Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation Behavior: Findings From the Ultimatum Game

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Behavioral Ethics Lab
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
Behavioral Economics
Economics
Personality and Social Contexts
Social Psychology
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Contributor
Abstract

We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment, compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Series name and number
Publication date
2013-12-01
Journal title
Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
At the time of publication, author Alex Chavez was affiliated with the University of Michigan. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Behavioral Ethics Lab at the University of Pennsylvania.
Recommended citation
Collection