 M) to the campaigning and consular elections for 70 BCE. The remaining phase of Pompey's career covered in the remnants of the *Histories* is the debate over and passage of the *lex Gabinia* in 67 BCE; Maurenbrecher assigned eight fragments to this episode (5.19-5.27 M).

The figure of Pompey has attracted more scholarly attention than has any other character in the *Histories*; this is probably due in some part to the relative abundance of Pompeian material, including the text of the *epistula Pompei ad senatum*. As in the cases of the other figures in *Histories*, much of the scholarship revolves around Sallust's attitude toward Pompey, and uniformly concludes that Sallust was hostile toward Pompey. Katz, for example, concludes that "Pompey appears to be the most loathed of Sallust's many loathsome characters";<sup>195</sup> Syme, "For malice against Pompeius, the *Historiae* offered opportunity ever and again, gladly taken. The denigration looks like an obsession."<sup>196</sup> As we have seen to be the case regarding other central characters in the *Histories*, however, deducing Sallust's "opinion" of Pompey is an insufficient analysis of Pompey's role in Sallust's narrative.

This chapter focuses on three aspects of Sallust's portrayal of Pompey in the *Histories*. In the first section, I discuss Sallust's presentation of Pompey as a "Roman Alexander." Many sources, including Sallust, claim that Pompey actively strove to emulate the Macedonian monarch. Comparisons between the two were natural, given the parallels between their careers : both parlayed youthful success on their fathers' campaigns into impressive military careers, and both achieved victories which opened up

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<sup>195</sup> Katz 1982, 83.

<sup>196</sup> Syme, 1964, 212.



the east to their respective empires. Pompey, focusing on these similarities and the brilliant success of Alexander as a commander, cultivated comparisons between himself and Alexander. Alexander, however, was a monarch, a role antithetical to the values of the republican system. For Sallust, writing not long after the assassination of Julius Caesar, whom many suspected of regal aspirations, and at a time when Mark Antony increasingly appeared more like an eastern monarch than a Roman general, Pompey seems to represent a dangerous precedent : the prominent Roman who wants to be king. In section 4.2, I examine two ways in which Sallust portrays Pompey's association with Alexander as problematic. First, the two-sided problem of flattery. Like Alexander, Pompey both thrived on and expected flattery from his "subjects." However, Sallust's language in his depiction of Pompey further suggests that, also like Alexander, Pompey began to desire divine honors in addition to the flattery he received as a powerful man; Pompey thus sets the stage for Julius Caesar and the main figures of the triumviral period, all of whom buttressed their claims to power with claims to divine descent and favor. At the same time, Pompey, unlike Alexander, did not obtain his position by heredity; in fact, his father Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo was one of the more ignominious figures of his generation. Pompey knew well that his continued prominence was predicated, at least in part, on his popular support; therefore, at the same time as he blatantly cultivated flattery and honors for himself, Pompey was also preoccupied with pandering to the interests of the *populus Romanus* to maintain his popularity. The second problematic aspect of Pompey's association with Alexander which I discuss in this section is the danger posed by exceptional single commands. The passage of the *lex Gabinia* in 67 BCE granted

Pompey unprecedented and wide-ranging military power to combat piracy in the Mediterranean. At the time of the law's passage, many called into question the wisdom of risking everything in the hands of one man; if all of Rome were entrusted to one commander, what would happen to Rome if something should happen to *him*? At the time of the *Histories*' composition, the question of the most effective form of state power was still relevant; Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus were still nominally bound together in the form of the triumvirate, but by the early 30s it had surely become clear that each (Octavian and Mark Antony, at least) ultimately desired sole power. Both forms of power – sole command and the triumvirate – were anomalous and similarly problematic. The death of a sole commander would lead to a power vacuum, while the removal of one of three triumvirs would lead to an imbalance of power; for example, when Crassus was killed in Parthia, without a mediating and mitigating third party, the remaining two members of the “first triumvirate” soon opposed each other in open civil war.

In section 4.3, I discuss Sallust's portrayal of Pompey as dangerously and obsessively self-interested, often pursuing personal glory to the detriment of the *res publica*; in this section, I also address Sallust's depiction of the general Lucullus. Both Pompey and Lucullus zealously pursued their own interests, often when those interests countered the interest of the state. Lucullus, for example, resisted being replaced in his command against Mithridates; although his troops were beginning to turn against him after two difficult winters, and his support back and at Rome had withered, Lucullus was preoccupied with his desire to accumulate wealth, political influence, and glory through

victories in the east. Excessive personal ambition was obviously a concern during the period of the *Histories'* composition, as well. The triumvirs (and Sextus Pompey) were engaged in near-constant conflict as each struggled to obtain individual power; Rome was subjected to continuous civil disturbance because of the self-interest of influential men. Although the pursuit of individual glory was certainly not a novel characteristic among politicians of the 70s and 60s, as I will discuss, Sallust's Lucullus and Pompey are permitted by the senate and the people to indulge their own ambitions to such an extent that it sets the precedent for the destructive self-interest of the figures of the triumviral period, particularly Octavian. Sallust thus, once again, demonstrates how the political scene of the late 70s and early 60s set dangerous precedents for the major players of Sallust's own day.

In the final section of this chapter, I discuss Pompey's role in Sallust's discussion of the changing position of historiography at the time of the *Histories'* composition. First, I demonstrate that Pompey follows the lead of Sertorius and actively tries to take a hand in “writing” his own history, attempting to portray his victory over Sertorius as a victory over a foreign enemy to prevent the conflict from being viewed as a civil war; by acting as his own historian in this way, Pompey attempted to maintain his popularity with the people and his eligibility for a triumph. I next discuss the stance toward historiography taken by Sallust's Pompey in the epistle, and demonstrate how Pompey's dismissal of the value of recording *res gestae* challenges the relevance of writing history. In his letter to the senate, Pompey essentially makes the case that language is too corrupt to be effective; words now have to be backed with threats of action to achieve any results.

This rejection of language, I argue, is a manifestation of the disruption of language in *stasis* described by both Sallust and Thucydides (1.12 M, 3.82.4). Sallust's Thucydidean model fails him in this context, however, and this suggests that it may be impossible to overcome the devaluation and perversion of language in the context of civil war.

#### 4.2 Roman Alexanders

Pompey Magnus was often depicted as an admirer and emulator of Alexander the Great. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given the similarities in their career trajectories : both used their fathers' campaigns as a launching point for their careers and enjoyed substantial military success early on, and both were particularly famed for their victories in the east. Pompey's adoption of the cognomen *Magnus* was surely no coincidence, but rather calculated to evoke the exploits of the “great” Macedonian king. The elder Pliny explicitly compared the accomplishments of Pompey and Alexander (with Hercules and Dionysus included for good measure) :

Verum ad decus imperii Romani, non solum ad viri unius, pertinet victoriarum Pompei Magni titulos omnes triumphosque hoc in loco nuncupari, aequato non modo Alexandri Magni rerum fulgore, sed etiam Herculis prope ac Liberi patris. (*NH* 7.95)

Truly, it is relevant not only to the glory of one man, but to the glory of the Roman empire, that all the titles and triumphs of the victories of Pompey the Great are recounted here, since he equalled not only the glory of the deeds of Alexander the Great, but nearly equalled the glory of Hercules and even father Bacchus, as well.

By the first century CE, then, Pompey and Alexander were linked in Roman thought; according to sources beginning as early as Sallust, Pompey himself actively cultivated

that association. Plutarch reports that Pompey even exploited (to varying effect) the physical similarities between himself and the Hellenistic king :

ἦν δέ τις καὶ ἀναστολὴ τῆς κόμης ἀτρέμα καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ὄμματα  
ῥυθμῶν ὑγρότης τοῦ προσώπου, ποιοῦσα μᾶλλον λεγομένην ἢ  
φαινομένην ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως εἰκόνας. ἣ  
καὶ τοῦνομα πολλῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεπιφερόντων οὐκ ἔφευγεν ὁ Πομπήϊος,  
ὥστε καὶ χλευάζοντας αὐτὸν ἐνίους ἤδη καλεῖν Ἀλέξανδρον ἦ (*Pompey*  
2.1)

There was a certain gentle lift to his hair and softness of the contour of his face around the eyes, creating a similarity (more talked about than apparent) to the likenesses of the king Alexander. When many people gave that name [Magnus] to him in his youth, he did not decline it, with the result that some people, mocking him, called him Alexander.

As has been discussed in previous chapters, Plutarch probably relied on the *Histories* as one of the main sources for the relevant *Lives*. Although there is no obvious parallel for this passage in the fragments, it is clear from what remains of Sallust's Pompeian narrative that the tradition claiming that Pompey intentionally imitated Alexander had already taken hold by the time of the *Histories'* composition (or that it originated with Sallust himself). Sallust tells us explicitly that Pompey, encouraged by those seeking to flatter him, strove to imitate Alexander the Great :

3.88 Sed Pompeius a prima adolescentia sermone fautorum similem fore se credens Alexandro regi, facta consultaque eius quidem aemulus erat.

But Pompeius, believing from his earliest adolescence, because of the discussion among his partisans, that he would be similar to the king Alexander, was an imitator of his actions and plans.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> This fragment is preserved (with book number) by Nonius to illustrate the use of *aemulus* as a synonym for *sectator* or *imitator*.

Maurenbrecher assigned this passage to Sallust's narrative of the end of the Sertorian War. The editor admitted that, in terms of content, this remark would be more appropriately placed in the character sketch of Pompey in Book Two; as Funari points out, *ab adulescentia* is a common way of opening character sketches (cf. 2.23 M, which Maurenbrecher associates with Licinius Macer : *multos tamen ab adulescentia bonos insultaverat*). However, Maurenbrecher follows Nonius in assigning the fragment to Book Three. The editor further suggests (and McGushin concurs) that this fragment should be placed alongside 3.89, in which Pompey set up trophies for his Spanish victories; presumably this dedication was one of the ways in which he imitated the *facta* of Alexander. According to Arrian (5.29) and Diodorus (17.95), when his army revolted and refused to march further into India, before turning his campaign to the south, Alexander erected twelve monumental altars to the gods. Arrian claims that the altars were constructed in thanks to the gods, but Diodorus says they comprised one element of Alexander's plan to create a grand legacy, leaving behind structures of exaggerated size to convince the natives that their conquerors were superhuman in magnitude. Arrian's narrative, of course, is too late to have influenced Sallust, but Diodorus was a near-contemporary; it is possible, then, that Sallust was familiar with Diodorus' version (or that of Diodorus' source), in which Alexander's monuments are calculated to intimidate. If, as Maurenbrecher speculates, 3.88, in which Sallust characterizes Pompey as Alexander's *aemulus*, was originally from the same passage as 3.89, Pompey's *tropaea* appear more openly propagandistic; more on this in section 4.4 below.

The language of this fragment suggest that Sallust wanted to seize the reader's

attention here; *aemulus*, in particular, warrants closer analysis. Although the manuscripts contain *aemulatus*, Maurenbrecher and Reynolds follow Victorinus and Lindsay and emend to *aemulus*. As Funari points out, a form of *aemulor* (*aemulabatur*, *aemulatus erat*) would usually be expected here, rather than the periphrastic *sum* + substantive adjective. Furthermore, *aemulus*, when used as a substantive adjective, typically governs a genitive noun (e.g., *Carthago aemula imperi Romani*, *BC* 10.1).<sup>198</sup> In 3.88 M, however, *aemulus* takes an accusative of respect with no preposition (*facta consultaque*); the closest parallels for this use of a substantive are archaic (e.g., *quae fuisti inscius*, Turpil. *com.* 65 R; *gnaruris vos volo esse hanc rem*, Plautus, *Most.* 100; *uno fetu et quod graviast*, *Amph.* 878). If we accept Maurenbrecher and Reynolds' reading here, then, we have a striking bit of Sallustian prose which surely would have caught his reader's attention.

This unexpected construction suggests that Sallust crafted this passage in such a way to encourage his reader to take a closer look. This special attention makes it clear that Pompey's self-identification and self-fashioning as a Roman Alexander will be important to the program and narrative of the *Histories*. The association between Pompey and Alexander the Great was strong during Pompey's own lifetime, and, if we believe Sallust in 3.88 M, Pompey intentionally cultivated that association. In Pompey's eyes, and in the eyes of some others (see the Pliny passage above), this association had positive connotations; Pompey surely identified with Alexander as a prodigy, a popular general, a successful conquerer of the East. In Sallust's eyes, however, this connection was not an unambiguously positive one. In this section, I examine Sallust's portrayal of Pompey as a

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<sup>198</sup> TLL Vol. 1, 976, 63-4.

“Roman Alexander” from two perspectives. First, I discuss the reciprocal, mutually dependent relationship of flattery between Pompey and the Roman people. In ancient literary portrayals, kings (including Alexander in particular) are notoriously greedy for flattery; this limits the ability of those communicating with the kings to speak openly. This, in turn, creates an atmosphere of near-paranoia, in which the king is obsessed with being flattered, and those around him struggle to flatter him (or at least not to offend). In Sallust's characterization, however, Pompey is dependent not only on receiving flattery, but on dispensing it, as well. Pompey is thus in some ways more dangerous than a king; not only do those around him have to worry about whether he is sufficiently appeased, he is desperate to maintain their favor, and so perhaps more inclined to follow the will of the people at the expense of what is expedient for the Roman state. In the second part of this section, I discuss Pompey's appointment to a special command against the pirates in 67 BCE, and the risks and problems created by vesting one man with nearly absolute authority.

#### 4.2.1 The Danger of Flattery

Alexander the Great was often portrayed as being particularly susceptible to flattery; indeed, by the later years of his life, Alexander's enjoyment of flattery had increased to the point that he both expected and demanded adulation :

καὶ τᾶλλα πάντων ἥδιστος ὢν βασιλέων συνεῖναι καὶ χάριτος οὐδεμιᾶς ἀμοιβῶν, τότε ταῖς μεγαλαυχίαις ἀηδῆς ἐγίνετο καὶ λίαν στρατιωτικός, αὐτός τε πρὸς τὸ κομπῶδες ὑποφερόμενος, καὶ τοῖς κόλαξιν ἑαυτὸν ἀνεικῶς ἱππᾶσιμον, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν παρόντων ἐπετρίβοντο, μήθ' ἀμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς κόλαξι μήτε λείπεσθαι βουλόμενοι τῶν [αὐτῶν] ἐπαίνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει, τὸ δὲ κίνδυνον ἔφερε. (Plutarch,



*Alex. 23.4)*

And although in other respects he was the most agreeable of all kings and was in no way lacking charm, he then became insufferable with ostentation and excessively aggressive, and inclined to boastfulness, and was excessively driven by flattery, by which the closest friends among those around him were troubled, because they did not want to compete in flattery, nor did they want to refrain from praise; for the one seemed shameful, but the other brought danger.

By the late Republic, Alexander's dependence on flattery had become something of a *topos*; calling someone an Alexander was a short-hand way of indicating someone who needed to be pandered to. For example, in letters to Atticus from the summer of 45 BCE in which he describes his struggle to strike the right tone in his communications with Julius Caesar, Cicero likens the dictator to Alexander the Great; both, he implies, will only hear with equanimity those things which conform to their own opinions :

συμβουλευτικὸν saepe conor. Nihil reperio, et quidem mecum habeo et Ἀριστοτέλους et Θεοπόμπου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. Sed quid simile? Illi et quae ipsis honesta essent scribebant et grata Alexandra. Ecquid tu eius modi reperis? Mihi quidem nihil in mentem venit. (*ad Att.* 12.40.2)

I often begin a piece of advice. I learn nothing, and I even have with me the letters of Aristotle and Theopompus to Alexander. But how is this similar? They were writing things which were both worthy of themselves and pleasing to Alexander. Can you come up with anything of this sort at all? Indeed, nothing comes to my mind.

