Departmental Papers (ASC)

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

6-1-2007

Publication Source

Rhetoric & Public Affairs

Volume

10

Issue

2

Start Page

249

Last Page

273

DOI

10.1353/rap.2007.0038

Abstract

This essay argues that, if carefully read, the public statements of the Bush administration in the run-up to the March 2003 U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq reveal that the available evidence did not warrant the administration’s confident claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction(WMD). To support this argument, the essay explores the administration’s verbal leakage and Freudian slips, shifts in the burden of proof, strategies that minimized evidentiary accountability, assertions of the presence of convincing evidence that could not be publicly revealed, and tacit concessions that the case for WMD was a patchwork.

Copyright/Permission Statement

Copyright © 2007 by Michigan State University. This Article originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 10, Iss. 2, 2007, pages 249-273.

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Date Posted: 26 June 2014