Aristotle and Theopompus, Cicero argues here, had an advantage in their interactions with Alexander, insofar as that which appealed to and flattered Alexander was not contrary to their own principles. For Cicero to appease Caesar, on the other hand, would require the betrayal of Cicero's principles. Hence the dilemma posed by this Roman

Alexander :

Quamquam de Parthico bello, quid spectare debui nisi quod illum velle arbitrabar? Quod enim aliud argumentum epistulae nostrae nisi κολακεία fuit? An, si ea quae optima putarem suadere voluissem, oratio mihi defuisset? Totis igitur litteris nihil opus est. (*ad Att.* 13.27.1)

Yet, about the Parthian War, what should I have considered, except that which I thought he wanted? For what was the point of my letter, except flattery? Or, if I had wanted to persuade him what I thought was best, would speech have failed me? Therefore, there is no need for this letter at all.

Both Caesar and Alexander, then, were only willing to hear agreement; dissenting opinions were unwelcome. Sallust's Pompey seems to have operated in much the same way. 4.48 M implies that Pompey expected those around him to serve his own interests :

4.48 Collegam minorem et sui cultorem expectans.  
Expecting a lesser colleague and one who tended to his interests.<sup>199</sup>

The fragment is probably from Sallust's account of the consular elections for 70 BCE, in which Pompey supported Crassus' bid to be his consular colleague. According to Plutarch (who probably used the *Histories* as a source for the *Life of Crassus*), though Pompey was still Crassus' junior in experience and esteem, he anticipated that Crassus would be easily manipulated and could be kept continually in his political debt; he thus eagerly granted Crassus' request to aid his campaign for the consulship (*Crass.* 12.2). Pompey, then, expected the flattery of not only the common people, but of his colleagues as well. Although his political credentials made Pompey technically Crassus' junior, he

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<sup>199</sup> This fragment is preserved by Arusinius (p. 461 K. VII) to illustrate the use of *cultor* governing the reflexive genitive *sui*.

demanding to be treated as his senior colleague; his assistance during Crassus' campaign was motivated not by generosity, but by his desire to compel Crassus to flatter him and serve his own interests.

Sallust's use of *cultor* in 4.48 M to describe Pompey's intentions for Crassus suggests that, at least in Sallust's characterization, Pompey's expectation of flattery had grown out of control; no longer content with common flattery and human honors (most of which he had run through already anyhow), Pompey was perhaps beginning to think of himself as worthy of divine worship. Sallust, then, seems to suggest that Pompey was one of the figures who set the stage for the exploitation of claims to divine favor in the triumviral period. During the late 40s and early 30s BCE, all of Rome's leading political players engaged in some form of propaganda battle with one another, and pretensions of divine descent were a central component; Octavian, Mark Antony, and Sextus Pompey all made competing claims to heavenly heritage.<sup>200</sup> The practice of claiming divine descent or favor and seeking cult worship for oneself was, of course, much older than the triumviral period or late Republic; it was a customary practice of eastern monarchs, and

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<sup>200</sup> Mark Antony, for example, claimed descent from Hercules through Hercules' son Anton, and issued coinage promoting the association (*RRC* 494.2a-b; see Osgood 240). As Antony's interest shifted toward the east, however, he began to present himself as a new Dionysus, and was hailed as such at Ephesus (For references, see Chapter 3, section #). Sextus Pompey, too, made claims to divine lineage, styling himself as a son of Neptune (for references, see Chapter 4, section #). As the adopted son of Julius Caesar, Octavian was able to take advantage of the Julian family's claim to descent from the goddess Venus. The senate's confirmation of deification of Caesar in 42 BCE was a further boon, for now Octavian was not only descended from the divine, but the son of a god; by the early 30s, coinage depicting the *divi filius* and *divos Iulius* was in wide circulation (for example, *RRC* 535.1 and 535.2; see Osgood 239 and Zanker 53-57). Octavian also cultivated an association with Apollo, allegedly even playing the part of the god himself at a mock feast of the twelve gods (Osgood 237-239, Zanker 48-53). A precedent for these claims to divine descent and overtures toward seeking cult for oneself was set during the late Republic, particularly by Sulla, Julius Caesar, and Pompey. Sulla associated himself with the goddess Venus, and was known as *Epaphroditus* in the Greek world (Plutarch, *Sulla* 34.2). In his *laudatio* for his aunt Julia, Caesar famously boasted that the Julian line was descended from Venus herself (Suetonius, *DJ* 6). Pompey, too, made a claim to Venus' favor; he dedicated a temple to Venus Victrix as part of his theatre complex.

the career of Alexander the Great himself was characterized by pretensions of divinity. After a visit to the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah in 331 BCE, Alexander began to promote himself as the son of Zeus Ammon, and thereafter demanded to be worshipped as a god (Plutarch, *Alex.* 27-28). Read in this light, 4.48 M now seems to suggest that Pompey not only expected to be flattered as a powerful man, but that he had begun to think of himself as worthy of his own cult. It was, perhaps, no longer enough for Pompey to be merely associated with the favor of the gods; now Pompey, like Alexander, wanted to be treated like a god himself. The fragment, again :

4.48 M Conlegam minorem et sui cultorem expectans.  
Expecting a lesser colleague and one who tended to his interests.

*Cultor* most commonly belongs to the agricultural world, synonymous with *agricola* or even *incola* (e.g., *fuga cultorum*, 1.112 M); it can also be used as a synonym for, for example, *fautor*, *curator*, or *custos*, and take objects ranging from humans to abstract concepts and inanimate objects (e.g., *belli cultorem*, BJ 54.3). It can also, however, refer to one conducting worship of a god. Although this becomes more common in Augustan literature (e.g., *Aeneid* 11.788; Horace, *Ode* 1.34.1; Ovid, *Met.* 3.127), this usage of *cultor* begins to appear in the late republic. In the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, one of Cicero's interlocutors claims that mankind's purpose is to serve the gods :

hominemque ipsum quasi contemplatorem caeli ac deorum cultorem  
(*Tusc.* 1.69-70)

. . .and man himself exists as if to be an observer of heaven and  
worshipper of the gods

This usage of *cultor* also appears in Livy's first pentad. According to Livy, the first official acts of Camillus were of a religious nature, because he was a devoted worshipper of the gods :

omnium primum ut erat diligentissimus religionum cultor, quae ad deos  
immortales pertinebant retulit (5.50.1)

First of all, since he was a most diligent worshipper in religion, he  
addressed those things which pertained to the immortal gods. . .

Depending on the date of Livy's first five books<sup>201</sup>, this passage is roughly contemporary with the *Histories* or slightly later; in any case, it is temporally close enough to Cicero and Sallust that we can assume this usage was becoming more common at the time of the *Histories'* composition, and so it is possible to read 4.48 with this meaning in mind.

Did Pompey, flush with his successes against Sertorius and Spartacus, Pompey, like Alexander, now want to be treated like a god? Fragment 4.48 M is too short and too decontextualized for us to assert with full confidence that Sallust accuses Pompey of demanding divine honors for himself. However, the fact that at the time of the *Histories'* composition *cultor* was beginning to take on its eventual meaning of “divine worshipper” leaves open the possibility that it is being used here in this way. Sallust's deployment of a novel use of *cultor* suggests that he sees some novelty in Pompey's self-perception as a statesman. Sallust's audience was surrounded by the images of the triumvirs' and Sextus Pompey's competing claims to divinity; this portrayal of Pompey reminds the reader of Pompey's role in the development of this political tactic.

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<sup>201</sup> The date of the composition of the first pentad of the *AUC* continues to elude scholarly consensus; Burton 2000, who argues convincingly in favor of Luce 1965's case for a late triumviral start-date (Burton suggests 33/32 BCE), gives a useful summary of the various hypotheses.

Despite his efforts, however, Pompey could never be a perfect imitation of Alexander the Great. Alexander was a hereditary king, having inherited the Macedonian crown from his father Philip; Pompey, on the other hand, had risen to prominence in spite of the deep antipathy of the Roman senate and people for his father, Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo. In particular, Pompey had bypassed the traditional *cursus honorum* on his route to the consulship largely on the strength of his public support, which he cultivated in part by promising that he would restore the authority of the tribunes.<sup>202</sup> As McGushin points out, the senate's dismissal of the Sullan prerequisites was probably influenced by the magnitude of Pompey's public support; this was not, however, a uniformly lauded decision, and Pompey met resistance from members of the nobility who objected to an equestrian upstart. During the late 70s BCE, the tension between the *nobilitas* and common people was high. Sallust outlined the arguments of the people in the voice of C. Licinius Macer, tribune of the plebs, in a speech in Book Three of the *Histories*. In this speech to the people, set in 73 BCE, Macer praises Pompey's efforts on their behalf, and claims that these efforts have set him at odds with the *nobiles* :

3.48.21 M Itaque simul comparant delenimenta et differunt vos in adventum Cn. Pompei, quem ipsum, ubi pertimere sublatum in cervices suas, mox dempto metu lacerant.

And at the same time they prepare blandishments and put you off until the arrival of Gnaeus Pompeius, the very man whom, when they were afraid, they carried on their backs, but now, once their fear has been removed, they shred.

<sup>202</sup> Appian *BC* 1.121 : ἐς δὲ ὑπατείαν ἄμφω παρήγγελον, ὁ μὲν ἐστρατηγηκὼς κατὰ τὸν νόμον Σύλλα, ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος οὔτε στρατηγῆσας οὔτε ταμιεύσας ἔτος τε ἔχων τέταρτον ἐπὶ τοῖς τριάκοντα· τοῖς δὲ δημάρχοις ὑπέσχητο πολλὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐπανάξειν, “Both were running for the consulship. One had served as praetor according to the law of Sulla, but Pompey had been neither praetor nor quaestor, being only thirty-four years old – but he promised the tribunes that he would restore most of their office to its former state.”

Macer here describes the resistance of the senate to Pompey; because of this opposition, Macer claims, Pompey is dependent on the people's support to be in a position to grant them any favors in the future :

3.48.23 M Mihi quidem satis spectatum est Pompeium, tantae gloriae adolescentem, malle principem volentibus vobis esse quam illis dominationis socium auctoremque in primis fore tribuniciae potestatis.

In my opinion, Pompey, a young man of such glory, clearly appears to prefer to be a leading man with you being willing, rather than to be an ally in their domination, and, among the leaders, he will be a proponent of the power of the tribunes.

Pompey, then, was as dependent on the people as they were on him. The people were drawn to his youth, charisma, and success, and they relied on Pompey to protect their interests; in turn, Pompey found it necessary to cultivate their favor to support him against the optimate faction. Sallust seems to depict Pompey doing just this :

4.47 M Multitudini ostendens, quam colere plurimum, ut mox cupitis ministram haberet, decreverat.

Making a display for the multitude, to whom he had decided to pay great attention, in order that he soon have them as an attendant to his desires<sup>203</sup>

As we have seen him do before, Sallust here re-appropriates a Ciceronian phrase, adopting Cicero's language and adapting it to his own style and context. Cicero had used a similar expression in the *Verrines* to describe one of Verres' henchmen (*quod toti Asiae iure occisus videbatur istius ille verbo lictor, re vera minister improbissimae*

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<sup>203</sup> This fragment is preserved by Arusinius (p. 494 K. VII) to illustrate the use of *minister* governing a dative; *minister* generally takes an objective genitive (e.g., *illi ministri regis*, BJ 27.1).

*cupiditatis*. . . , “Because that man appeared to all Asia to have been justly slain (in name, his lictor, but in truth, the minister of his most shameful desire),” *In Verr.* II.1.73).

Cicero, seeking to discredit Verres by portraying the trial of Philodamus as illegitimate, maligns Cornelius as a henchman rather than a lictor with official duties. Cicero uses the same expression again, this time applied to Verres' administrative appointees, whom he accuses of disrupting and plundering Verres' province (*qui primum certos instituerit nomine decumanos, re vera ministros ac satellites cupiditatum suarum*. . . , “In the first instance he appointed certain men, collectors of the tenths in name, in reality the ministers and satellites of his desires,” *In Verr.* II.3.21). In the *Verrines*, then, Cicero associates the phrase *minister cupiditatis* with those supporting the less-than-admirable aims of a corrupt provincial governor; it is a personal insult in an invective speech.

Sallust, however, uses the same phrase to describe the Roman people themselves, and, perhaps more pointedly, puts this characterization of the Roman people in the mind of a consul of Rome. This creates an unflattering parallel between Verres and Pompey. By the time of the *Histories'* composition, Verres was a figure of disgrace. Having been soundly defeated by Cicero, he lived in exile until being proscribed by Antony in 43 BCE; Cicero's victory had been so decisive that the characterization of Verres in the prosecution speeches was probably his enduring image. The comparison between Pompey and Verres, then, even during the triumviral period, would certainly be read as uncomplimentary. Like Cicero's Verres, Sallust's Pompey is not in office to serve the people, but to have his own interests served by them (and his co-consul). Furthermore, Verres' henchmen were hardly innocent bystanders; they were, at least in Cicero's



characterization, willing participants and complicit in his crimes for the sake of profit. In this light, Sallust's parallel between Verres' *ministri* and the *populus Romanus* is highly unflattering.

Sallust does not spare the Roman people the criticisms of *avaritia* and *ambitio* that he brings against Rome's leading men; everyone, it seems, at least in Sallust's view, was complicit in the decay of the Roman state. In the *BJ*, for example, Sallust describes the bad behavior of both the *nobilitas* and the *plebs*, and demonstrates the complicity of both parties in the breakdown of the *res publica* during the war against Jugurtha :

Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere trahere rapere. Ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt, res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata (*BJ* 41.5)

For the nobles began to turn their rank, and the people, their liberty, toward their passion, each for himself seizing, pillaging, plundering. And so everything was rent into two factions; the republic, which was the common ground, was torn apart.

In this account of the behavior of the Roman state, all groups share the blame : the *nobilitas* turned their rank into a vice, and the people did the same with their freedom. This, in turn, led to factionalism and the division of the *res publica*. Elsewhere in the *BJ*, Sallust again makes clear that the senatorial class was not solely responsible for the troubles of the state :

Sed plebes incredibile memoratu est quam intenta fuerit quantaque vi rogationem iusserit, magis odio nobilitatis, quoi mala illa parabantur, quam cura rei publicae : tanta lubido in partibus erat (*BJ* 40.3)

But the plebs - it is incredible to recall, how eagerly and with what force they passed the bill, more from hatred of the nobility, against whom

these harsh things were contrived, than out of care for the republic : so great was the passion in the factions.

The willingness of the populace to serve as Pompey's *ministra cupitis*, then, is one example of the process of gradual corruption Sallust demonstrates in his works. More interested in protecting their own interests than pursuing what was best for the republic, in Sallust's view, the *plebs* were willing to hand themselves over to Pompey for whatever ends he desired as long as he showed favor to them (*colere*).

Sallust's use of *colere* in 4.47 M is worth examining. When used to denote relationships between people or groups of people, *colere* is typically a synonym for *sustinere*, *adiuvare*, *curare*, vel sim.; that is, it has a positive connotation.<sup>204</sup> Livy, for example, uses it in an episode in Book Three in which one Valerius Publicola tries to calm the public (*memorem se maiorum suorum, memorem cognominis quo populi colendi velut hereditaria cura sibi a maioribus tradita esset*, “. . . mindful of his ancestors and the family name, by which the responsibility of protecting the interests of the people had been handed down by his ancestors like an inheritance. . .” 3.18.6). Here, *colendi* clearly has a positive connotation; Publicola tries to appeal to the people by demonstrating his respect for public institutions and his sense of obligation to protect the interests of the *plebs*. Livy similarly uses *colere* again in Book 7. Here, Valerius Corvinus, addressing his troops to raise their spirits before a battle against the Samnites, reminds his army that he has always protected the interests of the Roman people :

semper ego plebem Romanam militiae domique, privatus, in  
magistratibus parvis magnisque, aequae tribunus ac consul, eodem tenore

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<sup>204</sup> TLL Vol III , col. 1675, 72ff.

per omnes deinceps consulatus colo atque colui. (7.32.16)

On campaign and at home, as a private citizen, in lesser offices and great ones, as tribune and consul in the same way, with the same course through all my consulships I protect and have protected the interests of the Roman people.

Although a cynical reader might question the sincerity of Valerius' use of *colo* and *colui*, Livy, at least, writes under the assumption that Valerius did indeed show genuine empathy (*non alias militi familiarior dux fuit omnia inter infimos militum haud gravate munia obeundo*, “Nor ever was any leader more familiar to his soldiers, because he cheerfully underwent tasks with the lowest-ranked of the troops” 7.33.1).

In the voice of Cicero, however, *colere* seems to imply bribery or undue influence :

neque vero tam durus in plebem noster ordo fuit ut eam coli nostra modica liberalitate noluerit (*Pro Planc.* 45)

Nor indeed has our rank ever been so harsh toward the people that it did not wish them to be courted by our moderate liberality.

Sallust's complex relationship with Cicero manifests itself yet again in the use of *colere*. Cicero describes the senate's willingness to court the common people with generosity, but he does not say this in such direct terms. Rather, he portrays the senate as not unwilling (*neque. . . noluerit*) that this should happen, and he uses a passive construction (*eam coli*) to avoid naming the senate as the subject of the bribery. Sallust's Pompey, on the other hand, is depicted as actively deciding (*decreverat*) to pay special attention to the plebs, specifically for the purpose of manipulating them to serve his own interests (*ut mox*

*cupitis ministram haberet*). Sallust's *colere*, then, while closer to Cicero's usage than to Livy's, takes on an even more insidious tone than Cicero's.

#### 4.2.2 One versus the many : the risks of exceptional command

The question of the most effective structure of power was one of the great concerns of the triumviral period. By the time of the *Histories*' composition, it had become evident that the traditional forms of power at Rome were giving way to the control of powerful individual men. The career of Julius Caesar obviously illustrated many of the risks and rewards of the consolidation of authority in the hands of one powerful man. The chaos and civil war that broke out after Caesar's assassination illustrated another risk : when one man holds absolute authority, what happens to Rome if something happens to him? The confirmation of the triumvirate under the *lex Titia* in 43 BCE posed a novel set of questions and problems. Although the triumvirs' initial (self) appointment was nominally for a five-year term, the fact that the triumvirs conspired among themselves to create the very office and circumvented traditional legislative protocol by enacting the law the day it was proposed<sup>205</sup>, probably failed to convince the Roman people that their *de facto* dictatorship was any less perpetual than Julius Caesar's.

The precedent for all these men, of course, was old; for example Marius and Sulla had both risen to great individual prominence on the strength of their armies. Pompey's path to power, however, was novel in multiple ways; the speed with which he was catapulted to prominence is often noted in both ancient sources and modern scholarship, but it should also be noted that Pompey, unlike Marius and Sulla, was essentially gifted

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<sup>205</sup> Appian *BC* 4.7.

with autocracy by the Roman people themselves. Whereas Marius and Sulla developed their power independently and in defiance of established power structures, Pompey was appointed to exceptional command by the passage of the *lex Gabinia* in 67 BCE, with the law overwhelmingly supported by the tribunes and passed by the assembly. The tribunes and the people thus willingly handed unprecedented power over to one man, and although there were many in the senate opposed to the proposal, their efforts to block the bill were insufficient. The terms of the law amounted to military *carte blanche* for the thirty-nine year old general. In practice, then, at least in terms of the vast extent of his powers, Pompey's command against the pirates was not so different from a kingship. As the case of Alexander the Great demonstrates, the problems with monarchy are not just ideological, but also practical. The Roman distaste for kingship is well established; the state that prided itself on the expulsion of its kings and establishment of its republican government blanched at the suggestion of royal ambitions.<sup>206</sup> However, monarchy (or dictatorship, or exceptional single command) posed a risk by entrusting the state to one person. After Alexander the Great died in 323 BCE leaving no heir, the Macedonian empire ceased to be a unified entity; the regencies established by Perdiccas gave way to civil war, and a generation later the former Macedonian empire had splintered into four kingdoms (Macedon, the Seleucid Empire, the Ptolemaic kingdom, and Pergamon). If Pompey was indeed the Roman Alexander, then, what would his death mean for Rome?

On the other hand, a single commander could, perhaps, be more effective than a

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<sup>206</sup> See Rawson 1975 on Caesar's apparent royal ambitions for a useful summary of the literary evidence for Rome's queasiness about kingship. Rawson points out, however, that Roman distaste for monarchy was not absolute: "a mixture of distaste and conscious superiority on the one hand, and attraction and a hidden inferiority complex on the other (152)." Despite these qualifications, however, it is clear that Rome's attitude toward kingship was ambivalently curious at its warmest.

shared command; a general acting alone is unencumbered by the delays and obstructions of collaboration. Soon after the establishment of the Augustan principate, Livy used the figure of Alexander to think through the relative merits of sole command :

et quo sint mirabiliores quam Alexander aut quisquam rex, denos vicenosque dies quidam dictaturam, nemo plus quam annum consulatum gessit; ab tribunis plebis dilectus impediti sunt; post tempus ad bella ierunt, ante tempus comitiorum causa revocati sunt; in ipso conatu rerum circumegit se annus; collegae nunc temeritas, nunc pravitas impedimento aut damno fuit; male gestis rebus alterius successum est; tironem aut mala disciplina institutum exercitum acceperunt. At hercule reges non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus sed domini rerum temporumque trahunt consiliis cuncta, non sequuntur. (9.18.13-17)

They are so much more marvelous than Alexander or any king : some held the dictatorship for ten or twenty days, none held the consulship more than a year; their levies were impeded by the tribunes of the plebs; they went into wars late, they were called back early because of elections; during their effort, their terms expired; now the impulsiveness, now the depravity of a colleague was the source of difficulty or loss; they were successors to affairs managed badly by others; they received an army that was inexperienced or accustomed to bad discipline. But, indeed, kings are not only free from all impediments, but they are the masters of affairs and timing, and they lead everything by their plans; they do not follow.

Here, Livy argues that the exploits of Rome's generals are more impressive than those of Alexander because the Romans became successful at war despite being encumbered by the Roman state bureaucracy; when action was required, these generals were forced to negotiate with different entities with varying interests. Livy was writing the second pentad of the *AUC* at a time when it had become apparent that Rome was going to be under the rule of one man for the foreseeable future, and so had some incentive to portray sole command as an ideal form of government. Still, regardless of any pressure from

Augustus, Livy makes valid points here; the multifaceted and bureaucratic Roman system of authority ran the risk of stalemate. On the other hand, in theory, this system of power-sharing was praiseworthy in some respects. Polybius argued that the mixed constitution of Rome, combining elements of aristocracy (the senate), democracy (the people), and monarchy (the consuls), was ideal :

Τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς ἐκάστου τῶν μερῶν δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ καὶ βλάπτειν καὶ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοις, πρὸς πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς περιστάσεις δεόντως ἔχειν τὴν ἀρμογὴν αὐτῶν, ὥστε μὴ οἶόν τ' εἶναι ταύτης εὐρεῖν ἀμείνω πολιτείας σύστασιν (6.18.1)

Since this is the power of each of the parts of hindering or working with the others, it happens that their united form is suitable in all emergencies, with the result that it is not possible to find a better arrangement of constitution than this.

πάντα γὰρ ἐμμένει τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὰ μὲν κωλυόμενα τῆς ὁρμῆς, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεδιότα τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πέλας ἐπίστασιν (6.18.8)

For everything remains according to the established rules, since, on the one hand, they are hindered from aggression, and on the other, from the very first each fears interference from the next [group].

At the time of the *Histories'* composition the question of the best form of state power was relevant and urgent. The triumvirate was not an entirely novel form of government, since the coalition of Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus had functioned as Rome's *de facto* government for six years. While all three were alive, the coalition, while occasionally tenuous, was for the most part stable; during that time Rome at least avoided the outbreak of full-scale civil war. After the death of Crassus in Parthia in 53 BCE, the longstanding rivalry between Caesar and Pompey, previously mitigated or balanced by

the presence of a third party, matured into civil war. The “first triumvirate,” however, was an unofficial coalition in which each individual relied on the powers granted by the legitimate offices they held at the time. This would not be the case with Octavian, Mark Antony, and Lepidus; this triumvirate, established by the *lex Titia*, was an anomalous and unprecedented form of government. As was discussed in Chapter 3,<sup>207</sup> the triumvirs were in near-constant conflict, despite their efforts to create a public image of *concordia*.

Turning from the time of the *Histories*' composition to the time of its narrative : the risks of placing the outcome of a war entirely in the hands of one man came to the fore during the senatorial debate over the Lex Gabinia. The law, proposed by the tribune Gabinius, addressed the need for swift and decisive action to be undertaken against the pirates menacing the Mediterranean; Marcus Antonius' campaign against the pirates in 74 BCE had been ineffective<sup>208</sup>, and the threat of famine loomed if the grain supply routes could not be secured. Gabinius did not explicitly name Pompey as the law's beneficiary, but there was no doubt that he was the individual commander Gabinius had in mind.<sup>209</sup> Under the law, one commander would be chosen from among those of consular rank to direct the campaign against the pirates. The law provided for a three-year command with proconsular *imperium*. It gave Pompey control of, essentially, the entire Mediterranean, and even all the mainland to a distance of 400 furlongs (approximately 50 miles) inland; he was given two hundred ships and granted authority to appoint fifteen legates with *imperium*, to raise levies, and to help himself to the treasury at Rome as needed (Plut.

<sup>207</sup> See section 3.3.

<sup>208</sup> *Qui orae maritimae, qua Romanum esset imperium, curator nocentior piratis*, “Who, as the protector of the maritime regions, where there was Roman rule, was more destructive than the pirates,” 3.2 M.

<sup>209</sup> For example, Dio 36.23.5 : “ἀντικρυς μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Πομπηίου ὄνομα οὐκ εἶπεν· εὐδελον δὲ ἦν ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ τι τοιοῦτον ὁ ὄμιλος ἀκούσῃ, ἐκείνον αἰρήσεται,” “He did not say the name of Pompey outright. But it was clear that the people heard anything of this sort, they would choose him.”



*Pomp.* 25). Gabinius thus proposed no ordinary command, but, at least in Plutarch's estimation, “outright monarchy” and “irresponsible power over all men (ἄντικρυς δὲ μοναρχίαν. . . καὶ δύναμιν ἐπὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπους ἀνυπεύθυνον, *Pomp.* 25).”

Unsurprisingly, Gabinius' proposal provoked nearly unanimous opposition in the senate. In the ensuing debates, speeches were given by at least Julius Caesar, the consul C. Piso, Hortensius, and Catulus. It seems probable that Sallust narrated the debate over the *lex Gabinia* in Book Five of the *Histories* in some way, although it is unclear the extent to which any of the individual characters was afforded direct speech. If there were originally any longer speeches, we might expect them to have been transmitted along with the extant speeches and letters. However, at least two of the fragments do appear to be in *oratio recta* (5.21 and 5.22 M). 5.24 M is the first fragment in this section to address the issue of sole command. Without context, it is difficult to determine whether 5.24, assigned by Maurenbrecher to the debate, is in *oratio recta* or *oratio obliqua* (that is, whether it is presented as Catulus' actual words, or as Sallust's summary of the speech) :

5.24 M Nam si in Pompeio quid humani evenisset.

OR : For if anything of human chance had befallen Pompeius. . .

OO : For if anything of human chance befell Pompeius<sup>210</sup>

Maurenbrecher assigns this fragment to the debate over the *lex Gabinia*; the similarity of the fragment with other accounts of Catulus' speech suggests that 5.24 has been correctly

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<sup>210</sup> This fragment is preserved with book number by Arusinius, illustrating the use of *evenit* with the prepositional phrase *in* + dative.

assigned. Cicero, for example, reports that Catulus posed the same question as the one asked in this fragment :

reliquum est ut de Q. Catuli auctoritate et sententia dicendum esse videatur, qui cum ex vobis quaereret, si in uno Cn. Pompeio omnia poneretis, si quid eo factum esset, in quo spem essetis habituri, cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum ac dignitatis, cum omnes una prope voce in eo ipso vos spem habituros esse dixistis. (*Pro Man.* 59)

As for what remains - it seems we should have a discussion about the authority and opinion of Quintus Catulus - who, when he asked you, if you placed everything in the hands of Pompey alone, in whom you would place your hope if anything happened to him, seized the great fruit of his own virtue and dignity, when you all said as if in one voice that you would place your hope in him himself.

Cicero here is speaking in support of the *lex Manilia*, under which Pompey would replace Lucullus in the war against Mithridates. Cicero reminds his audience that, when the *lex Gabinia* was proposed, many, including Catulus, had opposed the bill, arguing that placing supreme power in the hands of one man alone ran the risk of catastrophe if anything should happen to that one man. In that case, Cicero points out, the people knew that if anything happened to Pompey, the war against the pirates could simply be entrusted to another (for example, to Catulus himself), and the same reasoning should be brought to bear in the debate over the *lex Manilia*, as well. According to Cicero, then, there is little risk in entrusting everything to one single general; if anything should have befallen him, another great Roman commander would have followed in his footsteps. On the other hand, as Sallust's account suggests, there was no guarantee that Pompey's fate would be any different from that of the Macedonian king he so admired; no great commander stepped in to fill Alexander's shoes, and the Macedonian empire was

splintered by civil war.

### 4.3 Self-interest

Although self-interest was not a new personality trait in the 70s and 60s BCE, the brazen openness with which figures like Pompey and Lucullus pursued their own interests contrary to traditional rules and procedures and at the expense of the good of the state set a precedent, for example, for Octavian to force his way into the consulship contrary to the *lex annalis* in 43. This theme had concerned Sallust since the composition of the *BC* :

Namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora quicumque rem publicam agitare honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma foret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant (*BC* 38.3)

For, that I might sum up the truth in a few words, after that time, whoever stirred up the republic under honorable pretexts, some as if they defended the rights of the people, another part as if they wanted the authority of the senate to be the strongest, each one fought for his own power, pretending it was the public good.

In this passage, Sallust refers to the period covered in the later books of the *Histories* (*nam postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta est. . .* “For after the tribunician power was restored during the consulship of Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus [70 BCE]. . . , *BC* 38.1), a period during which both Lucullus and Pompey were striving for individual power by obtaining lucrative military commands for themselves. In this section, I examine Sallust's portrayals of Lucullus and Pompey and show how he characterizes them as ambitious and singularly self-interested to the

detriment of the Roman state.

#### 4.3.1 Lucullus

Lucullus makes his first appearance in the fragments at the beginning of his consulship in 74 BCE. Sallust describes the reaction of the senate to the letter from Pompey, in which Pompey outlined the difficulties facing his army in Spain; the outgoing consuls were preoccupied with selecting their provinces for the next year, while the incoming consuls, Lucullus and Marcus Aurelius Cotta, sought to defuse the situation in Spain primarily to prevent any damage to their own reputations :

2.98D M Hae litterae principio sequentis anni recitatae in senatu. Sed consules decretas a patribus provincias inter se paravere : Cotta Galliam citeriorem habuit, Ciliciam Octavius. Dein proximi consules L. Lucullus et M. Cotta litteris nuntiisque Pompei graviter perculsi cum summae rei gratia tum ne exercitu in Italiam deducto neque laus sua neque dignitas esset, omni modo stipendium <e>t supplementum paravere

This letter was read in the senate at the beginning of the following year [74 BCE]. But the consuls furnished to themselves the provinces that had been decreed by the senate : Cotta had nearer Gaul, Octavius had Cilicia. Then the next consuls Lucullus and M. Cotta, who were very disturbed by Pompey's letter and messages, both because of the seriousness of the matter and because there would be no praise or honor for them if his army was led into Italy, supplied pay and reinforcement . . .

It would be troublesome for the new consuls if Pompey followed through on his threat to lead his army back to Italy; Pompey's return would be disastrous for the political ambitions of Lucullus, in particular. Although Sallust does not make Lucullus' reasoning explicit in the extant passages of the *Histories*, Plutarch, whose *Life of Lucullus* is based

in some part on Sallust's work, claims that the incoming consul already had designs on a command against Mithridates. If Pompey ran out of resources in Spain and abandoned the campaign against Sertorius, he would return to Italy; Lucullus feared that the more popular Pompey would take control of the whole city (implying, perhaps, that Pompey would have the choice of any command he liked):

διὸ καὶ χρήματα αἰτοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ γράφοντος, ὥς εἰ μὴ πέμποιεν,  
ἀφείς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ Σερτώριον εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀπάξοι τὰς δυνάμεις,  
συνέπραξεν ὁ Λεύκολλος προθυμότερα πεμφθῆναι τὰ χρήματα καὶ μηδ’  
ἀφ’ ἡστινοσοῦν προφάσεως ἐκεῖνον ἐπανελθεῖν ὑπατεύοντος αὐτοῦ.  
πάντα γὰρ ἂν ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ γενήσεσθαι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρόντι μετὰ  
τοσαύτης στρατιᾶς. (*Luc.* 5.3)

Therefore, when he asked for funds and wrote that if they did not send them, abandoning Spain and Sertorius he would bring his forces into Italy, Lucullus most eagerly arranged to have money sent and to prevent Pompey's return under any pretext while he was consul. For everything in the city would be in the hands of that man if he were there with such an army.

From the very beginning of his consulship, then, Lucullus appears to have been openly more concerned with his personal ambition than with what was best for the Roman state. “All of the city” being in Pompey's hands might not have been the best thing for the Roman state,<sup>211</sup> but neither was a hastily contrived resumption of the Mithridatic War.

Sallust does not claim in 2.98D, however, that Lucullus was *only* concerned about Pompey's return because of its potential to limit his own political and military prospects; he remarks that the consuls were also stricken by the magnitude of the entire affair (*perculsi . . . summae rei*). This statement is vague, but Sallust seems to at least allow for

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<sup>211</sup> This was, indeed, a relevant and urgent issue at that time; see section 4.2.2 above.

the possibility that the consuls were not exclusively concerned for their own interests. It is also worth noting that *both* incoming consuls are implicated in this characterization, not Lucullus alone. 2.98D thus does not present an uncomplicated picture of Lucullus as singularly self-interested, but it lays the foundation for Sallust's later development of this theme.

Sallust returns to this characterization of Lucullus in his character-sketch of the general in Book 4 :

4.70 M Imperii prolatandi percupidus habebatur, cetera egregius

He was seen as very desirous of extending power, but extraordinary with respect to the rest.<sup>212</sup>

Kritz and Maurenbrecher both assign this passage to a putative character portrait of Lucullus, placed at the point in the narrative where Lucullus turns his attentions to Armenia, immediately after the letter of Mithridates to Tigranes. Nearly every word in this fragment is being used by Sallust in a novel or unexpected way, and Sallust's reader probably would have needed to linger over this peculiar line. This suggests that this character-portrait of Lucullus (like those of Sertorius, Spartacus, and Pompey, as I have discussed) was thematically or otherwise important to the *Histories*.

Without the fragment's context, it is not immediately clear whether *imperii* refers to the sphere of Roman control or to Lucullus' personal command; that is, does he appear to desire greatly the extension of Rome's boundaries and authority, or to be preoccupied

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<sup>212</sup> This fragment is transmitted by Arusianus to illustrate the use of *egregius* with an accusative of respect (more on this usage below). The grammarian incorrectly attributed the quotation to the *BJ*; Maurenbrecher follows Kritz in assigning it to Book 4 of the *Histories*.

with extending his own command at any cost? Such ambiguity is typically Sallustian. In late Republican and triumviral literature, *imperium* can denote either individual command or the authority of the state. Sallust uses the term in both ways. For example, in his speech, Philippus refers to the *imperium* of individual Romans (*uti Ap. Claudius interrex cum Q. Catulo pro consule et ceteris, quibus imperium est, urbi praesidio sint. . .*, “. . . such that Appius Claudius the interrex, along with the proconsul Quintus Catulus, and all those who have military authority, be a guard for the city. . .,” 1.77.22 M); Sertorius' rule over his Spanish troops is also described as *imperium* (*modicoque et eleganti imperio percarus fuit*, “He was greatly beloved for his moderate and fastidious command,” 1.94 M). However, Sallust also uses *imperium* to refer to the dominion of the Roman state (e.g., *Populus Romanus, paulo ante gentium moderator, exutus imperio. . .* “The Roman people, not long ago the ruler of nations, now stripped of power. . .,” 1.55.11 M; *qui orae maritimae, qua Romanum esset imperium, curator <noce>ntior piratis*, “Who, as the guardian of the maritime provinces as far as Roman control extended, was more harmful than the pirates,” 3.2 M). Analysis of Sallust's usage of *imperium*, then, does not guide us strongly in either direction. Nor does the gerundive *prolatandi*, by which *imperii* is governed; *prolatare*, as a synonym of *dilatare* or *extendere*, can be either spatial or temporal.<sup>213</sup> Fragment 4.70 M could thus plausibly refer to the expansion of the territory of the Roman empire, or the extension of the duration of Lucullus' command.

However, in light of Plutarch's account in the *Life of Lucullus*, based in part on the *Histories*,<sup>214</sup> and fragment 4.71 M, it seems probable that *imperium* here refers to

<sup>213</sup> TLL X 2 Fasc. XII 1817, 35ff (spatial usage) and 46ff (temporal). O. Prinz, the author of the TLL entry, was also apparently challenged by the ambiguity of Sallust's language here; this fragment is listed in the entry for spatial usage, “nisi de imperio magistratus continuendo accipias.”

<sup>214</sup> Plutarch explicitly acknowledges Sallust's influence on at least this passage : Σαλούστιος μὲν οὖν

Lucullus' personal command.

φθόνῳ τοῦ Λευκόλλου κατηγοροῦντες ὥς ὑπὸ φιλαρχίας καὶ φιλοπλουτίας ἔλκοντος τὸν πόλεμον καὶ μονονοῦ κατέχοντος ἐν ταύτῃ Κιλικίαν, Ἀσίαν, Βιθυνίαν, Παφλαγονίαν, Γαλατίαν, Πόντον, Ἀρμενίαν, τὰ μέχρι Φάσιδος, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ Τιγράνου βασιλεία πεπορθηκότος, ὥσπερ ἐκδῦσαι τοὺς βασιλεῖς, οὐ καταπολεμῆσαι πεμφθέντος (Plutarch, *Luc.* 33.4)

Out of envy, they accused Lucullus that he was dragging out the war because of his love of power and love of wealth, and that he already had to himself Cilicia, Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Pontus, Armenia, and the regions as far as Phasis, but now he had plundered the kingdom of Tigranes as if he had been sent to strip the kings bare, not subdue them in war.

Plutarch does claim that those denouncing Lucullus on the grounds that he was prolonging the conflict for his own gain were doing so out of jealousy, but that certainly does not guarantee that these charges were false. If Plutarch is following Sallust as closely here as elsewhere, this passage suggests that Sallust's Lucullus was desperate to maintain his personal command.

Fragment 4.71 M also suggests that Sallust portrayed Lucullus in this way :

4.71 M Schol. Gronov. Ad Cic. *pr. Leg. Man.* 28 : “Ut dicit Sallustius, Lucullus pecuniam Quintio dedit, ne illi succederetur.

“As Sallust says, Lucullus gave money to Quintius so that he would not be succeeded in it [his command].”

Kritz assigned this fragment to Book 5 and the year 67 BCE, but Maurenbrecher assigned it instead to the transition to Lucullus' Armenian ambitions in Book 4 based on Plutarch's

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φησι. . .(*Luc.* 33.3)



claim that Lucius Quinctius led the complaints about Lucullus' self-interest in trying to extend his command in 69 BCE (*Luc.* 33.5-6). Funari and McGushin follow Maurenbrecher's assignment and interpret the fragment as referring to Lucullus' attempt to bribe Quinctius so that Quinctius would abandon his campaign to have Lucullus replaced. And Lucullus *should* have been replaced; Lucullus had no support from either his troops or his former political allies back in Rome, and his attempt to extend his command imperiled the success of the entire campaign against Mithridates (Plut. *Luc.* 33.3-4). Thus, as is suggested by Plutarch's narrative as well as by evidence from the *Histories* themselves, Lucullus seems to have been portrayed by Sallust as obsessively self-interested, willing to resort to bribery to extend his command in the east well past the point of effectiveness; in this light, the *imperium* in 4.70 is reasonably understood to refer to Lucullus' command in the east. This is further supported by *cetera egregius*. In the context of late republican Rome, it could be considered *egregius* to be zealous for the expansion of power; the contrast between *imperii prolatandi percupidus* and *cetera egregius*, then, would make no sense. At any rate, even if the entire Lucullan narrative were extant, it would not be surprising if Sallust left *imperium* ambiguous anyhow. As we have seen, intentional ambiguity is one method by which Sallust catches the reader's attention and forces him to read a particular passage carefully; it may not be possible to resolve this ambiguity, or even desirable to try to do so.

*Percupidus* is an very unusual term; its only other attested occurrence in late Republican and triumviral Latin comes in a letter from Cicero to Lentulus from 56 BCE, in which Cicero reassures Lentulus that his support at Rome remained strong :

Quo quidem tempore, ut perscripsi ad te antea, cognovi Hortensium percupidum tui, studiosum Lucullum, ex magistratibus autem L. Racilium et fide et animo singulari (*ad Fam.* 1.7.2)

At that time, as I thoroughly described to you before, I found Hortensius was very fond of you, Lucullus was devoted, moreover, among the magistrates, L. Racillius was with exceptional trust and support.

As Funari points out, Sallust's use of *percupidus*, which appears to have belonged to *sermo cotidianus* rather than to the loftier, more literary language of historiography, is a noteworthy transgression of generic boundaries. Cicero's epistles were probably published too late for Sallust to have been referencing this letter in particular;<sup>215</sup> even if Sallust's reader did not recognize a Ciceronian source for the word, however, Sallust indulges in colloquialisms infrequently enough that it would have seized the reader's attention.

Sallust's use of the passive *habebatur* here is interesting, as well. Sallust does not tell us that Lucullus *was* (*erat* or *fuit*) *percupidus* and *egregius*, but that he *seemed* or *was thought* to be such. Sallust may simply want to claim that this was the general opinion about Lucullus without explicitly vouching for its veracity. The phrasing may be more pointed, however. More specifically, the use of the passive form of a speculative verb establishes distance between Sallust's narrative voice and the stated opinion and thus creates uncertainty with respect to the validity of the expressed opinion. Grethlein has argued that, far from presenting himself as a dogmatically omniscient narrator, Sallust uses displays of uncertainty to shape the reader's experience of the narrative. Narrative uncertainty, according to Grethlein, functions on three levels (mimesis, rhetoric, and

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<sup>215</sup> On the date of publication of the letters, see Shackleton Bailey 1995 and 2004.

reception); Grethlein describes the rhetorical function as “Sallust's use of expressions of uncertainty in order to highlight other parts of the narrative.”<sup>216</sup> In other words, this is one of the methods by which Sallust directs the reader's attention in a particular direction; just as we have seen Sallust draw our focus to specific remarks with archaic or unusual vocabulary and syntax (especially in the character portraits), the sudden intrusion of uncertainty expressed with the use of *habeor* demands a critical reading of the passage. Although Grethlein primarily focuses on Sallust's first-person statements, Sallust's use of *habebatur* thus seems to fit Grethlein's characterization of narrative uncertainty for rhetorical purposes. This narrative uncertainty accords well with Sallust's techniques of linguistic and moral ambiguity elsewhere in the *Histories*.

Fragment 4.70 M is not the only passage in which Sallust seems to use *habeor* to create ambiguity and thus encourage closer and more critical attention from the reader, especially in the context of the characterization of important figures in his narratives. For example, forms of *habeor* appear twice in the debate and *synkrisis* of Caesar and Cato :

Cato clarus atque magnus habetur (*BC* 53.1)

Cato was considered noble and great

Caesar beneficiis ac munificentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae  
Cato (*BC* 54.2)

Caesar was considered great because of his favors and generosity, Cato  
because of the integrity of his way of life.

Sallust's opinion of both Cato and Caesar has been discussed extensively by scholars,

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<sup>216</sup> Grethlein 2006 305-308.

who have concluded both that Sallust admired Cato at Caesar's expense<sup>217</sup> and that he admired Caesar at Cato's expense<sup>218</sup>; in other words, Sallust's characterization of the men is presented in such a way that scholars have found evidence in the same passage to support opposite conclusions. The only thing that is clear about Sallust's opinion is that it is not clear at all, and this is no accident. His use of *habetur* and *habebatur* rather than making a first-person or more straightforward (e.g., *est*, *erat*) assertion is one factor which contributes to this uncertainty. *Someone* thought Cato and Caesar were *magni*, but it was not necessarily Sallust. To return to fragment 4.70 M : is Sallust calling into doubt whether Lucullus was *imperii prolatandi percupidus*, or *cetera egregius*, or both? If he wanted that to be clear to the reader, it would be clear. As with so many other passages in the *Histories*, the ambiguity is exactly the point; the uncertainty introduced by *habebatur* forces the reader to evaluate the characterization being made. The uncertainty here stands in stark contrast with Sallust's decisively critical remarks about Pompey in Pompey's character portrait, discussed in section 4.3.2 below. This may reflect the ultimate impact each man and his self-interest had on Rome. After his victory in Armenia in 69 BCE, Lucullus faded from the political scene and retired to his garden estate; although Lucullus had been willing to risk the success of Rome's eastern enterprise by holding on to his command too long, his selfish political machinations caused little lasting damage to Rome.

In Sallust's view, however, as I will discuss in the next section, Pompey's meteoric political rise, similarly driven by self-interest, contributed significantly to the unraveling

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<sup>217</sup> See, for example, Skard 1930, Earl 1961, Syme 1964.

<sup>218</sup> Schwartz 1897, Wirtz 1910.

of the remains of the Roman republic. Sallust may thus have been somewhat more generous with Lucullus than with Pompey; although Pompey was unquestionably *invrecundus animo*, Sallust is more willing to allow the uncertainty introduced by *habebatur* in the case of Lucullus, suggesting that he might have been *percupidus* but not convicting him of it. Perhaps more importantly, however, this may be a narrative technique to “train” the reader to accept Sallust's judgment of Pompey; this was especially necessary because, at the time of the *Histories*' composition, Pompey was still remembered fondly by some.<sup>219</sup> By using a verb of seeming (*habeor*) rather than making an explicit declaration, Sallust forces the reader to make a judgment about whether Lucullus really was *percupidus*; the rest of Sallust's depiction, however, makes it clear the judgment at which the reader should arrive (*imperii prolatandi percupidus erat*). Once the reader has thus accepted Sallust's characterization of Lucullus, Sallust's depiction of Pompey's more open and blatant self-interest will seem more plausible than it might have if no precedent had been set previously in the *Histories*.

In his character portrait of Lucullus, Sallust thus creates a picture of a Lucullus who is deeply self-interested and willing to go to extreme lengths to pursue his aims. As I discuss in the next section, these are also defining characteristics of Sallust's Pompey, who, like Lucullus, is depicted as a precursor of the triumvirs in the single-minded pursuit of individual power at the expense of the state. Just as Pompey's conduct made it possible for the triumvirs to act as they did by setting a precedent for the circumvention of law and tradition on his road to power, Sallust's Lucullus seems to act as a precursor of Sallust's Pompey, albeit a weak one; by trying to badger the senate into extending his

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<sup>219</sup> See, for example, Appian *BC* 5.99.

command against Mithridates, Lucullus tried unsuccessfully to establish himself as the Roman conquerer of the east, a claim which would later be made more convincingly by Pompey. Lucullus lacked the reputation and success to compel others to capitulate to his self-centered desires, but his attempts contributed to the habituation of the senate and the people to such overt acts of self-interest; in comparison, the demands of the successful and popular Pompey would not seem as excessive, and Pompey would use this to his advantage.

#### 4.3.2 Pompey

As was discussed in the previous section, Sallust characterizes Lucullus as intensely self-interested, willing to subordinate the welfare of the *res publica* to his own pursuit of glory and success. Fragments 2.16 and 2.17 M, probably from a character portrait of Pompey, seem to suggest that Pompey was characterized by a similar obsession with his own advancement.

2.16 M Suetonius de gramm. c. 15 : “ut Lenaeus. . .Sallustium historicum, quod eum (scil. Pompeium) *oris probi, animo invereundo* scripsisset, acerbissima satira laceraverit.”

Just as Lenaeus slandered Sallust the historian in a most bitter satire, because he had written that he [Pompey] was of an honest face but with a shameless spirit.

This fragment is preserved in Suetonius' *De Grammaticis*; Suetonius describes the loyalty of one of Pompey's freedmen, Lenaeus, and his angry reaction to Sallust's characterization of Pompey (presumably in the *Histories*). Maurenbrecher assigns the

fragment to a putative character-portrait of Pompey in Book Two, at the point in the narrative where Pompey obtained the command in Spain during the Sertorian War (77 BCE).<sup>220</sup> Since, as we have seen, Sallust uses other character-portraits in the *Histories* and the monographs to highlight major themes of his narratives, the fragments of the Pompey character-sketch must be closely analyzed; as will be discussed below, the fragments in this section contribute to Sallust's characterization of Pompey's self-interest at the expense of the state.

*Inverecundo* is the most obviously loaded word in the fragment; we can imagine that Lenaeus objected to Sallust's use of this adjective to describe his patron. This is the only use of *inverecundus* in the extant Sallustian corpus. *Inverecundus* is not a common adjective in republican and triumviral Latin; however, a parallel for the pairing of *inverecundus* and *probus* in 2.16 M appears in the fragments of early Latin tragedy :

Nam si veretur, quid eum accuses, qui est probus?  
 Sin inverecundum animi ingenium possidet  
 quid autem eum accuses qui id parvi auditum aestimet? (Trag. inc. 179 R)

For if he is reverent, what accusation could you make against one who is upstanding?  
 But if he possesses a shameless spirit in his soul  
 Again, what accusation could you make against one who thinks what [accusation] he heard is unimportant?

Once again, then, Sallust seems to be mining the vocabulary of archaic Latin, here borrowing from the early dramatists. Displaying his characteristic *inconcinnitas*, Sallust

<sup>220</sup> This assignment is defensible by comparison with Sallust's other character-sketches; the structure and tone of Sallust's remark in 2.16 (and 2.17) closely echo other character-portraits (e.g., on Catiline : *fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo pravoque*, BC 5.1; *satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum*, BC 5.4). The thematic relationship of this fragment to Sallust's other character portraits is discussed in more detail below.

here sets up a slightly unbalanced antithesis. *Inverecundus*, in this instance synonymous with *impudens*, *insolens*, *male audax*, or something similar,<sup>221</sup> is not equivalent to *improbus*; it implies a refusal to control one's ambition or impulses, or a transgression of boundaries, rather than a generic moral failing. Close enough that the reader understands the gist of the antithesis between the adjectives, but slightly off-balance. *Inverecundus* is, perhaps, a closer antonym of *modestus*, which appears in fragment 2.17 M (which, if the Pompey character-sketch followed a structure similar to that of the portrait of Catiline, for example, was probably in close proximity to 2.16 in the original text); *inverecundus* suggests a lack of self-limitation or *modestia*. Sallust's choice of an adjective with the negating prefix *in-* rather than a base adjective with the same meaning is another rhetorical trick by which Sallust catches the reader's attention. He evokes a positive characteristic (*verecundus*) at the same time as he deprives Pompey of it, making his criticism more pointed. Once again, Sallust has crafted a passage which forces the reader to pay close attention.

Although the freedman Lenaeus was probably too offended by *animo inverecundo* to appreciate the originality of the phrase *oris probi*, this is a peculiar characterization.<sup>222</sup> The pairing of *probus* with *os* is especially unusual. *Probus*, both in the Sallustian corpus and in republican and triumviral Latin in general, tends to denote a moral quality.<sup>223</sup> Sallust uses *probus* infrequently<sup>224</sup>, but when he does (except 2.16 M), he uses it in the expected sense, to refer to the moral quality of a person or institution. For example, in

<sup>221</sup> TLL VII.2, 161,75ff.

<sup>222</sup> Peculiar, but elegant and fitting enough to have been adopted from Sallust by later sources; see, for example, Pliny *NH* 37.14 (*erat et imago Gn. Pompei. . illius probi oris venerandique per cunctas gentes*).

<sup>223</sup> TLL X.2 fasc. X, 1483, 22ff; see especially 1484, 55; 1485, 4 and 27.

<sup>224</sup> *Probus* appears only 5 times in Sallust's corpus : 1.55.9 M, 2.19 M, *BC* 25.2, 51.37, *BJ* 85.9.



the *BC*, Sallust says Sempronia played the lyre and danced more attractively than was necessary for an honest woman (*psallere et saltare elegantius quam necesse est probae*, *BC* 25.2); in his speech in the same work, Sallust's Caesar says that the *maiores* were not too proud to adopt foreign customs, provided that the customs were worthy (*neque illis superbia obstat quo minus aliena instituta, si modo proba erant, imitarentur*, *BC* 51.37). In both remaining appearances in Sallust, the masculine substantive form of *probus* is used (*probi*, 1.55.9 M, *probos*, BJ 85.9). In other words, 2.19 M is the only occurrence of *probus* in the Sallustian corpus in which it refers to a physical object rather than a person or institution, both of which may be more easily described as possessing moral qualities than, for example, a face.

In general, then, *probus* describes a moral quality, not a physical one; the pairing with *os* probably would have surprised Sallust's readers. There was some precedent for reading ethical qualities into one's physical appearance, particularly the *os*; authors as early as Terence had done so (*tum equidem istuc os tuum impudens videre nimium vellem*, “Indeed, I really would have liked to see that shameless face of yours” *Eun.* 597; *os durum!*, “cruel face!” *Eun.* 806). More contemporary with Sallust, in the *Verrines*, Cicero claims that Verres' savagery could be seen all over his countenance : *ardebant oculi, toto ex ore crudelitas eminebat* (“His eyes blazed, his savagery shone forth from his whole expression, 2.5.161). In the *In Vatinius*, Cicero uses a similar (if more colorful) image to denounce Vatinius :

si . . . strumae denique ab ore improbo demigrarunt et aliis iam se locis conlocarunt (Cic. *Vat.* 39)

. . .and, at last, if the scrofulous tumor has fled your shameless face and has removed itself already to other places. . .

Here, Cicero calls Vatinius' face itself *improbis*, but the implication, of course, is that this assessment applies to Vatinius' character, as well; in this case, the interior quality is assumed to match the exterior quality. For Sallust, on the other hand, this correlation does not hold. Pompey appears upstanding, but his spirit is not. The distance between appearances and reality is a central theme in Sallust's work, as has been observed.<sup>225</sup> This disparity was central to Sallust's characterization of Catiline, for example, who would pretend anything to suit the circumstances (*cuius rei lubet simlator ac dissimulator*, “pretender or concealer of whatever he pleased,” *BC* 5.4); Cato, on the other hand, is described as seeking to overcome the disparity between appearance and reality (*esse quam videri bonus malebat*, “he preferred to *be* good rather than *seem* good,” *BC* 54.6).

For Sallust, however, the disparity between appearances and reality was not just a character flaw, but an element of Roman political life which contributed to the breakdown of the *res publica*. According to Sallust (in the archaeology of the *BC*), one of the causes of state decay which crept in after the fall of Carthage was ambition, the symptoms of which included a disparity between what one said and thought (*Ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore aliud in lingua promptum habere*, “Ambition compelled many men to become false, to have one thing hidden in their hearts and another ready on the tongue,” *BC* 10.5). As was discussed at the beginning of this section, a later passage in the *BC* is especially relevant, because Sallust explicitly addresses the late 70s and early 60s BCE (the historical context of the Pompey

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<sup>225</sup> See especially Hands 1959.

narrative of the *Histories*); after tribunician power had been restored during the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70, Sallust says, men acted as if they were defending the rights of the people or the senate, but in truth, they were acting in their own interests (*BC* 38.3; text at the beginning of this section). The same theme appears in Marius' speech in the *BJ*, Marius criticizes those who only pretend to be *probus* and questions their ability to hold power responsibly (*Illis difficile est in potestatibus temperare, qui per ambitionem sese probos simulavere*, "It is difficult for them to be moderate with their powers, those who, out of ambition, pretended that they were upstanding," *BJ* 85.9).

Yet again, then, Sallust seems to be repurposing a Ciceronian expression to suit his own style and themes. Whereas Cicero suggested that Vatinius' *improbum os* was representative of his inner qualities, Sallust describes Pompey's *os* as *probum* to highlight the disparity between Pompey's innocent appearance and his shameless spirit (*animo inverecundo*). On the surface, Pompey appears harmless, but beneath this nonthreatening surface lies unrestrained self-interest. This, in turn, highlights one of Sallust's major themes : the threat to the *res publica* caused by the disparity between apparent and real intent. What was, in Cicero's speech, a colorful piece of invective meant to malign a political opponent, becomes in Sallust's voice a more sober accusation; the disparity between Pompey's appearance and the reality of his character is not just an objectionable personal quality, but a potential threat to Rome. Moreover, Sallust's surprising dip into the vocabulary of oratory compels us to pay closer attention to fragment 2.16; by unexpectedly crossing genres to borrow the vocabulary of invective for use in a historical

text, Sallust yet again throws his reader off-balance.

The same theme of extreme self-interest is continued more explicitly in 2.17 M :

2.17 M Modestus ad alia omnia, nisi ad dominationem.

Modest toward all other things, except toward tyranny.<sup>226</sup>

Maurenbrecher, following Dietsch against Kritz, assigned this fragment along with 2.16 to the character portrait of Pompey upon his entry into the Sertorian War. Also like 2.16, this fragment is characterized by language which demands the reader's close attention. For example, as Funari points out, the use of *modestus* with the preposition *ad* and an accusative noun is a Sallustian innovation; *modestus* usually appears with the preposition *in* and an ablative noun. The usage in 2.17, then, would have stood out to a reader as peculiar, drawing attention to the passage. Like *probus* in fragment 2.16, *modestus* is rare in the Sallustian corpus.

If allowing in the first half of the fragment that Pompey did display *modestia* in some circumstances seemed to be mitigating the critique to follow, Sallust's use of *dominatio* in the second half is an abrupt reversal. In the *Histories*, *dominatio* typically has a strongly negative connotation; for example, in the speech of Macer, the tribune uses *dominatio* to describe the object of civil war (*praesertim cum his civilibus armis dicta alia, sed certatum utrimque de dominatione in vobis sit*, “especially since, in civil strife, other things were said, but the contest on both sides was under whose tyranny you would be,” 3.48.11). More specifically, however, *dominatio* is the word used by Sallust to refer

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<sup>226</sup> This fragment is preserved with book number by Donatus in his commentary on Terence's *Phormio*, line 170, to illustrate the use of *modeste* as a synonym for *moderate* (*ni unum hoc desit animus qui modeste istaec ferat, Phorm. 170*).

to the reign of Sulla, of whom Sallust was critical.<sup>227</sup> In Book One, Sulla's power is first described as *dominatio* (*Sullae dominatio*, 1.31 M); the same term is applied to Sulla in the speech of Lepidus (*At ille eo processit, ut nihil gloriosum nisi tutum et omnia retinendae dominationis honesta aestumet*, “But he has come to such a point that he thinks nothing is glorious except what is safe, and every means of holding on to his tyranny honest,” 1.55.8 M). In the *Histories*, then, *dominatio* represents the outcome of civil discord; the victor in civil war gains *dominatio* over his fellow citizens. Sallust's portrayal of Pompey as immoderate with respect to *dominatio* links Pompey not only back to the context of civil war, but to Sulla, in particular. The similarity of Pompey and Sulla was a recurring theme during Pompey's career. After Sulla's death in 78 BCE, his ghost continued to haunt the Roman imagination; individuals who grew too powerful, like Pompey and Caesar, were feared on the grounds that one might become a “new Sulla.”<sup>228</sup> Pompey, in particular, evoked this fear in his contemporaries. In a letter to Atticus from March 49 BCE, in which Cicero debates whether to follow Pompey out of Rome, Cicero worries that Pompey is intentionally styling himself after Sulla :

quam crebro illud “Sulla potuit, ego non potero?” (*ad Att.* 9.10.2)

How frequently he said this - “Sulla was able, but I will not be able?”

ita sullaturit animus eius (*ad Att.* 9.10.6)

His spirit has thus desired to imitate Sulla.

<sup>227</sup> For example, on Sulla's career after the war with Jugurtha : “For the things which he did later, I am uncertain whether to be ashamed or sad to speak of them,” (*nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere*, *BJ* 95.4)

<sup>228</sup> Even the original Sulla was seen by some as a new iteration of tyranny; see, for example, Plutarch, on Sulla's victory over Marius at Praeneste : “This made even the dullest Roman understand that there had been an exchange of tyranny, not an escape (*Life of Sulla* 30.4).”

Here Cicero reveals the growing fear that, if he were victorious in the war against Caesar, Pompey would follow the cruel and violent precedent set by Sulla a generation earlier. By evoking this connection between the two generals in 2.17 M, Sallust thus seems to suggest that Pompey not only shows an excessive interest in promoting his own career, but that he, like Sulla, might be willing to return Rome to a state of civil war whenever it would aid the pursuit of his own interests. Sallust's Pompey fairly obviously suggests this himself in his letter to the senate at the beginning of 74 BCE, in which he threatens to march from Spain back into Italy with his army if the senate does not send money and reinforcements (*qui nisi subvenitis, invito et praedicente me exercitus hinc et cum eo omne bellum Hispaniae in Italiam transgredientur*, “Unless you send aid - although I am unwilling and I have warned you – this army and all the war in Spain will cross over into Italy, 2.98.10 M); I discuss this letter in more detail in the following section.

#### **4.4 Sallust, Pompey, and historiography**

In the previous two chapters, I discussed the ways in which Sallust uses the figures of Sertorius and Spartacus to demonstrate the difficulties of engaging in historiography under the triumvirate. Through Sertorius, I have argued, Sallust addresses anxiety about the continuing relevance of historiography under the triumvirate by showing the soldier taking responsibility for his own *memoria*; Sallust's Spartacus, on the other hand, relies on Sallust to magnify him from runaway slave to prominent historical actor, suggesting that, even during the triumviral period, the historian still has the ability to commit *res gestae* to (or conceal from) history. It is clear that, along with Sertorius

and Spartacus, Pompey was one of the primary figures of the narrative of the *Histories*, playing perhaps a greater role than either of those characters; it thus seems likely that Sallust also used the character of Pompey as figure with which to think through the role of historiography under the triumvirate. In this section, I examine the impact of Sallust's Pompey on historiography in two ways. First, I discuss Sallust's implication that Pompey has no use for historians, but that like Sertorius, he is eager to take on the preservation of his *memoria* himself. In the second section, I discuss how Sallust's Pompey ultimately poses a more critical challenge to history-writing by dismissing the value of recording *res gestae* altogether. In his letter to the senate, Pompey essentially makes the case that language is too corrupt to be effective; words now have to be backed with threats of action to achieve any results. For Sallust, I argue, this is the greatest challenge in the task of writing the *Histories* : overcoming the devaluation and perversion of language in the context of civil war.

#### 4.4.1 Recording history

In some respects, it should not surprise us if we find Sallust's Pompey, like Sertorius, usurping the role of the historian to dictate his own legacy. Sallust's Pompey is characterized by a competitive spirit, striving to outdo everyone he encountered in every arena :

2.19 M Cum alacribus saltu, cum velocibus cursu, cum validis vecte certabat.

He competed in jumping with the quick, in running with the swift, in weightlifting with the strong.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> This fragment is preserved without book number by Vegetius in *De Re Militari*.

Maurenbrecher assigned this fragment to the character portrait of Pompey in Book Two. Vegetius specified that Sallust here refers to Pompey's *exercitium* (*de exercitio Cn. Pompeii Magni Sallustius hoc memorat*); since *exercitium* typically denotes physical exercise,<sup>230</sup> and since the citation is from a treatise on military training and exercises, we might assume that the description should only be taken literally, but we also might wonder whether Sallust implies that Pompey is inclined to compete with other experts at their own craft – experts like, for example, historians.

In Sallust's account of Pompey's reaction to his defeat of Sertorius' army in Spain, Pompey does, in fact, seem to be trying to usurp the role of the historian; in particular, he attempts to “rewrite” as a foreign war what was, in reality, a civil war. According to Sallust, on his victory march home from Spain, Pompey set up trophies to commemorate not a victory over Sertorius, a Roman commander, but over a Spanish army :

3.89 M Devictis Hispanis tropaea in Pyrenaei iugis constituit

When the Spanish were conquered, he set up the trophies on the ridges of the Pyrenees.<sup>231</sup>

Maurenbrecher assigned this fragment to Sallust's account of the end of the war with Sertorius in Spain; Pliny confirms that Pompey set up such a monument to commemorate his victory in Spain (*NH* 7.96).<sup>232</sup> Maurenbrecher was, accordingly, critical of previous

<sup>230</sup> TLL V.2.2, 1384, 70ff

<sup>231</sup> This fragment is preserved by Servius in his commentary on a parallel use of *constituo* in *Aeneid* 11.6 (*CONSTITUIT TUMULO in colle, quia tropaea non figebantur nisi in eminentioribus locis. Sallustius de Pompeio ait. . .*).

<sup>232</sup> Also elsewhere in the *NH* : *Citerioris Hispaniae sicut conplurium provinciarum aliquantum vetus forma mutata est, utpote cum Pompeius Magnus tropaeis suis, quae statuebat in Pyrenaeo, DCCCLXVI oppida ab Alpibus ad fines Hispaniae ulterioris in dicionem ab se redacta testatus sit*, “The old shape of



unnamed editors who assigned the fragment to the fourth book (“Quartum in librum cur haec verba reicerint editores, sane nescio, cum et e reliquis fragmentis et ex Exuperantio elucere videatur et Hispaniam plane subactam et Pompeii reditum narratum esse libro tertio.”) rather than to the conclusion of the Sertorian War in Book Three.

Pompey's need to portray the victory over Sertorius' army as a foreign conquest was twofold. The more immediate and practical concern was that, according to Roman tradition, the senate would not grant Pompey a triumph for a victory over a Roman citizen. According to Florus, Pompey intentionally left Sertorius' name off the dedication for just this reason :

Bellum Sertorianum quid amplius quam Sullanae proscriptionis hereditas fuit? Hostile potius an civile dixerim nescio, quippe quod Lusitani Celtiberique Romano gesserint duce. . .victores duces externum id magis quam civile bellum videri voluerunt, uti triumpharent.

What more was the Sertorian war than the inheritance of the Sullan proscriptions? I do not know whether to call it a war against a foreign enemy or a civil war, because the Lusitani and Celtiberi fought under a Roman general. . .The victorious leaders wanted it to be considered a foreign rather than civil war, so that they could celebrate a triumph.

Pompey wanted another triumph; for this to be granted, he needed to boast about the conquered Spaniards (*devictis Hispanis*), but leave Sertorius out of it.<sup>233</sup> More generally, Pompey must have known that by 72 BCE, the year of his victory in Spain, the Roman populace was weary of civil conflicts. Pompey knew equally how complete was his dependence on the goodwill of the people. It would not have been politically expedient

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Hither Spain has been altered somewhat, just like many other provinces, insofar as Pompey Magnus testified on his trophies, which he set up in the Pyrenees, that 876 towns from the Alps to Further Spain had been brought under control by him” (NH 3.18)

<sup>233</sup> There was another problem with Pompey's bid for the triumph, which the senate was evidently willing to overlook: traditionally, *triumphatores* were required to have waged the triumphant war within their own province, but Pompey's province was Transalpina, not Hispania. For more, see Ebels 1975.

for Pompey to remind the public that his victory was over another Roman; Sertorius had been away from the city for a long time and was commanding foreign troops, but it must have been difficult to forget entirely that he was, indeed, a fellow Roman. For Pompey to boast explicitly about Sertorius' demise, then, would have been to risk alienating the people on whose goodwill he depended.

These same challenges of public image and perception would be encountered by Julius Caesar in the 40s; Caesar followed Pompey's example in “rewriting” his wars to create the illusion that he was the victor of foreign conflicts. Caesar's quadruple triumph in 46 BCE posed a challenge much like that faced by Pompey in his victory over Sertorius; how does one celebrate a triumph over Roman citizens as if it were *not* a triumph over Roman citizens? The triumph of 46 was only partially successful in this regard. For Caesar, the answer was to focus on his foreign opponents (Pharnaces, Achillas and Pothinus) and the foreign allies of the Pompeians (Juba). Just as Pompey did with Sertorius, Caesar leaves Pompey out of it entirely, thus effectively turning against Pompey his own clever tactic of historical erasure.

τὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίων φυλαζάμενος ἄρα, ὥς ἐμφύλια οὐκ εἰκότα τε αὐτῷ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀπαίσια, ἐπιγράψαι θριάμβῳ, παρήνεγκεν ὁμῶς αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε τὰ παθήματα ἅπαντα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ ποικίλαις γραφαῖς, χωρὶς γε Πομπηίου· τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ μόνον ἐφυλάξατο δεῖξαι, σφόδρα ἔτι πρὸς πάντων ἐπιποθούμενον. (Appian, *BC* 2.101)

But he took care not to inscribe the names of any Romans in his triumph, on the grounds that it would be inappropriate in his eyes and shameful and inauspicious in the eyes of the Romans, but he nevertheless showed all their sufferings in his triumph, depicting the men in images and various pictures, except Pompey; for he took care not to show him alone, since he was still longed for by everyone.

Although Caesar exercised restraint by not displaying Pompey's image at his triumph, he does seem to have miscalculated the spleen of the Roman people for encountering images of notable fellow citizens who died in the civil war. In particular, the public reacted badly to Caesar's depictions of Cato, Scipio, and Petreius :

ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις κακοῖς, καίπερ δεδιώς, ἔστενε, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅτε ἴδοι Λεύκιόν τε Σκιπίωνα τὸν αὐτοκράτορα πλησσόμενον ἐς τὰ στέρνα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεθιέμενον ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, ἢ Πετρήιον ἐπὶ διαίτῃ διαχρώμενον ἑαυτόν, ἢ Κάτωνα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ διασπώμενον ὥς θηρίον· Ἀχιλλῶ δ' ἐφήσθησαν καὶ Ποθεινῶ καὶ τὴν Φαρνάκους φυγὴν ἐγέλασαν (BC 2.101)

The people, although frightened, wept over their domestic misfortunes, especially when they saw the general Lucius Scipio struck in the chest by his own hand and casting himself into the sea, or Petreius killing himself at the banquet, or Cato torn apart by his own hands like a beast. But they cheered at Achilles and Pothinus and laughed at the flight of Pharnaces.

Caesar, then, demonstrates the need, which Pompey also recognized, for downplaying or misrepresenting civil war. He avoided arousing resentment by depicting the defeated Pompey, and he boosted the spirits of war-weary Romans by recalling the defeat of their foreign enemies, but his bold portrayal of defeated fellow Romans was not well-received.

As has been discussed in previous chapters, the near-constant civil strife of the triumviral period left Rome's leading men struggling to justify their wars against other citizens as wars against barbarians, *latrones*, or other non-Romans; war against non-Romans was more readily accepted than war against Romans, especially so soon after the conflict between Caesar and Pompey. Octavian had used edicts and invective poetry to reframe the Perusine War as a response to the threat posed by the ambitious, scheming

Fulvia; by framing the war as the justified suppression of an overbold woman (as he would later do with Cleopatra), Octavian tried to avert both the perception that he was engaged in a civil war with Antony and the perception that, by besieging Perusia, he was continuing the violence against the Italians who had just suffered through the land confiscations. Octavian similarly endeavored to present his war with Sextus Pompey as a campaign against plundering *latrones*, a motley crew of freedmen and Greeks, rather than against the son of a Roman consul and his fleet. Suetonius claims that Octavian celebrated ovations after the battles at Philippi and Naulochus, both victories over Romans (*Aug.* 22). According to Dio, however, the first ovation (held in 40 BCE) appeared more like a celebration of the reconciliation of Octavian and Mark Antony (48.31); The inscription of the declaration of the ovation suggests the same<sup>234</sup> :

IMP CAESAR DIVI F C F  
 III VIR R P C OVans an  
 dccxiii QUOD PACEM CUM M  
 ANTONIO FECIT (*CIL* 1, 714)

The ovation of 40 BCE, then, seems to have been cleverly repackaged so that it appeared like a celebration of Roman *concordia* and not like a victory celebration over Roman citizens. Turning back to the *Histories* : by re-writing the Sertorian War as the “Spanish War,” Sallust's Pompey seems desirous of usurping the role of the historian in a similar way; by declaring his victory in Spain to be over a foreign army, he tries to prevent his campaign from being recorded as a civil war. On some level, Pompey was successful; he was, in fact, granted the triumph he so greatly desired. Sallust, however, remains

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<sup>234</sup> Shuckburgh 1984, 51.

unconvinced; as was discussed in Chapter Two, Sallust's Sertorian War is very much a civil war. Although he was thus not entirely successful, Pompey still sets a precedent for both Caesar and Octavian to conceal their own civil wars under the guise of foreign conflicts.

#### 4.4.2 Creating history

In the previous section, we saw first how Sallust's Pompey, like Sallust's Sertorius, seemed to render the historian irrelevant by taking his legacy into his own hands. By “writing” his victory over Sertorius as a victory over a Spanish army, Pompey maintained his immense popularity among the Roman people, who might not have been able to bear another open civil war so soon after the conflict between Marius and Sulla and its aftermath; at the same time, he maintained his eligibility for a triumph, which he was indeed awarded at the end of 71 BCE. Pompey can record his deeds himself and present whatever version of them he likes; there is no need for someone like Sallust. However, the case made by Sallust's Pompey for the irrelevance of historiography actually goes further than this. Whereas Sertorius, using his battle scars as a type of “writing,” seemed to show some concern for the *memoria* of his *res gestae*, Pompey, at least in his letter to the senate, seems to dismiss the need for writing history at all. *Verba*, Pompey argues, are now insignificant compared with *facta*, and Pompey is the one in control of the latter. The letter of Pompey has received more scholarly attention than most fragments of the *Histories* (save the prologue and the speeches and letter of Mithridates); as was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, scholars have primarily focused on how the letter either develops or complicates the portrait of Pompey established in the character-sketch

in Book Two. In this section, I read the letter as part of Sallust's commentary on the state of historiography under the triumvirate.

Pompey opens his letter to the senate by describing the challenges facing his army in Spain. They have exhausted all their resources and Pompey's own contributions (2.98.2-3); Pompey is furthermore hindered by the inexperience and inferior numbers of his troops (2.98.5). After outlining these obstacles, Pompey reminds the senate of his accomplishments in the Sertorian War thus far :

2.98B M Quid deinde proelia aut expeditiones hibernas, oppida excisa aut recepta enumerem? Quando res plus valet quam verba : castra hostium apud Sucronem capta et proelium apud flumen Turiam et dux hostium C. Herennius cum urbe Valentia et exercitu deleti satis clara vobis sunt

Why should I enumerate, then, the battles or winter expeditions, the towns razed or captured? Since actions are stronger than words : the camps of the enemy captured at Sucro and the battle at the river Turia and the leader of the enemies, Herennius, destroyed along with the city Valentia and his army – these are famous enough to you.

Pompey here invokes a familiar Sallustian antithesis : *res* versus *verba*, action versus words.<sup>235</sup> This is one of the first questions posed by Sallust with respect to historiography, as has been discussed in previous chapters; in the prologue of his first monograph, the historian argues that the task of writing history is more difficult than it seems, especially in comparison with the modest praise historians receive for their effort :

ac mihi quidem, tametsi haud quaquam par gloria sequitur scriptorem et auctorem rerum, tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere;

<sup>235</sup> The words/deeds antithesis is a central theme of Sallust's work and cannot be discussed exhaustively here; I thus focus exclusively on the relationship between this antithesis and Sallust's discussion of the role of history-writing. For more on words/deeds more generally in both the monographs and the *Histories* and, in particular, Sallust's Thucydidean model, see Scanlon 1980.

primum quod facta dictis exaequanda sunt, dehinc quia plerique quae delicta reprehenderis malivolentia et invidia dicta putant (*BC* 3.2)

But indeed, although not at all equal glory follows the recorder and the performer of deeds, it nevertheless seems to me that writing history is extremely difficult; first, because the things that were done have to be equal to the narration, and second, because many assume that the faults you criticize are mentioned out of malevolence or jealousy.

Historians face a near-impossible challenge, Sallust suggests; although they are limited to the use of mere words, they are expected to somehow match the magnitude of the subject being narrated. Sallust's Pompey, however, feels no such constraint. Although his plea to the senate is in writing, Pompey is hardly limited to the use of *verba* to make his point; he sits with his army in Spain, prepared to either carry on the war or march back into Italy (2.98.10). Pompey's prioritization of deeds over words is unsurprising, at least according to the Sallustian worldview. According to Sallust, this is exactly why Rome has lacked the quantity and quality of Athens' great historians :

At populo Romano numquam ea copia fuit, quia prudentissimus quisque maxime negotiosus erat: ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat, optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefacta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat (*BC* 8).

But there was never this abundance of talent among the Roman people, because all the most foresighted people were always entirely devoted to business: no one worked the mind without the body, all the great men preferred to act rather than to speak, and preferred that their own good deeds be praised by others rather than that they themselves narrate those of other men.

Rome's great men, Sallust argues, preferred to keep physically as well as mentally active (*ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat*), and preferred to act rather than to speak (*optumus quisque facere quam dicere*). These men still expected praise in exchange for

their achievements, but could not be bothered to praise themselves (let alone praise the deeds of others). The Athenians, however, were remembered as perhaps greater than they were, because the outstanding skill of their historians so glorified their achievements. In that case, deeds were not, in fact, stronger than words, and Sallust suggests that unless someone (like himself) takes responsibility for committing the *res gestae* of the Romans to writing, the Romans run the risk of being remembered as *less* than they were. Sallust's assessment of the disparity between *actual* greatness and *remembered* greatness echoes the archaeology of Thucydides :

Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθείη δὲ τὰ τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἂν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι. . Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανεραῆς ὀψεως τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἔστιν (1.10)

For if the city of the Lacedaemonians became desolate, but the temples and the foundations of buildings were left, I suppose, after a long time passed, among later generations there would be great disbelief that their power was in proportion to their fame. . .but if Athens suffered the same thing, because of its visible appearance the power of the city would seem twice what it is.

If the cities of Sparta and Athens were judged by their physical remains alone, Thucydides argues, the austere appearance of the Lacedaemonian city would not indicate its dominance as a military force, while Athens' monumental structures would suggest power of exaggerated magnitude. Part of the role of the historian, Thucydides suggests (and Sallust follows him in suggesting) is to correct this disparity between appearance and reality. I return to Sallust's use of Thucydides as a historiographical model in more detail below.



Besides displaying the preference for “doing” rather than “saying” which Sallust claims has characterized Rome's great men since the state's foundation, Pompey's rejection of *dicta* in favor of *facta* may also represent one of the symptoms of civil war : the disruption of language.

1.12 M Postquam remoto metu Punico simultates exercere vacuum fuit, plurimae turbae, seditiones et ad postremum bella civilia orta sunt, dum pauci potentes, quorum in gratiam plerique concesserant, sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine dominationes affectabant, bonique et mali cives appellati non ob merita in rem publicam omnibus pariter corruptis, sed uti quisque locupletissimus et iniuria validior, quia praesentia defendebat, pro bono ducebatur

After the Punic threat was removed there was opportunity to engage in feuds, frequent riots, and sedition; at last civil war arose, while a few powerful men, to whose support many people were in debt, sought tyranny under the honest name of the senate or the people, and citizens were called “good” or “bad” not because of their merit, since everyone was equally corrupt, but all of the wealthiest and more resistant to injury were considered “good” because they defended the present circumstances.<sup>236</sup>

Just as he argued in both monographs, in this passage from the preface of the *Histories*, Sallust marks the Roman victory in the Second Punic War as a crucial moment; when the external threat posed by the Carthaginians was removed, the Romans, now unoccupied and arrogant with success, turned against each other and *seditiones* and *bella civilia* arose. Among the effects of these civil disturbances, Sallust argues, was the disruption of language. Terms like *boni* and *mali* were no longer applied according to the same criteria

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<sup>236</sup> This fragment is preserved by multiple sources; 1.12 M is assembled from quotations by Gellius, Augustine, and Arusianus. Gellius (9.12.15) quotes *postquam. . . fuit* along with 1.53 M illustrate the use of *metus* with the objective genitive. Augustine (*Civ.* 3.17) quotes *plurimae turbae. . . ducebatur* in his discussion of the end of the republic to illustrate the various ills which befell the state during the years of civil war. Finally, Arusianus cites *quorum in gratiam plerique concesserant* to demonstrate the use of *concedo* with *in gratiam*.

as before (that is, according to whether someone was morally good or bad); the main qualification for being called *bonus* was being rich and powerful. As many scholars have recognized, this view of the effects of civil war on language seems to be heavily informed by Thucydides' description of the breakdown of language in *stasis*, from his account of the Corcyrean revolt in 427 BCE<sup>237</sup> :

καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ  
δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη,  
μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου  
πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν (3.82.4)

And they exchanged of the traditional value of words in accordance with what seemed justified. For reckless audacity was considered courage on behalf of comrades, prudent forethought was considered specious cowardice, moderation a veil for spinelessness, and capacity to understand everything was considered laziness about everything.

Scholars and translators have long disagreed on the precise meaning of καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων.<sup>238</sup> At the very least, it is clear that Thucydides and Sallust both observe some kind of disruption of language during periods of civil strife; words can no longer be relied upon to perform the same functions as they once did. This obviously

<sup>237</sup> See, for example, Scanlon, 1980.

<sup>238</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in perhaps the first scholarly commentary on Thucydides' *Histories*, interprets “καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει.” as “changing the names as ordinarily applied to acts,” and claims that people simply applied new names to old behaviors (τά τε εἰωθότα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι λέγεσθαι μετατιθέντες ἄλλως ἤξιουν αὐτὰ καλεῖν, *Thuc.* 29). Modern scholars have argued that this represents a misunderstanding of ἀντήλλαξαν; see, for example, Pritchett 1975. Hogan 1980 builds on Dionysius' remarks : “During *stasis* citizens confounded in thought previously distinguishable concepts. This confusion revealed itself in two different ways. When men saw an action that was objectively τόλμα ἀλόγιστος, either they thought (or pretended to think) that it was ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος and called it that (Dionysius' interpretation); or they considered τόλμα ἀλόγιστος to be a good thing and when praising it called it by its right name (145).” Wilson 1982, argues solely for the latter interpretation, dismissing Dionysius' interpretation and those who have hewed to it; Wilson focuses particularly on the interpretation and translation of ἐνομίσθη, which he claims cannot be responsibly translated with “was called,” but rather must mean something closer to “was considered” or “was taken to be”.

poses a challenge to the historian, who relies on language to perform his task. If words are unstable during periods of *stasis*, can anyone write history during a civil war? Thucydides' answer is that the historian must challenge these “new meanings” by showing that the old values still apply. By demonstrating through his narrative that actions which previously would have been labeled, for example, “bad,” “shameful,” or “impious” still should be considered bad, shameful, or impious, regardless of what the *stasiotai* now called them, Thucydides shows that language itself is still viable, because it has not fundamentally changed, it is just being deployed incorrectly; history-writing, therefore, is still a viable and potentially valuable undertaking. Thucydides demonstrates this clearly in his account of the revolt at Corcyra :

ἡμέρας τε ἑπτὰ, ὡς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυσὶ  
 παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι  
 ἐφόνευσαν, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν,  
 ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἐχθρας ἔνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν  
 ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων· πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ  
 οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι  
 περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατήρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν  
 ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ  
 περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον (3.81.4-5)

For seven days, when Eurymedon had arrived and was remaining with his sixty ships, the Corcyreans slaughtered those they thought of as their enemies, putting forth a charge against them that they were destroying the people, but some killed because of private hatreds, and others by debtors because of money owed to them. All forms of death prevailed, and, as is accustomed to happen in this sort of situation, there was no limit it did not surpass by far. For father killed son, and people were dragged away from altars or killed upon them, and some, having been walled up in the temple of Dionysus, died there.

In this passage, which appears immediately before the excursus on the nature of *stasis*, Thucydides describes the actions of the *stasiotai* at Corcyra at the height of the revolt.

The Corcyreans, killed private enemies and those who owed them money under the pretense of suppressing anti-democratic activities, but their behavior surpassed mere violence. Thucydides charges that the *stasiotai* violated traditional boundaries of piety in two grossly egregious ways. First, he claims that fathers killed their own sons, a clear transgression of familial bonds. Parricide was a recurring theme in Greek mythology, the transgressive crime *par excellence* of Athenian tragedy, in particular.<sup>239</sup> Second, Thucydides tells us that suppliants were either dragged from their altars or executed at the altar or in a temple, both manifestly transgressive acts.<sup>240</sup> Both of these acts – filicide and profanation of sacred space – are, in the context of fifth-century Greece, unjustifiable and unarguably reprehensible, but the Corcyreans engage in them anyhow. Although this passage is not part of the *stasis* digression proper, it seems to be significant, even programmatic. The crimes described – the murder of family members and violation of suppliants – are paradigms of moral transgression; it is very difficult to imagine any of Thucydides' readers *not* recognizing these behaviors as uniformly wrong. Furthermore, Thucydides' generalization that these are the types of crimes which “are accustomed to happen in this sort of situation (καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι)” indicates that this statement is thematically important. As Scanlon has discussed, both Thucydides and Sallust frequently emphasize the importance of a theme by juxtaposing a generalization with a specific illustration; these generalizations are often about the typical tendencies of human nature in a particular context (such as, in this case, *stasis*).<sup>241</sup>

Thucydides, then, seems to demonstrate that he, as a historian, is in a position to

<sup>239</sup> For example : Medea and her sons; Atreus and his nephews; Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and Orestes.

<sup>240</sup> Priam's execution at the altar of Zeus, for example, is most famously recounted in Book 2 of the *Aeneid*, but probably known to Thucydides from the cyclic poems.

<sup>241</sup> Scanlon 1980, 64-73; 137-140

combat the perversion of language which takes place during civil strife; although the *stasiotai* apply new, more favorable names to abhorrent behavior in order to justify it, Thucydides shows that it is not *language* which has failed in *stasis*, but rather human morality. Bad acts are still bad acts, whatever the participants in civil war call them; the historian must demonstrate that these new labels are being falsely applied by making clear that violence and transgression are still violence and transgression. In fragment 1.12 M, as was discussed above, Sallust echoes Thucydides' claim that language is disrupted in this way during periods of civil discord, but does he adopt the same model for overcoming this disruption? At this point, it is useful to return to the letter of Pompey and determine what type of “words” Pompey intends to reject. Thucydides' description of “disrupted language” is quite general; τὰ ὀνόματα is vague, and suggests that all fields of language and vocabulary are subject to perversion during *stasis*. As we have seen, however, Sallust's Pompey is a key figure through which Sallust explores challenges to the practice of writing history; therefore, we might first examine whether Pompey's attack on the traditional value of language particularly targets history-writing.

What type of language, then, does Pompey reject? Pompey's written words were ineffective insofar as his complaints went unheeded until he threatened to back them up with actions; his verbal threat to follow through with action, however, was effective, for the senate sent the requested support. In his letter, Pompey writes that, specifically, there is no need to once again recount his exploits for the sake of convincing the senate (*Quid deinde proelia aut expeditiones hibernas, oppida excisa aut recepta enumerem?* “Why should I enumerate, then, the battles or winter expeditions, the towns razed or

captured?”). That is, Sallust's Pompey does not necessarily dismiss the use of *verba* altogether; he particularly rejects the practice of recording *res gestae*. Power, Pompey suggests, rests only with those who have the capacity to back up verbal threats with action; only those who are able to make things happen are relevant, not those who record the things which have already occurred. This is a reversal of Sallust's claims in the prologues of the *BC* and *BJ*, where Sallust asserted that the task of recording *res gestae* is valuable and necessary :

Pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est. . . (*BC* 3.1)

It is a fine thing to act well on behalf of the republic; moreover, it is hardly useless to speak well on its behalf. . .

Ceterum ex aliis negotiis quae ingenio exercentur in primis magno usui est memoria rerum gestarum. Cuius de virtute quia multi dixere, praetereundum puto, simul ne per insolentiam quis existimet memet studium meum laudando extollere. (*BJ* 4.1-2).

But out of those pursuits which are conducted with the mind, the recording of things that have happened is of the greatest use. Concerning the value of this, because many have spoken about it, I think it can be passed over (also, in order that no one think that, out of pride, I am elevating my own interest by praising it.

As I have noted previously<sup>242</sup>, the *Histories* contain no such assertions of the value of writing history. The years which passed between the composition of the *BC* and the *Histories* were turbulent, and saw the triumvirate (particularly Octavian and Mark Antony) tighten their grip on the *res publica*; the triumvirs carefully choreographed the appearance of a legal and stable form of government, and for those who were not

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<sup>242</sup> See Chapter Two, section 2a and conclusions.

convinced (like Sallust), it may have raised alarm that the project of writing history would be useless in the face of a regime which so aggressively told its own story. While it is possible that the prologue of the *Histories* *did* contain a programmatic statement similar to those in the monographs which was lost in the transmission of the text, we certainly may not assume this. If there was no such programmatic statement, as I have previously argued, this could indicate Sallust's abandonment of his conviction that writing history is as valuable as “making” history. Sallust's Pompey, then, seems to suggest that as long as Rome is under the control of men like himself (or Octavian and Antony) who have the means to set the course of history with their actions, it *is*, in fact, *absurdum* to waste time with mere words.

Although none of the characters explicitly *call* it a civil war, as I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, Sallust's depiction of the narrative present of the *Histories* suggests that this period is as disturbed by civil strife as any period of open civil war. The letter of Pompey supports this reading; Pompey's rejection of *verba* demonstrates that the perversion of language, identified by Thucydides as a symptom of *stasis*, is in effect. If the 70s and 60s are, in effect, periods of civil war, what does this mean for the period of the *Histories'* composition? As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, Sallust presents the 70s and 60s as an analogue for his contemporary Rome, demonstrating how the major players of the previous generation set precedents for the destructive, transgressive, and illegal behaviors of the major players of the triumviral period. If the analogy is taken a step further, is Sallust suggesting that his own day is a period of civil war, as well? As has been discussed in this and previous chapters, the

triumvirs were actively trying to prevent the appearance of *discordia*, through political marriages, public displays, and formal alliances.

If we accept Sallust's suggestion that, despite all “official” claims and the self-presentation of the triumvirs, the late 40s and early 30s were just as much a period of civil war as were, for example, 49-45 BCE, what does this mean for Sallust's project of history-writing? We have seen how, through the characters of Sertorius and Spartacus, Sallust played out his anxieties about the continued relevance of historiography under an aggressively propagandistic regime. Sertorius challenged the historian's role by “writing” his own history, while Spartacus relied upon Sallust to elevate him to historical prominence. Pompey, however, certainly does not rely upon Sallust as Spartacus did, and his co-option of his own *memoria* is different from Sertorius'; although Pompey does “write” some of his history himself (by presenting his victory of Sertorius as a foreign victory over a Spanish army), he effectively puts his *memoria* up for sale, rewarding the Greek poet Theophanes for recording his deeds. Pompey's most significant challenge to Sallust and his craft comes, however, in his letter to the senate, where he declares that *res plus valet quam verba*. Narrating his *res gestae* like a historian got Pompey nowhere; he knows the only words to which the consuls and senate will respond are threats of action (that is, *verba* backed up by *res*). By refusing to continue reciting his accomplishments, Pompey effectively rejects the practice of recording history. Given that, in Sallust's perception, Pompey's letter arises from a civil war context, we may interpret Pompey's dismissal of historiography as one of the casualties of the disruption of language in *stasis*.



As was discussed above, Thucydides offers one model for overcoming the perversion of language in times of *stasis*. Thucydides depicts the *stasiotai* at Corcyra engaged in two of the most obviously transgressive forms of violence imaginable : parricide and the execution of suppliants. Although the participants in the revolt have justified these actions by claiming that they are merely protecting the state from those who seek to destroy the people (τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν), the historian makes it clear that, regardless of the applied labels, actions which have always been considered transgressive or reprehensible continue to be so. By thus depriving the Corcyreans of their specious pretense, Thucydides neutralizes the perversion of language and demonstrates the power of the historian to expose the truth behind the justifications and pretexts of the figures in their histories. If Sallust is, indeed, also writing in the context of civil war, could this same model be an effective way of maintaining the value of writing history in the face of such disruption to language?

Sallust does follow his Greek model in many ways – stylistically, often thematically – and so it might not be surprising if he followed Thucydides' model for overcoming the linguistic perversion of *stasis*, as well. In the Sallustian world, however, can any model overcome the corrupt and degraded version of the *res publica* under which the historian is writing? Sallust does not, in fact, appear to adopt Thucydides' model of demonstrating the historian's ability to overcome the disruption of language. At least in the example discussed above, Thucydides made this point by providing bold and unquestionable examples of violent, transgressive behavior, but very little in the *Histories* is so morally unambiguous. The work is, rather, characterized by nuance,

equivocation, and obscurity. Even Sallust's character portrait of Pompey, "the most loathed of Sallust's many loathsome characters,"<sup>243</sup> is shaded with some ambiguity; Pompey is *inverecundus* in spirit but *probus* in appearance, and he is *modestus* toward some things (although not toward *dominatio*). The sum of Sallust's remarks may be a critical portrait of Pompey, but he refuses to hand over to his reader anything so obvious. Similar ambiguity and nuance can be seen in the primary passages under consideration in this section, the letter of Pompey and the reaction of the consuls and the *nobiles*. This is clearly a moment at which Sallust, if he thought Thucydides' model would be successful, could have clearly condemned Pompey, the consuls, and the senate. Pompey was threatening to renew civil war by marching on Rome, a threat which recalls Sulla's violent takeover of the city a decade earlier; this should be easily reproachable behavior. Like Thucydides, given the perversion of language, Sallust does not attempt to merely "tell" his reader in words that Pompey is threatening action that would, under non-*stasis* circumstances, be considered criminal, but which Pompey has managed to justify. Unlike Thucydides, however, Sallust also does not employ his own voice *qua* narrator to demonstrate that Pompey is behaving reprehensibly. He instead allows his Pompey to speak in his own voice, forcing the reader to dig through yet another layer of interpretive distance. In his letter, Pompey details the reasons why it would be just for him to take action against a state which has failed to support him. Although presented in blustering, over-bold fashion, his complaints are not obviously beyond the pale; he requests reinforcements and pay for his troops, demands which do not seem unusual for a commander leading a war in its fifth year. In his account of the response at Rome to

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<sup>243</sup> Katz 1982, 83.

Pompey's letter, Sallust similarly refuses to make an obvious moral evaluation. As was discussed in section 4.3 above, Lucullus, one of the incoming consuls for the year 74 BCE, seems to have been portrayed by Sallust as deeply self-interested, but that characterization is the sum of all of Sallust's depiction of Lucullus throughout the *Histories*, and is not stated explicitly. In this passage, Lucullus and Cotta are described as being concerned for their own interests, fearful that Pompey's return to the city would threaten their own chances for individual power and prestige. Sallust does state, however, that the consuls were *perculsi cum summae rei gratia*, which suggests that they were concerned about Pompey's threats for reasons other than selfish ones; his assessment of their reaction is not straightforward. Whereas Thucydides chose the most obvious, archetypical examples of “bad” or transgressive behavior to demonstrate that the actions which the *stasiotai* defended were, in fact, Sallust, as usual, presents a more ambiguous picture, suggesting that there is no available model to completely overcome the perversion of language in *stasis*.

#### 4.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have examined the role of Pompey Magnus in the *Histories* and demonstrated the character's centrality both Sallust's critique of the 70s as the precursor to the triumviral period and to Sallust's discussion of the state of history writing at the time of the *Histories'* composition. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, I discussed the ways in which Pompey is presented by Sallust as the key figure of the 70s who sets the precedent for the transgressive and often criminal behavior of the major figures of the triumviral period. As I have demonstrated, Pompey's emulation of the Macedonian king Alexander is

particularly problematic for Sallust in two ways. First, Pompey is shown to mirror Alexander's obsession with receiving flattery; Sallust suggests, however, that, inflated by his early military successes, by the period narrated in the *Histories* Pompey had begun to think of himself as worthy of divine honors. Unlike a hereditary king, however, Pompey's power and position were in large part dependent on his popularity with the Roman people; Pompey thus was compelled to pander relentlessly to the *populus* at the same time as he expected the people and his colleagues to flatter him. In this section, I also discussed the problems posed by Pompey's appointment to an exceptional command against the pirates with the passage of the *lex Gabinia*. The risks posed by entrusting command to one single general are similar to those posed by a triumvirate; if anything should happen to the sole commander or one of the triumvirs, a power vacuum is created or the balance of power is shifted dangerously, with the two remaining parties left to directly oppose one another. As I demonstrated in section 4.3, Sallust portrays both Pompey and the general Lucullus as dangerously and obsessively self-interested, often pursuing personal glory to the detriment of the *res publica*; both Pompey and Lucullus zealously pursued their own interests, often when those interests countered the interest of the state. This, of course, set the precedent for the leading figures of the triumviral period, who circumvented and blatantly ignored Roman customs, traditions, and laws in their paths to power and the very establishment of the triumvirate itself. In the final section of this chapter, I discussed the ways in which Sallust uses the character of Pompey, like Sertorius and Spartacus, to address his anxieties about the continued relevance of writing history under the triumvirate. As I demonstrated, Pompey poses a

series of challenges to Sallust's craft and its role in the *res publica*. Like Sertorius, Pompey tries to take control of his own history by portraying his victory over Sertorius as a triumph over a foreign army, and not a continuation of the Sullan civil wars. In his letter to the senate, Sallust's Pompey rejects *verba* in favor of *facta*, suggesting that the use of language has become inefficient in the present context of civil war. Sallust echoes Thucydides' observation that language becomes perverted during times of *stasis* but, as we have seen, Sallust demonstrates that Thucydides' model for overcoming this perversion fails in the context of the 70s and the triumviral period.

## Chapter Five : Conclusions

nam quid ultra? Quaeve humana superant aut divina impolluta sunt?  
Populus Romanus, paulo ante gentium moderator, exutus imperio,  
gloria, iure, agitando inops despectusque, ne servilia quidem alimenta  
relicua habet. (1.55.11 M)

For what is left? What human laws survive, and what divine laws have  
not been defiled? The Roman people, so recently the guide of nations,  
now stripped of power, glory, and rights, bereft of the means to govern  
and despised, do not even hold the rations of slaves.

So laments Sallust's Lepidus in a speech in Book One of the *Histories*; the dramatic date of the speech is 78 BCE, but we can easily imagine the same sentiments being voiced in 35, the year of Sallust's death. The Sallust of the *Histories* is acutely aware that the problems of earlier generations have not been solved and, indeed, that Rome has continued on the path of moral and societal decay. The style of history-writing offered by Sallust in the *Histories* is, as I have demonstrated in this dissertation, calibrated to suit its triumviral context. Using three central characters of the *Histories* (Sertorius, Spartacus, and Pompey) as figures through which to examine the broader historiographical aims of the work, I focus on three aspects of Sallust's "triumviral historiography": analogical historiography, ambivalent exempla, and the use of characters as ciphers for the historian.

Although the narrative of the *Histories* is nominally about the 70s and early 60s BCE, as I have demonstrated, Sallust composes his account of these years in such a way that the narrative evokes events, figures, and themes relevant at the time of composition (the early to mid-30s BCE). For example, civil war appears in unexpected or anachronistic contexts, and Sallust's characters behave conspicuously like the major

figures of the triumviral period. Sallust's method of analogical historiography has three main functions. First, it was obviously in Sallust's best interest to avoid directly confronting the triumvirs. Although the triumviral period was not characterized by large-scale persecution of dissenting writers, the climate was volatile, and the major players could be unpredictable. Concealing a critique of contemporary affairs under the pretense of writing earlier history afforded Sallust plausible deniability. Second, by demonstrating or creating parallels between an earlier generation and contemporary Rome, Sallust reinforces the Thucydidean notion that *stasis* is bound to recur as long as human nature stays the same (ἕως ἄν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ). This, in turn, reflects the overall hopelessness of the triumviral period, a time during which civil war had begun to seem perpetual and inevitable (see Horace, *Epode* 16 : *altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas suis*. . .). Finally, Sallust's analogical historiography shakes his reader out of complacency and forces him to negotiate multiple interpretive layers. Sallust expects his reader to work to interpret the *Histories*, just as he wants his contemporaries to resist the superficial claims of the triumvirs to peace, stability, and a restored republic.

As I have demonstrated, the characters who populate the *Histories* are, above all, morally ambiguous. Exemplarity was one of the primary ways Romans thought about and used their own past, but exemplarity requires its audience to be able to correctly interpret and then enact its moral lesson. As Sallust makes clear in the *Histories* (as well as the monographs), his contemporaries are too morally bankrupt to know (or to care) what to do with *exempla*. The characters of the *Histories*, accordingly, do not offer clear-cut moral lessons; noble characteristics are undercut by troubling ones, and it becomes

unclear whether these figures should be imitated or rejected. A character like Spartacus, for example, is extremely difficult to disentangle. He is physically strong and skilled in warfare, but deploys that strength and skill against the Roman state in a revolt which, in Sallust's telling, evokes the Roman civil wars. As a gladiator, he is at once the example of bravery in battle and of the baseness of servitude. A proper *exemplum* should embody a clear and well-defined moral lesson, but these are not proper *exempla*.

Finally, I argue in this dissertation that the *Histories* may be read as an extended meditation on the nature and changing role of historiography during the triumviral period. With their tightly controlled public images and well-honed techniques of propaganda, the triumvirs and other leading men of this period attempted to “write” their own version of Roman history. In such a climate, the position of the historian was tenuous; the cacophony of “authorities” threatened to subsume the historian's account. In the *Histories*, Sallust plays out his anxieties about the continuing relevance of historiography through his major characters, who serve as ciphers for the figure of the historian. Sertorius and Spartacus function as complementary historian-figures. Sertorius, like the triumvirs, takes an active role in shaping his own *memoria*, exploiting his war wounds and creating a living legacy for himself in spite of the authors who neglect him. Sertorius, then, does not need a historian; Spartacus, on the other hand, relies on Sallust to vindicate him from obscurity. A Thracian gladiator who had scarcely made it into the historical record or literary tradition, Spartacus is nevertheless elevated to a major role in the *Histories*. Sallust thus suggests that the historian still has some ability to magnify or to obscure at his discretion. Sallust's Pompey, however, dismisses the value of recording



*res gestae* altogether; in the context of the 70s (and, by analogy, the 30s), language has become too corrupt to be effective. As with so many aspects of Sallust's work, the final verdict on the value of historiography is left ambiguous. Pompey makes a compelling case that the devaluation and perversion of language in the context of civil war is insurmountable, but Sallust has written the *Histories* anyhow.

I outline here three of this dissertation's major contributions to the study of Roman historiography and Latin literature more generally. First, this examination of the *Histories* has revealed a great deal about the historiographical views and technique of the earliest well-preserved Roman historian. Although there is a great deal of scholarship on every aspect of Sallust's work and worldview as revealed in the monographs, scholars have largely declined to take the *Histories* into consideration because of their fragmentary state. Neglecting Sallust's *magnum opus*, however, leads to a distorted picture of his literary career. This study has explored the ways in which Sallust's historiographical technique evolved as the political and cultural climate of Rome rapidly changed during the triumviral years. Scholars have addressed the development of Sallust's self-presentation as a historian between the composition of the *BC* and the *BJ*, but this is only half of the story; it is logical to assume that Sallust's style and technique as a historian continued to develop between the composition of the *BJ* and what was intended to be his greatest work, as well.

Second, in this demonstration of Sallust's innovative style of historiography, I have shown how Sallust, by creating ambiguous “exempla” and morally ambivalent characters who defy simple interpretation, sets the stage for similarly complex figures in

later Latin literature. Jasper Griffin argued against the idea that the characters of the *Aeneid* stand by simple analogy for historical or mythical figures (Aeneas “is” Augustus, Dido “is” Cleopatra, and so forth).<sup>244</sup> Griffin suggests instead that Vergil's characters are part of an intricate network of allusion and reference, and that each individual character embodies multiple and sometimes contradictory resonances. In this dissertation, I have made clear that this innovation does not belong to Vergil alone, nor did it necessarily originate in the field of poetry, as many have assumed. Although writing a historical work populated by nominally historical figures, Sallust's Sertorius, Spartacus, and Pompey (for example) are very much Sallustian creations. Like the characters of the *Aeneid*, the *Histories'* main characters are the product various literary and historical influences, adding up to something more complex than the mere sum of these influences. Vergil was constantly engaged with his literary predecessors and certainly knew his historians; it is possible, then, that the complex characters of the *Aeneid* reflect Sallust's influence on the poet. More broadly speaking, I have demonstrated that Sallust, though “only” a historian, skillfully employed many of the same literary techniques and devices as his poetic counterparts did, particularly intertextuality and allusion. In this respect, this dissertation is a contribution to the growing body of work on historiographical use of these techniques.

Finally, although the purpose of this dissertation is not to propose a revolutionary overhaul of the traditional framework of literary periodization, I do suggest that my discussion of the *Histories* should encourage us to take more seriously the idea of a triumviral period of literature. The *Histories* exemplify the major themes and concerns

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<sup>244</sup> Griffin 1982.

shared by the works of the triumviral period (as was discussed in the introduction to this dissertation) : the horror of civil war and the pessimism of a community which is experiencing it for the third time in a half-century; suspicion of parvenues and upstarts, and the general confusion of social boundaries; and the vague consciousness of existing at some sort of societal turning point, even if the nature of the looming change was unclear. We might even, perhaps, regard the *Histories* as an anchoring text for this period, much in the same way as we tend to think of the *Aeneid* for the Augustan era.

This dissertation also represents a starting point for numerous avenues of potential future inquiry. As I have already suggested, this work is a contribution to the growing body of scholarship on intertextuality and allusion in historiography. Scholars have finally begun to take seriously the notion that classical historians were engaged in the same literary practices of their poetic colleagues. It is my suspicion that reading the *BC* and the *BJ* from this perspective might be as fruitful as approaching the *Histories* this way has been. Because my focus has been on demonstrating the ways in which Sallust reacts to Ciceronian notions of historiography and the new historiographical product he offers instead, this dissertation has necessarily looked backward, not forward. Sallust served as a model for later Roman historians (most particularly Tacitus and Ammianus Marcellinus, although his influence may be detected in the later books of Livy and elsewhere, as well); it may be useful to ask how the historiographical techniques employed by Sallust in the *Histories* (e.g., analogy, ambivalent *exempla*, metaliterary “historians”) were adopted or adapted by later authors. Finally, my discussion of the *Histories* may serve as a starting point for a project exploring the collective trauma of the

Roman civil wars and the ways in which Romans tried to make sense of their own history of civil strife while still embroiled in domestic discord. The notion of “collective trauma” has long been central to scholarship on the First World War, and interest has been renewed in recent years by reactions to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. A future project might examine accounts of Roman *stasis* in light of Freud's theory of trauma repetition. According to this reading, analogical historiography can be seen as the re-enactment of the collective trauma of civil war; by confronting the memory of past trauma, the historian attempts to render its memory benign by repetition.

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